REFORMED DOGMATICS

VOLUME THREE:

SIN AND SALVATION IN CHRIST

HERMAN BAVINCK

Reformed Dogmatics

Vol. 3. Sin and Salvation in Christ

Herman Bavinck

Monergism Books

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Contents

MONERGISM EDITOR'S NOTE.

CHAPTER VI. On the World in its Fallen State.

1. § 35. Providence.
2. § 36. The Origin of Sin.
3. § 37. The Essence of Sin.
4. § 38. The Spread of Sin.
5. § 39. The Punishment of Sin.

CHAPTER VII. On Christ.

6. § 40. The Covenant of Grace.
7. § 41. The Person of the Mediator.
8. § 42. The Work of the Mediator.

CHAPTER VIII. On the Benefits of the Covenant.

9. § 43. The Order of Salvation.

10. § 44. Calling and Regeneration.

11. § 45. Faith and Justification.

12. § 46. Sanctification and Perseverance.

13. PROJECT GUTENBERG EDITOR’S REMARKS.

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Chapter VI. On the World in its Fallen State.

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§ 35. PROVIDENCE.

1. When God on the seventh day had finished his work which He had made, He rested on the seventh day from all his work which He had made, Gen. 2:2, Ex. 20:11, 31:17. Thus Scripture indicates the transition from the work of creation to that of preservation. That this resting of God does not have its cause in weariness, nor does it consist in an idle looking on, is each time clearly and distinctly expressed by Holy Scripture, Jes. 40:28, Joh. 5:17. Creating is for God no work and preserving no rest. The resting of God only makes known that He made an end to the bringing forth of nova genera, Pred. 1:9, 10; that the work of creation in the proper and narrower sense, as productio rerum e nihilo, had been completed; and that He in this finished work delighted himself with divine good pleasure, Gen. 1:31, Ex. 31:17, Ps. 104:31, cf. August., de civ. XI 8. XII 17. de Gen. ad lit. IV 8 sq. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 73. Calvin on Gen. 2:2. Zanchius, Op. III 537 etc. Creating now passes over into preserving. Both are in Scripture so essentially distinguished, that they can be placed over against each other as labor and rest. And yet they are also so

intimately related and connected, that preserving itself can be called a creating, Ps. 104:30, 148:5, Jes. 45:7, Am. 4:13. Preservation is, after all, itself also a divine work, no less great and glorious than creation. God is no Deus otiosus, He always works, Joh. 5:17, [2] and the world has no stability in itself. From the moment of its origin onward it exists only in and through and unto God, Neh. 9:6, Ps. 104:30, Hd. 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:15, Hebr. 1:3, Op. 4:11. Although distinct from his essence, it is in its existence never independent; independence would be non-being. The whole world with all that is in it and happens in it, stands under God's government; summer and winter, day and night, fruitful and unfruitful years, light and darkness, everything is his work and is formed by Him, Gen. 8:22, 9:14, Lev. 26:3v., Deut. 11:12v., Job 38, Ps. 8, 29, 65, 104, 107, 147, Jer. 3:3, 5:24, Mt. 5:45 etc. Scripture knows no independent creature; it would be a contradiction in itself. God cares for all creatures, for animals, Gen. 1:30, 6:19, 7:2, 9:10, Job 38:41, Ps. 36:7, 104:27, 147:9, Joël 1:20, Mt. 6:26 etc., and in particular also for human beings. He sees them all, Job 34:21, Ps. 33:13, 14, Spr. 15:3, forms the heart of them all and pays heed to all their works, Ps. 33:15, Spr. 5:21; they are all the work of his hands, Job 34:19, the poor and the rich, Spr. 22:2. He determines the dwelling of all, Deut. 32:8, Hd. 17:26, inclines the heart of all, Spr. 21:1, governs the steps of all, Spr. 5:21, 16:9, 19:21, Jer. 10:23 etc. does with the host of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan. 4:35. They are in his hands as clay in the hand of the potter, as a saw in the hand of him who draws it, Jes. 29:16, 45:9, Jer. 18:5, Rom. 9:20, 21. Very particularly his providential government extends yet over his people. The whole history of the patriarchs, of Israel, of the church, and of every believer is proof thereof. What human beings have intended for them for evil, God intends

for them for good, Gen. 50:20; every instrument prepared against them shall not succeed, Jes. 54:17; even the hairs of their head are all numbered, Mt. 10:30; all things work together for their good, Rom. 8:28. Thus all that is created stands in the power and under the government of God; both, chance and fate, are unknown to Scripture, Ex. 21:13, Spr. 16:33. It is God who works all things according to the counsel of his will, Ef. 1:11, and makes all things serviceable to the revelation of his virtues, to the honor of his name, Spr. 16:4, Rom. 11:36. All this Scripture comprehends in a beautiful manner in this, that it time and again speaks of God as of a King, who rules all things, Ps. 10:16, [3] 24:7, 8, 29:10, 44:5, 47:7, 74:12, 115:3, Jes. 33:22 etc. God is a King, the King of kings and the Lord of lords; a King who in Christ is a father for his subjects, and a Father who at the same time is king over his children. All that is found among creatures, in the animal and human and angelic world, in family and society and state, of care for, of love toward, of protection of the one by the other, is a weak shadowing-forth of God's providential ordering over all the works of his hands. His absolute power and his perfect love are the proper object of the faith in providence in Holy Scripture.

To this testimony of Scripture is added that of all peoples. The doctrine of the providence of God is an articulus mixtus, in part known to all men from God's revelation in nature. It is an article of faith in every religion, even in the most degenerate; whoever denies it undermines religion; without it there is no longer any place for prayer and sacrifice, for faith and hope, for trust and love. Why serve God, asks Cicero, Nat. D. I 2, if He does not concern Himself with us at all? Therefore all religions agree with the word of Sophocles, Elect. 173: ἐστι μεγας ἐν οὐρανῳ Ζευς, ὸς ἐφορα παντα και κρατυνει. And philosophy too has many times acknowledged and defended

this providence of God, e.g. Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. I 4 IV 3. Plato in Timaeus, Leges X 901, Rep. X 613 A. Aristotle in Eth. Nic. X 9. the Stoa in Cicero, Nat. D. II. Seneca, de providentia and de beneficiis, Cicero, Nat. D. I 2 III 26, Plutachus, de fato, Plotinus, περι εἱμαρμενης and περι προνοιας, cf. also Philo's writing περι προνοιας, Wendland, Philo's Schrift über die Vorsehung, Berlin 1892. Yet for that reason the doctrine of providence in pagan religion and philosophy was not the same as it is in Christianity. Among the Heathen the belief in providence was more theory than practice, more philosophical contemplation than religious dogma; it did not reach into distress and into death; it always swayed back and forth between chance and fate. Because God, for example, in Plato was not a creator but only a former of the world, his power found its limit in finite matter, Zeiler, Philos. d. Gr. II4 928. Although Aristotle expresses his belief in God's providence more than once, this nevertheless [4] for him entirely coincides with the operation of natural causes; the deity as νοησις νοησεως stands in solitary self-contemplation outside the world, without will, without action, and the creature has from it no help or love to expect, ib. III 368 f. 790 f. With the Stoa the προνοια was identical with the εἱμαρμενη and the φυσις, ib. IV 143; and according to Epicurus providence was in conflict with the blessedness of the Gods, ib. 428. And indeed some, such as Plutarchus and Plotinus, exerted themselves to escape both chance and fate; but in fact fate always rose again behind and above the deity, and chance from below again pressed into the lower creatures and the smaller events; magna Dii curant, parva negligunt, Cicero, Nat. D. II 167. Cf. Pfanner, Syst. theol. gent. c. 8. Creutzer, Philosophorum veterum loci de provid. divina ac de fato 1806. Schneider, Christl. Klänge aus den gr. u. röm. Klassikern, 1865 S. 231 f.

2. Of that nature, however, the Christian faith in God's providence is not. On the contrary, it is a source of comfort and hope, of confidence and courage, of humility and resignation, Ps. 23, 33:10v., 44:5v., 127:1, 2, 146:2v. etc. The faith in providence in Scripture rests absolutely not only on God's revelation in nature but much more on his covenant and promises; it has as its foundation not only God's righteousness but above all also his compassion and grace; it presupposes the knowledge of sin, much deeper than among the Heathen, but also the experience of God's forgiving love; it is no cosmological speculation but a glorious confession of faith. And therefore it looks, through all pain and suffering, again joyfully into the future; even if the riddles are not solved, faith in God's fatherly hand always lifts itself up again out of the depth and even causes one to glory in tribulations. In connection with this it is noteworthy that Scripture does not know the abstract word providence. People have indeed wished to give this word a Scriptural character by appeal to Gen. 22:8, 1 Sam. 16:1, Ezech. 20:6, Hebr. 11:40; a few times the word also occurs of human foresight, Hd. 13:14, Rom. 12:17, 13:14, 1 Tim. 5:8. But all that does not take away that Scripture, when treating of God's providence, uses wholly other [5] words. It does not sum up the activity of God, expressed by this word, in an abstract concept and does not hold a theological treatise about it. But it depicts it itself in the richest and most vivid manner and lets us see it in history; Scripture as a whole is the book of the providence of God. And thus, depicting that providence, it speaks of creating, Ps. 104:30, 148:5, making alive, Job 33:4, Neh. 9:6, renewing, Ps. 104:30, seeing, beholding, observing, Job 28:24, Ps. 33:13, 15, preserving, guarding, keeping, Num. 6:24, Ps. 36:7, 121:7, leading, teaching, ruling, Ps. 25:5, 9, 93:1 etc., working, Joh. 5:17, bearing, Hebr. 1:3, caring, 1 Petr. 5:7. The word

providence is borrowed from philosophy. According to Laertius Plato was the first who used the word προνοια in this sense, cf. Zeller, Philos. der Gr. II4 929. The apocryphal books already use it, Sap. 14:3, 17:2, 3 Mk. 4:21, 5:30, 4 Mk. 9:24, 13:18, 17:22, alongside διατηρειν, Sap. 11:25, διακυβερναν, 3 Mk. 6:2, διοικειν, Sap. 8:1 etc. And the church fathers adopted it and gave it citizenship in Christian theology, cf. Suicerus. s. v. In doing so, however, the word underwent a not unimportant change. Originally providence after all means the foreseeing, providentia, or the foreknowing, προνοια, of what will happen in the future. Providentia est, per quam futurum aliquid videtur, Cic. Inv. II 53. Understood thus, the word was absolutely not suitable to encompass everything which the Christian faith confesses in the doctrine of God's providence. As foreknowledge of the future, the providence of God would then belong only to the scientia Dei and be fully dealt with in the locus on the virtues of God. The Christian faith, however, understands by the providence of God not a nuda praescientia, but confesses that all things are by God not only foreknown but also predetermined and ordained. Therefore providence was soon reckoned not merely to the understanding but also to the will of God, and by Damascenus defined as βουλησις θεου, δι' ἠν παντα τα ὀντα την προσφορον διεξαγωγην λαμβανει, de fide orthod. II 29. Taken in this sense, the providence of God would belong at home in the doctrine of the decrees of God and be dealt with there entirely. But again the Christian faith confesses more than is indicated by [6] the word in this sense. The decrees of God are, after all, carried out; and the creatures, which as a consequence thereof receive their existence, do not exist for a moment of themselves, but they are from moment to moment borne only by God's almighty hand. The arising and the existence of all creatures have their origin, not in a

foreknowledge nor also in a decree but specifically in an almighty act of God. And providence is thus, according to the doctrine of Scripture and the confession of the church, that act of God by which He maintains and governs all things from moment to moment, not only Fürsehung but also Vorsehung. These different meanings in which the word providence was understood were, however, the cause that the place and the content of this doctrine in Christian dogmatics continually changed and were subjected to all kinds of alterations. Now it is reckoned to the virtues, then to the decrees (opera Dei ad intra), then to the opera ad extra, cf. deel II 374v. Damascenus defines it as ἡ ἐκ θεου είς τα όντα γενομενη ἐπιμελεια, de fide orth. II 29, and treats it indeed after creation but yet in close connection with the praescientia and praedestinatio, II 30. Lombardus discusses it in the chapter on the praedestinatio, but before creation, Sent. I dist. 35. A very clear exposition is given by Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 1; he defines it first in general as ratio ordinis rerum in finem and regards it as principalis pars prudentiae, whose task it is precisely, ordinare alia in finem; but then he says further that ad providentiae curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae dicitur providentia et dispositio, et executio ordinis, quae dicitur gubernatio, cf. also Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 35 and Hugo Vict. S. Sent. tr. 1 c. 12. Following these and other examples, the doctrine of providence in Roman theology was treated either with the praedestinatio with the will of God, Petavius, de Deo VIII c. 1-5. Becanus, Theol. schol. I c. 13. Theol. Wirceb. Paris 1880 III 175. Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 1838 p. 233. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 158; or only as conservatio or gubernatio separately after creation, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 103-105, c. Gent. III 65 and commentatores on Sent. II dist. 37. Theol. Wirceb. III 497; or entirely in the broadest sense after the locus de creatione, Schwetz, Theol. dogm. I

405. Jansen, Prael. theol. II [7] 329. Simar, Dogm.3 252. Scheeben, Dogm. II 12. And likewise in the theology of the Reformation providence was now taken as a consilium, according to which God governs all things, Conf. Helv. post. art. 6. Ursinus, Explic. qu. 27. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV § 19. Alsted, Theol. schol. 174, then again as a work of God outwardly, Calvin, Inst. I 16, 3. 4. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 1. Junius, Theses Theol. XVII 1. 2. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 3. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. VII 3 etc. The difference naturally concerns more the name than the matter, as Alsted, Theol. schol. 175 and Baier, Comp. theol. I 5, 2, rightly remark. If God really maintains and governs the world, then He must know it beforehand (providentia), also will and be able to care for it (prudentia) and in time also in fact maintain and govern everything in such a way that the end proposed by Him is attained. Thus taken in a broad sense, providence comprises 1o an actus internus, which then further was indeed again distinguished into προνωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις, cf. Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 2, and 2o an actus externus, which was defined as executio ordinis, as conservatio, concursus, gubernatio. The actus internus of this providentia, however, has earlier already been fully treated in the doctrine of the virtues and of the decrees of God; here, after the doctrine of creation, providence can therefore come into consideration only as actus externus, as an act of God outwardly. Although now providence in this sense can never be detached from the actus internus, the προγωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις, nor even be thought without it, it is nevertheless distinguished from it, as the executio ordinis from the ordo itself. The word providence has thereby undergone an entire alteration. And the question can arise whether the word is still suitable for indicating the matter. When formerly providence was still treated in the doctrine of the virtues or of the decrees of God, it retained its

original meaning; but since it is more and more conceived as conservatio and gubernatio and comes up after creation, that original meaning has almost entirely been lost. Providence in this latter, narrower sense is no proper providentia any more, no ratio ordinis rerum in finem, for this precedes it and is presupposed by it; it itself is executio ordinis. This latter was therefore in dogmatics further defined by [8] conservatio or by gubernatio or by both together, Lactantius, de ira Dei c. 10. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 103. 104. Bonaventura, Brevil. ed. Frib. 1881 p. 93. Ned. Geloofsbel. art. 13. Heid. Cat. X. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 3 etc. Between these two there was later still, in order to ward off pantheism and deism, inserted the concursus or cooperatio, which in substance indeed was always treated with the doctrine of providence, e.g. with Aug. de trin. III 4. de civ. V 8-11. Theodoretus, de provid. or. X. Boëthius, de cons. IV and V. Damasc., de fide II 29. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 48. 49. 104 art. 2, qu. 105 art. 5 I 2 qu. 19 art. 4 Cat. Rom. I c. 2 qu. 20. Zwingli, de provid. c. 3. Op. IV 86. Calvin, Inst. I 16. 2. Contre la secte des libertins, C. R. 35 p. 186, de aet. Dei praed., C. R. 36 p. 347-366. Zanchius, Op. II 449. Martyr, Loci C. p. 56. 59. Wollebius, Theol. c. 30. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 13. Gerhard Loc. VI c. 9 etc., but which later also formally obtained a place of its own between conservatio and gubernatio, Mastricht, Theol. III 10, 10. 29. Turret., Theol. El. VI qu. 4. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI 270. IX 210. Brakel, Red. Godsd. XI 6. Marck, Godg. X 9. Quenstedt, Theol. I 531. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 421. Buddeus, Inst. 409. From this it appears that the word providence was not considered sufficient for indicating the executio ordinis and was further specified by maintenance and government. These too are undoubtedly conceived more correctly, more vivid in representation and more in accordance with the usage of Holy

Scripture. Especially when the word providence is taken abstractly and put in the place of God himself, as Plutarch already began with this, cf. Cremer s. v. προνοια, and the rationalism of the previous century followed this, it is open to objection. Yet the word, which obtained citizenship in the language of theology and of religion, may be retained, provided that the matter which is indicated by it is understood in the Scriptural sense.

3. The Christian doctrine of providence as an almighty act of God, whereby He preserves and governs all things, is to be distinguished not only from pagan fate and chance but for that reason also from the pantheism and deism which repeatedly revive in the Christian centuries. For, there are but [9] three alternatives for the sum of existence, chance, fate or Deity. With chance there would be variety without uniformity, with fate uniformity without variety, but variety in uniformity is the demonstration of primal design and the seal of the creative mind. In the world as it exists, there is infinite variety and amazing uniformity, James Douglas in U. B. Smith, System of Christian Theol. New-York, Armstrong 1890 p. 107. Pantheism knows no distinction between the being of God and the being of the world and, idealistically, lets the world be absorbed into God, or, materialistically, God into the world. On this standpoint there is no place for creation and therefore, in the proper sense, also not for preservation and government. Providence coincides with the course of nature; the laws of nature are identical with the decrees of God; and the government of God is nothing but fixus et immutabilis naturae ordo sive rerum naturalium concatenatio, Spinoza, Tract. theol. pol. c. 3, cf. Strauss Gl. II 384. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 46 and further part II 388-396. Of itself, with that, the miracle, the self-activity of the causae secundae, personality, freedom, prayer, sin, the whole of religion, falls away. Pantheism, however beautiful and seductive a form

it may present itself in, in fact leads into the arms of a pagan fate. There is then no other being than the being of nature; there is no higher power than that which works in the world according to fixed law; there is no other, better life than for which the data are present in this visible creation; for a time man may flatter himself with the idealistic hope that the world, through immanent development, will perfect itself; soon this optimism turns into pessimism, this idealism into materialism. Over against this pantheism, Christian theology had to maintain the distinction of creation and preservation, the self-activity of the causae secundae, the freedom of personality, the character of sin, the truth of religion. And it did this by rejecting the fatum and by clearly setting the confession of God's providence in distinction from it in the light. The characteristic feature of the doctrine of the fatum does not consist in this, that all that is and happens in time is grounded and determined in God's eternal counsel, but it lies herein, that all being and happening is determined by a power coinciding with the world, which without consciousness and without will [10] determines everything with blind necessity. According to Cicero, the fatum of the Stoa was an ordo seriesque causarum, cum causa ex se causam gignit, de divin. 1, cf. Seneca, de benef. IV 7. Nat. Qu. II 36. Commonly it was then further distinguished into a fatum mathematicum or astrale, when the events on earth were thought to be determined by the stars, and into a fatum physicum, when they were thought to be determined by the nexus of nature. In the latter form the doctrine of the fatum now appears with pantheism and materialism; but it is remarkable that also the fatum astrale in the most recent time is renewed and finds warm defenders, cf. Wetensch. Bladen 1896 IV 453. Christian theology now by no means contested that everything was eternally known and determined by God; insofar it even acknowledged

a fatum and some also thought to be able to use the word in a good sense. If we consider, says Augustine, that fatum comes from fari, and if we then thereby designate the eternal, unchangeable word, whereby God bears all things, then the name is to be approved, de civ. V 9. Boëthius spoke of the fatum as inhaereus rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus, de cons. philos. IV pros. 6. And even Maresius thought to be able to connect a Christian sense with the word, Syst. Theol. p. 149. But commonly one was more cautious; belief in fate nevertheless proceeded from the thought that everything happens as a consequence of a blind, irresistible power without consciousness and will, and fatalia were called those events which praeter Dei et hominum voluntatem cujusdam ordinis necessitate contingunt, Aug. de civ. V 3. In this sense the fatum was most firmly contested by all Christian theologians, by Augustine and his people no less than by those who defended free will. Omnia vero fato fieri non dicimus, imo nulla fieri fato dicimus, Aug. de civ. V 9. The only ordinis necessitas on the Christian standpoint is the wise, almighty, loving will of God. Thereby it was not denied, as will later appear, that in the world of creatures there is a connection of causes and effects and that there are fixed ordinances, but the order of nature does not stand behind and above and likewise not outside and over against God's will, but it is grounded in that will of an almighty and loving God and Father, determined by that will, serviceable to that will; and it also does not stand as a [11] blind, coercive power outside and over against our will, for ipsae nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur, Aug. ib. and further comment. on Sent. I dist. 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 116. c. Gent. III 93. Petavius, de Deo VIII 4. Gerhard, Loc. VI 13. Calvin, Inst. I 16, 8. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 313 sq. Alting, Theol. elenct. nova p. 290.

Heidegger, Corp. Theol. VII 2. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI 2. M. Vitringa II 170. 177-181. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 472 etc.

On the other hand stands deism, which separates God and world; which, after the creatures have once been created, lets them exist and work wholly or partially, and then again for a greater or smaller part, by their own power received along with creation; and thus essentially renews the pagan doctrine of chance. In the sense of the magna Dei curant, parva negligunt, Hieronymus once expressed that God's providential care did not extend over all small insects, cf. deel II 160. Pelagianism, like Cicero, Nat. D. III 36, ascribed virtue to man's own will and power, and semi-Pelagianism divided the work and ascribed something to both God and man. When later this system penetrated into Roman theology, there arose, concerning God's cooperation in providence, no small difference; the Thomists conceived it as a praedeterminatio physica, an applicatio ad operandum, Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 9 art. 6 ad 3. qu. 79. 109. c. Gent. III 67-70. 162; the Molinists, on the other hand, understood by it a concursus simultaneus, mere cooperans, quo Deus cum alio concurrente in eundem actum et effectum influit, cf. Daalman, Summa S. Thomae II 286-314. Theol. Wirceb. I c. 2. Dens, Theol. I 66 sq. Liberatore, Instit. philos. III c. 4 a. 1, 2. Scheeben, Dogm. II 22 f. Jansen, Prael. II 334. Socinianism set the infinite and the finite over against each other so abstractly and dualistically, that God could create the world not even out of nothing but only out of an eternal and finite matter; and accordingly it also withdrew a great part of the world from the providence of God and left it to the human being's own insight and judgment. The will is by nature also so free, that God cannot even calculate with certainty beforehand what a human being will do in a given case; only when the decision has fallen does God thereafter direct his

acting accordingly; the free causes therefore stand wholly independently alongside and outside God. The relation of God to the world is like that of a craftsman to the machine; after he has made it and set it in motion, he leaves it to itself and intervenes only when something needs to be repaired, Volkelius, de vera relig. II c. 7. Crell, de Deo et ejus attrib. c. 2-6. cf. Fock, Der Socin. 496 f. The Remonstrants likewise were of the opinion that in creation powers had been bestowed on the creatures, on which they could now subsist. Preservation was therefore a negative act of God, whereby He essentias, vires ac facultates rerum creatarum non vult destruere sed eas vigori suo relinquere, quoad vigere ac durare possunt ex vi per creationem ipsis indita, or at least this view was not called incorrect. In connection with that, the concursus as a naturalis quaedam influentia in res omnes ex naturae divinae perfectione emanens was rejected; the predestination of the number of human beings, of the marriages, of the end of life, of the elect and the lost was contested; free will defended and all providentia efficax circa peccatum replaced by a negative permissio or non-impeditio, Conf. Rem. c. 6, Apol. Conf. ib. Episc. Inst. Theol. IV sect. 4. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 25 sq. Arminianism was indeed condemned at Dordrecht and placed outside the Reformed pale, but as a spiritual tendency it found entrance everywhere and penetrated into all Christian countries and churches. The period which began with the middle of the 17th century was characterized by a powerful striving to emancipate nature, world, human being, science, etc. from God and to make them independent over against God, Christianity, church, theology; latitudinarianism, deism, rationalism, pietism, Aufklärung, etc. agree in this. This world is the best possible, the human being is sufficient to himself with his understanding and will; natural law, natural force, natural right, natural religion, natural morality

together constitute a fund of powers given by God to the world at creation and now completely sufficient for existence and development; revelation, prophecy, miracle, grace are wholly superfluous. Deism did not deny the existence of God, nor creation and providence either; on the contrary, it gladly spoke of the Supreme Being and held broad discourses about providence. But the power from this faith was gone. Deism [13] denied in principle that God worked in creation otherwise than according to and through the natural laws and forces; it was anti-supernaturalistic from the outset. The conservatio was enough; a cooperatio or an influxus Dei with every action of the creature was unnecessary, Reinhard, Dogm. § 61. Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 106. In its 18th-century form this deism now indeed belongs to the past. But in fact it still prevails even now in broad circles, both in theory and practice. Since especially in this century the knowledge of nature has been expanded and the firmness of its ordinances has been recognized, many are inclined to withdraw the pitiless, unchangeable nature from God's government, to let it rest independently in itself, and to restrict God's providence to the religious-ethical domain. But naturally then here too providence cannot be conceived absolutely; it finds its boundary in human freedom, cf. Kreibig, Die Räthsel der göttl. Vorsehung, Berlin 1886. Schmidt, Die göttl. Vorsehung und das Selbstleben der Welt 1887. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den christl. Vorsehungsglauben, Halle 1888. No wonder that with such a view the old doctrine of the concursus is no longer understood and is set aside as superfluous or incorrect, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 54. Müller, Sünde I5 318. Vilmar, Dogm. I 255. Lipsius, Dogm. § 397 f. Oosterzee, § 59, 5. 7, cf. also Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II3 266. Indeed, the inference then lies close at hand, with the ethical moderns in this country, to place the power of nature and

the moral power, as it were, as two Gods in Manichaean fashion alongside and over against each other, at the risk that the domain of the latter, like that of the Red Indians in America, will be more and more curtailed and finally wholly taken possession of by blind, irrational power, cf. deel I 451. For that is certainly the principal objection against deism: by separating God and world, the infinite and the finite, and placing them dualistically alongside each other, it makes both into two competing powers, which are involved in continual struggle and dispute dominion with each other. What is given to God is taken away from the world. The more God's providence extends, the more the creature loses its independence and freedom, and conversely the creature can maintain its self-activity only if it pushes God back and takes dominion away from Him. Peace therefore exists between the two only with complete separation. Deism is in its ground irreligious. Not in communion with but in separation from God lies the blessedness of the human being; the deist feels at ease only when he is detached from God, i.e. is practically an atheist; and because he realizes that he can never be that, he is a fearful creature, always anxious that a piece of his territory will be taken away from him. Hence there are in deism all sorts of degrees; the boundaries between God's activity and that of the world are drawn differently each time. There are whole, half, three-quarter Pelagians, etc., according as world and human being are withdrawn wholly or for a greater or smaller part from God's government. In principle deism is always the same, it sets God to non-activity, but one walks that path further than another. A deist is a human being who in his short existence has not found the time to become an atheist, Quack, Port Royal 180. That domain now, which by deism is withdrawn from God's government, then comes to stand under the power either of fate or of chance. Also in this respect deism

repeatedly comes into conflict with itself. Especially nowadays, now all are so deeply convinced of the firmness of the natural order, there is in it no place for chance and deism falls back into the hands of the old fate; chance remains chiefly preserved only for the religious-ethical domain. But the doctrine of chance is no better than that of fate. Fatum could at need still have a good meaning in the Christian view of life and the world; but casus and fortuna are through and through unchristian. Something is accidental only in human beings' eyes, because at that moment they do not know the cause. But objectively accidental there is nothing and there can be nothing. Everything must have a cause and has it in the last instance in the almighty and all-wise will of God, cf. Augustinus, qu. 83 qu 24. c. Acad. I 1. de ord. I 2. de civ. V 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 2. qu. 103 art. 5. c. Gent. III 72. Gerhard, Loc. VI 3. Calvijn, Inst. I 16, 2. 9. Chamier, Panstr. Cathol. II 2, 4 sq. Turret., Theol. El. III qu. 12. Mastricht, Theol. III 10, 30. J. Müller, Sünde II 34 f. Weisse, Philos. D. I 518. Kirchner, Ueber den Zufall, Halle, Pfeffer 1888. G. Rümelin, Ueber den Zufall, Deutsche Rundschau März 1890 S. 353-364, and furthermore on deism: [15] Lechler, Gesch. des engl. Deismus 1841 and art. in Herzog2. Pünjer, Gesch. d. chr. Relig. Philos. I 209 f. Hanne, Die Idee der absol. Persönl. II2 76 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II2 534 f. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer v. God 80v.

4. The providence of God, thus distinguished from the knowledge and the decree of God and maintained over against pantheism and deism, is, according to the fine definition of the Heid. Catech., that almighty and omnipresent power of God, by which He still upholds and governs heaven and earth, together with all creatures, as it were with His hand. Even so, the doctrine of providence is still of very wide scope. It properly comprises the entire execution of all decrees which have reference to that which was once

called into existence by creation. If the act of creation is excepted, it is as rich as the scientia libera, as the decrees of God, as all that exists and happens in time. It extends over everything that is further treated in dogmatics after creation and includes within itself both the works of nature and of grace; all works of God outwardly, which follow upon creation, are works of His providence. Only, the locus de providentia does not enter into those works themselves, but describes in general the nature of the relation in which God stands to the created world and which is always the same in spite of the many different works which He brings about in the world in His providence. Therefore it is also not desirable, in this locus, to bring up all kinds of subjects, such as the miracle, prayer, the end of life, freedom of the will, sin, theodicy, etc., for in part these subjects have already been treated earlier in the doctrine of the virtues and the decrees of God, in part they later come up in their own place at length. Not on the locus de providentia alone, but on the whole of dogmatics rests the task of theodicy. The doctrine of providence therefore does not include within itself the material for the following loci, but confines itself to the description of the relation, remaining like itself under all different works, in which God stands to the creatures. That relation is expressed by the words preservation, cooperation, and government, which gradually were conceived as parts of providence. Whatever God may do in nature and grace [16], He is always the one who preserves all things, flows into them with His power, and governs them. Preservation, cooperation, and government are therefore not parts or pieces into which the work of providence is split, and which, separated in substance and in time, follow one upon another. Nor do they differ among themselves in such a way that preservation would have reference only to the being of the creatures, cooperation only to the activities, and government

exclusively to the guidance toward the final goal. But they are always connected with one another, they interpenetrate one another at every moment, preservation from the very first beginning is also government, and government cooperation, and cooperation preservation. Preservation tells us that nothing exists, not only no substance, but also no power, no activity, no property, no idea, unless it all exists from, through, unto God. Cooperation makes known to us that same preservation as such a one which does not abolish the being of the creatures but precisely posits and maintains it. And government points out both to us as leading all things in such a way that the end goal established by God is attained. And always, from the beginning to the end, providence is one simple, almighty, and omnipresent power.

When conceived as such a power and act of God, providence stands in the closest connection with, and yet is also essentially distinct from, the activity of God in creation. Pantheism and deism seek the solution of the problem that here presents itself by denying either creation or providence. Theism maintains both and seeks to set their unity and their distinction in the light both for theory and for the practice of life. Always to be a theist in the full, true sense, i.e. to see in everything God's counsel and hand and work and yet at the same time, indeed precisely for that reason, to develop every power and gift to the highest activity, that is the glory of the Christian faith, that the secret of the Christian life. Scripture leads us in this. On the one hand it designates providence as a creating, Ps. 104:30, a making alive, Neh. 9:6, a speaking, Ps. 33:9, 105:31, 34, 107:25, Job 37:6, a sending forth of his Word and Spirit, Ps. 104:30, 107:26, a commanding, Ps. 147:15, Lam. 3:37, a working, John 5:17, a bearing, Heb. 1:3, a willing, Rev. 4:11, so that [17] everything without exception is from God and exists through and unto him, Acts 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:17. God is never idle. He

never looks on passively. He always works with divine power in nature and grace. Providence is therefore a positive act, not a letting but a causing to exist and to work from moment to moment. If it consisted only in a non-destruere, it would not be God who maintained things, but these would exist in and through themselves, be it then also through a power bestowed at creation. And this is absurd to think; a creature is by itself an absolutely dependent being; what does not exist of itself can also not exist for a single moment by itself. If God does nothing, then there is nothing and nothing happens. Virtus Dei, ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species omnisque natura concideret, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 12. Conf. IV 17, cf. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 104 art. 1-4. c. Gent. III 65 sq. Calvin, Inst. I 16, 4. Leydecker, Fax verit. VIII 2. Alsted, Theol. schol. 304 etc. And just as providence is a power and an act, so it is also an almighty and omnipresent power. God is immanent with his being present in all creatures. His providence extends to all creatures; everything exists in him. Scripture states it most emphatically, that nothing, however small, falls outside God's providence. Not only all things in general, Eph. 1:11, Col. 1:17, Heb. 1:3, but even the hairs of the head, Mt. 10:30, the sparrows, Mt. 10:29, the birds of heaven, Mt. 6:26, the lilies of the field, Mt. 6:28, the young ravens, Ps. 147:9 are the object of his care. For what is small or great for him who alone is great? In the coherence of the world the small is just as much in its place as the great, just as indispensable and necessary, and many times of still richer significance and of weightier consequences. Providence may therefore be distinguished into in generalis, Ps. 104, 148:1-3, specialis, Ps. 139:15v., Job 10:9-12, Mt. 12:12, Luke 12:7, and specialissima, 1 Tim. 4:10. But it nevertheless extends as God's power to all and to each creature. Habakkuk complains in chap. 1:14 indeed about it,

that God by his chastisement makes men like fishes of the sea, that are caught in the net and כְּרֶמֶשׂ לֹא־מֹשֵׁל, like creeping things, that have no ruler, namely to protect it over against [18] its enemies, but thereby in the least does not express that God's providence does not extend over these creatures. With more appearance of right one appeals for the limitation of God's providence to 1 Cor. 9:9; yet Paul, who everywhere else conceives God's sovereignty so absolutely, e.g. Acts 17:28, Rom. 11:36, Col. 1:17, here in this place by no means denies that God also cares for the oxen, but only indicates that the reason why this word is included in God's law does not lie in the oxen but in men. God says also this word concerning the oxen δι' ἡμας, v. 10, cf. Rom. 4:23, 24, 15:4, 2 Tim. 3:16, in order that we might learn from it that the laborer in the gospel is worthy of his wages. Thus providence is an act of God just as great, almighty, and omnipresent as creation; it is a creatio continua or continuata; they are both one act and differ only ratione, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 15. Conf. IV 12 de civ. XII 17. Thomas I qu. 104 art. 2. Quenstedt, Theol. I p. 351. Ursinus, Explic. Cat. qu. 27. M. Vitringa II 183. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 190.

Thus speaking, earlier theologians nevertheless in no way wished to abolish the distinction that exists between creation and providence, as e.g. Hodge I 577 fears. Scripture, on the other hand, represents providence as a resting from the work of creation, Gen. 2:2, Ex. 20:11, 31:17 and further as a seeing, Ps. 14:2, as a beholding, Ps. 33:13, as a paying heed, Ps. 33:15, as a watching, Ps. 130:3 etc., which all presupposes the existence, the self-activity, the freedom of the creature. These data of Scripture also may not be neglected. Creation and providence are not the same. If providence were a creation renewed every moment, the creatures would also be brought forth out of nothing every moment. The coherence, the connection, the ordo

causarum would then be entirely lost, and of development, history there could be no question. All creatures would then exist not really, but only in appearance, and lack all independence, freedom, responsibility; God himself would be the cause of sin. Although many called providence a creatio continua, they nevertheless by no means intended thereby to erase the distinction between the two; rather, they all at the same time conceived providence as a causing to persevere [19] in existence, as a conservatio, which presupposes creation. Thus, e.g. Augustine says that God rested on the seventh day and created no new genera any more, and he then describes the work of providence in distinction from that of creation as follows: movet itaque occulta potentia universam creaturam suam..... explicat secula, quae illi cum primum condita sunt tanquam implicita indiderat, quae tamen in suos cursus non explicarentur, si ea ille qui condidit provido motu administrare cessaret, de Gen. ad lit. V 20. Providence may therefore sometimes be called a creatio, it is always distinguished from the first and proper creation in this, that it is a creatio continua. Both therefore agree with each other in this, that it is the same Divine, almighty and omnipresent power that is active in creation and in preservation; this is no lesser act than that; for both, power, Divine omnipotence is required. Further, creation and preservation are of course also not distinguished in God himself, for in Him, the Eternal, there falls no change nor shadow of turning; He has not passed over from not-creating to creating nor also from creating to preserving; He is unchangeably the same, cf. deel II 411. Creation and preservation are therefore not objectively and essentially, as acts of God, in God's being, but only ratione distinguished. That, however, does not mean that our thinking simply arbitrarily makes a distinction between the two; no, that distinction is indeed well grounded in the revelation of God and

derived from it by our thinking. There is a difference between creation and preservation, but that difference does not lie in God's being an sich, but in the relation in which God places himself to the creatures. One thing is what happens with the things through creation, and another thing what happens with them through preservation. The relation in which through both acts the creatures are placed to God is a different one. This difference is not to be indicated thus, that creation is out of nothing and preservation out of the existing; but creation calls forth the things that are not, that have no other being than that of ideas and decrees in the being of God; through preservation God calls forth with the same power those things that have received an existence distinct from his being and nevertheless are solely and only out of and through and unto God. Creation gives being; preservation, the perseverance [20] in being. The difficulty for thought, to maintain both creation and preservation, lies again and again in this, that creatures through creation have received a being of their own, distinct from God's being, and that yet that being cannot or may not be regarded for a moment as a being independent of God, resting in itself. We stand here before a mystery that far surpasses our understanding, and always we are inclined to do too little to the one or to the other. On that inclination pantheism and deism rest. Both proceed from the same error and set God and world over against each other as two magnitudes. The first sacrifices the world to God, creation to preservation, and thinks that the being of God is then only a Divine infinite being when the being of the world is denied, dissolved in appearance, swallowed up in the Divine being. And the second sacrifices God to the world, preservation to creation, and judges that the creature comes the more into its right, in proportion as it becomes less dependent on God and removes itself more from Him. The Christian, however, confesses that the

world and every creature in it has received a being of its own but yet in that same measure increases in reality, in freedom, in true being, as it is more dependent on God, and from moment to moment is out of and through and unto Him. A creature stands the higher, in proportion as God dwells in it more and permeates it with his being. Preservation in so far even goes beyond creation; for this gave only the beginning of being, but that is the continuing and ever increasing communication of God to his creatures. The providence is the progressive expression in the universe of his divine perfection, the progressive realization in it of the archetypal ideal of perfect wisdom and love, Sam. Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb. Clark 1897 I 532.

5. In this way the manner has also already been indicated in which God exercises his providence in the world, and which in former times was expressed by the doctrine of the concursus. This is as rich as the diversity which in creation has been introduced into the creatures, Sicut creationis magna est varietas, ita et gubernationis, Alsted, Theol. schol. 315. By creation a world has been called into existence, which at the same time deserves to be called a κοσμος and αἰων [21] and is in both space and time a speculum lucidissimum gloriae divinae, cf. deel II 420v. Providence now serves to lead the world from its beginning on to its final goal; it comes into operation immediately at creation and maintains and brings to development what is given in that creation. Conversely, creation is adapted to providence; the creation gives to the creatures such a being, that in and through providence can be brought to unfolding. For the world was not created in the state of pure potency, as a chaos or mass of mist, but as a cosmos, and man was placed therein not as a helpless wretch but as man and woman; only from such a ready world could development proceed and

thus it was by creation offered to providence. Further, that world was a harmonious whole, in which unity was paired with the richest diversity; each creature received its own nature and therein its own being, its own life and law of life. Just as in Adam's heart the moral law was implanted, as rule for his life, so all creatures bore in their own nature the principia and the laws for their development. All things are created by the word. Everything rests on thought. The whole creation is a system of God's ordinances, Gen. 1:26, 28, 8:22, Ps. 104:5, 9, 119:90, 91, Pred. 1:10, Job 38:10v., Jer. 5:24, 31:25v., 33:20, 25. He gave to all creatures an order, a law, which they do not transgress, Ps. 148:6, cf. deel I 259, 287v. It rests in all its parts on the counsel of God, and this comes out in the small and in the great; it all proceeds from the Lord of hosts, He is wonderful in counsel, He is great in deed, Jes. 28:23-29. Thus Scripture teaches us to understand the world, and thus also Christian theology has understood it. Augustine said that in the creatures semina occulta, originales regulae, seminariae rationes had been implanted, which, hidden in the secret womb of nature, are the principia of all development. Quaecunque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi primordia, et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus tamquam regulis sumunt, de trin. III 7. de Gen. ad lit. IV 33. The world is therefore pregnant with the causes of beings; sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic [22] ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium, quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur nec moritur aliquid nec incipit esse nec desinit, de trin. III 9. It is an arbor rerum, which brings forth branch and blossom and fruit out of itself, de Gen. ad lit. VIII 9. God nevertheless so preserves the things and so works in them, that they themselves as causae secundae cooperate. That does not say that one must stop with these second

causes; we must always ascend to the cause of all being and motion, and that is only the will of God; voluntas conditoris conditae rei cujusque natura est, de civ. XXI 8, cf. de trin. III 6-9. Insofar providence is not only a positive, but also an immediate act of God. His will, his power, his being is immediately present in every creature and in every event. Everything exists and lives together in him, Hd. 17:28, Col. 1:17, Hebr. 1:3. Just as he created the world by himself, so he also sustains and governs it by himself. Although God also works through the causae secundae, this is not to be interpreted with deism in such a way that they would stand between God and the workings with their consequences and remove these from him. Immediate Deus omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. qu. 103 art. 6. qu. 104 art. 2. c. Gent. III 76 sq. Therefore a miracle is also no breaking of the law of nature and no intervention into the order of nature from without. It is on God's side an act which has no more immediately and directly God as cause than every ordinary event, and in the counsel of God and in the world-idea it takes an equally ordered and harmonious place as every natural phenomenon. In the miracle God only brings a special power into operation, which, like every other power, works in accordance with its own nature and law and thus also has its own product as consequence, cf. deel I 289. But at creation God laid in the things his ordinances, an ordo rerum, by which the things themselves stand mutually in connection with one another. God does not depend on those causes, but the things do depend on one another. That connection is manifold; although in general it can be called causal, causal in this sense is nevertheless by no means to be identified with mechanical, as materialism wishes. The mechanical connection is only one manner in which a part of the things in the world [23] stands in relation to one another. Just as the

creatures in creation received their own nature and differ mutually, so there is also distinction in the laws according to which they work, and in the relations in which they stand to one another. These are distinct on physical and on psychical terrain, in the intellectual and in the ethical world, in family and society, in science and art, in the kingdoms of the earth and in the kingdom of the heavens. It is the providence of God, which in connection with creation maintains and brings to full unfolding all these distinct natures, powers, ordinances. In providence God does not destroy but rather respects and develops what he called into existence in creation. Thus he sustains and governs all creatures in accordance with their nature, the angels otherwise than men and these again otherwise than animals and plants. But insofar as God now in his providence maintains the mutual relations of things and makes the creatures mutually serviceable to one another's existence and life, it can be called mediate. Immediate Deus omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, quoad executionem ordinis vero per aliqua media providet, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. Thus he created the angels all at once but lets men proceed from one blood; thus he preserves some creatures individually, others as species and genus; thus he repeatedly makes use of all kinds of creatures as means in his hand, in order to carry out his counsel and to reach his goal.

Christian theology did not deny this; on the contrary, following the lead of Scripture, it has always emphatically maintained the order of nature and the causal connection of phenomena. It is untrue that Christianity, with its supranaturalism, would be hostile to a natural order and would make science impossible, as Draper's history of the struggle between religion and science, 2e uitg. Haarlem 1887, with evident pleasure tries to demonstrate. Much more correct is the judgment of Du Bois Reymond, when he said: die

neuere Naturwissenschaft, wie paradox dies klinge, verdankt ihren Ursprung dem Christenthum, Kulturgesch. und Naturw. Leipzig 1878 S. 28, cf. also Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 129 f. and others in Martensen Larsen, Die Naturwiss. in ihrem Schuldverhältnis zum Christenthum, Berlin 1897. In any case Christianity [24] made science, specifically that of nature, possible and prepared the ground for it. For the more the phenomena of nature, as in polytheism, are deified and regarded as visible images and bearers of the Godhead, the more impossible a scientific investigation becomes, which of itself acquires the character of sacrilege and disturbs the mystery of the Godhead. But Christianity has distinguished God and world and, by its confession of God as the Creator of all things, has detached God from the nexus of nature and placed Him high above it; investigation of nature is no longer an assault on the Godhead. Furthermore, by that it has at the same time made man free from and placed him independently over against nature, as the beautiful contemplation of nature among psalmists and prophets, with Jesus and the apostles, so clearly proves; for the believer nature is no longer an object of worship and fear; while in deep humility he bows before God and is absolutely dependent on Him, he has precisely the calling to rule the earth and to subject all things to himself, Gen. 1:26. Dependence on God is something quite different from convenienter naturae vivere and accommodating oneself to circumstances. Many reason in such a way that they either ascribe all things and events to God's will and consider resistance unlawful, or that they limit God's providence and place many things in the hands of man, cf. e.g. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den christl. Vorsehungsglauben 1888 S. 24 f. Yet Scripture warns us against both this antinomianism and this pelagianism and cuts off at the root all false, fatalistic resignation and all arrogant self-confidence. Bowing before

the power of nature is something wholly different from submitting to God in a childlike way; and ruling the earth is a serving of God. The captain who, during a storm, went into his cabin to pray and read in the Bible, did indeed submit to the power of the elements but not to God, Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all I 545. There is much more true piety in Cromwell's word: trust God and keep your powder dry. Next, it is the confession of God as the Creator of heaven and earth which at once brings with it the thought of the one, absolute truth, never divided against itself; of the harmony and the beauty of the counsel of God; and thus also of the unity of the world-plan and of the order of the whole of nature. [25] Wenn in freier und grossartiger Weise dem einen Gott auch ein einheitliches Wirken aus dem Ganzen und Vollen zugeschrieben wird, so wird der Zusammenhang der Dinge nach Ursache und Wirkung nicht nur denkbar sondern er ist sogar eine nothwendige Consequenz der Annahme, Lange, Gesch. d. Mater. 130. Scripture itself leads us in the recognition of such a natural order, of all kinds of ordinances and laws for created things. And the miracle makes so little breach in that, that it rather presupposes and confirms that fixed natural order. The Christian church and theology have at all times gladly acknowledged such an ordo rerum; Augustine repeatedly appealed to the word in Wijsh. 11:20, omnia mensura numeroque et pondere ordinasti. They have at least in the first period powerfully resisted the dreadful superstition which in the third and fourth century rose to an extraordinary height, and in particular also combated astrology, Aug. de civ. V 1-8. Thomas, S. c. Gent. III 84 sq. Calvijn, Contre l'astrologie, C. R. 35 p. 509-544. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 2. Moor II 435. M. Vitringa II 180 etc. The struggle that often broke out was not waged between Christianity and natural science; the parties were grouped quite differently; it was mostly a

struggle between old and new world-view, in which there were believing Christians on both sides, cf. deel II 465.

This principially correct view of nature, which theology advocated, is evident nowhere more clearly than from its doctrine of the concursus and the causae secundae. In pantheism and in deism this doctrine cannot come into its own. There there are no causae and here no causae secundae any longer. In pantheism the causae secundae, i.e. the causes of things lying alongside one another within the circle of the created, are identified with the causa prima, that is God. There is between the two no distinction of substance and operation; God is materialiter and formaliter the subject of all that happens, thus also of sin; at most the so-called second causes are occasions and passive instruments for the operations of God. Formerly occurring only sporadically, this doctrine came to dominance in the newer philosophy of Cartesius and thus led to the idealism of Berkeley and Malebranche and to the pantheism of Spinoza, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 46, [26] Strauss, Gl. II 384 etc. Thus Malebranche, e. g., says, qu'il n'y a qu'une vraie cause parce qu'il n'y a qu'un vrai Dieu, que la nature ou la force de chaque chose n'est que la volonté de Dieu, que toutes les causes naturelles ne sont point de véritables causes, mais seulement des causes occasionnelles. A true cause can be God alone, because He alone can create and cannot communicate this power to any creature; if creatures could really be cause of motions and phenomena, then they themselves would be Gods, but toutes ces petites divinités des payens et toutes ces causes particulières des philosophes ne sont que des chimères, que le malin esprit tâche d'établir pour ruiner le culte du vrai Dieu, De la recherche de la vérité, l. 6 p. 2 ch. 3 cf. also Eclaircissement 15. There are thus only phaenomena, representations, and the only reality, power, substance, that

hides behind them, is that of God himself, cf. also Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit II2 336-347. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 592. Conversely, in deism the causae secundae are separated from the causa prima and made independent; the causa prima is wholly restricted to creation, to the giving of the posse, and in the velle and facere wholly excluded, as in original pelagianism; or the two causae are conceived as causae sociae, which work alongside and with one another, as two horses draw a wagon forward, even if the one is then perhaps stronger than the other, as in semipelagianism and synergism; the creature here becomes creator of his own acts. Now, however, Scripture says, both that God works all things, so that the creature is only an instrument in his hand, e. g. Jes. 44:24, Ps. 29:3, 65:11, 147:16, Mt. 5:45, Hd. 17:25 etc., and that providence is distinct from creation and presupposes the existence and the self-activity of the creatures, e. g. Gen. 1:11, 20, 22, 24, 28 etc. In accordance with that, Christian theology teaches that the causae secundae are absolutely subordinated to God as prima causa and yet in that subordination remain genuine, true causae. A few indeed deviated here sideways, such as the nominalist Biel in the Middle Ages, Zwingli in the time of the Reformation, who wrongly considered the second causes so called and preferred to call them instruments, de provid. Op. IV 95 sq., and the American theologian Emmons in later time, cf. Strong, Syst. Theol. New-York 1890 [27] p. 205. Hodge I 594. H. B. Smith, Syst. of christ. Theol. 1890 p. 103. But nevertheless it was the constant doctrine of the Christian church, that the second causes, though wholly and entirely dependent on the first cause, are at the same time nevertheless also true, essential causes. God flows with his almighty power into every causa secunda and is with his being present in it at its beginning, progress, and end. He is the one who posits it and brings it to action (praecursus), and

further also in its operation accompanies and leads it up to its effect (concursus); He works the willing and the working according to his good pleasure. But this influence of the causa prima in the causae secundae is so divinely great, that He precisely thereby brings those causae secundae to their own activity. Providentia Dei causas secundas non tollit sed ponit, Wollebius in Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 191. The concursus is precisely the cause of the self-activity of the second causes; and these, borne by God's might from the beginning to the end, work with a propria et insita virtus. So little does the activity of God nullify the activity of the creature, that the latter becomes the more powerful, the more richly and fully the former reveals itself. The causa prima and secunda thus remain two distinct causes; the first does not destroy the second but precisely bestows reality upon it, and the second exists only through the first. Nor are the causae secundae merely instrumenta, no organa, no sticks and blocks, but genuine, essential causes, with their own nature, power, spontaneity, operation, and law. Sathan et les mechans ne sont pas tellement instrumens de Dieu, que cependant ils n'operent aussi bien de leur coste. Car il ne faut pas imaginer, que Dieu besongne par un homme inique comme par une pierre ou par un tronc de bois, mais il en use comme d'une creature raisonnable, selon la qualité de sa nature, qu'il luy a donnée. Quand donc nous disons, que Dieu opere par les mechans, cela n'empeche pas que les meschans n'operent aussi en leur endroict, Calvin, C. R. 35, 188. With respect to God the causae secundae can be compared with instruments, Jes. 10:15, 13:5, Jer. 50:25, Hd. 9:15, Rom. 9:20-23; with respect to their effects and products they are causae in the proper sense. And precisely because the first and second cause do not stand and work dualistically alongside one another, but the first works through the second, therefore the operation that [28] proceeds from

both is one, and the product also is one. There takes place no division of labor between God and his creature, but the same operation is wholly and entirely operation of the causa prima and likewise wholly and entirely operation of the causa proxima; and the product is in that same sense wholly product of the first and wholly product of the second cause. Because, however, the causa prima and the causa secunda are not identical but differ in essence, therefore the operation and the product are indeed realiter wholly and entirely operation and product of both causes; but formaliter they are nevertheless only operation and product of the second cause. The wood burns, and it is God alone who causes the burning, but formally the burning may not be ascribed to God but must be ascribed only to the wood as subject. Man speaks, acts, believes, and it is God alone who causes him to speak, act, believe, yet not God but man is the formal subject of all these acts. And thus it is also God alone who grants the sinner all life and power which he needs for the committing of a sin; but sin has not God but man as subject and author. In this way Holy Scripture draws the lines within which the reconciliation of God's sovereignty and of man's freedom must be sought.

6. In providence, conceived as preservation or as cooperation, government is already included. He who so maintains things that he bears not only their being but even their powers and operations by his will and his being, he is absolutely sovereign, king in the true sense. Government is therefore no new element that is added to preservation and cooperation; it is, like each of these two, in itself the whole providence, only now considered from the standpoint of the final goal, toward which God leads all that is created through his providence. It is a beautiful, rich thought when Holy Scripture repeatedly calls God King and describes his providence as a government.

There are many in this time who reject every concept of sovereignty in family, state, society and want to know of nothing but democracy and anarchy. Under the influence of these views there are also those who in theology find the representation of God as King Old-Testament and antiquated [29] and at most still want to speak of God as Father. But this judgment is superficial and untrue. First, the name Father for God is not New-Testament but was already customary in the Old Testament and even among the Heathen; the N. Test. may have conceived its meaning more richly and more deeply, it did not first give that name to God, cf. part II 113. Conversely, the name of King for the Divine being occurs not only in the Old, but also in the New Testament repeatedly, Mt. 6:10, 13, 33, 1 Tim. 1:17, 6:15, Op. 19:6 etc. And secondly, the designation of King is no less worthy of God than that of Father. All πατρια in heaven and on earth is named from Him, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Ef. 3:15. All relations that exist among creatures between superiors and inferiors are a likeness of that one original relation in which God stands to the works of his hands. What a father is for his family, what an educator is for the youth, what a commander is for the army, what a prince is for his people, all that and so much more is God in an entirely original way for his creatures. Not one, but all his virtues come to manifestation in the world and therefore ought to be honored by us. And now especially also kingship is a glorious Divine institution. It gives to the people not only a personal unity, but, as hereditary kingship, also assumes the character of originality, exaltedness, independence, and immutability. In all this it is a beautiful, though indeed weak, image of the kingship of God. All sovereignty on earth is borrowed, derived, temporal, limited, many times not for blessing but for curse. But God is King in an absolute and in a true sense. The government of the world

is not democratic and not aristocratic, not republican and not constitutional, but monarchical. God's is the one, undivided, legislative, judicial, and executive power; his sovereignty is original, eternal, unlimited, rich in blessing. He is the King of kings and the Lord of lords, 1 Tim. 6:15, Op. 19:6. His kingdom is the entire universe. His are heaven and earth, Ex. 19:5, Ps. 8:2, 103:19, 148:13. He possesses all nations, Ps. 82:8, rules over the Heathen, Ps. 22:29, 47:9, 96:10, Jer. 10:7, Mal. 1:14, and is the Most High over the whole earth, Ps. 47:3, 8, [30] 83:19, 97:9. He is King forever, Ps. 29:10, 1 Tim. 1:17; no opposition has anything to signify over against Him, Ps. 93:3, 4. His kingdom surely comes, Mt. 6:10, 1 Cor. 15:24, Op. 12:10; his glory shall be revealed and his name shall be feared from the rising to the setting of the sun, Jes. 40:5, 59:19; He shall be King over the whole earth, Zach. 14:9. Also in this government God deals with each thing according to its nature. Deus regit res, naturae ipsarum convenienter, Alsted, Theol. schol. 301. And therefore that government of God is also presented in Scripture in different ways and called by different names. Through his government He keeps the world standing and establishes it, so that it shall not totter, Ps. 93:1; He disposes the light and the darkness, Ps. 104 vs. 19, 20, commands the rain and holds it back, Gen. 7:4, 8:2, Job 26:8, 38:22v., gives hoarfrost and snow and ice, Ps. 147:16, rebukes i.e. reproves and stills the sea, Nah. 1:4, Ps. 65:8, 107:29, sends curse and destruction, Deut. 28:15v., everything does his word, Ps. 148:8. Equally mighty and sovereignly He rules in the world of rational creatures, He rules among the Heathen and possesses all nations, Ps. 22:29, 82:8, counts the peoples less than nothing and vanity, Jes. 40:17, does with the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan. 4:35, and guides every heart and thought, Spr. 21:1.

And this government of God over his rational creatures extends not only to the good, of which He is the Giver both in nature and in grace, Jak. 1:17, and also not only to his favourites, whom He elects, calls, preserves, cares for, and leads to eternal salvation, but it also extends to the evil and to those who love and do the evil. Indeed it is established throughout the whole of Scripture that God hates sin with his whole being, Deut. 32:4, Ps. 5:5-7, Job 34:10, 1 Joh. 1:5 etc.; and his government, by the prohibition of sin in law and conscience, by its judgments and sentences, bears an incontrovertible testimony to that. But nevertheless the whole of Scripture at the same time teaches that sin from beginning to end stands under his Divine regiment, cf. Clemen, Die christl. Lehre von der Sünde, Göttingen 1897 I 123-151. At its beginning God sometimes intervenes preventively; He prevents someone from sinning, Gen. 20:6, 31:7, destroys the [31] counsel of the ungodly, Ps. 33:10, grants power to remain standing in temptation, 1 Cor. 10:13, and in so far always restrains sin, insofar as He forbids it and curbs the sinner by some anxiety and fear in the conscience. But this impeditio is by no means the only form in which God governs sin. Many times He permits it and does not prevent it. He gave Israel over to the good pleasure of his heart, Ps. 81:13, let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16, 17:30 and gave them over to a reprobate mind, Rom. 1:24, 28; and thus it can be said that God permitted the fall of Adam, the murder of Abel, the unrighteousness of men before the flood, Gen. 6:3, the sale of Joseph, Gen. 37, the condemnation of Jesus etc. But this permissio is so little negative that sin also in its very first beginning stands under God’s governing power and sovereignty. He creates and orders the occasions and inducements to sin, in order to test man and thereby either to strengthen and confirm or also to punish and harden, Gen. 2:7, 2 Chr. 32:31, Job 1, Mt. 4:1, 6:13, 1 Cor.

10:13. Although sin at first seemed nothing other than an arbitrary act of men, it nevertheless later appears that God had his hand in it and that it happened according to his counsel, Gen. 46:8, 2 Chron. 11:4, Luk. 24:26, Hd. 2:23, 3:17, 18, 4:28. It is even, in its beginning, though not formaliter and subjective but yet materialiter, ascribed to God. God is the potter and man is the clay, Jer. 18:5, Klaagl. 3:38, Jes. 45:7, 9, 64:7, Am. 3:6; He hardens, makes obstinate, blinds, Ex. 4:21, 7:3, 9:12, 10 vs. 20, 27, 11:10, 14:4, Deut. 2:30, Jos. 11:20, Jes. 6:10, 63:17, Mt. 13:13, Mk. 4:12, Luk. 8:10, Joh. 12:40, Hd. 28:26, Rom. 9:18, 11:8; He turns the heart so that it is hateful and disobedient, 1 Sam. 2:25, 1 Kon. 12:25, 2 Chron. 25:20. Ps. 105:24, Ezech. 14:9. He sends an evil spirit, a lying spirit, Richt. 9:23, 1 Sam. 16:14, 1 Kon. 22:23, 2 Chron. 18:22, incites David by Satan, 2 Sam. 24:1, 1 Chr. 21:1, makes Shimei curse, 2 Sam. 16:10, gives men over to their sins, lets the measure of their iniquity become full, Gen. 15:16, Rom. 1:24, sends a power of delusion, 2 Thess. 2:11, sets Christ for a fall and rising, for an odour of death and of life, Luk. 2 vs. [32] 34, Joh. 3:19, 9:39, 2 Cor. 2:16, 1 Petr. 2:8 etc., cf. deel II 315v., 369v. And not only at the beginning but also in the progress God keeps sin under his almighty government; many times He restrains it, limits it, checks it in its course and by judgments and sentences brings it to an end, Gen. 7:11, Ex. 15 etc., Mt. 24:22, 2 Petr. 2:9, but also where He lets it continue, He governs it, Spr. 16:9, 21:1, and in its end, whether He forgives it or punishes it, against its will and intention, He makes it subservient to the execution of his counsel, to the glorification of his name, Gen. 45:7, 8, 50:20, Ps. 51:6, Jes. 10:5-7, Job 1:20, 22, Spr. 16:4, Hd. 3:13, Rom. 8:28, 11:36. Just as sin, the malum culpae, so also suffering, the malum poenae, stands under the dominion of God. He is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and the

evil, Am. 3:6, Jes. 45:7, Job 2:10. Death is his punishment and entered in by his command, Gen. 2:17, and all disasters and adversities, all pain and suffering, all visitations and judgments come to men from God's almighty hand, Gen. 3:14v., Deut. 28:15v. etc. Already under Israel, however, the disharmony was noticed that in this life exists between sin and punishment, holiness and salvation, Ps. 73, Job, Pred. Faith wrestled with this dreadful problem, but from it it nevertheless again lifted up its head triumphantly, not because it saw the problem solved, but because it continued to cling fast to the kingly power and the fatherly love of the Lord. The prosperity of the ungodly is only appearance and in any case only temporary, and the righteous, even in the heaviest suffering, are still partakers of God's love and favour, Ps. 73, Job. The suffering of the pious has many times its ground not in their personal sin but in the sin of humanity, and its goal in the salvation of humanity and in the honour of God. Suffering serves not only for retribution, Rom. 1:18, 27, 2:5, 6, 2 Thess. 1:9, but it also serves for testing and chastisement, Deut. 8:5, Job 1:12, Ps. 118:8, Spr. 3:12, Jer. 10:24, 30:11, Hebr. 12:6v., Op. 3:19; for strengthening and confirmation, Ps. 119:67, 71, Rom. 5:3-5, Hebr. 12:10, Jak. 1:2-4; for testimony to the truth, Ps. 44:23, Hd. 5:41. Phil. 1:29, 2 Tim. 4:6; for the glorification of God, Joh. 9:2. In Christ justice and grace are reconciled with one another; [33] suffering is the way to glory, the cross points to the crown, lignum crucis arbor vitae. The end to which all things are led by the providence of God is the establishment of his kingdom, the revelation of his virtues, the honour of his name, Rom. 11:32-36, 1 Cor. 15:18, Op. 11:15, 12:13 etc. In this comforting way Scripture deals with the providence of God. Enough riddles remain, both in individual life and in the history of world and humanity; dogmatics from now on occupies itself with nothing else than

with the mysteries which the providence of God in sin, freedom, responsibility, punishment, suffering, death, grace, reconciliation, prayer etc. has set before us, and therefore does not need here to enter into all those subjects. But over all those riddles and mysteries God lets the light of his Word shine, not to solve them, but so that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope, Rom. 15:4. The doctrine of providence is not a philosophical system but a confession of faith, a confession that, in spite of the fact that the appearance of things often speaks against it, yet no Satan and no man and no single creature but God and He alone by his almighty and omnipresent power upholds and governs all things. Such a confession is able to preserve us both from a superficial optimism that fails to recognize the riddles of life, and from a proud pessimism that despairs of world and fate. For the providence of God extends over all things, over the good not only, but also over sin and suffering, pain and death; for if these were withdrawn from God's guidance, what would then still remain in this world for his government? It reveals itself not only and not chiefly in the extraordinary events and in the miracles, but equally in the fixed order of nature and in the ordinary occurrences of daily life; for what poor faith would it be that saw God's hand and counsel from afar in a few weighty events, but did not perceive it in one's own life and lot? And it leads all these things, not against but in accordance with their nature, not apart from the means but through these; for what power would be hidden in a faith that praised stoic indifference or fatalistic resignation as true piety? Thus, however, as the almighty and [34] omnipresent power of God, it makes us thankful in prosperity and patient in adversity; it causes us with childlike submission to rest in the guidance of the Lord and yet at the same time rouses us from our sloth to the highest activity; and it grants us under

everything a good confidence in our faithful God and Father, that He will provide us with all the necessities of body and soul, and that He will turn to our benefit all the evil that He assigns to us in this vale of tears, since He is able to do so as an almighty God and also wills to do so as a faithful Father.

§ 36. The Origin of Sin.

1. The providence of God, as government of sin, goes the farthest beyond all our thinking and understanding and at the same time, as such, celebrates its highest triumph. Hardly had God created the world good and perfect, when sin pressed into it. The mystery of being becomes still more incomprehensible through the mystery of evil. Almost at the same moment when the creatures come forth pure and glorious from the hand of their Maker, they are robbed of all their splendor and stand corrupted and unclean before his holy countenance. Sin has destroyed the whole creation, turned its righteousness into guilt, its holiness into uncleanness, its glory into shame, its blessedness into misery, its harmony into disorder, its life into death, its light into darkness. Whence then that evil, and what is the origin of sin? Scripture justifies God, and gives a continuous theodicy, when it pronounces and maintains that in no case is God the cause of sin. For He is righteous and holy and far from ungodliness, Deut. 32:4, Job 34:10, Ps. 92:16, Isa. 6:3, Hab. 1:13, a light without darkness, 1 John 1:5, tempting no one, Jas. 1:13, abundant fountain of all that is good and clean

and pure, Ps. 36:10, Jas. 1:17; He forbids sin in his law, Ex. 20, and in the conscience of every human being, Rom. 2:14, 15, has no pleasure in ungodliness, Ps. 5:5, but hates it and is wrathful against it, Ps. 45:8, [35] Rom. 1:18; He judges and reconciles it in Christ, Rom. 3 vs. 24-26, cleanses his people from it through forgiveness and sanctification, 1 Cor. 1:30, and wills to punish it both temporally and eternally, Rom. 1:18, 2:8. For the origin of sin Scripture always points us to the creature. But therefore God's governance of sin, also in its origin, is not excluded. It is God himself who created the possibility of sin. Not only did He form the human being so that he could fall. But He also planted the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, set the human being by the probationary commandment before the choice between good and evil, and allowed the temptation by the serpent. It was his will to walk with the human being the dangerous way of freedom, rather than at once to raise him above the possibility of sin. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is undoubtedly so called, because the human being, eating of it, would obtain a knowledge of good and evil which he did not possess up to that point, which was forbidden to him and which he was not permitted to obtain. The question is, what is to be understood under that knowledge of good and evil. The usual explanation is that the human being, by eating of the tree, would obtain an experiential knowledge of the good and the evil; but rightly the objection has been raised against this, that this knowledge of good and evil would make the human being like God, Gen. 3:5 and yet God has no empirical knowledge of evil or can have it; further, that the human being by eating of the tree precisely lost the experiential knowledge of the good; and finally, that Gen. 3:22a must then be taken as irony, which in itself is already unacceptable and is definitely in conflict with vs. 22b. Others have

therefore thought that Gen. 3 related the development of the human being from the animal state to self-consciousness and reason, and have therefore seen in the fall the first venture of reason, the beginning of moral life, the origin of culture, the happiest event in the history of humankind; thus already in earlier time some Ophites, who held the serpent to be an incarnation of the Logos, and later Kant, Mutmassl. Anfang der Menschengesch. 1786. Schiller, Ueber die erste Menschengesellschaft 1790. Hegel, Werke VII 1 S. 14 f. IX 390 f. XI 194. Strauss, Gl. II 29, cf. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. § 89. This view, however, is so much in conflict with the intention of the narrative that it is nowadays almost generally abandoned. For it would presuppose that God created the human being in a state of childish, even animal, innocence and had always wanted to keep him in it; but knowledge, also moral knowledge, had already been bestowed on the human being at his creation, as the creation in God's image, the naming of the animals, the receiving and understanding of the probationary commandment proves; and that knowledge which the human being acquired through his fall was a wholly different one, which was forbidden by God and made him worthy of all manner of punishment. Gen. 3 does not relate a Riesenfortschritt but a fall of the human being, Wellhausen, Gesch. Israels 1878 S. 344 f. Rütschi, Gesch. u. Krit. der k. Leben v. d. urspr. Vollkommenheit, Leiden 1881 S. 8. Smend, Altt. Relig. 120. Marti, Gesch. d. israel. Relig. 1897 S. 179. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 151 f. These then also advocate the opinion that under the knowledge of good and evil not the very first intellectual or moral knowledge is to be understood, but rather, with appeal to 2 Sam. 19:35, 36 die intellectuelle Welterkenntniss, die metaphysische Erkenntniss der Dinge in ihrem Zusammenhange, ihrem Werth oder Unwerth, ihrem Nutzen oder Schaden

für den Menschen, m. a. w. wisdom, the art of world-mastery, which in fact would make the human being independent and like God and would take dominion away from Him. This opinion, however, is burdened by the same objections as the previous one; only the manner in which Marti develops it contains a hint toward the correct interpretation. For in Gen. 3 it is not in the first place a matter of the content of the knowledge which the human being would acquire through disobedience, but of the manner in which he would obtain it, cf. Kuyper, Heraut 950, 951. Clearly the nature of the knowledge of good and evil meant here is described by the fact that the human being would thereby become like God, Gen. 3:5, 22. By eating of the tree, he would detach himself from God, himself judge and determine what was good and what was evil, set his insight and his wisdom over against the wisdom of God, and thus make himself like God. Instead of living and acting in dependence on God, in submission to his law, the human being, eating of the tree and transgressing the commandment, would stand on his own feet, himself choose the way which he wanted to go, and himself seek his own happiness. When the human being fell, he then also got what he desired, he made himself like God, independent, by his own insight and judgment knowing the good and the evil; Gen. 3:22 is dreadful seriousness. But this emancipation from God did not lead and cannot lead to true happiness. Therefore God forbids in the probationary commandment this urge for freedom, this lust for independence. But the human being succumbed to the test and voluntarily and willfully struck out on his own way.

Only a short time had he probably remained in the state of innocence, when he was tempted from without by a serpent, which was more crafty (עָרוּם, LXX φρονιμος, prudens, cf. Mt. 10:16, 2 Cor. 11:3) than all the

beasts of the field, and was brought to a fall. The serpent addresses itself not to the man but to the woman, who had received the prohibition of eating of the tree not herself directly from God but by means of her husband, and therefore was more susceptible to reasoning and doubt. First of all, then, the serpent also tries to awaken in the heart of the woman doubt concerning the commandment of God, and to that end also represents it as given by God out of harshness and selfishness. The woman shows, in the manner in which she repeats and extends the commandment, clearly, that that commandment of God has come to her consciousness as a sharp boundary and as a restrictive provision. After doubt has been awakened and the burdensomeness of the commandment has been brought to consciousness, the serpent proceeds to sow both unbelief and pride in the prepared mind of the woman; it now decidedly denies that the transgression of that commandment will have death as its consequence, and it gives to understand that God has given that commandment only out of selfishness; if man eats of the tree he will, instead of dying, become like God and receive a perfect, divine knowledge. The assurance of the serpent and the high expectation which it aroused made the woman look at the tree; and in proportion as she looked longer, she was enticed by its fruit. Lust of the eyes, lust of the flesh, pride of life made the temptation irresistible; finally she took of the fruit and she ate, and she also gave to her husband with her and he ate. The speaking of the serpent has brought many to the thought that this narrative was an allegory, or that at least the serpent was no real animal, but a name and image for lust, Philo, Clemens [38] Alex., Strom. III 14, 17; or for sexual lust, Schopenhauer, Die Welt als W. u. V.6 II 654, 666; or for erring reason, Bunsen in his Bibelwerk; or also for Satan, Cajetanus, Eugubinus, Junius, Rivetus, Amyraldus, Vitringa father and son, Venema e.

a., cf. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 5, 5. M. Vitringa, II 256, and also J. P. Val d'Eremas, The serpent of Eden, a philol. and crit. essay on the text of Gen. 3 and its various interpretations, London 1888. But this explanation is not plausible; the serpent is in Gen. 3:1 reckoned among the animals; the punishment vs. 14, 15 presupposes a real serpent, and in 2 Cor. 3:11 Paul is of the same opinion. Also the mythical conception, which arose later and found acceptance with many, is in conflict with the intention of the narrative, with the whole setting in which it occurs, and with the continuous doctrine of Scripture; moreover the mythical explanations also diverge very widely among themselves, Hengstenberg, Christol. I2 5. Köhler, Bibl. Gesch. I 6. Delitzsch on Gen. 3:1. The speaking of the serpent is therefore to be explained in another way; yet not with Josephus, Ant. I 1, 4, from the opinion of the narrator, that the animals before the fall had the gift of speech, for he has just related that man is essentially distinguished from the animals, gave them names and found among them no help; but undoubtedly from the influence of a spiritual, superterrestrial power. Of what nature that power has been, is not said with a single word in the narrative itself; Gen. 3 keeps to the visible facts, describes but does not explain. Many have indeed been of the opinion, that Gen. 3 narrates nothing else than the origin of the enmity between man and animal. But apart from the fact that this explanation does not satisfy because of its flatness, it is in conflict with what in Gen. 2 has been related concerning the relation of man and animal, and it does not tell us how and why the serpent appeared as a seducing power over against man. Hence many now again return to the old exegesis, even if only because this is upheld in the apocryphal literature of the O. T., Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 158 f. Further, it is intelligible that Gen. 3 makes no mention of the spiritual background of the events. Only gradually,

with the advancing light of revelation, is the depth of the darkness unveiled. Seemingly innocently begun, sin in its essence and power becomes known only [39] in the course of history. The deviation from the right way is at the beginning slight and scarcely noticeable, but, continued, proceeds in a wholly wrong direction and leads to an entirely opposite outcome. From that it is also to be explained, that Scripture, both in Old and New Testament, relatively so seldom looks back to the narrative of the fall; the principal passages which come into consideration for this are Job 31:33, Spr. 3:18, Jes. 43:27, Hos. 6:7, Ezech. 28 vs. 13-15, Rom. 5:12v., 8:20, 1 Cor. 15:21v., 42v., 2 Cor. 11:3, 1 Tim. 2:14, Op. 2:7, 22:2, cf. Krabbe, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde und vom Tode, Hamburg 1836 S. 83-100. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, I 364 f. Kurtz, Gesch. d. A. Bundes I2 1853 S. 69 and for the quotations in the apocryphal literature, Clemen t. a. p. 169 f. 173. Only Paul sets over against the person of Christ the significance of Adam in the light. Thus also only gradually in the history of revelation does the spiritual power become known, which hides itself behind the appearance and temptation of the serpent. Then it is gradually unveiled, that in the struggle of evil here on earth also a conflict of the spirits is mingled, and that humanity and the world are the booty, for which between God and Satan, between heaven and hell, there is combat.

The whole power of sin here on earth is connected with a kingdom of darkness in the world of spirits. There, too, a fall has taken place. Jesus himself says in Joh. 8:44, that the devil is a murderer of men ἀπ’ ἀρχης, i.e. from the beginning of the existence of mankind, that he in the truth οὐχ ἐστηκεν, has not placed himself and thus does not stand, because there is no truth in him, and he, speaking a lie, ἐκ των ἰδιων speaks. Likewise 1 Joh. 3:8 teaches that he sins from the beginning; in 1 Tim. 3:6 Paul warns the

neophyte against conceit, lest he fall εἰς κριμα του διαβολου, into the same judgment as has struck the devil; and Jude speaks in vs. 6 of ἀγγελους τους μη τηρησαντας την ἑαυτων ἀρχην ἀλλα ἀπολιποντας το ἱδιον οἰκητηριον, i.e. of angels who have not kept their beginning, origin, or also dominion, and have left the dwelling-place assigned to them. It is clearly implied here that many angels were not satisfied with the state in which they had been placed by God. [40] Pride took possession of them, to strive after another, higher rank. Sin first broke out in the world of spirits; it arose in the heart of beings of whom we possess only slight knowledge; under relations which are to us as good as wholly unknown. But this is, on the basis of Holy Scripture, certain, that sin did not first begin on earth but in heaven, at the foot of God's throne, in his immediate presence, and that the fall of the angels took place before that of man. Scripture is silent about whether there is a connection between that fall of the angels and the creation of man; it also does not say what drove the fallen angels to seduce man. But for whatever reason, Satan is ὁ σατανας, ὁ πειραζων, ὁ διαβολος of the human race, ἀνθρωποκτονος, Mt. 4:3, Joh. 8:44, Ef. 6:11, 1 Thess. 3:5, 2 Tim. 2:26, ὁ δρακων ὁ μεγας, ὁ ὀφις ὁ ἀρχαιος, Op. 12:9, 14, 15, 20:2. Thus he came to Christ, the second Adam; and thus he also came to the first man. That he did not himself come to him directly and personally, but made use of a serpent, is indeed to be explained from this, that he hoped better to succeed when the temptation took place through a being that was well known to man as good. Without doubt the speaking of the serpent must have seemed strange to the woman, but precisely this strangeness strengthened the temptation; even an animal, rejecting God's command, came to higher perfection. Moreover, Scripture teaches us that the unclean spirits also can do superhuman things and can temporarily take possession

of bodies and organs of speech, Mt. 8:28v., Mk. 5:7v., Luk. 8:28v., Hd. 19:15. The temptation by Satan had, in man, the fall as its consequence. Scripture seeks the origin of sin only in the will of the rational creature.

2. The tradition of such a fall also occurs among other peoples. The Avesta relates that the first evil deed of Ahriman consisted in bringing forth a great serpent, Dahaka, with three heads, three mouths, six eyes and a thousand powers, in order through it to ruin the world. Ahriman, who is also himself called the serpent, the liar, the deceiver of mortals, has through it disturbed the peace, destroyed paradise, sown doubt and [41] unbelief in the hearts of men, brought sickness and suffering upon the earth, for Jima, the noble ruler in the golden age, has been disobedient to God; he fell through pride and self-exaltation into sin, Ahuramazda left him and he was killed. The Babylonian-Assyrian tradition also stands in unmistakable connection with the biblical narrative; the serpent is there called Tiamat, brings man to a fall through its seduction, but is for that also cursed and fought by Merodach_toggle, cf. Fischer, Heidenthum u. Offenbarung 1878 S. 137 f. 208 f. Delitzsch op Gen. 3:1. Moreover, just as the essence, so also the origin of sin is unknown to the heathen. Even the Jews, who acknowledged the fall and the temptation by Satan, Wijsh. 2:24, and therefore often called him the old serpent, sometimes taught that Satan on the sixth day was created at the same time with Eve, that he, stimulated by sensual lust, tried to tempt man, and that man also already before the fall alongside the יצר הטוב received a יצר הרע, an inclination to evil, in order to overcome this and thus to make his works truly meritorious, Weber, System 210 f. 242 f. And thus elsewhere in the heathen world the origin of sin was sought not in the will of rational creatures but in the essence of things. The fall is unknown. Confucianism is a shallow rationalism and moralism, which held man to be

by nature good and sought the way of salvation in a virtuous life, in agreement with the world order, Saussaye, Religionsgesch. I 249. According to Buddhism the Atman or Brahman, the divine substance, is the only real; the world of appearances is but a dream, has illusion, Maya, as principle, and is in continual becoming and change. Therefore suffering and pain are universal, for everything is subject to transience, to birth, old age, death; and the cause of that suffering is to be sought in the desires, in the desire for being, in the willing to be; deliverance therefore consists in extinction of consciousness or also in destruction of being, nirvana, ib. 411 f. Parseeism traced evil back to an originally evil spirit, Ahriman, who stands over against the highest God, Ahuramazda, has a kingdom of darkness of his own, corrupts God's creation, but is subordinate to Ahuramazda and will one day succumb to him, ib. II 34 f. The Greeks and Romans indeed have in [42] the legends of an aurea aetas, of Prometheus and Pandora something that can recall the biblical narratives; but they originally knew no evil spirits that stood over against the good, and ascribed to the gods all manner of evil desires and misdeeds. The human race also did not fall all at once but degenerated more gradually, and man's will still possessed the power to live virtuously, to keep within bounds, and thus to overcome sin, which essentially was ὑβρις, ib. 191, cf. G. Baur, Stud. u. Krit. 1848. S. 320. Philosophy usually adopted the same standpoint. According to Socrates the cause and the essence of sin lie only in ignorance; no one is voluntarily evil, i.e. unhappy; whoever therefore knows well, is good and acts well; there is nothing other than development needed, in order to bring man, who is by nature good, to the practice of virtue, Xen. Mem. III 9, 4 sq. IV 6, 6. Plato and Aristotle did see the inadequacy of this view; reason was after all far from always capable of

mastering the passions; sin was rooted deeper in human nature than that it could be overcome by knowledge alone; Plato even came to a wholly different doctrine about the origin of sin and sought this in a fall of the praeëxistent souls. But both nevertheless maintained free will and remained of the opinion that virtue stands in our power; external fate may be determined, virtue is ἀδεσποτος and depends only on the will of man, ἐφ' ἠμιν δε και ἡ ἀρετη, ὁμοιως δε και ἡ κακια, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II4 852 III3 588. The Stoa, on its pantheistic and deterministic standpoint, could not seek the cause of sin in the will of man and therefore tried to insert physical and moral evil into the order and beauty of the whole. It was not even possible for the Deity to keep human nature free from every defect; sin is just as necessary as diseases and disasters, and is in so far something good, as it serves the good and brings this to manifestation, Zeiler, ib. IV3 175 f. Yet the Stoa also knew no other way to overcome sin and to practice virtue than man's will, ib. 167 f. And finally with Cicero, Seneca, Plotinus, etc., the thought always returned again, that sin was an act of the will and also could be undone again by the will, ib. 667. 717. 722. V3 585. Outside the sphere [43] of special revelation, sin was therefore always either explained deistically from man's will and conceived as a pure act of will, or also derived pantheistically from the essence of things and understood as something necessary in the order of the whole.

3. Both of these conceptions repeatedly returned in the Christian centuries. The first was renewed by Pelagius, cf. Augustine, c. duas ep. Pel. and c. Jul. Pelag., and then found, in the weakened form of semipelagianism, more and more acceptance. After the Reformation it was again taken up by Socinianism, Fock, Der Socin. 484 f. 653 f., gained, through Remonstrantism, Episcopius, Inst. Theol. IV 3 c. 6. 7 IV 5 c. 1. 2.

Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 24 III 2 sq., important in influence and then became, in the deism of Locke, Tindal, Rousseau etc. and in the rationalism of Wegscheider, Inst. § 99. 112, Bretschneider, Dogm. II 17 f., the dominant view of that time. At present it has again attained significance in the theology of Ritschl and his school, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. 2 II 241-246 III 304-357. Kaftan, Wesen der christl. Relig. 1881 S. 246 f. Dogmatik 1897 § 34. 40. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 319 f. Siebeck, Lehrb. der Religionsphilos. 436 f. However much presented in all kinds of modifications, the fundamental thought is nevertheless always this, that sin does not root in a nature, is no habit and no state but always an act of the will. The image of God in man then consisted chiefly or exclusively in dominion; insofar as a status integritatis is assumed, this consisted especially in childlike innocence, in the freedom of indifference, in the possibility to choose the good or the evil. The fall itself, if still acknowledged as a historical fact, loses its dreadful significance and becomes an event, freely similar to that which takes place at every moment in human life, when evil is chosen instead of good. And the consequences of the fall are therefore also slight. The children are born in the same condition as that in which Adam lived before his disobedience; the freedom of will, i.e. the image of God, has remained; at most there is transplanted from man to man a certain inclination to sin, but such an inclination is actually not the consequence of Adam's first sin but of all the sins of all [44] our forefathers; it is also no sin in itself but becomes this only when the free will gives heed to that inclination; there is thus a distinction between sin (stain, sinful inclination) and guilt (evil deed, intentional, voluntary transgression); only the latter has need of atonement and forgiveness, the former, the inclination to sin, and the unconscious, involuntary yielding is actually no sin, it is more ignorance, which brings

no guilt with it. And likewise as sin and guilt, so also sin and suffering must be distinguished; there is manifold suffering that exists independently of sin and would also exist if there were no sin; death is essentially no consequence of sin but by nature proper to man; spiritual and eternal death has not at all been a punishment for the first sin; at most that punishment consists in the moriendi necessitas, which in Adam, if he had remained standing, would have been prevented by a miracle, or in the manner of dying, which without sin would have been less painful and less premature.

It is understandable that this conception of sin, in the long run, can satisfy neither intellect nor heart. It provokes too many and too serious objections. It does not reckon with the seriousness and the power of sin, as everyone comes to know it in his daily experience; it proceeds from an atomistic view of the human race and does not explain how all without distinction are subject to sin; it fails to recognize the priestly and kingly office of Christ and is content with the teacher and prophet of Nazareth; it restricts the operation of sin and thus the dominion of redemption to the religious-ethical sphere and places the whole of culture detached alongside Christianity. Among the proponents themselves, the need for another, deeper conception repeatedly awakens; thus in semipelagianism over against Pelagius, in Volkelius, de vera religione II c. 6 over against Socinianism, in Wegscheider § 116 over against rationalism, and in Kaftan, Nitzsch, Schultz e. a. over against Ritschl, cf. James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology and the evang. faith London 1897 p. 213. G. Ecke, Die Theol. Schule Albr. Ritschl's und die evang. Kirche der Gegenwart, Berlin 1897 I. The more deeply sin is conceived, the less it becomes something accidental and arbitrary, the more it increases in power and significance, not only for the religious and ethical, [45] but also for the intellectual and aesthetic, for

the physical and the whole cosmic life. If, however, with this insight the origin of sin is asked after, different answers again present themselves. Not all go equally far. Some explain it from human nature, others from the cosmos, still others from God.

4. To the former belong those who seek the origin of sin in the domination of man by matter. Greek philosophy was in general of the opinion that reason had the task of restraining the sensuous impulses and passions. The Jews assumed in man by nature a יצר הרע, which with bodily development continually increased in strength, reached its climax in sexual desire, and lay at the basis of all disobedience to God's commandments, Weber § 49. 50. In the ascetic tendencies this thought recurs again and again; Roman theology even acknowledged its relative right, when it spoke, with respect to man without the bridle of the donum superadditum, of a natural conflict between flesh and spirit, of a morbus and languor naturae humanae, Bellarminus, de gratia primi hom. c. 5. In more recent philosophy and theology sin is repeatedly derived in the same way from an original antithesis between nature and reason, sensuousness and understanding, lower and higher self, flesh and spirit, egoistic and social inclinations. Sensuousness is, from this standpoint, indeed not itself held to be sin, but is nevertheless regarded as the occasion and the stimulus to sinning. All sin thus essentially consists in this, that the spirit serves sensuousness and allows itself to be ruled by it; and all virtue lies in this, that man by his reason rule over nature and thus become a free, independent personality. This view even gladly appeals to the Pauline doctrine of the σαρξ, and rejoices in this Scriptural support. Cf. Cartesius, Wolff, Fichte, Hegel, Werke XI 190 f. XII 209 f. bij Jodl, Gesch. der Ethik in der neuern Philos. I 1882 II 1889 en v. Hartmann, Das sittliche Bewustsein2 1836 S. 265 f., and

further Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 66. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 459 f. Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 763 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 100 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 468 f. 477 f. Schultz, Grundriss d. ev. Dogm.2 [46] 1892 S. 61. Scholten, The free will 177. L H K. II 422v. 574v. etc.

But this explanation of sin suffers from half-heartedness. One of the two, indeed: the sensuous nature of man is in itself no sin, but sin arises only when the reason and the will of man comply with its demands, then this theory falls back into that of Pelagianism; or the sensuous nature is in itself sinful and then sin is proper to matter as such and the anthropological explanation must proceed to the cosmic. This has also been done by many. Plato assumed an eternal ὑλη alongside and over against God. The world was indeed a work of reason, but from the beginning there also worked in it another, blind power, which the δημιουργος could not wholly control. God therefore could not make the world as good as He willed; He was bound to finitude, to the ὑλη. The cause of sin, suffering and death thus lies in the σωματοειδες; the ὑλη hinders the inworking and permeation of the idea; the body is a prison for the soul, source of fear and unrest, of desire and passion, Zeiler, Philos. d. Gr. II 765 f. 855 f. The ὑλη has a similar significance in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism and in manifold ascetic and theosophical directions, cf. Zeller, ib. V 125. 171. 236. 297. 386. 547. And akin to this doctrine of Plato are all theories which derive sin from a matter indeed created by God but nevertheless standing over against Him, Weisse, Philos. Dogm. § 541 f. 561 f. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 55, or from finitude and limitation, l'imperfection originale des créatures, Leibniz, Theodicée § 156, or in general from the realization of the world-idea.

This explanation of sin from the nature of creaturely being, however, cannot escape the consequence of, in one way or another, going back to

God and seeking the origin of sin in his nature or work. With Plato the ὑλη itself had an eternal and independent existence alongside God. In Parzism and Manichaeism two personal Divine beings as creators of light and darkness stood eternally over against one another and gave to the existing world its two-sided character, Schwane, D. G. II 503 f. Neoplatonism and Gnosticism made creation, fall, redemption, etc. into moments in an emanation, which proceeds from God as the βυθος ἀγνωστος, the [47] absolute pleroma, in ever descending formations, finally gives to the material world with its ignorance, darkness, sin, suffering, death its aspect, but then in the process of redemption leads that outflowed and from God fallen world back again to God, Stöckl, Die spekulative Lehre v. Menschen II 52 f. With these ideas the theosophy in Böhme and Schelling has nourished itself, when it sought to explain the personality of God, trinity, creation, fall, redemption out of the essence of God, cf. part II 304, 393. The three Potencies, which are assumed in God, in order that He might become person, spirit, are at the same time the principia of another being, namely the world. As person God has the freedom and the power, to set the Potencies, which are in Him but which He eternally controls, also outside himself in tension, Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 272 f. 310. 338 f. In that tension lies the possibility of sin. In the original creation, whether only ideal or also real the first, these Potencies were at rest. Sin, misery, darkness, death, etc. were indeed there but only potentially; they slumbered in the Urgrund of creation. But man, in whom those Potencies were also present, broke that unity and unleashed the evil powers, which were potentially present in creation. A world like the present one with so much wildness and misery, is only to be explained from a fall; this is the Urthatsache of history, cf. Joh. Claassen, Jakob Böhme II 185 f. Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 336-416. I 8 S. 331

f. II 3 S. 344 f. 358 f. Still more strongly Hegel regarded it as an apostasy, that the idea of the absolute realized itself in the world as its other-being. However much nature in Hegel was a product of reason, he nevertheless could not deny that it was powerless to realize the idea fully and therefore he declared that the idea, giving existence to such a world, had become unfaithful to itself and had fallen away from itself, Werke VI 413. VII 1 S. 23 f. VII 2 S. 15 f. Thus the way was paved for pessimism, which in the manner of Buddhism holds being itself to be the greatest sin, committed by the blind, alogical will, which is the Urschuldige, Schopenhauer, Die Welt als W. u Vorst.6 I 193 f. II 398 f. v. Hartmann, Philos. d. Unbew. II9 198 f. 273 f. 295 f. [48]

5. The origin of evil is, after that of being, the greatest riddle of life and the heaviest cross of the intellect. The question: ποθεν το κακον, has occupied the thoughts of men in all ages and still awaits in vain an answer that satisfies better than that of Holy Scripture. Insofar as philosophy in this matter taught anything of significance, it is, taken as a whole, a powerful proof for the truth of Holy Scripture, that this world cannot be explained without a fall. All great thinkers have, even if they did not know Gen. 3 or if they reject it as a myth, in spite of themselves paid silent or explicit homage to this simple narrative. And insofar as philosophy sought a solution to the problem in another way, it has strayed miserably and lamentably from the track. This applies first of all to the Pelagian explanation of sin, against which the many objections above on p. 44 were already mentioned with a single word and later, with the essence and the spread of sin, will come up for discussion more broadly. But it applies further also to all those systems which trace evil back, not to an act of will of the creature, but to the being or the nature of man, world, or God.

In the first place, sin cannot be derived from the sensuous nature of man. For then sin would always and everywhere bear a sensuous, fleshly character; but this is by no means always the case; there are also spiritual sins, sins with a demonic character, such as pride, envy, hatred, enmity against God, which are more hidden but absolutely not less in degree than the fleshly sins; and these are not explained by sensuality, just as, on this standpoint, the existence of fallen angels is not possible. If sins sprang from man's sensuous nature, one would also expect that they would be strongest and most frequent in the first years of life; that the spirit, in proportion as it develops more, would also rule over it the more powerfully and finally would overcome it entirely. But experience teaches quite otherwise. In proportion as man grows up, sin, even the sensuous, becomes more powerful over him; it is often not the child but the youth and the man who is a slave of his lusts and passions; and the development of the spirit is many times so little able to restrain sin that it rather provides the means to seek satisfaction of desires in [49] still stronger measure and in a more refined way. And even when the sensuous sins in later age have lost their dominion, they still remain secretly in the heart as desires or make room for others which, though more spiritual in nature, are nevertheless no less dreadful. If this explanation of sin from sensuality is then meant in earnest, it must lead to seeking redemption in suppression of the flesh; but precisely the history of asceticism is best able to cure once and for all of the error that sin can be overcome in that way. Also in the monastery the heart of men goes along, and out of that heart all kinds of sins and unrighteousness proceed. Finally, this theory wrongly tries to maintain itself with an appeal to the notion בָּשָׂר and σαρξ in Holy Scripture, specifically in Paul. This word denotes first of all the material, the substance of the human body, 1

Cor. 15:39, then the body itself organized out of that material in contrast with πνευμα, νους, καρδια, Rom. 2:25, 2 Cor. 7:5, Col. 2:5, further, more in the Old-Testament sense, man as an earthly, weak, frail, perishable being, Gen. 6:3, 18:27, Job 4:17-19, 15:14, 15, 25:4-6, Ps. 78:39, 103:14, Isa. 40:6, Jer. 17:5, Rom. 3:20, 1 Cor. 1:29, Gal. 2:16, and finally then in Paul the sinful direction of life of man. Thus he speaks of σαρκικος, ἐν σαρκι, κατα σαρκα είναι, ζην, περιπατειν, of σαρξ ἁμαρτιας, φρονημα της σαρκος, Rom. 3:7, 7:14, 8:3v., 1 Cor. 3:3, 2 Cor. 10:2, 3 etc. In this sense σαρξ forms an antithesis with πνευμα, yet not with the human πνευμα, which indeed is also sinful and needs sanctification, Rom. 12:1, 2, 1 Cor. 7:34, 2 Cor. 7:1, Eph. 4:23, 1 Thess. 5:23, but with the πνευμα ἁγιον or θεου, Rom. 8:2, 9, 11, which renews the human πνευμα, Rom. 7:6, 8:14, Gal. 5:18, also sanctifies the body and places it in the service of righteousness, Rom. 6:13, 19, 12:1, 1 Cor. 6:13, 15, 19, 20, and thus places in man a καινος ἁνθρωπος over against the old, sinful direction of life, the σαρξ, of the παλαιος ἁνθρωπος, Rom. 7:5v., 8:1v., Gal. 5:13-25, Eph. 2:3, 11, Col. 2:4. Some have now thought that the flesh according to this view is not only seat and organ but also source and origin of sin, Baur, Holsten, Lüdemann, Zeller, Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 1890 S. 60 f. [50] Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. 1897 II 13 f., Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 188 f., Matthes, Theol. Tijdsch. 1890 blz. 225-239. But this cannot be maintained against nor reconciled with these undeniable data, that Paul clearly derives sin from the temptation of the serpent and the transgression of Adam, Rom. 5:12, 2 Cor. 11:3; that he speaks of a defilement of flesh and spirit and with respect to both demands cleansing, 2 Cor. 7:1; that he also names among the works of the flesh all kinds of spiritual sins, such as idolatry, strife, wrath and even heresy, Gal. 5:19v.; that he designates enmity against God as φρονημα της

σαρκος, Rom. 3:7; that he assumes the existence of evil spirits, who nevertheless have no σαρξ at all, Eph. 6:12; that he nevertheless acknowledges Christ, though γενομενος ἐκ γυναικος, Gal. 4:4 and from Israel το κατα σαρκα, Rom. 9:5, as without any sin, 2 Cor. 5:21; that he calls the body a temple of God and claims all members for the service of righteousness, Rom. 6:13, 19, 12:1, 1 Cor. 6:13-20; that he teaches a resurrection of the dead bodies, 1 Cor. 15, and in principle combats asceticism, Col. 2:16, 1 Thess. 4:4. The proponents of the opinion that Paul holds the flesh to be the principle of sin therefore often turn back halfway and say that the flesh is not itself sin and does not of itself bring sin with it, but does provoke and tempt to sin, Clemen 204. Holtzmann II 38. Others have therefore judged that Paul, when he uses the word σαρξ in an ethical sense, entirely loses sight of its original meaning, Neander, Gesch. der Pflanzung u. Leitung der christl. Kirche5 1862 S. 508 f. Tholuck, Stud. u. Krit. 1855 S. 477 f. Weiss, Bibl. Theol.3 1880 § 68. Wendt, Die Begriffe Fleisch u. Geist 1878 cl. Theol. Stud. van de la Saussaye c. s. 1878 blz. 361v. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 315 f. This, however, is in itself already not probable and does not do justice to the connection that Scripture repeatedly lays between the earthly, weak, perishable nature of man and his sin. There is undoubtedly an intimate connection between both; the sensuous nature of man is not sin itself nor also source or principle of sin, but is nevertheless its dwelling, Rom. 7:17, 18 and organ of its dominion over us, Rom. 6:12. Man is not purely spirit, but he is earthly out of the earth, has become a living [51] soul, 1 Cor. 15:45v., thereby stands in connection with the cosmos and always has the body as his instrument and as the organ of his acting, Rom. 6:13, 8:13. This sensuous nature gives to sin, as it is proper to men, a particular character, distinct from that in the angels, both in its origin

and in its essence. The temptations come to him from without through the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life. And it is the sensuous nature of man that gives to his sin this character, that he makes the belly his God, that he minds the things that are below, that he seeks himself and lives for himself, and that he honors the creature above the Creator, Rom. 1:21v., Phil. 2:4, 21, 3:19, Col. 3:2, etc. Σαρξ denotes the sinful direction of life of man, who according to soul and body turns away from God and toward the creature. Cf. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I2 559. Müller, Sünde I5 447 f. Ernesti, Die Ethik des Ap. Paulus3 1880 S. 32 f. Cremer in Herzog2 4, 573. Gloël, Der H. Geist 1888 S. 14-61, 246.

6. The explanation of sin from the sensuous nature of man, however, as was remarked above, cannot stop here, but must come to this, to seek its cause in matter or in the finitude and limitation of the creature, and thus further in an eternal, independent power alongside God or in a dark nature or blind will in the Divine being itself. This opinion concerning the origin of sin recommends itself above the previous one by its deeper insight into the power and dominion of sin; it has an open eye not only for its ethical and anthropological but also for its cosmic and theological significance; it takes seriously the undeniable truth, that a power as tremendous as sin cannot have arisen accidentally, outside God's will and counsel. It finds support in the whole present condition of the world, both the physical and the ethical. Everywhere, in nature and history, there are sharp, deep oppositions, which seem to be necessary for life and development. Heaven and earth, light and darkness, day and night, summer and winter, storm and calm, war and peace, labour and rest, prosperity and adversity, love and hate, joy and sorrow, health and sickness, life and [52] death, truth and lie, sin and virtue, they are the contradictory factors of which all that exists is

composed and without which there can apparently be no question of progress and advance. What storms are in nature, wars and revolutions in society, the peasants and slaves in a drama, the solecisms and barbarisms in language, the antitheses in an oration, the discords in music, the shadow on a painting, that is sin in the world; see these and similar images already in Plato, the Stoa, Plotinus, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 765. 929. IV 173. V 548-562 and then later also in Augustine, Erigena, Leibniz etc. All activity also presupposes hindrance; a dove might indeed think that it could fly better in a vacuum, but the resistance of the air is precisely necessary for its flight (Kant); and so a man too may think that he could live better without sin, but sin is precisely necessary for his moral perfection. The law of contradiction is the fundamental law of all that is, der Quellbronn des ewigen Lebens. Was zum Handeln treibt, ja zwingt, ist allein der Widerspruch. Ohne Widerspruch also wäre keine Bewegung, kein Leben, kein Fortschritt, sondern ewiger Stillstand, ein Todesschlummer aller Kräfte, Schelling, Werke I 8 S. 219. 321. What would a life without sin be? It would be an existence without content, a vain abstraction, without opportunity for struggle and victory, for conflict and reconciliation; without material for drama and song, for science and art. Therefore Dante could paint his hell with colours borrowed from this world; but for the depiction of a heaven this earth offers no data (Schopenhauer). Indeed, the proponents of this opinion concerning the origin of sin gladly appeal to many passages of Holy Scripture, which speak of a necessity of sins and calamities, Mt. 18:7, Luk. 24:26, Joh. 9:3, 1 Cor. 11:19, 2 Tim. 2:20; to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin, who also let God's counsel and providence extend over sin; to the well-known words in the Easter vigil of the missale

romanum: o certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!

There is in this representation so much that is true, that it need not surprise that it has at all times held minds spellbound. [53] Sin is not accidental or arbitrary, it is included in the counsel of God. It is so interwoven with our whole existence, that we can form no conception of a holy life, of a sinless history. Against its will it is made serviceable by God Almighty to the revelation of his virtues and to the honour of his name. And yet, despite all the truth that is hidden in this representation and will later come to light still more clearly, yet it cannot and may not be accepted. In the first place it deprives sin of its ethical character. Sin is certainly not only and not always an act of the will, as Pelagianism says, but indeed also a condition, a nature of the will; yet it never goes wholly outside the will. Omne peccatum est voluntarium, understood in the sense of Augustine, is undoubtedly correct. Here, however, sin is in gnostic and theosophical fashion paralleled and identified with the physical phenomena of darkness, sickness, death etc.; derived from the flesh, matter, the essence of creatures, the nature of God, and thus made into a substance or into a necessary quality of the existence of things. Thereby sin is deprived of its ethical character and reduced to a physical phenomenon. Secondly, sin according to this representation becomes eternal and unconquerable. For since it is not ethical but physical in nature, it is necessarily proper to all that exists, both God and the world, and is indispensable for the existence of everything. The good is not only necessary for the evil, but conversely the evil also for the good. The evil is here not attached to the good and to being, but it is itself a being, itself a good, without which the good also cannot exist. The human being who strives after deliverance from sin would cherish a godless wish

and work at his own downfall. A world without sin would be impossible; a status gloriae nothing but a dream. Thirdly, sin hereby ceases to be an antithesis, it becomes a lower, lesser degree of the good, in its place just as good as the good itself. It becomes a moment in life and history always destined to disappear and yet never disappearing; a not-yet-being of what the creature ought to be and yet never becomes or can become; a pure negation, which actually has no reality but exists only in our [54] thought. Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus, Spinoza, Eth. praef. cf. Ep. 32 en 34. Cog. metaph. I 6, 7, en voorts Hegel, Werke VIII 180 f. Strauss, Gl. II 365-384. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 81. Paulsen, Syst. d. Ethik I 251 f. Scholten, L. H. K. II 34v. 422. 580. Fourthly, on this standpoint God must become the author of sin. Parseeism and Manichaeism still shrank back from this, set the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness directly opposite each other and placed at the head of both an eternal, Divine being. The God of nature is a wholly different one than the God of the good, the moral power that asserts itself in conscience. But gnostic philosophy and theosophy took up the oppositions into the one Absolute. God himself must, in order to become person, spirit, carry a dark nature in himself and eternally overcome it. He himself comes through a struggle, a process, whether then before and outside or in and through the world, to his Divine existence. An sich is Hij βυθος ἀγνωστος, dark nature, blind will and as such the Creator of matter. Damit des Böse nicht wäre, müsste Gott selbst nicht seyn, Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 403. Against this now not only does Holy Scripture testify, but the moral consciousness in all people also rises up in resistance. Sin may be what it will, but this one thing

stands firm, that God is the Righteous and the Holy, who in his law forbids it, in conscience testifies against it, in punishments and judgements visits it. Sin is not rational and not lawful, it is ἀνομια; it is not necessary for the existence of creatures, it is much less necessary for the existence of God. The good is necessary, so that even the evil could be; but the good does not have need of the evil, holiness does not have need of sin, truth does not have need of the lie, God does not have need of Satan. If nevertheless sin still often serves to bring the good to greater manifestation and to glorify God's virtues, then this does not happen with and through but against its will, through the wisdom and the omnipotence of God. Against its nature sin is then compelled to be serviceable to the honour of God and to the coming of his kingdom. Thus the evil often pays homage to the good, thus the lie is overtaken by the truth, thus Satan must, in order to tempt, often appear as an angel of light. But all that is not to be credited to sin but to the omnipotence of God, who can cause the good to proceed from the evil, the light from the darkness and life from death. Finally, this whole false representation avenges itself in a dreadful way in the practice of life. If philosophy proclaims it in so many words: God bears the blame for everything, the human being goes free, then in practice libertinism and pessimism do not wait long. Libertinism, which holds sin to be a delusion and this delusion to be the only sin, which wipes out all boundaries between good and evil, falsifies all moral concepts or with Nietzsche melts them down and mints them anew, which under the slogan of the emancipation of the flesh glorifies bestiality as geniality. Pessimism, which, blind to sin, thinks only of suffering, casts the blame for all that suffering upon the alogical act of an absolute will, and seeks in the destruction of what exists the deliverance from suffering. Judged by the outcome, the so-called

independent philosophy also is guided by the striving proper to every human being, to justify oneself and to accuse God of injustice. Cf. Müller, Sünde I5 374 f. Weiszäcker, Zu der Lehre v. Wesen der Sünde, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1856 S. 131-195. Kahnis, Dogm. I 478 f. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 143 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 114 f. Orr, Chr. view of God and the world p. 193.

7. Yet with that, that God is no cause of sin, not everything has been said. Scripture, which keeps God far from all ungodliness, on the other hand speaks as decisively as possible that his counsel and government also extend over sin; see the passages already mentioned earlier, part II 315, 369 and above p. 30v. God is not the author of sin, but it nevertheless does not proceed apart from his knowledge, his will, and his power; how then is that relation of God to sin to be conceived? Some, in order to keep Him free from all sin, even deprived God of omniscience, part II 161. Others judged that sin indeed did not proceed apart from God's knowledge but did proceed apart from his will and were satisfied with the concept of the permissio. God did indeed know sin beforehand but did not will it; He only permitted it and has [56] not prevented it. Thus spoke the church fathers, Clemens Alex., Strom IV c. 12. Orig., de princ. III 2, 7. Damasc., de fide orthod. II 29 etc., cf. Suicerus, s. v. προνοια and συγχωρησις. With this manner of speaking and with this solution the Pelagians were content, cf. Augustinus, c. Julianum Pelag. V c. 3; many Roman Catholic theologians, Trid. VI c. 6, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. II 16. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 6, 5; the Remonstrants, Arminius, Op. 644 sq. 694 sq. Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV sect. 4 c. 10. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 29; the Lutherans, Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 9. Quenstedt, Theol. I 533 Hollaz, Ex. theol. 449. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 560, Bretschneider, Dogm. I 506, and many more recent theologians, Ebrard, Dogm. § 265. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 419. 444 etc. Now from this

side it was often indeed acknowledged that the permissio was no lack of knowledge and power in God, that it also did not make Him into an idle spectator of sin, but still the permissio was always defined as an actus negativus, as a suspensio impedimenti, as neither a positive willing nor a positive not-willing of sin but as a non velle impedire. It is clear that this representation not only gives no solution but is also ambiguous and evades the actual question. The question, on which it depends, is this: suppose that such a more or less negative act of divine permissio precedes in a particular case, does sin then follow or not, does it then still stand in the choice of the free will of man or not, can he then still just as well omit it as do it? If the decision then still rests with the free will of man, then Pelagius is right and the government of sin is in fact wholly taken away from God and He is at most an otiosus peccatorum spectator. If, on the other hand, God's permissio is of such a nature that man, placed in those circumstances, not by compulsion but by virtue of the ordinances that apply specifically to the moral life, must commit sin, then the right is on the side of Augustine, one may judge about the word permissio as one will. Thus posing this problem, Augustine had already seen that the permission could not be purely negative but must be an act of God's will. Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo. God does all that pleases Him; He does not will something without doing it, but what He wills, that He does; and what [57] happens, never happens apart from his will. Miro et ineffabili modo non fit praeter ejus voluntatem, quod etiam contra ejus fit voluntatem, quia non fieret, si non sineret (nec utique nolens sinit sed volens) nec sinere bonus fieri male nisi omnipotens et de malo facere posset bene, Ench. 95-100. de trin. III 4 sq. de civ. XIV 11, de gr. et lib. arb. 20. 21. Many scholastic and Augustinian theologians still spoke in a similar spirit; even

though they also made use of the word permit, it was nevertheless understood as velle sinere or velle permittere mala fieri, Lombardus, Sent. I 46. Thomas, S. Theol. I 19 art. 9. c. Gent. I 95. II 25. Comment. op Sent. I 46. Hugo Vict. S. Sent. I c. 13. de Sacr. I. 4 c. 4-15.

In the essence of the matter the Reformed had no other conviction; hence a certain Livinus de Meyer rightly said: ovum ovo non esse similius quam doctrinam Calvinianam Thomisticae, bij Daelman, Summa S. Thomae II 308. Only, they had gained the experience that the word permissio was used in a very ambiguous meaning and was misused to conceal Pelagianism. Therefore they were not inclined toward the word. They had in itself so little against it, that they nevertheless in fact all used it again, cf. bij Ebrard, Dogm. § 265. But the permissio was then, according to their conviction, no pure negation, no mera cessatio voluntatis, proceeding from ignorantia or impotentia or negligentia, but a positive act of God, a volitio efficax, yet not efficiens or producens but deficiens, upon which, according to the nature of the moral life, sin must follow, Zwingli, Op. III 170 IV de provid. c. 5. Calvin, Inst. I 17, 11. 18, 1. 2 II 4, 2-4 III 23, 4. 8. 9. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 315. 387. 399. II 347. III 426. Zanchius, Op. II 269. Martyr, Loci C. p. 58. Gomarus, de provid. Dei c. 11. Twissus, de permissione Op. I 544-668. Maccovius, Loci C. p. 206. Alting, Theol. El. nova p. 316. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI 277. M. Vitringa II 196 etc. It is true that in the heat of the struggle dicta duriora have sometimes been used by the Reformed, cf. e.g. Calvin, Inst. III 23, 7. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 319. 360. 401 Zanchius Op. V 2. And Roman Catholics, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. II c. 3 sq. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 5 X c. 8. Möhler, Symb. § 2-4, Socinians, Cat. Racov. X 16, Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. c. 2 and 6, Episc. Op. I 375 sq., and Lutherans, [58] Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 10. Quenstedt, Theol. II 97 have

not failed to make use of it and time and again to accuse the Reformed that they made God the author of sin. But in the first place those dicta duriora are all still milder than those which sometimes occur in Holy Scripture, e.g. Ex. 7:3, 2 Sam. 16:10, 24:1, Mal. 1:3, Luk. 2:34, Rom. 9:17, 18, 2 Thess. 2:11 etc.; further, all such harsh expressions have at all times been imputed by the Judaizers to Paul, by the Pelagians to Augustine, by Hincmar to Gottschalk, by the Jesuits to the Jansenists; next, they have always been avoided by the Reformed in their confessions, Maccovius was questioned about it at the Synod of Dordt, Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. III 1831 bl. 632; moreover, they have been omitted by most Reformed theologians or also elucidated and explained, Voetius, Disp. I 1119-1137, Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV 18. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 7. 8. Trigland, Kerk. Gesch. IV 673v. V 694. Id. Antapologia c. 8-10, Chamier Panstr. Cath. II lib. 3 Moor II 487 etc.; and finally their meaning and intention is for everyone who wishes to understand them completely transparent from the connection with the whole of the Reformed doctrine. The matter is simply this, that the permissio, taken in a negative sense, in the question of God's relation to sin offers not the least solution; does not in the least remove the objection that God is its author, and in fact withdraws the whole of sin from God's providential government. For he who can prevent an evil and yet, looking on silently, lets it happen, stands just as guilty as he who commits the evil itself, Beza, Tract. Theol. I 315. Moreover, even if God has only and solely permitted sin, there must nevertheless be a reason why He has not wished to prevent it. That reason cannot in God lie in a lack of knowledge or power; thus it must lie in his will. Therefore the permissio is then nevertheless again an act of his will; He has willed to permit it; and this willing to permit

cannot be conceived otherwise than that sin now in fact also, not by God, but by the creature, takes place.

Moreover, Christian theology, when it discussed God's government over sin, has nevertheless never remained standing with this permissio. If, namely, both Scripture and Christian thought forbade placing sin wholly or in part outside the will and providence, then only such a solution could still be attempted [59] that a distinction was made in the manner of God's government over the good and over the evil. And indeed, although in a certain sense it can also be said that God has willed sin, i.e. that He has willed that sin should exist, He has nevertheless willed evil in a wholly different manner than the good; in the good He has good pleasure, but evil He hates with divine hatred. In order that this difference in God's government over the good and over the evil may come to light, it must in the first place be pointed out that God and man are never separated but yet are always distinguished, cf. above p. 28. Faith is a gift, God causes to believe, but yet it is formaliter not God but man who believes. Much more does this apply to the sinful act. Materialiter this is most certainly to be ascribed to God, but formaliter this remains at the charge of man. When a murderer beats someone to death, all the deliberation and the strength that he needs for that are derived from God, but the act is, formally considered, his and not God's. Yes, the fact of killing is, purely taken in itself, not yet a sin, for the same has often taken place in war and on the scaffold. What makes the killing into sin is not the materia, the substratum, but the forma, i.e. the vitiositas, the ανομια; not the substantia but the accidens in the act. Against this it has been objected that this distinction, even if it is correct, nevertheless in fact gives nothing, because it places the formal element of the act, i.e. precisely the sinful in sin, outside God's government,

Episcopius, Op. I 180. Quenstedt, Theol. II 101. This remark is only partly correct; it contains truth, not in general but only in this special case, concerning sin. For with faith no one will from the fact that man is formaliter its subject conclude that it lies outside God's providence. But it is true that with faith the situation is wholly different than with sin. Faith, indeed, is an absolute gift and excludes all merit; sin, on the other hand, is man's act and brings guilt with it. Therefore sin must here not be set over against faith, which is now bestowed by God out of grace, but over against the good that man would have done if he had remained standing. That good would have been materialiter wholly God's work; formaliter, however, it had man [60] as subject and brought for him, not indeed from itself but according to the foedus operum, a claim to reward. Just as now that good would not thereby have been withdrawn from God's government, so sin is not placed outside his providence because in the formal sense it has not God but man as subject. But there is more. With the good, God's providence is to be conceived in such a way that He himself by his Spirit works in the subject and positively makes it capable for the good. With sin it cannot and may not be represented thus. Sin is ἀνομια, deformitas and thus has God not as causa efficiens but at most as causa deficiens. Light cannot of itself bring forth darkness; darkness arises only when the light is taken away. God is therefore at most the negative cause, the causa per accidens of sin; in man its real, positive cause is to be sought. Because, however, sin is only forma and no substantia, it is in no respect placed outside God's providence by the fact that it is formaliter an act of man. He works in it, yet in a manner wholly corresponding to the nature of sin. Just as in his government He governs all things in accordance with their own nature, so also in the moral domain He maintains the ordinances that He has established for it in

particular. Sin too arises and develops according to fixed law, not according to the laws of nature or of logic, but according to those which are implanted in ethical life and continue to operate even in the devastation. Sickness, dissolution, death are the antipodes of health, development, life, but are no less than these governed from the beginning to the end by fixed laws. And so there is also a law of sin, which determines its whole history in man and mankind. And precisely that law-governed element in sin proves that God reigns kingly also in and over it. A man who sins does not make himself loose and independent of God; on the contrary, while he was a son, he becomes a slave. He who does sin is a servant of sin. Cf. on God's relation to sin: the church fathers Orig., Athan., Basil., etc. in Münscher-v. Coelln, D. G. I 157, and further Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 49 art. 2. II 1 qu. 79 art. 2. S. c. Gent. III 3. 71. Comm. op Sent. I dist. 46-48 II dist. 37. Bellarm., de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. II 18. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 6. Quenstedt, Theol. I 535. Hollaz, 448. Calvin, [61] Inst. I 18. II 4. de provid. C. R. 36, 347-366 and 37, 269-318. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 312 sq. 337 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 259. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II lib. 3. Twissus, Vindic. gratiae I 317 sq. 544 sq. Trigland, Antapol. c. 9. 10. Gomarus, de provid. Op. p. 136. Mastricht, Theol. III 10, 19, sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 8. Moor II 492. Vitringa II 196.

8. With the distinction between the material and the formal in sin, however, the question has not yet been answered why God has included sin in his decree and in the execution thereof. The answer lies enclosed in the providence of God, as it also extends over sin. Scripture repeatedly expresses it, that God uses sin as a means, for punishment of the ungodly, Deut. 2:30, Jos. 11:20, Judg. 9:23, 24, John 12:40, Rom. 1:21-28, 2 Thess. 2:11, 12, for the salvation of his people, Gen. 45:5, 50:20, for the testing

and chastisement of believers, Job 1:11, 12, 2 Sam. 24:1, 1 Cor. 10:13, 11:19, 2 Cor. 12:7, for the glorification of his name, Ex. 7:3, Prov. 16:4, Rom. 9:17, 11:33, etc. Precisely because God is the absolutely Holy and Almighty, he can use sin as a means in his hand. Creatures cannot do that and are themselves defiled and unclean at the slightest contact. But God is so infinitely far from ungodliness, that he can make sin serviceable as nothing but a will-less instrument to his glorification. There are examples in abundance, to prove that in this too the proverb holds: duo cum faciunt idem, non est idem. God wills that Shimei curses David, that Satan visits Job, that Jews and Gentiles deliver up his holy child Jesus to death—and yet in all these unrighteousnesses the creatures stand guilty and God goes free. For even when he wills that evil be, he never wills this otherwise than in a holy manner; he uses it but does not commit it. And therefore he has also permitted sin in his creation. He would not have tolerated it, if he had not been able to govern it in an absolutely holy and sovereign manner. He would not have endured it, if he were not God, the Holy and the Almighty. But because he is God, he has not feared its existence and its power; he has willed it, in order that in and over against it he might bring his Divine virtues to [62] light. If he had not granted it existence, there would always have been room for the thought, that he was not in all his virtues exalted above a power whose possibility was given with creation itself. For every rational creature, as creature, as finite, limited, changeable being, includes the possibility of apostasy. But God has, because he is God, not feared the way of freedom, the reality of sin, the outbreak of unrighteousness, the power of Satan. And thus he always rules over sin, at its origin and at its development. He does not compel it; he does not check it with violence; he does not crush it by his might; but he lets it come to its full development of

power. He remains king and yet lets it have free play in his kingdom; he grants it everything, his world, his creatures, his Christ even, for mala sine bonis esse non possunt; he permits it to make use of all that is his; he grants it opportunity to show what it can do, in order then nevertheless at the end to step forth from the field of battle as King of kings. For sin is of such a nature, that it perishes through the freedom granted to it, that it dies of its own sickness, that it eats death to itself. At the summit of its power it is, solely by the cross, publicly displayed in its powerlessness, Col. 2:15. Therefore God has willed that sin should exist. Quamvis ergo ea, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona, tamen ut non solum bona sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi hoc esset bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est, quod non vult esse, non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatur ipsum nostrae confessionis initium, qua nos in Deum omnipotentem credere confitemur, Aug., Enchir. 96. Because he knew that he could absolutely control sin, melius judicavit de malis bene facere quam mala nulla esse permittere, ib. 11. 27. de civ. XXII 1, de Gen. ad litt. II 9. de Gen. ad Manich. II 28. He thinks and leads evil to good and places it in the service of his glory. Augustine even makes use of all kinds of images, to assign sin a place in the order of the whole. It has there the same significance as the shadow in a painting, de civ. XI 23, the solecisms and barbarisms in language, [63] de ord. II 11, the contrasts in a song, de civ. XI 18. God has composed the ordo seculorum as a pulcherrimum carmen out of some antitheses, in order to increase the beauty and the harmony of the whole, de civ. XI 18, XIV 11, de Gen. ad Manich. I 16, cf. Erigena, de div. nat. V 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 48 art. 2 c. Gesch. III 71. Leibniz, in Pichler, Theol. des Leibniz I 264 f. and also above p. 51. These

images do contain some truth, but they readily give occasion to misunderstanding, they make sin appear far too much as necessary and in the whole of things precisely in its place, they sacrifice the particular to the general and thereby also offer to those who struggle with sin or are bowed down under suffering, neither reconciliation nor comfort. But this is true, that also and precisely in the government of sin the virtues of God come to glorious revelation. The riches of God's grace, the depth of his mercy, the unchangeableness of his faithfulness, the incorruptibility of his righteousness, the glory of his wisdom and power have, through sin, come forth all the more clearly into the light. When man had broken the covenant of works, he has put in its place the so much better covenant of grace. When Adam had fallen, he has given Christ as the Lord from heaven. That now is Divine greatness, thus to govern sin, that it even contrary to its nature and striving becomes serviceable to the honour of his name. And therefore sin, which is in the world, can so little take from us faith in God, in his love and power, that it, rightly considered, rather confirms and strengthens us in that faith. Si malum est, Deus est. Non enim esset malum, sublato ordine boni, cujus privatio sit malum; hic autem ordo non esset, si Deus non esset, Thomas, c. Gent. III 71.

9. Although sin from its beginning stands under God's government, it nevertheless does not have its origin in God but in the will of the rational creature. But here at once a new problem arises. How is sin ever to be explained from the will of a being that was created after God's image in true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness? The Pelagian representation, that the first man was in a state of childish innocence, of moral indifference, already appeared to us earlier to be unacceptable, part II 517; it does not explain the fall of man [64] but changes it into an insignificant accident,

and makes it incomprehensible that from it such dreadful consequences and such terrible miseries have proceeded for the whole human race. If a source can bring forth such a stream of unclean water, it must itself be inwardly corrupted. It is therefore impermissible to reduce the distance between the status integritatis and the status corruptionis so much that the transition becomes easy and gradual. Man was created by God not morally indifferent but positively holy. Yet in doing so the following must be considered. In the first place God has very certainly willed the possibility of sin. The possibilitas peccandi is from God. The thought of sin was first of all conceived in his consciousness. God has eternally thought sin as his absolute opposite, and thus, with that nature, included it in his decree; otherwise it could never have arisen and existed in reality. Neither Satan nor Adam and Eve were the first to arrive at the thought of sin; God himself, as it were, set this visibly before their eyes. By the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and by the probationary command God clearly pointed out to man two ways, which he could take. And before his fall God even permitted that an evil power from without penetrated into paradise, used the serpent as its instrument and began to negotiate with Eve about the meaning of the probationary command. The possibility of sin is thus without doubt willed by God. In the second place: in agreement with that objective possibility God created angels and men in such a way that they could sin and fall. They did not yet have the highest; they were placed not at the end but at the beginning of the way; the gift of perseverantia, which is a gift and always remains so, which can never in the proper sense be merited and can never belong to the nature of a creature, was still withheld from them. Otherwise it would also have had the appearance as if God wanted to prevent sin by force and feared its power. Angels and men therefore had the gratia, qua

potuerunt stare, not that qua vellent perpetuo stare, Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 178, 179. They did not yet have the highest, inalienable freedom, i.e. the freedom of no longer being able to will to sin. The image of God was thus in man still limited; it was not unfolded in all [65] its fullness; it still had a boundary in the possibility of sin. Man indeed stood in the good, but the possibility of evil still lay alongside it; he indeed walked on the good way but could stray aside; he was good, but changeably good, mutabiliter bonus. God alone is the being in all his virtues and therefore unchangeable. Every creature, however, becomes and can therefore also become degenerate. If materia and forma are distinct, as is always the case with creatures, then the possibility always remains open that the materia changes from forma. What is formed can be deformed and thus also reformed again; what is created can be misshapen and thus also recreated again. Moral freedom, however strong, is in itself essentially distinguished from logical necessity and physical compulsion. A creatura naturaliter impeccabilis is therefore a contradiction, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 63 art. 1. c. Gent. III 109. In the third place, in the question concerning the origin of sin the capacity and activity of the imagination come into consideration. Formerly little account was taken of this in dogmatics, although one was also aware that temptation in man first and most directs itself to the imagination and thereby works upon desire and will, Voetius, Disp. I 943. Burmannus, Synopsis I 46, 54. Edwards, Works III 122. In mysticism, however, the imagination took a great place in; according to Böhme Lucifer has, through the Phantasey, hinein imaginiert himself into the abyss of sin; er neigte sich in die Phantasey, also ergriff sie ihn auch und ergab sich ihm in sein Leben, bij Joh. Claassen, J. Böhme II 95. And in fact it always proceeds in the arising of the sinful act as Thomas a Kempis describes it: primo occurrit menti

simplex cogitatio, deinde fortis imaginatio, postea delectatio et motus pravus et assensio, de imit. Chr. I 13, 5. Consciousness takes the thought of sin into itself, the imagination adorns it and transforms it into an alluring ideal, desire stretches itself out toward it and the will accomplishes it. Thus also in angel and man the imagination has been the capacity that made the transgression of the command appear as the way to Godlikeness, cf. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. II 422 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 433 f. Kuyper, Heraut 906. And finally attention must be paid to the fact that Paul in 1 Cor. 15:45v. speaks of the first [66] man as earthly out of the earth, as by creation having become a living soul and thus sets him over against Christ, the Lord out of heaven, who has become a life-giving spirit. This comparison and contrast between Adam and Christ also has a deep significance for the fall of the first man. Adam was earthly out of the earth, also before the transgression of God's command; by his creation he became a living soul; the natural is first, afterward the spiritual. In this now is expressed that the origin and the nature of sin in angels and men differ very much. To be sure we know little of the fall of the angels; but with a view to 1 Tim. 3:6 and 2 Petr. 2:4 it may nevertheless be called highly probable that pride, wanting to be like God in power and dominion, has been the beginning and the principle of their fall. The angels were not tempted as men were; the temptation did not come to them from without; they fell through themselves. Jesus says that the devil speaks ἐκ των ἰδιων when he speaks a lie. He has from himself, through his own thinking, become dissatisfied with his position and his power; he has brought forth the lie out of himself and set it as a kingdom, as a system over against the truth of God. But with man it is not so. He was not a pure spirit; he was not placed so high, although as created after God's image he still stood nearer to God

than the angels; he could not think so high and so boldly exalt himself; he was earthly out of the earth, a living soul, indeed more refined and more delicate but therefore at the same time also weaker and more fragilely organized. As such a being indeed created after God's image but nevertheless earthly, sensuous, he offered Satan a suitable opportunity for temptation. This came to him from without, accommodated itself as it were to his nature, awakened in him the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh and the pride of life, and thus brought him to a fall. Origin and essence of sin in man bear an entirely different character than in the angels; in both it comes out that man sins, not as a devil, but as a man, as a being that is earthly out of the earth and that by creation has become a living soul. For this reason Scripture and especially Paul lays such a close connection between the sensuous nature of man and sin. [67] There absolutely does not lie at the basis of that the contrast of sensuousness and reason, and the thought that matter is of a lower order and the principle of sin. This contrast and this thought are not Israelite but Greek in origin. Scripture knows nothing of such a dualism, but it does know of something else, namely of this, that man from the outset is a sensuous, a psychic being. He is immediately created as a living soul, earthly out of the earth. That therefore he was also already in the status integritatis; and therefore he was, in spite of the knowledge and the righteousness that he possessed, susceptible to seduction and temptation. Already with the first sin it came out that man was σαρξ; and all following sins have only always brought his temptability, weakness, unreliability ever more clearly to light. All sin of man, also the spiritual, bears a character that corresponds with his psychic nature and differs from that of sin in the angels. The image of God was man before the fall not in

spite of, but in his peculiar, psychic nature; and from that his sin also receives its stamp.

With all this nothing else and nothing more than the possibility of sin has been demonstrated. How that possibility has become reality is a mystery and will probably remain so. We can indicate that the thought of sin has existed eternally in God's mind, that it has been set before man's eyes in the probationary commandment, that he thus, besides the good, also had knowledge of a forbidden evil, that the imagination is the faculty which transforms thoughts into ideals. But thereby the transition from possibility to reality, from mere representation to the sinful deed, has not yet been explained. This explanation escapes us, not only in the origin of the first sin, but repeatedly in all kinds of deeds and actions of man. In psychology and biography we do indeed content ourselves with a few data; if we know something of someone's ancestry, parents, upbringing, etc., we think that we have explained his personality, his life and deeds. But this is in fact rather superficial; every human being is a mystery, and every action has yet another and deeper root than that of the milieu. In a much stronger measure this holds true with sin. Here we enter the mysterious domain of moral freedom and we are confronted with a [68] phenomenon which by its very nature escapes an explanation in its origin. For a moral action is never like a conclusion from premises, nor like a physical or chemical result. It is essentially distinct from both and has a nature of its own; moral learning is entirely sui generis, it is always a life of freedom, and this is by its very nature a riddle. But much more is this the case with a sinful, and then specifically with the first sinful deed. Sin cannot be deduced logically or physically from preceding circumstances, reasonings, deliberations; it can especially not be derived from a holy nature created in God's image.

Whoever understood and explained sin, i.e. could demonstrate that it necessarily had to follow from what preceded, would do its nature injustice, erase the boundaries between good and evil, and reduce evil to something good. The sinful deed has as its cause the sinful will, but who points out the cause of this sinful will? Causas defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint sed deficientes, velle invenire, tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras vel andire silentium, Aug. de civ. XII 7. Sin began with a lie, Joh. 8:44, it rests on a false imagination, on an untrue representation, on an imagination of a good that was no good; it is thus in its origin a folly and an absurdity; it has no origin in the proper sense, but only a beginning. Not without reason has Satan therefore been called an Ironie aller Logik, cf. Tholuck, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde, 8te Aufl. 1862 S. 15. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 256. H. Schmidt, Herz.2 15, 22. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 37. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 156. This impossibility of explaining the origin of sin is therefore also not to be conceived as an evasion, as an asylum ignorantiae. Rather it is to be stated openly and clearly; we stand here at the boundaries of our knowledge. Sin is there, but it will never be able to justify its existence; it is unlawful and unreasonable.

10. Concerning the time of the fall no precise determination is possible. For Manichaeism and pantheism the question about it also has no significance. Sin is then eternal; it is rooted in an evil being or in God himself and coincides with [69] the existence of the finite. Between creation and fall there is no distinction; creation itself is an apostasy of God from himself as pure being. According to the theosophists the fall of the angels took place in the time that lies between Gen. 1:1 and 2. The desolation, emptiness, and darkness of the earth cannot have been created by God, who is the God of life and of light; they already presuppose a fall and a curse

that followed upon it. The angels first dwelt on this earth; this was their οἰκητηριον, Jud. 6; that is also evident from the fact that Satan is still now called the prince of the world, that he wants to wrest it from man, who later received it from God as an inheritance, that he wanted to hand it over to Christ in the temptation in exchange for an act of worship, that he still now dwells in the air, and that the world lies in the Evil One. Heaven and earth, however, which were created in Gen. 1:1 and assigned to the angels, were of an entirely different nature than those that were later prepared in the six days, Gen. 1:3v. They were a spiritual, immaterial realm of light. The physical, material earth, which arose in the six days, already presupposes the fall of the angels, just as the desolation, emptiness, and darkness of Gen. 1:2. Matter is in itself unclean, selfish, and therefore cannot have been produced directly by God. Nur ein ungeheures Verbrechen, weniger ein Abfall als eine Empörung, konnte diese materielle Offenbarung als Krisis, Hemmungs- und Wiederherstellungsanstalt veranlassen, und nur die Fortdauer dieses Verbrechens macht den Fortbestand oder die Forterzeugung dieser Materie begreiflich (Baader); cf. Joh. Claassen, Jakob Böhme, Sein Leben u. seine theos. Werke II 1885 S. 127 f. Id. Franz von Baader, Leben u. theos. Werke II 1887 S. 157 f. Keerl, Der Mensch das Ebenbild Gottes I 166 f., and many others, Hamberger, Schubert, K. v. Raumer, R. Wagner, Kurtz, Delitzsch etc., cf. Reusch, Bibel u. Natur4, 1876 S. 88. But this theory, however attractive, nevertheless has no sufficient ground in Holy Scripture. In Gen. 1:2 it does not say that the earth became desolate and empty, but that it was so; with not a single word is it said that this desolation and emptiness was a devastation that followed upon an ordered condition; and much less is there yet any mention that the fall of the angels took place before that time and was the cause of that desolation.

Furthermore, it is not to be seen what connection there can be between the fall of the [70] angels—suppose that this already took place before Gen. 1:2—and the desolation of the earth. In order to establish such a connection, one must take refuge in all manner of gnostic ideas; one must then teach that the angels in a certain sense are bodily beings and received the original earth as a dwelling-place, just as they now, according to some, still dwell on the fixed stars; that the first earth, which was created in Gen. 1:1, was an essentially different one than that which was prepared in the six days and consisted of a finer substance; that coarse matter, out of which it now consists, although created by God, nevertheless presupposes the fall, is something ungodly and by nature unclean and selfish—all together opinions that are not derived from Scripture but from Gnosticism.

Little ground exists for the opinion that the fall of man already took place before Gen. 3, whether in the pre-existent state of souls, or in Gen. 2 at and before the creation of the woman. This was the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato: the souls first existed in the τοπος ὑπερουρανιος, whence they were driven out by a fall and, as punishment, were shut up in earthly bodies as in prisons, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 819 f. Origen adopted this view, in order to explain by it the inequality among creatures, part II 442. Theosophy often connected with it still the opinion that man was first created androgynous and that the creation of the woman was already proof of a fall that had previously occurred, part II 548, and further also M. Vitringa II 265. Related to this is the doctrine of Kant, who speaks of an intelligible act as cause of the radical Hang zum Bösen and of the angeborne Schuld, Religion ed. Rosenkranz 34. 42. 44 f., and likewise also Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 385. Müller, Sünde II5 99 f. Steffens, Renouvier, Sécrétan, Dr. Edw. Beecher e. a. But these assertions all lack every theological and also every

philosophical ground. In the first place they include the pre-existent existence of souls, which for various reasons is not plausible, part II 565. Further, the fall that is related in Gen. 3 is deprived of its character and significance; it ceases to be a fall and becomes only the appearance of something that already long ago has taken place; in connection therewith the temporal, empirical freedom of man loses all its value; the soul alone has fallen and has been placed as punishment in the [71] body. Further, this doctrine is also in conflict with the organic coherence of the human race. Every man determines his own lot, das Wesen des Menschen ist wesentlich seine eigene That (Schelling). Besides, it gives rise to astonishment that all men individually, without any exception, determine themselves to evil, and that only the first man, though fallen, nevertheless still received a trial, whether he perhaps still wished to remain standing and to restore his fall. And finally it is clear that humanity, thus dissolved into an aggregate of individuals, can have neither a common head in Adam nor also in Christ. There is no common fall, there is therefore also no common restoration; each falls for himself, each must therefore also raise himself up; in spite of the radical Böse Kant therefore also concluded from the du sollst to the du kannst.

We must therefore remain with the data of Scripture, however few these may be. The time of the fall of the angels is not mentioned at all. With a view to the ἀπ’ ἀρχης, Joh. 8:44, many theologians were of the opinion that the angels, indeed not in the moment of their creation itself, in primo instanti, but then nevertheless immediately thereafter, in secundo instanti, by their first act of will were either confirmed in the good or fell into sin, Aug. de civ. XI 13. Thomas. S. Th. I qu. 62 art. 5. qu. 63 art. 5 en 6. Others assumed that a short time elapsed after their creation, and that their fall then

either still before the creation of heaven and earth in Gen. 1:1, Episcopius, Inst. Theol. IV 3, 1; or within the six days of creation, Coccejus on Joh. 8:44; or with a view to Gen. 1:31 first after the completion of the whole work of creation took place, Voetius, Disp. I 919. 920. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 5. M. Vitringa II 261. Just as little can be said with certainty about the time of man's fall. Some speak of years after his creation; others think, because Genesis after the account of the creation immediately passes over to that of the fall and also on the ground of Gen. 4:1, that the fall of man took place only a few days after or even on the same day as his creation, Marck, Hist. Parad. III 7. Moor, Comm. IV 166 M. Vitringa II 261. Zöckler, Urstand des Menschen 35 f. These determinations of time are also of less weight. What is of importance is this, that according to Scripture the fall is essentially distinct from the creation itself [72]. Sin is a phenomenon, for which the possibility was indeed given in the creation of finite, changeable beings, but the actuality of which could be called into existence only by the will of the creature. It is a power that does not belong to the essence of creation, that originally was not there, that has come there through disobedience and transgression, that has unlawfully penetrated into the creation and that ought not to be there. It is there, and its being is no accident; indeed, with a view to the counsel of God, which took it up and assigned it a place, it may to a certain extent and in a certain sense be said that it had to be there. But then it nevertheless always had to be there as something that ought not to be and that has no right to exist.

§ 37. The essence of sin.

1. The question concerning the essence of sin is not identical with that concerning its beginning, for only in the development does it become fully manifest what lies hidden in a principle. But yet in the first sin sin itself is already active and in it therefore also already to some extent knowable. Concerning the character and nature of the first sin, of which angels and men made themselves guilty, however, there is difference. The opinion that the sin of the angels began with lust has already been refuted earlier, vol. II 436. Much more probable is it, with a view to the nature of the temptation in Gen. 3:5 and Mt. 4:3, 6, 9 and the admonition 1 Tim. 3:6, not to become puffed up and thus to fall into the same judgment as the devil, that the first sin of the angels consisted in pride; but too little has nevertheless been revealed of their fall for us to be able to speak here with absolute certainty; others therefore also thought of lying, Joh. 8:44, envy, Wijsh. 2:24, or another sin, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 157. According to the Roman Catholics the first sin in man also consisted in pride, Bellarminus, de amiss. grat. et statu pecc. III c. 4, who appeals to Sir. 10:13,

14, Tob. 4:13, Rom. 5:19, August., de Gen. ad litt. XI 30. Enchir. 45. de civ. XIV 13. [73] Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 163 etc. These proofs are not strong; Sirach and Tobias speak only of pride in general, Paul calls the first sin precisely disobedience, and church fathers and scholastics, when they call the first sin pride, chiefly combat the view that makes it consist in sensual lust. The Protestants, however, usually let the sin in Eve already begin with doubt and unbelief, which were then followed by pride and covetousness, Luther on Gen. 3. Gerhard, Loci IX c. 2. Calv. Inst. II 1, 4. Zanchius, Op. IV 30. Synopsis pur. theol. XIV 9 sq. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2. M. Vitringa II 267. Yet it was rightly remarked by Tertullianus, adv. Jud. 2 and Augustine, Enchir. 45, that the first sin already enclosed many kinds of sins in itself and in principle was a transgression of all commandments; it was, after all, disobedience to God, doubt, unbelief, self-exaltation, pride, murder, theft, covetousness etc.; and correspondingly there were also various thoughts, affections, desires, movements awakened in man; understanding and will, soul and body took part in it. It was a conscious and free act, ἁμαρτια, παραβασις, παραπτωμα, παρακοη in the proper sense, Rom. 5:12v. Although tempted, the first men were nevertheless not brought to a fall as innocent children, without knowing better. They transgressed God’s command with consciousness and freedom; they knew and willed what they did. Excuses are not in place here. The circumstances under which the first sin was committed by angels and men do not serve for extenuation but increase the guilt. It was committed against God’s express and clear command; by a man who had been created after God’s image; in a matter of very slight significance, which scarcely demanded any self-denial; and perhaps a short time after the command had been received. It has become the source of all unrighteousness and abominations, of all disasters

and misfortunes, of all sickness and death, which since then have been committed and suffered in the world. Hinc illae lacrimae! The sin of Adam cannot be a trifle; it must have been a principial reversal of all relations, a revolution, whereby the creature detached itself from and set itself over against God, a rebellion, a fall in the most proper sense, which was decisive for the whole world and led it in a direction and on a path, away from God, toward godlessness and the [74] ruin, ineffabiliter grande peccatum, Aug. Op. imp. c. Jul. I 165. Thus seriously was the first sin conceived in the Christian church and theology, August. de civ. XIV 11-15. XXI 12. Enchir. 26. 27. 45. Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 163 art. 3. Conc. Trid. V 1. Bellarminus. de am. gr. et st. pecc. III c. 8-10. Scheeben, Dogm. II 594. Ned. Gel. art. 14. Heid. Cat. qu. 7. 9. Mastricht, Theol. IV 1, 15. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2, 10 etc.

2. The many names which Holy Scripture uses for sin indicate its dreadful character and its many-sided development. חַטָּאת is called sin as an act that misses its goal and consists in deviation from the right way; עָוֶל or עָוֹן designates it as bending, crookedness, perversity, as deviation from the good direction; פֶּשַׁע makes it known as transgression of the set boundaries, as breach of the covenant relationship to God, as apostasy and rebellion; שְׁגָגָה as a wrong deed that has happened unintentionally, by mistake; רֶשַׁע as a godless acting and walking, deviating from the law, culpable. Further, it is characterized by אָשָׁם as guilt, by עָוֶל as vanity, by שָׁוְא as falsehood, by נְבָלָה as folly, by רַע as an evil, malum, etc. The Greek words are especially ἁμαρτια, ἁμαρτημα, ἀδικια, ἀπειθεια, ἀποστασια, παραβασις, παρακοη, παραπτωμα, ὀφειλημα, ἀνομια, παρανομια; they speak for themselves and describe sin as deviation, injustice, disobedience, transgression, apostasy, lawlessness, guilt; and moreover the sinful power in man is also indicated

by σαρξ, ψυχικος and παλαιος ἀνθρωπος and in the world by κοσμος. The Latin peccatum is of uncertain derivation; the Dutch word zonde, which probably is connected with the Latin sons, i.e. nocens, Müller, Sünde I 114 f., has in Christian usage become a thoroughly religious concept; it denotes a transgression, not of a human, but of a divine law; places man in relation, not to his fellow men, to society and state, but to God, the heavenly Judge; is therefore also not loved in many circles and is then preferably replaced by moral evil etc. By far the most of these names make sin known as a deviation, transgression of the law. Scripture always conceives sin [75] as ἀνομια, 1 Joh. 3:4; its standard is the law of God. This law also had in different times a different form. Adam was in a wholly special case; no one can sin after him in the likeness of his transgression, Rom. 5:14. From Adam to Moses there was no positive law proclaimed by God. The objection can therefore be made that if there is no law, there can also be no transgression, sin and death, Rom. 5:13, 4:15. In Rom. 5:12v. Paul gives no other answer to that than that through the one transgression of Adam sin as a power entered into the world and ruled all and thus death passed through to all men. The transgression of Adam has constituted all as sinners and subjected all to death. This influence of Adam's transgression does not exclude but includes that all men themselves also personally are sinners. For precisely because through the one transgression of Adam sin began to rule in the world of men and all consequently were themselves also personally sinners, therefore death also passed through to all. Paul says no more in Rom. 5:12v. That was there, in that connection, sufficient. But from elsewhere this answer can be elucidated and supplemented. If from Adam to Moses there has been sin and death, Rom. 5:13, 14, then there must also have existed a law, indeed no positive one, which with audible voice was

proclaimed by God as in paradise and on Sinai, but nevertheless a law, which also then bound men personally and rendered them guilty. Paul also says that clearly in Rom. 2:12-16. The Gentiles do not have the Mosaic law, but they nevertheless sin and perish ἀνομως, because they are a law to themselves and their conscience itself accuses them. There is a revelation of God in nature both of religious and ethical content, which is sufficient to take away all excuse, Rom. 2:18v., 1 Cor. 1:21. While God, however, let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, He made His laws and ordinances known to Israel in a clear way. And this law is now for Israel the standard of all moral action. In recent times this has indeed been contested, Stade, Gesch. des Volkes Israel I 1887 S. 507 f. Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 21 f. It is thought that חטא originally only meant: to be in the wrong or to be placed in the wrong over against a more powerful one, Ex. 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon. 18:14; that it [76] thereafter indicated an acting in conflict with the custom of the people, Gen. 19:7v., 34:7, Jos. 7:15, Richt. 19:23, 20:6, 2 Sam. 13:12, 21:1-14, and that only gradually did it denote an ethical transgression of the law of God. Through the prophets, indeed, Ihvh first received an ethical character; while His wrath earlier often flared up without there being any guilt on the part of man, 2 Sam. 16:10 and one thus could become a sinner without knowing or willing it, Num. 22:34, 1 Sam. 14:43 f., now Ihvh could only be angry over sin; this consisted from now on truly in aberratio a lege divina. This opinion, however, is contradicted by the facts. Even if חטא in the first-mentioned three places should have the broader meaning of suffering injustice in a juridical sense, without there being mention of ethical guilt, then that would still prove nothing for the thesis that this was the oldest and original concept of sin among Israel. The word properly means to miss, Richt. 20:16, and thus alongside the ethical it can also have

had the broader meaning of: to suffer injustice, to be placed in the wrong. But even that is not yet the case in Ex. 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon. 18:14. In Ex. 5:16 the Israelites simply say to Pharaoh: we get no straw and yet must make bricks, and if we do not make them, we are nevertheless beaten and we get the blame, וְחָטָאת עַמֶּךָ. In 1 Kon. 1:21 Bathsheba says to David: if you do not decide and Adonijah becomes king, then we, Bathsheba and Solomon, will soon be the guilty ones, who are killed by Adonijah because we do not acknowledge him. And in fact we are nevertheless right, on the ground of your oath v. 17. In 2 Kon. 18:14 Hezekiah makes a confession of guilt, which is wrung from him in distress and which he himself later does not acknowledge. Further, it is indeed a fact that the custom of the people everywhere counts as a standard of moral action, but this is absolutely not in conflict with the fact that nevertheless the law of God in the last instance is the norma of good and evil. Jos. 7:15 teaches how both, the transgressing of the covenant and the doing of a folly in Israel, can coincide. The custom of the people is in itself as little in conflict with God's law as the conscience, which is also a subordinate, subjective norma of the moral life; always it is and remains, also in the most Christian society, a norma normata; and also in Israel the custom of the people, e. g. of [77] hospitality, is not destroyed by the law but indeed acknowledged and sanctified. Only, where it comes into conflict, it must yield to the law of God. That now in fact the customs of the people in Israel always agreed with God's law or were purified by it, no one asserts, any more than that the conscience of Christians is already fully conformed to God's law. Many deeds of the saints in O. and N. T., of Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Rachel, David, Peter etc. are therefore also decidedly to be condemned and not, because they were believers, to be excused with the Rabbis. The essence of

sin is in the end not determined by what under Israel, in the congregation, is or is not customary, but by the law of God. And this is the standpoint that Holy Scripture always takes. Sin may be great or small, it is always only therefore sin, because it goes against God and His law, Gen. 13:13, 20:6, 39:9, Ex. 10:16, 32:33, 1 Sam. 7:6, 14:33, 2 Sam. 12:13, Ps. 51:6, Jes. 42:24, Jer. 14:7, 20 etc. It always comes down to the Lord's will and word and law, to His rights and statutes, to His commandments and ordinances; to know and to serve God is the all-embracing calling of Israel, and by that it is tested by the prophets. And likewise it is in the N. T. Jesus sets no one less than God Himself as example, Mt. 5:48, and judges everything according to His law, Mt. 19:17-19, Mk. 10:17-19, Luk. 18:18-20. This is for Him the content of law and prophets, and He maintains it fully, without taking anything away from it, Mt. 5:17-19, 23v., 6:16v., 21:12v., 23:3, 23, 24:20 and judges precisely from that standpoint the human ordinances, Mt. 5:20v, 15:2v., Mk. 2:23v., 7:8, 13 etc. In Mt. 7:12 he therefore sets forth no new ethical principle but gives nothing other than a practical interpretation of the commandment of love of neighbor. The Mosaic law has indeed in Christ reached its goal and its end, Rom. 10:4, Gal. 3:24, and the believer is free from it and stands in grace, Rom. 6:14, 7:4, 10:4, Gal. 2:19, 3:15v., 5:18, but this freedom nevertheless does not abolish the law but confirms it, Rom. 3:31; its requirement is precisely fulfilled in him who walks according to the Spirit, Rom. 8:4. For that Spirit renews us and teaches us to examine and know and do what God's will is, Rom. 12:2, Ef. 5:10, Phil. 1:10. That will is knowable from the O. Test., Rom. 13:8-10, 15:4, 1 Cor. [78] 1:31, 10:11, 14:34, 2 Cor. 9:9, 10:17, Gal. 5:14, is revealed in Christ, 1 Cor. 11:1, 2 Cor. 3:18, 8:9, 10:1, Phil. 2:5, 1 Thess. 1:6, 4:2, 1 Thess. 2:21, and also finds resonance in one's own conscience, 1 Cor. 8:7, 10:25, 2 Cor.

1:12; it is written in the heart of believers, Hebr. 8:10, 10:9. Everywhere in Scripture the essence of sin is ἀνομια, 1 Joh. 3:4, deviation from the will of God, revealed to Adam or Moses or Christ or to the congregation by the Holy Spirit. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 20-42. Schultz, Altt, Theol.4 659 f. Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 106 f. 119 f. 192 f. etc.

3. By this doctrine of Scripture the conception of sin in Christian theology was determined. On the one hand, therefore, that opinion could not be accepted which sought the essence of sin in some substance and therefore reduced it to a principle of wrath in God (Böhme), or to an evil power alongside God (Mani), or to some kind of matter, such as the ὑλη, the σαρξ (Plato, the Jews, Flacius, etc.). And on the other hand, the theory was also to be rejected, that sin consisted in a not-yet-being, that it belonged to the necessary oppositions in life and was by nature proper to the finite man, developing himself, striving after perfection (Spinoza, Hegel etc.), cf. above p. 45v. Over against this, Christian theology from the beginning maintained that sin was no substance. There has never been any difference or conflict about this. Petavius adduces numerous Church Fathers, who all teach the same in this respect. Here too no doubt or hesitation was possible. If sin were a substance, there would be a being that did not have God as author, or God would also be its cause. Sin therefore had to be conceived and defined as οὐτε ὀν οὐτε ἐν τοις ουσιν, as an ἐλλειψις, στερησις, ἀναχωρησις του ἀγαθου, as ἀσθενεια, ἀσυμμετρια, just as blindness is a deprivation of sight, Athan. c. Gent. 3 sq. Greg. Nyss., Catech. c. 5. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4. Damasc., de fide orthod. II c. 30. In the West Augustine in particular brought this privative character of sin to light and maintained it over against the Manicheans, cf. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen nach der Lehre des H. Aug. Regensburg 1854. All being is in itself good.

Omnis natura, [79] in quantum natura est, bona est. Evil therefore can only be in the good, non potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono, quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura. It is even nulla natura, but amissio, privatio, corruptio boni, vitium, defectus naturae; bonum minui, malum est. de civ. XI 17. 22. Enchir. 11-13 c. Jul. I c. 3. etc. It therefore also has no causa efficiens, but only deficiens, de civ. XII 7. 9. And likewise by the scholastics, by the Roman, Luth. and Reformed theologians the concept of sin in the metaphysical sense was reduced to that of privatio, cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 34 and 35 and comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura, etc., further Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 48. 49. c. Gent. III 7 sq. Bonav., Brevil III 1. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. I c. 1. II c. 18. V c. 1. Becanus, Theol. schol. II 1 tract. 1 cap. 5 qu. 1. Melanchton, Loc. de peccato. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 1. Quenstedt, Theol. II p. 50. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 501. Buddeus, Inst. theol. p. 546. Zanchius, Op. IV 6 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 335. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 p. 199. Hoornbeek, Theol. practica IV c. 1. Turretinus, Theol. El. loc. IX etc.

On the other hand, however, it is clear that sin is not sufficiently described by the concept privatio. For it is not a mere lack, not a purely non-being; but it is an active and destructive principle, a dissolving, devastating power. Scripture speaks of it mostly in a very positive sense as transgression, perversity, disobedience, lawlessness, etc., and ascribes to it the activity of bearing witness, ruling, moving, devising, fighting, etc. Various theologians have therefore also rejected the distinction between materia and forma in sin. They appealed, e.g., to the fact that blasphemy against God, idolatry, hatred against God, etc. as acts were sinful and could never assume a good forma, and they therefore preferred to define sin as an entitas quaedam realis ac positiva, as a reale quid, Cajetanus in Becanus t. a. p. Theol.

Wirceb. VII 15. Vitringa Sr., Observ. Sacr. VI c. 15. 16. M. Vitringa, II 288-290 and furthermore also Arminius, Op. 1629 p. 730. Limborch, Theol. Chr. V 4. 2. Strauss, Gl. II 360 f. Müller, Sünde I 396-409. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 371. For a correct understanding, however, let the following be noted here. 1o. When most Christian theologians conceived of sin as privatio, [80] they thereby had first of all the refutation of Manichaeism in view. Insofar their opinion is also entirely correct and to be accepted without reservation. Sin is not a substance, neither spiritual nor material, for then it would have God as its cause, or God would not be the Creator of all things. 2o. Also the essence of sin itself forbids thinking of it as a substance. For sin is not a physical but an ethical phenomenon. It is a state and an act of the will and has its cause in this; it is not given with creation but arose after creation through disobedience. It therefore cannot be a materia, which existed eternally or was created in time by God, but has reality only as deformation of what is; insofar it can even be called an οὐκ ὀν, a nihilum. 3o. By that it is by no means meant that sin is a nihil negativum. Rather, the pantheistic conception of sin as a pure negation, as a not-yet-being, as a necessary moment in the development of a finite and limited being, as a delusion of thought, has at all times been opposed by Christian theology as decisively as possible. Sin was no mera negatio but a privatio. The difference between the two consists in this, that negation indicates only lack (carere), privation, on the other hand, indicates defect (egere); that a stone does not see is a negation, that a human being does not see is a privation, because seeing belongs to the qualities of a human being. Sin is a deprivation of that moral perfection which the human being ought to possess. 4o. The definition of sin as privatio therefore does not in the least exclude that it also, considered from another side, is an actio. It is no οὐσια, substantia, res, but indeed in

its deprivation of the good an ἐνεργεια, just as the limping of the lame man is not a not-walking but a wrong walking. Augustine, who repeatedly describes sin as a privatio, therefore calls it a transgressio legis, de cons. Ev. II c. 4, voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, de duab. an. c. Man. I. c. 11. Retract. I 11, a deficere, which includes a tendere, deficere autem non jam nihil est sed ad nihilum tendere, c. Secund. Man. c. 11, inclinatio ab eo quod magis est ad id, quod minus est, ib. c. 12, cf. de lib. arb. I 16 II 19, and then gives this definition of sin: peccatum est factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem; [81] lex vero aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans, c. Faust. Man. XXII 27. This definition was later adopted by all, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 135. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 71 art. 6; sin is no mera or pura privatio sed actus debito ordine privatus, ib. qu. 72 art. 1 ad 2. qu. 75 art. 1 ad 1, a privatio cum positiva qualitute et actione, an actuosa privatio, Zanchius, Op. IV p. 1 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 3. Heidegger, Corp. Theol. X 8. Bucanus, Inst. Theol. XV 7. Synopsis pur. theol. XVI 4-9 etc.

4. On the basis of Holy Scripture and in accordance with the confession of the Christian faith, the essence of sin can therefore be more precisely described and elucidated in the following manner. 1o. Since sin is not a physical or metaphysical but an ethical antithesis of the good, it has no proper, independent existence, existing independently of the being of things. Whoever regards sin as a substance may indeed seem deeply penetrated by its power and significance, but in fact weakens it, transfers it from the ethical to the physical domain, and makes the struggle between good and evil into a wrestling between light and darkness, spirit and matter, a good and an evil God, which never ends and makes all redemption from

sin impossible. Therefore it is of the highest importance to regard sin always as an ethical phenomenon. The punishments and consequences of sin certainly also extend over the physical domain, but sin itself is and remains of an ethical nature. Then it also can have no proper principle and no independent existence; it arose after and exists only through and by the good. Evil is indeed dependent on the good, but not conversely. Τῳ μεν γαρ ἐσθλῳ ἐγχωρει κακῳ γενεσθαι, Plato, Protag. p. 344. Το βελτιον και το τιμιωτερον προτερον εἰναι τῃ φυσει δοκει, Arist., Categ. c. 9. Good (true) is the index of itself and of evil (false). The good has been the cause of evil by free choice, and remains its substrate. Fallen angels and human beings are and remain as creatures good, and exist from moment to moment only through and in and unto God. And just as in its origin and in its being, so sin also in its works and struggles remains dependent on the good. It is able only [82] to do something with and by means of the powers and gifts that have been bestowed by God. Satan is therefore rightly called the simia Dei; if God establishes a church, he builds a chapel; over against a true one, he awakens a false prophet; over against the Christ he sets the antichrist. Even a band of robbers can exist only if it respects justice within its own circle. A liar adorns himself with the appearance of truth. A sinner pursues evil sub ratione boni. Satan appears as an angel of light. Sin is always doomed, in its operation and appearance, in spite of itself to borrow from virtue. It lies under the unbreakable fatality, that, striving after the destruction of all good, it simultaneously also works toward its own death. It is a parasite of the good. 2o. Although sin thus by virtue of its nature strives toward non-being, it nevertheless has no power over being itself. It cannot create; it also cannot destroy. Through sin, therefore, neither the essence of the angels, nor that of human beings, nor that of nature has been changed. They are

essentially the same creatures before and after the fall, with the same substance, the same faculties, the same powers. Before and after the fall, the human being has soul and body, intellect and will, affections and passions. What has changed is not the substance, the materia, but the forma, in which it appears, the direction in which it works. With the same power of love with which the human being originally loved God, he now loves the creature. The same intellect with which he formerly contemplated the things that are above him now makes him, with admirable acuteness and profundity, honor the lie as truth. With the same freedom with which he once served God, he now serves the world. Substantially nothing has been taken away from the human being by sin and nothing has been brought into him. It is the same human being, but now walking, not toward God, but away from God, toward destruction. Peccatum non est essentia aliqua sed defectus et corruptela, qua scilicet corrumpitur modus, species et ordo, Bonaventura, Brevil. III 1. 3o. Also the loss of the image of God and the breaking of the covenant of works is not in conflict with this conception of sin. The image of God, after all, although not a donum superadditum and belonging to the human being by nature, was not a substantia but an accidens; i.e. the human being, as he was created, was so constituted that his nature of itself, [83] without supernatural grace, yet not without God's good providence, brought along and manifested knowledge and holiness and righteousness, which were the principal content of the image of God. When the human being, however, fell, he lost nothing substantial, not even a faculty and no power, but because sin has damaged the forma of his whole nature, of all his faculties and powers, all these now work in such a way that they no longer produce the knowledge of God and righteousness but precisely the opposite. The human being therefore by the fall did not merely

lose an insubstantial addition to his nature, a donum superadditum, while otherwise his nature remained intact; he also did not become a devil, who, incapable of re-creation, can never again display the traits of the image of God; but while he has remained essentially and substantially the same, i.e. human, and has retained all human constituent parts, faculties, and powers, the forma of all these, the nature and character, the disposition and direction, has been so changed that they now, instead of God's will, fulfill the law of the flesh. The image has been changed into a caricature. And likewise the foedus operum has been broken, insofar as by the works of the law no flesh can any longer be justified, Rom. 3:20, Gal. 3:2, but it is so little destroyed and abolished that the law of that foedus operum still obliges every human being to absolute obedience, that it has been taken up and perfectly fulfilled in the covenant of grace by Christ, and now remains for believers still a rule of gratitude. 4o. Abstracting from the good substrate by which sin is borne and to which it clings, it therefore can never be described otherwise than as privatio boni. One should, however, well consider that then sin is spoken of abstractive and metaphysice. And thus described, it has no being, it is no substance, but a nihil, nothing positive but only something privative; whoever wished to conceive it otherwise would thereby, in a Manichaean sense, make evil independent and eternal and set over against the summum bonum a summum malum. The above-mentioned objection, raised against the definition of sin as privatio, therefore actually rests on misunderstanding. Abstractive and metaphysice sin is a privatio and on a Christian standpoint it cannot and may not be conceived otherwise. But concretive it occurs in no other way than as a wrong forma of a definite state or act and makes that state or that act itself sinful, just as a disease, without being a substance, nevertheless makes the

body sick. In concreto sin is therefore always in and on something that is substantially good. It may be difficult to distinguish in particular cases of sin between materia and forma, and much more difficult to separate them, just as at a given moment the heat of the stove cannot be separated. Yet, just as therefore the stove is not the heat itself, so the being or the act to which sin attaches itself is not to be identified with sin. Even in blasphemy the power needed to utter it and the language of which it makes use are in themselves good; what makes these and what makes all things wrong and sinful is the deformitas, the aberratio a lege divina. 5o. For the standard of sin is God's law alone. What sin is is in the last instance determined, not by the church (Rome) or the state (Hobbes), not by the independent moral law (Grotius) or the autonomous I (Kant), not by humanity (Comte) or the social instincts (Darwin), but solely and only by the law of God. The concept sin expresses this clearly and is therefore avoided by all who know no higher standard for moral evil than a human one. God is also the only one who has absolute authority over us and can bind and obligate us in the conscience. Now He gave many laws for the different creatures, laws for sun and moon, heaven and earth, plant and animal, human being and angel; and, as far as the human being is concerned, again different laws for his bodily, spiritual, intellectual, aesthetic life, etc., also proper laws for his moral life. More precisely, it is now this moral law which is the standard of all sin. Transgression of all other laws, logical, aesthetic, social, political, ecclesiastical, etc., is only then and insofar sin as it directly or indirectly includes a transgression of the moral law, of the command of God. This moral law, which was implanted in the human being at his creation, continues to work after the fall in his conscience, was proclaimed by God on Sinai, and also remains for believers a rule of life, is the source of

knowledge of sin, Rom. 3:20, 4:14, 5:20, 7:7. Indeed, very certainly the Christian faith is necessary in order to learn to know sin rightly, and indeed in the [85] gospel, as by way of contrast, the nature and the magnitude of sin is made manifest, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 112 5. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 384 f. Kaftan. Wesen der chr. Relig. 250, but all that nevertheless does nothing to alter the fact that not the gospel but the law is the Erkenntnissgrund of sin. In that moral law God comes to us not only as Father with fatherly admonitions and chastisements, but, as the categorical imperative testifies in everyone, also as Lawgiver and Judge with commands and punishments. Although not coercive like the logical and not unbreakable like the laws of nature, the moral law in majesty surpasses all others; it addresses itself to the will, breathes in freedom, demands fulfillment out of love; and yet it turns to all human beings without distinction, comes to them in all circumstances, extends over their words and deeds not only but also over their state, knows of no yielding and of no excusing, speaks inexorably, categorically, with sovereign authority and avenges each of its transgressions in strict punishment. It is a decretum Numinis, revelation of God's will, expression of his being. 6o. From this character of the moral law it follows that sin can dwell only in a rational creature. Irrational nature can suffer under the consequences of sin, but sin occurs only in a being endowed with intellect and will. More precisely, the will is the proper subject, το δεικτικον, of sin. The moral law is precisely the law for the will of the creature; the moral good is of such a nature that it can be realized only by the will. What absolutely and decisively proceeds outside any influence of the will can be no sin. In that sense Augustine rightly said: adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium, de vera relig. 14. But this word is

susceptible to misunderstanding. And when the Pelagians made use of it as proof that sin can never exist otherwise than in an act of will, Augustine later gave it such an explanation that sins of ignorance, of concupiscence, and original sin were not excluded by it, Retract. I 13; and elsewhere he expressly says that the law also forbids the motus concupiscentiae involuntarios, de spir. et lit. c. 36. de nupt. I 17. 23. c. Jul. IV c. 2. VI c. 8. de civ. XIV 10. In accordance with that, many scholastics still taught that sin indeed had in the will its ultimate cause [86] and thus in that sense always had its seat in the will, but then nevertheless not in voluntate sicut in subjecto sed sicut in causa, Thomas, Sent. II dist. 24 qu. 3 art. 2 ad 2. S. Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 2. II 2 qu. 10 art. 2; sin therefore can also have its seat in the sensualitas, even if it is then only a peccatum veniale, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 24, 8. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 3. Bonaventura, Brevil. III c. 8 Sent. II dist. 24 pars. 2 art. 2 qu. 2. But various reasons gradually brought about a modification in this doctrine. The concupiscentia was an unclear concept; it could be understood equally in bonam as in malam partem, since many natural desires that arise of themselves in us, such as e.g. of the hungry person for food, are nevertheless no sin; Augustine therefore spoke of the concupiscentia sometimes in such a way that it was no sin and could not harm, if only it was not consented to in conflict with the law, c. Jul. VI 5. de Gen. c. Manich. II 14 etc. Further, scholasticism gradually began to distinguish between motus primo-primi, secundo-primi and plane deliberati, i.e. between such thoughts and desires as rise in us before all consent of the will, wholly involuntarily, and are no sin at all; such as against which the will does indeed resist but by which it is overcome and which are venial sins; and such as in which the will consciously and fully consents and which are mortal sins. And in addition

there came still that original sin was increasingly conceived more weakly and was regarded as wholly annulled by baptism; what remained, the concupiscentia, was itself no sin but could only become an occasion for sinning. Thus Rome also determined that guilt and stain of original sin are wholly taken away by baptism, that the concupiscentia indeed remains but does not harm those who do not consent to it, and can only be called sin, quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat, Trid. V 5, and further Cat. Rom. II 2, 7. Becanus, Theol. schol. II 1519 p. 145-150. Sylvius, Comm. in totam primam sec. S. Thomae, ed. 4 II p. 336 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. I 1. V 520. Daelman, Theol. II 1759 p. 174 sq. Dens, Theol. I 1828 p. 314 sq. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. II 644. The Reformation opposed this and asserted that also impure thoughts and desires that rise in us before and without our will are sin; by that it did not mean that all desiring in a psychological and philosophical sense was sin, but that the concupiscentia in Scriptural and theological meaning made us guilty before God. And in this it undoubtedly was right. For certainly sin began with a conscious and free act of will. But that first sinful act has not passed by us without trace; it has corrupted the whole human nature and left a state that in all respects is in conflict with the law of God. Although sin thus arose through the will, it now in fact does exist outside the will and has its seat also in all other faculties and powers of the human being, in soul and body, in lower and higher cognitive and appetitive faculty, Gen. 6:3, 8:21, Ex. 20:17, Ps. 19:13, 51:7, Jer. 17:9, Mt. 5:28, Mk. 7:21, Rom. 7:7, 15-17, 8:7, Gal. 5:7 etc. Sine voluntate non potest esse peccatum, quia sine voluntate non potest existere ut sit; sine autem voluntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate potest manere quod existit, Aug. in Dorner, Augustinus 129. Lutheran and Reformed theologians therefore usually contested the proposition that all peccatum

was voluntarium. By that, however, they by no means meant that there could also be sin that proceeded wholly and absolutely outside the faculty of will. It only depends on forming a correct conception of the nature and operation of the will. The will, namely, is absolutely not the whole appetitive faculty, but of that only a particular power and activity, cf. my Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 p. 166v. The will in this narrower sense precedes only actual sins, as Jas. 1:15 speaks of them, but absolutely not state-sins and involuntary sins. If the voluntarium in this sense were a necessary element of sin, not only would all impure thoughts and desires cease to be sin, but with the slogan tout comprendre serait tout pardonner almost all actual sins would also be excusable. In order to be able to maintain the innocence of the concupiscentia, Bellarminus already came to the explanation: non omne quod repugnat legi peccatum est, the motus involuntarii are indeed in conflict with the law but nevertheless no sins, de amiss. gr. et st. pecc. V 10. But even if it is the case that the voluntarium in this narrow sense does not always constitute the concept of sin, nevertheless the state-sins and the involuntary sins do not therefore proceed wholly outside the will; there is not only a voluntas antecedens, but also a voluntas concomitans, [88] consequens, approbans; the will later approves in a stronger or weaker degree the sinfulness of our nature, of our thoughts, and takes pleasure in it. And also when later the will, instructed by reason, resists it, or the regenerate can testify with Paul that he does not will the evil that he does, then thereby certainly the degree of sin is diminished, but the nature of sin is not determined. For this has its standard only in God's law; Paul calls what he does not will but nevertheless in fact does indeed sin, and assents to the law that it is good. Yet even then, even the sin that is committed without being willed does not proceed wholly outside the will.

For very certainly Paul can say: I no longer do it but the sin that dwells in me, and thus make an antithesis between his reborn I and his unreborn flesh, but Augustine has rightly already explained these words thus: etsi concupiscentiae non consentio, etsi post concupiscentias meas non eo, tamen adhuc concupisco et utique etiam in ipsa parte ego sum. Non enim ego alius in mente et alius in carne. Sed quid igitur ipse ego? Quia ego in mente, ego in carne. Non enim duae naturae contrariae sed ex utroque unus homo, quia unus deus a quo factus est homo, de verbis apost. serm. 5. For it is not another being that in the flesh does the sin, and another that nevertheless does not will it. But it is in both cases the same human being, who on the one hand in the concupiscentia in an impure way chases after the forbidden and yet on the other hand in the deepest of his will turns away from it and fights against it. And therefore, because the human being, even the regenerate, as long as he is in the flesh, always in weaker or stronger measure still desires the forbidden, even if it is the case that with his will in the narrower sense he goes against it, therefore it can be said that all sin is nevertheless in the deepest ground voluntary. There is no one and nothing that compels the sinner to serve sin. Sin does not have its seat outside him but in him and has directed his thinking and desiring in its direction. It is his sin, insofar as he has made it his own by means of his various faculties and powers. Cf. Melanchton, Apol. Conf. art. 2. Loci C. de peccato. Form. Conc. II 1. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 6 en 11. Quenstedt, Theol. II 60. 92. 139. Hollaz p. 501. 525. Calvijn, Iust. II 1. III 3. IV 15, 10. 11. Zanchius, Op. IV 56 sq. Beza, Tract. II 345. [89] Polanus, Synt. p. 336, Martyr, L. C. 70. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX qu. 2. XI qu. 21. Mastricht IV 2, 22. Burmannus, Synopsis II 7, 9. C. Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. I 563. M. Vitringa II 293. Moor III 132. Many Comm. on Ex. 20:17, Rom. 7:7, Gal. 5:16, Heid. Cat, Q. 113

etc. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 131. 202. Müller, Sünde I5 251 f. My Beginselen der Psychol. 145-148. Thus it finally appears 7o that sin is an incomprehensible riddle. We do not know whence it is, nor what it is. It is there and has no right of existence. It exists and no one explains its origin. It itself came into the world without motive and yet has become the motive for all thinking and acting of human beings. It is, abstractly considered, nothing but a privation and yet in concreto a power that rules all and everything. It has no proper, independent principle and yet is a principle that devastates the whole creation. It lives from the good and combats it unto destruction. It is nothing and has nothing and can do nothing without the beings and powers which God has created, and yet organizes all these to the revolt against Him. It combats with what is God's all that is God's. It is the will of the weak, finite creature in resistance against the Creator; dependence, in enmity against the Independent One and itself chasing after independence; the becoming that has no permanence in struggle with the eternally Being; the greatest contradiction, tolerated by God in his creation and by Him, in the way of right and righteousness, used as an instrument for his glory. Cf. Further on the essence of sin: Tholuck, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde u. vom Versöhner8 1862. Müller, Sünde5 1867. Weiszäcker, Zu der Lehre v. Wesen der Sünde, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1856 S. 131-195. Krabbe, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 143 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk I3 181 f. Dorner, Gl. II 4 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I2 417 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 287 f. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I Die biblische Lehre 1897. Walther, Das Wesen der Sünde, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. April 1898 S. 284-325 enz.

5. Although sin is always one in principle and essence and always consists in ἀνομια, there are in its manifestations and operations very different

degrees. First of all there is a great distinction [90] between diabolical and human sin. In the Old Test. we do not yet find a developed demonology. That in Gen. 3 an evil, spiritual power appears, we know only first from the N. T.; the שְׂעִירִם, Lev. 17:7, 2 Chron. 11:15, Jes. 13:21, 34:14, שֵׁדִים, Deut. 32:17, Ps. 106:27, לִילִית, Jes. 34:14, and עֲלוּקָה. Spr. 30:15 certainly are not to be regarded as elements of revelation; and that with עֲזָאזֵל, Lev. 16, one must think of an evil spirit, is unprovable. Of evil spirits there is mention only in 1 Sam. 16:14-23 and 1 Kon. 22:19v., and of Satan in Job 1, 1 Chr. 21:1, Zach. 3. The separation between good and evil angels has not yet been completed; the evil spirit still goes out from God, Satan still finds himself among the sons of God; only gradually does the antithesis become sharper. The word satan means adversary and can in itself have a good sense; it occurs of human opponents, 1 Sam. 29:4, 1 Kon. 5:4, 11:14, 23:25, of hindrances on the way, 2 Sam. 19:23, of a human accuser, Ps. 109:6, 20, 29, even of the Malak Ihvh, who steps in Balaam's way, Num. 22:22, 32. But yet Satan in the O. T. is already thought of as a being that stands hostile over against God and his people. And when revelation is completed and Christ comes, to break the works of the devil, then also the βαθη του σατανα become manifest. The N. Test. makes known to us a βασιλεια, Mt. 12:26, Mk. 3:24, Luk. 11:17, 18, of evil spirits, which forms the antithesis of Christ and his kingdom. At the head stands Satan, called by different names, διαβολος, σατανας, ἐχθρος, Mt. 13:39, Luk. 10:19, κατηγωρ, Op. 12:10, βελιαρ (syr. for βελιαλ, worthlessness), πονηρος, Mt. 13:19, Ef. 6:16, 2 Thess. 3:3, 1 Joh. 2:13, 14, 3:12, 5:18, βεελζεβουλ (lit. lord of the dwelling, but probably arisen from βεελζεβουβ, fly-god, art. Herzog3 2, 514) Mt. 10:25, ἀρχων των δαιμονιων, Mt. 9:34, ἀρχων της ἐζουσιας του ἀερος, Ef. 2:2, ἀρχων του κοσμου, Joh. 12:31, ὁ θεος του αἰωνος τουτου, 2

Cor. 4:4, ὁ δρακων ὁ μεγας, ὁ οφις ὁ ἀρχαιος, Op. 12:9, 20:2 etc. And under him stand many δαιμονια, δαιμονες, πνευματα πονηρα, ἀκαθαρτα, πνευματικα της πονηριας, which again are distinguished into all kinds of classes and ranks, 1 Cor. 15:21, Ef. 6:12, Col. 2:15, Jud. 6, also in wickedness the one still surpassing the other, Mt. 12:45, Luk. 11:26, [91] and together are Satan's ἀγγελοι, Mt. 25:41, 2 Cor. 12:7, Op. 12:7, 9. Cf. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis 12 418 f. Sander, Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom Teufel 1858. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 200. Knenen, G. v. I. II 256v. Hahn, Theol. des N. T. § 128 f. Schwartzkopff, Der Teufels- und Daemonenglaube Jesu, Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche von Gottschick, VII 1897 S. 289-330. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 53 f. 167. II 238 f. etc. Weser, Die verschiedenen Auffassungen vom Teufel im N. T., Stud. u. Krit. 1882 S. 284 f. Everling, Die paulin. Angelologie und Daemonologie, Göttingen 1888. Even if there is thus among them still some difference in strength and wickedness, all together they are nevertheless presented as thoroughly corrupt. They are always and everywhere the opponents of God, the disturbers of his kingdom, the combatants of Christ, the seducers of men, the accusers of God's children; they live in sin as in their element. Never do they occur as an object of God's love, although they are his creatures; Christ has not assumed their nature; an object of our love, of our intercession they may not be; for them there is no hope of restoration and preservation.

There is in the being and concept of the devils something completely incomprehensible. Wir können des absolute böse Wesen immer nur unter der Bedingung denken, dass wir entweder an der absoluten Bosheit oder an der wahren Existenz etwas fehlen lassen, C. J. Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehr § 116. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 337. Absolutely evil they cannot be, for they are creatures of God and thus as such good; and yet they are only the

object of God's hatred and of his eternal wrath. Because of this incomprehensibility of the nature of the devils many have denied their existence, and have regarded them as souls of deceased human beings or as personifications of our evil sins or as impersonal principles of evil, Bekker, Betov. Werelt II c. 20v. Semler, de daemoniacis 1760. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 44. 45. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 241 f. Rothe, Ethik § 503. Martensen, Dogm. § 99 f. Mallet, art. Teufel in Herzog. Strauss, Chr. Gl. II 1 f. Biedermann, Dogm. 614 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 521-524 enz. But the reality of Satan and his angels has been placed beyond doubt by Scripture; of accommodation there is not the least to be thought; Jesus has, in a very weighty point of religion, wholly and entirely erred, or it is thus, as He has said. And [92] the doctrine of Satan is for the whole Christian doctrine also far from indifferent. It is of value over against Manichaeism, for Satan is not an original being but a fallen angel; over against Pelagianism, for Satan has by one decision of the will become wholly and entirely corrupted; over against the conception of sin as weakness and sensuality, for Satan is a high, glorious, rich spirit; over against the opinion that sin is a passing moment in development, for Satan remains Satan and is never restored; over against the lowering of man to a devil, for Satan has fallen of himself, man was seduced by him, is not unschuldig but also not urschuldig; over against the conception of the atonement as an ethical process, for Christ has come to break the works of the devil. Faith in Satan's existence is not an element of saving faith in Christ; but it nevertheless is connected with it. There lies truth in the: nullus diabolus, nullus redemptor! If there were no sin, there would be no redeemer, and the seriousness of sin comes out precisely most clearly in the doctrine of Satan. From everything that Scripture testifies concerning the angels, it nevertheless appears that the moral life in them

bears another character than in human beings. Human beings are, in every domain and thus also in the moral, subject to development; they are born small, in knowledge, strength, virtue or vice, and gradually grow up in all these. But thus it is not with the angels. They have all been created at the same time with one another and mature; those who remained standing were at once confirmed in the good, and they who fell were immediately hardened and perfected in evil. Satan was not seduced, but he brought forth the lie, the sin out of himself, Joh. 8:44, and in that has at once become hardened. The nature of his sin is such that he is no longer susceptible to any repentance; of a moral consciousness, of a conscience there is in him no question; he lives from hatred. Der eigentlich satanische Charakter besteht in einem Hass alles dessen, was über ihm und bloss weil es über ihm ist (Baader). Sin also in the devils is no materia but forma; there is no summum malum, as there is a summum bonum; but the forma of sin has become so one with the angelic nature that no separation is any longer possible. It is indeed all too bold to assert that the fallen angels are also for God's omnipotence [93] irredeemable; and it is better to rest here in God's good pleasure, Voetius, Disp. I 920. Turret., Th. El. IX 5, 8. Heidegger, Corp. Th. VIII 49. Moor II 414. But yet it appears sufficiently that that good pleasure is no arbitrariness. Here on earth there is already among human beings a sin that is unforgivable, viz. the blasphemy against the H. Geest; with death, i.e. with that peculiar dispensation in which we live here on earth, the forgiveness of all sins ceases; the nature of sin cuts off, in the case of the fallen angels, the way of redemption. To which then is added that the angels are not one race. Human beings could fall and have fallen in one; and they can be saved and are saved in one. But the devils have not fallen in one, not in another, but each for himself and head for head; there was

among them no foedus operum, and therefore there is also for no foedus gratiae place. The satanic sin is thus, with all agreement, nevertheless in origin, nature, consequences a wholly other than the human. It bears an absolute character; Satan is the highest revelation of evil. Therefore he is in Scripture named with such mighty, lofty names as prince of the world, god of this age, etc. But therefore also the victory over Satan is the complete triumph of sin. God has in Satan given it every opportunity to show what it is and can do. The highest and best, the noblest and greatest in God's creation it has made subservient to itself. And yet it appears at last, in the struggle of power against right, to be powerless. Es ist der Charakter des Bösen, dass es immer mit Energie anfängt und mit Schwäche aufhört (Baader). Sin is not, it wants to be; it has no true reality and never attains to that; it is lie in its origin and lie in its end. And therefore Satan at last, with all his power, is subservient to God's glorification. Luzifer ist, kann man sagen, durch die Probe inne geworden, dass nichts wahrhaft ist als Gott. Darum ist Luzifer so gut ein Beweis Gottes als ein Engel. Wenn der Gute beweist, dass Gott ist, so beweist der Böse, dass nur Gott ist (Baader). Cf. Augustinus, de civ. XI en XII. Anselmus, de casu diaboli. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 2-7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 63. 64. Petavius, de Angelis l. III. Gerhard, Loc. V c. 4. sect. 10 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. I 450 sq. Zanchius, Op. III 167-216. Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq. Daub, [94] Judas Ischarioth, Heidelb. 1816. 1818. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 251 f. Lange, Dogm. II 559 f. Dorner II 188 f. Oosterzee § 76. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 428.

6. Apart from between the devilish and the human sins, there is also again great distinction among the latter. The Stoa, Novatian, Seb. Franck, Deurhof and others have wrongly denied this, M. Vitringa II 377. Indeed, in principle sin and virtue are indivisible; whoever has one has them all and

whoever lacks one lacks them all; between good and evil there is no gradual transition, someone agrees with the law of God or not: and the law of God is an organism which, if one of its commandments is transgressed, is violated in its entirety, for God, who gave the commandment that was transgressed, is the author of all the other commandments, Jak. 2:10, cf. Vinet, L'unité de la loi, in his Nouvelles études évangéliques. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 730. 731. But for that reason not all sins are equal. The different names, in use for sin, already point to that. In the offering of Cain and Abel in Gen. 4 it comes out that the disposition is of more value than the gift. The law, given to Israel, does indeed contain all kinds of ceremonial commandments, but throughout the whole O. T. ethical action nevertheless stands far above the cultic and liturgical; faith is reckoned for righteousness, Gen. 15:6, obedience is better than offering, 1 Sam. 15:22, Am. 2:6, 5:14, 21v., Hos. 4:1v., 12:7, Mich. 6:6, 8, Jes. 1:11v., 5:8v., Jer. 7:3, 22:3, Ezech. 16:49, 18:5v., Zach. 7:5v., Mal. 3:5 etc., cf. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 70. When after the exile Pharisaism arises and reverses this relation, Jesus and the apostles return again to law and prophets, Mt. 5-7, 19:18v., Mk. 7:21v., Rom. 1:29v., 1 Cor. 5:10v., 6:9v., 2 Cor. 12:20v., Gal. 5:19v., etc. The law itself moreover makes a distinction between sins בִּשְׁגָגָה, which are committed without evil intent, out of ignorance or weakness, do not break the covenant and can be atoned for within the covenant, and sins בְּיָד רָמָה, which are committed with awareness and deliberately, place the perpetrator outside the covenant and make him worthy of death, Lev. 4, 5, 22:14, Num. 15:22v., 35:11v., Jos. 20:3, 9. Scripture never abandons the objective standpoint, which seeks the standard of sin only in the law of God. But [95] nevertheless the guilt of the transgression is still smaller or greater, according as the commandment was violated with weaker or

stronger awareness and will. On the one hand Stade, Gesch. des Volkes Israel I 512 f, wrongly infers from Gen. 12:17, 20:3. 26:10, Num. 22:34, 1 Sam. 14:24v., 36v., that to ancient Israel the distinction between conscious and unconscious transgressions was unknown and one thus could become guilty wholly outside his knowing and willing; for all these passages hold the ignorance to be a selbstverschuldete or speak of no guilt. But on the other hand it is nevertheless also not true, dass Sünde im Allgemeinen nur ist, sofern auch ein Bewusstsein derselben ist, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 68, 2. Sin does indeed presuppose some knowledge of the law; a human being without the least moral sense would be not accountable but would also cease to be human, Rom. 2:14, 15; and sin does indeed usually go together with some consciousness of guilt, but nevertheless the standard of sin is not the consciousness of guilt but the law of God. There are sins which are hidden not only from others, but also from ourselves, Job 11:4v., Ps. 19:13, 90:8, or are only later recognized and confessed as guilt, Ps. 25:7, 51:7. Ignorance is also often itself sin, and the consciousness of guilt weakens, the longer sin is served, Am. 2:11, Hos. 4:6, Mich. 3:1, 6:8, Spr. 24:12, Pred. 4:17. Therefore the subjective consciousness of guilt cannot determine the character of sin. Although ignorance thus can never make the sin itself good, it nevertheless often, when it is not willful, serves as an excuse. Paul says that he formerly was a blasphemer, persecutor and oppressor, but adds that mercy was shown to him because he did it ignorantly, 1 Tim. 1:13. And thus Holy Scripture speaks repeatedly of the sins of the Jews and of the Gentiles, as done in ignorance, Luk. 23:34, Hd. 3:17-19, 13:27, 17:30, Ef. 4:18, Hebr. 5:2, 1 Petr. 1:14, 2:25. Thereby those sins are indeed not stripped of their guilty character, as Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers.2 II 38. 241-246. III 350-354 seems to think; for Rom. 1-3, 5:12v., Ef.

4:17-19, Col. 3:5-7, 1 Cor. 15:9, 1 Tim. 1:13, 15 etc. teach otherwise. But nevertheless these sins, done in ignorance, are thereby distinguished from sins that have arisen from hardening; the ignorance offers a ground of plea for forgiveness. And just as sins differ in degree and [96] measure, according as they are committed out of ignorance and weakness or out of intent and malice, so they are also distinguished according to the object against which they are directed: sins against the first table are heavier than against the second, Mt. 22:37, 38; according to the subject that commits them: the more richly someone is endowed with gifts, the guilt of his transgression increases, Mt. 11:21, Luk. 12:47, 48, Joh. 9:41, 15:22, 24; according to the circumstances under which they are committed: he who steals out of poverty sins less heavily than he who does it out of greed, Spr. 6:30, Jes. 26:10; according to the degree to which someone yields to sin: he who commits adultery with thought and word stands guilty but aggravates his judgment if he completes the sin in deed, Mt. 5:28. There is also in sin a development, there is a law of sin. A particular sin comes gradually into being through suggestio, delectatio, consensus, operatio; in suggestione peccati semen est, in delectatione fit nutrimentum, in consensu perfectio, Gregorius M., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II 24, 8. Bonav., Brevil. III 8. And thus sin also develops gradually with a person, in a household and family, with a society and people, and also in the whole of humanity. Sin is indeed not in itself so rich that it can assume so many forms, for it is no independent principle and is metaphysically nothing but privatio boni. But as in its origin, so it also exists in its development only in and through the good. It connects itself with the endless richness of the created, devastates all that exists, fights with the whole world as its instrument against God and his holy law, and thereby assumes all those different forms and shapes which

all together give it the character of a well-governed kingdom, of an organism animated by one principle, of a κοσμος, standing under the guidance of the ἀρχων του κοσμου, den θεος του αἰωνος.

Since sin in its essence is privatio, neither a principium dividendi nor also a divisio can be derived from it itself. Privatio receives its species from the form to which it is opposed. The earlier dogmatics and ethics therefore did indeed speak of the character of the first sin, but otherwise made no effort to trace out a so-called principle of sin and to reduce all transgressions of the moral law to it. Only in later times has one attempted to establish such a principle, and has sought it in turn [97] in sensuousness, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 66 e. a. or in selfishness, Müller, Sünde I5 178. Tholuck, Sünde8 18. 98. Vilmar, Moral I 136. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III2 3. Lange, art. Selbstsucht in Herzog and further Thomasius, Kahnis, Frank, Zöckler etc., or also in both, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 461. Lipsius, Dogm. § 480. Indeed, human sins also for the most part display the character of sensuousness or selfishness, of fleshly lust or spiritual pride, of weakness or wickedness; sometimes sin seems to consist in the dominion of matter over the spirit, sometimes also in a misuse of freedom, in revolt against God's ordinances. But yet it has succeeded neither for Rothe, to explain selfishness from sensuousness, nor also for J. Müller with his praeëxistentianism, to explain sensuousness from selfishness, cf. Dorner, Gl. II 90-98. And that is also easy to understand. Metaphysically and abstractly sin cannot be otherwise and cannot be more closely defined than as privatio boni; then it has no principle of its own, no real existence; it exists only on the good. The forms which it assumes it derives from the good, in which it dwells and which it corrupts. It will therefore differ in appearance according as to the creatures in which it is seated. Although always privatio boni, it bears in angels and

men and even in each of these again a particular character. And since man by nature is neither only a sensuous nor only a spiritual being but always both together, therefore all sin in him will also display this character. No single sin of man is exclusively sensuousness or exclusively selfishness. Just as with the first sin in Adam, there are in every sin various sides to be noticed, even if it is also the case that usually the one is more striking than the other. Every sin in man is aversio a Deo, disobedience, revolt, anarchy, anomie and at the same time, since he never has enough in himself, conversio ad creaturam, idolatry, pride, selfishness, sensuousness etc., Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 42 art. 3 qu. 2. And since the creatures to which man can turn are so many, therefore sin in him can also assume so many forms. There are as many kinds of sins as there are different commandments, duties, virtues, moral goods. Thomas divided the sins according to the objects to which they are directed, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 72 art. [98] 1, Scotus according to the virtues to which they are opposed, Sent. II dist. 37 qu. 1, 9, cf. Liguori, Theol. mor. de pecc II. n. 32. And alongside that there still existed many other divisions, such as that into seven capital sins, superbia, avaritia, luxuria, via, gula, invidia, acedia (vox memorialis: saligia); according to the norma into sins against the different commandments of the law or into sins against God, the neighbour and ourselves; according to the instrument with which they are committed, into sins with thoughts, words and works, or into sins of the spirit and of the flesh, or in accordance with 1 Joh. 2:16 into peccata sentiendi, sciendi et dominandi, or into sins of weakness, ignorance and wickedness; according to the form into sins of omission and of commission, or into sins per se and per accidens; according to the adjuncta into hidden and public, reigning and not reigning, silent and crying sins etc., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42.

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 72. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 5 sq. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 202. Moor III 313. Mastricht, Theol. IV 3,10. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. X 61. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 221. Zöckler, Das Lehrstück v. d. sieben Hauptsünden, München 1893 etc.

Leaving further elaboration to ethics, we here discuss only the Roman distinction of sins into peccata mortalia and venialia. This has its origin in the practice of penance, cf. Pijper, Gesch. der boete en biecht in de Chr. Kerk I 1891 bl. 306v., and in substance already occurs in Tertullian, de pudic. 2. 3. 19. adv. Marc. IV 9, and in Augustine, who spoke of peccata levia, brevia, minuta, minima, quotidiana, which still remain in believers, Enchir. 44. 71. de civ. XXI 27. de nat. et gr. 39. de spir. et litt. 36. Worked out by scholasticism, Lombard and others on Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 88. 89, it was established by the church, Trid. VI c. 11 can. 27 XIV 5. Cat. Rom. II 5 qu. 40, and since then defended by all theologians with zeal against all opposition, Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 3 sq. Becanus, Theol. Schol. II 1619 p. 117. Liguori, Theol. Mor., de pecc. n. 51 sq. Busenbaum, Theol. mor., de pecc. qu. 31 sq. Antoine, Theol. Mor., de pecc. c. 2 etc. According to this distinction there are sins which cause the received grace to be lost and are worthy of death, and others, such as an idle word, an overly boisterous laugh, an involuntarily surging desire, agitation, [99] anger, a very small theft, etc., which do not cause grace to be lost, not so much contra as praeter legem, and are by nature pardonable. The distinction is grounded on the fact that Scripture speaks of different sins and punishments, Mt. 5:22, 7:3, 23:23, Luk. 6:41, 1 Cor. 3:12-15, sometimes connects death with sins, Rom. 1:32, 6:23, 1 Cor. 6:9, Gal. 5:21, 1 Joh. 3:14, and yet often continues to recognize believers as such, even though they stumble in many things, Spr. 24:16, Mt. 1:19, Luk. 1:6, Jak. 3:2, and

furthermore also on the consideration that there exist curable and incurable diseases and that there are small offenses which do not abolish friendship. The Reformers rejected this distinction as in conflict with God's Word. They did not deny that there were degrees in sins; and they also still retained the terms peccata mortalia and venialia, but they attached another meaning to them. The Lutherans had, to a certain extent, still to adopt the distinction, because believers could commit sins in which grace was preserved, and others in which it was lost, Luther in Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 472 f. Melanchthon, Loci Comm., de peccato. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 20, cf. also Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 4. But the Reformed went further and wanted to know nothing of the whole distinction. If they sometimes still used the words, they understood by them that all sins, except the blasphemy against the H. Spirit, can be forgiven by God's mercy and are in fact also forgiven to believers, but that they all in themselves are worthy of death, Calvin, Inst. II 8, 58. III 2, 11. 4, 28. Antid. conc. Trid. VI 12. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 209. Gomarus, Theses theol. disp. 13. Moor III 308-312. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 4. Mastricht IV 3, 22. Pictet, Christ. Godg. VI 11. Heppe, Dogm. 257. The Scripture passages on which the Romanists appeal for their distinction are therefore all without any probative force. Only Mt. 5:22 offers some semblance of ground, but the intention of Jesus' word there is nevertheless entirely different from distinguishing light from heavy sins. Over against the ancients, namely, who said that only the sinful deed, the actual homicide, made one guilty and punishable before the local court, Jesus says that not only the deed but already the first stirring of unlawful anger, even if it does not yet express itself in a word, [100] makes one guilty and punishable before that court; that when that anger expresses itself in a small, involuntary word, the sin is already so great that it must be dealt

with by the sanhedrin; and that when the anger expresses itself in a word of abuse, it is at once, without form of process, worthy of the hellish fire. There is therefore so little question here of pardonable sins, that Jesus, precisely the reverse, regards the slightest sin as most punishable, as punishable as the ancients regarded the sinful deed, i.e. murder. Jesus equates the surging, unlawful anger with homicide; he says that the lightest sin is precisely already a very heavy sin, which deserves as great a punishment as, according to the ancients, homicide. What punishment this stirring of anger is worthy of in the hereafter, Jesus does not say with a word; but if that anger is accompanied by a word of abuse, then this sin is so great that at that very moment it is worthy of hellish punishment; no court is any longer needed to determine a punishment. Properly understood, this text is therefore rather an argument against than for the distinction of peccata mortalia and venialia. And so the whole of Scripture stands against this division. The law is an organic whole Jak. 2:10, whoever transgresses one commandment is in principle guilty of all; it must be fulfilled in its entirety, Mt. 5:17-19; it demands us wholly with the whole heart and understanding, with soul and body, Mt. 22:37; for it nothing is indifferent and small, cursed is he who does not continue in all that is written in the book of the law, that he do it, Deut. 27:26, Gal. 3:10; even the smallest and least transgressions of the law, such as a surging anger, an impure desire, a superfluous affirmation, an idle word, Mt. 5:22, 28, 37, 12:36, Ef. 5:4 are sin, in principle equal to sinful deeds, and thus as sin also ἀνομια, enmity against God. Considered according to the principle, there are no small and slight sins. Nullum peccatum contemnendum ut parvum, cum revera nullum sit parvum, quando Paulus de omni peccato generatim pronuntiaverit, stimulum mortis esse peccatum, Basilius in Gerhard t. a. p. When a sin, e.g.

an idle word, is set by itself and detached from its whole connection with the person, the circumstances, etc., the assertion seems excessively strict that it deserves eternal death. But it is precisely that abstract, atomistic view which, as in conflict with Scripture and with reality at the same time, was in principle rejected by [101] the Reformers. Sin is not a quantum which, isolated from the doer, can be counted on the fingers or weighed in the balance. The Roman distinction has in fact therefore led to all kinds of evil practices. Not only do the theologians not agree as to whether the venial sin offends God or not; whether it ought or ought not to be confessed; whether for its restoration actual repentance is really necessary or whether the performance of some meritorious work is sufficient. But all also acknowledge that the distinction, both in theory and practice, is very difficult and almost impossible to maintain. One must therefore take refuge in all kinds of subtle reasonings, which in the process cause the whole character of sin to be lost. Where reasonings fail, one counts up the opinions of the doctores and contents oneself with a smaller or greater degree of probability. Thus one arrives at an atomistic, casuistic, mechanical, materialistic estimation of sins and of satisfactions, and keeps souls continually in anxiety whether they may perhaps have committed a mortal sin, or brings them to frivolity and indifference, because the sins are mostly of a very light nature and very easily made good.

7. Only one sin is mentioned by Holy Scripture which is unforgivable in this and the coming life, namely, the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. In the O.T. there is no mention of it, although in the law no atoning sacrifice was instituted for the sins בְּיָד רָמָה, because they annulled the law itself, Hebr. 10:28. Jesus speaks of it first, Mt. 12:31, Mk. 3:28, Luk. 12:10. When He once completely healed a demoniac, who was also blind and mute, the

crowds were so astonished by this miracle that they acknowledged Jesus as the Son of David, as the Christ. But the Pharisees were thereby driven up to a pinnacle of hatred, which made them say, not only that He cast out demons by the devil, but that He himself also was possessed by the devil, Mk. 3:22, βεελζεβουλ ἐχει. This accusation was prompted solely and only by hatred; it sprang forth from sheer, conscious, willed enmity. Jesus also shows that, Mt. 12:25-30; a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand, Satan does not cast out himself, but the [102] casting out of Satan is a proof that the kingdom of God has come to them, Jesus casts out the devil by the Spirit of God. The contrast between Jesus and the Pharisees is here therefore strained to the utmost; they say that Jesus is possessed, performs his miracles by the devil, and establishes the kingdom of the devil. And Jesus declares that He is the Christ, that He casts out the devil by the Spirit of God and that He thus brings the kingdom of God to them. And in this connection, on this occasion, Jesus speaks of the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit as the unforgivable sin. Whether one now thinks that the Pharisees at that moment had committed this sin, or whether one thinks one must deny this, inter alia because the Holy Spirit had not yet been poured out then, Joh. 7:39, in any case the connection always makes it clear that the sin against the Holy Spirit must consist in a conscious, willful, deliberate blasphemy of the clearly recognized, and yet out of hatred and enmity ascribed to the devil, revelation of God's grace in Christ by the Holy Spirit. The blasphemy against the Holy Spirit therefore does not consist in simple unbelief, nor in resisting and grieving the Holy Spirit in general, nor in the denial of the personality or deity of the Holy Spirit, nor in sinning against better knowledge and to the end, without more. It is also not a sin against the law alone, but specifically also against the gospel, and indeed against

the gospel in its clearest revelation. Much therefore precedes it: objectively a revelation of God's grace in Christ, the nearness of his kingdom, a powerful working of the Holy Spirit, and subjectively an illumination and conviction of the understanding, so vivid and powerful that one cannot deny the truth of God, that one must acknowledge it as divine. And then it itself does not consist in doubting or simply denying that truth, but in a denial that goes against the conviction of the understanding, against the illumination of the conscience, against the prompting of the heart; in a fully conscious, willful and deliberate ascribing of what is clearly recognized as God's work to the influence and working of Satan, i.e. in a decided blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, in a willful declaring that the Holy Spirit is the spirit from the abyss, that the truth is the lie, that Christ is Satan himself. Its root is therefore the fully conscious, deliberate hatred against God and against what is recognized as divine; its essence is the [103] sinful in its highest manifestation, the completed, the consummated revolution, the placing of God in the place of Satan and of Satan in the place of God; its character is no longer human but demonic. Even if it is also the case that the devils do not commit this sin in this particular form, because God's grace has not appeared to them, Christ has not assumed their nature, the Holy Spirit has not been poured out among them and the kingdom of God has not come to them; nevertheless the demonic sin bears the same character that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit displays among men. Therefore it is also unforgivable; God's grace is indeed not too small and too powerless for it; but there are also in the kingdom of sin laws and ordinances, which have been laid in it by God and are maintained by Him. And that law consists here with this sin in this, that it excludes all repentance, sears the conscience, utterly hardens and obdurates the sinner and in this way makes

his sin unforgivable. Apart from in the gospels, nowhere in Scripture is there mention of this sin in direct words. But this blasphemy against the Holy Spirit can be committed in different circumstances. And thus Hebr. 6:4-8, 10:25-29 cf. 12:15-17 says that those who have once been enlightened and have tasted the heavenly gift and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit and who then fall back to Judaism, trample and crucify and put to shame the Son of God, regard the blood of the N. T. as unclean and do insult to the Spirit of grace, that such cannot be brought again to repentance. And likewise 1 Joh. 5:16 testifies that there is a sin which necessarily by virtue of its nature leads to death without repentance, and for which John does not say, i.e. does not command, that one shall pray. The prayer, if not unlawful, is nevertheless fruitless. Probably John here, in connection with his whole epistle, thinks of the decided and willful denial of the Christ as the incarnate Son of God. In both these passages we therefore have to do with sins which harden man completely, and therefore are themselves unforgivable. In fact and in substance these coincide with the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For the astonishingly rich literature on this subject reference is made to Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 14 art. 1. Comm. op Sent. II dist. 43. M. Vitringa II 378. Walch, Bibl. theol. [104] sel. I 88. 254. Schaff, Die Sünde wider den H. Geist, Halle 1841. Muller, Sünde II 596 f. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 89-100.

§ 38. THE SPREAD OF SIN.

1. Sin, already so dreadful in its essence, acquires an even more serious character through the extent of its dominion. Even outside special revelation the absolute universality of sin is acknowledged. The various religions with their priests and altars, their sacrifices and penances are all built on the confession of sin; dogma and cultus, prayer and song, religion and philosophy sometimes express in a moving way the general consciousness of sin. Ἀνθρωποισι γαρ τοις πασι κοινον ἐστι τοὐξαμαρτανειν. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. Communis hominum labes. Cf. Pfanner, Theol. gent. IX 7. Bretschneider, Dogm. II4 16. Lamennais, Essai sur l'indifférence III p. 393-408. Hettinger, Apol. d. Christ. III7 30. 412. Still more clearly this universality of sin is expressed in Holy Scripture, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, 1 Kon. 8:46, 2 Chr. 6:36, Job 4:17-21, 14:4, 25:4-6, Ps. 14:3, 53:2, 130:3, 143:2, Spr. 20:9, Pred. 7:20, Jes. 53:6, 58:1, 59:4, 12 etc., cf. Sir. 8:6, 25:26, Wijsh. 9:6, 13-18, 12:10, 11 etc. Jesus presupposes it, when He calls all without distinction to repentance and connects entrance into the kingdom of God with rebirth from water and Spirit, Mt. 4:17, Mk.

1:15, 6:12, Luk. 12:47, Joh. 3:3, 5. To be sure He speaks of healthy persons and righteous persons, Mt. 9:12, 13, Mk. 2:17, Luk. 5:31, 32, but He does that, without passing a judgment on the nature of that health and righteousness, objectively, according to the opinion of those whom he thus describes. How He Himself thinks about that righteousness appears sufficiently from other passages; over the Pharisees He pronounces His woe, but the weary and burdened He invites to His rest. Likewise the apostles teach that all have sinned, that the whole world lies in the evil one and is condemnable before God, that all have need of the forgiving love of the Father, [105] of redemption through Christ, of renewal by the Holy Spirit, Rom. 3:9-20, 23, 5:12, 11:32, 2 Cor. 5:19, Gal. 3:22, 1 Joh. 1:8, 5:19. Furthermore, according to Scripture sin is proper to the human being from youth, from birth, even from conception onward, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Joh 14:4, 13:26, Ps. 25:7, 51:7, 58:4, 103:14, Jes. 43:27, 48:8, 57:3, Ezech. 16:3, Hos. 5:7, Joh. 3:6, Rom. 7:7v., Ef. 2:3. David in his confession of guilt goes back to the deepest ground of his sinfulness, finds it in the sins of his parents and declares from that that he himself, from his conception and birth onward, stands unclean before God, Ps. 51:7. In Joh. 3:6 Jesus says that the flesh, i.e. the human being as a sensuous being, can bring forth only flesh, that such a human being has no entrance into the kingdom of God and for that needs rebirth from the Spirit, that the human being as such a sensuous being, as σαρξ, is unclean and corrupt from his birth onward. And in Ef. 2:3 Paul declares that Jews and Gentiles are τεκνα φυσει ὀργης; he certainly does not set φυσει here over against actual sins, of which he is precisely speaking, vs. 1-3, but says that they were φυσει children of God’s wrath, while they now, after they have been made alive and saved by grace, are objects of His love, and thus indicates that their former condition, their

being dead through sins and trespasses, was a natural condition, a φυσις, which rested in their existence itself, cf. Rom. 2:14, 11:21, 2:15, 4:8. For the rest it is true that Holy Scripture presupposes the universality of sin and the corruption of the human being reaching back into conception far more than it describes it at length and repeatedly. Human beings themselves are everywhere depicted as sinners; not only the generation before the flood and all Gentiles and ungodly persons, but also the people of Israel; and within that people many sins are also related of the pious, of the patriarchs, Moses, Job, David, Solomon etc., indeed it is precisely the pious who, even where they are convinced of the justice of their cause, nevertheless fall down before God in humble confession of guilt and implore mercy and forgiveness, Ps. 6, 25, 32, 38, 51, 130, 143, Jes. 6:5, 53:4-6 etc. It is the heart of the human being that is corrupt, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Ps. 14:1, Jer. 17:9, Ezech. 36:26, Mt. 15:19; from it are the issues of life, Spr. [106] 4:23, from it come all unrighteousnesses and also folly, Mk. 7:22. The understanding of the human being is darkened, Job 21:14, Jes. 1:3, Jer. 4:22, Joh. 1:5, Rom. 1:21, 22, 1 Cor. 1:18-28, 2:14, Ef. 4:18, 5:8; his soul is guilty and unclean and has need of atonement and repentance, Lev. 17:11, Ps. 19:8, 41:5, Spr. 19:2, 15, Mt. 16:26, 1 Petr. 1:22; his spirit is proud, erring, defiled and therefore must be broken, enlightened, cleansed, Ps. 51:19, Spr. 16:18, 32, Pred. 7:9, Jes. 57:15, 66:2, 1 Cor. 7:34, 2 Cor. 7:1, 1 Thess. 5:23; his conscience is stained and needs cleansing, Tit. 1:15, Hebr. 9:9, 14, 10:22; his desire, inclination and will extend to what is forbidden and are powerless for good, Jer. 13:23, Joh. 8:34, 36, Rom. 6:17, 8:7, 2 Cor. 3:5; and the body, with all its members, eyes, Deut. 29:4, Ps. 18:28, Jes. 35:5, 42:7, 2 Petr. 2:14, 1 Joh. 2:16, ears, Deut, 29:4, Ps. 115:6, 135:17, Jes. 6:10, Jer. 5:21, Zach. 7:11, feet, Ps. 38:17, Spr. 1:16, 4:27, 6:18, Jes. 59:7, Rom.

3:15, mouth and tongue, Job 27:4, Ps. 17:10, 12:4, 15:3, Jer. 9:3, 5, Rom. 3:14, Joh. 3:5-8 etc. stands in the service of unrighteousness. In one word, sin does not adhere to and around but in the human being and spreads over the whole human being and over all humanity, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 670 f. Of the passages that are cited for the opposite view, only Rom. 7:7-26 needs some further discussion. At all times the Pelagians have appealed to this pericope as proof that the νους or the πνευμα in the human being has remained free from sin and that this resides only in the σαρξ; in more recent times this exegesis has been almost generally accepted. Augustine, however, in his later period and all his followers both in the Roman and in the Protestant churches, have always contradicted this interpretation and understood verses 14-25 as spoken by Paul as one reborn and concerning the present, an explanation that is still advocated today by Delitzsch, Philippi, Luthardt, Harless, Thomasius, Umbreit, Kohlbrugge, e. a., cf. Tholuck in his Comm. zum Brief an die Römer5, 1856 S. 333-369, and further Meyer, Philippi etc. The latter exegesis deserves preference for various reasons. 1o Paul argues in Rom. 7:7-26 that the law, from which the believer, by having died with Christ, has been released, is itself not sinful. And he does that by pointing out that it first brought the believer to knowledge of his sin and his death, 7-13 and that it now still has the assent of his inner man, even though his flesh resists it, 14-26. In this connection the argument that the law now still has the assent of the believer, even though he has been released from it, is necessary. For for the proposition that the law itself is holy, it is not enough that the unreborn, but it is precisely necessary that the reborn approves it. And thus Paul also speaks from verse 14 onward in the present tense, not out of vividness of representation, but because he precisely as one reborn loves and approves

the law. Because the law indirectly granted him the painful experience of his sin and death, because he in communion with Christ, vs. 4, Gal. 2:19, 20 through the law has died to the law and has been freed from its curse, Gal. 3:13, therefore and thereby he has learned to know it as holy and righteous and good, he bears witness to it and confirms the law through faith, Rom. 3:30. 2o Because Paul according to the course of his argument wants to honor the law in its holy character, he casts all blame on the sin that dwells in him, and he makes a sharp distinction between the center and the periphery of his being. Inwardly, according to his will, according to his inner man he loves God's law, but in his members there dwells another power and another law, namely sin. Such a deep distinction is nowhere assumed in Scripture with the unreborn. With this one there is indeed a knowledge of God and of the law and also a doing by nature of the things that are of the law, Rom. 1:19, 2:14, 15, i.e. thus a struggle between reason and sensuousness, conscience and lust, understanding and heart; but a struggle between flesh and spirit, as Paul depicts it here, exists only with the reborn, Gal. 5:17; only they can say that they love the law of God, approve it, will it with their whole heart. 3o Although Paul as one reborn still calls himself σαρκινος, πεπραμενος ὑπο την ἁμαρτιαν, he nevertheless does not thereby say that he is ἐν σαρκι, 8:8, 9 or walks κατα σαρκα, 8:1, for he calls himself so only because on account of the sin dwelling in his members he cannot do what he wills and thus is held captive by that law of sin in his members. Although wretched, because with the [108] flesh he serves the law of sin, he nevertheless with his νους serves the law of God, vs. 26, and it is precisely this latter that is further worked out in Rom. 8. In Christ he is righteous and he walks according to the Spirit. 4o In addition there is still this, that, if Rom. 7:14v. were to be understood of the unreborn, rebirth

itself would be unnecessary, a helping grace would be sufficient and the whole doctrine of Scripture about sin and grace, about justification and sanctification, about faith and repentance would be overthrown. Rather Rom. 7:7-25 is a strong proof for the total corruption of human nature; for if the reborn still has so to complain about the power of sin that dwells in him, then the unreborn is wholly and entirely, without knowing it, a servant of sin, being in the flesh and walking according to the flesh, and the minding of that flesh is enmity against God.

This universality of sin is derived in Gen. 3 from the fall of the first man. True, it is not stated there in so many words; Gen. 3 pays much more attention to the change in the circumstances, which occurs as a consequence of the fall (pain of the woman, curse of the ground, expulsion from the garden), than to the moral reversal which took place in Adam and in his descendants. But it nevertheless relates that immediately after the evil committed shame and fear take hold of them, that the consciousness of guilt awakens, that they flee from God. The punishments, pronounced Gen. 3:16v., relate not only to Adam and Eve but without doubt also to their descendants, and these punishments, according to the whole conception of the O. T., also presuppose common guilt. The first fact that is reported after the fall is Cain's fratricide; history itself becomes another, even without this being said more precisely, it becomes a history of sin, misery, and death. Man is now by nature evil, Gen. 6:5, 8:21. Likewise the further O. T. Scriptures do not expressly connect the universality of sin with the fall of the first man. They remain with the fact of the universality of sin or also trace this back to the perishable, sensuous nature of man, Job 4:17v., 14:4, 15:14v., 25:4v., Ps. 78:38v., 103:13v., Mk. 14:38, Joh. 3:6, Rom. 6:7v. etc., cf. above p. 49v. It is only Paul who in 1 Cor. 15:21v., Rom. 5:12v. [109]

explains the universality of sin from Adam's disobedience, cf. also Wijsh. 1:13, 14, 2:23, 24, Apoc. Baruch 23:4, 54:15, 56:5, 9, 4 Ezra 7:68. In 1 Cor. 15:21v. he says that the death of all men has its cause in the man Adam in the same way as the resurrection from the dead in the man Christ. It clearly lies here that the death of all men is not first caused by their personal sins, but has already been pronounced over all men and has passed to all men, solely and only because of the disobedience of Adam; in the same way as the resurrection is not merited by the personal good works, the faith, etc. of believers, but exclusively by the obedience of Christ. Not in and through themselves but in Adam they die; and not in and through themselves do they rise, but only in Christ. How and why that death has passed to all is set forth more precisely in Rom. 5:12v. Since we through the death of Christ have been reconciled as enemies, we are certain that with Him we shall also live eternally; indeed so certain are we that we now already boast through Christ, who granted us the reconciliation, vv. 10, 11. The grace and the life of Christ therefore (δια τουτο, v. 12) far surpass the sin and death of Adam. This is the theme of the pericope vv. 12-21, and it is worked out and proved in this way. Through one man sin, as a mighty and all-governing principle, has come into the world, and in that way and along that path death also has passed to all men, since all sinned. The little words ἐφ' ᾧ are not to be translated with Orig., Vulg., Aug., etc. by in quo, for they stand too far from ἀνθρωπος to be able to refer back to it, and they also do not mean in whom, although this thought in itself is not unscriptural, Hebr. 7:10, 1 Cor. 15:22, but they are a conjunction, ἐπι τουτῳ ὀτι, eo quod, quia, quandoquidem, Calvin, Martyr and most newer exegetes; ἡμαρτον does not indicate a sinful state, but an act. Paul therefore says in verse 12: Adam transgressed, thereby sin and death came into the world and reigned over all. The causal

clause ἐφ᾽ ᾧ παντες ἡμαρτον does not make known that Paul seeks the cause of the death of each man in his personal, actual sins, for in 1 Cor. 15:22 he says expressly that all die in Adam; here in verse 14 [110] he declares that death also reigned over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression, and—so may we add—also over the children; and in vv. 15 and 17 he expresses it as strongly as possible that through the trespass of one many have died. Yet on the other hand, with that causal clause it is not silently to be thought that all sinned in Adam. This is in itself already improbable, but it is made impossible by the fact that vv. 13 and 14 precisely deal with the sin which men committed not in Adam but themselves personally, even though they then also did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. But Paul means to say that through Adam's transgression both sin and death, both in connection with each other, have come to dominion in humanity, that as a consequence of Adam's transgression all men themselves personally have become sinners and all die head for head. He argues this proposition in the following verses thus: the sin which entered the world through Adam's transgression was also there and also reigned in the time from Adam to Moses, when God had not yet promulgated his law; men sinned also then. But—so Paul, as it were, objects to himself—sin is nevertheless not imputed when there is no law; the law of Moses was not yet there, thus sin could then also not be imputed. And to that he answers: most certainly it could, for death nevertheless reigned from Adam to Moses, even if it is also the case that men then did not transgress a positive law expressly and verbally promulgated by God and thus could not sin in likeness of Adam's transgression. They nevertheless did sin, because they also then had a law which was known to them by nature, Rom. 1:18v., 2:12-15. If death therefore nevertheless

reigned then, then sin must also have reigned then. And it reigned then, not because each person personally transgressed a positive command as Adam and thus each for himself and through himself became a sinner; no, but because through the transgression of Adam sin had come into the world and reigned over all and as a consequence of that also death. Adam is therefore precisely a type of Christ. It goes with sin and death, which come to us from Adam, in the same way as with righteousness and life, which Christ has acquired. There is a difference in intensity, grace is more abundant and life is more powerful, but the modus quo, by which both become our portion, is the same. The trespass of one was the cause of the guilt, the sin, and the death of all men, and so the obedience of one is the cause of the righteousness, acquittal, and life of all. In one all are condemned and have died; in one they are all justified and saved. In both cases a judgment of God, a κριμα, precedes; and from that κριμα are derived on the one hand our sin and death, and on the other hand our righteousness and our life. And thus the thought which Paul develops in this pericope comes down to this: 1o over the one transgression of Adam God has rendered a verdict, consisting in declaration of guilt and condemnation to death. 2o that verdict has been rendered in Adam over all men, because they in one way or another, which Paul does not explain more precisely here but lets be surmised from his line of argument, were included in Adam; all have been declared guilty in Adam and condemned to death. 3o by virtue of this preceding judgment of God all men have personally become sinners and all also in fact die. God thinks and regards, judges and condemns all men in one, and therefore they also all proceed from him as sinners and they are all subject to death. Cf. Moor III 255. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. Ontw. v. h. Ex. v. Tol. X 373. Dietzsch, Adam u. Christus, Bonn 1871. Hünefeld,

Römer 5:12-21, Leipzig 1895. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 524 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. werk I 212. Pfleiderer, Der Panlin. 53 enz.

2. On these data of Scripture the doctrine of original sin was built in the Christian church. From the beginning a certain connection was acknowledged between Adam's sin and that of his descendants, cf. many citations in Vossius, Hist. Pelag. p. 134 sq. Horn, Comm. de sententiis eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Aug. plurimum valuit, de peccato originali, Gott. 1801. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 403 f. Münscher-v. Coelln, D. G. I 343. 353. Schwane, D. G. II 439. Harnack, D. G. III 38. 151. Insofar the assertion that the doctrine of original sin is an invention of Augustine is wholly incorrect, and he himself could testify: non ego finxi peccatum originale, quod catholica fides credit antiquitus, de nupt. II 12. But yet it is true that [112] theology in the first period, especially in the East, laid the emphasis much more, over against Gnosticism, on free will and personal, actual sin than on original sin from Adam; and where it is acknowledged that a malum animae ex originis vitio antecedit, Tert. de an. 41, the essence of that original sin is nevertheless not more precisely determined and the manner of its propagation not more deeply thought through. Pelagius could therefore with some appearance of right appeal to many predecessors, but he nevertheless went much further than they, taught something essentially different, and denied original sin. According to Pelagius the image of God consisted only in free personality, not in positive holiness, immortality, etc. Adam's transgression did not take away that image of God and in fact had no harmful consequences at all. There is no original sin. Only insofar did Adam's transgression do damage to his descendants, as he set a bad example, which, followed by others, made sin into a power in humanity. Inheritance of sin is a Manichaean error; sin is not a condition but an act,

and always bears a personal character; it would be in conflict with God's righteousness to impute to us alien sins; also propagation in marriage would be impermissible, if the inheritance of sin took place by that way; moreover baptized parents can no longer propagate sin, since it has after all been eradicated in baptism. Sin is therefore not propagated by generation but by imitation. Human beings, whose souls are created pure by God, are even now born in the same condition as that in which Adam found himself before the fall; sickness, suffering, death etc. are no punishments of sin; the human being is still completely free and can of himself know and do the good, he has no need of grace; it is possible to abstain from all sins, and some human beings have in fact also brought it so far, cf. the anti-Pelagian writings of Augustine and the litt., part II 320. Pelagius in this denial of original sin agreed with the Jews, who thought that the souls were created pure by God and were in a position to resist the יצר הרע dwelling in the flesh and to live sinlessly, Weber, System 217 f. And later the Socinians agreed with him, Fock, Der Socin. 654 f., some Anabaptists, Cloppenburg, Op. II 151 sq., many humanists and rationalists, Wegscheider, Instit. [113] theol. § 117, and at present also Ritschl and his school. According to Ritschl we may not assume behind the particular, actual sins a general concept of sin, for such a concept is wholly incomprehensible; a passive inherited condition cannot be conceived as sin; Scripture does not teach it, Ps. 51:7 is only an individual confession, Ef. 2:3 refers to the former actual sins of those who are now Christians, and Rom. 5:12 is too unclear to derive anything from it; original sin would remove all responsibility, make education impossible, do away with the distinction of degree in sins; each human being would then in original sin already have risen to the highest degree of sin and the personal, actual sins would thereby hardly any longer come into consideration. No,

sin is not a unity by virtue of one principle but a collective unity as result of all individual actions and inclinations; and subject of sin is not humanity as a race, which is an abstraction and only a memory-image, but humanity as sum of all individuals. Not first the sinful condition and then the act, but conversely the self-determination of the will is the ground of all sins. Only the will, which always does the evil, does indeed gradually acquire an inclination, a habitus, and this then in turn works upon the acts of will. And thus there does indeed arise in the human being a Gesetz der Sünde, a kingdom of sin, a common sin, but this is quite something other than original sin and was wrongly so named by Schleiermacher. A sinless development of life can therefore also a priori not be denied, the will of children is not directed toward evil, rather there is in them a general inclination toward good, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Unterricht in d. chr. Rel. 1886 S. 25. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 256.

This Pelagian explanation of the universality of sin, however, encounters too many and too serious objections for it to be able to find acceptance for a long time and among many. In the previous century, with its rationalism, individualism, and optimism, there was room for it; Rousseau made the thoughts from many a heart public, when he glorified uncorrupted nature and sought the cause of all sin and misery in society. But the historical sense, which awoke after the revolution; the insight into the incalculable value of community, society, and state; the organic view, [114] which has penetrated everywhere; the doctrine of heredity above all, the significance of which, also in the spiritual and moral domain, has been brought to light more than formerly, have put an end to the individualistic and atomistic conception of humanity and of the sin reigning in it. If anything is certain, then it is indeed this, that sin is not merely an accidental phenomenon in the

life of individuals, but that it is a condition and mode of life of the whole human race, a property of the species. The sinful deeds, which do not occur now and then but are proper to all people in all ages and circumstances, point back to a sinful disposition, just as bad fruits presuppose a bad tree and turbid water points back to an impure source. From that, indeed, it alone is explained that all children from youth show a desire for what is forbidden and an inclination to all kinds of evil. To be sure, the Pelagians have many times, with appeal to Jon. 4:11, Ps. 106:38, Mt. 18:3, 19:14, Luk. 18:17, Joh. 9:3, 1 Cor. 7:14, spoken of the innocence of children. And in a relative sense that is also correct; there is difference in degree between the sins; in connection with age and development, sin in children also has not yet come to its full manifestation and cannot yet present itself in such dreadful forms as at a later age; but the experience of all parents and teachers also teaches, that with the increase in knowledge etc., in the children also the sinful inclination develops. And if we ourselves review our own life, we find sin as far back as we can remember; and the deeper our consciousness of guilt descends, the more it goes back to the sins of youth, yes, of birth and conception, Ps. 25:7, 51:7. The above-mentioned Scripture passages therefore also offer the Pelagians no support; they speak at most of a relative innocence, but do not teach the sinlessness of children. Furthermore, the assertion that there have been people who have lived without sin or can live without sin, is devoid of all probability and of all ground. Xenophon's testimony concerning Socrates, Mem. I 1, 11. IV 8, 11, is understood by no one in an absolute sense; of the pious in O. and N. Test. numerous sinful deeds are reported to us; those who have advanced farthest on the way of sanctification have in that same measure felt their guilt and imperfection all the more deeply. And so strong and general is the

conviction of the sinfulness of the whole [115] human race, that, if someone came forward with the assertion of being sinless, we all would at once ascribe this to lack of self-knowledge, pride, or insanity, Müller, Sünde II 370. This absolute universality of sin is not to be explained by imitation. It precedes every conscious and intentional act of will, and is in us all a condition, long before it passes over into deeds. That Ritschl does not acknowledge this, is connected in him also with nominalism; humanity is not an organism but the sum of all individuals; sin is not a condition but consists only in acts of will; things in general are, or in any case are only knowable, in their effects. Yet Ritschl himself does not remain faithful to his point of departure; for although he denies inborn sin and teaches the integrity of human nature, he nevertheless, just like Pelagius, ascribes to the bad example and the influence of society such a power, that thereby the universality of sin is explained and there even arises a common sin. Now one of the two: these influences from without work only accidentally and then they explain nothing and the universality of sin is a riddle; or they in fact cause the general sinfulness, but then they are of a much worse nature than the Scriptural doctrine of original sin. Furthermore, Ritschl does indeed combat this doctrine with the claim that it abolishes all degrees in sin, but this rests on misunderstanding; he himself has only two classes of sins, those of ignorance and of definitive wickedness, which certainly do not encompass the many-sidedness of sinful life. And the attempts to remove this doctrine from Holy Scripture, with all their acuteness, nevertheless bear too violent a character for them to be called successful. Cf. Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl'sche Theologie, in Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1889. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 149. Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, London 1897 p. 145.

3. Pelagianism was condemned by the Christian church. From the beginning the church fathers assumed a certain connection between Adam's sin and that of his race. Even if this connection was not yet conceived, Adam's transgression nevertheless brought about a great moral change for himself and for his descendants. The nature of that moral change, however, was conceived very differently. According to semipelagianism the consequences [116] of Adam's fall for him and for his descendants consisted, besides in death, chiefly in a weakening of moral power. A proper original sin, which would be guilt, does not indeed exist, but there is nevertheless an Erbübel; through Adam's fall man has become morally sick; his will is weakened and inclined to evil; a struggle has arisen in him between flesh and spirit, which makes it impossible that there lives a man without sin; but he can nevertheless will the good, and if he wills this, grace comes to his aid in the accomplishing, Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. II 54-82. On this standpoint stands the Greek church, deel II 319, and although in the West Augustine had much influence, the church nevertheless strayed more and more toward semipelagianism, and taught at Trent, that freedom of the will is indeed weakened but not destroyed and that the concupiscentia in itself is no sin, cf. deel II 322v. Entirely in agreement herewith is the opinion of the Anabaptists, bij Moor III 205, of Zwingli, cf. mijne Ethiek van Zwingli bl. 17. 18, of the Remonstrants, Conf. c. 7 and Apol. Conf. ib., Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV sect. 5 c. 2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 2., the Herrnhutters, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. II 213 f., the Supranaturalists, Reinhard, Dogm. § 81-84, Krabbe, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 148 f. and many more recent theologians, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 485 f. H. Schmidt bij Herzog2 15, 31. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 260 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 325. Oosterzee, Dogm. II 278v. Doedes, Leer der Zaligheid n. 27 and Ned. Gel.

art. 15 etc. All agree in this, that Adam's fall also had consequences for his descendants, because they stand in physical connection with him. But the moral condition, which as a consequence of Adam's transgression has entered into the human race, is not a condition of sin and guilt, but of weakness, defect, sickness. In itself this original sin cannot damn man and at most has a poena damni, without poena sensus, as a consequence; it is an occasion for sin but not sin itself in the proper sense. But since the will is weakened, it readily gives ear to the temptation that proceeds from the flesh; and then, when the will consents and the concupiscence yields, original sin becomes personal sin, which renders guilty and makes worthy of punishment. In substance this doctrine concerning original sin entirely agrees with the theory that [117] sin proceeds from sensuousness, Biedermann, Dogm. II 573.

This Semipelagian conception of original sin, however, is at bottom not much better than that of Pelagius and runs up against equally great objections. 1o. It fails to recognize the character and the seriousness of sin. Sin, after all, is ἀνομια, dislegalitas. The condition in which human beings are born either accords with God's law or deviates from it; it is good or evil, either not sinful or sinful; there is no third. That condition is good and in all parts accords with God's law, the Semipelagians too do not dare to assert. Yet they also do not call it sinful in the proper sense. And thus they create an intermediate condition, and speak of original sin as a disease, defect, infirmity, which is not sin in the proper sense but can only be an occasion for sin; or they separate sin and guilt and say, as Rothe and Kaftan, that original sin is indeed sin but no guilt. 2o. Both of these are impossible. Sin and guilt are inseparably connected with one another, Gal. 3:10, Jak. 2:10, 1 Joh. 5:17; if sin is ἀνομια, then it is punishable, and conversely, where guilt

and punishment are, there must be sin. Now, however, original sin is of such a nature that death follows upon it, Rom. 5:14, that it makes the communion of God and his heaven unworthy (Doedes), that it is in itself unclean, that it is the occasion and the source of many sins, it therefore itself must indeed be sin. Otherwise God would be unjust, who with death, the wages of sin, Rom. 6:23, punishes what is no sin and does not deserve death; the law would lose its absolute validity, for there would be deviation that was not worthy of punishment; communion with God would be withheld without there being any mention of guilt; between heaven and hell, good and evil, light and darkness there would come a condition in, which would be neither of the two, a poena damni without poena sensus; what brings forth all manner of sins would itself be no sin; the tree would be good and yet it bore evil fruits; the source would be pure but unclean the water that flows out of it. 3o. That this inborn sinfulness first becomes sin and guilt when the will consents to it, does not improve the theory but makes it still worse. For one of two: the will then stands, as it were, above and outside that inborn inclination, and then original sin consists in nothing but the inborn sensuous nature and the whole character of sin [118] is lost; or the will itself is affected and weakened by that original sin in greater or lesser degree; it itself is rooted in the sinful nature and arises out of it, and then one loses precisely in that same degree, as one lets the will be weakened, that which one wanted to maintain with this theory, namely, that there is no sin without a free decision of the will. But moreover, even if such a will, which stood wholly or in part outside the inborn sinful nature, were conceivable; it would nevertheless in fact not give what one aims at with it. The first decisions of the will, which consent to the inborn concupiscentia, all fall in the first years, when the will is still weak and powerless. No one is

conscious that with those first decisions of the will he loaded such a guilt upon himself, that he in fact only then fell and became a child of wrath. Over against whoever asserts this, everyone could excuse himself that he did not know better and could not do otherwise, that for such a weighty decision concerning his eternal weal or woe he was already placed in very unfavorable circumstances; indeed, if original sin is no sin, then all other later sins, which so easily and so necessarily flow from it, can also be no sin. Schleiermacher too therefore rejected the representation that original sin cannot be guilt earlier than before it breaks out into actual sins, indem ja der Umstand, dass es noch an Gelegenheit und an äusserer Anreizung gefehlt hat, den geistigen Werth des Menschen nicht erhöhen kann, Chr. Gl. I 382. 4o. The Semipelagian theory not only does not solve the problem that lies here, but it does not even touch it with the fingers and deliberately closes its eyes to it. The universality of sin is a fact, which the Semipelagians too acknowledge; they reject the explanation of it from imitation; they assume that an unclean, defective, sick, sinful (even if then also not sinful and punishable) condition precedes the sinful deeds; they acknowledge that that unclean, sick condition in all without distinction leads to sinful, guilty, punishable deeds, so that the weakened free will in fact has very little significance. Well then, how is that dreadful phenomenon to be explained? How is it to be reconciled with God's righteousness, that He, apart now from the covenant of grace, lets all human beings be born in such a condition, which for the children who die earliest in any case brings death and banishment from his [119] communion and for all others eternal perdition? The Semipelagian theory does not at all think this problem through and contents itself with a superficial and insignificant doctrine of free will. Cf. Müller, Sünde II 445 f.

4. To this problem, however, Paul had given an answer, taught by the antithesis of Christ, that through the trespass of one, sin and death had come into the world and had passed through to all men. Gradually, in Christian theology, consciousness opened up for this profound doctrine, cf. Schwane, D. G. II2 439 f. 480 f. Irenaeus said: in primo quidem Adam (Deum) offendimus, non facientes ejus praeceptum, in secundo autem Adam reconciliati sumus, obedientes usque ad mortem facti, adv. haer. V 16, 3. Tertullian spoke of a malum animae, which had come to us ex originis vitio and is to be derived from Adam's fall; omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur, de an. 40. 41, cf. also Cypr. de op. et eleem. 1. ep. 64, 5. Ambrose speaks most strongly, who more than others before him lays the emphasis on the guilty character of all sin and on the sinful condition in which we are born and traces this back to the fall of Adam; fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes, periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt, Harnack, D. G. III 45. But yet it was especially Augustine who seized upon Paul's thought and developed it further; repeatedly, especially in his two writings against Julian, he appeals to Rom. 5:12, 1 Cor. 15:22, Ef. 2:3; furthermore he cites Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory Naz., Chrysostom e. a., in defense of his opinion; then he also sees in the practice of infant baptism a powerful proof for his doctrine of original sin; and finally he points out that the dreadful misery of the human race cannot be explained otherwise than as a punishment for sin. How can God, who is nevertheless good and righteous, subject all men from their conception onward to sin and death, if they are completely innocent? There must rest upon all an original guilt; the grave jugum, which presses upon all children of Adam, is otherwise not to be understood; whoever traces the miseries of human life, from the first crying

of the children up to the last sighs of the dying [120] must with Paul come to the acknowledgment of an originale peccatum. Quoniam Dei non est iniquum judicium, ideo in miseria generis humani, quae incipit a fletibus parvulorum, agnoscendum est originale peccatum, Op. imperf. c. Jul. III 77 and so passim, I 25. 49. II 107. III 44. 202. VI 17. 28 etc. The sin of Adam must therefore be conceived as an act of him and of all his descendants. Adam was not a private person, not an individual alongside others, but all men were included in him. The manner of this is not completely clear in Augustine; since he, in the question concerning the origin of the soul, refrained from a choice between traducianism and creationism, he also here does not express himself decisively as to whether, in the being-included of the human race in Adam, he thinks only realistically or also federalistically. On the one hand he repeatedly says that all were in Adam's loins, like the Israelites in those of Abraham, that Adam could bring forth no better than he himself was, that Adam's sin is transplanted by propagation and not by imitation, that the sin of Adam becomes our share by birth in the same way as the righteousness and the life of Christ by rebirth, de civ. XIII 3. Op. imp. c. Jul. I 48 etc. But on the other hand the fact is nevertheless of significance that he does not accept Tertullian's traducianism, and that he repeatedly expresses as strongly as possible that all were in Adam and sinned in him; omnes ille unus homo fuerunt, omnes fuimus in illo uno, de pecc. mer. et rem. I 10. de civ. XIII 14 etc. Original sin is distinguished from actual sins in that it was not personally committed by us, but it is nevertheless sin, because in a certain sense it was again our act. It is both a foreign and a proper sin; aliena enim (sunt peccata originalia), quia non ea in sua vita quisque commisit; nostra vero, quia fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes, Op. imp. c. Jul. III 25, cf. I 48. 57; it is even a peccatum

voluntarium, quia ex primi hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est quodam modo haereditarium, Retract. I 13. c. Jul. III 5. de nupt. et conc. II 28 etc. The sinful condition in which we are conceived and born is a consequence and punishment of our transgression in Adam, Op. imp. c. Jul. I 47 VI 17; God often punishes sin with sin, c. Jul. V 3. de nat. et gr. 22. And it consists in fact in the concupiscentia. Sometimes [121] Augustine takes this word in a broad sense and says that the inherited sinfulness is seated not only in sexual lust but in quocunque corporis sensu cognosci, Op. imp. c. Jul. IV 28; that the carnalis concupiscentia also has its seat in the soul, ib. V 7, that original sin is not a substance but an affectionalis qualitas, a vitium, languor, morbus, substantiae accidens, de nupt. et conc. I 24. 25 II 34. Op. imp. c. Jul. VI 7 Conf. VII 12 etc. But yet he thinks, with concupiscentia, first of all of sexual lust; in the independent motus genitalium, independent of the will, the corruption of nature especially comes to expression, and shame serves as proof thereof; through sexual drive, then, sin also propagates itself and makes the whole of humanity into a massa corrupta, which is subjected to the misera necessitas non posse non peccandi, cf. especially de nupt. et conc. passim, Harnack, D. G. III 190 f. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 107 f. This concupiscentia is better called peccatum originale than naturale, because it is not of divine but of human origin, Op. imp. c. Jul. V 9; it is sin, quia peccato facta est appetitque peccare, ib. I 71, and makes man originaliter reum, c. Jul. VI 5. Children dying unbaptized are lost on account of it; its guilt, however, is taken away in baptism, it itself remains as a stimulus for the struggle, reatus ejus regeneratione solutus est, conflictus ejus ad agonem relictus est, Op. imp. I 71. 101. c. Jul. VI 5. de pecc. mer. et rem. II 4, cf. also Gangauf, Die metaph. Psych. d. h. Aug. 420 f. Scholasticism and Roman Catholic

theology built further on this foundation but nevertheless introduced a not unimportant modification into Augustine's representation. The thought was retained that Adam's transgression was the cause of all men's sin and death. Original sin consists first of all in the imputation to all men of that transgression which Adam committed, because they all were included in him; it is in the first place guilt, thereafter punishment. Scripture also expressed this clearly, and the church took it up in its confession, conc. Milev. can. 2. conc. Araus. c. 2. Trid. V 2. Cat. Rom. I 3, 2. Pighius and Catharinus even went so far that they let original sin be wholly absorbed in this imputation of Adam's transgression and wanted to conceive all that followed upon it, loss of original righteousness, corruption of nature etc., only as punishment but not as sin, in Bellarminus, [122] de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V c. 16. But undoubtedly these theologians thereby expressed a thought that followed from the development of the doctrine of original sin in Roman Catholic theology. There arose, namely, soon a difference concerning the character of that moral condition which after Adam's disobedience entered in him and in all his descendants. In Augustine this consisted in the concupiscentia, which then had in sexual drive its principal seat and organ. Lombardus still remained at this, Sent. II dist. 30. 31. But gradually the doctrine of the donum superadditum arose, which was bestowed upon Adam but was lost by his fall. The first consequence of Adam's transgression was thus for him and all men the loss of the gratia supernaturalis (justitia originalis); this was the first, negative element in original sin, to which then the second, positive, namely the concupiscentia, was added. Thus Anselmus already defined original sin, de casu diaboli 27, and was followed therein by Halesius, Bonaventura, Albertus, Thomas. Original sin thus consisted in privatio originalis justitiae and in quaedam

inordinata naturae dispositio (concupiscentia), Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82 art. 1 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393-413. But with further reflection, difference had again to arise concerning this latter. For the image of God was gradually conceived as a donum supernaturale, part II 518, thus there was also a man conceivable and capable of existing without that image and yet without sin, a homo naturalis; in such a man, however, flesh and spirit would nevertheless by nature stand over against each other and wage conflict with each other; i.e. the concupiscentia, the lust of the flesh against the spirit, is by nature, necessary, by creation proper to man and thus cannot in itself be sin. The image of God had indeed been bestowed upon Adam as a remedium and frenum, but when he lost this, the conflict of flesh and spirit arose of itself again; this lay in his nature, was indeed suppressed but now became free again. The concupiscentia is a morbus seu languor naturae humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, part II 527; it can in itself be no sin and thus also can form no part of original sin. The Roman doctrine of the domum superadditum takes its revenge here in a questionable way upon original sin. It is historically to be shown how therefore gradually in Roman [123] Catholic theology the center of gravity in the doctrine of original sin was shifted from the concupiscentia to the privatio justitiae originalis, from the positive to the negative. Augustine defined the whole of original sin by concupiscentia; the scholastics added to that the loss of original righteousness, but nevertheless still maintained original sin in a positive sense as an inordinata dispositio, languor naturae, habitus corruptus, Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82 art. 1. Trent speaks very cautiously; it says that Adam not only lost righteousness but also was changed for the worse in body and soul; that he, after he was defiled, poured out not only death and the punishments of the body but also especially sin upon his descendants;

that the sin of Adam is not by imitation but by propagation proper to each, inest unicuique proprium, and can be taken away only by Christ's merit in baptism, sess. 5. But the Synod intentionally refrained from narrower determinations, Möhler, Symb. 57; the nature of this sin is not further defined; the words in deterius say little; the concupiscentia, which remains in the baptized, is itself no sin but only is ex peccato et ad peccatum inclinat, ib. 5; free will is not lost but weakened, VI c. 5, and can also do good works before faith, ib. 7. Taken all together, it is not to be seen in what, apart from the imputation of Adam's transgression and the loss of original righteousness, original sin could further still consist. Nothing remains for it. After Trent, therefore, the opinion of Lombardus is also expressly contested, later still embraced by Henricus, Gregorius Arim., Driedo, that original sin would consist formaliter or materialiter in concupiscentia, in a positive qualitas, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V c. 15. Becanus, Theol. schol., de pecc. orig. qu. 3 and 4. Theol. Wirceb. VII 84-94. With appeal to Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus etc. original sin is set only in the loss of the justitia originalis; Bellarminus expressed it openly and clearly: non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adae a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis infirmitate et ignorantia laborat, quam esset et laborasset in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturae non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia neque ex alicujus malae [124] qualitatis accessu sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit, de gr. pr. hom. 5. The condition in which man is born after the fall is completely equal to that of Adam before the fall without the donum superadditum. Of a corruptio or vulneratio naturae there can be spoken only insofar as this

condition ought not to be there, because Adam received the donum superadditum and lost it; the loss of it is guilt. But in substance that condition is not wrong; it is naked naturalness; original sin nothing other than reductio ad statum mere naturalem; supernaturalia amissa, naturalia integra; in baptism this loss is restored by the gratia infusa; after death original sin is punished only with poena damni. Some still attempt to maintain a corruptio naturae, but the supranaturalistic conception of Christianity makes this impossible. Only there is still difference over whether the imputation of Adam's sin, which had as consequence the loss of the donum superadditum for all his descendants, rests on a nexus physicus or on a nexus moralis (foederalis). Some say that all men were indeed not formaliter but yet causaliter, materialiter, seminaliter included in Adam; others think they can explain the imputation no otherwise than by assuming that Adam was not only our progenitor but also our head and our representative; still others connect both representations with each other. Cf. Anselmus, de conceptu originali et de originali peccato. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 30-33 and the comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura etc. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 81 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. V 17-20. Becanus, Theol. Schol. II tr. 2 c. 9 de pecc. orig. Theol. Wirceb. VII 65 sq. Vasquez, Suarez e. a. in Schwane, D. G. der neueren Zeit 1890 S. 166-198. Schwetz, Theol. cath. II 163-177. Dens, Theol. I 356 sq. Perrone, Prael. theol. III 1839 p. 189. 216-223. Scheeben, Dogm. II 633 f. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit 1887 S. 110 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 616-675. Simar, Dogm. 351-367. Pesch, Prael. theol. III 111-152 etc.

5. Against this Roman weakening of original sin the Reformation rose in protest. In itself it found no objection to the scholastic definition of original sin as privatio justitiae originalis, homini [125] inesse debitae, provided

only that it was not understood in a purely negative sense. This, however, became more and more the case in Roman theology, and therefore the Reformation laid emphasis precisely on the point that original sin was not only a privatio but that in it there was at the same time a total corruption of human nature. Frequently in the first period this corruption was still designated by the name of concupiscentia, yet then this was not one-sidedly conceived, with Augustine and Lombard, as sexual lust, but as ἀταξια omnium appetitionum, seated as well in the higher as in the lower faculties of man. Calvin says very clearly: they who define original sin as loss of original righteousness do indeed describe it wholly, but do not sufficiently express its power and operation. Our nature, namely, is not only deprived of something good, but it is also malorum omnium fertilis et ferax. If original sin therefore is described as concupiscentia, this is good, provided one adds, quidquid in homine est, ab intellectu ad voluntatem, ab anima ad carnem usque hac concupiscentia inquinatum refertumque esse, aut ut brevius absolvam, totum hominem non aliud ex se ipso esse quam concupiscentiam, Inst. II 1, 8. Further, the Reformers taught that this lust was sin also in its primoprimi motus; it does not first become sin when the will has consented to it, but it is sin in itself, not first as formata therefore but also already as informis. Calvin again declares that in this point he departs from Augustine; the latter calls the concupiscentia, when in baptism the guilt of it has been taken away, by the name of infirmitas; nos autem illud ipsum pro peccato habemus, Inst. III 3, 10. And finally this corruption of human nature was so total that man by nature is incapable of any spiritual good, inclined to all evil, and for it alone already worthy of eternal punishment. It cannot be denied that one has sometimes, out of reaction against Rome, especially on the Lutheran side, expressed oneself all too strongly. Even if it was not

meant so badly, it was nevertheless certainly liable to serious misunderstanding, when Luther called original sin peccatum essentiale and essentia hominis, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 366 f. Flacius spoke still more strongly of original sin as substantia hominis. And also the Formula Concordiae said in Luther's own words that man's understanding, heart and [126] will in spiritual matters was prorsus corruptus atque mortuus, capable of nothing more quam lapis, truncus aut limus, ed. Müller 589. 594, cf. also Frank, Theol. d. Conc. I 138. However much the Romanists therefore tried to accuse the Lutherans of Manichaeism, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. V c. 1 sq. Becanus, de pecc. orig. qu. 2 sq. Möhler, Symbolik S. 66 f., yet they have in the Form. Conc. expressly confessed that sin was no substance, and all theologians agree with that. Yes, although the Lutherans in general had embraced traducianism and although they were therefore inclined to have original sin propagated through the carnalis concupiscentia, Luther in Köstlin II 367. Melanchton, Loci C. de pecc. orig. C. R. XXI. p 668 sq., cf. Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel I 50 f., yet Melanchthon also says there that he has no objection, natos etiam propter lapsum Adae reos esse; the Form. Conc. declares that original sin is culpa seu reatus, quo fit, ut omnes propter inobedientiam Adae et Hevae in odio apud Deum et natura filii irae simus, Müller, Symb. Bücher 576, and later various Lutheran theologians say that Adam is not only to be regarded as caput physicum but also as caput morale seu foederale generis humani, and that therefore his transgression is imputed to all, Quenstedt, Theol. II 53. 118. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 515. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 172 f. The Reformed from the beginning guarded themselves against such strong expressions as the Lutherans sometimes employed; Calvin absolutely did not approve the above-mentioned images, Schweizer, Centrald. I 385. 394. But nevertheless

they too taught that original sin consisted negatively in carentia justitiae originalis but also positively in corruptio naturae, and that it had its cause in the imputed transgression of Adam, Calvin, Inst. II 1, comm. on Ps. 51:7, Rom. 5:12 etc. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 344. Martyr, Loci C. 68 sq. Polanus, Synt. 336. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 202. Explic. Catech. qu. 7. Zanchius, Op. IV 30. Junius, Theses Theol. 19 20. Heppe, Dogm. 245 f. On this point there prevailed a very great agreement. Rivetus collected a long series of statements from ecclesiastical confessions and theological works, which all teach the same, Testimonia de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris, Op. III 798-826, for the most part translated into English in Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 195-217. [127] There came, however, opposition to this doctrine from the school of Saumur; Placaeus taught namely in his theses de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam, Synt. thesium theol. in acad. Salm. ed. 2 1665 p. 205, that the disobedience of Adam was imputed to his descendants only mediately, i.e. only insofar and on the ground that they were born from him already unclean. Formerly it was taught unanimously: corrupti nascimur, quia primum peccatum nobis imputatur; Placaeus reversed this and said: primum peccatum nobis imputatur, quia corrupti nascimur, and explained his opinion still further in Disp. bipartita de imputatione primi peccati Adami 1655. The Synod at Charenton condemned his opinion 1645, Rivetus collected at the command of the Synod his above-mentioned testimonia, various theologians opposed the doctrine of Placaeus, Heidegger, Turretinus, Maresius, Driessen, Leydecker, Marck, Comrie, Holtius etc. But the time seemed past for the reformational doctrine of original sin. Placaeus found acceptance everywhere, in France, Switzerland, England, America, among theologians such as Wyttenbach, Endemann, Stapfer, Whitby, John Taylor, Roell,

Vitringa, Venema etc. cf. M. Vitringa II 349, and also among the Lutherans, Walch, Bibl. theol. I 85. In America Jonathan Edwards did indeed still write his famous tract Original sin defended 1757, Works II 305-310, against Whitby, but he himself already advocated therein the mediate imputation of Adam's sin and brought the New England Theology of Hopkins, Edwards Jr., Dwight, Emmons etc. entirely into the line of Placaeus. Pelagianism made its entry everywhere; Protestantism, in the same measure as it became unfaithful to its past, fell back into Romanism; man was good by nature but succumbed very easily in the struggle against sensuality. Even the more recent theologians, who assume an influence of Adam's sin on his descendants, have thereby still only in part returned to the doctrine of the Reformation, Vilmar, Dogm. I 270. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 40. Ebrard, Dogm. § 340-344. Dorner, Chr. Gl. § 82. 83. Frank, System d. chr. Wahrh. I 460. 482. Müller, Sünde II 426-503 etc. Yet through all sorts of causes the deep meaning of the doctrine of original sin has again become clear to many. In 1845 Gervinus wrote: wir sind der Erbsündenangst entnommen, die wie die Gespensterfurcht nur die Furcht einer abergläubischen Religionslehre war, in Delitzsch, Christl. Apol. 119. There will [128] not be many who now still agree with this superficial judgment. The philosophy of Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer etc., the doctrine of heredity and of solidarity, the historical and sociological studies have offered the dogma of original sin an unexpected and important support. When theology had rejected it, philosophy took it up again.

6. The doctrine of original sin is one of the weightiest but also one of the most difficult subjects of dogmatics. Nothing is more familiar for preaching than original sin, nothing more secret for understanding, Augustine, de mor. eccl. cath. I 22. Chose étonnante, que le mystère le plus éloigné de notre

connaissance, qui est celui de la transmission du péché, soit une chose sans laquelle nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connaissance de nous-mêmes. Car il est sans doute, qu'il n'y a rien qui choque plus notre raison que de dire que le péché du premier homme ait rendu coupables ceux qui, étant si éloignés de cette source, semblent incapables d'y participer.... et cependant, sans ce mystère, le plus incompréhensible de tous, nous sommes incompréhensibles à nous-mêmes. Le noeud de notre condition prend ses replis et ses tours dans cet abîme, de sorte que l'homme est plus inconcevable sans ce mystère que ce mystère n'est inconcevable à l'homme (Pascal). Le péché originel explique tout et sans lui on n'explique rien (de Maistre), and yet it itself needs explanation more than anything. From of old it was designated in theology as peccatum originale, not as though it were proper to man from his origin by virtue of creation, but because in all men it is the origin and source of all other sins. Much misunderstanding is prevented if this original sin is clearly distinguished into peccatum originans (imputatum, culpa) and peccatum originatum (inhaerens, poena). Properly, under original sin, peccatum haereditarium, there is only to be understood that moral corruption which man immediately brings with him at his conception and birth from sinful parents. But this moral corruption, which is proper to all men by nature and does not first arise in them later through their own wrong deeds, must nevertheless have a cause. And this cause, according to Holy Scripture and also for Christian thinking, can be no other than the first transgression of the first man, through which [129] sin and death came into the world. Adam's disobedience is the peccatum originans; Scripture says that clearly, Rom. 5:12, 1 Cor. 15:22; and experience confirms it at every moment, all men are conceived in sins and born in iniquity. This is now conceivable in no other way than that that transgression of Adam concerns

us all in one way or another. If absolutely no connection existed between Adam and us, it would be impossible that we are born in sins, because he transgressed God's commandment. Scripture and history thus together point us to an original, common guilt of the human race. The hypothesis, to be sure, of Plato and others, that every soul had already existed long before its coming into the human body and had already fallen there, has earlier appeared to us for conclusive reasons to be wholly untenable, above p. 70; there lies only the undeniable truth at its foundation, that every man is born under guilt. That guilt has not been brought upon himself by each personally, individually, actually; it rests upon each man on Adam's account; δια νης παρακοης του ἑνος ἀνθρωπον ἁμαρτωλοι κατεσταθησαν οἱ πολλοι, Rom. 5:19. Apart from whether we can make it in any measure intelligible that God immediately through and on account of Adam's disobedience constitutes all men sinners, the fact itself stands firm, on the ground of Scripture and experience. But yet something can be said, in order, if not to explain this manner of acting of God, then at least to remove it from the appearance of arbitrariness. In the first place, for the human race is not an aggregate of individuals, but an organic unity, one race, one family. The angels all stand independently alongside one another; they were all created at the same time and did not proceed the one from the other; among them a judgment of God, as was pronounced in Adam over all men, would not have been possible; each stood and fell for himself. But it is not so among men. God has made them all from one blood, Hd. 17:26; they are not a heap of souls on a piece of ground, but all related to one another in the blood, bound to one another by all kinds of bonds, and therefore in everything determining one another and determined by one another. And in particular the first man occupies an entirely unique and incomparable place.

Like rami in radice, massa in primitiis, [130] membra in capite, so were all men included in Adam's loins and have they all proceeded from his hip. He was no private person, no loose individual alongside others, but he was radix, stirps, principium seminale totius generis humani, our all caput naturale; in a certain sense it can be said, that nos omnes ille unus homo fuimus, that what he did was done by us all in him; his choice of will and act of will was that of all his descendants. Undoubtedly this physical unity of the whole of humanity in Adam is already of great significance for the explanation of original sin; it is its necessary presupposition, its praerequisitum; if Christ would be able to bear sin for us and make his righteousness partaken of by us, he first had to assume our human nature. But yet realism without more is insufficient for the explanation of original sin. For, in a certain sense it can indeed be said that all men were included in Adam, but then also only in a certain definite sense; it is repraesentative but not physice true. In the covenant of grace too no one speaks thus. We can and may indeed say that God so appropriates the righteousness of Christ to us, as if we had performed all the obedience which Christ has performed for us, Heid. Cat. vr. 60, but for that reason we are not personally and physice yet those who have satisfied God's righteousness; Christ satisfied for us and in our place. And so it is also with Adam; virtualiter, potentialiter, seminaliter we may have been included in him, but personaliter and actualiter he transgressed the probationary commandment and not we. If realism would not want to acknowledge this distinction, and would want to be consistent to the utmost, then it would make all imputation superfluous both with Adam and with Christ; in both cases it would then have been each man himself who had personally sinned with the deed and had satisfied by his suffering and death. Further, if Adam's

transgression in this realistic sense has been ours, then man is also guilty of all other sins of Adam, of all sins of Eve, indeed of all the sins of his forefathers from whom he was born, for he was included in these just as well as in Adam when he transgressed the probationary commandment; it is then also not to be seen how Christ, who physice, i.e. as far as the flesh is concerned, is from the fathers and from Adam and Eve, could then be free [131] from original sin; the physical unity on this standpoint nevertheless brings the moral necessity along with it. Further, realism comes into no small embarrassment with the covenant of grace; for if there is no foedus operum, then also no foedus gratiae; the one stands and falls with the other. If now the righteousness of Christ is not acquired and applied in the way of the covenant, but in a realistic way, then this consists with Christ in that he assumed our nature, and in that case satisfaction and salvation are the portion of all men, for Christ assumed the nature of them all; or it consists in that each first obtains this physical, realistic unity with Christ through regeneration or faith, and then it is not to be seen how Christ could beforehand satisfy for those with whom he first becomes one through faith; then regeneration and faith run the danger of losing their ethical character, the center of gravity is shifted from the Christ to the Christian, and the benefits of the covenant come into being only after and through faith. Finally, realism does indeed defend an excellent interest, namely the unity of the human race, but in doing so it loses another interest out of sight, which is of no less weight, namely the independence of personality. A man is a member of the whole, very certainly, but in that whole he nevertheless also occupies a place of his own; he is more than a wave in the ocean, more than a passing form of appearance of the general human nature. Earlier, part II 551f., it has therefore already been remarked that the relations in which

men stand to one another are distinct from those which are found among the angels and among the animals; for related to both, he is nevertheless also different from both; he is a creature with a nature of his own. And therefore physical unity with him is not sufficient; there is added yet another, an ethical, federal one. Cf. against Shedd, who is a strong supporter of realism, Dogm. Theol. II p. 6 etc., also Arch. Alex. Hodge, The atonement, Philad. Presb. Board of Publication n.d. p. 99 etc.

As soon as people in the Christian church began seriously to reflect on the connection between Adam's sin and ours, they did not have enough with the physical unity. Shedd does indeed assert that Augustine, the scholastics, the oldest Reformed theologians were all realists, t. a. p. II 37. But this is incorrect; the doctrine of the covenant [132] had not been worked out, but the thought already occurs among the church fathers and the medieval theologians, cf. vol. II 549, above p. 124 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393 f. IV 166 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 711. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. d. Menschheit 165. 167. Scheeben, Dogm. I 500. Pesch, Prael. III 136 etc. The one fact alone, that they almost all adhered to creationism, says enough, for a creationist cannot be a realist. Federalism therefore does not exclude the truth that lies hidden in realism; on the contrary it accepts it fully; it proceeds from it but it does not stop there; it recognizes a unitas naturae, cui unitas foederalis est innixa. In humanity we encounter all kinds of forms of community, which rest absolutely not only and even not chiefly on physical descent, but on another, higher, moral unity. There are "moral bodies," family, kin, society, people, state, church, and associations and societies of every kind and for every purpose, which lead a life of their own, are subject to special laws, in particular also to the law which Paul formulates when he says: και είτε πασχει ἐν μελος, συμπασχει παντα τα μελη, είτε δοξαζεται

μελος, συγχαιρει παντα τα μελη, I Cor. 12:26. All the members of such a body can be for one another a blessing or a curse, and that all the more, the more excellent they themselves are and the more weighty a place they occupy in the organism. A father, mother, guardian, caregiver, instructor, teacher, patron, guide, prince, king etc. have the greatest influence on those over whom they are placed. Their life and action decide the fate of their subordinates, raise them up and bring them to honor or cast them down and drag them along to ruin. The family of a drunkard is destroyed and laden with shame because of the sin of the father. The family of a criminal is, in a wide circle and for a long time, reckoned with and condemned with him. A congregation languishes under the unfaithfulness of its minister. A people perishes because of the folly of its prince. Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi. There is among human beings a solidarity in good and in evil; a community in blessings and in judgments. We stand on the shoulders of the preceding generations and inherit what they have amassed in material and spiritual capital; we enter into their labor, rest on their laurels, enjoy [133] what they have often obtained through struggle and suffering. All that we receive undeservedly, without having asked for it, it all lies ready at our birth, it is bestowed on us by grace. No one who objects to that and rises up in resistance against this law. But when that same law now also comes to rule in evil and makes us participants in the sin and the suffering of others, then the heart rises in revolt and the law is accused of injustice. The son who accepts the inheritance of his father refuses to pay the debt of his father. Thus the Israelites also complained in the days of Ezekiel. There was in the O. T. a law of solidarity, Gen. 9:25, Ex. 20:5, Num. 14:33, 16:32, Jos. 7:24, 25, 1 Sam. 15:2, 3, 2 Sam. 12:10, 21:1v., 1 Kon. 21:21, 23, Jes. 6:5, Jer. 32:18, Klaagl. 3:40v., 5:7 Ezr. 9:6, Mt. 23:35, 27:25. But when Israel in

its supposed righteousness complains about it, the Lord has the prophet proclaim, not what He can do justly, but what He will do, if Israel repents and does not walk the way of the fathers. There is a solidarity of sin and suffering, but God permits it and often grants the strength to break that moral community and oneself to become the beginning of a generation that walks in the fear of the Lord and enjoys his favor. But thereby the solidarity itself is so little abolished that it is rather confirmed by it. Christ has proved the truth of the solidarity of the human race in another and better way than Adam. If this solidarity could also be broken, not only all compassion, but also all love, friendship, intercession etc. would cease to exist; humanity would fall apart into lifeless atoms; there would be no mystery, no mysticism, no human life any more. Yet it is true what Shedd asserts, Dogm. Theol. II 187, that this solidarity of suffering does not yet explain the imputation of Adam's sin to all his descendants; to suffer for the sin of another is not the same as to be punished for the sin of another and thus also oneself to be regarded as the perpetrator of that sin; there is suffering without personal transgression, Luk. 13:1-5, Joh. 9:3. But this solidarity, which we see daily, nevertheless takes the argument out of our hand, to accuse God of injustice, if He makes the whole of humanity share in Adam's punishment. Thus [134] He acts at every moment, both in blessings and in judgments. If such a manner of acting is compatible with his righteousness, then this is and must also be the case with Adam's transgression. But in addition there is still the fact that there is a special reason why the above-mentioned law of solidarity in the case of Adam does not apply wholly and entirely nor even can apply. The law of solidarity does not explain the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, but is built upon it and points back to it. It always rules within narrower circles than are

formed by humanity itself. However great the blessing or curse of parents and guardians, of sages and artists, of founders of religions and reformers, of princes and conquerors etc. may have been; there were nevertheless always “circumstances” of place, time, country, people, language etc., which set bounds and limits to it; the circle in which their influence ruled was always enclosed by other and greater ones. Only two human beings have existed whose life and works have extended to the boundaries of humanity itself, whose influence and dominion continues to work through to the ends of the earth and into eternity. They are Adam and Christ; the first brought sin and death, the second righteousness and life into the world. From this wholly exceptional place occupied by Adam and Christ it follows that they alone are to be compared with one another, and that all other relations, derived from circles within humanity, can indeed serve for elucidation and are of great value, but nevertheless offer only analogy and no identity. That is to say, that Adam and Christ have both been placed under a wholly special ordinance of God, precisely with a view to the special place which they occupy in humanity. When a father plunges his family, a prince his people, a philosopher his pupils, a patron his workers with himself into misery, then we can go back behind their persons and in the solidarity which rules within humanity and its different circles find, to a certain extent, an explanation and satisfaction. But thus we cannot do with Adam and Christ. They do not have humanity behind but before them; they do not proceed out of it but bring it into being; they are not borne by it but bear it themselves; they are not a product but, each in his own way, beginning and root of humanity, caput totius generis humani; they are not [135] explained by the law of solidarity but explain this only by themselves; they do not presuppose, they constitute the organism of humanity. If

humanity were really to remain a unity both in the physical and in the ethical sense, as it was destined to be; if therefore there were really in that humanity not only community of blood, as with the animals, but on that foundation also community of all material, moral, spiritual goods; then that could not be brought about and maintained otherwise than by judging all in one. As it went with him, so it would go with the whole human race. If Adam fell, humanity fell; if Christ remained standing, in him humanity was raised up. Covenant of works and covenant of grace are the forms by which the organism of humanity is maintained also in the religious and ethical sense. Because God is concerned not with a few individuals but with humanity as his image and likeness, therefore it had to fall in one and also be raised up in one. Thus is the ordinance, thus the judgment of God. He declares all guilty in one, and therefore humanity is born unclean and dying out of Adam; He declares all righteous in one, and therefore that same humanity is reborn out of Christ and sanctified unto eternal life. God has shut them all up under obedience in order that He might be merciful to them all. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 78-121. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 192. Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 128-194. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 704 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 211. E. Bersier, La solidarité. Paris 1870. Vercueil, Etude sur la solidarité dans le Christianisme d'après St. Paul, Montauban 1894.

7. The consequence of the peccatum originans is the peccatum originatum. Because all are reckoned as sinners in Adam, they are also all born from him in a sinful condition. The hereditary stain is a punishment for the hereditary guilt. From this point of view original sin was first considered by Augustine, which provoked a powerful protest on the part of the Pelagians, cf. August., c. Jul. V 3, as likewise later on the part of the

Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. VII 4. But Scripture speaks many times in that spirit and sees in subsequent sins a punishment for the preceding, 2 Sam. 12:11, 12, [136] 1 Kon. 11:11-31, 22:30, Jes. 6:9, 10, 7:17, 10:5-7, 14:3, Jer 50:6-8, Rom. 1:24-28, 2 Thess. 2:11, 12 etc. The sins too stand under God's governance; the laws and ordinances that apply to the life of sin have been established by God and are maintained by him. And among those laws is also this: Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen That, dass sie fortwährend Böses muss gebähren. Sin has that nature, that it makes the sinner more and more foolish and hardened, entangles him ever more firmly in its snares, and makes him fall ever more quickly along a sloping plane into the abyss. It is true that sin, considered in itself, can never be punishment for sin, for both differ essentially and stand over against each other; sin arises from the will and punishment is undergone by someone against his will; sin is transgression, punishment is maintenance of the law; punishment has God as author but sin does not. But nevertheless a subsequent sin may be called a punishment of the preceding, because it removes the sinner still further from God, makes him more wretched, and delivers him over to all kinds of lust and passion, anxiety and remorse, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 36. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87 art. 2, qu. 75 art. 4. qu. 84 art. 1-4. Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 10 n. 140. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 15. Spanheim, Op. III 1268-1270. Moor III 332-335. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71, 2. Müller, Sünde II 589 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. I 489. Christ, Die sittl. Weltordnung S. 59. According to this law, in Adam and all his descendants a sinful condition followed upon the sinful act. The Pelagians represent it in such a way that some act of will or other leaves absolutely no consequences; the will, which at one moment did evil, can immediately thereafter, if it pleases it, do good again; the will with them never has and never acquires a certain nature, a

definite character; it is and remains neutral, indifferent, without inner inclination, always placed between opposite things and directing itself now to the one side, then to the other, with incalculable arbitrariness. But such a representation meets contradiction from all sides. There had taken place in Adam and Eve, when they transgressed God's commandment, a great moral change; shame and fear of God took possession of them; the rest, the peace, the innocence was gone; they hid themselves from God in the trees of the garden; they cast the blame upon each other; Cain made himself guilty of fratricide; [137] and soon the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, that all the imagination of the thoughts of his heart was evil from his youth. With Adam's transgression a dreadful degeneration of the human race begins. We stand here before a terrible reality, the explanation of which escapes us. How is it possible that one single sinful act had such dreadful consequences and brought a radical reversal in the whole human nature? In general it may be remarked that the relation between an act and its consequences repeatedly appears to us in life very disproportionate. One hour of thoughtlessness can make one weep for years. One small mistake, a single misstep gives to the life of many people a wholly different direction; small insignificant events work on through generations; on a so-called accident our happiness or unhappiness often depends. The one transgression of Adam brought an entire change in the deliberations, dispositions, and inclinations of his nature. For experience teaches that whatever a human being does, in greater or lesser measure works back upon himself and leaves a trace in his character. At bottom nothing is indifferent and nothing passes by us without leaving a trace. Every act of will, arising from preceding inclinations and desires, works back upon these and strengthens them. Every sin can in that way become a

habit, an inclination, a passion, which rules over the human being like a tyrant. A human being is so changeable, so pliably formable; he adapts himself to all circumstances, he adjusts himself to every milieu, he becomes accustomed to everything and conforms everywhere. He who commits sin becomes at once a servant of sin. A crime, a lie, a theft, a murder is never past with the moment in which it is committed. The disobedience of Adam has changed his whole nature. Moreover, his transgression had not only an outward but also an inward side. It is not so that the sinful act of Adam, consisting in the eating of the forbidden fruit, happened suddenly without any preparation and only thereafter had all kinds of moral changes in his nature as a consequence. In that way, with Adam guilt and stain do not stand in relation to each other. The act of eating was itself already a manifestation of [138] an entire moral change that had taken place in the inner man. Strictly speaking it was not the first sin but the first fully developed sin in the sense of Jak. 1:15. The sinful act was preceded by sinful deliberations of the understanding (doubt, unbelief) and sinful inclinations of the heart (lust, pride), which had their occasion in the temptation of the serpent and were fostered by the will of the human being. Both before and during and after the eating of the forbidden tree, man's relation to God and to his law was changed. He became, not first the one and then the other, but simultaneously and in connection with each other, both guilty and unclean before the face of his Maker. Guilt and stain are both simultaneous consequences of the one and the same sin, two sides of the same matter. Finally, the change that entered in with Adam did not consist in this, that any sinful principle was implanted in him or any constituent part of his being, of his soul or body, of his faculties or powers, was taken from him. But it consisted in this, that the human being through

his doubt and unbelief, through his pride and lust, and finally through the sinful act itself, increasingly detached himself from God and from his law, placed himself outside his favor and fellowship, and began to use all his gifts and powers precisely against God and his commandment. And then when this happens, when the human being places himself outside God's fellowship and outside God's law, then the sinful condition enters of itself, just as darkness enters when the light disappears. Fieri nequit quin maxime sese amet creatura, quam non absorpserit amor Dei (Melanchton). The human being, withdrawing himself from the fellowship of God in which he was created, is not otherwise conceivable than as a sinner, guilty and corrupt before his face.

That same religious and ethical change, which took place in Adam under and at his fall, is also the lot of all his descendants. These are all born in that same moral condition in which Adam fell through his transgression. This fact is hardly susceptible of any denial. Scripture teaches it not only, but experience and history prove it day by day. If anything is certain, then it is this, that human beings are not conceived and born as righteous and holy but as sinners. That points to the fact that they have one guilt in common with Adam, for guilt and stain in sin always go together. Just as it did not happen in Adam in such a way that he first committed the sinful deed, thereby loaded guilt upon himself, and as a consequence of that now also became morally unclean and corrupt, so also his descendants do not come into the world, as it were, with a double guilt, first with that of Adam's transgression and then also with that of their moral corruption. For this moral corruption is not a later additional, external appendage and not an accidental consequence of the first transgression, but in it an essential element and not to be separated from it. Just as Adam through his

transgression at the same time and in the same measure made himself guilty and became unclean, so also with his descendants the being guilty in him and the being born unclean out of him are two sides of the same thing, Edwards, Works II 482. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 170. It is incorrect to infer from that with Edwards that the stain precedes the guilt. There is here no before and no after. The uncleanness in which all human beings are born is the reverse side of the guilt of that transgression, which was committed by Adam as caput foederale. Guilt, stain, death stand with Adam's descendants in the same relation as with himself and have thus, in that mutual connection, passed on to all.

8. The way in which this peccatum originatum becomes the portion of all human beings is not that of imitation but of generation. A κριμα, a judgment of God, precedes it, and by virtue of that judgment all human beings are born from Adam guilty, unclean, and dying. They do not first become all this at a later age through their actual sins, but are it from their conception and birth onward. Death is the proof, for this reigns not only over adults but much more strongly over the little children, even the unborn; and that death is according to Scripture not a natural process but a wage of sin. Now this doctrine of original sin, however much it was formerly condemned as unreasonable, has in recent times again found favor in the eyes of so-called science. It proved after all not so foolish and absurd as earlier interpreters of science had displayed it. Scientifically, now precisely the opposite holds of what in a former century counted for that. The doctrine of the innate goodness of man and of society as the cause [140] of all evil has had its day; one now teaches precisely the opposite: man, descended from an animal, remains in his heart an animal; in every man lurks la bête humaine, vitium hominis natura pecoris; and the "holy" society and the "divine" state

are what keep him happily in bonds and compel him to virtue; all vice is innate, all virtue is acquired, cf. e.g. Brunetière, La moralité de la doctrine évolutive, Paris 1896. It is not the newly discovered facts that have brought about this change in the view. For that every species brings forth its like, that children take after their parents, that not only bodily but also all kinds of spiritual properties are inherited, that is no discovery of the 19th century but was, as appears from the doctrine of traducianism, also formerly well known. And that again not all properties are inherited, that each individual is nevertheless something different and something more than the sum or the product of his parents, that too was, as appears from the doctrine of creationism, not unknown to earlier generations. Certainly the knowledge of the facts has been extended and increased, but this was far from being of such a nature that it alone could radically change an entire view. This change is chiefly to be ascribed to the fact that one viewed approximately the same facts from another point of view and with another eye, namely from the standpoint of monism and with the eye of a dogmatist of evolution. In conflict with all sober scientific sense, one has built upon a few facts a series of deeply far-reaching conclusions and has brought these in all manner of ways to the public in popular writings: man—that had clearly appeared—was by no means an independent being, but nothing but a product of existing factors, a plaything of circumstances; to speak of freedom in his case is foolishness, he is a will-less instrument of fate; criminals are a distinct type, who are already born as such and are incorrigible and not responsible; every man must of necessity be what he is. An army of partly talented writers, such as Zola, Ibsen, Nietzsche etc. have depicted this view in novel and drama for the heated imagination. And whoever now does not sing along in that choir and doubts the scientific

character of this view, is put under the ban. And yet for the sober observer [141] all that science has brought to light in this field comes down to this little: 1o There is not only heredity but also variation, not only unity but also change, not only memory but also imagination. Many properties pass over from parents to children, for all species after all bring forth their like; but yet not all properties pass over, for each individual is something new; no single child resembles his parents exactly. With this nothing new has been said and only an old familiar truth, denied by no one ever, has been repeated. 2o. These two facts are very gladly labeled with the name of laws; but how those laws rule is still as good as entirely unknown. Heredity and variation are continually connected with each other, they work together and cross each other, and hence the explanation of the facts is so difficult. And this difficulty is further increased by the fact that inheritance in all higher beings takes place through the mixing of two individuals (amphimixis, as Weismann called it). 3o. This appears as soon as one specializes somewhat more closely. That species-properties are inherited, i.e., that parents bring forth children of the same species, is certain but does not carry one much further. That race- and variety-properties are constantly transplanted is subject to legitimate doubt; by selection the race, e.g. of animals or plants, can indeed be improved; but this improvement is limited and temporary; after four or five generations the height of the improvement is reached; as soon as one ceases with the selection, the descendants return to the old type; the properties are not taken up into the nature of the creatures, they retain the tendency to revert to the original form. That finally individual, acquired properties pass over from parents to children has indeed been asserted by Darwin et al., but is by A. Weismann, professor at Freiburg, contested as strongly as possible, and his theory nowadays finds ever more assent. 4o.

The attempt to bring together the phenomena that occur here under some laws has not only not succeeded but is for the present to be regarded as very premature. The phenomena are far too numerous and too complicated, as e.g. those of the weather, to be able already now to make us speak of fixed laws. The law of atavism therefore also gives entirely the impression of having been invented [142] merely in order to give a semblance of regularity to the many cases in which the favorable properties are not inherited and thus the "law" of heredity does not hold. Nicht begriffene Thatsachen scheinen schliesslich bekannt, sobald man sie mit einem bekannten Worte bezeichnet, Dr. Kohlbrugge, Der Atavismus, Utrecht 1897, S. 3, who therefore, like Emery, holds atavism to be a saga. The hypothesis of Lombroso concerning the criminal type already belongs again to the past. And statistics, even if it may also indicate a certain regularity in births, marriages, crimes etc., is thereby nevertheless by no means entitled to the conclusion that each man is compelled to his deeds, any more than the fact that the age of a population on average amounts to thirty years compels every thirty-year-old to die, Wundt, Grundzüge der physiol. Psych. II2 397. A. v. Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik3 1882 S. 24 f. Finally 5o. the different theories for the explanation of heredity and variation have all up to the present day proved insufficient. Already the great number that has been set up proves that none of them satisfies. All natural philosophers and biologists have tried their powers on it, without having unveiled this secret of life. The professor at the Sorbonne, Yves Delage, has in his learned work: La structure du protoplasma et les théories sur l'hérédité et les grands problèmes de la biologie générale, Paris Reinwald et Cie 1895 discussed all theories at length and then comes to the conclusion: après avoir étudié et discuté les nombreuses théories émises pour résoudre les problèmes de

l'hérédité et de l'évolution, nous sommes obligés de reconnaître, qu'aucune ne présente une solution acceptable. Toutes pèchent en quelques points, non pas accessoires mais fondamentaux, et la plupart sont, en outre, appuyées sur des hypothéses gratuites et tout à fait improbables, p. 743. He himself therefore also does not venture to offer the reader a théorie complète; nos connaissances sont loin d'être assez avancées pour que cela soit possible, p. 747; cf. also Hugo de Vries, Eenheid in veranderlijkheid, Album der Natuur 1898 bl. 65-80. Ribot, L'hérédité psychol.5 Paris Alcan 1894. van Bemmelen, De erfelijkheid van verworven eigenschappen, 1890. R. Schäfer, Die Vererbung, Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard 1897. Dr. Jonker, Erfel. en Toerekenb. in Theol. Stud. v. Dr. Daubanton 1894 bl. 291-322 etc. With all this [143] we do not, however, deny the facts of heredity nor also its extensive dominion. Christian theology has not the least interest in doing any injustice to these even in the slightest degree; on the contrary it fully acknowledges and respects the laws that have been established in this area by God; the more fixed laws are traced in heredity, the greater becomes the glory of Him who is the Creator of all ordinances and no God of confusion but of order. It is also completely true that we can almost never indicate with accuracy the boundaries that separate personal guilt from common guilt. What Schleiermacher says of original sin is something quite different from what Scripture and church pronounce concerning it, but in itself it is nevertheless completely true of sin in general that it is a Gesammtthat und Gesammtschuld des menschlichen Geschlechtes, i.e.: the sinful condition and the sinful deeds of each man are on the one hand caused by those of the forefathers and on the other hand again cause of the sinful conditions and deeds of the descendants; sin is in Jedem das Werk Aller und in Allen das Werk eines Jeden, Chr. Gl. § 71, 1. 2. But however true all this may be, so

long as biology alongside heredity must also acknowledge variation, all right is lacking to deprive man of his independence and freedom and to represent him as a will-less instrument of evil powers. Such a representation does not rest on sound science but is a fruit of sick imagination and, by killing all will-power in man, causes incalculable devastations. And further, even if the support offered by the science of the day to the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin may to a certain extent be gratefully acknowledged, it itself does not become stronger by it any more than it becomes weaker by it if that same science perhaps tomorrow might again please to display it as foolish and nonsensical. Original sin is still something other than what nowadays is understood under heredity. For it is not a species-property that belongs to the essence of man, for it has entered into human nature through transgression of God's command and can through regeneration and sanctification be removed from it again; and on the other side it is also no individual acquired property, for it is proper to all human beings without exception and it is so [144] inherent in human nature that even the regenerate still bring forth children who by nature are children of wrath; justus non generat unde ipse regeneratus sed unde generatus est (Augustine). Original sin therefore occupies a special place; the present doctrine of heredity may have rid it of its apparent absurdity, but it does not explain it. Formerly this was attempted by traducianism or creationism. But whatever standpoint one may take concerning the origin of souls, the propagation of original sin always remains equally difficult. Original sin is after all no substance that has its seat in the body and can be transplanted by generation; it is a moral quality of man, who lacks the communion with God which he according to his original nature ought to possess and has possessed. Adam's corruption entered of itself and at the same moment

when he in doubt and unbelief, in pride and lust tore himself loose from God. And in the same way moral corruption enters in his descendants from the first moment of their existence onward. As God withdrew his communion from Adam on account of his transgression, so He does this also to all his children. And just as He, while nevertheless sustaining Adam after his transgression, by the withdrawing of his communion did not become the positive cause of his corruption, so neither is He this in his descendants, whether one thinks the origin of souls traducianistically or creationistically. Each man is born under guilt and in stain by virtue of the physical and ethical relation in which he stands to Adam. Est ergo quisque sui individui peccati originalis et proximum principium et subjectum et auctor, Voetius, Disp. I 1104, cf. Martyr, L. C. p. 70. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 3. Zanchius, Op. IV 50. Voetius, Disp. I 1078 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 12. Moor III 289. M. Vitringa II 358. Edwards, Works II 478.

9. Original sin is a property of human nature and therefore proper to all creatures that partake of this nature. In Adamo persona corrumpit naturam, in aliis hominibus natura corrumpit personam, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 8 art. 5 qu. 69 art. 3. The Pelagian assertion, that there are men or at least can be men without any sin, is contradicted by Scripture, by experience, by the testimonies of all religions [145] and peoples. To the rule that every human being is a sinner there is only one exception, viz. Christ, but He was also the only-begotten Son of God, the second Adam, head of another and better covenant, and conceived in a special manner by the Holy Spirit. The Roman Catholics, however, also make an exception for Mary, the mother of Jesus. The three privileges, gradually ascribed to Mary in Roman theology, viz. freedom from original sin (immaculata conceptio), freedom from all actual sin (perfectio justitiae) and freedom from death (assumptio in coelum) are

simple inferences from the high rank of mediatrix, to which she, on the ground of her virginitas and deipartus, has been elevated by the church. With respect to the immaculate conception Pius IX determined in the bull Ineffabilis, beatissimam virginem Mariam in primo instanti conceptionis suae fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservatam immunem. It is not implied herein that Mary would not be included under Adam and would not have fallen in him, for Mary was preserved free from original sin only by a special grace of God and with a view to Christ's merits. But it is also not expressed in it that Mary was first conceived in sins and then immediately sanctified, for it is expressly declared that in the very first moment of her conception she was preserved free from original sin. For this dogma, however, not the weakest ground is present in Scripture. Thomas said outright, quod de sanctificatione B. Mariae, quod scilicet fuerit sanctificata in utero, nihil in Scriptura canonica traditur, S. Theol. III qu. 27 art. 1. The Roman theologians are therefore in no small embarrassment about this, seek all manner of reasons in order to explain this "hiddenness of Mary" in Scripture, and force the strangest texts into an appearance of proof. Thus they appeal to Gen. 3:15, Ps. 45:11v., Song of Sol. 1:8-16, 2:2, 3:6, 4:1v., 6:9, Wijsh. 1:4, Luke 1:28, 41, 48, Rev. 12 and to types such as the ark of Noah, the dove with the olive branch, the burning thornbush, etc.; but all these citations and reasonings serve only to cover their poverty of arguments and have no need of refutation, cf. e.g. Spencer Northcote, Maria in den Evang. Mainz [146] 1889. Schaefer, Die Gottesmutter in der h. Schrift, Münster 1867. Scheeben, Dogm. III 455-472. Rather, Scripture teaches decisively that all men, except Christ alone, are sinners; for Mary an exception is never made; even though no definite

sinful words or deeds of hers are recorded, not even in Mk. 3:21, John 2:3, yet she rejoices in God her Saviour, Luke 1:47, is pronounced blessed indeed on account of her motherhood of Christ but never on account of her sinlessness, Luke 1:28, 48, is also in this motherhood in itself placed behind those who are Jesus' mother and brothers and sisters in a spiritual sense, Mt. 12:46v., Mk. 3:31v., Luke 8:21, and perseveres with the apostles in praying and supplicating, Acts 1:14. Nor do the church fathers teach either the immaculate conception or also the sinlessness of Mary; Irenaeus, adv. haer. III 16, 7, Tertullianus, de carne Chr. 7, Origenes, hom. in Luc. 17 etc. speak with respect to her of actual transgressions; and even Roman scholars cannot deny this. Dr. von Lehner, Die Marienverehrung der ersten Jahrh. Stuttgart 1881 S. 151 says that this was the view prevailing at that time; Schwane, D. G. I2 382 acknowledges that the tradition from that time likewise furnishes no stringent proofs any more than Holy Scripture; and Scheeben, Dogm. III 474, 476 concedes that the person of Mary in the first four centuries recedes into the background and is in relative Dunkelheit. At most it was believed only propter honorem Domini that Mary by special grace had remained free from actual sins, Augustinus, de nat. et gr. 36. Damasc., de fide orthod. IV 14. Even when since the fifth century the veneration of Mary increased more and more and later still the feast of her conception arose, the principal theologians—just as Canus, Loci VII c. 1, Scheeben, Dogm. III 541 f. and others also acknowledge—did indeed teach a sanctificatio B. Virginis post animationem et contractionem peccati in anima but contested a praeservatio, which apriori kept Mary free from all original sin, Anselmus, Cur Deus homo II 16. Lombardus, Thomas, Bonaventura on Sent. III dist. 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 81 art. 3. III qu. 27 art. 1. 2. Comp. Theol. c. 224 etc. But Duns Scotus introduced a change

in this; he argued that, even if Mary was included in Adam, God nevertheless could in the very first moment of her conception bestow upon her the gratia that kept her [147] free from all sin. And because this was more worthy of God, Christ, and Mary and was not in conflict with the authority of Scripture and of the church, he considered it probabile, quod excellentius est attribuere Mariae, Sent. III dist. 3 qu. 1. And thereby the ground is also indicated on which at Rome this dogma rests. It has no support in Scripture nor in the tradition of the ancient church, but it is, like the assumption of Mary, simply an inference from the mediatorship that was gradually ascribed to her. It is not fitting, not conveniens, that Mary was conceived in sin, committed sin, and died. She must be sinless, and therefore she is, even though it is taught neither by Scripture nor tradition. Cf. Preuss, Die röm. Lehre v. d. unbefleckten Empfängniss 1865. Benrath, Zur Gesch. der Marienverehrung, Stud. u. Krit. 1886. Art. Maria in Herzog2. Bolland, Rome en de geschiedenis, Leiden 1897 bl. 1-53.

10. As extensive as original sin is in humanity, so it is also in the individual human being. It rules over the whole human being, over intellect and will, heart and conscience, soul and body, over all faculties and powers. His heart is evil from youth on and a source of all kinds of sins, Gen. 6:5, 8:21, Ps. 51:7, Jer. 17:9, Ezech. 36:26, Mk. 7:21; he cannot renew himself, Jer. 13:23, Ezech. 16:6, cannot understand the things of God, 1 Cor. 2:14, cannot submit to the law of God, Joh. 8:34, 36, Rom. 6:17, 20, 8:7, is dead through sins and trespasses, Ef. 2:1. Regeneration is therefore necessary for entrance into the kingdom of God, Joh. 3:3; the whole salvation is objectively and subjectively a work of God’s grace, Joh. 6:44, 15:5, 1 Cor. 4:7, 15:10, Phil. 2:13 etc. Upon these definite statements of Holy Scripture, Augustine and his followers and later the Reformers built the doctrine of

the incapacity of man for good. Because in Adam the whole human nature has been corrupted, nothing truly good can any longer proceed from it, any more than an evil tree can bring forth good fruits. Rather, the human being now finds himself under the dura necessitas non posse non peccandi, his virtues are vitia potius quam virtutes, he is by nature inclined to all evil, inclined even to hate God and his neighbor. This discourse is undoubtedly hard, and it is no wonder that it has at all times met with decided contradiction [148]. The Heathens did not know this deep corruption of sin; however much they also often expressed its general spread, they nevertheless continued to believe in the natural goodness of man and in the possibility of virtue, Sunt ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret, Cic. Qu. Tusc. II 1. Erras, si existimas, nobiscum nasci vitia, supervenerunt, ingesta sunt, Seneca, Ep. 96. In Pelagianism this paganistic doctrine was renewed; it denied original sin entirely. Through its mechanical conception of the image of God the Roman church came to the doctrine that the homo naturalis after loss of the donum superadditum can still do truly good works, indeed not in a supernatural but yet in a natural sense, Trid. VI can. 5. 7. Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Quakers, Rationalists, etc. fell back to this Roman standpoint. Coornhert took offense at the 5th and 8th question of the Heid. Catechism. Rousseau preached the natural goodness of man. And Allard Pierson testified of himself that he was absolutely not inclined to all evil but indeed to much good, Gids Nov. 1895 bl. 259. To the natural aversion, which involuntarily arises in the heart against the doctrine of the complete moral corruption of man, there is undoubtedly also joined, among its opponents, much misunderstanding. For if this doctrine is clearly set in the light, it is confirmed day by day by everyone’s experience and

justified by the testimonies of its opponents themselves. 1o. The doctrine of Scripture and church is, after all, not that every human being lives in all possible actual sins and stands actu guilty of the transgression of all commandments. It speaks only of the deepest inclination, the most inward disposition, the fundamental direction of human nature and confesses that this is not turned toward God, but turned away from Him. If the human being is an organic unity, then one of the two must nevertheless be the case. Many dispose of it by saying that the human being by nature is neither of the two or both at the same time, Hegel, Werke XII 209 f., but this betrays lack of reflection, is in conflict with the nature of the good and was therefore also very seriously opposed by Kant, Religion, ed. Rosenkranz 23-26. Whoever commits one sin stands in principle guilty of the transgression of all commandments, and whoever possesses one virtue in [149] truth has them in principle all. The human being is at the root of his being either good or evil—there is no third. 2o. Sin, however, is not a substance; it dwells indeed in and on and with the human being, but it is not and cannot be the essence of the human being. The human being has also after the fall remained human; he has retained reason, conscience, and will, can thereby control his lower sensuous impulses and inclinations and thus compel himself to virtue; Augustine, who called the virtues of the Heathens splendida vitia, nevertheless acknowledged this wholeheartedly; many of their deeds are not only no reproach but rather worthy of our praise and our imitation, cf. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 119-123. The Lutherans spoke of the natural human being as a block and a stick in the spiritual domain, but in the so-called lower hemisphere of civil life they nevertheless still ascribed to him all kinds of powers for good, Frank, Theol. der Conc. I 144 f. And more than they all, Calvin and the Reformed have honored the virtues of

unbelievers and have many times set them as an example even to Christians themselves, cf. my address on the Common Grace bl. 27v. The doctrine of the total corruption of human nature, therefore, by no means implies that the sinful inclination, which lies at the bottom of the heart, always breaks out in such deeds as clearly betray enmity and hatred against God and the neighbor. There are various circumstances that intervene between the two and prevent the inclination from expressing itself fully. Not only are many sinful deeds restrained by the sword of the government, civil propriety, public opinion, fear of disgrace and punishment, etc.; but all kinds of factors, such as the natural love still proper to each human being, the moral character cultivated by upbringing and struggle, favorable circumstances of constitution, environment, sphere of work, etc., lead the human being many times to the practice of beautiful, praiseworthy virtues. Only, thereby the sinful inclination of the heart is suppressed but not eradicated; in all kinds of evil deliberations, thoughts, desires it repeatedly comes to the surface; when the opportunity is favorable and necessity presses, it often breaks through all dams and dikes that held it in; and those who in dreadful words and deeds show that they hate God and the neighbor bear no other nature than that which all human beings share. 3o. When it is taught that the human being through sin is incapable of any good and this incapacity is called a natural one, then no physical necessity or fatalistic compulsion is meant thereby. The human being has through sin not lost his will and the freedom implanted in him; the will by virtue of its nature excludes all compulsion and cannot but will freely. But the human being has indeed lost the free inclination of the will toward the good; he now no longer wills to do the good; he now does freely, out of inclination, the evil: the inclination, the direction of the will has been changed; semper est in nobis voluntas

libera, sed non semper est bona, Aug., de gr. et lib. arb. 15, cf. also the Reformed in Heppe, Dogm. 237, 264. The inability for good is in this sense not physical but ethical in nature; it is an inability of the will. Some therefore preferred to speak of moral rather than of natural inability, Amyraldus, Testardus, Venema bij Moor III 231-233, and especially Jonathan Edwards. Edwards had namely in his days to defend the inability of man against Whitby and Taylor, who denied original sin and considered the human being capable of keeping God's law. They objected to him that, if the human being could not keep God's law, he also did not have to do it and, if he then did not do it, was also not guilty. In order to defend himself against that, Edwards made a distinction between natural and moral inability, and said that the fallen human being did have the natural, but not the moral power, to do the good. And he added that only natural inability was really inability, but moral inability could be so called only in an improper sense. Sin is namely not a physical defect in the nature or the powers of the will; but it is an ethical defect, a defect of affection, love for the good, see his Freedom of the will, Works II 1-190 passim. Now Edwards did say that the human being could not bestow that affection for the good upon himself and could not change his will; in this respect he stood entirely on the side of Augustine and Calvin. But by his refusal to call this unwillingness for good natural inability, he has fostered much misunderstanding and in fact promoted Pelagianism. The Reformed have therefore before and after spoken of natural inability. This word natural can, however, have different senses. One can thereby have in view [151] the original human nature, created by God in Adam according to His image, as the Protestants said that the image of God was natural,—then the inability for good is not natural. One can also thereby mean the physical substance or

power of any creature, and then too the inability, since all substance and power has been created by God, is not to be called natural. The incapacity for good is no physical impossibility, such as it is for example impossible for a human being to touch the stars with his hand. But one can, speaking of natural inability, also think of the properties of fallen human nature and thereby indicate that the incapacity for good now in the fallen state is "by nature" proper to every human being, is inborn to him from the first moment of his existence and is not first introduced into him from outside by habit, upbringing, imitation. In this sense the name of natural inability is perfectly correct, and that of moral inability is liable to misunderstanding. For morally impossible is after all often called that which, on the ground of someone's character, habit, upbringing, is held to be impossible for him to do; it is morally impossible that a virtuous man suddenly becomes a thief, a mother hates her child, a murderer strangles an innocent child. That morally impossible nevertheless does indeed occur in some circumstances. It is not so with the incapacity for good. It is indeed ethical in nature and an inability of the will, but it is proper to the human being by nature, it is inborn to him, it is a property of his willing itself. And precisely because the will even now in the fallen state by virtue of its nature cannot but will freely, it cannot will otherwise than what it wills, than that to which it is by nature inclined, cf. Thomas, S. c. Gent. IV 52. Calvin on Ef. 2:3. Ursinus and other comm. on Heid. Cat. vr. 5. 8. Form. Conc. I 12. Cons. Helv. § 21. 22. Turret., Theol. El. X 4. 39. Moor III 232. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 257-272. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. 219-257. III 364-374. 4o. Finally one must keep in view that Scripture and church, teaching the complete corruption of man, thereby apply the highest standard, namely the law of God. The doctrine of the incapacity for good is a religious confession. According to the standard that

people usually use [152] in daily life or also in philosophical ethics, it can be wholeheartedly acknowledged that much good and beautiful is done by human beings. The follower of Augustine can with this standard in hand in the assessment and appreciation of human virtues still be milder and broader than the most convinced Pelagian. There is, however, still another, higher ideal for the human being; there is a divine law, to which he must correspond. Virtues and good works are distinct. Good, truly good, good in the eyes of the holy God, is only that which is done from faith, according to God's law and to God's honor. And tested by this standard, who then dares to say that any work is done by human beings that is completely pure and needs no forgiveness and renewal? With Rome and in part also with the Lutherans to divide the human being in two and to say that in the supernatural and spiritual he can do nothing good but in the natural he can do something completely good, that is in conflict with the unity of human nature, with the unity of the moral law, with the doctrine of Scripture that the human being must always be the image of God, must do whatever he does to God's honor and must love God always and everywhere with his whole heart and understanding and strength. If this now is so, if the essence of the human being consists in this that he is image and likeness of God, then in the human being, as he now lives and works, nothing can stand before God's face. Weighed in the balance of God's sanctuary, all his doing is found too light.

One can differ over this standard, and, in order to arrive at a more favorable conclusion, bring down the law of God from its height and make it ready-made to fit human conduct. But given this standard, no other judgment is possible than that of Scripture, that there is no one who does good, not even one. And this judgment of Scripture is confirmed by all

kinds of testimonies. Let those who do not believe Scripture listen to the voices of the greatest of our race. As soon as one, in oneself or in others, does not remain with the words or deeds but investigates the hidden motives, the secret intentions, the sinful nature of all human striving comes to light. Nos vertus ne sont le plus souvent que des vices déguisés (Rochefoucauld). L'homme n'est que déguisement, que mensonge et hypocrisie, et en soi-même et à l'égard [153] des autres (Pascal). Homo homini lupus; without the state human society would be a bellum omnium contra omnes (Hobbes). According to Kant, human beings are von Natur böse; there is in him a natural Hang zum Bösen, ein radicales, angebornes Böse; the terrible facts which the history of humanity makes known to us prove this sufficiently. Ein jeder Mensch hat seinen Preis, für den er sich weggiebt. What the apostle says is general truth: there is no one who does good, there is also not one, Kant, Relig. ed. Rosenkranz 35 f. Diejenigen, welche ein servum arbitrium behaupteten und den Menschen als einen Stock und Klotz charakterisirten.... hatten vollkommen Recht, Fichte, Syst. der Sittenlehre 1798 S. 265. Das natürliche Herz, worin der Mensch befangen ist, ist der Feind, der zu bekämpfen ist, Hegel, Werke XII 270. Der Mensch hat sich von Ewigkeit in der Eigenheit und Selbstsucht ergriffen und alle, die geboren werden, werden mit dem anhängenden finstern Princip des Bösen geboren. Dieses ursprüngliche Böse im Menschen, das nur derjenige in Abrede ziehen kann, der den Menschen in sich und ausser sich nur oberflächlich kennen gelernt hat, ist in seinem Ursprung eigne That, Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 388. Die Haupt- und Grundtriebfeder im Menschen, wie im Thiere ist der Egoismus, d. h. der Drang zum Daseyn und Wohlseyn. Dieser Egoismus ist im Thiere wie im Menschen mit dem innersten Kern und Wesen desselben aufs genaueste

verknüpft, ja eigentlich identisch. This egoism is indeed restrained by all kinds of bonds of decency, fear, punishment, government, etc.; but when these are removed, that unersättliche Habsucht, that niederträchtige Geldgier, that tief versteckte Falschheit, that tückische Bosheit spring forth. Kriminalgeschichten und Beschreibungen anarchischer Zustände muss man lesen, um zu erkennen, was in moralischer Hinsicht der Mensch eigentlich ist. Diese Tausende, die da vor unseren Augen in friedlichen Verkehr sich durcheinander drängen, sind anzusehen als eben so viele Tiger und Wölfe, deren Gebiss man durch einen starken Maulkorb gesichert hat. Even conscience is mostly composed of 1/5 fear of people, 1/5 deisidaemonie, 1/5 prejudice, 1/5 vanity and 1/5 habit, Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 3e Aufl. 1881 S. 186 f. Welt als Wille u. V. I6 391 f. Parerga u. Paral. II5 229 f. The adherents of evolution have [154] returned to the doctrine of Mandeville, Helvetius, Diderot, d'Alembert etc., that egoism is the basis of morality and the norm of all human action; man is descended from the animals and he remains at bottom an animal, led by egoistic instincts; civilization can tame but never make of man anything other than what he originally is and by disposition is; what we call moral life is an accidental product of circumstances, of the life of human beings in a particular society; under other circumstances and in another society good and evil would have a wholly different content, Darwin, Afst. des menschen, hoofdst. 3-5. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 16e Aufl. 478-492. In his Ethisch idealisme Amst. 1875 de Bussy makes a great distinction between the moral man, whose egoistic nature has been constrained by the community in its arbitrariness but not destroyed, whose virtues are many times splendida vitia, 22v., and the ethical man, in whom a new principle has been planted. It is truly not Scripture alone that judges harshly of man.

It is human beings who have pronounced the harshest and strictest judgment over human beings. And then it is always still better to fall into the hand of the Lord than into that of man, for his mercies are many. For if God condemns us, then at the same time in Christ He offers us his forgiving love, but if human beings condemn human beings, they many times thrust them away from themselves and give them up to their contempt. If God condemns us, then He has this judgment brought to us by human beings, prophets and apostles and ministers, who do not set themselves above us on high as saints but include themselves with all in a common confession of guilt; but the philosophers and moralists, despising human beings, thereby mostly forget that they themselves are human beings. If God condemns us, then He speaks of sin and guilt, which indeed is great and heavy but which nevertheless can be taken away because it does not belong to the essence of man; but the moralists speak many times of egoistic, animal inclinations, which are proper to man by virtue of his origin and belong to his essence; they do indeed strike him down but do not raise him up; if we are animals from the outset, why then ought we to live as children of God? [155]

§ 39. The Punishment of Sin.

1. The punishment of sin cannot yet be treated fully in this paragraph. The whole, deserved punishment was indeed threatened beforehand by God upon sin, but after it had been committed it was not executed; nor does it enter in completely upon anyone in this life, indeed it is not yet applied in full even at death; only after the judgment on the last day does it strike the guilty one in its whole weight. In Gen. 2:7 God had expressly said: on the day that you eat of it you shall surely die. This definite threat, however, has not been carried out. An element has intervened between the two, which has moderated and postponed this punishment. Adam and Eve remained alive for many years after the fall; Eve even became the mother of the living; a human race has proceeded from them, which is borne and nourished by the earth. The beginnings of history continue after the fall, even if in a very altered form. All this is not to be ascribed to God's justice, but, as will later become clearer, to his grace. This comes into operation immediately after the fall. It receives the guidance of history, not at the expense of but in connection with the right of God. All consequences and punishments, which

enter in after sin, therefore at once bear a double character. They are not merely consequences and punishments, instituted by God's justice, but all without distinction, under another point of view, also means of grace, proofs of God's longsuffering and compassion. It cannot be objected against this, that God would then have spoken untruth in Gen. 2:7. For there only the true, full punishment is announced, which sin deserves; sin breaks communion with God, is spiritual death and deserves death. That that punishment would be moderated, postponed, even remitted, was by the nature of the case not susceptible of communication before the transgression. God therefore in Gen. 2:7 makes mention only of the one, great punishment of sin, i.e. death. With that, after all, everything ceases at once, life, joy, development, labor, also the possibility of repentance and forgiveness, of restoration of communion with God. Sin [156] deserves nothing other than the whole, full death. All other punishments, which after the fall have in fact entered in and been pronounced, such as shame, fear, hiding from God, curse upon the serpent, upon the earth etc., are indeed punishments but at the same time presuppose that God does not at once and in full carry out his threat, that He still has another plan with humanity and world and therefore lets these continue to exist in his longsuffering and grace. Yet they are under a certain point of view very certainly also punishments and in so far ought here to come under discussion. God's grace expresses itself in them, but also his justice. Punishment, according to the general thought of Scripture, has the intention to restore the right of God, which has been violated by sin. Under Israel it had the tendency to maintain the laws instituted by God and to put away the evil from the midst of the people, Deut. 13:5, 17:7, 12, 22:21v., 24:7, and then further, to prevent such transgressions and to cause Israel in fear to walk in the Lord's statutes,

Deut. 13:11, 17:13, 19:20, 21:21. The purpose of punishment was thus twofold, had reference to the past and the future, had to restore committed transgressions and to prevent future ones. The standard of punishment was not arbitrariness or revenge, Lev. 19:18, Spr. 24:29, but the nature of the crime, Ex. 21:23-25, Lev. 24:19, 20, Deut. 19:21, without, however, the jus talionis always being applied strictly, literally, both qualitatively and quantitatively, e.g. Ex. 21:30v. Pharisaism applied this rule, which applies only to the government, also in private life, in conflict with the O. Test. itself, Lev. 19:18, Deut. 32:35, Spr. 24:29. Against that Jesus rises up, Mt. 5:38; He forbids all lust for revenge, whether one seeks this privately or by public means, and commands patience and mercy. Retribution, however, is throughout the whole of Scripture the objective standard of punishment, not only for the earthly government but also for God himself. Not only does He threaten punishment upon sin, Gen. 2:7, Deut. 27:15v., Ps. 2:9v, 5:5, 11:5, 6, 50:21, 94:10, Am. 6:8, Jes. 10:13-23, Jer. 25:12, Mt. 21:42, 23:13, 24:15, Rom. 2:3, Joh. 8:24, Rom. 6:21, 23, Gal. 6:8, 2 Petr. 2:12, 3:7 etc., but He also determines the measure of punishment according to the nature of the crime and repays each one according to his work, Ex. 20:5-7, Deut. 7:9, 10, 32:35, Ps. [157] 62:13, Spr. 24:12, Jes. 35:4, Jer. 51:56, Mt. 16:27, Rom. 2:1-13, Hebr. 10:30, Op. 22:12.

2. In agreement with this, Christian theology spoke of a justitia judicialis, distinguished into justitia remunerativa and vindicativa, part II 199v., and derived from that the right and the essence of punishment. Indeed, there is no other ultimate and deepest principle from which punishment can be deduced than the righteousness of God. All punishment presupposes that he who pronounces and imposes the punishment is invested with authority over him who transgressed the law. This authority, this right cannot have its

origin in man, nor in his physical nature, for this creates only the right of the strongest, nor in his ethical nature, for all men are sinners and the right to punish never rests in the fact that someone stands morally higher than the guilty person. All so-called relative theories, which have been devised apart from Divine righteousness for the maintenance of penal law, such as the self-defence-, the preventive-, the deterrence-, the improvement-theory, are insufficient to vindicate the right to punish and are also in conflict with the essence of punishment; they may perhaps be moments in, but cannot be principle of punishment; punishment is always in the first place poena vindicativa and only thereafter poena medicinalis and exemplaris. Utility creates no right. All the mentioned theories, which build penal law on the interest of the state, society, the transgressors, therefore all fall back into the theory of the right of the strongest; right is exchanged for power. If there is no moral and legal order, above and independent of man, and if its maintenance has not been entrusted to anyone by a higher authority, then punishing may be useful for some persons, for an accidental majority, but there is no right to it. Atheism is the undermining and destruction of all law and morality; ni Dieu ni maître. Only then is there a right to punish, if there exists a legal order, established by God and in his name to be maintained by the government even at the cost of the life of its transgressors, because it is more precious than any good and far surpasses every creature in value. To be sure, at first hearing it seems strange that the legal order—and behind it the moral order—of [158] is of such incomparable value and demands the good and life of man for its maintenance and restoration. But this moral world-order is no idea of man, no state of affairs produced by him; it is also no independent power resting in itself, of which no one can say what it is; but it is the revelation and operation of the righteousness of God in this

world, it rests in the perfect, holy will of Him who sustains and governs all things; whoever assails it assails God himself. Therefore it stands high above man and is worth more than all creatures together; if it comes to a conflict, man perishes thereby; fiat justitia, pereat mundus; wenn die Gerechtigkeit untergeht, so hat es keinen Werth mehr, dass Menschen auf Erden leben (Kant). In order to maintain it, punishment has been instituted; it intends restoration of law, maintenance of God's righteousness; if it does not serve that, it becomes coercion and overpowering force. Cf. Lombardus, Sent II. dist. 36. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87. Stöckl, Lehrb. d. Philos. III 53. 97. Polanus, Synt. p. 340. Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. I 412. Moor III 329. Buddeus, Inst. theol. mor. I 612-629. Stahl, Philos. d. Rechts5 II 1 S. 160 f. 2 S. 681 f. Ulrici, Gott u. d. Mensch II 391 f. Dorner, Gl. I 286 II 324. Kohler, Das Wesen der Strafe, Würzburg 1888. H. Seuffert, Was will, was wirkt, was soll die staatliche Strafe? Bonn 1897. Caro, Problèmes de morale sociale 1887 p. 193. Dale, The atonement, 18th ed. 1896 p. 373. Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb. 1897 II 442. F. C. Domela Nieuwenhuis, Het wezen der straf I Utrecht 1867. H. L. Lindaal Jacobs, Beschouwingen over straf en straffen, Amst. 1884. Kuyper, Ons Program 1879 bl. 738.

Punishment always consists in a certain suffering, in deprivation of some good, whether of property or freedom, of body or life; it is a malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis. Why the juridical order demands suffering from him who violates it and how it is thereby restored and satisfied, is difficult to say. Arbitrariness and chance this certainly is not. Behind that juridical order stands the living, true, holy God, who by no means holds the guilty innocent; and with Him punishment does not rest on a dominium absolutum in the sense of Duns Scotus, cf. deel II 207. 216, but

on the demand of His justice. If He did not punish sin, He would grant to evil equal rights [159] as to good and deny Himself. In order that God may remain God, the punishment of sin is necessary. As soon therefore as the moral or the juridical order is assailed, it rises up and cries out for restoration. It avenges itself in punishment, both inward and outward, presses the transgressor down and shows therein its incomparable majesty. God cannot tolerate that the sinner, instead of standing under His law and obeying it, exalts himself above it and in principle makes himself equal to God. And therefore He maintains in punishment His divine sovereignty; by suffering He presses the sinner down to the place where he ought to stand, and brings him, where he does not wish to accept it voluntarily, by punishment to the forced acknowledgment that he is the lesser, that he is not God but a creature. He who will not listen must feel. Punishment is a powerful proof that only righteousness has a right to exist, that God alone is good and great. In part punishment flows from sin itself; sin by its nature brings separation from God, and thus darkness, ignorance, error, falsehood, fear, unrest, consciousness of guilt, remorse, misery, slavery; the service of sin is so unspeakably hard. But in part punishment is also added to the transgression from without by the competent authority. Thus it happens in the family, in the school, in society and the state, and thus it is also with the punishments which God lets follow upon sin. Many have denied this latter and in this sphere have wished to know only of natural, but in no case of positive punishments, Spinoza, Eth. V prop. 42, many rationalists in the previous century, cf. in Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 391 and Dogm. I 527. Strauss, Gl. I 603. Scholten, L. H. K. II 108v. 569v. Vrije Wil 236, cf. also Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 84, Biedermann, Dogm. II 575 f. Lipsius, Dogm. §. 393. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 397 III2 326 f. Kaftan, Dogm. § 36 etc.

On this standpoint there is actually no reward and no punishment; virtue bears its reward, vice its punishment in itself; a heaven or hell exists only in the mind of man himself; die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht; at most there exists a subjective necessity for the guilty man, to conceive his suffering as punishment. Now the word of the poet is true: Das Leben ist der Güter grösstes nicht, Der Uebel [160] grösstes ist die Schuld. Puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum. Culpam quam poenam plus de ratione mali habere certum est, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 48 art. 6. Guilt makes suffering into punishment; if it is taken away from it, suffering can remain the same and yet wholly change in character. Death as a fact is the same for believers and unbelievers, but for the latter it is a punishment, for the former a passage to eternal life. Therefore also from the suffering that befalls someone one may not conclude to his personal sin, Luk. 13:4, Joh. 9:1; suffering namely in God's hand according to His grace and wisdom serves not only for punishment, but also for testing, chastisement, education; He is so mighty that He can make all things work together for good for those who love Him, Rom. 8:28. But with all this the objective connection between sin and suffering, established by God, is not broken. Scripture furnishes proofs for it on almost every page. History is indeed not the, but it is nevertheless a world-judgment; it makes facts known to us that compel even the most unbelieving to the confession: this is the finger of God. Though suffering often may not have its cause in a personal sin, it nevertheless does have it in the sin of race, people, or humanity. One's own conscience testifies in every human being that there is a connection and must be a connection between holiness and blessedness, between virtue and happiness. Kant was so convinced of that, that from the disharmony which exists here on earth between the two he concluded to an afterlife. Not for

the reward does the pious man serve God, but he is just as little indifferent to it, as the advocates of an amour desintéressé claim to be; Paul says that believers would be the most miserable of all men, if they were hoping in Christ only in this life. After the fall God has laid between ethos and physis, between moral and natural order, between fallen man and the devastated earth, such a connection that they together are serviceable to the honor of His name and the coming of His kingdom. The positive punishments, which God often already in this life lets follow upon sin, are therefore no arbitrariness but take, even though we do not discern it, their ordered place in the history of human sin and guilt. He who denies them or ascribes to them only a subjective existence, runs the danger of seeing in sin [161] itself no more than an imagination and a delusion; history becomes for him a discord, which is never resolved into a higher chord. Cf. Stapfer, Wederl. Godg. IV 448v. Bretschneider, Dogm. I 525 f. Van Voorst, Over de Goddelijke straffen, Haagsch Gen. 1798. V. d. Wijnpersse, Over de straffende gerechtigheid, ib. 1798. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 287 f. II 224 f.

3. The punishments which God has set upon sin in this life are guilt, stain, suffering, death, and the dominion of Satan. Guilt is the first and heaviest punishment. The word, which is connected with zullen, at first indicates only that someone is the agent of something, just as αἰτια, causa. For the most part it already includes the thought that someone is the cause of something that ought not to be or to happen (it is his guilt). In this sense guilt presupposes that we were obliged to do or to omit something; we are guilty to keep the whole law, Luk. 17:10, Gal. 5:3. And if we then have not done that, we stand guilty; because we are the cause of the transgression of the law, we are in a state of accusation (αἰτιασθαι, accusare, reus), the deed is imputed to us, we must answer for it and are obliged to satisfy the law;

we are liable to punishment. Guilt is the obligation resting upon someone on account of transgression of the law, to satisfy the law by a proportionate suffering of punishment. It binds the sinner immediately after his transgression to the law, to its demand for satisfaction and punishment. Man thinks by transgression to become free from the law, but precisely the opposite takes place, he becomes in another way much more firmly bound to its demand. God, who cannot cease to be God, even though he gives man freedom to set himself against Him, never lets man go, and this one never becomes free from God. At the same moment that he places himself outside the law, i.e. outside love, it strikes him with its curse and binds him to its punishment. Guilt is obligatio ad poenam justam sustinendam, subjectio peccatoris ad poenam, Polanus, Synt. p. 338. Moor III 135. Turret., Theol., El. IX qu. 3. Mastricht, Theol. IV 2, 7. Müller, Sünde I 264. Vilmar, Moral I 195. Art. Schuld in Herzog2 and Wuttke, Ethik II 97. Scholten, Vrije wil 217v. Hoekstra, Vrijheid 303v. Roman [162] theology makes a distinction between reatus culpae and poenae, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, I 2 qu. 87 art. 6. Trid. VI c. 14 can. 30 XIV de poenit., c. 8 and can. 12-15. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V 19. Theol. Wirceb. VII 27. But this distinction clearly betrays its intention, to justify the satisfactorial punishments for believers here on earth and in purgatory, and is in direct conflict with the nature of guilt and punishment. It is indeed true that the sins of believers, i.e. of those who have received full forgiveness, in themselves always remain sins and deserving of punishment; against the Antinomians, who denied this and therefore considered the prayer for forgiveness for believers unnecessary, the Reformed have always maintained this and made the distinction of reatus potentialis and reatus actualis, Moor III 135. But when the guilt has been taken away from the

sins, then thereby of itself all satisfaction and punishment also lapses, for guilt is nothing other than obligation to punishment. God is then no longer a Judge but a Father; he does indeed chastise the son whom he loves, 2 Sam. 12:13, 14, but does not punish him; and demands no satisfaction from him, for whom the whole righteousness has been brought about by Christ. Thus Augustine also says of the baptized: omni peccato caret, non omni malo, quod planius ita dicitur, omni reatu omnium malorum caret, non omnibus malis, c. Jul. VI c. 16, cf. Alting, Theol. el. nova XVII 5. Turret., Theol. El. IX qu. 3. Moor III 136. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 414.

That sin now truly entails guilt is established by the testimony of God in Scripture as well as in the conscience. In Scripture sin, guilt, and punishment are concepts so mutually connected that the words for sin, such as עָוֹן, חַטָּאת, imperceptibly acquire the meaning of guilt, Gen. 4:13, Ex. 34:7, Lev. 24:15, Num. 9:13 etc. The proper word that designates sin as guilt is אָשָׁם, Gen. 26:10, Lev. 4:13, 5:2, Num. 5:7 etc., and ὀφειλημα, Mt. 6:12, cf. 5:26, Luk. 7:41, 42, 13:4., Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 684 f. God by no means holds the guilty innocent and pronounces the curse upon all who do not remain in the book of the law, Deut. 27:26, Gal. 3:10. Curse, עָלָה, מְאֵרָה, קְלָלָה, καταρα, ἀναθεμα, maledictum, is the opposite of blessing, בְּרָכָה, εὐλογια, benedictio, Deut. 11:26, 30:19. Just as God's blessing assigns to someone all manner of salvation and life, [163] so the divine curse is the surrender of someone to ruin, destruction, death, judgment, Satan. Human beings can only wish blessing and curse, but God's blessing and cursing is always exhibitive; it sends what it wishes. At first God's blessing rested upon creation, Gen. 1:22, 28, 2:3, but that blessing has been turned into a curse, Gen. 3:17. To be sure, later the blessing of God was again pronounced over the earth and humanity, but this flows forth from God's

grace. The heathen therefore do not know the concept of the divine blessing. All the more do they know of the divine curse; classical antiquity is governed by fear of the vengeance of the Erinyes (Moiren, Furiën), the goddesses of the curse. In all pagan religions anxiety (δεισιδαιμονια, religio) far outweighs trust in the gods; religion passes more and more into superstition; everywhere one deems oneself surrounded and governed by ruin-bringing gods, whom one seeks in vain to reconcile by sacrifices and tortures. There truly rests a curse of God upon humanity and world. To wish to explain life and history solely from the love of God is impossible. There is a principle of the wrath of God active in the whole creation, which only the superficial can deny. There is no communion but separation between God and the human being; the covenant is broken; God has a dispute with his creature. All stand guilty and punishable before his face, παντων ἐνοχοι, Mt. 5:21, 22; Mk. 3:29, Jac. 2:10. The whole world is ὑποδικος τῳ θεῳ, Rom. 3:19; it stands under the judgment of God and has nothing to answer. Art. Segen in Herzog2, ἀναθεμα bij Cremer. Subjectively this is confirmed by the testimony of God in the conscience of every human being. Guilt and consciousness of guilt are not the same. Whoever wishes to ascend from consciousness of guilt to guilt cuts off for himself the way to understand guilt in its proper meaning and weight. Ignorance can to a certain extent excuse sin, Luk. 23:34, Hd. 17:30, just as conscious and intentional transgression aggravates sin, Luk. 12:47, Joh. 15:22, 9:41, but there are also sins hidden from ourselves and others, Ps. 19:13; and also sins of ignorance are sins, Hd. 17:27-29, Rom. 1:19-21, 28, 1 Tim. 1:13-15. Yet objective guilt reflects itself more weakly or more strongly in the [164] consciousness of the human being. Immediately after the fall the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened and they became aware that they were naked. In this lies that

they also know and acknowledge that they have done evil. Shame is fear of disgrace, an unpleasant painful feeling about something wrong or improper. And with that shame comes fear of God and the urge to hide oneself from Him. That is, in the human being the conscience has awakened. Before the fall there was in the human being, strictly speaking, no conscience; there was no chasm between what he was and what he knew that he had to be. Being and self-consciousness coincided. But through the fall separation arises. The human being still retains, by God's grace, the awareness that he ought to be otherwise, that he had to correspond in all parts with God's law. But reality testifies otherwise; he is not what he ought to be. And this testimony is the conscience. The conscience is therefore not the consciousness of the communion of God with the human being, as Schenkel conceived it, art. Gewissen in Herzog1 and Die christl. Dogm. vom Standpunkt des Gewissens aus 1858. It is rather the opposite; it is precisely a proof that communion with God is disturbed, that there is a distance and chasm between God and the human being, between his law and our condition. This comes out clearly when the conscience appears accusingly, but also where it excuses in a given case, i.e. in fact is silent, that separation from God lies at the foundation, Rom. 2:14, 15. The conscience is the subjective proof of the human being's fall, the witness of his guilt before the face of God. God does not only accuse the human being; in the conscience the human being condemns himself and takes sides for God and his verdict against himself. The finer and more conscientious the conscience judges, the more it justifies God's thought about the human being in Scripture. The best and noblest of our race have confirmed God's truthfulness and pronounced themselves guilty over their own head. Cf.

concerning the conscience my Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 bl. 111. 203.

4. Another punishment of sin is the stain. Just as with the first sin, so also with sins in general the outward transgression is manifestation and proof of the inward. Sin consists not only in the deed but also in the thought, desire, [165] inclination, etc. On each of those stages sin is at once both guilt and stain. Adam did not first become guilty when he ate, but he already also loaded guilt upon himself when he desired the fruit of the tree. Guilt and stain are always the two sides of sin, they go together inseparably; where the one is, the other is. Sin is guilt, because it conflicts with God's righteousness; it is stain, because it is opposed to his holiness. Guilt binds us to punishment, stain defiles us. Through guilt the objective relation to God, through stain the subjective communion with God is disturbed. Sin is at once breach of the covenant of works and destruction of the image of God. The first implies that God is no longer man's covenant partner; He cannot turn in favor and love toward the guilty one, and the sinner no longer stands in that covenant, can no longer love and keep the law and thus by this way can no longer acquire life. Out of the works of the law no flesh can any more be justified, Ps. 143:2, Rom. 3:20, 2 Cor. 3:6v., Gal. 3:2, 10. Even if it is also the case that the law of the covenant of works, besides obliging us to restoration of the evil committed by suffering punishment, also still remains obliging us to complete obedience to its commandments, Mt. 5:48, 22:37; although God himself keeps his promise and remains attaching life to the keeping of the law, Lev. 18:5, Mt. 19:17, Luk. 10:28; indeed, even if the covenant of works is in that sense unbreakable, that God in the covenant of grace lays the demand for satisfaction and absolute obedience to the law upon Christ, yet it is broken in this respect, that man is incapable of

entering into life by this way. Paradise is closed to him, the tree of life denied him. Cf. Moor III 105-108. Marck, Hist. Parad. II c. 15. Ex. v. h. ontw. v. Tol. X 478-480. Witsius, Oec. foed. I c. 9. Mastricht, Theol. III 12, 22. And at the same time with that the image of God has been destroyed by sin. Rome understands by that, that the supernatural gifts have been lost and the natural have remained uninjured. The Lutherans originally taught that man had wholly lost the image of God, since it consisted only in the moral qualities, and that man was now like a stick and a block. But the Reformed maintained that the image of God in the narrower sense had indeed been lost and in the broader sense wholly damaged and [166] corrupted, but yet had not been destroyed, Ned. Gel. art. 14. The image of God is not an outward, mechanical addition to man, but is organically connected with his being; it is the health of man. The man who transgresses God's law does not cease to be man; he retains his body, his soul, his faculties, his powers, his understanding, will, etc., but they all stand in the service of sin and work in a wrong direction. As deprivation and disturbance of the image of God, the stain of sin is by nature proper to all men, except Christ; qualitatively there is no difference. But for that reason there is nevertheless quantitative difference. All have indeed turned away from God and by nature walk on the path that leads to destruction. But not all have advanced equally far on that wrong way and are not equally far removed in a quantitative sense from the kingdom of heaven. There is an endless variation and transition between the beginning and the highest development of the sinful life. Men, families, generations, families, classes, estates, peoples also diverge widely in sin. There are those who are not far from the kingdom of God; there are also those who drink in sin like water, are given over in unrighteousness, hardened, obdurate, and are incapable of any good impression. And this

quantitative difference among men does not first come about through their personal deeds and individual actions, but is already given with conception and birth. Original sin, which comes to us from Adam's side, is indeed the general presupposition and source of all individual, actual sins, but the sinful deeds of individuals also in turn react upon that inborn moral corruption, strengthen it, and develop it in a particular direction. Just as a sinful deed, repeatedly performed, cultivates in us a sinful inclination, e.g. to drink, sensual enjoyment, lust; so also can sinful morals and customs in family, kin, generation, people strengthen the inborn corruption and develop it toward a particular side. And also that peculiar modification of the inborn corruption often transmits itself from parents to children, from the one to the other generation. Man is no individual. Das Individuum ist eine Fiktion so gut wie das Atom, Natorp, Archiv f. syst. Philos. III 1 S. 81. Man is born out of the community and lives from [167] the very beginning in a particular circle, condition, and time. Family, kin, society, people, climate, way of life, culture, century, etc., everything exercises influence on the individual man and modifies his inborn moral corruption. Sin is therefore essentially indeed always the same, but it presents itself in different persons, families, estates, peoples and in different conditions and times each time in another way and in another form. Each man also as a sinner bears an own physiognomy. The sins in the East bear another character than those in the West, in the hot zone another than in a cold region; in the countryside another than in the cities, in the state of culture another than in a state of savagery, in the nineteenth century another than in the eighteenth, etc. There are family-, generational-, kin-, national-, social sins. Statistics has proved that in certain times and conditions and circles there also prevails a shuddering regularity of crimes, e.g. of homicide, suicide, extra-marital

births, etc., A. von Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine Socialethik, 3te Aufl. Erlangen 1882. We all stand on every terrain under the influence of wrong habits, sinful examples, of the spirit of the age and public opinion. Besides properly so-called original sin there is also a Gesammtschuld and Gesammtthat der Sünde. Just as men, so also their sinful inclinations and deeds stand in connection with one another. Penetrating into the endless richness of all that is created, sin also forms a realm, which, animated by one principle of life, organizes itself in manifold forms and appearances. Cf. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71. 72. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Frank, Syst. der chr. Wahrh. I 463 f. H. Schmidt in Herzog2 15, 33 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 158 f. and above p. 96.

5. Besides guilt and stain, according to Holy Scripture suffering too is a punishment for sin. Through it man lost not only true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness but also dominion and glory. This is already evident immediately after the fall and is further confirmed by the whole of Scripture. God sets enmity between man and the serpent and thereby in principle deprives him of the dominion which originally [168] had been bestowed on him over the animal world, Gen. 1:26, 2:19. Further, God pronounces over the woman the punishment of painful pregnancy and of a desire for the man which nevertheless ever torments her. The man himself receives his share of suffering in the curse that is pronounced over the earth and that obliges him to laborious toil for the bread of his modest portion. With this the history of suffering is opened for humanity and for the whole earth. And all the suffering that befalls human beings here on earth, a short life, a sudden violent death, famine, pestilence, war, defeat, childlessness, painful losses, deprivation of goods, impoverishment, crop failure, death of the cattle, etc., it all has its cause, indeed not always in personal sins, for

there is also a sparing of the ungodly, Gen. 18:26v., and a punishing for the testing of the righteous, Job 1, Luk. 13:21, Joh. 9:1, 11:4, 2 Cor. 12:7, but still in sin in general; without sin there would also be no suffering, Lev. 26:14v., Deut. 28:15v., Ezech. 4:21, Hos. 2:8v., Openb. 18:8, 21:4. Even the irrational creation has been subjected by God, on account of man's sin, to the ματαιοτης and φθορα, and now groans together, as being in travail, awaiting the revelation of the glory of God's children, in hope of then itself also being delivered from the bondage of corruption, Rom. 8:19-22. Scripture is not pessimistic in the common sense of the word, but it knows and acknowledges suffering and interprets it in the most moving complaints, Gen. 47:9, Job 3, 6, 7, 9, 14 etc., Ps. 22, 38, 39, 69, 73, 74, 79, 89, 90 etc. Eccl., Lam., Mt. 6:34, Rom. 7:24, 8:19v., 1 Cor. 15:19 etc. And such complaints continually rise up from the whole of humanity. Teachers of religion, moralists, philosophers, poets, artists, richly gifted and disadvantaged persons, all speak in the same spirit. The light-hearted and superficial get over it, but all who are serious-minded have always sensed something of the mysterious connection of life and suffering. Greek antiquity also makes no exception to this; the basic mood there was not so cheerful as people formerly thought; it was rather bitter and sad. To live in pain is the lot that the gods have ordained for mortals; only they themselves are free from cares (Homer). Besides God, [169] no one is happy (Euripides). No mortal remains free from misfortune, no one escapes his fate; man is perishable as a shadow, vain as a dream, his happiness is appearance; the best is not to be born, and if one is born, to die as soon as possible (Sophocles). Death is perhaps the greatest good (Socrates). A sudden death is the greatest happiness, a short life the greatest benefaction, the desire for death the deepest wish (Plinius), cf. Pfanner, Theol. gent. c.

17 de morte. Nägelsbach, Homer. Theol. 310 f. Paulsen, Ethik I 80 f. Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. I3 475-501 II3 464-517. The optimism of the previous century already turned into pessimism with Voltaire, Candide 1759, and Hegel's rationalism made way for the philosophy of Schelling, which elevated not reason but the will to the principle of the world, part II 204. Reason may be able to explain what and how things are; that they are, is only to be inferred from a will; and this existence of things is the properly positive, is the irrational remainder that in the end remains at the bottom of all that exists. Nach der ewigen That der Selbstoffenbarung ist nämlich in der Welt, wie wir sie jetzt erblicken, alles Regel, Ordnung und Form; aber immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden. Dieses is an den Dingen die unergreifliche Basis der Realität, der nie aufgehende Rest, das, was zich mit der grössten Anstrengung nicht in Verstand auflösen lässt, sondern ewig im Grunde bleibt..... Ohne diess vorausgehende Dunkel giebt es keine Realität der Creatur; Finsternis ist ihr notwendiges Erbtheil..... Alle Geburt ist Geburt aus Dunkel ans Licht, Werke I 7 S. 359 f. For this reason Schelling also had a wholly different view of life and world than Hegel; for the latter everything was rational, but Schelling saw the irrational, the lawless, the darkness, the chaotic lying at the basis of everything and acknowledged the path of suffering of the world-process. Es ist vergebliches Bemühen, aus friedlicher Ineinsbildung verschiedener Kräfte die Mannichfaltigkeit in der Natur zu erklären. Alles was wird, kann nur im Unmuth werden, und wie Angst die Grundempfindung jedes lebenden Geschöpfs, so ist alles was lebt, nur im heftigen Streit empfangen und geboren. Wer möchte [170]

glauben, dass die Natur so vielerlei wunderliche Produkte in dieser schrecklichen äussern Verwirrung und chaotischen innern Mischung..... anders als im heftigsten Widerwillen der Kräfte habe erschaffen können? Sind nicht die meisten Produkte der unorganischen Natur offenbar Kinder der Angst, des Schreckens, ja der Verzweiflung? Werke I 8 S. 322, cf. 328. 335 II 1 S. 582. There is even in God ein Quell der Traurigkeit, die aber nie zur Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern nur zur ewigen Freude der Ueberwindung dient. Daher der Schleier der Schwermuth, der über die ganze Natur ausgebreitet ist, die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens; Freude muss Leid haben, Leid in Freude erklärt werden, I 7 S. 399. The present world, in which we live, is only to be understood as an aussergöttliche. Of it man by his fall is the cause, II 3 S. 352 f., diese aussergöttliche Welt ist die Welt des göttlichen Unwillens, alle Menschen, Juden und Heiden, sind τεκνα φυσει ὀργης, von Natur Kinder des göttlichen Unwillens, ib. 372 etc., cf. v. Hartmann, Ges. Stud. u. Aufs. 1876 S. 683 f. All these thoughts return in systematic connection with the philosophers Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, in poetic form with Rückert, Lenau, Byron, Shelley, George Sand, Alfred de Musset, Leopardi and above all also in the more recent fin-de-siècle literature; Buddhism, which sees in the will to live, in being itself, the cause of all suffering, is honored as the highest wisdom. Life is suffering, it swings back and forth between pain and boredom, it is not worth the trouble of living. The world with its hospitals, lazareths, surgical torments, prisons, torture chambers, slave stables, battlefields, courts of justice, dwellings of misery, etc., offers a suitable material for the description of hell and is itself a hell, in which the one man is a devil for the other. If it were a little worse, it could not exist from misery. All that exists is therefore worthy that it perish, Schopenhauer, Die Welt u.s.w. I6 366 f. II

657 f. Parerga II5 303 f. v. Hartmann, Philos. d. Unb. II 273-390 etc., and further literature on pessimism in Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. d. Philos.8 1897 S. 183 f. 481. Concerning origin and goal of suffering the reflections have been many. Philosophy is almost always intent on casting the blame for it, as also for sin, directly or indirectly [171] upon God. Suffering is then derived from an independent, evil principle (Parzism, Manichaeism), from an originally evil being (Daub), from a dark nature in God (Böhme, Schelling), from the blind, alogical will to be (Buddhism, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann), from the self-objectification and Entäusserung of God (Hegel), from matter (Plato, Aristotle, Philo), from natural necessity (Weisse, Rothe), from the finitude of the creature (Leibniz), from the developmental state of the world (Ulrici), from the sinful consciousness of man, which conceives the in themselves necessary imperfections of the world as evil (Schleiermacher, Lipsius, Ritschl) etc. That, however, suffering is not to be ascribed to God in that sense that it was given with creation itself, stands firm on the ground of the doctrine of Holy Scripture, of the testimony of our conscience, and the essence of religion, which most closely connects holiness and blessedness. Yet an existence and development of world and humanity without suffering seems to be an impossible thought. Of a history without sin and misery we can form no conception; as soon as we think these away, there remains in the empty framework of time and space no event any longer. To the physical organism pain and death seem by nature, necessarily, to be proper; impassibilitas is a property that cannot be conceived in a sensuous creature. For human beings this already holds, much more still for plants and animals; modern natural science has shown us everywhere in organic and inorganic nature a struggle

for life, in which all creatures stand hostile toward one another and have set their aim on one another's death.

And yet, however natural pain and suffering may seem, against the preceding consideration the following may with good reason be urged: 1o. If we could once remove from world and humanity all suffering that without any doubt has been caused directly or indirectly by sin, then at once by far the greatest and heaviest suffering would have disappeared and the problem of suffering would have been reduced to very small dimensions. No one can deny that there exists a very closest connection between sin and misery; many sins, in everyone's judgment, drag along all kinds of dreadful consequences after them, not only spiritual, such as fear, regret, shame, disgrace, remorse etc., but also material, such as sickness, misery, pain, poverty, [172] brutalization etc. And not only is this the case with carnal sins, such as sensual pleasure, drunkenness, lust etc., but also with such sins as bear a more spiritual character, such as idolatry, superstition, unbelief, lying, greed, vanity, pride, hatred, envy, wrath etc. They all, in greater or lesser degree, also act upon the body and bring devastations upon it. A stream of spiritual and bodily misery in individual persons, in families, households, generations, peoples, in state, church, society, science, art takes its origin in sin. Take this away, and according to everyone's agreement almost no suffering remains. Die Welt ist vollkommen überall, wo der Mensch nicht hinkommt mit seiner Qual (Schiller). Die Hauptquelle der ernstlichsten Uebel, die den Menschen treffen, ist der Mensch selbst, homo homini lupus, Schopenhauer, Die Welt II6 663. 2o. Yet, however much truth may lie in Schiller's word, it is not entirely true. Even if we think away the suffering that in everyone's judgment has its cause directly or indirectly in sin, the world would nevertheless not at once thereby become perfect. There

would still remain all those disasters which befall man from without and do not, for everyone's consciousness, stand in connection with sin, such as earthquake, storm, thunderstorm, flood, famine, plague, railway accident etc. Here too, according to the testimony of Scripture, there is connection with sin, but it is nevertheless different than with the above-mentioned suffering. Pharisees and Motazilites also sought the explanation of that in personal sins, but Jesus judged otherwise, Luk. 13:4, Joh. 9:1. Not in personal sins, but in the sin of humanity, the disharmony and enmity of nature has its cause. God, because of the sin of man, struck the earth with the curse and subjected all creation to vanity and corruption. Fallen man no longer belongs in a paradise; with his condition the earth corresponds, which stands between heaven and hell. Man has, together with knowledge and righteousness, also lost dominion and glory; the forces and elements of nature stand many times hostile over against him; he can now subject them to himself in no other way than through laborious, strenuous work. In its entirety humanity is worthy of no better place than this earth; and for its [173] development, education, preservation there is also no better possible. Of particular disasters we can almost never indicate the intention with which God sent them, although they certainly are never absolutely speechless for the one whom they strike. But all the more presumptuous is it, with Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, to take the scales in hand, in them to weigh against each other the joy and the sorrow of the whole world, in order then to draw up the judgment that the punishment very far exceeds the joy. For every creature and every human being, even the most accomplished pessimist, in fact gives preference to painful being over painless non-being and strives to persist in his existence. And humanity as a whole has, in the struggle with nature, found a stimulus for its energy, a material for its labor,

a spur for its development. The curse over the earth has, by God's grace, been turned for it into a blessing. 3o. That the whole of nature shares in the fall of man stands firm not only on the ground of Scripture, but flows, as of itself, from the central place which man occupies in creation, and is also, with a view to contemporary natural science, more than probable. There has sometimes been reasoned very strangely about the condition of the world before the fall and about its change by and after the fall, part II 548. 549, but the Reformed have here in general observed a wise sobriety, ib. 559. 560, and followed the golden rule, that indeed the forma of things has been changed by sin but the materia has remained the same. Sin is, after all, no substance and can neither increase nor diminish the substance of things, which has God alone as author. Just as man after the fall has essentially remained man, so it is with the whole of nature. No new species have been added in the plant or animal kingdom; thorns and thistles have not been newly created by a word of God like the grass and the herb and the trees on the third day, Gen. 1:11; and creeping and wild animals also already existed before the fall, Gen. 1:24. But just as in man the same faculties and powers, corrupted by sin, went to work in another direction, so it is also with the whole creation, after it was struck by God with the curse. Left to itself, emancipated from the dominion and the care of man, burdened with God's curse, [174] nature has gradually run wild and degenerated and has brought forth thorns and thistles, all kinds of vermin and ravenous beasts. The possibility of such a degeneration is by the newer natural science raised above all doubt. Palaeontology supplies only very few fossils of ravenous animals; the great animals of the oldest time, rhinoceros, mammuth, mastodon were all plant-eating. Of the so-called saurians, which one takes for lizards, it is uncertain; but even the whales live in part on plants. Insects

are all plant-eating; only there are some which in an undeveloped state, such as caterpillars, larvae, ichneumon wasps (ichneumon) feed on the constituent parts of animal beings, but beetles, ants, bees, butterflies etc., all live on vegetable food. Among the birds there are indeed many that use animal food, but they can nevertheless also live on plants. To the ravenous animals belong the three genera of felis (lion, tiger, cat, panther, leopard etc.), canis (dog, wolf, fox) and ursus (bear etc). But of all these animals it is at least doubtful whether flesh-eating belongs to their nature. Darwin has, in his in this respect too for theologians very instructive work, Het varieeren der huisdieren en cultuurplanten, trans. by Dr. H. Hartogh Heys van Zouteveen, Arnh. Nijm. Cohen, proved that animals can become accustomed to changed nourishment and for that adduces various examples, II 344v. And likewise, by running wild branches can change into thorns, and by cultivation thorns into branches, II 361. Nature is now in many respects become an antithesis of man, 2 Kon. 17:25, Job 5:22, 23, Hos. 2:20, Jes. 11:6v. 7:23, 65:20v., Ezech. 14:15, 21, Op. 21, Sir. 39:32v.; plants and animals have become living images of human sinful inclinations and passions; fear of animals and veneration of animals prove the abnormal relation of man to the world around him. But the wondrous power over the animals still occurring now and then among men; the many changes which, as palaeontology shows, have entered into the plant and animal kingdom; domestication and the slow variability in plants and animals supply proofs in abundance that a condition such as Isaiah in chapters 11 and 65 depicts for us by no means belongs to the impossibilities. There is nothing absurd in [175] the thought that, just as with man, so also with nature as a consequence of the judgment of God an important change has entered in. In any case Scripture is far more rational than what is sometimes brought to

market under the name of science; according to Lindenschmitt men had formerly been ravenous animals, who had to protect themselves against each other by pile-dwellings built in the water, but the beasts of prey had then been highly innocent creatures, with Weiss, Apol. II3 497. 4o. Besides, finally, let one not forget that, theologically speaking, creation itself in a certain sense was infralapsarian, Delitzsch, Genesis 1887 S. 67. The fall has for God been no surprise and no disappointment. He foresaw it, had included it in his counsel and already took account of it in creation. This therefore took place in such a way that the whole world, in case man as its head fell, could become such as it now is. The condition of man and of the whole earth was before the fall a provisional one, which could not remain so. It was of such a nature that it could be led up to higher glory but also, in case of man's transgression, could be subjected to vanity and corruption. Through sin and the curse of God there came to appearance everywhere from beneath and from behind the harmony the lawless, the chaotic, the demonic, that confuses and frightens us. Over the whole creation a Schleier der Schwermuth has been spread. Πασα ἡ κτισις συνστεναζει και συνωδινει. Cf. Naville, Le problème du mal, Genève 1868. Delitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Apol. 1869 S. 141 f. Ebrard, Apolog. I 275 f. Pressensé, Le problème de la douleur, Etudes évang. 1867 p. 1-168. Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens in der Moral, Freiburg Herder 1895. Sterling Berry, Das Problem menschl. Leidens im Lichte des Christ. Aus d. Engl. Heilbronn 1895. Holliday, The effect of the fall of man on nature, Presb. and. Ref. Rev. Oct. 1896 p. 611-621. Paul Cadène, Le pessimisme légitime, Montauban 1894. James Orr, Christian view 217. 495. Harnisch, Das Leiden beurteilt vom theist. Standpunkt, Halle 1881. Kübel, in Herzog2 15, 702 f. Lamers, Het probleem des lijdens, Theol. Stud 1896. Illingworth, The problem of pain,

3d essay in Lux Mundi ed. by Ch. Gore, 13 ed. 1892 p. 82-92. Henry Hayman, Why we suffer and other essays, London 1890 p. 1-109. [176]

6. This suffering is completed in that other punishment for sin, which is called death. Many are of the opinion that Scripture, except in a few places, does not regard death as consequence and punishment of sin. Indeed, in Gen. 2:17 the sudden death, entering in immediately, is threatened as punishment for sin, and this is also always regarded as a calamity and a punishment. But death in itself is much more natural and is given of itself with the material organism of man, Gen. 3:19, 18:27, Job 4:19, Ps. 89:48v., 90:3, 103:14v., 146:4, Eccl. 3:20, 12:7. Thus formerly already the Pelagians, Socinians, Rationalists judged, and thus still many theologians judge, such as Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 59 Zusatz. Lipsius, Dogm. § 414. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 308 f. Smend, Altt. Rel. 504. Marti, Gesch. d. israel. Rel. 193. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 233 f. Matthes, Theol. Tijdschr. 1890 bl. 239-254 etc. There lies in this representation some truth. In Gen. 2:17 indeed it is not death in general, but specifically the death entering in immediately after the transgression, that is threatened upon sin. Gen. 3:19 therefore also does not relate the full execution of the threatened punishment; but modifies it and postpones it. Consequently the O. T. sees precisely in sudden death, entering in in the bloom of years, a punishment for sin, Gen. 6:3, Num. 16:29, 27:3, Ps. 90:7-10, just as also the death penalty is conceived thus. This view is connected with the then economy of the covenant and with the pedagogy of the people of Israel. God attached to the keeping of his commandments in the days of the O. T. a long and happy life and set upon transgression all kinds of punishments on this side of the grave. Thus the eye of the righteous was especially directed to the lot of this life and limited within the circle of earthly existence; only rarely did it

penetrate to the other side of the grave. The distinction between righteous and ungodly therefore lay not first of all in death as such, for this was the same for all, but in the different dispensation of the lot that preceded death. And if that dispensation also often differed so little, then the distinction between the righteous and the ungodly was sought in the different intention that suffering had for the former and the latter, Deut. 8:2v., Hos. 2:5v. Isa. 1:25v., Jer. 5:3, 9:7, 31:18, Lam. [177] 3:27v., Ps. 119:67, 71, 75, Prov. 3:11v., Job 1 etc. The righteousness of God, which visits the sins, becomes for pious Israel again principle of deliverance and salvation, part II 197v. But from this it by no means follows that death itself was regarded as natural and necessary. For the view that death is consequence of the material organism of man by no means excludes that that death is punishment of sin. Only for that reason can for man the punishment of sin consist in death, because he is dust and taken from the earth. Paul likewise teaches that Adam is earthly from the earth and that nevertheless death has come into the world through sin. And all Christians speak in the same way; man is dust, flesh, perishable, and yet his death is consequence of sin. Further, there is no people that has felt the dreadfulness and the unnaturalness of death more deeply than Israel; man is dust and must return to dust again, but natural this is not, sin has gradually weakened the life-force of men, Enoch and Elijah have escaped death, it is in conflict with the inner nature of man, Job 14:1-12, righteousness and life are intimately connected, Lev. 18:5, Deut. 4:1, 30:15, Jer. 21:8, Hab. 2:4, Ezek. 33:16, Ps. 36:10, Prov. 3:2, 18, 4:4, 13, 22, 8:35 etc., in the perishableness of life a judgment of God becomes manifest, Ps. 90:7-12, cf. Krabbe, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 690 f. Oehler, Theol. d. A. T. § 77. In the apocryphal and Jewish literature, Sir. 25:26, 39:29, 40:9, Enoch

69:11, Wijsh. 1:12v., 2:24, 4 Ezr. 3:7, Apoc. Bar. 23:4, Weber, System 238 f., and in the N. T., John 8:44, Rom. 1:32, 5:12, 6:23, 1 Cor. 15:22, 55, 56, Heb. 2:14, 1 Pet. 4:6, Jas. 1:15, 5:20, Rev. 20:14, 21:4 etc., it is then clearly expressed that death is wages of sin. There is therefore least of all for those who always exalt the N. T. at the expense of the O. T. reason to deny the connection of sin and death. Yet this happens many times on the ground of testimonies of history and pronouncements of natural science. There are namely many who seem to have overcome all fear of death and fall asleep very calmly; others by suicide even put an end to life; Rousseau asserted that the natural men all die in peace and without fear; Lessing thought that the ancients held death for a brother [178] of sleep and saw nothing terrifying in it; romanticism often raved in a sentimental way about death. And yet, even if some in stoic apathy have brought it so far that they see death with calmness as a fate, fear of death is innate to all that lives. We do not believe in the ground that we must die. Death plays such a great role in human life that philosophy can rightly be called a μελετη θανατου, Schopenhauer, Die Welt I 324 f. II 528 f. Death has always been for man the last and greatest enemy; all finally recognize in it an unnatural power and flee it as long as possible. Indeed natural science has often called death natural and necessary; Lauvergne said e.g., la mort de l'homme est une conséquence logique et naturelle de son être. Tout prend fin, dura lex sed lex, in Delitzsch, Apol. 132, cf. also H. Wagner, De dood toegelicht van het standpunt der natuurwet, Utrecht 1856. But speaking thus, science has asserted more than it could justify. Death is a mystery in the full sense. According to natural science matter and force are, and according to Weismann and others also the unicellular protozoa are immortal. Why then is the physical organism mortal, which is composed of such substances and

forces and cells? That organism moreover according to science in a man is renewed every seven years; it is from day to day nourished and strengthened; why can this process not continue and does it already cease after some tens of years? Let one not speak of old age and decline of powers, for these are names that indeed indicate the phenomena but do not explain them, and themselves precisely have need of explanation. Weshalb die Zellen sich abnutzen und dahinsiechen, weshalb sie im Alter Veränderungen unterliegen, von denen sie in der Jugend bewahrt bleiben, das ist uns bis jetzt noch verborgen, H. de Varigny, Wie stirbt man? Was ist der Tod? Uebers. von S. Wiarda, Minden z. j. 52. Many plants and animals moreover surpass the life-span of man up to sometimes by hundreds of years; why is the life-force in man so quickly exhausted and does he bring it at most to seventy or eighty years, if he is very strong? To that there comes still, that death by decline of powers occurs as good as never, neither in men, nor in plants and animals. Almost [179] always death enters in as a consequence of a disease, a disaster, an accident etc.; even if a single time a man so-called dies of decline of powers, death nevertheless still bears a pathological character and is caused by one or another disturbance of certain cells in the body. What then is the reason that death takes away almost all men before the time and often even in the strength of years, in the bloom of youth, in the first hours of their existence? Science does not know the cause which makes death into a necessity, de Varigny 18. That man dies, therefore says Prof. Pruys van der Hoeven in his Studie der Christ. Anthropologie, is a riddle that can only be explained by the degeneration of his nature, in Delitzsch, Apol. 126. Le mystère de la mort reste aussi intact que celui de la vie, Delage, La structure du protoplasme etc. 1895 p. 354. 771, and cf. further Sabatier, Le problème de la mort, 2 ed. 1896. Bourdeau,

Le problème de la mort, ses solutions imaginaires et la science positive, 2 ed. Paris 1896. Newman Smyth, The place of death in evolution, London Unwin 1897.

7. The last punishment of sin to be discussed here consists in this, that the world in an ethical sense has come into the power of Satan and his angels. Since Satan has seduced man and brought him to a fall, Joh. 8:44, 2 Cor. 11:3, 1 Tim. 2:14, Op. 12:9, 14, 15, 20:2, 10, the world is in his power and lies in the evil one, 1 Joh. 5:19, he is the prince of the world and the god of this age, Joh. 12:31, 16:11, 2 Cor. 4:4. Even if it is the case that the devils after their fall have been cast into hell, to be kept for judgment, 2 Petr. 2:4, Jud. 6; they have nevertheless not yet been struck by that judgment, Mt. 8:29, Luk. 8:31, Jak. 2:19. They still come into the assembly of the angels, Job 1, Luk. 10:18, Op. 12:7, keep themselves in the air, Ef. 2:2, 6:12, wander about, dwell and work on this earth, and have great power here. Especially the heathen world is the territory of their activity, Hd. 16:16, 26:18, Ef. 2:2, 6:12, Col. 1:13, 1 Cor. 10:20, 8:5, Op. 9:20; but when Christ came to earth, they also within the boundaries of the people of God entered into the struggle against Him. Satan ruled and worked in the Christ-hostile Jews, Joh. 8:44v., [180] tempted Jesus, Mt. 4:1-11, sent unclean spirits, entered into Judas, Luk. 22:3, Joh. 6:70, 13:2, 27 etc.; it was then his hour, Luk. 22:53, Joh. 14:30. But Christ was the stronger, Luk. 11:22, fought against him his whole life, Luk. 4:13, overcame him and cast him out, Luk. 10:18, Joh. 14:30, 12:31, 16:11, Col. 2:15, Hebr. 2:14, Joh. 3:8, and in principle withdraws the territory of the church from his dominion, Hd. 26:18, Col. 1:13, 1 Joh. 2:13, 4:4, Op. 12:11. Yet he still always works into the church from without; he wanders about over the earth, Job 1, tempts the believers and works against them, Luk. 22:31, 1 Cor. 12:7, 1 Thess. 2:18,

seeks to seduce them and bring them to a fall, 1 Cor. 7:5, 2 Cor. 2:10, 11:3, 13-15, 1 Petr. 5:8, 1 Thess. 3:5, Op. 12:10, so that the church is called to fight against him continually, Mt. 6:13, Ef. 6:12v., Rom. 16:20, 1 Petr. 5:9, Jak. 4:7, Op. 12:11. Once at the end of the days he raises himself up once more in all his power, Mt. 24, Mk. 13, Luk. 21, 2 Thess. 2:1-12, Op. 12v.; but then he will also be overcome by Christ and with all his angels be cast into the lake of fire, 2 Thess. 2:8, 1 Cor. 15:24, Op. 20:10, cf. Litt. above p. 91.

Belief in evil spirits occurs among all peoples and in all religions. Sometimes the fear of the evil spirits has almost entirely displaced trust in the good, Roskoff, Gesch. des Teufels 1869 I 20. And in almost all pagan religions physical evil is ascribed to one or more spiritual beings, who in nature and rank are equal to the good gods, ib. 24-175. Scripture, however, teaches otherwise, and in the first period Christianity in all kinds of ways subdued and opposed Jewish and pagan superstition; church and state made all kinds of regulations against sorcery, soothsaying, etc., and yet, down to the thirteenth century, applied to those who were guilty of it nothing other than disciplinary punishments, ib. I 287. 293. Even when later one had recourse to the death penalty, one nevertheless actually had in view thereby the extermination of pagan superstition. It is therefore not permissible, without more, to hold the Christian religion and church responsible for all the superstition that has also prevailed among Christians, and especially from the 13th to the 18th century. There cooperated thereto [181] all kinds of causes, the wretched conditions in state and society, the dreadful visitations of famine and plague, the gross ignorance of the people, the defective knowledge of nature, the magical, kabbalistic direction among the practitioners of natural science, etc., ib. II 314 f. Yet the church does not go

free in this. Many a time it adopted pagan superstition in theory and practice. Already among the church fathers that emerges. Just as every human being has his guardian angel, so he also has his daemon. Outside Christianity the devil has almost unlimited dominion. Redemption in Christ is in the first place a deliverance from the devil. All physical evil in the world, sickness, crop failure, famine, plague, death, is ascribed to Satan. He is the invisible cause of all idolatry, magic, astrology, heresy, unbelief; superstition rests on a daemonic reality. When the in many respects superficial conversions of the peoples of Europe, under a Christian varnish, caused all kinds of pagan doctrines and practices to live on, there was added in the Middle Ages the belief that the devil, in all kinds of forms, of tomcat, cat, mouse, goat, swine, werewolf, could appear, create all kinds of vermin, as incubus or succubus make himself guilty of whoredom, induce people to a covenant sealed with blood, bewitch them, enter into them, ride through the air with them, change them into animals, and also in nature could bring about all kinds of mischief. Rome has always taken the daemonic reality of this superstition under its protection, not only in the Middle Ages (bull of Innocentius VIII 1484. Malleus maleficarum 1487), but also after the Reformation down to the present day; in Roman theology, e.g. of Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Liguori, Görres, e. a., belief in the power of the devil occupies an extraordinarily broad place, cf. Graf Paul von Hoensbroech, Religion oder Aberglaube, Berlin Walther 1897 S. 56 f.; and how much superstition lives on in practice among Roman Christians has only recently come to light in a sad way in the notorious history of Leo Taxil, cf. H. Gerber, Leo Taxil's Palladismusroman, 2 Th. Berlin 1897. For Rome all that exists falls apart into a lower, unconsecrated and a higher, consecrated domain; in the first Satan rules with almost unlimited power, the second

must by sign of the cross, holy water, conjurations, etc., be secured against his influence and operation, [182] De Harbe's Verklaring der Kath. Geloofs- en zedeleer, bew. en verm. door B. Dankelman, Utrecht IV 1888 bl. 598v.; the Roman Christian sees himself threatened everywhere by the devil and must take all kinds of measures in order to drive him away, Kolde, Die kirchl. Bruderschaften, Erlangen 1895 S. 47. It is true that Protestantism in the first period left this Roman and at bottom pagan superstition almost entirely untouched; belief in witches and witch trials were defended by the Protestants just as strongly as by the Roman Catholics and later were opposed by the Roman Catholics (Spina, Molitor, Loos, Tanner, von Spee) just as well as by the Protestants (Weier 1563, Godelmann 1562, Reginald Scott 1584, van Dale 1685, Bekker 1691, Thomasius 1701); following Luther's lead, the Lutherans ascribed a very great power to the devil, derived all evil from him and maintained exorcism, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 351 f. Müller, Symb. Bücher 477. 483. 771, cf. Roskoff, t. a. p. II 364 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 341. But nevertheless the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic branch, did indeed bring about an important change in belief in the devil. Going back to Scripture and remaining with its data, confessing the absolute sovereignty of God, it could in Satan and his angels, however powerful, nevertheless see nothing other than creatures, who without God's will can neither stir nor move. The Reformation was not rationalistic. It maintained that there were evil spirits, who act upon human beings, especially upon their imagination, and could even degrade them to their instrument. But this power of Satan over humanity was nevertheless always subject to God's providence; it was in the first place ethical in nature and had its origin in sin; it was moreover limited within narrow bounds; not Satan, but God is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and

the evil; sickness and death are sent to us by Him, Jes. 45:7. Hebr. 2:7 says only that Satan has the power of death, because through sin he has brought death in the world to dominion and thus is a murderer of men from the beginning, Joh. 8:44. Our life and end of life is not in Satan's but in God's hand. Luk. 13:11, 16 and 2 Cor. 12:7 give no right to ascribe all sickness and ailment to Satan. And furthermore Satan cannot create [183] and bring forth something out of nothing, he can produce children neither as incubus nor as succubus, he can change no human beings into animals, put them to death or call them back to life; he cannot act immediately upon understanding and will, he cannot change the substance and the quality of things, etc., Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq., and further Polanus, Synt. V c. 12. Zanchius, Op. III 167-216. Synopsis pur. theol. XII 36 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. VII qu. 5. Mastricht, Theol. III c. 8. Brahe, Aanm. over de vijf Walch. art. 1758 bl. 195v. Moor II 328. M. Vitringa II 117 sq.

Only through such a faith, which closely adheres to Holy Scripture, is superstition to be overcome, which has struck such deep roots in the human heart and, in spite of all so-called intellectual development, keeps coming up again and again. Rationalism first combated the influence of evil spirits upon human beings and thereafter their existence; and the result has been that indeed faith in Scripture has been abandoned, but superstition has not been eradicated. On the contrary, this now, under all kinds of forms of magnetism, hypnotism, telepathy, spiritism, astrology etc., makes its entry precisely in the circles of unbelief; occultism, which has flourished through all centuries and among all peoples, cf. Kiesewetter, Gesch. d. Occultismus, 3 Bde, Leipzig 1891, A. Lehmann, Aberglaube und Zauberei, Stuttgart 1898, counts also in the last decades of this century its adherents by millions and is even glorified in art and science as the highest wisdom. Also

over against this modern superstition the foolishness of God is wiser than men. For not only is there nothing reasonable to be brought in against the existence of fallen spirits, but also the possibility that they can seduce human beings cannot be disputed on any single ground. Just as human beings by word and deed, by example and conduct exercise influence upon others, so there is nothing absurd in the thought that also from the fallen world of spirits a seductive power proceeds upon the imagination, understanding, and will of human beings. It is indeed objected against this that then the human being can always cast his guilt upon the devil; but this is also the case if someone is seduced by his fellow human being; furthermore, temptation always takes place in an ethical way and does not remove one's own guilt; and in the circles where the existence of [184] fallen angels is believed, the sense of guilt is usually not weaker than there where their existence is denied. Faith in the devil at the same time maintains the dreadful seriousness of sin and the capacity of the human being for redemption; entweder ein Teufel ausserhalb der Menschheit oder Tausende von Teufeln in Menschengestalt, Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. II3 519. There manifests itself in human beings sometimes such a savage, well-conscious, intentional hatred against God and all that is divine, ib. 574-587; children of God, and among them not the weakest and the smallest, but the most advanced, such as stand in the forefront in the struggle, who live most closely in communion with God, they complain many times of such terrible temptations and assaults, they speak of such godless thoughts and inclinations, which suddenly rise up in their heart, that it is a privilege to be allowed to believe in the existence of devils. There are βαθη του σατανα, which in Scripture, in the history of humanity, in the struggle of the church of Christ, in the experience of believers are sometimes uncovered for a

moment. And besides, let one consider that the sinful power forms a kingdom and in its combating of God and his kingdom proceeds systematically. Whoever could survey it entirely would without doubt discover in the history of its struggle a plan of attack and defense. There is in the sinful life of the individual human being, but much more still in that of families, generations, peoples, humanity through all centuries, a well-conscious, planned combating of God and all that is God's. And the leadership of this struggle rests with him who in Scripture is called the prince of this world and the god of this age. Thus he has already immediately appeared at the temptation and the fall of the first human being. In Heathendom he has organized a power which stands hostile over against all true religion, morality, civilization. When Christ appeared on earth, he has concentrated his power against Him, not only by attacking Him personally and restlessly persecuting Him, but also by surrounding Him on every side with daemonic powers and thus holding back and breaking off his work. The δαιμονιζομενοι in the N. T. were not ordinary sick persons, although symptoms of illness, such as deafness, dumbness, epilepsy, insanity etc., also occur with them. For they are repeatedly clearly distinguished from ordinary sick persons, Mt. [185] 4:24, 8:16, 10:1, Mk. 1:32, 3:15, Luk. 13:32. The special thing with the possessed is that out of them another subject speaks than they themselves are, that that subject recognizes Jesus as the Son of God, stands wholly hostile over against Him, and does not leave the sufferer except at his command, Mt. 1:34, 8:29, 31, Mk. 1:26, 3:11, Luk. 4:34, 41, 5:41, 8:2, 30, Hd. 16:17, 19:15. This obsessio now, however dreadful also, is so little impossible that we in hypnotism, whereby the one human being is subjected to the thought and will of the other, see an analogous phenomenon appear; that even today such cases of

possession present themselves; and that whoever deems it impossible would also have to deny all influence of the soul upon the body, and of God upon the human being and the world. Satan imitates everything; God reveals himself through theophany (incarnation), prophecy, miracle; the daemonic caricature thereof are obsessio, mantics and magic, to which Scripture therefore many times ascribes reality, Gen. 41:8, Ex. 7:12, 22, 8:7, 18, 19, Num. 22, Deut. 33:4, Jos. 24:10, 1 Sam. 6:2, 7, 28, 2 Chr. 33:6, Jes. 47:9-12, Jer. 39:13, Nah. 3:4, Dan. 1:20, 2:10, Hd. 8:9, 13:6-10, 16:16 etc., which it most firmly condemns and forbids, Ex. 22:18, Lev. 20:27, Deut. 18:10, Jer. 27:9, 2 Chr. 33:6, Mich. 5:11, Gal. 5:20, but which once again toward the end of the days will be revealed by Satan in all their seductive power, 1 Thess. 2:18, 2 Thess. 2:8-11, Op. 9:1-11, 13:13-15, 19:20. Cf. besides the literature already earlier mentioned concerning daemonology, above p. 91, Ebrard, art. Dämonische in Herzog1. Joh. Weiss, in Herzog3. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych.2 293. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 445 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III2 334 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 445 f. Beck, Vorles. über Chr. Gl. II 390 f. Weiss, Leben Jesu I 454 f. Justinus Kerner, Geschichten Besessener neuer Zeit, nebst Reflexionen von C. A. Eschenmayer über Besessensein und Zauber 1834, and with that Strauss, Charakteristiken und Kritiken 1830 S. 301. Demon Possession and allied themes, being an inductive study of phenomena of our own times, by Rev. John L. Nevius D. D. for forty years a missionary to the Chinese. With an introduction by Rev. F. F. Ellinwood D. D. 2 ed. New-York, Chicago and Toronto, Fleming H. Revell Company 1896. Hafner, Die Daemonischen im N. T. 1894. [186] Laehr, Die Daem. des N. T. Leipzig 1894. Zimmer, Sünde oder Krankheit, Leipzig 1894. J. A. H. van Dale, Possession and Insanity, Heusden 1896. Florenz Chable, Die

Wunder Jesu, Strassb. Theol. Stud. II 4. 1897 S. 45 f. Bodelschwingh, Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Pflege der Geisteskranken, 1896 S. 13 f.

Chapter VII. On Christ.

Monergism Books

§ 40. The Covenant of Grace.

1. Sin and misery are, to a certain extent, acknowledged by all men. And from this acknowledgment there is born in all a weaker or stronger desire for deliverance; the need of deliverance too is universal. Indeed all men are, in greater or lesser degree, conscious that deliverance must come from above. Παντες δε θεων χατεους' ἀνθρωποι. But the Heathens nevertheless did not know the grace which alone can deliver man from sin and misery; they had only surmises and wishes. Humana ad deos transferebat Homerus; divina mallem ad nos (Cicero). Only in Holy Scripture does the grace of God in all its richness and glory come to meet us. Immediately after the fall it already makes a beginning. The punishment threatened in Gen. 2:17 has evidently not been carried out in full. Adam and Eve did not die on the day of their transgression. If the righteous punishment for sin had been executed immediately and in full, then in the first human pair the whole human race would have been destroyed, the earth laid waste, the cosmos into a chaos, indeed returned again to nothing. But then Satan too would have triumphed and God would have lost it.

Therefore, immediately after the fall another principle comes into operation, which restrains, combats, and conquers sin. Not only is the punishment not applied in full; but also that punishment which is applied is at the same time also still a blessing. Everything that takes place immediately after the fall is revelation and proof of God's wrath and of God's grace at the same time. [188] The consciousness of guilt that awakens in Adam and Eve, the conscience that rises up accusingly, the shame over their nakedness, the fear and the hiding from God, Gen. 3:7v. are all a proof that they have transgressed God's law and are worthy of his wrath and punishment; but they nevertheless also show that man is not obdurate or hardened, that he has not become a devil but has remained man. With the angels it is so, that they, falling, also at once fall toward hell, Jud. 6, they are immediately obdurate in evil and irredeemable. But man is so created, that he, falling, can nevertheless be raised up again; he remains susceptible to deliverance. God holds back the full working-through of the principle and the power of sin in man. More still, God does not withdraw after the fall and even then does not let man go for a moment. When immediately after the transgression feelings of guilt, shame, fear awaken in man, then all this is already an operation of God's Spirit in man, a revelation of his wrath but also of his grace, a revelation that is the foundation of all religious and ethical life that is still in man after the fall. But God also reveals himself in another way. When man hides himself from Him, He seeks him out and calls him. It is true, God comes to him from afar and man out of fear wants to hide himself and make the distance between himself and God still greater. There is no longer any communion between God and man but estrangement and separation; the covenant is broken. And yet, God comes to man and seeks him out; He no longer leaves him over to his own folly

and fear, which makes him seek salvation in hiding from God. But He himself, of his own initiative, calls man back to himself. And in doing so He does not overtake and frighten man. He comes, as it were, from afar; He does not come to him in storm or thunderstorm but in the רוּחַ הַיּוֹם, that is, in the evening coolness, amid the solemn rustling of the trees in the evening. And by that they knew the voice of God and perceived that He was drawing near. That drawing near was grace. God gives man time, to come to himself and to consider what he shall answer. Still more clearly, in the examination and in the punishment this revelation of God's grace comes out, Gen. 3:9-13. The Lord calls Adam specifically, for this one is the head and the responsible person. God does not come at once with his verdict but institutes an inquiry, proceeds to questioning, and gives man every opportunity to give account. When man makes use of that, and indeed does not deny all guilt but yet also does not fall down humbly and penitently before God, but seeks to excuse himself, then God does not kindle in wrath, then He lets that excuse count to a certain extent. And then He pronounces judgment, while He in the examination began with Adam, now in the pronouncing of the punishment first turns to the serpent, then to Eve, thereafter to Adam.

And in that punishment mercy boasts against judgment. The punishment, Gen. 3:14, 15, first of all has reference to the serpent as an ordinary animal. God humiliates the serpent, and sets enmity between it and man; from now on, instead of the former subjection of the animals to man, a struggle between the two will prevail, in which man will indeed conquer but will nevertheless have much to suffer from the animals, particularly from the serpent. But further, this punishment, through the serpent, goes back to the evil power, whose instrument it was. With it man had concluded a covenant

and for that had broken the covenant with God; God graciously annuls this covenant of man, sets enmity between the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman, brings the seed of the woman, i.e. humanity, back over to his side, thus declares that from Eve there will yet proceed a humanity, and that that humanity in the struggle against the evil power will indeed suffer much but will nevertheless in the end triumph. The way for the human race will from now on go through suffering to glory, through struggle to victory, through the cross to the crown, through the state of humiliation to that of exaltation. This is the fundamental law, which God here proclaims for the entrance into the kingdom of heaven. The punishment over the woman, Gen. 3:16, strikes her both as mother and as woman; she will, precisely as woman, have much pain to bear; the highest, what she desires, namely to be a mother, she will not be able to obtain otherwise than in the way of manifold suffering, desire for, subjection to the man, bearing with pain; but thus she will nevertheless obtain her highest desire, and reach her destination; she will be a mother of the living, although by her transgression and exaltation above the man she had deserved death, and she will be saved in bearing children, 1 Tim. 2:15. [190] The punishment over the man, Gen. 3:17-19, consists in this, that the earth is cursed for his sake, that he will eat bread in the sweat of his face and after a life of labor and trouble will return again to dust. In connection with that he is then driven out of paradise and sent into the wide world, Gen. 3:22-24. But this punishment too is a blessing. Labor ennobles; it preserves man from moral and physical ruin, stimulates his energy and increases his activity. Even if it is the case that man is banished from paradise, he is nevertheless not consigned to hell; he is sent into the world, in order that he may subdue and rule it by toilsome and strenuous labor. Herein lies the beginning and the principle of all

culture; the dominion of man is not wholly lost but is extended by labor, Ps. 8; also in fallen man the image of God, after which he was created, is still recognizable. Yes, even temporal death is not only a punishment but also a benefaction; God has instituted death, in order that sin might not be immortal, Iren., adv. haer. III 23. 6. After the fall, therefore, twofold principle at once comes into operation: wrath and grace, justice and mercy. From that alone is also a world to be explained, such as we know it. This is a world full of humor, δακρυοεν γελασασα, standing in the sign of the cross, and immediately after the fall given to Christ, the man of sorrows, in order that He might preserve and subdue it.

After God has thus pronounced the punishment, Adam and Eve humbly bow the head; they bring in nothing more, lay the hand upon the mouth, and accept the word of God without any objection. That word indeed sounds unbelievable, its truth can first become apparent in the distant future, but nevertheless they believe it, blind as to the future and seeing as to the commandment. Relying on God's promise Adam calls his wife Eve, life, source of life, mother of the living. Before the fall he saw in her especially the woman who was given to him for help, and therefore called her woman. But now he beholds in her first of all the mother and calls her Eve. Death and ruin are indeed deserved, but God's blessing nevertheless makes the woman fruitful, and brings forth from her a humanity, which in her greatest son, the Son of man, shall overcome all evil power of sin. Adam [191] sees in the promise of God the propagation, the existence, the development, the preservation of the human race guaranteed and accepts it as such with a truly childlike faith. And this faith was reckoned to him for righteousness. In principle Genesis 3 contains the whole history of humanity, all the ways of God to the salvation of what is lost and to the overcoming of sin. In

substance the whole gospel, the entire covenant of grace, is present here. All that follows is the development of what has now already been planted as a seed.

2. Yet in Gen. 3 the word covenant is not yet mentioned; only with Noah, Abraham, and Israel at Sinai is there mention of it. The new criticism thinks that it has also here been antedated, and that Israel's religion originally did not differ from that of other peoples. The relationship of Ihvh to Israel was like that of Chemosh to Moab. The idea of a covenant existing between Ihvh and his people was wholly foreign to ancient Israel. It knew nothing of this, that God as the God of heaven and earth had chosen Israel out of all peoples, made it his possession, and placed it with himself in a covenant. All these thoughts arose only much later. Even with Amos the covenant relationship does not yet occur; Hosea only says that one can compare Israel's unfaithfulness with a breach of covenant, 6:7. Only Deuteronomy is in truth a covenant book; it was introduced and accepted in covenant-wise fashion, 2 K. 23:3, cf. Jer. 34:8v. Ezr. 10:3, Neh. 10:1. But now that covenant, when it arose, was again understood very differently than later. One then understood by it especially the obligation of Israel toward Ihvh, to be a holy people and to keep his laws. If, therefore, Israel did not keep the covenant, then it was broken and Israel burdened with the curse, Deut. 27 and 28. But although Israel formally accepted the covenant in Josiah's reformation, it did not adhere to it, was punished, and sent into exile. And then gradually the thought arose that God's covenant consisted in a law that he had given, that God had obligated himself to remain faithful to Israel and also, if it fell away, not to abandon it; God could indeed punish Israel, but not destroy the covenant. The Israel that returned from the exile clung fast to this covenant idea and projected it back into the past, into the [192]

history of the patriarchs, cf. Wellhausen, Gesch. Israels I 434 f. Smend, Altt. Theol. 116 f., and especially R. Kraetzschmar, Die Bundesvorstellung im A. T. in ihrer gesch. Entw. Marburg Elwert 1896. But this result has been obtained by means of a violent criticism, which strikes the facts in the face and in the end is nothing but arbitrariness. Thus, e.g., in Gen. 18:21 the words: so shall the Lord be to me a God, which really make one think of a covenant, are certainly a later addition. Ex. 21-23 indeed bears the name of the book of the covenant and Ex. 34 indeed contains the words of the covenant, but these pieces are not from Moses' time, and even if they are pre-deuteronomic, they nevertheless contain no formal covenant such as is spoken of in the days of Josiah; perhaps they are also post-deuteronomic. Hos. 8:1 is interpolated. In Gen. 15:18 the word covenant is only the solemn name for the oath by which God obligates himself to give the land of Canaan to Abraham's seed; of mutual obligations there is no mention etc. A criticism that reasons in this way obtains no certainty except that which it itself wishes to have. First it constructs, on the basis of the alleged spuriousness of the writings, the history of the religious conceptions, and later it uses this same reconstructed history to demonstrate the spuriousness of the writings directed against it. Cf. G. Vos, Recent Criticism of the early prophets, Presb. and Ref. Rev. April 1898 p. 214-238, also Strack in a review of Kraetzschmar's book, Theol. Lit. Blatt 1898 n. 5. Furthermore, the main question in the investigation into the covenant idea in Holy Scripture is absolutely not this, whether the word ברית originally meant covenant or rather ordinance. Some, such as Delitzsch, Gesenius, Dillmann, Schultz, Oehler, Wellhausen, Guthe, Bredenkamp, König, Cremer say the former, assume as a second meaning covenant condition, and thus let the sense pass over into ordinance, law, because a law obtains legal validity in

the way of the covenant. Others, such as Hofmann, Buhl, Friedrich Delitzsch, Orelli, Strack, Siegfried, Stade, Nowack think that determination, ordinance is the oldest meaning, and that this passed over into that of covenant, because a law regulates a reciprocal relationship. These explanations do not look plausible; it is also impossible, in Scripture, to demonstrate historically the transition from the one to the other meaning; now this meaning predominates, then that, without one being able thereby to distinguish older or younger sources. The concept of ברית is therefore to be determined differently. The derivation sheds little light on this. According to most, it comes from ברה, to cut, and thus points back to the ancient Eastern custom, at the conclusion of a covenant, of walking between the pieces of slaughtered animals laid opposite one another, to indicate that the same fate as these animals might befall the breaker of the covenant, hence כרת ברית, ὁρκια τεμνειν, foedus ferire, cf. Gen. 15:8v., Jer. 34:19; according to others it comes from an Assyrian stem that means to bind, Kraetzschmar 245. However this may be, from Gen. 21:22v., 26:26v., 31:44v., it is clearly evident that three things belonged to a ברית, an oath or promise that contained the agreed determinations, a curse that invoked the divine punishment upon the breaker, and a cultic ceremony that symbolically represented the curse. The conclusion of a ברית was thus always a religious act. The word was indeed first customary in the profane sphere of determinations and treaties between men. Long before God establishes his covenant with Noah and Abraham, covenants had already been established between men. And this also had to be so, if Noah, Abraham, Israel were to understand and appreciate religion as a covenant. Therefore the word also does not yet occur in Gen. 3:15. Only when, in sinful, deceitful human society, covenants were repeatedly needed for the

defense or acquisition of some good, could the meaning and the value of a covenant be perceived and religion be conceived under this point of view. But even if ברית is first used of human covenants, it nevertheless always denotes a religious act. The main thing in ברית is not whether it denotes a covenant or an ordinance. But it indicates in general such a promise, agreement, treaty, covenant, determination, disposition, etc., which is placed under God's guardianship by a solemn ceremony and thus acquires a character of unbreakableness, Kraetschmar t. a. p. 29. 30. 39-41. Whether ברית denotes more a bilateral covenant or a unilateral disposition depends not on the word nor also on the historical development of the concept, but simply on the parties who are involved in it. In proportion as one of the two parties is more subordinate and has less to say, the ברית involuntarily acquires the character of a disposition that is imposed by the one party upon the other; ברית then becomes synonymous with חֹק, Ex. 34:10, Jes. 59:21, Jer. 33:20, 31:36, 34:13, and כרת ברית is construed not only with עם and בין but also with ל, Jos. 9:6, Jes. 55:3, 61:8, Jer. 32:40. When the victor concludes a ברית with a vanquished one, or a king with his subjects, all the emphasis falls on the duties that the latter have to fulfill thereby, Jos. 9, 1 Sam. 11, 2 S. 5:3, 1 Kon. 20:34, Ez. 17:13. Still stronger does the meaning of disposition and ordinance become, when there is figuratively mention of a ברית with the eyes, Job 31:1, with the stones and the animals, Job 5:22, 40:28, with death, Jes. 28:15, of God with nature, Gen. 8:22, Jer. 33:20, 25, or with the animals, Gen. 9:12, Hos. 2:17-22, Jes. 11:6 etc. But also when God and man conclude a covenant, the monopleuric character repeatedly comes strongly to the foreground of itself; they are after all not equal parties, but God is the Sovereign, who imposes his ordinances upon the creatures. When God in Gen. 15:8v. concludes a covenant with Abram, that

is no proper pactio but a sponsio; God gives his promise, he binds himself to its fulfillment and passes between the pieces of the sacrificial animal. And elsewhere he swears by himself, Gen. 22:16, by his life, Deut. 32:40, by his soul, Am. 6:8, Jer. 51:14, in order to prove to man the unchangeableness of his counsel, Hebr. 6:17. And this monopleuric character of the covenant had to come to light ever more clearly in history. For indeed God's covenant also imposed obligations upon those with whom it was concluded; obligations namely, not as conditions for entering into the covenant, for the covenant was concluded and rests only in God's mercy, but as the way which those taken up into the covenant by grace now henceforth had to walk, Gen. 17:1, 2, Ex. 19:5, 6, 8, 24:3, 7, Lev. 26:14v., Deut. 5:29, 27:10v, 28:1v., 30:1v. etc. But although Israel repeatedly accepted God's covenant anew, Ex. 19:8, 24:3, 7, Deut. 29:10-13, Jos. 24:16, 2 Kon. 23:3, 2 Chr. 15:12, 23:16, 29:10, 34:31, Neh. 8 etc., it did not walk in the way of the covenant and profaned and broke it at every moment. Thus the question arose whether this covenant of grace was then as unstable as the covenant of works before the [195] fall. And to that revelation gave answer, and ever more powerfully and loudly, as apostasy increased: no, this covenant does not totter; men may become unfaithful, but God does not forget his promise, the covenant is fixed solely and only in his mercy, Lev. 26:40-44, Deut. 4:31, 30:1v., 32:36v., Richt. 2:1, 2 Kon. 13:23, Ps. 81:9, 12, 89:1-5, 105:8-10, 106:45, 111:5, Jes. 1:3, 5:13, 54:10, Jer. 18:5-10, Ezech. 33:10-16, Hos. 6:1-3, 11:7-9, 14:2-9, Joel 2:12-14. God cannot and may not break his covenant; he has bound himself to it voluntarily, of himself, with a costly oath; his name, his honor, his very being depends on it, Ex. 32, 33, Num. 14:16, Deut. 32:26, 1 Sam. 12:22, Jes. 48:8-11, Jer. 14:7, 20, 21, Ezech. 20:9, 14, 22, 43, 44, Joel 2:17-19 etc. And herein shines the glory of

religion, which we as Christians confess. Earlier, part II 551v. it has been shown why true religion must bear the form of a covenant. In it God descends to man, and takes him up into his communion. But if God thus gives himself to man, then man is also bound to give himself wholly to God. The covenant, which proceeds from God and takes us up, admonishes and obligates us to a new obedience. But if we then sometimes fall into sins out of weakness, we nevertheless must not therefore despair of God's grace nor remain lying in sins, for the covenant of grace is fixed in the unchangeable good pleasure of God. This unbreakableness, which is enclosed in the word ברית, is probably also the reason why in the LXX it has been rendered not by συνθηκη but by διαθηκη. The N. T. adopted this and applied it both to the O. and to the N. T. dispensation of the covenant of grace. It deserves remark that our Statenvertaling, as also the English translation, translates the word διαθηκη in the first case by covenant Luk. 1:72, Hd. 3:25, 7:8, Rom. 9:4, 11:27, Gal. 3:15, 17, 4:24, Ef. 2:12, Hebr. 9:4, and in the second by testament, Mt. 26:28, Mk. 14:14, Luk. 22:20, 1 Cor. 11:25, 2 Cor. 3:6, Hebr. 9:15, 12:24, 13:20. Underlying that is the thought that the concept foedus fits better the dispensation of the O. T. and the concept testamentum more that of the N. T., cf. Bengel on Mt. 26:28. After the covenant with the fleshly Israel has been broken, in its place has come [196] the spiritual Israel, which according to God's election is gathered out of all peoples, which receives the goods of salvation as by testamentary disposition of the Son, stands in a relationship of sonship to God and expects the heavenly blessedness as an inheritance, Luk. 22:29, Rom. 8:16, Gal. 3:15-17, Hebr. 9:15-17, 1 Joh. 3:1, 2, 1 Petr. 1:4. Literature on the doctrine of the covenant in Scripture in Kraetzschmar t. a. p. 1v.

3. From Scripture this covenant-idea of itself passed over into Christian theology. With the church fathers it occurs repeatedly, especially in their commentaries. But the doctrine of the covenant acquired dogmatic significance because the Christian religion had to be understood in its connection with and at the same time in its distinction from the Israelite. Two directions stood here, already from the days of the apostles onward, over against each other. Judaism, which in almost all congregations opposed Paul's person and doctrine, demanded observance of the Mosaic law, specifically of circumcision, also by the Christians from the Gentiles, Hd. 15, Rom. 16:17v., 1 Cor. 7:18, Gal. 5:4, 6:13, Phil. 1:15v., 3:2v., Col. 2:16, 21, Tit. 1:10, 14, 2:9, 1 Tim. 1:7v., and, after the breach between Jews and Christians had been effected, Jerusalem destroyed, the Christian congregation fled to Pella, a Gentile-Christian congregation in Jerusalem had been founded in 135 etc., became more and more a sect (Nazarenes, Ebionites), which became Jewish in its doctrine about God and denied the divinity of Christ. On the other side stood Gnosticism, which also already in the time of the apostles had its origins (Simon Magus, Cerinthus), but especially in the 2nd and 3rd century spread from the East over the West and in the person of Marcion directed its sharp attacks upon the O. Test. Proceeding from an eternal dualism between God and matter, he thought the transition between both mediated by all manner of aeons, and ascribed the creation of the world to a lower god, the demiurge or the Jewish god. This one was not the highest, true God, but a God of lower rank, the God of the law, of righteousness and of vengeance. The O. T. stood much lower than the N. T., for the God of the O. T. is jealous, vindictive, creator of evil; He hardens and makes obdurate, commands all manner of sins such as the robbing of the Egyptians, the killing of the [197] Canaanites; He gave laws

that were not good, and entered into covenant with men such as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, David etc., who made themselves guilty of all manner of sins of deceit, lying etc. It is that Jewish god, the demiurge, who even had Christ nailed to the cross, but was by Christ himself consigned to hell. In Christ a wholly different God has revealed himself, the God of grace and of love. The whole legalistic standpoint is therefore past. The Christian is free from the law and from the whole O. Test. The only one who has at once seen this well is Paul; he is the only, true apostle.

Over against these two parties the Christian church and theology saw itself called to a twofold task. It had, over against Gnosticism, to maintain the unity, and over against Judaism the distinction, of the two testaments, cf. especially Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV. Tertull., adv. Marc. II and III. For that purpose it made use of Paul's doctrine concerning the παλαια and καινη διαθηκη, 2 Cor. 3, lat. testamentum or instrumentum, which was then first applied to the oeconomies, thereafter to the Scriptures. Both are one in origin and content; God or the Logos is the author of both, and in both one faith, one covenant, one way to salvation is set forth. Distinction exists only in the form, and this also had to be so. For God is indeed one, but men differ and must therefore also be educated differently; God reveals his grace successively ever more richly and fully. In the days of the O. T. there was servitude, but now freedom, then image, now truth; then twilight, now light; then grace for one people, now for all; then the Messiah promised, now come, etc. This distinction, however, does not detract from the essential unity, for the law was given specially to Israel and given only on account of its stubbornness, Am. 5:17, Jer. 7:21, Ezech. 20:19, pointed typically to Christ, educated Israel for the Christ, and has in Christ reached its goal and end. And therefore: N. T. in Vetere latet, V. T. in Novo patet. Vetus Novum

praeoccupat et Vetus interpretatum est Novum, Vetus T. est occultatio Novi, et Novum est revelatio Veteris. Ἡ διαφορα οὐκ ἐστιν κατα την οὐσιαν ἀλλα κατα την των χρονων ἐυαλλαγην. Even the O. T. in the hierarchy, priesthood and idea of sacrifice, in the legalistic conception of the gospel, in cultus, painting, etc. obtained a great power over [198] the church, which in many respects wanted to be an O. T. theocracy, cf. art. διαθηκη in Suicerus. Diestel, Gesch. des A. T. in der Chr. Kirche Jena 1869. Harnack, D. G. I2 531 f. But nevertheless the church in the new dispensation was thereby placed high above the old. In scholastic and Roman theology the distinction of the two testaments was indicated in such a way that the promissa in the O. T. were temporalia and now are coelestia; that the praecepta then were exterius regulantia, but now are pleniora, non solum manum sed et mentem regulantia; that the sacramenta then were only figuralia, now gratiam conferentia, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 40 and other comm. Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 60 art. 6 ad 3. qu. 61 art. 4 ad 2. In connection therewith the believers of the O. T. also did not at once come into heaven, but into the limbus patrum, from which they were first transferred by Christ to heaven, Thomas, Suppl. S. Theol. qu. 69 art. 4-6. Bellarminus, de Christo IV 10. 11. Catech. Rom. I 3, 4, I 6, 6.

4. The Reformation saw over against and alongside itself all manner of directions, over against which it also had to determine its relation on this point. Judaistic and gnostic ideas had propagated themselves in the Middle Ages and even now made their influence felt. Anabaptism was radical, wanted not only religious-ethical but also social and political reform, and, with appeal to Scripture, demanded abolition of interest, polygamy, community of goods, etc. The same antithesis of nature and grace, from which it at first wished the introduction of all manner of O. and N. T.

ordinances, gradually caused the whole of Scripture to be set aside in favor of the inward word. Scripture was a dead letter; especially the O. T. lacked all evangelical content; Israel, as a herd of swine, was fed only with temporal goods; the law has lost all value and power for us, M. Vitringa IV 238. Diestel 307 f. Socinianism, by its rationalistic principle, arrived at the same result. The O. T. stands much lower than the New; it teaches polygamy, restricts love of neighbor, prescribes many virtues not at all, determines far too severe punishments for small sins; it knows only servile fear and earthly promise; it knows of no full righteousness and forgiveness; it is therefore completely abolished, [199] and Christ has appeared as novus legislator, Fock, Der Socin. 325. Diestel 535. Arminianism did not speak so boldly but nevertheless conceived the O. T. as a covenant that promised only temporal goods, Episcopius, Disp. II disp. 18-20. IV disp. 12-14. Limborch, Theol. Chr. III c. 9. M. Vitringa IV 242. Even Luther often set O. T. and N. over against each other as law and gospel, but later became more cautious and taught that there were also in the O. T. rich, evangelical promises, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I. 84 f. II 258. Yet this conception continued to have an effect in Lutheran theology. To be sure, it assumes that in O. and N. T. there is only one Messiah, one faith, one way of salvation, but it nevertheless refuses to say that there is only one testament. The word testament with it denotes that legalistic covenant which was established on Sinai with Israel; and in this sense it differs essentially from, is opposed to, and is abolished by the N. Test. There are indeed in the O. T. many promises given to Israel that still apply to us as well, but the O. Testament as a legalistic covenant of God with Israel was no foedus gratiae. The promises of the gospel, given to Adam, Abraham, etc., may indeed be summarized under the name of foedus gratiae, but even this foedus gratiae

in the O. T. then differs not only in accidentia but also in substantia from the N. Test., just as the promise differs from the fulfillment, the shadow from the body, Gerhard, Loci XIV 119 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. IV p. 255-280. Hollaz, Examen 1043-1053. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Pr. II 258.

The richest development is that of the doctrine of the covenant in Reformed theology. Federal theology does not originate with Cocceius, as Ypey thought, Beknopte letterk. Gesch. der syst. Godg. II 70v., and it is also not a peculiarity of that German-Reformed theology which would have its father in Melanchthon, as Heppe proposed it in his Geschichte and in his Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus. The incorrectness of these opinions is now acknowledged by all, Sepp, Godg. Ond. II 220. Schweizer, Gl. der ref. K. I 103. Gass, Gesch. d. prot. Dogm. II 265. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. des luth. u. ref. Lehrbegriffs II 146. Diestel, Studien zur Foederaltheol., in Jahrb. f. d. Theol. X 209. Van den Bergh, Calvijn over het Genadeverbond bl. 7 v. Heppe, Gesch. d. Pietismus u. d. Mystik in der ref. Kirche [200] 1879 etc. These all go back to Olevianus, Calvin, or Bullinger. The covenant-idea, however, was already taken up by Zwingli, who in his Elenchus contra Anabaptistas 1527, Opera III 412 sq. 418 sq. 421 sq. V 45 maintained the essential unity of Old and New Testament. From Zwingli it was then taken over into Swiss theology, Bullinger, de testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno 1534, Comp. relig. Christ 1556, Decades 1549v., Calvin, Inst. II c. 10. 11, cf. van den Bergh, Calvijn over het genadeverbond and the assessment of this dissertation by Dr. van Dijk, Studien VII 1880 1e stuk; in German Reformed theology by Olevianus, Ursinus, Sohnius, Eglin, Boquinus, Hyperius etc.; in English theology by Rollock, Howie, Cartwright, Preston, Thomas Blake, Perkins, Amesius, John Ball, James Usher, the Westm. conf. c. 7, Francis Roberts, Thomas

Boston etc. cf. Vos, De verbondsleer in de Geref. Theol. 1891; in the Netherlands by Snecanus, Junius, Gomarus, Trelcatius father and son, Nerdenus, Ravensperger etc. Long before Cloppenburg and Cocceius, therefore, the doctrine of the covenants was indigenous in Reformed theology. But these two made the covenant-idea the point of departure and governing principle of the whole dogmatics, Cloppenburg, Disp. de fordere Dei, Op. I 487-570, Cocceius, Summa doctrinae de foedere et test. explicata 1648, and so also Burman, Synopsis 1671, Braun, Doctrina foederum 1688, Witsius, de oec. foed. 1677. The struggle against Cocceius did not directly at all concern the doctrine of the covenant, which was acknowledged by all, but concerned the sabbath with Essenius and Hoornbeek 1655-1659, the condition of the church in the twofold economy with Maresius 1662, the παρεσις in the O. T. with Voetius 1665. What was contested in Cocceius was not his concept of foedus, but his biblical theology and his historical method. Just as Cartesius in philosophy, so Cocceius in theology rose up against scholasticism and traditionalism; he pressed for study of Scripture and wanted a summa theologiae ex Scripturis repetita, as the title of his dogmatics ran. In order to obtain that, he did not proceed from God and from his eternal counsel, but he took his standpoint in history and the covenant of God with human beings. His dogmatics thus became salvation-history, a biblical theology in historical form, of which Scripture was not principium and norma but object and content. [201] That covenant, i.e. the true religion, he traced historically from its first beginnings down to the present time; and everywhere he pointed out the development and the progress of that covenant, of the true religion. There was thus not only difference, as the Reformed said, in clarity of revelation, i.e. in brightness of insight and clearness of consciousness. No, there was difference in the

objective benefits themselves under the different administrations of the covenant of grace. Salvation was in the O. T. objectively less than in the N. T. In the O. T. the sabbath consisted in cessatio operis, Israel did not yet have vera et permanentia bona, but it was a people of hope, longing for a long earthly life, and still seized by fear of death. It did not have full ἄφεσις but only παρεσις; justification was imperfect; the animal sacrifice could bring about no reconciliation; the comfort of believers was still weak, their conscience not yet at rest, the circumcision of the heart was indeed promised but first became a good of the N. T., the law was administered by angels, i.e. in the O. T. everything was indeed present, but only in type and shadow; the reality of the thing itself was lacking or at least much less. Not subjectively but also objectively, not only in accidentia but also in substantia, the O. T. was another than the new. Yes, Cocceius even undermined the whole doctrine of the covenant, when he conceived the covenant of grace exclusively negatively, as a slow, historically and successively completing abolition of the covenant of works. In the end nothing remained of the covenant; it was only a temporary, human, ever-changing form of religion. Cf. Gass, Gesch. der prot. Dogm. II 266 f. Art. Coccejus by Ebrard in Herzog2. Heppe, Gesch. des Pietismus 217 f. Diestel, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1865. Van der Flier, De Johanne Coccejo 1859, also part I 121 and Dr. Geesink, De Ethiek in de Geref. theol. 1897 bl. 49v. Cocceius thereby without doubt left the point of departure and the line of Reformed theology. This was immediately felt by many, and therefore also more or less opposed. But it was more an attack on subordinate points than a principled opposition. Cocceianism, soon in alliance with Cartesianism, gained ever more entrance and led not only to opposition against various dogmas but also contributed to the degradation of the O. T. Everywhere,

unconsciously, the opinion [202] pressed through that the O. T. had only historical value and was of no dogmatic importance any longer. From this changed dogmatic view, in due time the historical criticism of the O. T. was of itself born, since Spinoza and R. Simon. Rationalism and supranaturalism had not the least awareness of the significance and value of the O. T. According to Kant, Judaism was only ein Inbegriff bloss statutarischer Gesetze, auf welchen eine Staatsverfassung gegründet war; the moralischen Zusätze were only an appendage and not essentially its own; Judaism did not at all want to be a church but only a state and therefore demanded only outward observance of the commandments, no inward disposition. Christianity did not arise out of Judaism, but is its full abolition, Religion ed. Rosenkranz S. 150 f. With Schleiermacher Judaism, because of its particularism, is still akin to fetishism, Chr. Gl. § 8. 4 and in its relation to Christianity it stands on a par with paganism, § 12, cf. § 132. Hegel placed Judaism as the Religion der Erhabenheit still below the Greek religion of beauty and the Roman religion of purposiveness, Werke XII 39 f. Vatke and Bruno Bauer, both pupils of Hegel, sought to confirm this philosophical view of the O. Test. by the historical criticism of the biblical books. The scriptural criticism of the last century has not changed the worldview, but the altered worldview demanded an often very negative judgment about the great facts of Holy Scripture, v. d. Bergh van Eysinga, Levensbeschouwing, Zutphen Thieme bl. 25. In O. T. scriptural criticism, then, today all views have returned that were formerly advanced about the O. T. by the Gnostics, Anabaptists, Socinians, Rationalists. Jahveh is not the one, true God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but a national god of Israel, originally a sun-god. The people of Israel is not chosen by God, but in ancient times was a wild horde of various tribes, which were given over

to all kinds of polytheism. The narratives of creation, fall, flood, patriarchs, judges etc. are myths and legends, in part borrowed from other peoples. The law stands much lower than the prophets and often bears an outward, sensuous, eudaemonistic character. The saints of the O. T., such as Abraham, Isaac, [203] Jacob, and especially David, are not worthy of that name and have not existed at all or have been idealized by posterity. The distinction between true and false prophets is wholly subjective. Christianity was prepared at least as much by paganism as by Judaism.

5. The doctrine of the covenant is of the greatest significance for dogmatics and at the same time for the practice of the Christian life. More than the Roman and Lutheran, the Reformed church and theology has understood this. On the basis of Holy Scripture it always conceived the true religion of the O. and N. T. as a covenant between God and man, whether this was established with the unfallen man (foedus operum), or with creation in general in the case of Noah (foedus naturale), or with the people of election (foedus gratiae). And even here it did not stop, but for these covenants in time it sought a firm, eternal foundation in the counsel of God, and again conceived this counsel, as intending the salvation of the human race, as a covenant of the three persons in the Divine being itself (pactum salutis, counsel of peace, covenant of redemption). This latter covenant occurs briefly and succinctly already in Olevianus, Wezen des Genadeverbonds, 2e art. § 1. Junius, Theses Theol. c. 25 th. 21. Arminius, de sacerdotio Christi 1603. Gomarus on Mt. 3:13, Luk. 2:21. Theses Theol. XIX 1. Amesius, de morte Christi I 5. Voetius, Disp. II 266. Essenius, de subjectione Christi ad legem X 2; is then further developed at length by Cloppenburg, de foedere Dei III 4-28 and Coccejus, Summa de foedere c. 5; thereafter receives a definite place in dogmatics with Burman, Braun,

Witsius, Vitringa, Turretinus, Leydecker, Mastricht, Marck, Moor, Brakel, and then is opposed by Deurhof. Over natuurkundige en schriftuurlijke samenstelling van de H. Godg. I 12, Wesselius in the preface to Pictet's Godgeleerdheid and others, and gradually disappears entirely from dogmatics again. The development of the doctrine of the pactum salutis among the Reformed was also not free from scholastic subtlety. The locus classicus Zach. 6:13, which was cited for this doctrine, proves nothing and says only that the Messiah, uniting in himself the kingship and the priesthood, will deliberate and promote the peace of his people (Keil). [204] From Job 17:3, Isa. 38:14, Ps. 119:122, which however none of them look to the Messiah, and Heb. 7:22, where it only says that Christ, because He lives forever, is surety that the new covenant will remain in existence forever, it was derived that Christ from eternity had become surety in the pactum salutis; and indeed not of God with us, as Crell on Hebr. 7:22, Limborch, Theol. Christ. III 21, 7, asserted, for God as the Truthful has no need of a surety, but of us with God, Coccejus, de foedere V § 150-162, Owen on Hebr. 7:22, Witsius, Oec. foed. II c. 5, Heidegger, Corp. Theol. XI 23, van den Honert, Het Hoogepr. van Christus 1712 bl. 403, Boston. Eene beschouwing van het Verbond der genade, 2e dr. 1868 bl. 68 etc. Further, from the jurists the distinction was borrowed between fidejussor and expromissor and the question was treated whether Christ in the pactum salutis had taken upon himself the sins of the O. T. elect conditionally, or rather absolutely; the former was said by Coccejus, de foed. § 150-162, Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 290, Allinga, van Til, d'Outrein, Perizonius and others cf. Heppe, Dogm. 270; the latter was said by Leydecker, Fax Verit. V 7, Vis Verit. II 1, Filius Dei sponsor 1674, Turretinus, Th. El. XII 9, Mastricht V 1, 34, Voetius, Disp. V 346, Moor IV 569-580, M. Vitringa III

12 etc. And finally the point of dispute was also discussed whether this pactum salutis bore more the character of a testament with appeal to Luk. 22:19, Joh. 17:24, Hebr. 6:17, 8:6, 9:15, 13:20, as Coccejus, Burman, Heidegger, Schiere, Doctrina test. et foed. I c. 10 asserted, or rather of a covenant, as Leydecker, Fax Verit. V 6, Wesselius and others maintained. Yet this doctrine of the pactum salutis, despite its defective form, rests on a Scriptural thought. For as Mediator the Son is subordinate to the Father; calls Him his God, Ps. 22:3, Joh. 20:17, He is his servant, Isa. 49v., to whom a work has been assigned to do, Isa. 53:10, Joh. 6:38-40, 10:18, 12:49, 14:31, 17:4, and who for the accomplished obedience Mt. 26:42, Joh. 4:34, 15:10, 17:4, 5, 19:30, receives reward, Ps. 2:8, Isa. 53:10, Joh. 17:4, 11, 17, 24, Eph. 1:20v. Phil. 2:9v. This relation between Father and Son, although coming out most clearly during the walk of Christ on earth, nevertheless did not first begin at the moment of the incarnation, for this incarnation already belongs to the execution of the work assigned to the Son; but it falls in eternity and thus also already existed during the time of the O. T. Scripture also teaches this clearly, when it ascribes the guidance of Israel to the Malak Ihvh, Ex. 3:2v., 13:21, 14:19, 23:20-23, 32:34, 33:2, Num. 20:16, Isa. 63:8, 9, and also already lets Christ be officially active in the days of the O. T., Joh. 8:56, 1 Cor. 10:4, 9, 1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19. For there is indeed only one Mediator of God and of men, Joh. 14:6, Hd. 4:12, 1 Tim. 2:5, who is yesterday and today and forever the same, Hebr. 13:8, who from eternity has been chosen as Mediator, Isa. 42:1, 43:10, Mt. 12:18, Luk. 24:26, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, 1 Petr. 1:20, Op. 13:8, and as Logos also existed eternally, Joh. 1:1, 3, 8:58, Rom. 8:3, 2 Cor. 8:9, Gal. 4:4, Phil. 2:6 etc. Scripture gives us through all this a rich and glorious representation of the work of redemption. The pactum salutis makes known to us the relation and

the life of the three persons in the Divine being as a covenant life, as a life of the highest self-consciousness and of the highest freedom. Here, within the Divine being, the covenant has its full reality; while the covenant of God and man, because of their infinite distance, always bears more or less the character of a sovereign disposition, διαθηκη, here between the three persons it is a συνθηκη in the full sense. The highest freedom and the most complete agreement coincide here. The work of salvation is a work of the three persons, to which all cooperate and in which each performs his particular task. In the decrees, also in those of predestination, the one will of God came to the foreground and the trinitarian character did not yet come out so clearly. But here in the pactum salutis the work of redemption comes out in its full Divine beauty. It is the Divine work par excellence. Just as in the creation of man God beforehand deliberately takes counsel with himself, Gen. 1:26, so in the re-creation each of the three persons comes forward still more clearly in his distinct character. The re-creation, like the creation, is a work of God alone; from, through, to Him are all things; no man has been his counselor or has first given to Him, that it should be repaid to him. It is God triune alone, Father, Son and Spirit, who together devise, determine, [206] execute, and bring to completion the whole work of salvation. But further, this pactum salutis also connects the eternal work of God unto salvation with that which He does thereto in time. The covenant of grace, which is revealed in time, does not hang in the air, but rests on an eternal, unchangeable foundation. It is fixed in the counsel and in the covenant of God triune, and is the application and execution infallibly following from that. Yes, in the covenant of grace, which in time is established by God with men, man is not the acting one and the one appearing actively. But it is again God triune, who, after having designed

the work of re-creation, also brings it to pass. It is not so that God first establishes his covenant with Adam and Noah, with Abraham and Israel, and finally only with Christ. But the covenant of grace lies ready from eternity in the pactum salutis of the three persons and is realized by them from the moment after the fall. Christ does not first begin to work with and after his incarnation, and the Holy Spirit does not first begin his labor with his outpouring on the day of Pentecost. But just as creation is a trinitarian work, so also re-creation from the first moment has been a work of the three persons. All grace that after the fall flows to creation accrues to it from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. The Son immediately after the fall appeared as the Mediator, as the second and last Adam, who takes the place of the first and restores and accomplishes what he ruined and left undone. And the Holy Spirit immediately appeared as the Comforter, as the applier of salvation, to be acquired by the Christ. All change, development, progress in insight and knowledge thus falls on the side of the creature. In God there is no change nor shadow of turning. The Father is eternally Father, and the Son eternally Mediator, and the Holy Spirit eternally Comforter. Therefore the O. T. is also to be understood as one in essence and substance with the N. T. For, although God communicates his revelation successively and historically and makes it richer and fuller, and humanity thus advances in knowledge, in possession and enjoyment of the revelation, God is the same and remains so. The sun illuminates the earthly realm gradually, but it itself is the same, in the morning and in the evening, in the day and in the night. Although Christ first accomplished his work on earth in the midst of history and although the Holy Spirit [207] was first poured out on the day of Pentecost, God could nevertheless also distribute in full the benefits to be acquired and applied by them in the days of the O.

T. The believers of the O. T. have not been saved in any other way than we. There is one faith, one Mediator, one way of salvation, one covenant of grace. Cf. Schneckenburger, Verlg. Darst. II 135 f. Dr. Vos, De Verbondsleer in de Geref. Theol. Grandrapids 1891.

6. In the execution of the pactum salutis in time, however, a distinction is indeed to be made between the foedus gratiae in a broader and in a narrower sense. It is not good, in the discussion of the covenant of grace in time, immediately to pass over to Israel and to the church of the N. T. For Scripture itself does not at once pass from Adam to Abraham; it does not let go of humanity, but describes in main outlines its development up to the time of Abraham. When from humanity Abraham and Israel are chosen, the bond with that humanity is not cut through; Israel does not float like an oil-drop upon the peoples, but remains in all manner of connection with those peoples, and holds fast to the end the expectation also for those peoples. In the fullness of time Jew and Gentile are reconciled in the one man; humanity gathers itself around the cross; and the church, chosen out of that humanity, stands with that humanity in the closest connection. Nature and grace, creation and re-creation are to be set in that mutual relation in which Scripture places them. And then it deserves remark, that the first promises of grace, which after the fall go forth from God's mouth to Adam and Eve, are wholly universal and concern the whole of humanity. Above it has been pointed out, that all punishment, pronounced in Gen. 3 over sin, is at the same time to be recognized as a revelation of God's grace. And that grace there extends without any limitation to the whole of humanity. General and special grace still flow in one bed. In the punishment, which God after the transgression pronounces over the serpent, the woman and the man, it is mercy even more than wrath that speaks; it is punishment and promise at

the same time, it is eine gnädige fröhliche Strafe (Luther). Therefore in it lies the origin and the guarantee of the continuance, the expansion and development, the struggle and the triumph of humanity. Religion and morality, cultus and [208] culture there take their beginning. In the long period from Adam to Noah these all develop under the influence of God's general and special grace. The original powers, laid by God at the creation in the different creatures, are indeed broken but also after the fall still continue to work for a long time. Especially this comes out in the strength and the much greater life-span of men before the flood, Gen. 5:5v., and in the much more powerful operation of the elements of nature, which are only after the flood put under restraint, Gen. 8:22. This history of Scripture is confirmed by the tradition of the peoples, which in its golden, silver, copper and iron age speaks of a slow decline of humanity, and also by geology, according to which to this our period another preceded, in which over the whole earth a higher temperature prevailed, the seasons were not yet bounded and fire and water played a much greater role than at present; at the transition from the mesozoic to the kainozoic period there nevertheless took place all manner of weighty changes, a great expansion of the mainland, by the uplifting of extensive parts of the sea-bottom above the water; the formation of the mountains such as the Alps, Pyrenees, Carpathians, Himalaya, Cordilleros etc.; a strong change in the climate; the extinction of the great, prehistoric animals and plants etc., Pfaff, Schöpfungsgeschichte, kap. 11-15. Haeckel, Nat. Schöpfungsgesch.5 320 f. Wossidlo, Leitfaden der Mineralogie und Geologie, Berlin Weidmann 1889 S. 196 f. In connection with all this, the greater strength and the longer life-span of men in the period from Adam to Noah is absolutely not improbable; the simpler manner of life, the less strenuous labor, the smaller number of

malignant diseases, the afterworking of the condition before the fall explain this fact sufficiently; even now by way of exceptions ages of 120 to 150 years still occur; and there is no physical necessity to be conceived why human vital force after 70 or 80 years must be exhausted. Cf. Fürer, Das Lebensalter des Menschen usw., Beweis des Glaubens 1868 S. 97 f. 184 f. Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen 1879 S. 244-288. Schanz, Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts, Freiburg 1896. Büchner, 's Menschen Levensduur, holl. door Schwencke, Amst. 1892. Religion [209] also remains after the fall and receives a fixed form in offering, Gen. 3:3, prayer and preaching, Gen. 4:26; culture takes a beginning with agriculture, cattle-breeding, city-building etc., Gen. 4:2, 17; arts and sciences come to development, Gen. 4:20v. But this first period in the history of humanity was also already soon characterized by the most dreadful godlessness; corruptio optimi pessima; the extraordinary powers and gifts were misused in the service of sin. With fratricide this period was introduced; the Cainites separated themselves from the Sethites, applied themselves to the mastery of the earth, Gen. 4:20v, and sought their strength in the sword, Gen. 4:24. But only when Sethites and Cainites mingled, did godlessness rise to the top; wickedness was manifold on the earth; the imagination of the thoughts of man's heart was every day only evil, Gen. 6:5; it was a period so full of unrighteousness, as there later has never been one and only in the future of the Son of man will return, Mt. 24:37. In the mighty flood this whole generation perishes, except Noah's family, which then becomes the origin of a second humanity. The period after the flood differs essentially from the preceding. From Adam to Noah nature, the plant- and animal-world, humanity bore an entirely different character than after Noah. Strong and richly provided with gifts, the world was in a certain sense left to itself; but

it soon appeared, that, if God did not powerfully intervene, the world would perish in its own godlessness. Therefore with Noah another period begins. The grace, which immediately after the fall revealed itself, now steps forth more powerfully in the restraining of evil. God formally makes a covenant with all his creatures. This covenant with Noah, Gen. 8:21, 22, 9:1-17, indeed has its origin in God's grace; it also stands in the closest connection with the proper foedus gratiae, because it bears and prepares this; but it is not identical with it. It is rather a foedus longanimitatis, made by God with all men and even with all creatures. The curse over the earth is thereby limited; nature is put under restraint; its destructive power is curbed; the water is subdued in its dreadful violence; a regulated alternation of seasons [210] is introduced; the whole irrational nature is bound to fixed ordinances, which are fixed in God's covenant; and as sign and pledge the rainbow is set in the clouds, Gen. 8:21, 22, 9:9-17. There appears a humanity which, in comparison with the former, is much gentler in nature, much smaller in strength, much shorter in duration. The blessing of multiplication is expressly pronounced again, Gen. 9:1, the fear and dread of man laid upon all animals, v. 2, the green herb and the flesh is given to man for food, v. 3. The life of man is guaranteed by the institution of the death penalty for murder of man, and therewith in principle of government, v. 5, 6; and when later humanity at Babel's tower-building forms the plan to continue dwelling together and to found a world-empire, then God frustrates that plan, causes humanity to disperse into peoples and languages, and in that way also opposes the development and the outbreak of godlessness. The grace of God thus after the flood steps forth much more powerfully than before that time. To it is due the existence and the life of humanity, the expansion and development of the peoples, the states and

societies, which have gradually formed, the religion and morality, which even among the most savage peoples have not wholly perished, the arts and sciences, which have risen high; everything, which after the fall also in sinful man still is good in every domain, the whole justitia civilis, is fruit of God's general grace. God indeed let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16, but He did not withdraw himself from them; He did not leave himself without witness to them, determined their dwelling, was not far from each one of them, revealed himself to them in the works of his hands, Hd. 14:16, 17, 17:27, 28, Rom. 1:19, Jak. 1:17. The Logos enlightens every man, coming into the world, Joh. 1:9. The H. Spirit is author of all life, power and virtue also among the Gentiles, Gen. 6:17, 7:15, Ps. 33:6, 104:30, 139:2, Job 32:8, Pred. 3:19. Through this grace, and under the dispensation of this foedus naturae, humanity has been led before Christ and prepared for his coming. There indeed falls in a good sense to speak of an education of mankind by God. The capacity for redemption has been maintained, the need for redemption has been awakened. Compare [211] concerning the Noachic covenant the older litt. in M. Vitringa IV 286; concerning the virtues of the Gentiles the litt., earlier part I 239 indicated and in M. Vitringa III 333; concerning the late time of Christ's coming, Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 4. Petavius, de incarn. II c. 17. Jansen, Prael. Theol. II 561; concerning the Divine education of humanity the works of Lessing, Herder, van Heusde, Hofstede de Groot, Lotze, Mikrok. III 20 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u Vers. III2 282 f.; concerning general grace, the significance of Heathendom, the preparation of Christ's coming and the fullness of the times my Rede over de Algem. Genade, Kampen 1894. Kuyper's art. in de Heraut 923v. D. Zahn, Die natürliche Moral, Gotha 1881. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 74-118. A. Wuttke, Gesch. des Heid. Breslau

1852-53. Tholuck, Der sittl. Character des Heid. Werke VIII 1-91. Uhlhorn, Der Kampf des Christ. mit dem Heid. c. 1-2. Rocholl, Die Fülle der Zeit, Hann. 1872. Id. Philosophie der Gesch. Gött. I 1878 II 1893. Kahnis, die Erfüllung der Zeiten, Leipzig 1877. Dorner, Gl. I 672 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 306. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II2 35. Talbot, The preparation in history for Christ, 4th essay in Lux Mundi ed. by Charles Gore 1892 p. 93-131. H. M. van Nes, De adventstijd, Rott. 1893.

7. Of an essentially different character was the preparation of salvation in Israel. Yet the connection of the foedus gratiae and the foedus naturae, of Israel and the nations, must not be lost from sight. Israel was taken from the nations; it was not different and not better than other nations, surpassed them even in stubbornness and rebelliousness, and was chosen only by grace, Deut. 7:7, 9:13, 32:5v. Jer. 5:23, Ezech. 16:3v. Am. 9:7, Mt. 11:21v. Nor does the distinctive character of Israel's religion lie in this, that all sorts of elements occur in it which are not encountered in other religions; on the contrary, there is nothing in Israel of which the analogy is not also to be found elsewhere; circumcision, sabbath, feasts, sacrifice, prayer, priesthood, temple, altar, ceremonies, morals, customs, political and social laws etc., occur also among other nations, and conversely institutions which first arose after the fall, such as polygamy, slavery etc. are also found in Israel. Even theophany, prophecy and miracle have in Heathendom [212] their analogy and caricature, cf. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 119-151. It is not only the right but also the duty of Old Test. scholarship, to bring all this to light. But yet, on account of the affinity and connection, let the essential difference not be overlooked. And that lies in grace, the gratia specialis, which was unknown to the Heathens. All the religions of the Heathens are self-willed and legalistic. They are all after-effects and degenerations of the

broken covenant of works. Man here always attempts himself to bring about his salvation, by purification, asceticism, penance, sacrifice, observance of law, ceremony etc. But all this is different under Israel. 1o First of all, Jahveh is for Israel from the beginning also Elohim, the Creator of heaven and earth. Even the oldest pieces according to the newer criticism express this faith clearly, Gen. 2:4, Ex. 20:11. Never has the relation of God and world in Israel been conceived otherwise than as that of Creator and creature, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 565. With this one dogma all paganism is in principle banished; it is the foundation of true, pure religion. 2o This Creator of heaven and earth is also the one who sustains and governs it, and who in particular has voluntarily and graciously entered into a special relationship with Israel. Israel is taken from the nations; Abraham was from Shem, in whose generations the knowledge and service of God was preserved the longest and the purest. The covenant with Abraham is prepared in history from the days of Adam onward. Israel's religion is built upon the broad foundation of the original religion of humanity. But yet the covenant with Abraham is a new and higher revelation, which again proceeds wholly and solely from God. He takes the initiative in this covenant. He establishes it, He chooses Abraham. By the wondrous birth of Isaac He shows Himself to be both Israel's Creator and Re-Creator. In Israel's religion it is not man who seeks God, but God who seeks man. 3o This covenant with the fathers remains, even when it later at Sinai assumes another form with Israel; it is the foundation and core also of the Sinaitic covenant, Ex. 2:24, Deut. 7:8. The promise has not been nullified by the law, which came later, Gal. 3:17. The covenant with Israel was essentially no other than that with Abraham. Just as God first voluntarily and graciously gives Himself to Abraham, without any [213] of his merits, as a

shield and reward, as a God for him and his seed, and now on that basis also calls Abraham to an upright walk before His face, so it is also God who chooses the people of Israel, delivers them from Egypt, and gives Himself to that people and now on that basis also obligates Israel as a people to be holy and to be His people. The covenant at Sinai is and remains in essence a covenant of grace. I am the Lord your God, who have led you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, Ex. 20:2, that is the preface and the foundation of the law, that is the essence of the covenant of grace. The Lord is Israel's God prior to and apart from all worthiness of Israel and He remains that eternally. It is an eternal covenant, which cannot be destroyed even by any sins and iniquities on Israel's side, Deut. 4:31, 32:26v., Richt. 2:1, Ps. 89:1-5, 105:8, 111:5, Jes. 54:10, Rom. 11:1, 2, 2 Cor. 1:20. 4o The benefits bestowed by God upon Israel in His covenant are the same as those to Abraham but further elaborated and specialized. Already Gen. 3:15 contains in germ the whole covenant and all the benefits of grace. God breaks the covenant concluded by man with Satan, sets enmity between the two, brings man over to His side and promises him the triumph over the hostile power. The one great promise to Abraham is: I will be your God, and you and your seed shall be my people, Gen. 17:8. And this is the principal content also of God's covenant with Israel. God is Israel's God and Israel is His people, Ex. 19:6, 29:46 etc.; and therefore Israel receives all kinds of blessings, not only temporal, such as the land Canaan, fruitfulness of marriage, a long life, prosperity and welfare, victory over the enemies, but also spiritual and eternal, such as God's dwelling among them, Ex. 29:45, Lev. 26:12; the forgiveness of sins, Ex. 20:6, 34:7, Num. 14:18, Deut. 4:31, Ps. 32, 103 etc.; the sonship, Ex. 4:22, 19:5, 6, 20:2, Deut. 14:1, Jes. 63:16, Am. 3:1, 2 etc.; the sanctification, Ex. 19:6, Lev. 11:44, 19:2, etc. 5o All

these benefits, however, are not set before the eyes in the O. Test. clearly and distinctly as in the N. Test. They would then not be understood and comprehended in their spiritual nature. The natural is first, afterward the spiritual. All spiritual and eternal benefits are therefore under Israel clothed in sensible forms. The forgiveness of sins is bound to [214] sacrifices of animals. The dwelling of God among Israel is symbolized in the temple on Zion. The sonship of Israel has in the first place a theocratic, and the expression people of God not only a religious but also a national meaning. Sanctification in the ethical sense is symbolized in the Levitical, ceremonial purity. Eternal life hides itself for the Israelite consciousness in the forms of a long life on earth. Foolish it would be to suppose that therefore those benefits of forgiveness and sanctification, of regeneration and eternal life also objectively did not exist in the days of the O. T. They were indeed also then bestowed by Christ, who is eternally the same. But the consciousness and the enjoyment of those benefits was in the O. T. far from as rich as in the days of the N. T. And in order that this consciousness of the pious might gradually in the course of time be opened up to the richness of God's benefits, to that end the covenant of grace under Israel assumed such a peculiar, symbolic form. Religion under Israel attaches itself to the religious forms occurring among all nations of sacrifice, altar, temple, priesthood, ceremonies etc.; the spiritual and eternal wraps itself in the garment of the natural and temporal; God Himself, who is Elohim, Creator of heaven and earth, descends as Jahveh, as God of the covenant, to the creature, enters into history, assumes human language and affections and forms, in order thus to communicate Himself with all His spiritual blessings to man and to prepare His incarnation, His enduring and eternal dwelling in humanity. Indeed we would not even have had words to name the spiritual, if that

spiritual had not first revealed itself in the form of the natural. The spiritual we, sensible creatures, can after all never express otherwise than analogically. If therefore the eternal had not been brought within our reach in the temporal, if God had not become man, then His thoughts also could not have been communicated to us in our language in Holy Scripture. God would then have remained eternally unknowable to us, and we would always have had to be silent about Him. 6o Just as Abraham, when God binds Himself to him, is obligated to a walk before His face, so Israel as a people is also by God's covenant admonished to a [215] new obedience. The whole law, which the covenant of grace at Sinai takes into its service, intends to cause Israel to walk in the way of the covenant. It is only an explication of the one word to Abraham: walk before my face and be upright, and therefore just as little an overthrow of the covenant of grace and an establishment of the covenant of works, as this word spoken to Abraham. The law of Moses is therefore not opposed to grace but subservient to it and is thus by Israel's pious also time and again understood and praised. But considered apart and detached from the covenant of grace, then it was indeed a letter that killed, a ministry of condemnation. Now the covenant of grace in the days of the O. T. also took the law into its service for this purpose, that it might awaken the consciousness of sin, increase the need for deliverance, strengthen the expectation of a still richer revelation of God's grace. From that side Paul especially views the O. T. dispensation of the covenant of grace. And then he says that Israel, as an underage child placed under the care of the law, had to be led to Christ, Rom. 10:4, Gal. 2:23v., 4:1v., and that in connection therewith sin would be increased, the unworthiness of works for justification and the necessity of faith would be seen, Rom. 4:15, 5:20, 7:7v., 8:3, Gal. 3:19. The law thus on the one hand

stood in the service of the covenant of grace, it was not a disguised covenant of works, it did not intend that man by his own works would obtain his justification. But on the other hand it nevertheless intended to prepare a higher, better dispensation of that same covenant of grace, in whose service it stood, in the fullness of time. The impossibility of keeping the Sinaitic covenant and of satisfying the demands of the law made another, better dispensation of the covenant of grace necessary. The eternal covenant of grace is by the imperfection of the temporal form which it assumed under Israel provoked to a higher revelation. Sin has become greater, in order that grace might be all the more abundant. Christ could not immediately become man after the fall and grace could not immediately reveal itself in all its richness. Preparation and education were necessary. Non decuit a principio humani generis ante peccatum Deum incarnari, cum non detur medicina nisi infirmis; nec [216] statim post peccatum, ut homo per peccatum humiliatus recognosceret se liberatore indigere: sed in plenitudine temporis quod ab aeterno disposuit, Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 1 art. 5. The necessity of this education and preparation does not lie objectively in God, as if He were changeable; not in Christ, as if He were not yesterday and today and eternally the same; not in the spiritual benefits, as if they did not exist and could not formerly be communicated by God. But it lies subjectively in the condition of the human race, which precisely as a race had to be saved, and therefore had to be prepared and educated gradually for salvation in Christ, Calv. Inst. II 11, 13. 14. Therefore Christ is truly the turning point of the ages, the cross the center of world history. First everything is led toward the cross, thereafter everything is derived from the cross. 7o When then also the fullness of time has come and Christ has accomplished His work on earth, the covenant of grace passes over into a

higher dispensation. The believers in Israel knew indeed that the Sinaitic dispensation was only temporary, and therefore looked longingly toward the day of the N. Covenant. And Jesus and the apostles, who thus read the O. T., saw therein the same covenant of grace with the same benefits, which now came fully to light. Old and New Testament are in essence one covenant, Luk. 1:68-79, Hd. 2:39, 3:25; they have one gospel, Rom. 1:2, Gal. 3:8, Hebr. 4:2, 6, 2 Tim. 3:15; one Mediator, namely Christ, who also existed in the days of the O. T., Joh. 1:1, 14, 8:58, Rom. 8:3, 2 Cor. 8:9, Gal. 4:4, Phil. 2:6 etc., exercised His mediatorial office, Joh. 8:56, 1 Cor. 10:4, 1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19, Hebr. 13:8 and is the only Mediator for all men and in all times, Joh. 14:6, Hd. 4:12, 1 Tim. 2:5; one faith as the way to salvation, Mt. 13:17, Hd. 10:43, 15:11, Rom. 4:11, Gal. 3:6, 7, Hebr. 11; the same promises and benefits of God's communion, 2 Cor. 6:16, Op. 21:3, forgiveness and justification, Hd. 10:43, Rom. 4:22, eternal life, Mt. 22:32, Gal. 3:18, Hebr. 9:15, 11:10 etc. The way was the same on which the believers in O. and N. T. walked, but the light differed by which they walked, Calvin on Gal. 3:23. Therefore with the unity there is also distinction. Old and New Testament stand as different dispensations of the same covenant of grace over against each other as promise [217] and fulfillment, Hd. 13:32, Rom. 1:2, as shadow and body, Col. 2:17, as letter that kills and as Spirit that makes alive, 2 Cor. 3:6v., as bondage and freedom, Rom. 8:15, Gal. 4:1v., 22v., Col. 2:20, Hebr. 12:18v., as particular and universal, Joh. 4:21, Hd. 10:35, 14:16, Gal. 4:4, 5, 6:15, Ef. 2:14, 3:6. 8o The new in the New Testament is thus the falling away of the not-arbitrary, but nevertheless temporary, sensible, national forms, under which the one and the same grace in the old day was revealed. The new dispensation in a certain sense already begins when with the birth of John

the Baptist and of Jesus the Old Test. promises begin to be fulfilled. Yet the old dispensation remained in force until the death of Christ. Jesus Himself was an Israelite, fulfilled all righteousness and still turned only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. But at His death the veil is torn, Mt. 27:51, the testator dies, Hebr. 9:15-17, the New Testament is founded in His blood, Mt. 26:28, the handwriting of the law that was against us is blotted out, Col. 2:14, the middle wall of partition is broken down, Ef. 2:14 etc. In fact the old dispensation may long continue to have effects, in law it is abolished. Or better still, nothing is abolished, but the fruit is ripe and breaks through the husk; the church, which as a little child was carried in Israel's mother's womb, is born to an own independent life and receives in the Holy Spirit an own, immanent principle of life; the sun of righteousness has risen to the zenith of heaven and shines over all nations; law and prophets are fulfilled and have in Christ as their end and goal reached their destination. The law was given through Moses, but grace and truth has come through Jesus Christ, Joh. 1:14; He is the truth, Joh. 14:6, the body, Col. 2:17, in whom all promises and shadows are realized. In Him everything is fulfilled. He is the true prophet, priest and king; the genuine servant of the Lord, the true ἱλαστηριον, Rom. 3:25, the true sacrifice, Ef. 5:2, the true circumcision, Col. 2:11, the true passover, 1 Cor. 5:7, and therefore His congregation is the true seed of Abraham, the true Israel, the true people of God, Mt. 1:21, Luk. 1:17, Rom. 9:25, 26, 2 Cor. 6:16-18, Gal. 3:29, Tit. 2:14, Hebr. 8:8-10, 1 Petr. 2:9, Op. 21:3, the true temple of God, 1 Cor. 3:16, 2 Cor. 6:16, [218] Ef. 2:22, 2 Thess. 2:4, Hebr. 8:2, 9, the true Zion and Jerusalem, Gal. 4:26, Hebr. 12:22, her spiritual sacrifice the true religion, Joh. 4:24, Rom. 12:1, Phil. 3:3, 4:18 etc. Nothing of the Old is lost in the New Testament, but everything is fulfilled, is completed, reaches its maturity and now brings

forth from the temporal envelope the eternal kernel into view. It is not so that under Israel there were a real temple and sacrifice and priesthood etc., and that all these have now disappeared. No, rather the reverse, under Israel there was of all that only the shadow, now however there is the body itself. The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are eternal.

8. This foedus gratiae, which through various dispensations has now been fully realized in the N. T., from the first moment of its revelation onward was and is still always on all sides surrounded and borne by the foedus naturae, which God has established with all creatures. The gratia specialis is indeed essentially distinct from the gratia communis, but nevertheless stands in the closest connection with it. For, although the covenant with Noah, by way of distinction, is called foedus naturae, for that reason it has nevertheless not flowed forth from God's nature or been given with the nature of things; it also rests on grace, has proceeded from God's longsuffering, and bestows all natural benefits and blessings out of God's general goodness; it is a covenant of grace in a broader sense. Further, it is the Father, who not apart from the Son but specifically through the Logos and the Spirit works all powers and gifts in nature and unregenerate humanity, Joh. 1:4, 5, 9, 10, Col. 1:17, Ps. 104:30, 139:7. And this Logos and this Spirit, who dwell and work in all creatures and men, are the same, who as Christ and as Spirit of Christ are the acquirer and applier of all benefits in the covenant of grace. Father, Son, and Spirit thus in the foedus naturae prepare the foedus gratiae and, as it were, repeatedly reach back from the foedus gratiae into the foedus naturae.

The essential nature of the covenant of grace therefore consists in this, that it flows forth from God's special grace and has as its content nothing

but grace, unmerited and forfeited blessings. In so far [219] it is distinct in its essence from the foedus operum established before the fall but broken by the fall. Certainly God was also not obliged to establish the covenant of works; it is condescending goodness, and thus also grace in a general sense, which caused Him to bestow this covenant upon man; He then also established it and determined all its parts; it is His ordinance and institution. But in that covenant of works God nevertheless came to man with the demand of obedience and promised him, first in that way and after that accomplished obedience, to grant him the salvation of heaven, eternal life, the enjoyment of His beholding. The covenant of works thus reckoned with the free will of man, it rested in part in man, and therefore it was shaky and unstable. In fact it has then also been broken, not by God but by man. God adheres to the rule that whoever keeps the law shall receive eternal life. He says that in His law, He testifies it in everyone's conscience, He makes this word good in Christ. But man has broken the covenant of works; on his part he can now no longer acquire life by keeping the law; by the works of the law no flesh can be justified. Therefore God, in distinction from and in opposition to the covenant of works, has established another, better covenant, not a legalistic, but an evangelical covenant. But He has established this not with one who was merely man, but with the man Christ Jesus, who was His own, only-begotten, much-beloved Son. And in this one, who partakes of the Divine nature and of the Divine attributes, it lies fixed unshakably. It can no longer be broken, it is an eternal covenant. It does not rest in any work of man, but only in the good pleasure of God, in the work of the Mediator, in the H. Spirit, who remains eternally. It is dependent on no condition of man, it bestows no gift on any merit, it does not wait for any fulfillment of the law on man's side. It is from and through

and unto grace. God Himself is the only and eternal, the faithful and true, in whom it rests; who establishes it, maintains it, carries it out, completes it; the covenant of grace is the Divine work par excellence, His work alone, His work entirely. All boasting is here excluded for man, but all glory belongs to Father, Son and H. Spirit. [220]

Yet by this the full content of the covenant of grace has not yet been brought to light. To that end the covenant of grace must be brought to light not only in its distinctness from but also in its kinship with the covenant of works. After the breach of the covenant of works God did not immediately devise a wholly different covenant, which has nothing to do with the former and bears an entirely different character. That cannot be the case, because God is unchangeable, because the demand set for man in the covenant of works is no whim and no arbitrariness, because the image of God, the law, religion in their essence can be only one, because grace cannot or may not nullify nature, faith the law. And it is not so either. The covenant of grace is not, as Coccejus taught, the successive abolition; it is rather the fulfilment and restoration of the covenant of works. Gratia reparat et perficit naturam. God holds to the demand that only in the way of obedience eternal life is to be obtained; and if man transgresses his law, then that demand is increased with another, namely, that the transgression must be expiated by punishment. After the fall God thus has a double demand upon man, that of the claim for punishment for the evil committed and that of perfect obedience to his law, satisfactio and obedientia. Arminius thought in a letter to Uytenbogaerdt that man before the fall was indeed obligated to obedience but now after the fall was obligated only to punishment, because the contract was broken and thus the party was released from his obligation. But obedience to God's law is indeed cast in the covenant of works in a

particular form and applied to a particular end, namely, to the obtaining of eternal life, yet it is in itself grounded in the nature of man and therefore an obligation from which man can never be released. Otherwise by one transgression he could thereafter release himself from keeping all God's commandments, and thus from all sins and punishments. Scripture therefore also pronounces God's judgment over the sinner not only, Deut. 27:26, Gal. 3:10, Rom. 6:23, Hebr. 10:27, but also maintains for man after the fall the demand for perfect obedience as the way to eternal life, Lev. 18:5, Mt. 19:17, Luk. 10:28.

The difference between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace therefore consists herein [221], that God in the latter appears not with a single but with a double demand, and that with that double demand He comes not to humanity in Adam but to humanity in Christ. The foedus operum and the foedus gratiae differ chiefly in this, that Adam is exchanged for and replaced by Christ. Paul says in Gal. 3:16-18, that the covenant with Abraham has not been annulled by the law that came in later, but in fact had reference to and essentially rested in Christ, who has fulfilled every promise and bestowed the inheritance. Still further he goes back in Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:22, 45-49; from Adam sin and death flow to humanity, from Christ righteousness and life flow to it. Christ is the second and last Adam, who restores and takes over what the first has corrupted and left behind, the mediator of the covenant of grace, the head of the new humanity. Reformed theology has brought this thought of Scripture to its due in its doctrine of the covenant better than any other. The course of development was in brief this, that first, for the maintenance of the essential unity of Old and New Testament, the doctrine of the covenant of grace arose; that accordingly also the relation of God and man before the fall was presented as a covenant,

and indeed as a covenant of works; that reflection on the agreement and the difference between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace led to the insight that the covenant of grace, insofar as it was established with Christ, was essentially a covenant of works; that therefore in the covenant of grace again a distinction had to be made between the covenant, as it was established with Christ from eternity (pactum salutis, counsel of peace) and the covenant, as it is established in time with the elect or believers as the execution of that counsel of peace; and that finally this distinction in turn was abolished, counsel of peace and covenant of grace were conceived as essentially one, and the covenant of grace itself was transferred into eternity, as being established there with Christ and in Him with all His own. The last point, the identification of counsel of peace and covenant of grace, first came to development in England, with Rollock, Preston, Blake, Westm. Catech.major, cf. Vos, De verbondsleer in de Geref. theol. 1891 bl. 27v., further Th. Boston, A consideration of the covenant of grace, from [222] the eng. by Al. Comrie 1741 and then taken over from the English by Comrie, Brahe, Explanation of Ps. 89, preface bl. V-XXXVI e. a., cf. also Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 360. Many, however, continued to cherish objections against this identification, such as Turretinus, Theol. El. XII 2, 12. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 2, 1. Misc. Sacra II 820-824. R. Schutte, Two treatises on God's testament and covenant 1785 bl. 143v. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 358.

There is also indeed a distinction between pactum salutis and foedus gratiae; in the former Christ is surety and head, in the latter mediator; the former remains limited to Christ and requires of Him the bearing of the punishment and the fulfilling of the law in the place of the elect, the latter extends over and through Christ to human beings and requires of them faith and repentance, which Christ has not fulfilled in our place or been able to

fulfill; the former concerns the acquisition of salvation, is eternal and knows no history, the latter deals with the application of salvation, takes a beginning in time and has distinct dispensations. But yet, with this distinction, the connection and the unity must not be overlooked. There are in Scripture only two covenants, two ways for man to heaven, namely the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The covenant of works is the way to heaven for the unfallen, the covenant of grace that for fallen man. The covenant of works was concluded with humanity in Adam, the covenant of grace in Christ; He and He alone is the Head substituting for and representing humanity. If then it is said in Scripture that the covenant of grace has been established with Adam, Noah, Abraham, Israel etc., then this must not be understood in such a way as if they were the actual parties and heads in this covenant. No, Christ was then and now, in O. and N. Testament the head, the party in the covenant of grace, and through his administration it came to the patriarchs and to Israel. He who existed from eternity and had set himself as surety, also immediately after the fall actually appeared as prophet, priest and king, as second Adam, as head and representative of fallen humanity. In the covenants with Adam, Noah, Abraham, David etc. He is the mediator, the surety, who stands surety for the realization of the covenant, who realizes it by his Spirit in the hearts, who [223] administers it to sinners, who bestows its benefits, who receives his own into the covenant. The whole covenant is entrusted to Him from the beginning to the end; only in Him does it lie fixed; just as the Father has ordained the kingdom for Him, so He ordains it for those who have been given to Him; He distributes the benefits acquired by Him as an inheritance. The covenant is firm as a testament, it is a foedus testamentarium and a testamentum foederale. It is relatively indifferent and touches no principle,

whether one places the duality or the unity of pactum salutis and foedus gratiae in the foreground; provided only it stands firm that in the pactum salutis Christ can never for one moment be thought of apart from his own, nor also in the foedus gratiae can the believers for a single moment be considered outside Christ. It is in both the Christus mysticus, Zanchius, Op. II 400 sq. Mastricht, Theol. V 1, 4, Christ as the second Adam, who appears as the acting party. Adam and Abraham and David etc. may be types, but the antitype is Christ. And since Adam already before the fall was a type of Christ, so the covenant of grace was not first prepared by Noah and Abraham, and not first by the covenant of grace with Adam but already in and through the covenant of works. God, who knows and determines all things and also included the breach of the covenant of works in his counsel, has already at the creation of Adam and at the institution of the covenant of works reckoned with the Christ and with his covenant of grace, part II 546.

9. Thus the doctrine of the covenant maintains, in a wonderfully beautiful way, God's sovereignty in the whole work of salvation. It far surpasses the covenant of works, as far as Christ surpasses Adam. Much more clearly than in creation, God's threefold being comes to revelation in re-creation. It is the Father who purposes and wills redemption; it is the Son who stands surety for it and actually acquires it; it is the Spirit who works it out and applies it. And in that whole work of salvation, from beginning to end, nothing of man enters in. It is God's work wholly and alone; it is pure grace and unmerited salvation. But all the more it is important to note that this doctrine of the covenant, notwithstanding that it, or rather precisely because it, in the work of salvation so [224] purely and fully maintains God's sovereignty, at the same time causes the rational and moral nature of man to come into its own in so beautiful a way. With the covenant of works this has

already been set forth at length, part II 553. But in the covenant of grace this comes out even more strikingly. In this respect it is greatly distinct from election. Indeed, the two are not so distinct that election is particular and the covenant of grace universal, that the former denies free will and the latter teaches or presupposes it, that the latter retracts what the former confesses. But they do differ in such a way that in election man is absolutely passive, but in the covenant of grace he also appears as active. Election says simply and without more who are elect and will infallibly obtain salvation; the covenant of grace describes the way along which these elect will reach their destination; it is the channel in which the stream of election moves onward toward eternity. Christ indeed appears in the covenant of grace as head and representative of his own, but he does not efface and destroy them. He stands surety for them, but in such a way that they also themselves, taught and enabled by his Spirit, consciously and voluntarily consent in the covenant. The covenant of grace is indeed concluded with Christ, but it extends over and through him also to his own and takes these wholly and entirely, body and soul, into itself. The pactum salutis extends to a foedus gratiae; the head of the covenant of grace is at the same time its mediator. And therefore, immediately at its promulgation, it also comes forward with the demand of faith and repentance, Mk. 1:15. In the first period the Reformed spoke freely of conditions of the covenant. Calvin, Inst. IV 15, 17, on Gen. 15:6, 17:4, Mt. 3:7, 9, Gomarus, de foedere, Maresius, Syst. Theol. VIII 5, Trigland, Antopologia c. 18, Preface of the Statenvert. to the N. Test., Voetius, Disp. V 272. 273 etc. But when the nature of the covenant of grace was thought through more deeply and had to be defended against Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and Remonstrants, many felt objections to that, Olevianus, Wezen des genadeverbonds I 13. 14. Junius, Disp. Theol.

XXV 12. 13. 19. Coccejus, de foedere § 87, Id. Summa Theol. 41, 5. 12. 13. Cloppenburg, de foedere § 29. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 1, 8-16. Franken, Kern c. 23. Brakel, Red. Godsd. XVI 17. Comrie, [225] Heid. Catech. I 352 etc., cf. M. Vitringa IV 224, in England especially also the Antinomians, Tobias Crisp and others, against whom R. Baxter, Dan. Williams and others came forward.

Properly speaking, in the foedus gratiae, i.e. in the gospel, which is the proclamation of the covenant of grace, there are no demands and no conditions. For God gives what He demands; Christ has accomplished everything and has also, regeneration, faith, and conversion, although He did not accomplish them in our place, nevertheless acquired them for us; and the H. Spirit applies them. But nevertheless the covenant of grace, in its administration through Christ, assumes this demanding, conditional form, in order to acknowledge man in his rational and moral nature, in order also, as fallen, still to treat him as created after God's image, in order also on this highest terrain, where it concerns eternal salvation and eternal perdition, to set him responsible and inexcusable, in order to cause him with consciousness and freedom to enter into this covenant and to break with sin. The covenant of grace is therefore indeed monopleuric, it proceeds from God; He has designed and established it. He maintains and realizes it; it is a work of God triune and completely finished within the three persons mutually. But it is destined to become dupleuric, to be, in the power of God, consciously and voluntarily accepted and preserved by man. This is the will of God, which in the covenant comes to light so clearly and so beautifully, that the work of grace may be clearly reflected in human consciousness, and may arouse man's will to vigorous energy. The covenant of grace does not kill man, and does not treat him as a stick and block; but it takes up man

wholly and entirely with all his faculties and powers, as to soul and body, for time and eternity; it encompasses him wholly, does not destroy his power but removes his impotence; does not kill his will but makes it free from sin; does not benumb his consciousness but delivers it from darkness; it recreates the whole man and then causes him, renewed by grace, free and independent, with his whole soul and spirit and body, to love God and to devote himself to Him. The covenant of grace expresses that God's honor and glory are obtained not at the expense but for the benefit of man and in the recreation of the whole man, in his illumined [226] consciousness and in his restored freedom celebrates its triumphs.

At the same time, thereby yet another thought is given, which in the covenant of grace, in distinction from election, comes to light. In election the elect appear as so many persons known to God by name; indeed they are chosen in Christ and form an organism with Him as their Head. But yet this does not in election come clearly and strongly to the foreground. Quite otherwise is this in the covenant of grace. Here Christ appears as the substitute of Adam, as the second Head of the human race. Here Christ stands with His church in connection with humanity under Adam. Election chiefly regards the individuals, and in itself it left open the possibility that the elect, each by himself, individualistically, by leaps, would be taken out of the human race, regenerated, and transferred to heaven. But the covenant of grace says that that election is realized in a wholly different way. It expresses the deep, beautiful truth, that Adam has been replaced by Christ; that humanity, which fell in the first, is restored in the second; that not some loose individuals are saved but that in the elect under Christ the organism of humanity and of the world itself is saved; that not only the persons of the elect but also, so to speak, the structure of the organism, which they form in

Christ, is derived from the original creation in Adam. Therefore the covenant of grace also does not leap from individual to individual, but it continues itself organically and historically. It runs through a history, and has various dispensations. It adapts itself to the times and occasions, determined by the Father as Creator and Preserver. It is never concluded with a single person alone but then always also therein with his seed; it is a covenant from generations to generations. It never comprises the person of the believer alone, in the abstract, but that person concretely, as he historically exists and lives, thus not him alone, but also everything that is his; him not for his person alone but him also as father or mother, as parent or child, with all that is his, with his family, with his money and his goods, with his influence and power, with his office and position, with his understanding and his heart, with his science and [227] art, with his life in society and state. The covenant of grace is the organization of the new humanity under Christ as its Head, which connects itself to the order of creation, reaches back into it, and takes up into itself the whole of that creation qualitatively and intensively. It therefore speaks for itself, that the covenant of grace temporally, in this earthly administration and dispensation, also takes up into itself such as inwardly remain unbelieving and are not partakers of the spiritual benefits. The Reformed, with a view to this, made a distinction between an inward and an outward covenant, Kantteekening op 1 Cor. 7:14, 1 Petr. 2:9, Witsius, Oec. foed. III 1, 5, Mastricht V 1, 28; or between covenant and covenant-dispensation, Olevianus, Wezen des Genadeverbonds I 2, Alting, Theol. catech. p. 33, Turretinus, Theol. El. XII 6, 5; or between an absolute and a conditional covenant, Maresius, Theol. syst. VIII 7, Koelman, Historie der Labadisten bl. 566; indeed some, such as Blake with Dr. Vos, De Verbondsleer bl. 12,

45, Stoddard at Northampton with Edwards, Works I 34, J. Schuts, Het verbond der genade verduisterd 1713 and Verhandeling over het H. Avondm. 1722, M. Swarte 1740, R. Schutte, Tweetal verhandelingen 1785 e. a. went so far, that they assumed two covenants, the one with the elect and true believers, the other with the not sincerely believing, outward members of the church, and thereby sought to justify the membership of the latter and their access to the Lord's Supper. But others, such as Edwards, Works 185-295, Koelman, Historie der Labadisten bl. 95v., Appelius, De Herv. Leer 1769, Vitringa, Obs. Sacr. II c. 6, Brakel, Red. Godsd. c. 16, Moor V 470, also Ds. de Herder, cf. Heraut 937 e. a. rightly protested against this. The covenant of grace is one; and its outward and inward side, although here on earth never coinciding, cannot and may not be detached from one another and placed alongside each other. There are very certainly evil branches on the vine, there is chaff among the wheat, there are in a great house golden and earthen vessels, Mt. 3:12, 13:29, Joh. 15:2, 2 Tim. 2:20. But we lack the right and the power, to make a separation between the two; God himself will do that in the day of harvest. So long as they, according to the judgment of love, walk in the way of the covenant, they are to be regarded and treated as covenant-partners. Although not de foedere, [228] they are nevertheless in foedere and will once be judged as such. They are here on earth in all manner of ways connected with the elect; and the elect, because they are members of the Adamic humanity, as an organism cannot otherwise be gathered under Christ as their Head into one, than in the way of the covenant.

§ 41. The Person of the Mediator.

1. The covenant of grace is distinguished from the covenant of works also in this, that it has a mediator, not of union but of reconciliation, in order to restore again the broken communion between God and man. Also with this doctrine of a mediatorship Holy Scripture does not stand alone, but is supported and confirmed on all sides by the analogies which occur thereof in the religions among the peoples. In general the words and deeds of great men are of the richest significance for the history and the life of the peoples; but specifically this holds true in the religious sphere. Almost everywhere there occur holy persons, who effect and maintain communion with God for others. Prophets appear as interpreters of the Deity and make known its will; priests represent men in their approach to God, convey their sacrifices and prayers and distribute to them God's blessing; kings are many times regarded as sons of the gods, as bearers of their wisdom and power. The origin of all these holy persons is not related to us by history; but their universality proves that we have here to do with a phenomenon that is not accidental but is connected with the essence of religion itself and with a

deep need of humanity. Many historical religions are moreover connected to the names of particular founders, who are then later raised above the rank of ordinary men, or even, as in Buddhism, wholly and entirely deified; apotheosis and incarnation occur almost in all religions. The distinction that Tiele makes between theocratic and theanthropic religions is also according to his own admission not strictly to be maintained [229] and only a difference of more or less, Introduction to the science of religion. Amst. 1897 p. 141v., 221v. Finally there is even in all religions not only in general an expectation that evil will once be overcome by good, but more than once that expectation also attaches itself to a particular person, such as e.g. to Krishna in the Indian and Baldur in the Norse religion. Also the myth of Heracles, the well-known statement of Plato about the righteous man in Rep. VII, the fourth eclogue of Vergil are in this respect noteworthy. In its most beautiful and noblest expressions Heathendom points unconsciously toward Christianity; cf. part I 238-240 and furthermore also still Lamennais, Essai sur l'indifférence III 408 s. Tholuck, Lehre v. d. Sünde, 4te Beilage. R. Ch. Trench, The Hulsean Lectures for 1845. 1846. 4th ed. Cambr. 1859 p. 153: Christ the desire of all nations or the unconscious prophecies of Heathendom. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilos.3 1896 S. 714 f.

But what among the Heathen was no more than an unconscious and indeterminate longing, that became in Israel the object of a firm faith and ardent hope. God gave his promises to that people. He did not let humanity begin its history without the hope that the woman's seed would one day triumph over the serpent's seed. Yes, it has been Christ himself who, as Angel of the covenant, led the people of God in the day of the O. T., through Israel prepared his own coming in the flesh, and by his Spirit caused his own image to be drawn in history and prophecy, Joh. 5:39, 1

Petr. 1:11, Op. 19:10. Therefore the O. T. also does not contain a few, self-contained Messianic texts, which in a Christology of the O. T. are atomistically gathered together; but the whole O. T. dispensation with its persons and events, its offices and institutions, its laws and ceremonies is a pointing and movement toward the fulfilment in the N. T. There is a "Symbolik der Schöpfung", a typology in nature, which, as is evident from Jesus' parables, attains its realization in him and in his kingdom. There is an unconscious expectation and hope in the religion and in the history of the peoples, which comes to its truth in Christianity. There is a direct and intentional preparation and foreshadowing of the λογικη λατρεια in the institutions and events of the O. T. [230] Temple and altar, priest and offering, Zion and Jerusalem, prophet and king, all are examples and shadows of a higher, spiritual, true reality. And especially the kingship received under Israel such a typical significance. The theocratic king, who was embodied especially in David with his humble origin, his rich life-experience, his noble nature, his deep feeling, his poetic disposition, his great gifts, his unbroken courage, his brilliant victories, Smend, Altt. Rel. Gesch. 58, was a son of God, 2 Sam. 7:14, Ps. 2:6, 7, Ps. 89:27, the anointed one par excellence, Ps. 2:2, 18:51, to whom all kinds of bodily and spiritual blessings were wished, Ps. 2:8v., 21, 45, 72, who was even addressed as Elohim, Ps. 45:7. The king is bearer of the highest, of the divine dignity on earth. In David the theocratic king found his purest image; therefore the kingship will also remain in his house, 2 Sam. 7:8-16. This promise of God to David is then the foundation, the centre of all subsequent expectation and prophecy. The prophecy, which is added to the typology for explanation, looks from the past and present toward the future and delineates the expected Davidide ever more clearly in his person and work.

The opinion, e.g. of Paul Volz, Die vorexilische Jahweprophetie und der Messias, Göttingen 1897, that the Messianic idea is foreign to the pre-exilic prophets, is refuted by the facts and can be maintained only by an arbitrary criticism. In proportion as the kingship in Israel and Judah corresponded less to its idea, prophecy took up the promise of 2 Sam. 7 and clung fast to it, Am. 9:11, Hos. 1:11, 3:5, Mich. 5:1, 2, Jes. 9:5, 6, 11:1, 2, 10, Jer. 23:5, 30:9, 33:17, 20-22, 26, Ezech. 34:23, 24, 37:22-24. This anointed king will come forth from David's house, when this shall have fallen into lowliness, been thrust from the throne, become like a hewn-down stump, Jes. 11:1, 2, Mich. 5:1, 2, Ezech. 17:22; God will cause him to spring forth as a shoot from David's house, Jer. 23:5, 6, 33:14-17, so that he even bears the name of Shoot, Zach. 3:8, 6:12. But despite his humble birth, he will nevertheless be the genuine, true, theocratic king. Although originating from the small, despised Bethlehem, where the Davidic royal house has its origin and, driven out of dominion, withdraws, [231] Mich. 5:2, cf. 3:12, 4:9, 14, the Messiah will nevertheless be a Ruler over Israel, whose goings forth and origins as Ruler, from God, are all from of old, from the days of eternity, deel II 243. He is given by God, is an eternal king, bears the names of Wonderful Counsellor, mighty God, cf. 10:21, Deut. 10:17, Jer. 32:18, everlasting Father (for his people), Prince of Peace, Jes. 9:5, 6, is anointed with the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding, of counsel and of might, of knowledge and fear of the Lord, 11:5, is laid as a tried precious cornerstone in Zion, 28:16, is a righteous, victorious, gentle and therefore riding on a she-ass king, who is not proud of his power but is supported by God, Jer. 33:17, 20, 22, 26, Zach. 9:9v., whom the people call and acknowledge as the Lord our righteousness, Jer. 23:6, cf. 33:16, where Jerusalem is so called as the city in which Ihvh causes his righteousness to dwell; who will be a

hero like David and whose house will be like God, like the Angel of God, who once went before Israel's host at the exodus, Zach. 12:8, cf. Mal. 3:1, who will reign eternally, establish a kingdom of righteousness, peace and prosperity, and will extend his dominion also over the Heathen, to the ends of the earth, Ps. 2, 45, 72, Ezech. 37:25, Zach. 6:13, 9:10 etc. This glorious Messianic image is then further completed by the fact that this future king is also depicted as prophet and priest. To be sure, these features do not come to the foreground, for in the kingdom of God the Spirit of God will be poured out upon all, Joël 2:28, Zach. 12:10, 13:2v., Jer. 31:34, and all the people will be priestly and holy to the Lord, Jes. 35:8, Joël 3:17, Zach. 14:20, 21; but nevertheless the Messiah is also presented as prophet, upon whom in a special measure the Spirit of the Lord rests, and who will bring a glad message to Israel and the Heathen, Deut. 18:15, Jes. 11:2, Jes. 40-66, Mal. 4:5; and he will unite the priestly and the royal dignity in himself, Jer. 30:21, Zach. 3, 6:13, Ps. 110. In the servant of the Lord in Isaiah all three offices clearly come to light; he is priest, who by his suffering atones for the sins of his people, he is prophet, who anointed with God's Spirit proclaims the acceptable year of the Lord, he is king, who is glorified and enjoys the fruit of his labour. How deeply this Messianic expectation has penetrated into Israel, the psalms show us; many proceed from the Davidic kingship and are in the narrower sense messianic, Ps. 2, 18, 20, 21, 45, 61, 72, 89, 132, others speak only of God or Jahveh as King, Ps. 10, 24, 29, 44, 47, 48, 66, 68, 87, 93, 95-100, 145-150. Cf. the works on the Christology of the O. T. by Hengstenberg, 2e Ausg. 1854, by Oosterzee, 1859-61, Bade, 2 Bde, 2e Aufl. Münster 1858, Böhl 1882, R. Gordon, Christ as made known to the ancient Church, 4 vol. Edinburgh 1854; further works on the O. T. predictions such as by Riehm, Die messian. Weissagung, Gotha 1875.

Hofmann, Weissagung und Erfüllung 1841, ’44. Schriftbeweis, 2e Aufl. 1859, Orelli, Die alttest. Weissagung von der Vollendung des Gottesreiches in ihrer gesch. Entw. 1882; then works on the theology of the O. T. by Schultz, Oehler, Smend, Dillmann, Riehm, Kayser, Kuenen, De profeten I 234v., Duhm, Die Theologie der Propheten 1875. König, Die Theologie der Psalmen 1857. Dornstetter, Das endzeitliche Gottesreich nach der Prophezie, Würzburg 1896. Stade, Die mess. Hoffnung im Psalter, in Gottschick’s Zeits. f. Th. u. K. II 1895 S. 369-413. Boehmer, Das Reich Gottes in den Psalmen, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VIII 1897, Heft 8-10; and finally also still dogmatic textbooks, such as by Dorner Chr. Gl. I 702. Grétillat, Exposé IV 95. Runze, Katech. der Dogm. Leipzig Weber 1898 § 75.

2. Even after the extinction of prophecy, the Messianic expectation continued to live in the heart of Israel’s people. In the apocryphal literature we do indeed find the expectation of Israel’s future deliverance and dominion, but without therewith any mention of the Messiah occurring otherwise than a few scant indications, 1 Makk. 2:57, 4:46, 9:27, 14:41. Philo too has nothing about the Messiah. In general the self-righteousness of Judaism was not favorable to the Messianic expectation; Israel after all had the law, was righteous through its observance, and therefore had no need of a deliverer; at most there was room for an earthly king, who repaid the Jews according to their merits and brought them to dominion over the peoples of the world. The Messiah became solely and only a political person. But among the people the Messianic expectation nevertheless remained alive and repeatedly came to the surface again, especially in times of oppression. It was maintained and nourished by [233] the reading of the O. Testament; many passages were declared Messianic, as the LXX proves; the Jews found in the Scriptures even 456 Messianic promises, 75 in the

Pentateuch, 243 in the Prophets, and 138 in the Hagiographa; and especially the apocalyptic literature of Enoch, the Psalterium Salomonis, Baruch, the Sibyl, 4 Ezra took up the Messianic expectation again and elaborated it. One expected in general that He would appear at the end of the עוֹלָם הַזֶּה, after anxious times, the so-called Messianic birth-pangs and Elijah or also another prophet like Moses or Jeremiah had preceded. He was usually designated as Messiah, Son of Man, Chosen One, Son of David, a few times also as Son of God, and was conceived as a man who already existed beforehand and was hidden with God, who would come forth to appear from Bethlehem, righteous, holy, and equipped with many gifts by God, and who would establish the kingdom of God on earth. In the main this corresponds with the expectation which, according to the testimony of the N. T., Luk. 1:38, 74, 2:25 etc., was encountered in popular circles, Schürer, Neutest. Zeitgesch. 613. Weber, System 333. Baldensperger, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der Mess. Hoffnungen seiner Zeit, Strassb. 1888, 2e Aufl. 1892. Herzog2 9, 653. Marti, Gesch. d. isr. Rel. 289. Holtzmann, Lehrb. der neut. Theol. I 68. Ludwig Paul, die Vorstellungen vom Messias u. vom Gottesreich bei den Synopt. Bonn 1895.

Amid these expectations Christ himself appears, and in his preaching he immediately attaches himself to them. The kingdom of God, which was foretold and expected by the prophets, in which God will be king and his will will be everyone's delight, which by origin and nature is a heavenly kingdom and is now already present in the heavens, Mt. 6:10, that kingdom also comes on earth, it is near, Mk. 1:15. But, connecting with those expectations, Jesus immediately introduces a great change into them; from the Jewish tradition he goes back to Scripture, and understands by the kingdom not in the first place a political, but a religious-ethical dominion.

The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Mk. 12:26, the God of Israel, Mt. 15:30, whom Jesus acknowledges and confesses as his God, is certainly also and above all King, Mt. 5:35, 18:23, 22:2, the Lord of heaven and of earth, Mt. 11:25, but he is also the Father in [234] the heavens, who in his kingdom wishes to rule as a Father over his children; his kingdom is also a family, a congregation, Mt. 6:4, 6, 9, 7:11, Mk. 3:34, 35; and these two thoughts of the kingship and the fatherhood of God do not harm but promote one another. Further: entrance into that kingdom is not by Pharisaic observance of the law, but by conversion, faith, regeneration, Mt. 18:3, Mk. 1:15, Joh. 3:3, and therefore it is precisely open to the poor, the lost, the publicans and sinners, Mt. 5:3, 9:11, 12, 11:5, 28-30, Luk. 19:10. That kingdom, which on the one hand must above all be sought and presupposes another and better righteousness than that of the Pharisees, Mt. 5:20, 6:33, 13:44-46 and is then presented as a reward, kept in the heavens, Mt. 5:12, 6:20, 19:21, 20:1-7, 24:45, is nevertheless on the other hand, with its whole content, forgiveness of sins, Mt. 9:2, 26:28, Luk. 1:77, 24:47, righteousness, Mt. 6:33, eternal life, Mt. 19:16, 25:46, Mk. 8:43 a gift far surpassing all work and merit, Mt. 19:29, 23:12, 24:47, 25:21, 25:34, Luk. 6:32v., 12:32, 37, 17:10, 22:29. Insofar as salvation is not yet enjoyed here in full, the kingdom is thus still indeed future; but insofar as it is already initially planted here in the hearts through regeneration, forgiveness, renewal, it is present, Mt. 11:11, 12:28, 23:13, Mk. 4:26-29, 10:15, Luk. 10:18, 17:21. Schmoller, Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes in den Schriften des N. T. Leiden 1891 and others, such as Joh. Weiss, Gunkel, have wrongly denied this latter. The kingdom of God with Jesus is not only a good lying ready in heaven, bestowed on righteousness as a reward, and thus only a religious concept; but it is also initially realized on earth in the benefits of

conversion, faith, regeneration, renewal, it gradually grows and permeates everything, it is at the same time an ethical concept. That is, Jesus takes over the concept of the kingdom of God, as it had been developed in Scripture and especially later in apocalyptic literature in an eschatological sense. But he connects with it the thought later neglected by Judaism, that, although the kingdom of God in an eschatological sense will only at the end of days be realized by an act of God intervening in the world, it nevertheless must be preceded and prepared by a religious-ethical [235] renewal, by the kingdom of God in this sense. With the prophets of the O. T. these thoughts go together and are interwoven. They know only one coming of the Messiah. The kingdom of God is the sum of all spiritual and natural benefits; it brings at the same time conversion and return (restoration of Israel as people and kingdom); it is at the same time an ethical and a religious concept. But Jesus distinguishes between these. The kingdom exists in a religious-ethical sense, it comes in an eschatological sense. The one idea of the kingdom of God is realized in two great moments. The one coming of the Messiah splits into a double one, for salvation and for judgment, for preparation and for completion. Das Messiaswerk wird Heilswerk, es entwindet sich der Eschatologie und mündet ein in die Soteriologie, Baldensperger, Das Selbstbew. Jesu 114. Leaving aside the question how long a time, for Jesus' consciousness and that of the apostles, would elapse between his present and his future kingdom; the fact stands firm that both are also temporally distinct. Cf. Holtzmann I 215-225, and further the literature on the kingdom of God, which is to be found in Frédéric Krop, La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume de Dieu d'après les évangiles synoptiques avec un appendice sur la question du fils de l'homme. Paris Fischbacher 1897 p. 7. s. Cf. also A. Ritschls Idee

des Reiches Gottes im Lichte der Gesch., kritisch untersucht von Dr. Rich. Wegener, Leipzig Deichert 1898.

Jesus did not arrive at this distinction because his labor, begun hopefully in Galilee, later remained without result and he could now remain faithful to his calling in no other way than by at the same time revealing his Messiahship and the program of suffering, Holtzmann, I 284. For from the beginning Jesus' place in that kingdom, whose Gospel he preached, was perfectly clear and distinct to him. Apart from the indication in the baptism by John, Mt. 3:11v., Joh. 1:26v., this is evident from the fact that Jesus immediately appeared with the names Son of man and Son of God. The first name Jesus derived, as is now, especially after Baldensperger's important study on Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, Strassb. 1888, 2e Aufl. 1892, fairly generally recognized, with awareness from Dan. 7:13, in order thereby to indicate both that he was the Messiah, [236] without whom the kingdom of God could not come, and that he was so in an entirely different sense than his contemporaries imagined this in their earth-minded expectations. The name son of man is thus not a symbol for the future kingdom of God (Hoekstra), nor a designation of Jesus as the true, ideal man (Herder, Schleiermacher, Neander, Lange, Ebrard, Thomasius, Godet, Beyschlag etc.) or as the humble, weak man (Grotius, de Wette, Ewald, Baur, Strauss, Kuenen, Schenkel, Stier, Nösgen etc.), but is a definite indication of his Messianic dignity exalted above all, in the sense as he himself understood it. Now, just as earlier already the rationalist Paulus, Comm. über das N. T. op Mt. 8:20 and Uloth in de Godg. Bijdragen 1862, so in the most recent time Lagarde, Wellhausen, Brandt, Oort and especially Lietzmann have indeed asserted that Jesus never called himself in the Aramaic בר נוש or used it only to designate himself in the third person as the man; that the Aramaic

words were later wrongly translated by ὑιος του ἀνθρωπου and in Christian apocalyptic, in connection with Dan. 7:13, were understood of the Messiah, and in that meaning then were put into Jesus' mouth. But this hypothesis is nevertheless very improbable; it lacks any explanation of when and why the Aramaic expression was thus rendered in Greek, was understood in a Messianic sense, and without any reason was put into Jesus' mouth, cf. Schulze, Die Religion Jesu und der Glaube an Christus, Halle 1897 S. 7-13. Fréd. Krop, La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume de Dieu 124 s. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung, Leipzig 1898 S. 78. Rather it is probable that the expression בר נוש already in Jewish apocalyptic designated the Messiah, or that Jesus himself intentionally derived that title from Daniel, in order to designate himself clearly and yet in another sense than his contemporaries thought, as Messiah. In any case, Jesus calls himself so where, by his humble life, Mt. 8:20, 11:19, by his serving, Mt. 20:28, by his seeking and saving of the lost, Mt. 18:11, by his forgiveness of sins, Mk. 2:10, by his power over the Sabbath, Mk. 2:18, by his suffering, Mk. 8:31, 9:12, 31, 10:33, by his return, Mk. 13:26, 14:62, he founds, extends and [237] completes the kingdom of heaven on earth. With this claim and this name Jesus did not first appear toward the end of his life; he was conscious of his Messiahship from the first moment of his public activity onward and began it by virtue of that consciousness. Already at twelve years of age he knew that he had to be in the things of his Father, Luk. 2:49. In the baptism by John he received the divine sign and seal of his calling, Luk. 3:21. And immediately he appeared with the name Son of man, long before the event in Caesarea Philippi, Mk. 2:10, 28. From the beginning he gives himself a special and wholly unique place in the kingdom of God, does works that presuppose his Messiahship, and demands an honor that belongs to him

only if he is the Messiah, Mt. 5:11, 10:18, 32, 37, 12:6, 41, 19:29. But it is indeed true that he uses the name Son of man sparingly in the first period, and that he employs it all the more frequently when, after the event at Caesarea, he can connect with the Messianity also the program of suffering. Jesus had to educate his disciples in such a way that they would recognize him as Messiah and yet would not transfer to him all those earthly political expectations that in Jesus' time were connected with the Messianic idea. Literature on the expression Son of Man in Oort, De uitdrukking ὁ υἱος του ἀνθρωπου in het N. T. Leiden 1892 bl. 5v. H. Lietzmann, Der Menschenson, Freiburg Mohr 1896. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 246. H. Appel, Die Selbstbezeichnung Jesu, Der Sohn des M. Stavenhagen 1896. Also Theol. Tijdschr. Nov. 1894. Mei 1895. Theol. Stud. van Dr. Daubanton enz., Mei 1895. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 1898 S. 75 f. Fréderic Krop, La pensée de Jésus etc. p. 118-132. With this it is said that Jesus' self-consciousness as Messiah cannot be explained historically or psychologically. It is immediately present at Jesus' appearance; it is not to be derived from the influence of apocalyptic literature, which without doubt is overestimated by Baldensperger in general and also in relation to Jesus. Therefore he also sees himself compelled to go further back, namely to the religious consciousness of Jesus, to his consciousness of God, and to say that at the baptism, together with his consciousness of God, his Messianity became immediately conscious to him; then he perceived God's nearness as never before, then he heard inwardly within himself the voice: You are my Son, Baldensperger, Das Selbstbew. [238] Jesu S. 160. To a certain extent this is correct. Jesus' consciousness that he was the Messiah flowed from the knowledge that he stood in a wholly unique relation to God. He called himself Son of man but also Son of God, cf. part II 243. In the O. T. thus

either the people Israel, or the king and especially the Messiah were designated. This theocratic meaning the name Son of God perhaps still has in the mouth of the demoniacs, Mt. 8:29, the Jews, Mt. 27:10, the High Priest, Mt. 26:63, and even of the disciples in the first period, Joh. 1:50, 11:27, Mt. 16:16. But Jesus places in this name another and deeper sense. He is Son of God, not because he is Messiah and King, but he is the latter because he is the former, because he is Son of the Father. God is his Father, Luk. 2:49; he is the one Son whom the Father loved and whom he sent at last, Mk. 12:6; at the baptism Mt. 3:17, and later at the transfiguration, Mt. 17:5, God calls him his beloved Son, in whom he has all his good pleasure; and in Matth. 11:27 he says that everything that is necessary for the execution of God's εὐδοκια has been handed over to him and that only the Father knows the Son and the Son the Father. This Sonship is the source of all his life, thinking and acting. In that consciousness he places himself above the ancients, Mt. 5:18v., above Jonah and Solomon, Luk. 11:31, 32, above even the angels, Mk. 13:32. Knowing that he stands in a wholly unique relation to the Father and is king of the kingdom of God, he pronounces blessed, Mt. 5:3v., Luk. 10:23, he forgives the sins, Mk. 2:20, he demands to leave everything for his sake, Mt. 5:11, 10:18, 22 etc., and connects with that the entrance into eternal life. The Synoptics already contain in germ everything that later was taught by the apostles and also by the Christian church about the person of Christ. It is true that the disciples before Jesus' resurrection still had no right insight into his person and work. The gospels tell us that themselves. Hence Jesus in his instruction also reckoned with the capacity of his young men, gradually led them to the knowledge of his Sonship and his Messianity and left much to the instruction of the Spirit, Joh. 16:12. But the resurrection already caused a

wondrous light to dawn over the person and the work of Christ; from then on he counted for all disciples as ein himmlisches Wesen; the doctrine of Paul [239] and John about the being of Christ found with none of the disciples opposition, Weiszäcker, Das apost. Zeitalter2 16. 110. What they add to it is nothing new, but only expansion and development. Jesus is true man, become flesh and come in the flesh, Joh. 1:14, 1 Joh. 4:2, 3, from the fathers, as far as the flesh is concerned, Rom. 9:5, seed of Abraham, Gal. 3:16, from the tribe of Judah, Hebr. 7:14, from the lineage of David, Rom. 1:3, born of a woman, Gal. 4:4, Hebr. 2:14, man in full, true sense, Rom. 5:15, 1 Cor. 15:45, 1 Tim. 2:15, who was weary, thirsty, sorrowful, joyful as we are, Joh. 4:6v., 11:33, 38, 12:27, 13:21, Hebr. 4:15, was under the law, Gal. 4:4, learned obedience unto death, Phil. 2:8, Hebr. 5:8, 10:7, 9, suffered, died and was buried etc. But this same man was at the same time free from all sin, Mt. 7:11, 11:29, 12:50, Joh. 4:34, 8:29, 46, 15:10. Hd. 3:14, 2 Cor. 5:21, Hebr. 4:15, 7:26, 1 Petr. 1:19, 2:26, 1 Joh. 2:1, 3:5; he has also risen, been glorified, seated at God's right hand, Hd. 2:34, 5:31, 7:55 etc. He existed already before his incarnation, Joh. 1:1, 17:5, 1 Cor. 10:4, 9, Hebr. 11:26, was then in the form of God, Phil. 2:6, firstborn of all creation, Col. 1:15, higher than the angels, Hebr. 1:4, through whom God created all things and in whom all things subsist, Joh. 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:16, Ef. 3:9, Son of God in a wholly unique sense, Joh. 1:14, 5:18, Rom. 8:3, 32, Gal. 4:4, and himself God, Joh. 1:1, 20:28, Rom. 9:5, 2 Thess. 1:1, Tit. 2:13, Hebr. 1:8, 9. (1 Joh. 5:20), 2 Petr. 1:1. Cf. art. Christologie, Schriftlehre van Kähler in Herzog3 4, 4 with the literature cited there.

3. This apostolic testimony concerning Jesus the Christ was too comprehensive for it to be immediately taken up into the Christian consciousness and to be expressed in a clear formula cutting off all error.

With the apostolic fathers there is therefore as yet no mention of this, although they assign to Christ an altogether unique place and although they call Him by all manner of glorious and exalted names, part II 250. Only through the errors arising on the left and on the right side, of Ebionitism and Gnosticism, was Christian thinking first awakened, [240] to appropriate the apostolic testimony to itself in its many-sidedness and to bring to clarity the relation of Christ, both to God and to humanity. Ebionitism did indeed regard Jesus as the Messiah, sometimes also believed that He was conceived in a supernatural manner and at baptism was equipped with a divine power, but otherwise it saw in Jesus nothing but a man, from David's lineage, anointed with God's Spirit and appointed as king over an earthly kingdom to be established at His return. Gnosticism, despising matter and ascribing the creation of the world to a δημιουργος, also made in the case of Christ a sharp separation between the divine and the human; the highest aeon, namely Christ, had descended from heaven and had united Himself for a time with the earthly man Jesus, or brought with Him from heaven a psychic body or temporarily assumed a phantom body, in order to free humanity from the bonds of matter. Harnack indeed thinks that the recognition of Jesus as a man chosen by God and equipped with the Spirit was not ebionitic but Christian, D. G. I 245, and also says that the doctrine of the two natures of Christ was originally gnostic, I 220, 516, but he must nevertheless concede that in the oldest tradition Jesus was also confessed as Son of God and was never held to be a ψιλος ἀνθρωπος, I 153-168, cf. Loofs in Herzog3 4, 18 f. There may have been different conceptions of how one and the same subject could at the same time be Son of God and man; but thus Christ was recognized by all from the beginning. This confession had to lead and did lead under Justin, Irenaeus and Tertullian, cf.

part II 250-256, to the doctrine of the two natures. The expression δυο οὐσιαι χριστου occurs for the first time in a fragment of Melito, the authenticity of which, however, is doubted, Harnack, D. G. I 165, according to Loofs, Herzog3 4, 31 wrongly. Irenaeus does not yet have the formula of the two natures, but teaches clearly that Christ is truly the Son, the Logos, and Himself God, that He as such became man, and that this incarnate Logos is an indissoluble unity. He is vere homo et vere deus, adv. haer. IV 6, 7, it is one and the same Christ who created the world and who was born and died, III 9, 3. 16, 6. 19, 1 etc. Tertullian teaches likewise and speaks still more strongly of two substances in Christ, carnea and spiritalis, of two conditiones, divina et [241] humana, de carne Chr. 5, and assumed in Him duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem verum, adv. Pr. 27. Soon thereafter in the West, for this doctrine of Christ the formula was used that He was una persona with duo naturae. Augustine regularly expresses himself thus; ita vero inter Deum et homines mediator apparuit, ut in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam, et solita sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret, Ep. ad Volus. 3. In the East, however, the terminology, as in the doctrine of the Trinity, remained for a long time unstable and therefore susceptible to all manner of misunderstanding. The words οὐσια, φυσις, ὑποστασις, προσωπον still lacked strict definition and were therefore used interchangeably; even Cyril still often designates the human nature of Christ as ὑποστασις instead of as φυσις, and then yet again speaks of one nature in Christ, μια σεσαρκωμενη φυσις; the union of both natures was designated by Gregory Naz. and Nyss. as a μιξις, ἀνακρασις, and by Cyril as a ἑνωσις φυσικη or κατα φυσιν; and that which came about through the hypostatic union was more than once called not εἰς but ἐν, Schwane, D. G. II 294 f. 341 f. The epistola dogmatica

of Pope Leo the Great to Flavianus, however, contributed much to promote also in the East clear insight and precise usage of language in the doctrine of Christ, Halm, Bibl. der Symbole u. Glaubensregeln3 321-330. And at Chalcedon, after rejection of Nestorianism, Patripassianism, Eutychianism etc., the confession of Christ was established as of one and the same Son and Lord, τελειον τον αὐτον ἐν θεοτητι και τελειον τον αὐτον εν ανθρωποτητι, θεον αληθως και ἀνθρωπον αληθως τον αυτον,..... ἐνα και τον αὐτον χριστον, υἱον, κυριον, μονογενη, ἐν δυο φυσεσιν (according to the original reading; not ἐκ δυο φυσεων) ἀσυγχυτως, ἀτρεπτως, ἀδιαιρετως, ἀχωριστως γνωριζομενον, Hahn, ib. 166.

4. Therewith the boundaries were sharply and clearly drawn, within which the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ could be further developed. But it was far from the case that by this agreement was obtained earlier and later. The question: what think ye of the Christ? has in Christian life and also in theology elicited all manner of answers; it has divided the heads and hearts of men through all centuries [242]. Even within those churches which together accept the Chalcedonense, in spite of all agreement there is nevertheless also still considerable difference. In the theology of the East the fundamental thought remained this, that God himself had to become man, in order that man might become partaker of the Divine nature, immortality, eternal life, the θεωσις. The consequences of sin are much more physical than ethical in nature, and therefore alongside rationalism in the Greek church mysticism always runs. This mysticism had to lead to this, that, even if the human nature of Christ was also acknowledged, the strongest emphasis nevertheless fell on his Godhead, on the entering of the Divine nature into the human, on the unity of both, on the essence of Christ more than on his historical appearance, on his incarnation more than on his

satisfaction. With the person of Christ, therefore, it depended especially on his Divine essence, which was communicated in human form and thus is received and enjoyed by man. For a strict distinction of the two natures, therefore, there was by no means any need felt; it is lacking in Athanasius, the Cappadocians, indeed even still in part in Cyril; the Greek reading of the Chalcedonense is a correction of the original text; the expression ἐν δυο φυσεσιν has been replaced by ἐκ δυο φυσεων. Monophysitism was in the East a power; however much condemned and suppressed, it nevertheless kept coming to the surface again, in the doctrine of the theopaschites, of the aphthartodocetes, of the aktistetes and of the monotheletes; it contributed to wiping out the boundary line between the Divine and the human and to making the churches in the East more and more ripe for destruction in Heathendom, cf. deel II 292. 293.

In contrast, the West strictly distinguished between the divine and the human nature of Christ; the terminology of una persona and duo naturae had already been fixed since Tertullian; the emphasis lay more on the ethical than on the physical, more on satisfaction, suffering, and death than on the incarnation. Yet here, too, not every danger of the deification of the human nature of Christ was avoided. The East took almost no notice of the West and in particular did not at all undergo the influence of Augustine. But conversely, the West did adopt the theology and specifically also the mysticism of [243] the East. Thereby, in the Latin church and theology as well, the thought of a deification of the human penetrated. Mystical contemplation, the doctrine of the donum superadditum, transubstantiation, all rest on the thought that the finite can have a share in the infinite. This could not remain without influence on Christology, for the human nature was united with the Godhead more closely than any other creature. If Adam

through the donum superadditum, if the believers through the gratia infusa, if the mystics through contemplation already became partakers of the divine nature and in a certain sense were deified, cf. part I 220v. 276v. II 152v. 518. 522v., then this had to be the case in a much stronger measure still in the case of the man Christ. Entirely in agreement with Joh. Damascenus, de fide orthod. III 3. 7. 17. 19, cf. Dorner, Lehre v. d. Person Christi II 267 f., scholastic and Roman theology therefore taught that each nature in Christ indeed remains itself and that the communication of the divine properties to the human nature is not to be thought of as real, but that nevertheless the divine nature wholly penetrates and permeates the human, as heat does iron, and makes it partaker of the divine glory and wisdom and power (περιχωρησις, θεωσις). From that it is then inferred that Christ as man already here on earth possessed the scientia beata, the visio Dei; Jesus was already on earth a comprehensor ac viator, walking by sight and not by faith; of faith and hope there can and may be no question in His case. Further, all the gifts for which the human nature of Christ was capable were granted to Him not gradually, but immediately, all at once at His incarnation. As man He did indeed remain finite and limited; He also had in the state of His humiliation all kinds of defects (susceptibility to suffering and death) and affects (affections of sorrow, hunger, cold, etc.). But He nevertheless received at His incarnation all at once all the wisdom of which His human nature was capable. His increase therein, Luke 2:52, is to be understood not objectively but subjectively; it seemed so to others; He also did not pray out of need, but only for our sake, to give us an example. Jesus was actually never a child; He was immediately a man. And because His human nature is thus so glorified and deified by the divine, therefore it too has a right to and is also a [244] object of worship; indeed every part of the

human nature of Christ, such as in particular the sacred heart, is worthy of divine veneration. Cf. Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 9. 13 sq. 23. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 7-15. 25. 33. 34. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 6. Bellarminus, de Christo III. IV. Petavius, de incarn. X. XI. Theol. Wirceb. IV 260 sq. Scheeben, Dogm. III 1-261. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. III 213 f. Pesch, Prael. IV 86 sq. 111 sq. Jansen, Prael. II 669. C. v. Schaezler, Das Dogma v. d. Menschw. Gottes 1870 S. 164 f. Simar, Dogm. 420 f.

The same fundamental idea we encounter in Lutheran theology. But it is nevertheless worked out and applied differently here. Greek and Roman theology did indeed teach a communication of divine gifts, but not of divine attributes to human nature; and they also did indeed teach a true and essential communication of the divine attributes, but then not to human nature as such, but to the hypostasis of both natures. Luther, however, taught that already in the state of humiliation the humanity of Christ was where the divinity was, and that both natures were united and mixed with one another with their attributes not only in the person but also mutually, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 392. f. Therefore the Roman theologians could unanimously combat the Lutheran Christology and especially the doctrine of ubiquity, Bellarminus, de Christo III 9. Petavius, de incarn. X 7-10 etc. But yet there is, here as in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, affinity. The Lutherans do indeed expressly teach that the two natures in Christ are never mixed or changed into one another, but that each of the two remains itself unto eternity and retains its essential attributes and never receives the attributes of the other nature as its own, Form. Conc. ed. Müller 675.676. Nor do they say that all divine attributes are communicated to human nature in the same sense and in the same degree; the quiescent attributes of infinity etc. were not bestowed upon it itself directly, but only through mediation of

the other attributes; the operative ones, however, such as omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, became directly and immediately the portion of human nature; and one even often ascribed to it not only the multivolipraesentia or ubiquitas in the sense of Chemniz [245] but specifically the omnipraesentia, ib. 685 sq. And in substance Roman and Lutheran theology agree in this, that they elevate human nature above the limits set for it and dissolve the human development of Jesus together with the state of his humiliation into appearance. In Lutheran theology that has already emerged very clearly. At the incarnation, namely, a distinction was indeed made not temporally but logically between the incarnatio (assumtio carnis) and the exinanitio (conceptio in utero). Of the former the Logos alone is the subject; and it consists in this, that he makes the human nature, finite in itself, capable of the indwelling of the fullness of the Godhead and communicates to it the above-mentioned divine attributes. But in this way not only the distinction between divine and human nature but also that between the state of humiliation and of exaltation threatened to be lost entirely. Therefore it was assumed that in the second moment, in the exinanitio, of which not the Logos but the God-man was the subject, he had again in a certain sense laid aside the attributes first communicated. But about the nature of this exinanitio there was great difference and there was even waged between the Giessen and Tübingen theologians a protracted (1607-1624) struggle. According to the Tübingen theologians Christ laid aside only the public use of those attributes; he did indeed retain them and he also used them, for the distinction between potentia and actus does not apply to the divine attributes; a potential omnipresence, omniscience etc. is absurd; but Christ used those communicated attributes in the state of his humiliation only in a latent, hidden way (κρυψις χρησεως); the state of

exaltation is nothing other than a visible display of what invisibly already existed from the hour of conception onward. In this way, however, the whole human development of Jesus, his increase in knowledge and wisdom, his hungering and thirsting, his suffering and dying, became mere appearance. And therefore the Giessen and the later Lutheran theologians preferred to say that Christ in the moment of the exinanitio had laid aside the whole use of the communicated attributes (κενωσις χρησεως); he did indeed retain them, but only potentia, not actu; only at the exaltation did he also take them into use. Cf. Chemniz. de duabus naturis in Christo 1570. [246] Gerhard, Loc. IV c. 11-14. Quenstedt III 79 sq. Hollaz 765 sq. Buddeus, Inst. theol. IV c. 2 and further Dorner, Entw. II 771-847. Gesch. der prot. Theol. 569 f. Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel III 165-396. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. § 26 Id. Zur kirchl. Christologie. Die orthodoxe Lehre vom doppelten Stande Christi nach luth. und ref. Fassung 1868. Sartorius, Christi Person und Werk I3 520 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 1 S. 243 f. Herzog1 art. Double state of Christ. Herzog2 art. Kenotiker und Kryptiker. Herzog3 art. Comm. idiom.

The Reformed were from the beginning in a much more favorable condition; they have also in the doctrine of Christ in principle overcome the Greek, Roman, and Lutheran mingling of the divine and the human. Although maintaining the unity of the person in the strictest manner, they have also applied to the human nature of Christ the rule: finitum non est capax infiniti and have maintained this not only in the state of humiliation but even also in that of exaltation. Thus Reformed theology obtained room for a purely human development of Christ, for a successive communication of gifts, for an essential distinction between humiliation and exaltation. And yet in doing so it has earnestly avoided Nestorianism, of which it was

always accused. And that came about because in Greek, Roman, and Lutheran theology the emphasis always fell on the incarnation of the divine being, of the divine nature. If that nature does not become flesh, the work of salvation, communion with God, seems to be endangered. But Reformed theology places in the foreground that the person of the Son became flesh; not the substance but the subsistentia of the Son assumed our nature. In that person the unity of the two natures, in spite of the strict distinction of both, is immovably established. As in the doctrine of the Trinity, of man as the image of God, and of the covenants, so also here in the doctrine of Christ the Reformed thought of personal, conscious life as the richest and highest life comes very clearly to the foreground. Cf. Calvin, Inst. II c. 12-14. Beza, de hypostatica duarum in Christo naturarum unione, Tract. Theol. I 625-645 II 74-101. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 652-663. Martyr, Loci Comm. loc. 17 p. 212. Zanchius, de incarnatione Filii Dei, Op. VIII p. 15-296. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 12 sq. [247] Owen, Declaration of the glorious mystery of the person of Christ, God and man, Works, Edinb. I. and more literature in Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. I 259. M. Vitringa V p. 45. 202.

5. All these developments of the doctrine of Christ proceed from and move within the boundaries of the symbolum Chalcedonense. But by no means could all Christians find themselves in this confession. At all times there were those who deviated to the right or to the left and followed in the footsteps of the old Ebionitism or Gnosticism. On the one side stand Arianism, Nestorianism, Socinianism, Deism, Rationalism etc., cf. deel II 260-264, and on the other side Patripassianism, Sabellianism, Monophysitism, medieval Pantheism, Anabaptism, Theosophy etc., cf. deel II 264-268 and further Petavius, de incarnatione I c 1: synopsis haeresum omnium, quae cath. in carnationis fidem oppugnarunt. Forbesius à Corse,

Instruct. hist. theol. lib. 2. 3. 5. 6. M. Vitringa V 46 sq. Baur, Lehre v. d. Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes 1841-43. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi2 1851-54. Réville, Histoire du dogme de la divinité de Jésus-Christ 1869. Münscher-v. Coelln, D. G. Art. Christologie, Kirchenlehre van Loofs in Herzog3 4, 16. Especially in more recent theology the thought has become dominant that the doctrine of the two natures did indeed fit with Greek theology and church, but has now lost for us all religious value, that it has also under the criticism of Socinianism and Rationalism irrevocably fallen and therefore now, in an entirely new, religious-ethical sense, ought to be modified. This new Christology has its principal representatives in Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl.

Kant could not accept the biblical and ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ, because he denied the knowability of the supernatural and, reasoning from the du sollst to the du kannst, had no need of a Redeemer. Christ therefore could for Kant remain only an example of morality and a teacher of virtue. All that Scripture and church further still pronounced of that Christ had only symbolic value. The ecclesiastical Christ is the symbol of the humanity well-pleasing to God; this is the true, only-begotten, much-beloved Son, for whose sake God created the world. The incarnation of Christ symbolizes the arising [248] of the true moral life in man; his vicarious suffering signifies that the moral man in us must atone for the evil of the sensuous man; faith in Christ indicates that man, for his salvation, must believe in the idea of the humanity well-pleasing to God. In one word, the historical man Jesus is no mediator or saviour, but all that the church confesses of that person applies in full to the idea of humanity, Religion ed. Rosenkranz, 69 f. Kant began in the new philosophy with, just like the ancient Gnostics, separating the historical Christ from the ideal one; and others have continued that. Fichte

proceeded from the thought that God and man were absolutely one. But Christ first recognized this unity in himself and clearly expressed it; that is his great, historical significance; thousands have through Him come to this recognition, to this communion with God. But even if this has historically been so, yet it is not thereby said that man cannot from himself, not otherwise than through Christ, come to that communion. If Jesus came back, He would be completely satisfied that Christianity ruled in hearts, even if his person were entirely forgotten. Only the metaphysical, eternal truth, the recognition of unity with God, makes blessed; the historical is a self-standing, transitory fact, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, especially 6th Vorl. With Schelling in his first period the absolute is not an unchangeably existing being but an eternal becoming, which thus in the world comes to revelation as its logos and son. Theology thinks that Christ is the only-begotten and incarnate Son of God. That is incorrect; God is eternal and cannot at a definite moment in time have assumed human nature; Christianity as a historical fact has transitory significance. But the idea remains eternal; the world is the son of God; the incarnation of God consists in this, that the absolute, in order to be itself, comes to revelation in a world, in a multiplicity of individuals, in a rich history, in a historical process. The world is thus God himself in his becoming; the incarnation of God is the principle of all life and history; the finite is the necessary form for the becoming manifest of God; everything must be understood from the idea of the incarnation. And this is also the esoteric truth of Christianity; the historical clothing is only a temporal [249] form for this eternal idea, Vorles. über die Methode des akad. Studiums, 1803, Werke I 5 S. 286 f. Likewise Hegel said that what theology represented symbolically in presentations was converted by philosophy into concepts; Christ is not the

only God-man, but man is essentially one with God and also becomes conscious of this at the highest standpoint of his development, Religionsphilos., Werke XII 235 f. From these philosophical praemisses Marheineke, Rosenkranz, Göschel, Daub, Conradi e. a. did indeed still seek to maintain the incarnation of God in Christ, but Strauss drew the consequences and said in his Leben Jesu, 1835 II 716 f. 734 f., that the idea does not pour out its fullness in one specimen but only in a multiplicity of individuals; humanity is the God become man, who is conceived of the H. Spirit, lives sinlessly, rises from the dead, ascends to heaven etc. In modern dogmatics, which proceeds from this philosophical thought, there therefore remains no place any longer for Christ, other than a religious genius, a teacher of virtue, a prophet, who has understood religion most deeply, has most clearly revealed God's love and has most clearly expressed the unity and communion of God and man; but the person of Christ itself in fact stands outside the essence of Christianity, Strauss, Dogm. II 214 f. Alte u. neue Gl.2 24 f. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 116 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 128. Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. II2 580 f. Lipsius, Dogm.2 § 588. Scholten, Initia c. 4 p. 171. Kielstra, Het godsd. leven 1890 bl. 39. Not without reason did von Hartmann, with a view to this modern theology, speak of a crisis and a Selbstzersetzung des Christendoms, Die Krisis des Christ. u. die moderne Theologie 1880. Die Selbstzersetzung des Christ. u. die Religion der Zukunft3 1888. And Dr. Boekenoogen, Christol. Beschouwingen, Theol. Tijdschr. March, May, Sept. Nov. 1892 Nov. 1897, attempted in vain to maintain the doctrine of Christ in modern dogmatics still as symbolic imagining of religious ideas.

Another direction was taken by Schleiermacher. Although decidedly rejecting the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ, he nevertheless tried to avoid

the error of speculative philosophy, namely, to seek the essence of Christianity in an abstract idea and to detach this from the historical person [250] of Christ. To that end he proceeded from the experience of the congregation, from the Christian consciousness, which has as its content reconciliation and communion with God. The ultimate cause of this is to be found nowhere else than in the founder of the Christian congregation, in whom therefore the God-consciousness must have been present in absolute power. And this strength of his God-consciousness was the being of God in Him, so that He is the religiöse Urbild der menschheid, sinless, perfect, highest product of the human race and at the same time brought forth by a creative act of God as the perfect subject of religion. Not on his doctrine but on his person, not on what He did but on what He was, not on his ethical example but on his religious life does it depend in the first place, Chr. Gl. § 91 f. By thus seeking the realization of the religious idea not in humanity but in the person of Christ, Schleiermacher exercised a powerful influence and again secured for Christology a place in dogmatics. First, Schleiermacher's influence became noticeable in that, in contrast with Kant, Fichte, Hegel, one tried to maintain in Christ a wholly special and entirely unique revelation of God. If the God-consciousness in Christ had been absolute and never disturbed by any sin, God must also have dwelt in Him in a wholly unique way. Naturally one could attempt this in different ways, according as one thought differently about the Trinity. Those who reject the ontological Trinity assume in Christ a special manifestation of God, a perfect indwelling of God, the realization of God's eternal world-thought or human-idea, Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 437-556. Schenkel, Dogm. II 2 S. 717. 724. Ewald, Göschel, Redepenning, Beyschlag etc. Others do indeed acknowledge an ontological Trinity but

think the relation of the Son to the Father as subordinatian, and therefore arrive at an Arian Christology, Thomasius, Kahnis, Gess, Keerl, Hofstede de Groot, Doedes etc. Still others coordinate the Son with the Father and therefore approach the ecclesiastical doctrine, K. I. Nitzsch, Twesten, Müller, Martensen, Sartorius, Liebner, Lange, Voigt, Philippi, Vilmar, Ebrard, Oosterzee e. a. Subsequently, through Schleiermacher there arose in newer Christology an interest, previously unusual, in the human, historical [251] development of the person of Christ. The doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum was therefore all but abandoned; the human nature of Christ was brought to the foreground; the doctrine of the two states was changed into a life of Jesus, and that life was traced in its preparation, development, and influence. Therefore the history of Israel, of the classical world, and especially of Jesus' own time (Neutest. Zeitgesch. of Hausrath, Schürer etc.) became very popular; further, the incarnation had to be regarded as not accidentally necessary on account of sin but as flowing from the idea of God and given with creation itself (Steffens, Göschel, Baader, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Ehrenfeuchter etc.); and then the development of Jesus as man had to be traced in its historical development, until He became second Adam, head of humanity, Centralindividuum (Rothe, Liebner, Schneckenburger, Martensen, Lange, Neander, Kahnis, Beyschlag, Keerl). Finally, in newer Christology, which still held fast to the confession of Christ as God-man, there arose the striving to maintain the unity of these two in another and better way than had occurred in the confession of Chalcedon and ecclesiastical dogmatics. To that end, in part to God himself but then especially to the God-man, the idea of becoming was applied. Schelling began with that in his second period, cf. part II 304 f. The Son was in a certain sense indeed eternal in the

Father, but as generated by the Father, as Son outside (praeter) the Father, He first appears in creation. Even then, however, the Son does not exist as actual, but as a Potenz, which can and must actualize itself. Through the sin of man, however, the world becomes an aussergöttliches Sein, and the Son, who is generated for that world and remains bound to it, acquires a being not inwardly but outwardly independent of the Father, Werke II 3 S. 317 f. He was in an intermediate state, ἐν μορφῃ θεου, He becomes Christ, remains bound to the fallen world, which the Father leaves over to Him, leads it back to the Father himself in the way of self-annihilation and obedience, and thus at the end of the world becomes himself Son in the full sense, II 4 S. 35 f. This thought about the becoming of the God-man had in theosophical circles, e.g. on Baader, Steffens, etc., great influence. And even Rothe and [252] Dorner adopted the thought that God or the Logos came to dwell more in the historical person of Jesus in that same measure as this one developed himself into religious personality, into spirit; the incarnation of God increases with the deification of man. In another and yet related way the explanation of the God-man has been attempted by the doctrine of the κενωσις, i.e. by the supposition that the Logos at the incarnation emptied himself of all or of some properties down to the level of human development and then gradually regained these in the way of development, cf. Gess, Die Lehre v. d. Person Christi 1856 S. 281 f. 309 f. Liebner, Die Chr. Dogm. aus d. christol. Princip, 1849 and Jahrb f. d. Theol. 1858. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 409-445. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. heiligen Liebe II2 21. Lange, Dogm. II 594 f. Ebrard, Dogm. § 350 f. Schöberlein, Prinzip u. System der Dogm. 167 f. Martensen, Dogm. § 133. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis II 1 S. 20 f. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych.2 326 f. Kahnis, Dogm. II 83. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II 137 f. Kübel, Ueber den Unterschied

zw. der posit. u. d. liber. Richtung in der mod. Theol.2 1893 S. 124. H. Schmidt, Zur Lehre v. d. Person Christi, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VII 1896 S. 972-1005, especially 982 f. Godet, Comm. op Joh. 1:14. Grétillat, Exposé IV 180 s. Recolin, La personne de J. C. et la théorie de la kenosis Paris 1890. Saussaye, cf. my Theol. van Ch. d. l. S. 44. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. II 494. Kähler, Herzog3 4.

Finally, Schleiermacher's Christology agrees with that of Ritschl; only it, attaching itself more closely to the philosophy of Kant, lays more emphasis on the work than on the person of Christ and assigns, in the essence of Christianity, a greater place to the ethical. Ritschl too rejects, in the doctrine of Christ, all metaphysics and everything that is condemned by natural science and by historical criticism, e.g. the pre-existence, the supernatural conception, the resurrection, ascension, return. Christ is in that respect an ordinary man. But his peculiarity lay in his calling, in the work that he has done, namely the founding of a kingdom of God. As an ethical person Christ stands high above all men; his will was perfectly one with the will of God, with the plan and the goal, which God, in relation to world and humanity, had [253] set before himself. But for that reason Christ also has great religious significance; in Him God himself, his grace and faithfulness, his will and intention with humanity, has come to revelation; Christ has shown it to us and confirmed with his death, that the kingdom of God is the destination of all men, that his will must become the will of the whole of humanity. Therein consists the royal power, the world-dominion of Christ; and therein also consists his Godhead. Christ is not God in a metaphysical sense, but the name God indicates in Him his rank and station, is not a name of essence but an official name; Christ may be called God because He, with respect to us, takes the place of God and the value of God, Ritschl, Rechtf.

u. Vers III2 358 f. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 1881 S. 295 f. Id. Brauchen wir ein neues Dogma, 1890 S. 49-72. Id. Dogmatik 1897 S. 404 f. Schultz, on Rom. 9:5, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. XIII 1868 S. 462-507 Die Lehre v. d. Gottheid Christi 1881. Gottschick, Die Kirchlichkeit der s. g. kirchl. Theologie 1890 S. 207. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 513. Lobstein, Etudes Christologiques, Strassb. 1892. Chapuis, La transformation du dogme christol. au sein de la théol. moderne, Lausanne Bridel 1893.

6. The doctrine of Christ is not the point of departure but indeed the centre of the whole of dogmatics. All other dogmas prepare for it or are derived from it. In it, as the heart of dogmatics, the whole religious-ethical life of Christendom beats. It is the μυστηριον εὐσεβειας, 1 Tim. 3:16. From this all doctrine of Christ has to proceed. If, however, Christ is the Word become flesh, then the incarnation is also the central fact of the whole of world history, then it must be prepared from the times of the ages and continue to work after and through into all eternity. Schelling rightly says that it must be difficult for someone, einer Persönlichkeit, die ihm nicht eher als von dem Augenblick an bekannt ist, wo sie in menschlicher Gestalt erschienen ist, die für ihn eine bloss historische ist, es muss ihm ungemein schwer fallen, einer solchen Persönlichkeit nachher eine vormenschliche, ja vorweltliche Existenz zuzuschreiben; er wird sich natürlich geneigt finden, diess nur als eine Vorstellung anzusehen, mit der im weiteren Fortgang die Person des grossen Religionsstifters umgeben und verherrlicht worden, Werke II 4 [254] S. 35. Quite different does this become, if, like every fact of revelation, so also the person of Christ is in the first place considered theologically. In the first place, the incarnation then has its presupposition and foundation in the trinitarian being of God. In deism and pantheism, there is no place for an incarnation of God; there God is separated from

world and man in an abstract manner, here God loses himself in the creatures and has no being and life of his own. It is therefore quite natural, if from this standpoint the incarnation is rejected as absurd. The Socinians came out openly for this and made their exegesis serviceable to this dictum rationis, Cat. Rac. qu. 98. 111; they called the incarnation a human dream-image and a monstrous dogma, and considered it easier that a man should be a donkey than that God became man, Fock, Der Socin. 525. Likewise Spinoza said that the becoming-man of God was just as absurd as that circulus naturam quadrati induerit, Ep. 21, cf. also Bretschneider II 195. Wegscheider § 128. Schleiermacher § 96. Strauss II 153 etc. Only the theistic and trinitarian confession of God's being opens the possibility for the fact of the incarnation. For here God remains who he is and yet can communicate himself to others. If, according to the word of Vinet, one must first have oneself in order to give oneself, then absolute love is only to be conceived as perfection of a triune Divine being. For then alone is there a distinction between being and person, and therefore communion of man through the person with the being of God, without this being being identified with man or overflowing into him. The Trinity, in a word, makes it possible that there be a mediator, who himself partakes of both the Divine and the human nature and thus connects God and man with one another. However much, then, the theosophy of Böhme and Schelling went astray when it attempted to derive the becoming-man from the being of God, yet the trinitarian being is the presupposition and condition of the incarnation of God, Dorner, Gl. II 394.

It is therefore also important to maintain that not the Divine nature as such, but specifically the Person of the Son became man. The patripassianism of Praxeas, Hermogenes, Noëtus, Beron, Beryllus,

Sabellius, cf. M. Vitringa V 52. Dorner, Entw. I 518, has been condemned by the church at all times, e.g. [255] at the synod of Aquileia, and no longer occurs in this form. But according to its basic idea it is proper to all pantheistic systems, especially those of Hegel, Schelling, von Hartmann etc., which conceive the absolute not as being but as becoming and let the Divine pour itself out into the world and come to an end; the world and humanity with all its pain and misery is then a moment in the life of God, the history of revelation is then the history of the suffering of God, cf. also A. von Oettingen, Das göttliche noch nicht, Leipzig 1895. Although in this now also, as will appear presently, a component of truth can be recognized, yet Holy Scripture always ascribes the incarnation to the Son, Joh. 1:14, Phil. 2:6, Hebr. 2:14, 15. Indeed the Reformed preferred to speak of the fact that the person of the Son, rather than with the Lutherans, that the Divine nature in Christ had become man. By that they did not wish to deny that the fullness of the Godhead dwelt bodily in Christ, Col. 2:9, that the Son partakes of the same Divine essence with the Father and the Spirit, and thus insofar also the Divine nature had assumed our flesh. But yet, against all mixing, they emphasized that the person of the Son, in whom the Divine nature existed in a particular manner, had assumed the human nature. The difference is certainly not of great significance, as Mastricht V 4, 15, Moor III 480 remark, but yet it is noteworthy that many Lutherans prefer to express themselves thus, that the Divine nature in the person of the Son has become man; it undoubtedly stands in connection with their basic idea. But the Reformed gave preference to the manner of speaking that the person of the Son immediately and the Divine nature in Him mediately was united with the human nature, Zanchius VIII 47. Polanus VI c. 13. Synopsis XXV 8. Alting, Loci Comm. p. 74. Maresius, Syst. IX 12. M. Vitringa V 51. 63.

Thus it had also earlier been taught by the patres and confessed by the church. The 6th Synod at Toledo 638 declared: although the whole trinity cooperates in the incarnation, because all works of the trinity are inseparabilia, solus (Filius) tamen accepit hominem in singularitate personae, non in unitate divinae naturae, in id quod est proprium Filii, quod non commune trinitati, Hahn, Bibl. d. Symbole u. Glaubensregeln3 237; cf. also Anselmus with Dorner II 376. [256] Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 5. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 3 art. 4. Bellarminus, Contr. I lib. 3 c. 8. Becanus, Theol. schol. III 1 c. 4 qu. 1 etc. Questions, such as were treated in scholasticism on Sent. III dist. 1, whether also the Father and the H. Spirit could have become man, therefore need not cease. The Father could not be sent, for He is the first in order and exists of himself; the H. Spirit proceeds from the Son, follows after Him and is sent by Him. But the Son is the one designated for the incarnation. He occupies in the Divine being the place between Father and Spirit, is Son and Image of God by nature, was already Mediator in the first creation and could as Son restore us again to children of God, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 1. Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 3 art. 8. Petavius, de incarn. II 15. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. III 180 f. Turretinus, Th. El. XIII qu. 4. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 266. Dorner, Gl. II 394. Yet, although the incarnation is subjective and terminative only proper to the Son, it is nevertheless originaliter, principiative, quoad efficientiam a work of the whole trinity; Christ is sent by the Father and conceived of the H. Spirit. Reformed theology already gave expression to this in its doctrine of the pactum salutis. The whole work of re-creation is not merely a decree of God, it rests on the free, conscious deliberation of the three persons; it is an opus personale, not naturale. The Father is eternally in the Son the Father of His children; the Son is eternally their Surety and Mediator; the H. Spirit is

eternally their Comforter. Not only after the fall, not even only at the creation, but in eternity the foundations of the covenant of grace have been laid. And the incarnation is no accidental decision that arose later; it is intended and determined from eternity. There was no time when the Son was not. There was also no time when the Son did not know and was not willing to assume the human nature from the fallen race of Adam. The incarnation is prepared from eternity; it does not rest in the essence but in the persons; it is not a necessity as in pantheism but also not an arbitrariness or chance as in pelagianism.

7. Apart from the Trinity, the incarnation further has its presupposition and preparation in creation. Creation gives [257] existence to finite, limited beings; it is absolutely impossible that God would create something which in essence was like Him and were God. God has therefore eternally conceived finite creatures and has also given them existence within the necessary limits of space and time. In those creatures He has thus, as it were, limited His eternal thoughts, His infinite omnipotence. Specifically, the creation of man after God's image is a presupposition and preparation of the becoming-man of God. Under the influence of the pantheistic doctrine of identity and also in connection with the Lutheran communicatio idiomatum, more recent theology has made much misuse of this. In place of the old finitum non est capax infiniti it set the rule: homo divinae naturae capax, pointed to the affinity of God and man, erased the distinction of both, and proceeded from the thought that for the perfection of both the becoming-man was necessary, Dorner, Entw. II 1227. This is forbidden by Christian theism. But yet, man is akin to God, His image, His son, His offspring; and therefore the becoming-man of God is possible, Thomas, Bonaventura e. a. on Sent. III dist. I, so that questions whether God can also

assume the nature of a stone, a plant, or an animal, Sent. III dist. 2, as Occam answered affirmatively, Stöckl, Philos. d. M. A. II 1620, are out of place. And if God then creates man after His image, and in that man dwells and works with His Spirit, causes influences to go out upon his heart and head, speaks to him and makes Himself known and understood to him, then that is a descent of God to, an accommodation to His creature, an anthropomorphizing of God, and thus in a certain sense and insofar a becoming-man of God. With and in creation the possibility of revelation and also of the becoming-man is given. Whoever deems the incarnation impossible must, upon reflection, also come to the denial of creation; whoever accepts the latter has in principle lost the right to combat the former. Earlier, part II 310. 401, it has appeared that the possibility of creation is given with the generation of the Son; if God were incommunicable, He would have been able to give life neither to the Son nor to any creature. Now it must be added that, if God has been able to create and has been able to reveal Himself to beings essentially distinct from Him, then He must also be able to become man. For the [258] becoming-man is certainly indeed distinct from all other revelation, but it is nevertheless also related to it, it is its point, its crown, its completion, cf. Athan. and Greg. Nyss. with Harnack, D. G. II 167. All revelation works toward and groups itself around the incarnation, as the highest, richest, most perfect revelation. Generation, creation, incarnation stand in close connection, even though the following does not proceed necessarily from the preceding. But there is more. Creation itself is already to be thought infralapsarian and Adam was already a type of Christ. This is unacceptable from the standpoint of those who think that God proceeded to creation without counsel and decision and in creation passively awaited what man

would do. But Scripture teaches otherwise. In the creation of Adam God already reckoned on the Christ. Creation itself in this sense already prepared the incarnation. The world is so created that it, falling, could be raised up again; humanity is so organized under one head that it, sinning, could be gathered together again under another head; Adam is so appointed as head that Christ could immediately take his place; and the covenant of works is so arranged that it, broken, could be healed in the covenant of grace. Therefore one has wrongly thought that the incarnation of God's Son would also have taken place without sin. Among the church fathers this opinion does not yet occur clearly, cf. only Tertullianus, de resurr. carnis 6. adv. Prax. 12. But in scholasticism this question was much discussed; apart from the Trinity the incarnation was an article of faith also before the fall and necessary, in order to bring man to his supernatural goal, cf. part I 518 II 528. The question was therefore answered affirmatively by Rupert v. Deutz, Duns Scotus, Sent. III dist. 7 qu. 3, Alexander Halesius, Albertus Magnus, Joh. Wessel, Catharinus, Pighius, Suarez, cf. also Bellarminus, de Christo V c. 10, who does not decide; further by Osiander, Socinus, Praelect. theol. c. 10; and then by many more recent theologians, Steffens, Göschel, Baader, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Schöberlein, Ebrard, cf. Dorner, Entw. II 1243-1260, Chr. Gl. I 642; many English theologians, who try to explain everything by the incarnation, such as Westcott, Christus Consummator, London 1886 p. 99v. Illingworth, The incarnation in relation to development, 5 essay in Gore's Lux [259] Mundi, also Van Oosterzee, Christol. III 85v. Dogm II 107. 495 etc. It is understandable how, by reasoning, one came to this opinion. A fact such as the becoming-man of God cannot be accidental, and cannot have its cause in sin as an accidental and arbitrary act of man; sin may be able to modify

God's plan, it could not destroy it; and therefore the becoming-man must stand fast abstracted from sin; sin only caused that that becoming-man had to take place for the redemption of the sinner. There is then added to that still, that religion before and after the fall cannot differ essentially; if a mediator is now necessary, then such a one was also necessary in religion before the fall; Christ's person and work then also by no means are exhausted in the reconciling of sins, in the acquiring of salvation; He is not only mediator but also head; He is not a means but also an end, Selbstzweck, 1 Cor. 15:45-47, Ef. 1:10, 21-23, 5:31, 32, Col. 1:15-17. He is not there only for the church, the church is also there for Him; the predestination of Christ to glory precedes that of man. These considerations contain so much truth that the assent which the hypothesis of the becoming-man of God outside sin has found cannot be surprising. If the Pelagian freedom of the will is taught and sin is thus for God a contingency and disappointment, there is no better means to unite free will and God's plan with one another than by saying that the becoming-man was nevertheless determined and has only been altered in something subordinate. On the standpoint of Augustine and still more closely of Reformed theology, however, there is no need at all for this whole hypothesis. There is only one plan and decree of God; for another reality than the existing one there is, with a view to God's counsel, no place. However much sin then also came into the world through the will of the creature, it is nevertheless from eternity included in God's counsel and is for Him not contingent or unforeseen. In that eternal counsel the incarnation also has a place on account of sin; it does not depend on man but only on God's good pleasure. Yes more still, the Son was also abstracted from sin for man mediator unionis; many Reformed persons acknowledged this with Calvin, Inst. II

12, 4. 6. Because this was not well understood by Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. I 110 cf. [260] Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 190, he could count Zanchius, Bucanus, Polanus among the proponents of the incarnation outside sin. The intention was only that religion in covenant of works and covenant of grace was essentially one and the same, and salvation thus must always consist in communion with the triune God. Only Comrie, by his strictly maintained supralapsarianism, came to the doctrine that the predestination of man in Christ preceded that of the fall, part II 339. But otherwise most theologians adhered to Scripture, which always and only brings the incarnation of Christ into connection with sin and in it sees the greatest proof of God's mercy, Mt. 1:21, 9:13, 20:28, Luk. 1:67, 2:30, Joh. 1:29, 3:16, Rom. 8:3, Gal. 4:4, 5, 1 Tim. 3:16, Hebr. 2:14, 1 Joh. 3:8 etc. The opposite opinion also so easily leads to the thought that the becoming-man is in itself fitting and necessary for God, that is, to the pantheistic doctrine of the eternal self-revelation of God in the world. Cf. Iren., adv. haer. V c. 14. Greg. Naz., Or. 36. August., de verbis Apost. 8, 2. 7. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 1 art. 3, but otherwise Sent. III 1 qu. 1 art. 3. Bonaventura, Sent. III dist. 1 art. 2 qu. 2. Petavius, de incarn. II c. 17. Schaezler, Das Dogma v. d. Menschw. Gottes 307. Kleutgen, Theol. III 400. Quenstedt II 108-116. Calovius, Isag. ad theol. 59-99. Calvijn, Inst. II 12, 4-7. Mastricht V 4, 17. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 3. Moor III 759. M. Vitringa V 47. J. Müller, Dogm. Abh. 1870 S. 66-126. Philippi, K. Gl. IV 376. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II2 80. Heraut 264. 265. Orr, Chr. View 319-327.

8. A third and final preparation for the incarnation is the history of revelation from paradise onward. The incarnation did not take place immediately after the fall; but many centuries elapsed from the first sin until the coming of Christ in the flesh. Scripture points this out, when it

speaks of the fullness of time, Ef. 1:10, Gal. 4:4, that this was no accident or arbitrariness, but had thus been determined by God in his wisdom. The incarnation first had to be prepared in the preceding history by all manner of means and along all manner of ways. Just as the incarnation presupposes generation and creation [261], so now there is added yet another presupposition and preparation, namely, revelation. It is especially John in his prologue who sets this preparation of the incarnation in the preceding history before us in the light. Not only was the Logos in the beginning with God and himself God; and not only are all things made through him. But this Logos has also, from the moment of creation onward, communicated his life and light to the creatures. For in him was life and the life was the light of men. Even after the fall this revelation did not cease. On the contrary, the light of that Logos shone in the darkness and enlightened every man, coming into the world. In particular he revealed himself in Israel, which he had chosen for himself as an inheritance, and as Angel of the Covenant led and blessed. He continually came to his own, in theophany, prophecy, and miracle. Thus the Son prepared and made ready the whole world, Jews and Gentiles together, for his coming in the flesh. World and humanity, land and people, manger and stable, Bethlehem and Nazareth, parents and blood relatives, nature and environment, society and civilization, it is all a moment in the fullness of the times, in which God sent his Son in the flesh. It was the Son himself, who thus immediately after the fall as Logos and as Angel of the Covenant made ready the world of the Gentiles and of the Jews for his coming. He was coming from the beginning of the times onward and finally came for good into humanity and by his incarnation made his dwelling in it. Cf. Baldensperger, Der Prolog. des vierten Evangeliums, Freiburg Mohr 1898. The incarnation connects with

the preceding, both general and special revelation. It stands and falls with this. For if God has been able to reveal himself in such a way as Scripture testifies with respect both to the Gentile world and to Israel, then the possibility of the incarnation lies therein of itself enclosed; and if the latter were not possible, the former also would not be maintainable. Revelation, after all, rests on the same thought as the incarnation, i.e. on the communicability of God, both within the being of God to the Son (generation) and outside the being of God to the creatures (creation). This whole preparation of the incarnation in the preceding centuries now, as it were, concentrates itself and is completed in the election and bestowal of grace upon Mary as mother of Jesus. Mary is the blessed [262] among women. She has received an honor which has fallen to no other creature. High in unmerited grace, bestowed upon her, she surpasses all men and angels. Rome has rightly maintained this; whoever denies it is not in earnest about the incarnation of God. Only, the Roman church has, without any ground, proceeded from this acknowledgment to the doctrine of the immaculata conceptio B. Virginis, see above 211v. What has guided it therein and brought it thereto is not the authority of Scripture or of tradition; nor is it the attempt to explain and to guarantee thereby the sinlessness of Jesus, for this rests causally in his divine nature and instrumentally in the conception by the Holy Spirit. But the driving force for this dogma lies again for Rome in the hierarchical idea. In proportion as a creature stands nearer to God, it must also all the more have a share in his nature and in all his attributes; it must all the more share in the θεωσις, in the deificatio. Now above Mary no creature stands; she is united with God in the closest manner, she is θεοτοκος, Deipara, she has carried God’s own Son under her heart, God himself has dwelt in her. Whether there are proofs from

Scripture and tradition is not the main point; but the Roman cannot think of the mother of the Savior otherwise than above all children of men and above all angels of heaven, pleasing to God, pure and spotless. Was she not bound to the God-man, and thus also to the Divine Person of the Word, to holiness itself, by the closest and tenderest relations? Has God, by the fact itself of her election to so high a dignity and so intimate a familiarity, not shown most clearly that he loved that pure virgin above all creatures? And is it therefore also, apart from the proofs from Scripture and tradition, not very plausible that God has endowed the holy virgin above all creatures with his gifts of grace? The honor of the Savior demanded that his chosen mother remain free from every trace and shadow even of sin. It is fitting that a creature which had to associate so intimately with God, stood in so intimate and tender a relation to him, should remain preserved from the least stain of sin. It is fitting that the house of the Lord was holy. Thus Bensdorp in the Katholiek, CXII 1897 bl. 429. 445. 447. In the hierarchical [263] system of the Roman church and theology the doctrine of the immaculate conception, the sinlessness of Mary, fits, and therefore this has gradually been incorporated into it; even the doctrine of her assumption is a question of time. Therefore the predicates ascribed to Mary increase more and more, both in number and in quality; she is daughter of the Father, bride of the Son, temple and organ of the H. Spirit, complementum, Ergänzung der Dreieinigkeit, die instrumentale und theilweise die meritorische Ursache unserer ewigen Auserwählung, the principal reason of natural and supernatural creation, the wise one, working all miracles, equipped with unlimited dominion, almighty ruler of the church, as God rules the world etc., see e.g. Wörnhart, Maria die wunderbare Mutter Gottes und der Menschen, Innsbrück 1890 S. 13. 19. 244. 289, also Petavius, de incarn.

XIV. Scheeben, Dogm. 69. 93, a Jesuit Salazar in Rivetus, Op. III 681. Mariolatry with Rome displaces true, Christian worship of God entirely and completely. Prof. Schoeler, Das vatik. Bild, Gütersloh 1898 sees this superstition typically expressed in a wall painting in the Vatican, which represents the Madonna, placed high in the middle, while Father and Son, as instruments of her almighty will, are seated on the right and left side. It is against this deification of man that the Reformation rose in protest. It would not be surprising if, out of fear of such an idolatry, it had not always shown to Mary the honor due to her. But that too is not the case, although it was of course cautious in its praise. Mary also stands in high honor with all Protestants who confess the incarnation of the Word. She has been chosen and prepared by God to be the mother of his Son. She is the graced one among women. She has been desired by Christ himself as his mother, who received him from the H. Spirit, who bore him under her heart, who nursed him at her breast, who instructed him in the Scriptures, in whom, in one word, the preparation of the incarnation was completed.

9. Yet, although Christ in his incarnation connects with the preceding revelation and by nature and history prepared his own coming, He is not a product of the past, no fruit of Israel or of humanity. Up to [264] a certain extent it holds true of every human being, that he cannot be fully explained from his parents and environment. Therefore Kuenen too, G. v. I. II 506v., Volksgodsd. en Wereldgodsd. 158. 193, after he had indicated the conditions and building materials for Christianity, could acknowledge that thereby the person of Christ is still not understood. But it holds true of Christ in another and higher sense than was meant by him. For according to Scripture, in Christ that Word has become flesh, which in the beginning was with God and itself was God. At all times and from all sides this divinity of

Christ has been denied and contested. But 1o Scripture teaches nothing else, above bl. 231, 238. We are, as Ch. de la Saussaye once said, accustomed to the superlatives of Holy Scripture and often no longer understand the force of its expressions. But if a human being spoke of himself as Jesus always did, if others so venerated a human being as prophets and apostles do the Christ, then everyone would hold that for insane fanaticism or dreadful blasphemy. Scripture ascribes to Christ, not in a single place but repeatedly, a personal eternal pre-existence, Joh. 1:1, 8:58, 17:5, Rom. 8:3, 2 Cor. 8:9, Gal. 4:4, Phil. 2:6, a divine Sonship in a supernatural sense, Mt. 3:17, 11:27, 28:19, Joh. 1:14, 5:18, Rom. 8:32, the creation and the preservation of all things, Joh. 1 3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Ef. 3:9, Col. 1:16, 17, Hebr. 1:3, Op. 3:14, the acquisition for all and each of all salvation and blessedness, Mt. 1:21, 18:11, Joh. 1:4, 16, 14:6, Hd. 4:12, 1 Cor. 1:30, the kingship in the church, Mt. 3:2, 5:11, 10:32, 37, Joh. 18:37, 1 Cor. 11:3, Ef. 1:22, Col. 1:18, the dominion over all things, Mt. 11:27, 28:18, Joh. 3:35, 17:2, Hd. 2:33, 1 Cor. 15:27, Ef. 1:20-22, Phil. 2:9, Col. 2:10, Hebr. 2:8, the judgment over the living and the dead, Joh. 5:27, Hd. 10:42, 17:31, Rom. 14:10, 2 Cor. 5:10; it calls Him directly and unambiguously by the name of God, Joh. 1:1, 20:28, Rom. 9:5, 2 Thess. 1:12, Tit. 2:13, 2 Petr. 1:1, Hebr. 1:8, 9, cf. Cremer, s. v. θεος. 2o It is true that all contesting of the divinity of Christ begins with an appeal to Scripture against the confession. But this illusion lasts only a very short time. Impartial exegesis soon shows that the doctrine of the church has far more ground in Scripture than one [265] originally had expected. Thus one then sees oneself compelled to go back again from the Christ of the apostolic proclamation to the Jesus of the Synoptics and then to criticize this for so long until all the supernatural disappears from it. The divinity of Christ can then be declared to be a fruit of profound theological or

philosophical speculation, originally wholly foreign to the church, Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 522. Schultz, Gottheit Christi 417 f. 438. 468. This, however, always lasts only so long as one sets store by it and has an interest in presenting one's own faith as the original, pure Christianity. As soon as that standpoint is abandoned, impartiality resumes its voice and gives the ecclesiastical confession its due. Negari nequit, in dictis eorum (scriptorum s.) semina quaedam doctrinae ecclesiasticae vere inesse, Wegscheider § 128. Es ist unleugbar, dass auch dasjenige, was die Kirchenlehre über die göttliche Natur Christi lehrt, Stützpunkte im N. T. besitzt, Nitzsch ib. 518. 521, cf. also Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 353. 418. Baldensperger, Der Prolog. des vierten Ev. 4 f. Thereby the explanation of this dogma from later, theological or philosophical speculation again falls away. 3o. Just as the study of Scripture, so dogma-historical research also again and again sets the seal of truth upon the ecclesiastical confession of the divinity of Christ. The development of the Christological dogma shows a logical course, which in the end is noticed and acknowledged by every investigator, v. Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christ. 6. Simple was the faith with which the church stepped forth into the world. But it knew one thing, that in Christ God himself had come to it and had taken it up into his communion. That stood firm, that it did not allow to be taken from it, that it defended against all manner of contesting and formulated clearly and distinctly in its confession. In the doctrine of the divinity of Christ it maintained the absolute character of the Christian religion, the reality of its communion with God. In Christianity Christ occupies a wholly different place than Buddha, Zarathustra, Mohammed in their religions. Christus ist nicht der Lehrer, nicht der Stifter, er ist der Inhalt des Christenthums, Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 35, cf. v. Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christ. 1880 S. 1. Strauss,

Dogm. II 174. Therefore, judged according to the doctrine of Scripture and the faith of the church, [266] in the end men such as Irenaeus, Athanasius, Augustine are again and again put in the right over against their opponents. Everyone counts agreement with them as an honor; no one is gladly named after Arius, Pelagius, or Socinus. 4o. It is clear that the Christian religion, i.e. the true communion of God and human being, cannot be maintained otherwise than by the confession of the divinity of Christ. For if Christ is not true God, then He is only a human being. And however highly He may then be placed, He can be neither in his person nor in his work content and object of the Christian faith. Whether Christ then for himself stood in unbroken communion with God (Schleiermacher), first pronounced the unity of God and human being (Hegel), fully realized the sonship of God in himself (Lipsius), revealed God's love and founded the kingdom of God (Ritschl); Christianity is now nevertheless, now that it once exists, independent of Him; He is its founder, historically his significance remains great, and his example continues to work, but He himself stands outside the essence of Christianity. The Arian Christology, the moral Christology of rationalism, the symbolic of Kant, the ideal of Hegel, the aesthetic of de Wette, the anthropological of Feuerbach, none of them leave to Christ in dogmatics a place. Wird die Persönlichkeit Christi als eine menschliche, wenn auch noch so sehr idealisirte, festgehalten, so kann nicht sie selbst als Persönlichkeit die erlösende Kraft für den Gläubigen sein, v. Hartmann ib. 15. 5o. Ritschl and his followers, however, still try to maintain for Jesus, although only human, the title of God, because He for the church takes the place of God and possesses the value of God. Formerly this was attempted in the same way by the Socinians. They contested the divinity of Christ as strongly as possible and said that Christ, in those few Scripture passages

where He was called God, such as Joh. 1:1, 20:28, Rom. 9:5, was thus called on account of his rank, dignity, and dominion, to which He especially after his resurrection was exalted, Cat. Rac. qu. 94-190. Christ works by divine power those same things, quae ipsius Dei sunt, tanquam Deus ipse, ib. 120. 164. Hoc nomen Deus non est nomen substantiae cujusdam proprium vel personae, sed auctoritatis, potentiae, just as also angels and authorities in Scripture [267] according to Jesus' own word, Joh. 10:34, are sometimes called Gods, Socinus, on Joh. 1:1. The same is now taught by Ritschl and his school; the name of God is indeed used in Scripture and in the church for Christ, but is then an office-name, not an essence-name. This representation, however, is wholly untenable. Indeed angels and authorities are sometimes called God in Scripture, but then the figurative, official sense is clear and strikes everyone's eye. With Christ that is a wholly different case. To Him a personal, eternal continuance is ascribed; of Him it is said that He was God, existed in his form, was the radiance of God's glory, only-begotten Son of God, Image of the invisible God, indeed God above all to be praised unto eternity—who can possibly understand this of a human being, who only on account of the office that he bore and the work that he did received the honorary title of God? Further, the Christian church, in calling Jesus God, never meant thereby an office-name but always an essence-name. When one begins to use that same word and that same name in a wholly different sense, one intentionally gives occasion for misunderstanding and confusion and makes oneself guilty of dishonesty toward the church. Further, if Christ is not God in an essential sense, then He may also not be so called and venerated. Even if one says that He has perfectly revealed God's love, that He has wholly taken up into himself God's plan with world and humanity, that He has fully made God's will his

own, all this does not justify, on a scriptural, Christian standpoint and also logically and philosophically, for the human being Jesus the designation of God. To be one with God in a religious and ethical sense is something wholly different than to be it in a metaphysical sense. A Werthurtheil is untrue if it does not have its ground in a Seinsurtheil. Finally, the designation and veneration of Jesus as God, while He is only a human being, is a pantheistic mixing of Creator and creature, a pagan idolatry, a return to Roman creature-deification, in direct conflict with the essence of Christianity and with the principle of Protestantism. If Jesus, although only a human being, may be invoked and venerated as God, then thereby in principle also the Roman veneration of Mary, the saints and the angels, and all pagan idolatry [268] is justified. In contesting that God can become human, one at the same time teaches that a human being can indeed raise himself to the rank and dignity of God, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 386 f. 389. 407. 411. 454. 463. Incarnation is impossible, but apotheosis will be able to exist very well. The becoming-human of God is absurd, but the becoming-God of the human being will be reasonable; as if what proceeds from development could ever be God. Το γαρ προκοπτον ού θεος, Greg. Naz. bij Schaezler t. a. p. 56, and cf. further Fock, Der Socin. 538 f. Lipsius, Theol. Jahresbericht X 378, Pfleiderer, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1889 S. 168 f. Dieckhoff, Die Menschw. des Sohnes Gottes. Ein Votum über die Theol. Ritschl's, Leipzig 1882. Stählin, Kant, Lotze, Albr. Ritschl, Leipzig 1888 S. 165 f. Hoensbroech, Christ u. Widerchrist. Ein Beitrag zur Vertheidigung der Gottheit Christi u. zur Char. d. Unglaubens in der prot. Theol. Freiburg 1892.

10. This Son of God became man according to the doctrine of Holy Scripture through conception by the Holy Spirit and through birth from the

virgin Mary. The supernatural conception was already denied in ancient times by the Jews, Eisenmenger, Entd. Judenthum I 105 f., by the Ebionites, by Cerinthus, Carpocrates, Celsus, cf. Moor III 722, deists and rationalists in the previous century, such as Morgan, Chubb, cf. Bretschneider, Entw. 567, by the more recent critics such as Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Renan etc., and in the most recent time by Harnack, Das apost. Glaubensbekenntniss, Berlin 1892; his judgment, that the words: conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the virgin Mary did not constitute a component part of the original proclamation of the gospel, gave occasion for a serious struggle, in which many ranged themselves on his side, such as Achelis, Zur Symbolfrage Berlin 1892, Herrmann, Worum handelt es sich in dem Streit um das Apostolikum? Leipzig 1893. Hering, Die dogm. Bedeutung und der relig. Werth der übernat. Geburt Christi, Zeits. f. Th. u. Kirche von Gottschick, 1895, S. 58-91. Lobstein, Die Lehre v. der übernat. Geburt Christi, 2e Aufl. 1896, but others also decidedly set themselves over against him, especially Wohlenberg, Empfangen vom h. Geist, geboren von der Jungfrau Maria 1893. Cremer, Zum Kampf um das Apostolikum, Berlin 1892, Th. Zahn, Das apost. Symbolum, Erl. u. Leipzig 1893. This struggle [269] gained still more importance through the discovery of a Syriac translation of the gospels by Mrs. Lewis and her sister Mrs. Gibson in a palimpsest of the Katharinenkloster on Sinai in the summer of 1892, The four gospels in Syriac, transscribed from the Sinaitic palimpsest. By the late Robert L. Bensley and by J. Rendel Harris and by F. Crawford Burkitt. With an introd. by Agnes Smith Lewis, Cambridge 1894. Mt. 1:16 indeed reads in this Syriac translation as follows: Joseph, to whom the virgin Mary was betrothed, begot Jesus, who is called Christ, cf. Theol. Tijdschr. May 1895 bl. 258v. Gids, July 1895 bl. 88-104. But even if this Syr. translator were

thereby to deny the supernatural conception of Christ, this fact would stand entirely by itself in the history of the gospel among the Syrians and would have remained without influence. The Syriac diatessaron of Tatian, the Syriac Gospel fragments, published by Cureton in 1858, and all later Syriac editions of the Gospels teach it clearly. Further, the newly found translation in Mt. 1:16 calls Mary virgin and betrothed to Joseph; v. 18 reads likewise as in our Gr. text and thus teaches the conception of the Holy Spirit, likewise v. 20, and with Luke 3:23 it is the same case. There is not the least proof that the Syr. translator by his text of Mt. 1:16 intended to deny the conception of the Holy Spirit, Th. Zahn, Theol. Lit. Blatt 1895 col. 28. But further, the supernatural conception by the Holy Spirit was certainly a component part of the original proclamation of the gospel. The old Roman symbol, which certainly existed before the middle of the second century and probably already toward the end of the first century, already contained the words: qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et Maria virgine, (τον γεννηθεντα ἑκ πνευματος ἁγιου και Μαριας της παρθενου), later somewhat altered for clarification. The opponents of the supernatural conception, including Cerinthus, a contemporary of John, never appealed to the fact that this doctrine had arisen later; in their time this must therefore have been content of the general Christian faith; there is not a single ground and it is moreover also strange, to hold the heretics Cerinthus etc., with Harnack, for the pure bearers and preservers of the faith of the first Christian congregation. Further, this doctrine is found in the letters of Ignatius, ad [270] Smyrn. I 1-3, ad Eph. VII 1-2, who suffered martyrdom about the year 117, and in the Apology of the philosopher Aristides of Athens found some time ago, which he presented in the year 125 to Emperor Hadrian. It must all the more have been content of the apostolic preaching, because the pagan fables of

sons of gods would otherwise certainly have deterred the Christians from a doctrine that seemed so closely related to them. Of an influence of those pagan fables on the origin of the evangelical narrative of the supernatural conception, as Usener, Religionsgesch. Untersuchungen, I Das Weihnachtsfest Bonn 1880 S. 69 f. and Hillmann, Die Kindheitsgesch. Jesu nach Lukas, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol., 1891 S. 192 f. assumed, there is nowhere any trace; Harnack, Theol. Lit. Z. 1889 No 8 therefore explains it only from Jewish data, specifically from an incorrect exegesis of Isa. 7:14, cf. also Weiss, Leben Jesu I 217 f. Finally, it occurs indeed in the N. T. directly only in Matthew and Luke, but that which it comes down to in these narratives in Matthew and Luke is the doctrine of all evangelists and apostles. Jesus is namely, in the first place, genealogically a son of David; for that he was generally held, by the crowd that surrounded Him time and again, and by all His disciples, Mt. 1:1, 20, 9:27, 12:23, 15:22, 20:30, 31, 21:9, 15, 22:42-45, Mk. 10:47, 11:10, 12:35-37, Luke 1:27, 32, 69, 18:38, 39, 20:41-44, John 7:42, Acts 2:30, 13:23, Rom. 1:3, 9:5, 2 Tim. 2:8, Hebr. 7:14, Rev. 3:7, 5:5, 22:16. Further, He is the Holy One, who has never done or known any sin, Mt. 7:11, 11:29, 12:50, Mk. 1:24, Luke 1:35, John 4:34, 6:38, 8:29, 46, 15:10, 17:4, Acts 3:14, 22:14, Rom. 5:12v., 1 Cor. 15:45, 2 Cor. 5:21, Hebr. 4:15, 7:26, 1 Petr. 1:19, 2:21, 3:18, 1 John 2:1, 3:5. And finally He, the one born of Mary, is the Son of God in an altogether unique sense, Mt. 1:23, 4:3, 8:29, 14:33, 16:16, 26:63, Mk. 1:1, 3:11, 5:7, 14:61, 15:39, Luke 1:32, 35 etc. In order that this might now be obtained, that a son of David, born from his lineage, would nevertheless be free from all sin and would be God’s Son, for that the supernatural conception was necessary; for that it occurred; and therefore it also has a high religious and ethical importance. This is, however—to dispose of this point here briefly—not the case [271]

with the theologoumenon that Mary remained a virgin in and after the birth. The virginity of Mary in partu and post partum is not yet encountered among the church fathers before Nicaea; Tertullian, de carne Christi c. 23, Origen, hom. 14 in Luc., Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV 66 do not yet know the virginitas in partu, and Tertullian, de carne Christi 7 also denies the virginitas post partum. The virginitas in partu occurs for the first time in the apocryphal Evang. Jacobi c. 19 and was also, as some persons' opinion, already known to Clemens Alex., Strom. VII c. 16. But after Nicaea the virginitas of Mary both in partu and post partum in connection with her Gottesmutterschaft (θεοτοκος, deipara) is taught ever more clearly, by Epiphanius, Hieronymus, Greg. Nyss., Ephraim, Ambrosius, Augustinus etc., and defended against the Apollinarians, Helvidius, Jovinianus, Bonosus, cf. Bellarminus, de sacr. euch. III c. 6. Petavius, de incarn. XIV c. 3 sq. Lehner, Die Marienverehrung S. 120 f. The fifth ecumenical council can. 6 adopted the title ἀειπαρθενος of Epiphanius for Mary, and the Lateran synod of 649 established in can. 3 her virginity also in and after the birth of Jesus, cf. Cat. Rom. I 4, 8. The semper virgo was also included in the Art. Smalc. I 4, Form. Conc. II 7, 100 and 8, 24. Zwinglii Expos. Chr. fidei 5, but Lutherans and Reformed nevertheless taught that the birth of Jesus had taken place in the ordinary way and that the virginitas of Mary, post partum, although acceptable for piety's sake, was nevertheless not an article of faith and in no case had been undertaken by Mary by way of a vow. That Mary bore Jesus utero clauso, Scripture teaches with not a single word. That she bound herself by vow to virginity is not to be derived from Gen. 3:15, Isa. 7:14, Luke 1:34 and from so-called types, Judg. 6:36, 11:29, Dan. 2:34, Ezek. 44:2. And that she later brought forth no more children is difficult to maintain in the face of Mt. 1:18, 25, 12:46, 13:55, Mk. 3:31, 6:3,

Luke 2:7, 8:19, John 2:12, 7:5, Acts 1:14, 1 Cor. 9:5. Cf. Calvin, on Luke 1:34. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 17. Rivetus, Apol. pro S. Virgine Maria, Op. III 601-744. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II 4 c. 3. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 10. Mastricht, Theol. V 10, 12. Moor III 563. 716. Quenstedt, Theol. III 401. [272]

11. The case is quite different with the supernatural conception. This is of the highest significance for the person of Christ and therefore also of religious importance. Scripture ascribes Jesus' conception to the Holy Spirit or to the power of the Most High. The Holy Spirit, who is the author of all physical, psychical, and pneumatical life, part II 230, is in Mt. 1:18, 20, as is evident from the prep. ἐκ, conceived as the causa efficiens of that conception, while this in Luke 1:35 is ascribed to the power that will go forth from God, the Most High, and will come upon Mary. Clearly it appears from this that the activity of the Holy Spirit in this conception did not consist in the pouring out of any heavenly, divine substance into Mary, but in a manifestation of power, which made her womb fruitful, in an overshadowing as with a cloud, cf. Ex. 40:34, Num. 9:15, Luke 9:34, Acts 1:8. If the old dispute between spermatists and ovists were decided in favor of the latter, which, however, is by no means yet the case, Schäfer, Die Vererbung, Berlin 1897 S. 74-80; then this activity of the Holy Spirit would thereby also be physiologically elucidated. But however this may be, what is conceived in Mary, το ἐν αὐτῃ γεννηθεν is ἐκ πνευματος ἁγιου, from the Holy Spirit as causa efficiens, has its cause in the activity of the Holy Spirit and not in the will of man or of the flesh. Besides this making fruitful of Mary's womb, the Holy Spirit also effected the sanctification of the little child, that would be born from her. It is a ἁγιον, that is born from her; it will be called Son of God, Son of the Most High, Luke 1:35. It is now of

importance to note that this activity of the Holy Spirit with respect to the human nature of Christ by no means stands by itself; it did indeed begin at the conception but did not end; it continued throughout his whole life, even into the state of exaltation. In general, the necessity of this activity can already be inferred from the fact that the Holy Spirit is author of all life in the creatures and in particular of the religious-ethical life in man. The true man, who bears God's image, is not conceivable for a moment without the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, part II 540. Furthermore, the human nature in Christ had to be prepared for union with the person of the Son, i.e. for a unity and communion with [273] God, as to which no other creature has ever been deemed worthy. If man in general already cannot have communion with God except through the Holy Spirit, then this applies in an even stronger measure to Christ's human nature, which had to be united with the Son in an altogether unique way. This special union, which far surpasses and essentially differs from the immanence of God in his creatures, the revelation of God in the prophets, the indwelling of God in his people, makes an altogether special activity of the Holy Spirit already a priori probable and even necessary. But Holy Scripture also teaches this expressly. Prophecy already proclaimed that the Messiah would in a special sense be anointed with the Holy Spirit, Isa. 61:1, and the N. T. relates that Christ received that Spirit without measure, John 3:34. Not only was he conceived by him, but that Spirit descends upon him at baptism, Mt. 3:16, fills him wholly and entirely, Luke 4:1, 18, leads him away to the wilderness and to Galilee, Mt. 4:1, Luke 4:14, gives him the power to cast out devils, Mt. 12:18, to offer himself to God without blemish, Heb. 9:14, in order, just as he became David's Son in the way of the flesh, so through the resurrection to be appointed as Son of God in power, as Lord, with a

glorified body, Rom. 1:4, to justify himself as such before all eyes, 1 Tim. 3:16, to depart from the earth and to ascend into heaven, 1 Pet. 3:19, 22, and to reveal himself as life-giving Spirit, whose the Spirit is and who works through the Spirit, to his own, 1 Cor. 15:45, 2 Cor. 3:17, 18, cf. Gloël, Der H. Geist, Halle 1888 S. 113 f.

Placed in this context, the conception by the Holy Spirit acquires a rich significance. Jesus had, according to his human nature, from the first moment onward, through his whole life, even unto the state of exaltation, to be formed into Messiah, Christ, Son of God of the Most High. He could not become this except κατα σαρκα, in the way of the flesh, through birth from a woman, Rom. 1:3, 9:5, Gal. 4:4, but at the same time, in order to be that, he could not be the fruit of the will of man or of the flesh. What is born of flesh is flesh. Jesus would then perhaps have been David's son and heir of his earthly kingdom, but not David's Lord, the Messiah, the Son of God, who is appointed to [274] be king in the Kingdom of God. And that he nevertheless was. Paul does indeed say that he was appointed Son of God and Lord by the resurrection, Rom. 1:4, but this does not exclude that he already at and before his conception was Son of God, Rom. 1:3; any more than the υἱοθεσια, expected by believers in the future, Rom. 8:23, excludes that they already possess it now, Rom. 8:15. Christ was Son of God from eternity; he was in the beginning with God; he is the firstborn of all creatures. Thus he also could not be begotten and brought forth by the will of man; he himself was the acting subject, who by the Holy Spirit prepared for himself a body in Mary's womb. In the O. T. he is therefore especially promised as the seed of the woman, Gen. 3:15, as the one given by God, Jes. 9:5, as the one begotten by the Lord, Jer. 23:5, 6, 33:14-17, as a shoot from the hewn-down trunk of Jesse, Jes. 11:1, as the son of an עַלְמָה, in

general a young woman, and especially an unmarried one, Gen. 24:43, Ex. 2:8, Ps. 68:26, Song of Songs 1:3, 6:8, Prov. 30:18, 19, who shall bear the name Immanuel, Jes. 7:14. In the O. T. nothing further is said about the manner of his conception; only, he shall be the son of a woman and at the same time a gift and revelation of God. This has thus been fulfilled in Christ. Leaving aside the difficult question whether Luke gives the genealogy of Mary and Mary herself was also of David's lineage, cf. Luk. 1:30-33, 35, 48; not according to Mary but according to Joseph was Jesus a Davidide. Even if he was not from Joseph, he nevertheless was, through Mary, who was betrothed to Joseph, civilly and legally the son of Joseph, Luk. 2:27, 41, 48, and inherited from him the rights to David's throne. Therefore Joseph was also admonished by God to take Mary to himself as his lawful wife, to act as head and father of the family, and as such to give the child the name Jesus, Mt. 1:18-21. Thus Christ became David's son and at the same time remained David's Lord. This exclusion of the man in his conception at the same time brought about that Christ, as not included in the covenant of works, also remained free from inherited guilt and therefore also according to his human nature could be preserved before and after his birth from every stain of sin. As subject, as I, he was not from Adam, but he was the Son of the Father, who from eternity had been chosen as Head of a new covenant. Not Adam but God was his Father. [275] As person he did not come forth from humanity but he himself came to it from outside and entered into it. And because he thus, according to God's righteous judgment, remained free from all inherited guilt, therefore he could be conceived by the Holy Spirit and by that Spirit remain freed from every stain of sin. The conception by the Holy Spirit was not the deepest ground and final cause of Jesus' sinlessness, as many assert, Ebrard, Dogm. II 4-10.

Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. Müller, Sünde II 535, but it was the only way in which he, who as person already existed and had been appointed Head of a new covenant, now also in a human way, in the flesh, could be and remain what he was, the Christ, the Son of God of the Most High. Cf. Polanus, Synt. XI. 13. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II 109 f.

12. Through this conception by the Holy Spirit and birth from Mary the Son of God became a true and perfect man. But no less strongly than his Godhead, his manhood has been contested. The Gnostics could not acknowledge it by virtue of their dualism, and therefore said that the aeon Christ had assumed only an apparent body (Saturninus, Marcion), or that He had brought with Him a glorious, spiritual body from heaven and had only passed through Mary as water through a pipe (Valentinus, Bardesanes), or that at His descent to the earth He had indeed formed for Himself a body out of the elements and had suffered in it, but at His return to heaven had dissolved and abandoned it (Apelles), or that He had only temporarily at baptism descended upon the man Jesus and had left him before the suffering (Cerinthus), or had, before the suffering, exchanged Himself with Simon of Cyrene and had delivered him over to death on the cross (Basilides), or that Christ, the Jesus impatibilis, who from the world of light already descended to Adam and only appeared on earth in an apparent body, is indeed to be distinguished from the Jesus patibilis, who was the son of a poor widow and an envoy of the devil, and, because he set himself against Christ, was struck by Him on the cross (Mani). All these ideas propagated themselves in the medieval sects and, under the influence of pantheistic mysticism, kabbalistic theosophy, and the more recent philosophy of nature, in the century of the Reformation among the Anabaptists came to a new, extensive dominion. They too [276] taught that Christ could not assume his human

nature from Mary, from Adamic humanity, because then He would necessarily have had to be a sinner; but He assumed it from eternity out of Himself, thus brought His body with Him from heaven and passed through Mary as through a channel (Hofmann, Menno Simons; cf. related representation of an eternal corporeality of God in the kabbala with its Adam Kadmon, in Swedenborg, Dippel, Oetinger, Petersen); or He formed for Himself this heavenly, invisible corporeality from eternity out of the eternal virgin, the Divine Eve, the wisdom of God, dwelt with it already immediately after the fall in Adam, Abel, etc., and then made it visible and mortal through the conception and birth from Mary (Weigel); or He assumed that glorious human nature already at once at the creation from Adam before the fall, who then still had a fine, heavenly corporeality, in order later to clothe it from Mary with a weak, mortal humanity (Ant. Bourignon, Poiret, Barclay); or also He formed for Himself his human nature from Mary, but not from the fleshly, rather from the regenerated Mary, who through her union with the Divine wisdom had received a holy, Divine element in herself and had regained the virginal being of Adam before the fall (Schwencfeld e. a.), cf. the works of Dorner, Schwane, Harnack etc. cited earlier. These thoughts seem to us very strange. Yet in other forms they express nothing other than what the more recent philosophy since Kant and Hegel with its separation of the ideal and historical Christ has presented. The ideal Christ is the eternal Logos, the absolute reason, the one substance which in the world realises itself eternally and cannot pour out its fullness in a single man but in humanity as the Son of God assumes human nature. But the historical Jesus is not the true, essential Christ; in the process of incarnation He indeed forms an important but nevertheless only a transient moment; He has been a weak,

mortal, sinful man, who has indeed revealed the idea of the true Christ, but by no means coincides with him and is one with him, cf. Runze, Dogm. § 78.

Now it needs no lengthy argument that Holy Scripture here stands in direct opposition. Under the O. T. promised as the Messiah, who will proceed from a [277] woman, from Abraham, Judah, David, He is in the fullness of time conceived in Mary, ἐν αὐτη, Mt. 1:20 by the H. Spirit, and born from her, ἐκ γυναικος, Gal. 4:4. He is her son, Luk. 2:7, fruit of her womb, Luk. 1:42, according to the flesh from David and Israel, Hd. 2:30, Rom. 1:3, 9:5, partaking of our flesh and blood and like us in all things, except sin, Hebr. 2:14, 17, 18, 4:15, 5:1, a true man, the Son of man, Rom. 5:15, 1 Cor. 15:21, 1 Tim. 2:15, growing up as a little child, Luk. 2:40, 52, hungering, Mt. 4:2, thirsting, Joh. 19:28, weeping, Luk. 19:41, Joh. 11:35, troubled, Joh. 12:27, sorrowful, Mt. 26:38, wrathful, Joh. 2:17, suffering, dying, etc. For Scripture it is so certain that Christ has come in the flesh, that it calls the denial of that antichristian, 1 Joh. 2:22. And not only does it teach that Christ has assumed a true, but also that He has assumed a perfect human nature. Arius denied this and said that the Logos, who after all was a creature, could not become man but had only appeared in human form and to that end had assumed only a body, but no soul. In contrast, Apollinaris wished precisely to maintain that Christ was not merely a man illumined by the Logos, an ἀνθρωπος ἐνθεος, as Paul of Samosata said, but that He Himself was God and His work divine; and thus he came to the doctrine that the Logos had assumed an ensouled human body, without pneuma, and Himself filled the place of that pneuma, cf. art. Apoll. in Herzog3 1, 671. But Scripture says clearly that Jesus was a complete man and ascribes to Him all the constituent parts of human nature, not only a body, Mt. 26:26,

Joh. 20:12, Phil. 3:21, 1 Petr 2:24, flesh and blood, Hebr. 2:14, bones and side, Joh. 19:33, 34, head and hands and feet, Mt. 8:20, Luk. 24:39, but also a soul, Mt. 26:38, spirit, Mt. 27:50, Luk. 23:46, Joh. 13:21, consciousness, Mk. 13:32, will, Mt. 26:39, Joh. 5:30, 6:38 etc. Apollinarianism was therefore condemned by the Christian church and theology at all times; they understood the importance that was at stake here: totus enim Christus totum assumpsit me, ut toti mihi salutem gratificaret; quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est, Damasc., de fide orthod. III 6. Lombardus, Sent. III 2. Petavius, de incarn. V c. [278] 11. The denial of the true and the perfect human nature always proceeds from a certain dualism. The σαρξ, matter, is by nature sinful and therefore cannot be a constituent part of the true Christ; therefore this one has not derived his substance from the sensible, material world, but from the invisible, heavenly essence in God, in himself, in the divine wisdom, in the unfallen Adam or the reborn Mary. The connection between this ideal Christ and the historical Jesus can therefore only be accidental, mechanical; it does not come to a true unity, that is, therefore also to no true communion of God and man. God and world, creation and re-creation, nature and grace, the eternal and the temporal, the heavenly and the earthly remain eternally alongside and over against one another. Among the Gnostics and the Anabaptists all this is clear. But however strange it may sound, this same dualism is also proper to the more recent pantheistic philosophy, which so gladly adorns itself with the name of monism. For indeed, it is an axiom of this philosophy that the idea cannot pour itself out fully in one individual; that is, no unity, no communion of God and man is possible. In order to come to communion with God, the individual must lose himself, erase his personality, sink away like a wave into the ocean of the all. God and man, eternity and time, and in particular holiness and

finitude stand over against one another; the finite is in its nature defective, imperfect; sin is necessary. Hence, Hegel, in Dorner, Entw. II 1115 f., Strauss, Gl. II 164, Leben Jesu 1835 II 716-718, Baur, Dreieinigkeit III 963 f. e. a. cannot maintain the sinlessness of Jesus; a finite individual cannot be perfect and enjoy full communion with God. Now this pantheism thinks to be able in another way to compensate what it first has taken away. It ascribes to the whole what it takes away from the parts; not one single man, but humanity is the true Christ, the son of God, it enjoys the highest unity and communion with God, in it God assumes human nature. But this compensation is apparent and gives nothing. Not only does humanity exist only in the individuals and is the all nothing other than the sum of the parts; but it is also not true that [279] the all, that humanity stands nearer to God than the individual human beings. Goethe did indeed say, willst du ins Unendliche schreiten, so geh' ins Endliche nach allen Seiten; but the endless is something wholly different from the infinite, eternity something wholly different from the unspeakable sum of all moments of time, and perfection something wholly different from the total of all imperfections. Even if pantheism exchanges the individual for humanity and the part for the whole, it thereby advances not a step; it leaves the transition from the infinite to the finite, from eternity to time, from God to the world completely unexplained and gives for explanation nothing but words and images, part II 392. If God cannot become man in one, then He also cannot become it in all. Over against this dualistic and atomistic view Scripture now places the organic. In one God comes to all, not in appearance but in truth. There is one Mediator of God and of men, the man Christ Jesus. But therefore it depends just as much on His Godhead as on His true and perfect human nature. If one essential constituent part in the human nature of Christ

is excluded from the true unity and communion with God, then there is an element in creation that remains standing dualistically alongside and over against God. Then there is an eternal ὑλη. Then God is not the Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth. Then the Christian religion is not truly catholic. Quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est.

13. Thus in Christ God and man are united with one another. Scripture does not speak in the language of later theology, but in substance contains that same thing which has been confessed by the Christian church in its doctrine of the two natures. The Pauline christology, says Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 75, ist allerdings ein erster Ansatz zur kirchlichen Lehre von der Doppelnatur. For according to Scripture the Word, which was with God and itself was God, became flesh, ὁ λογος σαρξ ἐγενετο, Joh. 1:14. He, who was ἀπαυγασμα της δοξης και χαρακτηρ της ὑποστασεως του θεου, partook of our flesh and blood and became like us in all things, Hebr. 1:3, 2:14, God sent his own, only-begotten Son into the world, who was born of a woman, Gal. 4:4. He, who [280] ἐν μορφῃ θεου existed, ἐαυτον ἐκενωσε μορφην δουλου λαβων, Phil. 2:7. From the fathers κατα σαρκα, He is nevertheless ὁ ὠν ἐπι παντων θεος εὐλογητος εἰς τους αἰωνας, Rom. 9:5. Although image of the invisible God, firstborn of all creatures, Creator of all things, He is nevertheless also πρωτοτοκος ἐκ των νεκρων, Col. 1:13-18; David's son, He is nevertheless at the same time David's Lord, Mt. 22:43; walking about on earth, He is also thus still always εἰς τον κολπον του πατρος, Joh. 1:18, ὁ ὠν ἐν τω οὐρανῳ, Joh. 3:13, being before Abraham, Joh. 8:58; in one word, the fullness of the Godhead dwells σωματικως in Him, Col. 2:9. At every moment in Scripture divine and human predicates are ascribed to the same personal subject, a divine and a human being, omnipresence and limitation, eternity and time, creative omnipotence and creaturely weakness.

What is all this other than the ecclesiastical doctrine of the two natures, united in one person? The more recent theology, however, feels for a part of this doctrine of the two natures a deep aversion, finds it the height of absurdity, and replaces it by the Doppelseitigkeit, Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 65. 94, by the Doppelheit von Gesichtspunkten, Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 129. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 513, by the doctrine of two successive states before and after the resurrection, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 417, or by that of idea and appearance, Schweizer, Chr. Gl. II 12 etc. It is clear that in these considerations the doctrine of Scripture concerning the person of Christ does not at all come into its own. Even if it is true that Christ, especially in Paul, only through his resurrection enters into the full Sonship, Rom. 1:4, becomes Lord from heaven and life-giving Spirit, 1 Cor. 15:45, 2 Cor. 3:17 and receives a name above every name, Phil. 2:9, thereby Paul in the least does not deny that Christ also before his incarnation already had a personal, divine existence, 2 Cor. 8:9, Phil. 2:6, Col. 1:15-17 and was God's own Son, Rom. 1:3, 8:32, Gal. 4:4. The doctrine of the two natures is something altogether different from the doctrine of two sides to or two states in the life of Christ. Jesus in Scripture bears all those glorious predicates not because He on the one hand as man devoted himself completely to God and therefore was truly man, and because He on the other hand as that same man completely revealed God's love to us, Schultz, Gottheit [281] Christi 338, but because He truly was God and man in one person. A man, however highly placed in religious and ethical sense, can and may nevertheless, precisely according to the strict monotheism of Holy Scripture, not bear those divine predicates which are precisely by it attributed to Christ. It then also appears convincingly that they who replace the doctrine of the two natures by that of the two sides or that of the two states nevertheless can

and dare by no means speak of Christ in such a way as Scripture does. The names of God, Son of God, Logos, Image of God, firstborn of all creatures etc. are therefore all deprived of their scriptural meaning and understood in a wholly different sense. Modern theology, assuming in Jesus only a human nature, can honor Him neither according to his religious side, as revelation of God's love, nor also in the state of exaltation, in which He would have become Lord, with the names which Scripture ascribes to Him. Its exegesis, supposing that it were correct, would give it not the least gain for its own Christology. For this is no longer there, if Jesus is only a man, and not also the eternal and only Son of God.

In order to maintain all the data of Scripture concerning the person of Christ, theology gradually arrived at the doctrine of the two natures. It did not set this up by way of hypothesis and did not intend by it a explanation of the mystery of Christ's person either; in it it only summed up, unmaimed and undiminished, the whole doctrine of Scripture concerning Christ and by that maintained it over against the errors which, on the left-hand and on the right-hand side, appeared in ebionitism and gnosticism, arianism and apollinarism, nestorianism and eutychianism, adoptianism and monotheletism, and in more recent times in the doctrine of Rothe and Dorner concerning the becoming God-man and in the doctrine of Gess e. a. concerning the kenosis. Nestorianism arose from the Antiochene school, had its preparation in Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodorus of Mopsuestia, and was then developed by Nestorius in such a way that the eternal, natural Son of God was distinct from and was another than the Son of David, who was born from Mary; for there is, after all, a distinction between the temple and him who dwells therein; between Him who was in the form of God, and him who walked about in the form of a servant; between the God and the

man in Christ, who both exist personally [282]. Mary therefore cannot be called θεοτοκος, and the man who was born from her is not the eternal Son of God but his adopted son (adoptianism). The union of God and man in Christ is not a natural but a moral one, as between man and woman in marriage, not an ἑνωσις but a συναφεια; the indwelling of God in Christ is not specifically but only gradually distinct from that in believers, and it increases, in proportion as the man Jesus advances in virtue and more and more becomes organ and instrument, temple and garment of the Godhead, in proportion as he is more θεοφορος, cf. Schwane, D. G. II 317 f. To that, in the most recent time, the doctrine of Dorner is related, according to which the Logos gradually communicates himself more to the man and grows together with Him more intimately, in proportion as this one develops morally under his influence, Chr. Gl. § 102 f. This whole conception is condemned by Scripture. This ascribes all kinds of and very different predicates to Christ, but always to one and the same subject, the one, undivided I, that dwells in Him and speaks out of Him. Specifically it also says that the Logos has not dwelt in a man but has become flesh, Joh. 1:14. What someone has become, that he is. If the Son of God has become man, then He himself is man. Of a person many things can be predicated, but never another person. Of many people it can be said that they are one, in one respect or another; but never can it be said of the one person that he is the other person. Man and woman are one flesh, but never is the man the woman or conversely. If, therefore, in Christ the man was another subject than the Logos, then Scripture could never have said that the Logos has become flesh and thus is. With Nestorius, therefore, the union between God and man in Christ is not a personal and natural one, but a moral one; they always remain two distinct subjects, however much they may also morally

become more and more one. And even this moral union is not point of departure but final goal and result; it is not even, as with Origen, fruit of the merit of the pre-existent soul, which has not fallen but has acquired for itself the union with the Logos in its pre-existence, de princ. II 6, 3. c. Cels. VI 47; but it comes about gradually in the earthly life of Jesus and depends on all kinds of conditions, it is only gradually distinct from the [283] union of God with other people; that is, Christ loses his wholly unique place, He is only a man, in whom God reveals himself more than in others; the idea of the God-man is lost and the work of redemption is undermined. Nestorianism is related to deism and pelagianism.

Chalcedon therefore rightly declared that the union of the divine and human nature in Christ was ἀδιαιρετος and ἀχωριστος. But just as much it maintained, over against the other direction, that it was ἀτρεπτος and ἀσυγχυτος. Over against Nestorius Cyril defended that the union in Christ was not a moral one, but a ἑνωσις κατα φυσιν or καθ' ὑποστασιν, a ἑνωσις φυσικη; but because he did not yet distinguish the words προσωπον, ὑποστασις, φυσις as clearly as later writers, he hesitated to speak of δυο φυσεις in Christ and also sometimes said that Christ has become one ἑκ δυο φυσεων, that He is μια φυσις, and that divine and human nature are united in Him εἱς ἐν τι, εἱς μιαν οὐσιαν. This could be misunderstood, and was misunderstood by Eutyches, according to whom both natures through and after the union lose each their particular properties and were changed and melted down into one new divine-human nature, cf. Schwane, D. G. II 351 f. To this monophysitism, in more recent times, the doctrine of the κενωσις is related. It was prepared by the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, above p. 245, was further developed by Zinzendorf, Plitt, Zinzendorf's Theology II 166 f., and then in this century, under the

influence of the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, which took up the idea of becoming in God, was by many warmly defended as the only possible explanation of the person of Christ. It holds that the Logos at His incarnation has divested Himself of all His divine attributes, also the immanent ones, or at least of His transient attributes, has descended to the standpoint of a pure potency, and then from there in union with the human nature has again gradually developed Himself into a divine-human person, above p. 252. But this theory too is just as unacceptable as that of Dorner. Scripture knows only one person, one subject, one Christ, but nevertheless ascribes to that a double kind of attributes, divine and human. He is [284] Logos and became flesh; He is according to the flesh from Israel and yet God above all to be praised etc., above p. 239. Whether one now more, as formerly, lets the human nature be changed into the divine, or, as now, more lets the divine empty itself down to the human, or also lets both natures wholly or in part flow together into a third, into a mixtum quid; always, in a pantheistic way, the boundary between God and man is erased and the idea of the God-man is falsified. The monophysite and kenotic doctrine is in conflict with immutability, with all attributes, with the essence of God, and likewise also with the nature of the creature and of finite man. A deity or a divine attribute that is only potentia and not actu is unthinkable; and a man who by development can make the divine nature his own ceases to be a creature and passes from time into eternity, from finitude into infinity. Indeed, the whole thought of a God-man, in whom the union of both natures is replaced by the mixing of both, is a monstrum, of which no one can form any conception. Such a one cannot be the Mediator of God and of men, because He is neither of the two; He does not truly bring about the union, the reconciliation, the communion of God and man, because He himself, by

his mixing of both natures, is distinguished from both and is a tertium genus. Cf. Form. Conc. ed. Müller 550, which rejects the kenotic theory. Dorner, Entw. II 1261-1276. Id. Gl. II 337 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften 207-241. Vilmar, Dogm. II 54. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 386. Kähler, Wiss. d. chr. Lehre II 348. Lipsius, Dogm. § 579. Schultz, Gottheit Christi 277 f. Bruce, The humiliation of Christ, Edinb. 1870. Orr, Chr. view 280. Lobstein, Revue de théol. et de philos. Mars 1891 p. 186 s. Id. Etudes christol., Paris Fischbacher 1891. Chapuis, Revue de théol. et de philos. Sept. 1891 p. 426 s. Scholten, L. H. K. II 385v.

14. For the time being, theology, if it truly wishes to be Scriptural and Christian theology, cannot do better than to maintain the doctrine of the two natures. In doing so it must deeply impress upon itself the defective character that clings to its language, specifically also in the doctrine of Christ. But all other attempts, [285] which up to now have been employed to formulate the Christological dogma and to bring it closer to our consciousness, fall short of the richness of Scripture and of the honour of Christ. And against this theology has, in the first place, to be on its guard. Whatever objections to the doctrine of the two natures have been raised earlier and later, it nevertheless has this in its favour, that it neglects no data of Holy Scripture, maintains the name of Christ as the only Mediator of God and of men, and in the end also gives the clearest and most lucid conception of the mystery of the incarnation. For this incarnation does not stand isolated in history. It is indeed essentially distinct from all facts and occupies an entirely unique place, but it nevertheless stands in close connection with all that has taken place before and alongside and after it. It has, as became clear to us earlier, as preparation and presupposition generation, creation, revelation, and inspiration. Finally, it must still be

added here that it also stands in connection with the essence of religion. Religion is communion with God; without it a human being can be no true, perfect human being; the image of God is no donum superadditum but belongs to his nature. That communion with God is a unio mystica; it far surpasses our understanding; it is a most intimate union with God through the Holy Spirit; it is a unio personarum, an indissoluble and eternal covenant of God and man, which is far too weakly described by the designation ethical and is therefore indicated as mystical; it is so intimate that it transforms man according to God's image and makes him a partaker of the divine nature, 2 Cor. 3:18, Gal. 2:20, 2 Petr. 1:4. If this communion of God and man is now truly understood, not as an imagination but as genuine reality, then its affinity and analogy with the incarnation is evident. Whoever truly confesses generation, creation, immanence, revelation, inspiration, religion, i.e. whoever truly confesses the communicability of God, has in principle also acknowledged the incarnation. Not in the sense as though the incarnation would of itself follow from the essence of religion, but indeed in such a way that the recognition of the one removes all right to deny the other. For if the incarnation is not possible either on God's side or on that of man, then religion also cannot truly exist [286] in communion of God and man. But religion in this sense has been disturbed by sin; there is no true, blessed communion of God and man. Therefore the union that in Christ was concluded between divine and human nature had to bear an altogether special character. It could not be identical with the religious relation between God and man, for it had to be precisely the beginning, the principle, the objective realization of true religion again. A covenant cannot be improvised; it must be concluded with a people in its king or representative. And so also God, in order to make his communion with

humanity a reality again, in Christ as its Head united himself with it. Therefore Christ is not an individual alongside others, but Head and Representative of humanity, the second and last Adam, the Mediator of God and of men. The union of divine and human nature in Christ is therefore essentially distinct from the indwelling of God in his creatures and in believers. It is not a unio personarum but a unio personalis et substantialis; it is not a moral union, which finds its image in marriage, no agreement of disposition and will, no communion of love alone. But it is a ἑνωσις φυσικη, as Athanasius, c. Apoll. I 8 and Cyrillus, Anathem. 3 called it. Thereby it is not made known that that union was necessary and of itself proceeded from one of the two or from both natures, but it is called so because it is not moral in nature, but a union of the natures in the person of the Son, a unio naturarum, not naturalis but personalis, Petavius, de incarn. III 4. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 6, 3. And the result of that union is not a new nature nor also a new personality, but only the person of Christ as Christ. He who was in the form of God, from now on also existed in the form of a man.

By virtue of this its wholly unique nature, the union cannot be conceived otherwise than as a union of the person of the Son with an impersonal human nature. For if the human nature in Christ had had an own, personal existence, no other union than a moral one would have been possible. Then Christ also would not have been personally God, but [287] only a man, living in close communion with God. Then also Christ would have been a definite man with an own individuality, but not the second Adam, head of the human race. He, however, had to be not an individual alongside others; his work did not consist in this, that he brought back to communion with God one single man, with whom he united himself. But he had to assume

the seed of Abraham, be Head of a new humanity and firstborn of many brethren. To that end he had to assume an impersonal human nature. This is not, with the Anastasius Sinaita and others, to be understood thus, that Christ assumed the human nature in its generality, in the sense of the Platonic idea, for this indeed exists in humanity but not in itself, in a numerical unity, Schwane, D. G. II 369. The human nature in Christ was, on the contrary, insofar indeed thoroughly an individual one, that he thereby was distinguished from all men, though partaking of the same nature, by definite properties. Yet Christ is therefore no individual alongside others, for the human nature had in him no own, personal existence alongside the Logos but was from the beginning by the H. Spirit so prepared for the union with the Logos and for his work, that it in that Logos could represent the whole human race and for all men of all generations and estates and ages, of all centuries and places could be the Mediator of God. Cf. Greg. Nyss., Hilarius, Basilius, Ephraem, Apollinaris e. a. bij Dorner, Entw. I 958 f. Damascenus, de fide orthod. III 3. 6. 11. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 4 art. 4. Petavius, de incarn. V 5. Moor III 776. Pictet, Christ. Godg. I 552. Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 74 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 405. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 295.

It is, however, precisely this distinction between nature and person which both in the Trinity and in the doctrine of Christ encounters the greatest objection and therefore in both doctrines is also the cause of most errors. Both Nestorius and Eutyches could not allow this distinction to stand and therefore concluded from the two natures to two persons or from the one person to one nature. Christian theology, however, was led to this weighty distinction in the doctrine of God and of Christ. In God there was one nature and three persons; in Christ [288] one person and two natures. The

unity of the three persons in the divine being is in the full sense naturalis, συνουσιωδης, coessentialis; the unity of the two natures in Christ is personalis. This distinction is also philosophically justified. Nature and person do not relate, as in Hegel's philosophy, as essence and appearance, as potentia and actus, so that nature, in all creatures essentially one, in man develops into person by immanent power. But nature is the substrate, the suppositum, that whereby something is what it is, principium quo; and person is the subject, not of a nature in general, but of a rational nature, individua substantia rationalis naturae, principium quod. Person is that which is in and for itself, which is the owner, possessor, and lord of nature, a complementum existentiae, sustentans et terminans existentiam naturae, the subject, which by nature with its whole rich content lives, thinks, wills, acts, etc., whereby nature becomes one existing for itself and is no accidens of another, Schwane, D. G. II 369 f. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorzeit III 71 f. Schaezler, Das Dogma v. d. Menschw. Gottes 3 f. Thus now the human nature in Christ is united with the person of the Son. The Son does not first become person in and through the human nature, for He was this from eternity; He needed neither the creation nor the incarnation in order to come to Himself and to become personality, spirit. But the incarnation does include that the human nature, which was formed in and from Mary, did not exist for a single moment on and for itself but from the very first moment of conception was united with and taken up into the person of the Son. The Son created it in Himself, in se ipso creavit et creando assumsit. Therefore that human nature is nevertheless not incomplete, as Nestorius and now still Dorner, Entw. II 1225 asserts. For although by an own personality and I-ness it did not close itself off within itself, it was nevertheless from the beginning personal in the Logos, who as subject in and through it, with all

its constituent parts, faculties and powers lived, thought, willed, acted, suffered, died, etc. That it did not receive in an independent I-ness its own, separate complementum existentiae, did not proceed from a defect, but precisely from this, that it had to be the human mode of existence of the Logos. [289] Naturae assumptae non deest propria personalitas propter defectum alicujus, quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed propter additionem alicujus, quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 4 art. 2 ad 2.

Therefore the human nature in Christ is not coordinated with the Logos by a personal subsistence of its own, but subordinated to Him. Both natures are and remain indeed ἄλλο και ἄλλο, but not ἄλλος και ἄλλος. It is always the same person, the same subject, the same I, that lives and thinks, speaks and acts through the divine and the human nature. The human nature is the tabernacle in which the Son has gone to dwell; the garment which He Himself has prepared and put on; the μορφη in which He has appeared to us; the instrument and organ which He has sanctified for Himself and of which He makes use with divine wisdom for His office and work. In Christo humanitas quasi quoddam organum divinitatis censetur, Thomas, Comp. Theol. c. 212, cf. S. Theol. III qu. 19 art. 1. Petavius, de incarn. IV 8, 6. Turretinus, Theol. XIII 6, 7. In this, now, there is nothing that deserves our contradiction. Without thereby doing anything short of the self-activity of the creature, we confess that the whole world is an instrument of the revelation of God, a garment in which He at the same time reveals and conceals Himself to us. The congregation and every believer desires nothing higher than to stand with soul and body and all powers in the service of God and to be an instrument in His hand. What, then, would be against it, that in a much richer measure, in an absolute sense, the human

nature in Christ is the glorious, willing organ of His Godhead? High above all our speaking and thinking goes the union of divine and human nature in Christ. Every comparison fails us, for it is without any equal. But it is then also the μυστηριον εὐσεβειας, into which the angels are eager to look and which the congregation admiringly marvels at in worship.

15. Yet this is always again brought forward as a weighty objection against the doctrine of the two natures, that it does not allow the human nature of Christ to come into its own and makes a human development in Him impossible. Roman Catholic and Lutheran Christology do indeed [290] give occasion for this misgiving. The union of the two natures in Christ, namely, entailed in earlier dogmatics three consequences, communicatio idiomatum, apostelesmatum and charismatum. The first implied that in the incarnation both natures with all their properties were communicated to the one person and the one subject, which therefore can be designated with Divine and human names; one may thus say, the Son of God was born, suffered, died, Acts 20:28, 1 John 1:7, and also the man Christ Jesus exists from eternity, has descended from heaven, etc., John 3:13. By the second it was understood that the proper mediatorial or redemptive works all bear a Divine-human character, i.e., that they all have as efficient cause the one undivided, personal subject in Christ; that they have been brought to pass by Christ with the cooperation of both His natures and with a double ἐνεργεια, and that they nevertheless again form an undivided unity in the result, because they are the work of one person. The third indicated that the human nature of Christ from the first moment of its existence was adorned with all manner of glorious and rich gifts of the H. Spirit. Over these three effecta unionis there arose an important difference, above pp. 242-246. The Lutherans construe the communicatio idiomatum in such a way that the

properties of both natures were communicated not only to the one person, but those of the Divine nature also to the human. The human nature was by the union elevated to Divine omnipotence and omnipresence, Symb. Bücher ed. Müller 679. 680; it received singulares, excellentissimas, maximas, supernaturales, impervestigabiles, ineffabiles atque coelestes praerogativas majestatis, gloriae, virtutis ac potentiae, which are not merely created and finite gifts, ib. 685, but Divine and infinite such as vivificare, omnipotentia, omniscientia, omnivolipraesentia, 686. 689. 691. 692. It is clear that this conception of the communication of the properties deprives the communication of the gifts of its entire significance; what gifts are still needed, if Divine properties are communicated. Lutheran Christology does indeed still speak of gifts, ib. 686, but it really does not know what to do with them, cf. Dorner, Entw. II 914-916, and has even no place any longer for the anointing of Christ with the H. Spirit, Schneckenburger, [291] Zur kirchl. Christol. 30. On the other hand, the Roman Catholics do indeed teach a communication of gifts and also combat the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, but they say that the human nature of Christ by virtue of the unio hypostatica immediately in the first moment of its conception uberrimam Spiritus Dei copiam atque omnem charismatum abundantiam accepit, Cat. Rom. I 4, 4. Both, Lutheran and Roman Catholic Christology, thus contain within themselves a docetic element; the purely human development of Christ does not here come into its own; in reaction one in this century swung over to the other extreme and failed to recognize the Godhead of the Lord. The Reformed, however, have understood the communication of the gifts in such a way that a human development of Jesus was thereby possible. Although the second Adam, Christ was nevertheless another than Adam. Adam was created adult, received as

dwelling-place a paradise and was not subject to any suffering and death. Christ, however, was conceived in Mary of the H. Spirit and born as a helpless little child; He was not placed in a paradise but came into a world that lies in the evil one; He was exposed to temptation from every side; He bore a nature that was susceptible to suffering and death. His was not the human nature of Adam before the fall, but God sent His Son ἐν ὁμοιωματι σαρκος ἀμαρτιας, i.e. in such flesh as in form and appearance was like the σαρξ ἀμαρτιας, Rom. 8:3.

By this fine doctrine of the communicatio charismatum the Reformed theology, better than any other, was in a position to maintain in Christ, alongside the Godhead, also the true, genuine humanity. It is of incalculable value for that purpose. 1o Among the Reformed there was still a difference over whether the incarnation in itself, abstracted from the state of sin in which it took place, was already an act of humiliation. On the one side one could appeal to the fact that the distance between God and man is so great that the assumption of human nature without more is already humiliating. But on the other side one could object to this that Christ would then now still, while He is glorified at the Father's right hand, be in the state of humiliation, Heraut 284, 285. The struggle is easily ended thus, that the incarnation in itself, [292] without more, always is and remains an act of condescending goodness, but is not in the narrower sense a step in the state of humiliation. It was that by the fact that it was an enfleshment, assumption of a weak, human nature. About this there was, after all, no struggle, that Christ assumed a weak human nature, subject to suffering and death, and that this was an act of humiliation for the Son of God. Scripture also establishes this beyond all doubt, Isa. 53:2, 3, John 1:14, 17:5, 1 Cor. 2:8, 2 Cor. 8:9, Phil. 2:7, 8 etc. 2o As soon as, however, we try to give

ourselves an account of what is enclosed in that weak human nature, the question becomes more difficult. For very certainly Jesus had all kinds of needs for food, drink, rest, sleep etc., but these were nevertheless also proper to Adam before the fall. And conversely it is difficult to think that Jesus according to his human nature was of himself susceptible to sickness, infirmity, death; He nevertheless himself had the power to lay down his life, John 10:17, but was not of himself, without his will, subject to death. From of old the opinions about this were therefore divided. About Jesus' outward appearance there was difference; some such as Origen, Chrysostom, Hieronymus and others ascribed to Him a beautiful form with appeal to Ps. 45:3, others such as Justin, Clement, Tertullian etc. thought that He was bodily without form or glory, Ps. 22:7, Isa. 53:2, 3; still others held the middle between these two representations or refrained from a judgment, cf. Vitringa V 501. Walch, Bibl. theol. III 439. Menzel, Symbolik 1855 I 177 f. Schotel, Iets over de uitwendige gedaante van Jezus Christus, Bosch 1852. Riehm, Handw. I 724 and art. Christusfiguren in Herzog3. And so also with respect to susceptibility to suffering and dying the aphthartodocetes and the phthartolatri stood over against one another. There is now no doubt that the Son of God assumed a human nature that was susceptible to suffering and dying, otherwise these would have been appearance and no truth; even Roman Catholics and Lutherans must acknowledge this. Further, on the other side it is also true that Christ assumed this human nature wholly voluntarily and in the abstract always retained the right to lay aside this weak human nature or to change it into a glorious one exalted above all suffering and death [293]. Insofar suffering and dying always remained his free act. He had and retained the power to take up and to lay down his life. No one could inflict any pain on Him nor take away his life, unless he

himself gave the power thereto. He disposed the hour and the power of darkness. But this his will presupposed, suffering and dying were for Him naturally given with the nature of the human nature which He assumed. Hilary, in Schwane, D. G. II 269 and others have often represented it precisely the other way around and have seen in the pain, the suffering etc. of Christ the non-natural, the miracle, and in the miracles of Christ precisely the natural. Although this can be taken in a good sense, it nevertheless does not sufficiently reckon with the fact that Christ assumed the weak human nature and in it was distinguished from Adam. From that it may not be inferred that Christ was also susceptible to all kinds of sickness and infirmity; for He did indeed take upon himself the general consequences of sin, suffering and death, which now belong to human nature, but not every particular infirmity that proceeds from particular circumstances, weak bodily constitution, disordered or imprudent manner of life, Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 14. Moor III 591. IV 26. Ebrard § 417. Nor was the human nature in Christ unfolded much more richly than in Adam; for in the status integritatis there was for many emotions, anger, sorrow, compassion, mercy etc. no occasion. But Christ has not only visited us with the inner movements of God's mercy; He has in his human nature opened to us that rich world of the heart, which in Adam did not yet exist and could not exist. 3o There has been in Christ a human knowing, an intellectual development, an increase in wisdom and knowledge. The Arians and Apollinarians, according to whom in Christ the Logos takes the place of the pneuma, could not assume a human knowing in Christ. The Monophysites also had to oppose this, but could just as well teach an omniscience of Christ when namely the human nature had been absorbed into the divine, as in the opposite case an ignorance (Themistius, head of the Agnoëten), with

appeal to texts such as Mt. 20:32, 21:19, Mk. 5:9, 13:32, Luke 2:52, 8:30, John 11:34, Schwane, D. G. II 366. Over against these parties the church fathers came, the longer the more, to posit the human knowledge of Christ from the first moment as perfect and not susceptible to any increase; and from them this opinion passed over into the scholastic and Roman and also into the Lutheran Christology. By this they came into conflict with the above-mentioned clear statements of Scripture, and had to take refuge in a docetic explanation. The true ground for this doctrine is therefore only the convenientia, that God to a human nature that was so closely united with Him must indeed grant this gift of knowledge, Kleutgen, Theol. III 251; the Scripture passages on which one appeals, such as John 1:14, 2:24, 25, 6:64, 13:3, Col. 2:3, 9 do not prove the contrary, because they speak of the whole Christ and not specifically of his human nature, and still much less of this in its historical development. The Reformed said over against this, first, that the scientia infusa and acquisita in Christ was not at once complete, but gradually increased and multiplied, and second, that Christ here on earth was not a comprehensor but viator, that He walked by faith and hope and not by sight, that the scientia beata was not yet his portion here on earth. Naturally the faith in Christ was not as in us a leaning on the grace and mercy of God, but this peculiarity faith has received only through the state of sin in which we are; by nature faith in Adam and in Christ is nothing but a clinging fast to the word and promise of God, a holding fast of the Invisible. And that Jesus also did, Mt. 27:46, Heb. 2:17, 18, 3:2. That faith and that hope were in Christ also not wavering and doubting, but firm and strong; they kept Him, who in us awakens and perfects faith, standing in the temptation and made Him, for the joy awaiting Him as reward for his labor, endure the cross and despise the shame, Heb. 12:2. Thus there was therefore

an increase in wisdom and knowledge in Christ; the human consciousness in Him, although having the same subject as the divine consciousness, knew that subject, that I, only very partially, indeed ὸλον but not ὸλως. Behind our limited consciousness there lies in us still a world of being; so behind the human consciousness of Christ there lay still the depth of God, which could shine through that human consciousness only gradually and always in a limited [295] way, Gomarus, Op. I 196. Voetius, Disp. II 155 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 12. 13. Moor III 804. M. Vitringa V 246. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 315. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 281. 307. 329. Kuyper, Het werk v. d. H. Geest II 281v. C. Lucassen, Der Glaube Jesu Christi, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VI 1895 S. 337-347. From this, however, it may not be inferred that Jesus could err on different terrains. Indeed this is nowadays taught in wide circles, in order specifically to escape Jesus' authority in the matter of the O. Test. But one thereby attacks Christ himself. For it is indeed true that Jesus gave no instruction in any human science and also did not come to earth for that. He came to declare the Father to us and to accomplish his work. But for that purpose He also had to know that Father in his revelation and works, and thus also to know whether the O. Testament was God's Word or not. This was not knowledge of a purely scientific but of a religious nature, and for the faith of the congregation of the highest importance. Whoever in this respect ascribes error to Jesus comes into conflict not only with his divine nature but also with his prophetic office, cf. part I 333. Herzog1 21, 204. Herzog2 6, 27. Voigt, Fundamentaldogm. 527 f. Tholuck, Das Alte Test. im N. 4e Aufl. 1854. Caven, Presb. and Ref. Review, July 1892. Schwartzkopff, Konnte Jezus irren? Giessen, Ricker 1896. Id. Die Irrthumslosigkeit Jesu Chr. und der chr. Glaube ib. 1897. 4o There is in Christ a moral development. Theodore of

Mopsuestia, Nestorius and all who proceed from the human nature of Christ assume that He has perfected himself through all kinds of struggle and temptation. Jesus was not positively holy, He did not bring with him the non posse peccare; on the contrary such an inborn holiness is impossible and ethically worthless. But Jesus was a man who brought with him the possibility of sinning yet by moral exertion and struggle has in fact kept himself free from all sins, has developed himself ethically to the highest standpoint and has made himself worthy of the union with God, cf. Schwane, D. G. II 319, 325 etc. This representation rests on a factual not reckoning with the Godhead of Christ; it proceeds from the erroneous thought that there is no other virtue than that which was acquired through struggle and it at most only attains to [296] a historical, factual sinlessness, which is insufficient for Jesus as Mediator. The attempts to prove Jesus' sinlessness historically such as by Ullmann, De zondeloosheid van Jezus, Tiel 1851, Dorner, Ueber Jesu sündlose Vollkommenheit, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. VII 1862 S. 49-107. Art. Sündlosigheit Jesu in Herzog1 suppl. Gouda Quint, De zondeloosheid des Heeren 1862. Schaff, Jezus Christus, het wonder der geschiedenis 1866. van Oosterzee, Leven v. Jezus I 569v. Dogm. § 93. Chapuis, La sainteté de Jésus, Revue de théol. et de philos., Juillet, Sept. Nov. 1897 etc., are insufficient, Philippi, K. Gl. IV 161. We do not have enough with historical certainty, which presently is again made uncertain by others. However much it deserves appreciation that so many, from whom according to their principle otherwise would be expected, still have a deep sense of Jesus' moral perfection, such as Daub, Marheineke, Rosenkranz, Vatke, Schleiermacher, Beyschlag, Hase, Schenkel, Lipsius etc., yet the faith is wavering that does not rest on the testimony of Scripture and therefore is always pressed and distressed by all kinds of

philosophical and historical objections. Scripture, however, makes us recognize in Christ not only an empirical sinlessness but also a necessary impeccability. He is the Son of God, the Logos, who in the beginning was with God and himself was God; He is one with the Father and always accomplishes his will and work etc. For whoever confesses this of Christ, the possibility of sinning and falling is an Ungedanke, Holtzmann, Neut. Th. II 446. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II2 178. Therefore Christian theology maintained over against Arians, Pelagians, Nominalists, such as Scotus, Biel, Durandus, Molina etc., that Christ could not sin. For then either God himself would have had to be able to sin— which is blasphemy; or the union of divine and human nature is regarded as breakable and in fact denied, Augustine, Enchir. c. 36. 40. 41. Lombardus, Sent III dist. 12 and comm. by Thomas and Bonaventura. Moor III 692. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 330. Philippi IV 161 f. etc. But thereby the essential distinction is nevertheless not abolished that exists between the holiness of God and the holiness of Christ as man. Taking note of that, Jesus could say that no one is good, goodness itself, except God alone, Mt. 19:16, 17, Mk. 10:17, 18, Luke 18:18, 19. The goodness or holiness of Christ according to his human [297] nature is not a divine, original one, but it is a bestowed one, infusa; and therefore it also had to reveal itself, hold itself upright, and confirm itself in the way of struggle and temptation. The bonitas infusa does not exclude the bonitas acquisita. The latter presupposes the former; no good fruits except from a good tree; but the virtue of the tree must nevertheless come out in the soundness of the fruits. And so Christ also had to reveal his inborn holiness through temptation and struggle; these are not made superfluous or idle by the non posse peccare. For although actual temptation could come to Jesus not from within but only from without, He

nevertheless had a human nature that looked up against suffering and death. Thus He was then tempted in all kinds of ways throughout his whole life, by Satan, his enemies, even by his disciples, Mt. 4:1-11, Mk. 1:13, Luke 4:1-13, Mt. 12:29, Luke 11:22, Mt. 16:23, Mk. 8:33. And in those temptations He had to keep himself standing in struggle; the non prosse peccare was not compulsion but was ethical in nature and therefore also had to come to manifestation in an ethical way. 5o The same holds for the power of Christ. Although as the Son of God omnipotent, He was nevertheless limited as regards the power of his human nature. The Monophysites do not distinguish these two, and let the two natures, the two wills and the distinct power merge into one another. But Scripture and church made distinction between the two and let the two natures be so connected that in the one divine-human work each nature does what is its own. And therefore the doing of miracles, the forgiving of sins, the granting of eternal life and all that belongs to the work of mediation belongs not only to his Godhead but also to his manhood. Therefore Christ precisely as Son of man, as Messiah, ascribes to himself this power of forgiveness and of judgment, Mt. 9:2-8, John 5:27. At touch power goes out from Him, Luke 6:19. His flesh is the bread that gives the world life, John 6:51. The Father has given Him all things into his hand, John 3:35, 13:3, 17:2. No one can snatch the sheep out of his hand any more than out of the hand of the Father, John 10:28-30. Just as the Father does, He hears prayer, John 14:13, cf. 16:23, he sends the Spirit, 15:26, cf. 14:26, he grants eternal life, 10:28, 17:2. But all this nevertheless does not exclude that his power, as human, is susceptible to increase. He is born as a little child, weak and helpless; He had need of food and drink, He was weary from the journey and sat down by the well, John 4:6; even in the doing of miracles He was dependent on

the faith of men, Mt. 13:58; in the garden He was strengthened by an angel, Luke 22:43. Only after the resurrection does He say that all power is given to Him in heaven and on earth, Mt. 28:8, Mk. 16:20, Luke 24:19. Then He receives back the glory that He as Son already previously had with the Father, John 17:5, and in it also makes his human nature share. By the resurrection Christ has also as man become Lord over living and dead, has He received a name above every name and power over all creatures, Mt. 28:18, Col. 2:3, 9, Phil. 2:9, Heb. 2:7, 8.

16. The confession concerning Christ finds its practical application in the veneration which is rendered to Him, in the honor adorationis. With those who, with Arius, deny the Godhead of Christ, or, with Nestorius, separate it from the human nature, or, with Socinus, see in Jesus only a man, every ground for the worship of the Mediator falls away. Yet one then still attempts to maintain this in all manner of ways. Nestorius said that the man Jesus also, as confessor and defender of the divine honor, might be worshiped: separo naturas, conjungo reverentiam, Schwane, D. G. II 349. Socinus defended it by this, that Christ had been exalted to Lord and had received all power and thus in need and misery could help us; many of his party, however, such as Davidis, Francken e. a. contested it, because God alone might be worshiped and the power of Christ in any case was a limited one; Socinus then also saw himself compelled to make a distinction between the veneration of God as prima causa and that of Christ as causa secunda of our salvation, Vitringa V 252. Fock, Der Socin. 538 f. The Remonstrants also derived the ground for the worship of Christ chiefly from this, that He was Mediator, King, Lord and as such had received from the Father a honor adorationis, which indeed was verus and divinus but yet not supremus, Apol. Conf. c. 2 p. 39. c. 3 p. 50. c. 16 p. 153. Arminius, [299]

Op. 436. Limborch, Theol. Christ. V 18. Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV 35 VII 27, 6, cf. against that Censura in conf. Rem. c. 2. 3. 12. Trigland, Antapol. c. 44. Heydanus, Causa Dei V 12. Vitringa V 268. The defense of the worship of Christ by Ritschl and his school essentially agrees with that of Socinus: Christ, as man in relation to God, may indeed be venerated but not worshiped, but Christ, religiously considered, as revelation of God, as that person in whom the congregation has God, is indeed to be worshiped, for then we do not worship Him alongside God, but God in Him. This worship of Christ then further belongs indeed in the public religion of the congregation but not in the prayer of private persons; the latter is unhealthy, makes Christ into a subject distinct from God, fosters a sentimental tendency and leads to creature-worship, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 1881 S. 706 f. Just as among the Socinians, so among the followers of Ritschl there are those who reject the worship of Christ entirely, and indeed call Him an object of faith and an example for imitation but not an object of religious veneration, Chapuis, Revue de théol. et de philos. Nov. 1895 p. 560-586, Id. Die Anbetung Christi in Gottschick's Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche 1897 S. 28-79. Socinianism and Ritschlianism thus end up with Unitarianism, which deprives Christ of all religious veneration. Insofar as they nevertheless still attempt to maintain a worship of the man Christ, they are related and offer support to those who, although acknowledging Christ's Godhead, nevertheless also derive from his human nature a ground of worship. To these belong in the first place the monophysites, against whom the fifth oec. Council c. 9, in Denzinger n. 180, determined that the worship of Christ does not rest on a συγχυσις της θεοτητος και της ἀνθρωποτητος but must be directed to God, the incarnate Logos with his flesh. But the scholastic and Roman theologians also have gradually come to venerate the human nature

of Christ in itself religiously. The point of departure was thereby the general doctrine of the church fathers, that the person of Christ in the undivided unity of her two natures, as incarnate Word, as God and man together, had to be venerated with one worship. From that it was inferred that the human nature of Christ itself, in itself, in se, might and must also be an object of divine veneration (λατρεια); however not for its own sake, per se and propter se, but on account of its hypostatic union with the Son of God. To that it was then further added that, although the human nature is in itself to be worshiped and thus objectum materiale of the adoratio, it nevertheless is always an objectum partiale and not totale; i.e. whoever worships it, worships with it always Him who has united himself with that human nature; and thus it was thereby permitted and made possible not only to make the human nature of Christ in itself, but even a part of it, such as e. g. the sacred heart of Jesus, into an object of worship; the worship nevertheless does not apply to that heart alone but applies to the whole Christ, who caused his divine love to dwell in that heart. And finally many theologians still said that the human nature of Christ not only on the ground of its hypostatic union with the Logos is an object of λατρεια, but also on the ground of the many gifts bestowed upon it without measure might be an object of δουλεια, and then more specifically again an object of ὑπερδουλεια, according to the hierarchical rule: adoratio est diversa pro diversitate excellentiae, quae est ejus objectum formale. Cf. Damascenus, de fide orthod. III c. 8. Lombardus and other comm. on Sent. III dist. 9. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 25. Bellarminus, de imag. sanct. II c. 12 sq. Petavius, de incarn. XV c. 1-4. Theol. Wirceb. IV 330. Perrone, Prael. theol. IV 274. Scheeben, Dogm. III 51 f. Pesch, Prael. theol. IV 97 sq. Simar, Dogm. 411. By virtue of their doctrine of the communication of the divine

properties to the human nature, the Lutherans also teach that the human nature of Christ is to be worshiped, Gerhard, Loc. IV § 23. Quenstedt, Theol. III 199-208 V 353. Buddeus, Inst. theol. p. 771 sq. And finally among the Herrnhutters the man Christ has almost entirely taken the place of God; He is not the mediator but the substitute of God and almost the only object of religious veneration, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. III 20 f. Römheld, Theol. sacrosancta 1888.

Wholly in accordance with their doctrine of Christ the Reformed now said that the Mediator was indeed an object of worship, but that the ground for that worship lay in his divine nature. Yet among them there was still [301] some difference of opinion. All were agreed in this, that Christ also as Mediator had to be worshiped and honored, but some thought that the ground for that worship lay only in the Godhead of Christ, Voetius, Disp. I 520 sq. II 304 sq. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 369 sq. Macc. Redivivus c. 91. Hoornbeek, Socin. confutatus I 36 sq. Mastricht V 2, 26 etc.; others judged that the objectum formale was not only the Godhead but the Mediatorship of Christ, Amesius, de adoratione Christi. Walaeus, Loci Comm. Op. I 389. Trigland, Antapol. c. 46. Alting, Theol. problem. XII 20. Cloppenburg, Op. I 461. Bucanus, Inst. XXXV qu. 9. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 18. Hottinger, Heidanus, Burman, Heidegger, Moor III 829. Vitringa V 247. Now Scripture leaves no doubt about it, that Christ, just as he is the object of our faith and trust, Joh. 14:1, 17:3, Rom. 14:9, 2 Cor. 5:15, Ef. 3:12, 5:23, Col. 1:27, 1 Tim. 1:1 etc., so also may be the object of our religious veneration and worship, Joh. 5:23, 14:13, Hd. 7:59, 9:13, 22:16, Rom. 10:12, 13, 1 Cor. 1:2, 2 Cor. 12:8, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 1:6, Op. 5:12, 13, 22:17, 20, cf. Loofs in Herzog3 4, 21. Th. Zahn, Die Anbetung Jesu im Zeitalter der Apostel, Stuttgart 1885, also in Skizzen aus dem Leben der alten Kirche

1898 S. 271-308. But nevertheless the ground of the worship of Christ according to Scripture can be derived from nothing other than his Godhead. For the word of Scripture stands firm: the Lord your God you shall worship and Him alone serve. That is the commandment which in principle condemns all pagan and Roman creature-worship. If in addition the royal power of Christ or also his mediatorship is still adduced as a ground for religious worship, then this commandment of God is weakened and violated. As mediator, king, priest, prophet, Christ is not absolute summus, but subordinated to God; in that capacity he has a different glory and a different power than that which he as Son shares with the Father and the Spirit; in that quality he is not the causa efficiens, which God alone is, but the causa instrumentalis of our salvation. If therefore the ground for the worship of the Mediator, besides in his Godhead, also still lies in his Mediatorship, then the ground also in fact lies in his human nature, for as Mediator [302] Christ cannot be conceived without this; then the Father and the Spirit, who are not Mediator, have one ground for their worship less than the Son and this one thus comes to stand above the Father and the H. Spirit; then there are two grounds for adoration, one which is derived from the Godhead, another which is derived from something else, that is from something creaturely, and then in principle the Roman distinction of λατρεια and δουλεια is brought in and creature-worship is legitimized. Christ therefore is most certainly to be worshiped as our Mediator, just as God is also honored and invoked as Creator etc., but the ground for that lies only in his Godhead. He is not God because he is Mediator, but he is Mediator because he is God, with the Father and the Spirit one single God, to be praised above all unto eternity. The mediatorial worthiness and the mediatorial works can and may be motives of worship, just as all kinds of

benefits compel us to worship God. They can also insofar be called grounds of worship, as the divine being works and reveals itself therein; but the foundation of worship is the being-God alone.

§ 42. The Work of the Mediator.

1. Among all peoples we encounter some awareness of sin and need of reconciliation and redemption. There also occur in almost all religions holy persons, who effect and maintain communion with God for others. Kings and prophets often act as such mediators, but especially the priests are charged with this service. The word priest comes from presbyter, elder, and thus originally had no hieratic sense at all; the names in other languages, such as כֹּהֵן, ἱερευς, sacerdos designate the priests as such persons, who stand before God and perform a holy work, specifically bring sacrifices. However much such a priesthood occurs in almost all religions, cf. Julius Lippert, Allgemeine Geschichte des Priesterthums, Berlin 1883-4, yet its origin is unknown to us. According to Scripture, in the earliest time there were as yet no special priests; Abel, Cain, Noah, the [303] patriarchs still themselves bring their offerings, Gen. 4:3, 4, 8:20, 12:7 etc.; only when among the peoples the consciousness of sin and the awareness of separation between God and man increases, does the idea of a mediation arise everywhere. The principal means of which this priesthood makes use, in

order to obtain communion with God, is the offering, מִנְחָה, עֹלָה, זֶבַח, אִשֶּׁה, δωρον, ἱερειον, προσφορα, θυσια, τελετη, oblatio, sacrificium. The origin and essence of sacrifice too is shrouded in darkness for us. Some explain sacrifice from the disposition of man, to make the Deity favorable by some gift or other and to obtain all kinds of help from it (do ut des, gift theory), Saussaye, Religionsphilos. I 101. v. Hartmann, Religionsphil. I 35. In addition, many then think that men at first thought the gods like themselves and therefore in the sacrifices offered them chiefly foodstuffs (food theory), ib. and Siebeck, Religionsphilos. 279. Others adhere to the mystical or sacramental theory and see the essence of sacrifice not in a gift to but in communion with the gods, enjoyed thereby, that one sits together at one table and consumes one food and drink, Marti, Israel. Relig.3 36. Smend, Att. Rel. 24. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilos.3 648. According to another, the symbolic theory, the sacrificer in the gift that he offers to the gods gives a proof of his reverence and submission, of his denial of all that is earthly and of his complete devotion to God, Wuttke, Gesch. des Heidenthums I 127 f. Finally there are still those who consider the destructive element in sacrifice essential and therefore give to every sacrifice an atoning character, Bellarminus, Vasquez and many Roman theologians, cf. Thalhofer, Das Opfer des alten und neuen Bundes, Regensb. 1870. Id. Handbuch der kath. Liturgik, Freiburg 1894 I2 197 f. The question concerning origin and essence of sacrifice becomes still more difficult when we think of the bloody and then again specifically of the human sacrifices. How did humanity come to this manner of worship of God? Which sacrifices were the oldest, the bloody or the unbloody? Whence the broad place and the tremendous significance, in the cultus, assigned to blood? History gives no answer here. Only Scripture relates that sacrifice already exists from the

earliest time of humanity. Before the fall it makes no mention of sacrifice. Yet there is nothing [304] absurd in the thought that even then sacrifice in a broader sense belonged to the elements of the cultus, just as much as prayer. Offering indeed is, according to the definition of Augustine, de civ. X 6, omne opus, quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. As such it also suited man in the status integritatis. He was after all created in God's image in true knowledge, righteousness and holiness; he was prophet, priest and king and as such had to glorify God's name, devote himself with all that was his to God, and govern and direct everything according to the will of God; he also received in the Sabbath a special day for the service of God and for that purpose needed definite forms of cultus; there is nothing strange in it, if for that purpose besides prayer also offering belonged. Indeed man can properly give nothing to God, for the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof. But God nevertheless gave the earth to man and appointed him as lord over it. And therefore man can in a symbolic sense offer something to God, as proof of his reverence and dependence. If offering from the outset belonged to the religion of man, which also before and after the fall cannot be different in essence, then it also explains easily that soon after the fall there is spoken of Cain's and Abel's offering, without God intentionally instituting the sacrificial cultus. Protestants and Roman Catholics formerly contended about whether sacrifice rested on a positive command of God or rather on an inner religious impulse of man, M. Vitringa IV 275-280. Herzog2 11, 31. But if sacrifice already existed before the fall, this dispute is thereby also resolved. Yet sin has brought great change in the offering, not only such that to the existing the sin-offering was mechanically added, but also specifically in the sense that the offering itself has changed in character. Man after the fall fears God and hides

himself from his face, and therefore the disposition and the intention have also changed with which he offers and with which he prays. The sin-offering (sacrificium propitiatorium, propter offensam commissam) comes to stand in the center and forms and bears the other offerings (sacr. latreuticum, propter Dei majestatem, praise-offering; sacr. impetratorium, propter beneficia sperata, prayer-offering; sacr. eucharisticum, propter beneficia jam suscepta, thank-offering), Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 102 art. 3 ad 10. Among those [305] sin-offerings the bloody sacrifices take a first place, and these bear a destructive and a substitutive character; what is offered to God is destroyed, slaughtered; and because properly man himself for his reconciliation had thus to sacrifice himself, he takes an animal or also another man in his place. And finally there gradually arises in all religions a separate class of priests; man feels himself removed from God and has need of a mediator, who brings him into the proximity of God. Thus all sacrifices of humanity, directly in Israel, indirectly also among the Heathen, point toward the great perfect offering, which has been brought by Christ, the Mediator of God and of men, on the cross of Golgotha. Cf. Pfanner, Theol. gent. c. 15. Lasaulx, Die Sühnopfer der Griechen u. Römer u. ihr Verh. zu dem Einen auf Golgotha, Würzburg 1841. Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. 1857 S. 315 f. Bähr, Symb. des mos. Cultus II 217 f. 269 f. Stöckl, Das Opfer nach seinem Wesen u. Geschichte2, Mainz 1861. Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. II3 248-304. Oswald, Die dogm. Lehre v. d. h. Sakr. der kath. Kirche I2 503 f. Gihr, Das heilige Messopfer6, Freiburg 1897 S. 10 f. Scheeben, Dogm. III 387 f. Daniel Dewar, The nature, reality and efficacy of the atonement 1831 ch. 1. Trumbull, The blood covenant. A primitive rite and its bearings on Scripture, 2 ed. Philad. 1893. Art. Blut in Herzog3.

2. The alteration, introduced into the offering by sin, manifested itself only gradually at first. At first the offering was a simple מִנְחָה, gift, Gen. 4:3; and the offerings were brought by the offerers themselves. When sacrificial cultus and priesthood had already developed among other peoples, these too were regulated for Israel. Just as the prophetic and the royal, so too the priestly office according to the law rests on election by Ihvh, Num. 16:7, Hebr. 5:4. The task entrusted to the priests is a double one; they must instruct the people of Israel, also by means of the urim and thummim, concerning the rights and laws of the Lord, Ex. 28:30, Deut. 17:9, 33:8-10, Jer. 18:18, Ezech. 7:26, 44:23, 24, Hagg. 2:12, Mal. 2:7, and further approach Ihvh with the offerings of the people, Lev. 21:8, Num. 16:5 etc., and then on his behalf bless the people, Lev. 9:23, Num. 6:23. The sacrifices which Israel had to bring were different. [306] The Passover sacrifice, Ex. 12, occupies an independent place, is sin-offering and burnt-offering, sacrificium and sacramentum at the same time; the covenant sacrifice, Ex. 24:3-11, served, just as that with Abraham, Gen. 15:9, Jer. 34:18v., for confirmation of the covenant; it therefore consisted of burnt-offerings of bulls, whose blood for the covering of sin and for sanctification by Moses as mediator of the covenant was sprinkled partly on the altar partly on the people, and was thereafter concluded with thank-offerings; the burnt- and thank-offering, Lev. 1, 3, served to maintain the communion with God resting on the foundation of the covenant; the sin- and guilt-offering, Lev. 4-6, presupposed that the communion with God had been disturbed by a sin of weakness and offered in the sprinkling of the blood of the slaughtered sacrificial animal covering of sin and restoration of communion with God. The atonement now came about thus: by the laying on of hands the offerer transferred his sin to the animal; this is indeed often

denied, but wrongly; laying on of hands in Scripture always includes some transfer, of blessing, Gen. 48:13, Mt. 19:13, curse, Lev. 24:14, office, Num. 27:18, Deut. 34:9, the H. Spirit, Hd. 8:17 etc., and thus with the bloody, also the burnt- and the thank-offerings, Lev. 1:4, 3:2, of acknowledged and confessed sin, Lev. 4:4, 15, 16:21, 2 Chr. 29:23; the offering itself was called חטאת or אשם. Thereby the sacrificial animal was now worthy of death. But because it served not only to undergo the punishment for the offerer but precisely to make atonement for his sin, therefore the killing of the animal is always called a slaughtering. It was not to do death as death, but in order thereby to obtain the blood, which had to make atonement. God had precisely given that blood of the animal for an atonement on the altar; and indeed because that blood is the seat of the soul, the seat of a life freed again from sin after and through the slaughtering, Lev. 17:11. When this blood now came on the altar or on the mercy-seat in God's proximity, then thereby the offerer or his sin was covered before the holy face of God; or rather, God himself was it, Deut. 21:8, Jer. 18:23, Mich. 7:19, and as his representative the priest, Lev. 5:13, 10:17, 15:15, who by the offering conceived as כֹּפֶר, λυτρον, ransom-price, covered the persons of the offerers from their sins away or also those sins themselves before his face, כִּפֶּר with the praep. על or בעד. [307] Litt. on the O. T. sacrificial cultus in Herzog2 11, 61 and further still Smend, Altt. Relig. 319. Marti, Gesch. d. isr. Rel. 226.

It deserves remark, however, that the expiatory sacrifices by no means atoned for all but only some, definite, unintentional sins; upon sins with a raised hand there stood extermination from the midst of the people, Num. 15:30. Even if the sins through error were also taken very broadly, Lev. 5, 6; yet the atonement, which was effected by the expiatory sacrifices, remained very limited. Besides, the covenant of grace, established by God with Israel,

did not rest on those expiatory sacrifices but preceded them and had its foundation only in God's promise: I am the LORD your God. The sin- and guilt-offerings served only to atone for unintentional transgressions, which were no definite breach of covenant, and to restore the fellowship with God disturbed thereby. This is also evident from the fact that they were ordained for cases in which there was only Levitical uncleanness but not subjective guilt, Lev. 5:2, 12:6, 7, 15:14. There thus remained numerous sins for which the law indicated no atonement by sacrifices; not only some sins with a raised hand, which were punished with extermination, but further all kinds of spiritual and fleshly sins, sins with thoughts and words, sins of pride and selfishness. For all these sins no sacrifices were prescribed. It is true, that by no means only the sin- and guilt-offerings but that also the burnt- and thank-offerings bore an expiatory character, Lev. 1:3, 4, 9:7, and that on the great day of atonement all sins of the people were atoned for, Lev. 16:16, 23:26-32, Num. 29:7-11. Yet it remains remarkable, that in that connection there is no mention of all the above-mentioned sins and that the proper sin- and guilt-offerings provide only in certain cases. On special occasions, when the people have sinned grievously and have made themselves guilty of breach of covenant, the atonement is therefore also obtained in an extraordinary way, through Moses' intercession, Ex. 32:30-35, Num. 14, Ps. 106:23, or through unusual sacrifices, Num. 16:45-50, 2 Sam. 24:25, 2 Chron. 29:8-11. And the pious in Israel knew that too; they knew, that the expiatory sacrifices opened a way to atonement only in very few cases; and therefore they go back behind those sacrifices and plead upon the mercy of God. And that is what the O. T. sacrificial cult also intended to teach Israel. Those few sacrifices, which [308] were prescribed, did not cover the whole life; they brought about no true atonement; they served only to awaken the

consciousness of sin and were types, which pointed onward to another and better sacrifice. The O. T. sacrificial cult was imperfect; the priests were themselves sinners; the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins; the sacrifices had to be repeated endlessly. Everything indicated, that the ceremonial dispensation of the O. T. had only a transient, symbolic, typical significance. And therefore, according to the prophecy, there comes another covenant, which is not broken but is kept by all, Jer. 31:31; another prophet, who in special measure will be anointed with the Spirit of God and will bring a glad message to Israel and the Gentiles, Deut. 18:15, Jes. 11:2, Mal. 4:5; another priest, who will be appointed not after the manner of Aaron but after the order of Melchizedek and therefore will unite in himself the priestly and kingly dignity and will bear both eternally, Ps. 110, Jer. 30:21, Zach. 6:13; another king, who will come forth from David's house and will be a Ruler in Israel, Mich. 5:1, 2. And so there will also come another, better sacrifice. The sacrifices of animals are not the true ones, Ps. 40:7, 50:8, 51:18, Am. 4:4, 5:21, Hos. 6:6, 8:11, Jes. 1:11, Jer. 6:19, 7:21 etc.; the true sacrifices of God are obedience, 1 Sam. 15:22, mercy, Hos. 6:6, a broken spirit, Ps. 51:19, hearkening to God's voice, Jer. 7:23. And that sacrifice will be brought by that servant of the Lord, who will take Israel's place, accomplish his work, be for a covenant of the people and for a light of the Gentiles, Jes. 42:6, 49:6, and for the sins of his people will set his soul as a guilt-offering, Jes. 53:10.

In the O. T. this promise of the suffering servant of the Lord and that of the anointed king still run in part parallel. Both promises are rooted in the steadfastness of God's covenant; God cannot forget his covenant, in spite of Israel's unfaithfulness and apostasy; He cannot do it for his name's sake; it is an eternal covenant, which knows of no wavering. And therefore Israel,

however it may have fallen into misery on account of its sin, nevertheless again receives a king from David's house. That king will be of humble birth, Jes. 11:1, 2, Mich. 5:1, 2, Ezech. 17:22, He will be not only king but also priest, Jer. 30:21, Zach. 3:1, 6:13, Ps. 110, bring about the [309] righteousness for his people, Jer. 23:6, make the sacrifices superfluous, Jes. 60:21, Jer. 24:7, 31:35, Ezech. 36:25, 27 and make all into priests, Jes. 61:6. Alongside this now runs the other promise, that this righteousness for Israel will be acquired only in the way of suffering. The sacrificial cult symbolized the necessity of the expiatory offering; history showed it in so many an example, in Moses, David, Job, the prophets and in that small band of the faithful, who did not bow the knee to Baal, that the best suffer the most, that they who stand up for the cause of God and in so far are righteous, must enter through suffering into glory; and in the exile and thereafter as congregation Israel became the servant of the Lord, who, being in distress and misery and hard pressed on all sides, would nevertheless be delivered by the Holy One of Israel, Jes. 41:8v. Yet Israel too is not the true servant of the Lord; and itself has need of deliverance, Jes. 41:14, 42:19v.; where could the prophet also in the past or present find the Israel or an individual person, a prophet, a martyr, who had been so wonderfully equipped by Jhvh, who remained so unwaveringly faithful, who in the proclamation of the truth to the Gentiles underwent the heaviest suffering and the most shameful death? Modern exegesis makes vain efforts to find, in the few pious among Israel, in the prophets, or also in Jeremiah or another sufferer, the figure for Isaiah's portrayal of the servant of the Lord. Israel itself with all its pious and prophets places itself in Jes. 53 over against that servant of the Lord, acknowledges that it despised Him on account of his suffering and confesses that He was wounded precisely for

their transgressions and crushed for their iniquities. Even if it is not said directly, the servant of the Lord can be no other than the Messiah, who after all will also be priest and will bring about the righteousness for his people. Cf. Delitzsch on Jes. 42v. Oehler, in Herzog2 9, 649 and the litt. cited there, also Smend, Altt. Rel. 257. It is a difficult question, whether Jewish theology before Jesus' coming already let these two lines in prophecy coincide and thus expected a suffering Messiah, cf. Wünsche, Leiden des Messias, Leipzig 1870. Dalman, Der leidende u. sterbende Messias der Synagoge 1888. Weber, System 344 f. Schürer, Neut. Zeitgesch. 597. Baldensperger, Selbstbew. Jesu 121 f. Oehler in Herzog2 9, 670. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I [310] 65 f. But even if this question is also answered affirmatively; the expectation of a suffering Messiah was nevertheless not the content of popular belief; Jesus' disciples show themselves wholly incapable of it, Mt. 16:22, Luk. 18:34, 24:21, Joh. 12:34.

3. According to the N. T. all these different testimonies of law and prophecy converge upon Christ; the whole O. T. is in principle fulfilled in Him; in Him all the promises of God are yea and amen, Rom. 15:8, 2 Cor. 1:20. He is the true Messiah, the king from David's house, Mt. 2:2, 21:5, 27:11, 37, Luk. 1:32 etc.; the prophet, who proclaims the gospel to the poor, Luk. 4:17v.; the priest, who in his person, his office, his appointment, his offering, his sanctuary far surpasses the O. T. priesthood, Hebr.; the servant of the Lord, who as a δουλος, Phil. 2:7, 8, came to serve, Mk. 10:45, subjected himself to the law, Gal. 4:4, fulfilled all righteousness, Mt. 3:15 and was obedient unto the death of the cross, Rom. 5:19, Phil. 2:8, Hebr. 5:8. As such Jesus now makes a distinction between the kingdom of God, as it is now founded by Him in a spiritual sense and as it will once be revealed in glory; between his first and second coming, which for the O. T. prophecy

still coincided; between his work in the state of humiliation and that in the state of exaltation. The Christ must enter into his glory through suffering, Luk. 24:26. The work, which He now accomplishes in the state of humiliation, is described in the N. T. in many-sided fashion. It is an ἔργον, entrusted to Him by the Father, Joh. 4:34, 5:36, 17:4; it consisted in general in accomplishing God's will, Mt. 26:42, Joh. 4:34, 5:30, 6:38, and then more particularly comprised the declaration of God, Joh. 1:18, the revelation and glorification of his name, 17:4, 6, 26, the communication of God's words, 17:8, 14 etc. Christ is a prophet, mighty in words and works, Luk. 24:19; He is no novus legislator, but he explains the law, Mt. 5-7, 22:40, Luk. 9:23, 10:28, Joh. 13:34, 1 Joh. 2:7, 8, proclaims the gospel, Mt. 12:16-21, Luk. 4:17-21, and in both preaches himself as fulfiller of the law and content of the gospel. He is the law and the gospel in his own person. He is not a prophet only by what He speaks, but first of all by what He is. He is the Logos, Joh. 1:1, [311] full of grace and truth, Joh. 1:18, anointed with the Spirit without measure, 3:34, the revelation of the Father, Joh. 14:9, Col. 2:9. The source of his preaching is He himself; it is not the inspiration but the incarnation. God's Spirit did not merely come upon Him; God did not merely speak with Him, as with Moses, face to face, but God was in Him and spoke through Him, Hebr. 1:3. He is not a prophet alongside others but the highest, the only prophet; source and center of all prophecy; and all knowledge of God, in the O. T. before his incarnation, and also now in the N. T. after his resurrection and ascension, is from Him, 1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19, Mt. 11:27. Next, the will of God, which Jesus came to accomplish, also comprised the miracles which He did; the one work falls apart into many ἔργα, Joh. 5:36, which are the works of his Father, 5:20, 9:3, 10:32, 37, 14:10, prove that the Father loves Him and is in Him, 5:20,

10:38, 14:10, testify that the Father has sent Him, 5:36, 10:25, and reveal his divine glory, 2:11, 11:4, 40. Yes, He not only does miracles, but He himself in his person is the absolute miracle; as the Son of God become man, conceived of the H. Spirit, risen and glorified, He himself is the greatest miracle, center of all miracles, author of the re-creation of all things, firstborn from the dead, in all things the First, Col. 1:18. Further, the will of God especially comprises that the only-begotten Son of the Father lay down his life for his own, Joh. 10:18. The N. Test. sees in Christ an offering, and the fulfillment of the O. T. sacrificial cult. He is the true covenant-sacrifice; just as the old covenant was confirmed by the covenant-sacrifice, Ex. 24:3-11, so the blood of Christ is the blood of the new testament, Mt. 26:28, Mk. 14:24, Hebr. 9:13v Christ is a θυσια, זֶבַח, the victim for our sins, Ef. 5:2, Hebr. 9:26, 10:12; a προσφορα, δωρον, קָרְבָּן, מִנְחָה, Ef. 5:2, Hebr. 10:10, 14, 18; a λυτρον, ἀντιλυτρον. Mt 20:28, Mk. 10:45, 1 Tim. 2:6 גְּאֻלָּה, פָּדוּי, כֹּפֶר, ransom-price, ransom-money, to buy someone free out of prison, and hence means of atonement, to cover another's sin by an offering and thus to save them from death; a τιμη, 1 Cor. 6:20, 7:23, 1 Petr. 1:18, 19, a price that has been paid for the redemption; a sin-offering, which for us has been made sin, 2 Cor. 5:21, 1 Joh. 2:2, 4:10; the Passover sacrifice, which for us [312] has been slain, Joh. 19:36, 1 Cor. 5:7, the Lamb of God, who bears the sin of the world and for it has been slain, Joh. 1:29, 36, Hd. 8:32, 1 Petr. 1:19, Op. 5:6 etc.; the ἱλαστηριον, Rom. 3:25, i.e. not the mercy-seat, כַּפֹּרֶת, although this word has also been rendered thus in LXX because no better aequivalent was to be found in Greek, but that which serves for reconciliation, means of atonement, or scil. θυμα, atoning sacrifice, cf. Deismann, Die sprachl. Forschung der griech. Bibel, Giessen 1898 S. 16. 17; a καταρα, Gal. 3:13, which took over from

us the curse of the law; as the serpent in the wilderness, lifted up on the cross, Joh. 3:14, 8:28, 12:33, and as a grain of wheat, dying in the earth, in order thus to bear much fruit, Joh. 12:24. The relation in which this offering of Christ stands to us and our sin is likewise expressed in very different ways. He gives or sets his life, Mk. 10:45, Joh. 10:15, sanctifies himself, Joh. 17:19, is made sin and curse, 5 Cor. 5:21, Gal. 3:13, is delivered up, Rom. 4:25, has given himself up, Gal. 2:20, has suffered, 1 Petr. 3:18, has been crucified and has died, Joh. 11:50, 51, Rom. 5:6, 1 Cor. 15:3, 2 Cor. 5:15, 1 Thess. 5:10, and indeed as a λυτρον άντι πολλων, Mt. 20:28, Mk. 10:45, in the place of many, or ὑπερ c. gen. pers., Joh. 10:15, 11:50, 51, Rom 5:6, 8, 2 Cor. 5:15, 21, Gal. 3:13, Ef. 5:2, Hebr. 2:9, for the benefit of us, of his people, cf. Phil. 13, ὑπερ σου, in gratiam tuam, so that you do not need to do it; or ὑπερ c. gen. rei, Joh. 6:51, 1 Cor. 15:3, Hebr. 10:12, for the benefit of the sins, to take them away, or for the benefit of the life of the world, so that this through Christ's death may obtain life; or περι c. gen. pers., Mt. 26:28, 1 Joh. 2:2, for, for the sake of many or of the whole world; or περι c. gen. rei, Rom. 8:3, Hebr 10:6, 18, 1 Petr. 3:18, 1 Joh. 2:2, 4:10, for, for the sake of sin; or δια c. acc. rei, Rom. 4:25, on account of, because of sin.

That which Christ has acquired by this his sacrifice is almost too much to enumerate. For himself he thereby acquired his entire exaltation, the resurrection, Ef. 1:20, the ascension, 1 Petr. 3:22, the session at the right hand of God, Ef. 1:20, Hebr. 12:2, the elevation to Head of the church, Ef. 1:22, the name above every name, Phil. 2:9-11, the Mediatorial glory, Hebr. 2:9, the dominion over [313] all things in heaven and on earth, Mt. 28:18, Ef. 1:22, 1 Cor. 15:24v., the last judgment, Joh. 5:22, 27. And further he acquired for his own, for humanity, for the world an immeasurable series of

blessings. He himself in his person is the sum of all those blessings, the light of the world, Joh. 8:12, the true bread, 6:35, the true vine, 15:1, the way, the truth, the resurrection and the life, 11:25, 14:6, our σοφια, δικαιοσυνη, ἁγιασμος, ἀπολυτρωσις, 1 Cor. 1:30, our ειρηνη, Ef. 2:14, the firstborn and the firstfruits, who is followed by many, Rom. 8:29, 1 Cor. 15:23, the second and last Adam, 1 Cor. 15:45, the head of the church, Ef. 1:22, the cornerstone of the building of God, Ef. 2:20; and therefore there is no participation in his benefits except through participation in his person. But from him all benefits nevertheless flow forth: the entire σωτηρια, Mt. 1:21, Luk. 2:11, Joh. 3:17, 12:47, and then more specifically the forgiveness of sins, Mt. 26:28, Ef. 1:7, the taking away, αἱρειν, of our sins, Joh. 1:29, 1 Joh. 3:5, the cleansing or deliverance from an evil conscience, Hebr. 10:22, justification, Rom. 4:25, righteousness, 1 Cor. 1:30, the υἱοθεσια, Gal. 3:26, 4:5, 6, Ef. 1:5, free access to God, Ef. 2:18, 3:12, the laying aside by God of his wrath on the ground of Christ's sacrifice, i.e. the ἱλασμος, Rom. 3:25, 1 Joh. 2:2, 4:10, Hebr. 2:17, the new, reconciled, no longer hostile but favorable relation of peace toward the world, which has taken the place of that with God, καταλλαγη, Rom. 5:10v., 2 Cor. 5:18-20, and the relation of peace of man in relation to God, Rom. 5:1; further the gift of the H. Spirit, Joh. 15:26, Hd. 2, Gal. 4:6, regeneration and sonship from God, Joh. 1:12, 13, sanctification, 1 Cor. 1:30, participation in Christ's death, Rom. 6:3v., the dying off of sin, Rom. 6:6v. Gal. 2:20, crucifixion to the world, Gal. 6:14, cleansing, Ef. 5:26, 1 Joh. 1:7, 9, and the washing away, 1 Cor. 6:11, Op. 1:5, 7:14, of sins by the sprinkling with the blood of Christ, Hebr. 9:22, 12:24, 1 Petr. 1:2, the walk in the Spirit and in the newness of life, Rom. 6:4, participation in the resurrection and the ascension of Christ, Rom. 6:5, Ef. 2:6, Phil. 3:20, the following of Christ, Mt. 10:38, 1 Petr. 2:21v.; further

still the deliverance from the [314] curse of the law, Rom. 6:14, 7:1-6, Gal. 3:13, Col. 2:14, the fulfillment of the old and the inauguration of a new covenant, Mk. 14:24, Hebr. 7:22, 9:15, 12:24, deliverance from the power of Satan, Luk. 11:22, Joh. 14:30, Col. 2:15, 1 Joh. 3:8, Col. 1:13, the victory over the world, Joh. 16:33, 1 Joh. 4:4, 5:4, deliverance from death and from the fear of death, Rom. 5:12v., 1 Cor. 15:55v., Hebr. 2:15, escape from judgment, Hebr. 10:27, 28; and finally, the resurrection, on the last day, Joh. 11:25, 1 Cor. 15:21, the ascension, Ef. 2:6, glorification, Joh. 17:24, the heavenly inheritance, Joh. 14:1, 1 Petr. 1:4, eternal life, already beginning here with faith, Joh. 3:15, 36 and once revealing itself fully in glory, Mk. 10:30, Rom. 6:22, the new heaven and earth, 2 Petr. 3:13, Op. 21:1, 5, the restoration of all things, Hd. 3:21, 1 Cor. 15:24-28.

4. The history of the doctrine of Christ's work exhibits a different character from that of the dogma of the Trinity and of Christ's person. No definite conflict has been waged over it, which has led to a sharp and clear formulation. Scripture was also so many-sided in the description of that work; and in the history of theology all kinds of conceptions of the work of Christ arose, which contained a kernel of truth, cf. Bähr, Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den drei ersten Jahrh. 1832. Baur, Die christl. Lehre v. d. Versöhnung in ihrer gesch. Entw. 1838. Dorner, Entw. d. Lehre v. d. Person Christi2 1851. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk II3 113 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers., part I. Art. Versöhnung in Herzog1 by Schoeberlein, in Herzog2 by H. Schmidt, and furthermore the dogma-historical works of Hagenbach etc. The apostolic fathers attach themselves to the usage of the H. Scripture and say only, that Christ out of love for us suffered and sacrificed himself, Barn. 7. Ign. ad Eph. 1. Polyc. ad Phil. 1. Diogn. 9. Soon, however, people attempted to give themselves some further

account of the work of Christ. And then immediately different conceptions occur alongside one another; from the beginning Christ was regarded not only as prophet but also as king and priest. Sometimes these three offices are also expressly mentioned alongside one another; Eusebius speaks of Christ as [315] μονον ἀρχιερεα των ὀλων και μονον ἀπασης της κτισεως βασιλεα και μονον προφητων αρχιπροφητην του πατρος, Hist. eccl. I 3, and related statements also occur in Lactantius, Greg. Nyss., August., de civ. X 6 etc., cf. Krauss, Das Mittlerwerk nach dem Schema des munus triplex, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1872 S. 595-655. That does not prevent one or another conception from sometimes coming one-sidedly into the foreground. The emphasis then falls on the fact that Christ is the Logos, who appeared on earth, in order to reveal the full truth to men and to give them an example of virtue, Just. Apol. I 10. Iren., adv. haer. V 1. Tertull., de orat. 4. Clem. Alex., Strom. V 12. Orig., de princ. III 5, 6. c. Cels. I 67. 68. Athan., de incarn. 16. Or else sin is felt more as power than as guilt and correspondingly the work of Christ is conceived more as redemption than as reconciliation; God has become man, in order that He might deliver men from sensuality, mortality, and dominion of demons and might make them like God, partakers of eternal life and immortality, Iren., adv. haer. III 16, 6. 20, 2 IV 2 V 1. Athan., de incarn. 7. Greg. Nyss., Catech. magna 17-26 etc. Another, well-known conception, and in spite of the contradiction of Gregorius Naz., Orat. 42, 48, embraced by many, was that Christ in his death had given himself over to Satan as a ransom, bait, or trap and thus had overcome him by cunning and had delivered men from his dominion, Orig., op Mt. 20:28. Greg. Nyss., Orat. cat. 22-26. Damasc., de fide orthod. III 1. 27 etc. And finally, from the beginning already, the thought also occurs that Christ in his suffering and dying offered himself for us and in our place to God, in order

to acquire reconciliation, forgiveness, sanctification, and the whole salvation. Very beautifully we find this thought already in the epistle to Diognetus c. 9, cf. Clemens Rom., I ad Cor. 7. Barnabas c. 5. 6. 7. According to Justin Martyr Christ not only became man, in order to make himself a partaker of our suffering and to bring healing, in order to put an end to the disobedience that had come into the world, in order to overcome the power of Satan and of death; but his death is also a sacrifice for all sinners who wish to repent, the passover that has been slaughtered for all, the cause of the forgiveness of sins, Dial. c. 40. 111, cf. [316] Semisch, Justin der Märtyrer II 416 f. Much more clearly Irenaeus says that Christ, who through his incarnation stands in communion with us and has entered into our whole condition, V praef. cf. III 18. 7. V 16, 2, through his suffering and death has reconciled us to God, III 16, 9, has restored us to the favor of God, against whom we had sinned, has reconciled the Father for us, has made good our disobedience by his obedience and has bestowed on us in faith the forgiveness of sins, V 17, 1. And a similar conception of the suffering of Christ as a sacrifice for our sins, which acquired for us righteousness and life, also occurs in Origen, Athanasius, Cyrillus, Gregorius Nyss., Damascenus, Thomasius, II 125 f. In the West too this conception was adopted and further developed. Tertullian saw in religion a legal relationship, in which man is subject to God's law and for transgressions has to render satisfaction to God through the poenitentia; as in the Trinity, so Tertullian in the doctrine of penance brought various terms into use, deo offenso satisfacere, deum iratum placare, reconciliare, deum promereri etc., which indeed were not yet applied by himself but already by Cyprian, Hilarius, Ambrosius and others to Christ and his offering, Harnack, D. G. III 15 f., cf. I 524. Augustine enumerated various fruits of

Christ's offering, which all come down to this, that on the one hand it has delivered us from guilt, stain, death, and devil and on the other hand has bestowed on us illumination, life, and salvation, Kühner, Augustinus Anschauung von der Erlösungsbedeutung Christi, Heidelberg 1899 S. 18. Alongside the ethical, the mystical, and the ransom theory, the juridical or satisfactorial also occurs in him. Christ is mediator, reconciliator, redemptor, salvator, medicus, pastor etc., He is sacerdos and sacrificium at the same time; He is the true and only sacrifice for sins, de civ. X 6. Enchir. 33. 41; himself without guilt, He took over our punishment, in order thereby to pay our guilt and to put an end to our punishment, c. Faust. Man. XIV 4. Delicta nostra sua delicta fecit, ut justitiam suam nostram justitiam faceret. His maledictio is our benedictio; Christus de te sibi habebat carnem, de se tibi salutem, de te sibi mortem, de se tibi vitam, de te sibi contumelias, de se tibi honores, Enarr. in ps. 60.

The representations that we encounter among the church fathers concerning the suffering of [317] Christ recur in scholasticism. But Anselm's writing Cur Deus homo nevertheless gave to the satisfactorial conception a preponderance over all others. What was new in Anselm did not consist in this, that he regarded Christ's death as an offering for our sins. But while earlier one had mostly said that the incarnation and satisfaction were not absolutely necessary, Anselm sought a ground in order to prove the contrary. He found it in this, that upon sin there must always follow aut poena aut satisfactio and that, if God wills to forgive and preserve humanity, none other than a God-man can bring that satisfactio to God and give back to Him His honour. But because Christ was God-man, his wholly voluntary death was of so great value, that He not only delivered from punishment but moreover also merited; and that merit He, since He did not

himself need it, ceded to humanity, in whose place He had given back to God the honour. No one took over this view of Anselm unchanged. The absolute necessity of Christ's incarnation and satisfaction was mostly denied; Duns Scotus stood wholly on the other side, denied the infinity of the guilt and the infinity of Christ's merit, denied that Christ's offering was sufficient in itself, taught that it was reckoned sufficient by God, and reduced incarnation and satisfaction to pure arbitrariness, to the dominium absolutum in God, cf. deel II 211; but Thomas also did not deem them absolutely necessary and called them conveniens, S. Th. III qu. 1 art. 1. 2. qu. 46 art. 1-3. Further, a single one, viz. Abaelard, contested the whole satisfaction-doctrine and set over against it, that Christ's incarnation and suffering was not a revelation of God's righteousness but only of his grace and love; that Christ from the beginning to the end of his life had taught us by his word and example and thereby awakens in us a love which delivers from sin and makes us God's children, and that herein the redeeming and reconciling power of Christ's person and work is situated, Herzog2 1, 16. Various elements in Anselm's representation were later rejected by all, such as the whole private-law character that he gives to the satisfaction, the conception of sin as an insult and of satisfaction as restoration of honour, the one-sided emphasis that he lays on Christ's death with [318] disregard of his life, the antithesis that he makes between poena and satisfactio, the mechanical connection that he lays between satisfactio and meritum, between Christ's merit and the reason why it benefits humanity. But that does not take away, that the doctrine of Anselm nevertheless in its essential constituent parts, as satisfaction for the debt of sin to God's righteousness, in order thereby to acquire for us righteousness and life, has obtained in later theology an enduring significance. The redemption brought about by

Christ was by Anselm first and most clearly conceived as a deliverance, not in the first place from the consequences of sin, from death and from the power of Satan, but first of all from sin itself and its guilt; the redemption of Christ became in the first place a reconciliation of God and man. Yet this has come much less into its own in scholastic and Roman theology than in Protestant. Thomas does not, with Anselm, limit the satisfaction chiefly to the death, but extends it to the whole suffering and the entire obedience of Christ, S. Theol. III qu. 46; he also explains the transfer of Christ's merit to his own better than Anselm from this, that Christ is the head and the church his body, ib. qu. 8; but he nevertheless does not bring it in the consideration of Christ's suffering to any unity, conceives it successively as meritum, satisfactio, sacrificium, redemptio, ib. qu. 48 and then names as its fruits the liberatio a peccato, a potestate diaboli, a poena peccati, reconciliatio, aditus paradisi, ib. qu. 49. The reconciliation is here not yet in the foreground and it also comes about only fully thereby, that Christ as a forma virtutis et humilitatis awakens us to imitation, by his love and grace moves us to love and in faith delivers us from sin; objective and subjective side of the reconciliation, forgiveness and renewal are not sufficiently kept apart from one another, ib. 48 art. 1. 49 art. 1 and further Lombardus and other comm. on Sent. III dist. 18. 19. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 7. 9. Later this also still remains so with many Roman theologians, Petavius, de incarn. XII. XIII. Theol. Wirceb.3 IV 295 sq. Deharbe's explanation of the Catholic doctrine of faith and morals, Utrecht 1888 II 267v., but others nevertheless place the whole work of Christ under the concept redemptio, or satisfactio (and meritum) [319] or also treat it in the schema of the three offices, Cat. Rom. I c. 3 qu. 7. Perrone, Prael. theol. IV 1839 p. 309. Liebermann, Instit.

theol.8 II 264. Dieringer, Kath. Dogm.4 465. Scheeben, Dogm. III 309-454. Pesch, Prael. dogm. IV 198 sq. 256 sq. Jansen, Prael. theol. II 708.

The Reformation originally had no other doctrine concerning the work of Christ than Rome, and defended the satisfaction of Christ tooth and nail against the Socinian attack. Yet, by virtue of its principle, it placed it under a new point of view and in another connection. Because it had learned to know sin first of all as guilt, in the work of Christ reconciliation came to stand in the foreground. Sin was of such a nature that it angered God; in order to appease that wrath, in order to satisfy God's justice, to that end, in the first place, satisfaction by the God-man was necessary. He brought this about by placing Himself, as Surety of the Covenant, in our place, taking upon Himself the full guilt and punishment of sin, and subjecting Himself to the entire demand of the law of God. The work of Christ therefore consists not so much in humilitas, not only in His death, but in His entire obedience, both active and passive. And He accomplished this work in His threefold office, not only as prophet by teaching us and giving an example and stirring us up to love, but also as priest and king, Calvin first in the Catech. Genev., thereafter in the edition of the Institutio of 1539 and then by him gradually taken over by Reformed, Lutheran, and Roman theologians. The objective and the subjective side of reconciliation are thereby clearly distinguished. Christ has accomplished everything. All benefits are objectively enclosed in His person. Because Christ by His offering has satisfied God's justice, He has objectively changed the relation of God and man and thereby also all other relations of man to sin, death, Satan, world. The first benefit is therefore the forgiveness of sins, and as a consequence thereof also the deliverance from stain, death, law, Satan. Christ is the only Mediator of God and of men, the all-sufficient Saviour,

the highest prophet, the only priest, the true king. Cf. Luther and Melanchton bij Thomasius II 168 f. Gerhard, Loc. IV 320-331. XVI 31-63. Quenstedt III 450-460. Hollaz, Ex. 728-764. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 806-859. Calvijn, [320] Inst. II 15-17. Polanus, Syst. Theol. VI c. 27-29. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 228 sq. Voetius, de merito Christi, Disp. II 228-284. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV. Id. De satisfactione Christi 1691. Owen, various tractates in vol. X of his Works, Edinburgh Clark 1862. Moor III 842 sq. M. Vitringa V 315 sq. VI 5 sq.

5. The work of Christ, however, like his person, was understood by others in a wholly different way. The Ebionites saw in Christ only a prophet, who by his teaching and example gives man strength for the struggle against sin. For the Gnostics Christ was an aeon of Divine wisdom, who had appeared on earth in an apparently human form, in order by illumination and knowledge to free men from the bonds of matter and to make them πνευματικοι. Over against this speculative rationalism the Montanists maintained the supernatural, transcendent character of Christianity, not only in the person of Christ, but also in the revelation continuing through the H. Spirit, which now still is the portion of believers and causes the Christian religion to pass from the childish into the manly age. In the dualistic, pantheistic, apocalyptic and libertinistic sects of the Middle Ages likewise no other significance remained for Christ than that he in his time had revealed to men their true essence and destination, whereby they now themselves in the age of the Spirit can become what Christ was; what Scripture teaches of Christ is realized in every Christian; the actual dying and rising of Christ takes place in the regeneration of every man. All these thoughts continued to operate in the century of the Reformation and led to a strong combating of the doctrine of Luther and Calvin. Not the Christ for

us, but the Christ in us, not the Word but the Spirit was the essence of religion. Osiander taught that Christ had brought the eternal, Divine essential righteousness in his human nature, and pours this into his own through faith and thus justifies them, Herzog2 11, 125 f. Carlstadt, Frank, Schwencfeld, Weigel e. a. saw in trust in Christ's imputed righteousness a dangerous error; our salvation lies not in what Christ outside and for us [321] but in what he does in and through us, in the mystical communion with God, Erbkam, Gesch. d. prot. Sekten 247 f. 340 f. 441 f. This mystical conception of redemption through Christ also later found acceptance with many. Böhme regarded the wrath of God and death as real, physical powers, which Christ has conquered by his death and in whose place he pours out a new Divine life into humanity, Joh. Claassen, J. Böhme, sein Leben u. seine theos. Werke III 31-76. Among the Quakers redemption indeed has its cause in Christ, but Christ himself is nothing other than the summary of grace and light in humanity; the actual, true redemption is that which takes place in us, Barclay, Verantwoording van de ware Christ. Godgel. Amst. 1757 bl. 154. Antoinette Bourignon and Poiret called vicarious suffering impossible and improper; Christ did not come to earth to make satisfaction for us, but to preach to us God's forgiving love and by his teaching and example to cleanse us from sin, M. Vitringa VI 51. Likewise J. C. Dippel conceived the suffering and dying of Christ as an example of his spiritual mediatorship, whereby he kills the old man in us and causes the new to rise; redemption takes place in us; an objective reconciliation is not necessary, for there is no wrath in God, ib. 56. Dorner, Entw. II 924. According to Zinzendorf Christ is the Creator and Sustainer of all things, the Jehova of the O. T., who therein has revealed God's love, that he has become so small, so poor, so humble and has suffered so much; his suffering is not so much punishment

and satisfaction to God, as rather voluntary and loving martyrdom; his blood, his death is thereby the source of the life of humanity; the martyr-wounds of Christ's side are the matrix of the human race, the origin of the Spirit, who from Christ pours himself out into all, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. I 291. II 194 f. Schneckenburger, Vorles. über die Lehrbegriffe der klein. prot. Kirchenparteien 195 f. Swedenborg held the belief that the suffering on the cross was the redemption to be a fundamental error, which together with the doctrine of the Trinity had brought the church to ruin. The suffering on the cross was not the redemption but was for Jesus the last temptation and, because he stood firm, the means of his glorification; then the human in him was united with the Divine of his Father, then God truly became man, [322] could he approach the hostile, sensuous powers of hell and overcome them; redemption is a continuing subjugation of hell and ordering of heaven, brought about by God as man, Swedenborg, Die wahre christl. Religion2 1873 S. 169-205.

But not only from the mystical side, but also from the rationalistic side, there arose opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrine concerning the work of Christ. To this may be reckoned the doctrine of Stancarus, that Christ only according to his human nature is our mediator and our righteousness, Herzog2 14, 590 f.; and also the denial of the obedientia activa by Karg (Parsimonius), and by Joh. Piscator, who first set forth his ideas in a letter in the year 1604, included in the Epist. praest. virorum p. 156, cf. Theses theol. XV 18. 19. Karg retracted his opinion in 1570, but Piscator found support with Martinius, Crocius, Pierius, Pareus, Wendelinus, H. Alting e. a., and later exercised through Camero, Placaeus, Capellus etc. a harmful influence on Reformed theology. But the most serious and solid opposition to the satisfactio vicaria came from the side of the Socinians. Indeed they

still call Christ prophet, priest, and king, Cat. Rac. qu. 101, but in fact they make the priestly office an appendage of the kingly office. When Christ was on earth, He was only a prophet, who before the beginning of his public activity had been taken up by God into heaven (raptus in coelum, Joh. 3:13, 31, 6:36, 62, 8:28, 10:28, Cat. Rac. qu. 195), there had been made acquainted by God himself with the truth, and thus was in a position to perfect the law with new commandments, Cat. Rac. qu. 209v, and to promise to the keepers of those commandments eternal life, ib. qu. 352 and the sanctifying power of the Spirit, qu. 361. This his doctrine Christ confirmed by his sinless life, by his miracles, and especially by his death and his resurrection ib. qu. 374. His death was necessary, in order to cause his followers to persevere to the end in their piety and holy walk, qu. 380, and in order clearly and distinctly to confirm God's love toward us, qu. 383.; and his resurrection served, to cause us by his example to see that they who are obedient to God are delivered from all death, and in order to grant to Christ himself the power to grant eternal life to all who obey Him, qu. 384. [323] The death of Christ thus had here a wholly different significance than in the doctrine of the church; it formed no independent moment in the work of Christ but served only, on the one hand to confirm his doctrine and on the other hand to cause Him to come to the resurrection, which first made Him King and Lord in heaven, qu. 386. And even this He in fact first became through his ascension. The resurrection still belongs to the state of humiliation, for even thereafter He still had a mortal body, qu. 465. But at the ascension He received a glorified body, and was exalted to King, Lord, and God. As such He received from God the power, to support those who follow his example in all distress and at last to reward them with immortality. That He can do this, is his kingly office; that He will do this, is

his high-priestly office, qu. 476. Priest, therefore, He was not yet on earth, qu. 483; his death was not the actual sacrifice, but the introduction and preparation for it; the true sacrifice He now brings in heaven, just as the O. T. high priest first brought about the reconciliation in the most holy place, qu. 413. And that sacrifice consists in this, that He accomplishes the reconciliation, i.e. delivers us from the service and the punishment of sin. From this standpoint the Socinians had to oppose the doctrine of satisfaction just as strongly as that of the Trinity and the Godhead of Christ, cf. especially Catech. Rac. qu. 388-414 and F. Socinus, Praelect. theol. c. 15 and de Jesu Christo Servatore, Bibl. Fr. Pol. II 121-252. First, in their judgment it is in conflict with Scripture; the proponents cannot adduce a single certain passage for their opinion; Scripture says clearly that God forgives sin out of grace and forgiveness excludes satisfaction; the expression that Christ has suffered for us etc. has no substitutionary meaning, but says only that Christ has suffered for us, not to satisfy God, but to deliver us from sin; the words redemption, reconciliation and the like indicate only that Christ has shown us the way to be delivered from the service and the punishment of sin, but absolutely not that God had to be reconciled by a sacrifice, for God was graciously disposed toward us and has made this known to us through Christ. Further, satisfaction is also not necessary; the justice and mercy in God are [324] not in conflict with one another, they are also not attributes naturally proper to God, but they are effectus ipsius voluntatis and depend on his will; whether God wills to punish or to forgive sins is not at all determined by his nature but by his will; God can just as well and better than a man forgive sins without satisfaction; indeed his justice is nullified by satisfaction, because it punishes the innocent and lets the guilty go free, and his mercy loses its

value if it can show itself only after satisfaction; God has therefore always promised forgiveness to the penitent and willed that we should imitate Him therein. Next, satisfaction is also impossible; the obedientia passiva is impossible, because indeed money debts but no personal moral debts can be transferred to another; to punish an innocent person for the sin of another is unjust and cruel; and even if this were possible, that other would then at most be able to undergo the punishment of sin, i.e. eternal death, for one single man, but never for many or for all men; and as regards the obedientia activa, this is even much less possible, for to the keeping of God's law each is personally obligated for himself, but the one can never take it over for the other; moreover the obedientia passiva and activa are in conflict with one another, whoever accomplishes the one is free from the other; Christ therefore has not accomplished them, He has not suffered eternal death but rose on the third day from the dead; however severe, his suffering was finite; his divine nature could not make it infinite in value, because it could not suffer and die, or it would at every moment in that suffering be infinite and thus make all the rest superfluous; moreover, what could that benefit us, since man had sinned, and how could God (the Son) satisfy God himself (the Father)? Finally, the doctrine of satisfaction is also harmful, because it exalts Christ with his mercy above God with his demand for satisfaction, obliges us to greater gratitude to Christ than to God, and also opens the door to carelessness and ungodliness; all sins have, after all, been satisfied, we can then sin as much as we wish. And the death of Christ intended precisely that we should be delivered from sin and should walk in a new godly life! [325]

Faustus Socinus' criticism of the doctrine of satisfaction was so sharp and complete, that later opponents could do nothing other than repeat his

arguments. The Remonstrants did indeed still try to maintain the satisfaction of Christ, but in fact adopted all objections raised against it; they taught not only, with Roman Catholics and Lutherans, that Christ had made satisfaction for all men, but they also denied that Christ suffered all punishments which God had imposed upon sin, that He underwent eternal death, that His obedientia activa was vicarious. Even His suffering and death was no satisfactio plenaria pro peccatis, no solutio debitorum, which after all would make forgiveness on God's side and faith on our side superfluous; but an offering, a perfect, unto death maintained, dedication of Christ to God, which was regarded by Him as sufficient for all sins. On the ground of that offering God now, through the gospel, has forgiveness of sins offered to all, in order that everyone who believes may be saved; but Christ did not acquire actual salvation for His own, but only the possibility of becoming saved, for all; whether someone actually is saved depends on himself, Conf. en Apol. Conf. c. 8. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 18-23. Hugo Grotius also, in his Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi 1617, undertook an attempt at justification of the doctrine of satisfaction. To that end he derived it, not from the will of God nor also from His punitive justice, but from the justitia Dei rectoria, i.e. from the necessity for God to maintain in the world order and law, right and justice, and to take account of the bonum commune. By conceiving that legal order, however, as a world-order which stood outside God, he made God's justice subservient and subordinate to it; he changed the satisfaction of Christ into an undeserved suffering, into a penal example for the deterrence of others, into a measure of regents' wisdom; and he left unexplained how Christ for that had to be God, and how God could thus cause an innocent person to suffer and could regard his suffering as satisfaction for others. Yet, however many

objections the Socinian and Remonstrant doctrine could provoke, it gradually gained the upper hand. The supranaturalists, such as Michaelis, Storr, Morus, Knapp, Steudel, Reinhard, Dogm. § 107, Muntinghe, Vinke, [326] Egeling, Weg der zaligheid II 175 etc., although sometimes still thinking to defend the ecclesiastical doctrine, in substance propounded no other doctrine than that of the Remonstrants or of Hugo Grotius. The same was the case in the New England Theology. The older Jonathan Edwards still defended the orthodox doctrine, Works I 582; but Edwards Jr., Smalley, Maxey, Burge, Dwight, Emmons, Spring, propounded the governmental theory of Grotius, cf. E. Park, The atonement, discourses and treatises of Jon. Edwards, Smalley, Maxey, Emmons etc., New-York 1860. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 328. But many went still further and rejected the whole doctrine of satisfaction. Ernesti, de officio Christi triplici, Opusc. theol. 1773 p. 413, contested the doctrine of the three offices with the argument that the names of prophet, priest, and king are unclear, Old Test. representations and that each office already includes the other two within itself. Töllner, in his de obedientia Christi activa commentatio 1755, renewed all Socinian objections, not only against the active obedience of Christ but against the whole doctrine of satisfaction. And with him Bahrdt, Steinbart, Eberhard, Löffler, Henke, Wegscheider, Inst. § 140-142, Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 41, Locke, Chubb, Coleridge, John Taylor, Priestley etc., argued that Christ was not a revelation of God’s justice but of His love and mercy; that God does not punish sin except with such natural punishments as proceed from sin itself and bear a paedagogical character; that the doctrine of substitution is an absurd thought of Augustine and Anselm and occurs in Scripture not at all or only from accommodation, in O. T. symbols; that the active obedience of Christ, if it were vicarious, would on

our side make all faith, conversion, moral improvement unnecessary; and especially, that forgiveness of sins, adoption as children of God, justification cannot precede moral renewal or sanctification but must follow it and be dependent on it. Religion was built upon morality; the center of gravity shifted from the objective to the subjective; Versöhnung made dependent on Erlösung; God a servant of man. Thus the death of Christ could only still be an example of virtue and confirmation of the truth (Eberhard, Löffler), or a sacrifice for the benefit of men and a proof of God's love (Schwarze), or a factual [327] declaration of God that He wishes to forgive sins to whoever repents (Morus, Köppen, Klaiber, Stäudlin), or a means to awaken trust in God, to deter from sin (Töllner, Egeling), or also, to free us from the erroneous thought that God is wrathful and punishes (Steinbart), or a symbolic representation of the voluntary assumption by the moral man of the punishment which he has deserved in his sinful condition, Kant, Religion 84 f., cf. v. d. Willigen, Oordeelk. Overzigt over de versch. wijzen, op welke men zich heeft voorgesteld het verband tusschen den dood van J. C. en de zaligheid der menschen, Godg. Bijdr. II 1828 bl. 485-603. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 608 f. Baur, Chr. Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 478 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I cap. 7. 8.

6. In more recent theology there has been no lack of attempts to modify the doctrine of Christ's office and work in accordance with the many objections raised against it, and yet to maintain it in a new form. In general it was thereby guided by the striving to transform the juridical doctrine of satisfaction, in which Christ in our place fulfilled the demand of God's justice, into that of a personal, religious-ethical activity of Christ, by which He brought about change not in God, who is always love, but in us, whether then more in our understanding or in our heart or in our will. Schelling and

Hegel, however, ascribed to Christianity as a historical phenomenon only a transitory value. That God becomes man in a particular person and then suffers and dies for another's sin is unthinkable. But, taken symbolically, it contains profound truth. The person and the work of Christ are the historical clothing of the idea that the world as Son of God, proceeding from Him and returning to Him, must necessarily suffer and thus enter into glory; the world and humanity subjected to time and finitude is the suffering and dying God, Schelling, Werke I 5 S. 386-305; the reconciliation of God is a necessary, objective moment in the world-process, God reconciles himself with himself and returns from alienation to himself, Hegel, Werke XII 249-256. Reasoning further in this way, von Hartmann said, God cannot redeem me, but I can redeem God, nur durch mich kann Gott erlöst werden. Das reale Dasein ist [328] die Incarnation der Gottheit, der Weltprocess die Passionsgeschichte des fleischgewordenen Gottes und zugleich der Weg zur Erlösung des im Fleische Gekreuzigten, Das sittl. Bewustsein2 1886 S. 688. In modern theology, which does not go that far but is nevertheless in principle governed by the philosophy of Hegel and Kant, the person of Christ accordingly attains no higher significance than that of liberator from the legalistic, historical starting-point of the Christian religion; archetypal realization of the sonship of God, of the unity of God and man; proclaimer of God's fatherly love and example of the congregation, Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 128. 133. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 115. 125 f. Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 802. 815 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 619 f., cf. v. Hartmann, Die Krisis d. Christ. in der mod. Theol. 1880. Scholten, L. H. K. I 410v. Hoekstra, Godg. Bijdr. 1866 bl. 273v. Id. Grondslag, wezen en openb. van het godsd. geloof bl. 201v.

Higher stands the person and the work of Christ with Schleiermacher; indeed he taught something entirely different from what the church confessed, although he also attached himself to her usage of language and to the doctrine of the three offices, but it was nevertheless his concern to assure Christ a lasting place in Christianity. The Erlösung comes about with Schleiermacher through the mystical union of the human being with Christ. Christ namely always shared in the communion with God, and was thereby holy and blessed. As such He came to us, entered into our communion, received a share in our suffering, suffered with us in priestly fashion, and maintained his holiness and blessedness down into the deepest sorrow, even unto the death of the cross. Thus, first entering into our communion, He then, not through his word and example only but through the mystical operation that proceeds from his whole person, takes us up into his communion, and causes us, through his redeeming activity, to share in his holiness and, through his reconciling activity, to share in his blessedness; the Erlösung, i.e. regeneration, sanctification, goes, as with Rome and rationalism, before the Versöhnung, before the forgiveness of sins, Chr. Gl. § 101-104. This mystical substitution theory remained the fundamental thought in the doctrine of reconciliation of the Vermittelungstheologie, Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehre § 80. 134-136. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 541-558. Schoeberlein, art. Versöhnung in Herzog1 en [329] Princip u. Syst. d. Dogm. 182 f. 647 f. Lange, Dogm. II 813-908. Martensen, Dogm. § 156-169, also Hofmann in his Schriftbeweis, which for that reason was contested by Philippi, Thomasius, Delitzsch e. a., cf. Weiszäcker, Um was handelt es sich in dem Streit über die Versöhnungslehre? Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1858 S. 155-188. Related is also the doctrine of reconciliation with Ritschl. This is not to be brought into connection with God as judge, with his

avenging righteousness or wrath, with a legal order of reward and punishment; for that is a juridical, Pharisaic conception of the relation of God and human being, which does not belong in religion. God is essentially love, and his righteousness consists in this, that He unchangeably wills to bring human beings to blessedness and to realize a kingdom of God in them. But now humanity, because of sin, is far from God; it goes bowed down under the consciousness of guilt, it has the feeling that it is in a state of punishment, it fears and does not dare to approach God, it does not live in communion with God. Therefore Christ has come to reveal to us the love of God. The doctrine of the three offices meets with objection with Ritschl; the word office belongs only in a legal community; in a moral community of love it is better to speak of a calling; the three offices are also not to be kept apart in Christ and run into one another; if one wishes to retain them, the kingly office stands in the foreground, Christ is appointed as king, in order to found a congregation, a kingdom of God on earth, and to that end He has revealed God as prophet, and has sacrificed himself to God for his own as priest. Christ namely stood in an altogether special relation to God; He made the goal of God, namely to unite human beings into a kingdom of God, into his task of life; and his whole life, suffering and dying must be conceived under this point of view, as a moral calling, which He fulfilled, not as a suretyship or mediation, as a substitution for us. In that moral task of life Jesus was absorbed, to that He devoted himself wholly, He remained faithful to it unto death. Thus living, He has fulfilled God's will, realized his goal with humanity, revealed his love, grace, faithfulness, and at the same time, in this his holding fast to his task of life unto death, sacrificed and devoted himself to God for the benefit of his own. Through this his moral obedience Christ [330] has exercised no effect upon God, as if He had been

disposed from wrathful to favorable, nor also brought it about that the believers are bought free from the power of Satan or of death; but indeed obtained that all who, like Christ, make God's will their own, in his communion may lay aside the consciousness of guilt, unbelief, distrust, the erroneous thought as if God were wrathful and punished, and in spite of their sins may believe in God's love and faithfulness and may glory in the forgiveness of sins (justification), and thereafter also themselves can positively enter into the new relation in which God stands to them, and can lay aside all enmity against God, Rechtf. u. Vers. III especially c. 6-8, and further Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott 1886 S. 93 f. Schultz, Grundriss d. ev. Dogm. § 44-46. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 246 f. Dogm. S. 446 f. Haering, Zu Ritschl's Versöhnungslehre, Zurich 1888. Id. Zur Versöhnungslehre, Gött. 1893. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 504-513. Ziegler in Gottschicks Zeits. f. Th. u. K. 1895. Riebergall, ib. 1897 S. 461-512. Ecklin, Der Heilswert des Todes Jesu, Basel 1888. Kühl, Die Heilsbedeutung des Todes Christi, Berlin 1890.

Similar attempts at a mystical or ethical reconstruction of the doctrine of satisfaction were also tried in other countries. In our country the Groningen theologians combated the ecclesiastical doctrine and saw in Jesus' death, which was done by men, suffered by Jesus, and permitted by God, especially in connection with his resurrection, a revelation of God's love, of Jesus' perfection, and of the sin of men, which makes them shudder at their wickedness, teaches them to admire Jesus' greatness, and to believe God's love, Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 181. Chantepie de la Saussaye, in his doctrine of reconciliation, adopted the ideas of Schleiermacher and of the Vermittelungstheologie, cf. my Theol. van Ch. d. I. S. 48. In England Thomas Erskine, The unconditional freeness of the gospel 1828, and Dr.

John Mc Leod Campbell, The nature of the atonement, 5 ed. 1878, taught that Christ did not acquire God's love but revealed it and thus was God's representative with us. But He was also our representative with God, in that He, entering into our fellowship, suffered the deepest sorrow over sin as guilt before God and as the source of all misery, pronounced the amen upon God's judgment over sin [331] and, as it were, made confession of it in our place, and thus as our Head acquired a righteousness and life which is not juridically imputed to us but is indeed mystically and ethically communicated to us. Horace Bushnell, Vicarious sacrifice grounded in principles of universal obligation, ed. New-York 1866, attempted to explain the suffering of Christ entirely from the vicarious character which all love bears. Maurice, Doctrine of sacrifice 1854, Kingsley, F. Robertson e. a. saw in the perfect self-surrender of Christ to the will of the Father the essence of the reconciliation brought about by Him; for all salvation for man flows from the offering of himself. Cf. Orr, Chr. view 346. Pfleiderer, Entw. der prot. Theol. 1891 S. 460 f. Clemen, Stud. u. Krit. 1892 S. 644 f. In France, for this mystical or ethical conception of the doctrine of reconciliation, the following are especially to be considered: Pressensé, Essai sur le dogme de la Rédemption, Bulletin Théol. 1867. Durand, Etude sur la Rédemption, Revue de théol. et de philos. 1889. Ménégoz, Péché et Rédemption. Bovon, Etude sur l'oeuvre de la Rédemption 1893 s. Unchanged, the ecclesiastical doctrine remained with scarcely anyone, but yet it was still presented in the main by Tholuck, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. d. Versöhner 1823. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk II. Vilmar, Dogm. § 48. Böhl, Dogm. 361 f. Bula, Die Versöhnung des Menschen mit Gott durch Christum oder die Genugthuung, Basel 1874. Koelling, Die satisfactio vicaria, d. i. die Lehre v. d. stellvertr. Genugthuung des Herrn Jesu, I

Gütersloh 1897. Gess, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1857 S. 679-752. 1858 S. 713 f. 1859 S. 467 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 612 f. Ebrard, Dogm. § 396 f. Id. Die Lehre v. d. stellvertr. Genugthuung 1857. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II2 157 f. Kähler, Wiss. v. d. chr. Lehre S. 363 f. Id. Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung, Leipzig 1898. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 480. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 378. Arch. Alex. Hodge, The atonement, Philad. 1867. Dale, The atonement, 18 ed. London 1896. Crawford, The doctrine of H. Scr. resp. the atonement, Edinb. London 1871. Candlish, The atonement, its reality, completeness and extent, London 1861. Hugh Martin, The atonement in its relations to the covenants, the priesthood, the intercession of our Lord, Edinb. Hunter z. j. George Smeaton, The doctrine of the atonement as taught by Christ Himself, Edinb. Clark [332] Lyttelton, The atonement, in Gore's Lux mundi 1892 p. 201-229. John Scott Lidgett, The spiritual principle of the atonement as a satisfaction made to God for the sins of the world2, London 1898. Merle d'Aubigné, L'expiation de la croix, 2 ed. Paris 1867. Bois, La nécessité de l'expiation, Revue théol. de Montauban 1888. Id. Expiation et solidarité, ib. 1889. Grétillat, Exposé de théol. syst. IV 300 s., etc.

7. The whole confession of Christendom concentrates in this, that Jesus is the Christ. With this claim, that He was the Christ, Jesus Himself appeared; through this faith the Christians came to stand as a particular sect both over against the Jews and over against the Gentiles; after the name of Christ the believers at Antioch were first called Christians. The name Jesus, יְהוֹשׁוּעַ and הוֹשֵׁעַ 3 p. imp. hi. alongside יְהוֹשִׁיעַ, Ps. 116:6 a. v. ישע, to save, to help, and thus He, viz. Ihvh, will help, later shortened to יֵשׁוּעַ, Ιησους, Jhesus, Jesus, was indeed given to His son by Joseph on the express command of the angel, Mt. 1:21, because He was the perfect Saviour, Hd. 4:12, Hebr. 7:25, but was nevertheless in Israel a common name, Num. 13:16, 1 S. 6:14, 18, 2

K. 15:30, 23:8, Hos. 1:1, Hagg. 1:1, Zach. 3:1, Ezr. 2:2, 6, Neh. 7:7, 11, 39, 10:24 etc., Hd. 7:45, Hebr. 4:1, Col. 4:11. In the name Christ, on the other hand, His office, His dignity is expressed. The Jesuits name themselves after the name Jesus and thereby arrogate to themselves a name that belongs to no one, for saviour is Christ alone; but they have also often brought upon themselves the judgment that they become the less Christians the more Jesuits they are. But the believers name themselves after the name Christ, for they are anointed with Him as prophets, priests, and kings. Of the other names that indicate His office and work, that of μεσιτης especially comes into consideration, 1 Tim. 2:5, Hebr. 8:6, 9:15, 12:24, mediator, sequester, intercessor, interventor, because He in the covenant of grace by His person and work unites and reconciles God and man with one another. In the age of the Reformation there arose over this mediatorship of Christ a not unimportant dispute. Over against Osiander, who held the essential righteousness of God in Christ to be the materia of our justification, Stancarus, professor at Königsberg, [333] defended the proposition that Christ was mediator only according to His human nature and thus also could justify us only on the ground of His humanly acquired righteousness, Herzog2 14, 590. He could appeal for that to Augustine, de civ. XI 2, Conf. X 43, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 19, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 26 art. 2, who all said that Christ was only mediator, in quantum homo, nam in quantum Deus non mediator sed aequalis Patri est; and these theologians were by Stancarus esteemed quite a bit higher than the Reformers: plus valet unus Petrus Lombardus, quam centum Lutheri, ducenti Melanchtones, trecenti Bullingeri, quadringenti Petri martyres et quingenti Calvini; qui omnes si in mortario contunderentur, non exprimeretur una uncia verae theologiae. Lutherans and Reformed opposed this most strongly and asserted that

Christ was mediator according to both natures, that He as such had been appointed from eternity and that He had also already fulfilled the office of mediator in the days of the O. T. Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K. ed. Müller 622. 684. Gerhard, Loc. IV 325. Quenstedt III 273. Calvin, in two letters, C. R. XXXVII 337-358, the ministers of the church of Zurich in two letters, Herzog2 14, 592. Polanus, Synt. theol. p. 430. Turretinos, Th. El. XIV qu. 2. The Roman Catholics maintained that Christ was mediator only according to His human nature, but they nevertheless had to acknowledge that Christ, in order to be mediator, had to be both God and man, that both natures constituted the suppositum and the substantia mediatoris and thus could only still assert that Christ accomplished the mediatorial works, offering, suffering, dying, in His human nature, that this therefore alone was the principium quo, principium formale of the mediatorial works, Bellarminus, de Christo V c. 1-8. Petavius, de incarn. XII c. 1-4. But this separation between the person and the work of the mediator is not to be maintained; the mediatorial works have precisely this peculiarity, that they have been performed by the one person with both natures. That does not mean, as Petavius imputes to Lutherans and Calvinists, ib. XII 4, 9, that these ascribe the mediatorial work to the divine nature of Christ per sese et ab humana divulsa. Not according to His divine nature as such, as one and equal with the Father and the Spirit, is the Son mediator, but [334] indeed according to that divine nature κατ' οἰκονομιαν, quatenus secundum eam voluntaria illa dispensatione gratiae se submiserit, Polanus p. 430. Scripture therefore also more than once calls Christ according to His divine nature subject of the humiliation, Joh. 1:14, 2 Cor. 8:9, Phil. 2:6; the church fathers more than once express themselves in the same spirit, Petavius XII 1; Augustine, Lombardus and Thomas meant nothing else than that Christ was

not mediator according to His divine nature as such, ab humana natura divulsa, but only as the incarnate Son of God was and could be mediator; and finally the Roman theologians themselves again had to defend this against Stancarus.

Yet there lies behind this another difference. If Christ, namely, is mediator only according to his human nature in the sense of Bellarmine and Petavius, then He also was no mediator before his incarnation but only began to be this at the moment of his conception, and the O. Test. thus in fact has been without a mediator, Petavius, de incarn. XII 4, 10. But even if it is the case that the Son first became flesh in the fullness of time, yet He has from eternity been chosen and appointed as mediator. It cannot be objected against this that David, Solomon, etc. also have from eternity been chosen as king and in that sense anointed. For herein consists this great distinction, that David, Solomon, etc. and all the elect before their conception existed only in the idea and the decree of God, but the Son was in the beginning with God and Himself God. His election to mediator did not take place outside of Him; it bears the character of a pactum salutis; the work of redemption is a common work of Father, Son, and Spirit, and has immediately after the fall been begun to be carried out by all three persons. In the same sense as the Father has from eternity been Father of his children and the H. Spirit has from eternity been Comforter of the believers, the Son has from eternity been appointed as mediator and immediately after the fall has appeared as mediator. Already under the O. T. He was active as prophet, priest, and king. The fallen world has immediately been delivered over to the Son as mediator for reconciliation and redemption. And in the fullness of time He, who already was mediator, has been manifested in the flesh, 1 Joh. 1:2, 3:5, 8. From this it is to be explained that [335] the kingly office in

Christ comes to the foreground; as such He is especially portrayed and foretold in the O. T.; and with that title He especially appears among his people. But that kingship of Christ is very distinct from that of earthly princes; it has its type only in the theocratic, in the Davidic kingship, which is essentially distinct from that of other kings; it is a kingship in God's name, subordinate to God's will, leading everything to God's honor; it is not a kingship of violence and weapons, but it rules and governs in a wholly other, much better way; it rules through Word and Spirit, through grace and truth, through right and righteousness. The king is therefore at the same time prophet and priest; his power stands in the service of the truth and the righteousness. Because the kingship of Christ bears an entirely peculiar character, many raise objection to speaking of his kingly office or use the title of king with Christ in a figurative sense, Wegscheider § 144. Scholten L. H. K. I4 369v. Yes, many consider it better, with Christ, not to speak of office but of personal calling, for office belongs in a community of law and Christ's kingdom is a kingdom of love and not of law, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 402. Indeed an office is distinguished from calling, craft, position in that it presupposes an authority, rests on an appointment by that authority, and serves that authority with his person, not for wages. But thus it is precisely the word office that ought to be used with respect to Christ. For He has not taken the mediatorial dignity to Himself, but God has chosen Him, called Him, appointed Him, Ps. 2:7, 89:19-21, 110:1-4, 132:17, Jes. 42:1, Hebr. 5:4-6; the name Christ is not a calling-name, but an office-name, a title, a dignity, to which Jesus lays claim, because He has been chosen by God Himself. Under the O. T. especially the kings were anointed, Richt. 9:8, 15, 1 Sam. 9:16, 10:1, 16:13, 2 Sam. 2:4, 5:3, 19:10, 1 Kon. 1:34, 39, 2 Kon. 9:1, 11:12, 23:30, probably with the holy anointing oil, 1

Kon. 1:39, Ps. 89:21; anointed was the name of the theocratic king, Ps. 20:7, 28:8, 84:10, 89:39 etc. The anointing with oil was symbol of the divine consecration, of the equipment with the Spirit of God, 1 Sam. 10:1, 9, 10. [336] And this anointing, not in an outward, symbolic, but in a spiritual, essential sense, Christ partook of, Jes. 11:2, 42:1, 61:1, Ps. 2:6, 45:8, 89:21, Luk. 4:18, Joh. 3:34, Hd. 4:27, 10:38, Hebr. 1:9, at his conception from the H. Spirit, Luk. 1:35 and at the baptism by John, Mt. 3:16, Mk. 1:10, Luk. 3:22, Joh. 1:32. And as real as his anointing, of which that under the O. T. was only shadow, was also his kingship. The theocratic, Davidic kingship was only the weak type of it, and has in the kingship of Christ received its essential fulfillment. Christ is king not in a lesser but in a greater, in a much truer sense than David and Solomon. For to the idea of the theocratic king belonged that he had to be a man after God's heart, had to be bound to God's law and might not exalt himself as a despot above his brothers, Deut. 17:14-20. To this kings' law Israel's kings did not adhere, and thus prophecy expected another, better king, who, himself anointed of the Lord and servant of God, would rule his people through truth and righteousness, and would overcome his enemies. As such a king Christ appears; He establishes a kingdom of God, which now exists only spiritually and morally but is destined also outwardly and bodily once to reveal itself in the city of God, where all the ungodly are banished and God will be all in all. And because He is such a king, a king in a true, full sense, therefore his kingship also includes the prophetic and priestly office.

8. This threefold office of Christ, however, meets with objection among many, because the one is not to be distinguished from the other, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 520 f. III2 386 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II2 158. 202. Kaftan, Dogm. 486. 531. It must then also be conceded that no single

activity of Christ is to be restricted exclusively to one office. His words are a proclamation of law and gospel, and thus point to the prophetic office; but He speaks as one having authority and everything obeys his command, Mk. 1:122, 4:41, Luk. 4:32 etc.; He himself calls himself king, come into the world, to bear witness to the truth, Joh. 18:37. His miracles are signs of his doctrine, Joh. 2:11, 10:37 etc., but also revelation of [337] his priestly mercy, Mt. 8:17 and of his kingly power, Mt. 9:6, 8, 21:23. In his intercession not only his high-priestly but also his prophetic and kingly office is expressed, Joh. 17:2, 9, 10, 24. His death is a confession and example, 1 Tim. 6:13, 1 Petr. 2:21, Op. 1:5, but also an offering, Ef. 5:2 and a display of his power, Joh. 10:18. Dogmatics has therefore also been at a loss as to what, in particular, was to be brought under each office from Jesus' life and works. Under the prophetic office there was usually treated teaching, foretelling, and doing miracles; under the priestly office offering, interceding, and blessing; but for the kingly office, in the state of humiliation, there then remained no more than the homage of the wise men from the east, the entry into Jerusalem, the appointment of the apostles, the institution of the sacraments; isolated facts, which in part can just as well be brought under the other offices. Still more difficult was the indication of the distinction in the state of exaltation; for Jesus' prophetic activity does indeed continue in the teaching of his congregation through Word and Spirit, but also as king He rules and protects his church through these two; and his high-priestly intercession is no supplication but a kingly willing, Joh. 17:24. It is then also an atomistic view, which detaches certain activities from the life of Jesus and assigns some of them to the prophetic, and others to the priestly and the kingly office. Christ is yesterday and today the same forever. He performs not merely prophetic, priestly, and kingly

activities, but is himself in his whole person prophet, priest, and king. And everything that He is, speaks, and does, brings that threefold dignity to revelation. To be sure, for us in the one activity more of his prophetic, and in another his priestly or his kingly office can come to expression; and indeed his prophetic office comes more to the fore in the days of the O. T. and in his walk on earth, his priestly office more in his suffering and dying, his kingly office more in his state of exaltation; but in reality He bears all three offices simultaneously and exercises all three always at the same time, both before and after his incarnation, both in the state of humiliation and that of exaltation. Therefore, however, speaking of three offices in Christ is no arbitrariness, no oriental figurative speech, which can be surrendered without [338] objection; nor is the one office to be reduced to one of the other two. Separation is not possible, but distinction is most certainly there. In order to be mediator, to be perfect saviour, He had to be appointed by the Father to all three offices and to be made fit by the Spirit for all three. For the idea of man already contains this threefold dignity and activity in itself; he has a head, in order to know, a heart, in order to give himself, a hand in order to rule and to lead; and correspondingly he was in the beginning equipped by God with knowledge and understanding, with righteousness and holiness, with dominion and glory (blessedness). Sin, which corrupted man, worked upon all his faculties and was not only ignorance, folly, error, lie, blindness, darkness, but also unrighteousness, guilt, moral corruption and furthermore misery, death and destruction. Therefore Christ, both as Son and image of God for himself as well as as mediator and saviour for us, had to bear all three offices; He had to be prophet, in order to know and to reveal the truth of God; priest, in order to consecrate himself to God and in our place to offer himself to God; king, in order according to God’s will to

rule and to protect us. Teaching, reconciling and leading; discere, acquirere and applicare salutem; wisdom, righteousness and redemption; truth, love and power, all three are necessary for our complete salvation. Prophet is He in his relation from God to us; priest in his relation from us to God; king in his relation as head to humanity. Rationalism acknowledges only his prophetic, mysticism only his priestly, chiliasm only his kingly office. But Scripture sees in Him all three, and these always and simultaneously, our highest prophet, our only priest, our eternal king. He is king, yet He does not rule by the sword but by his Word and Spirit; He is prophet, but his word is power and comes to pass; He is priest, but He lives by dying, conquers by suffering and is almighty by his love. He is always everything together, never the one without the other, in his speaking and acting mighty as a king and in his kingly dominion full of grace and truth. Witsius, Exerc. 10 in Symbolum, Amesius, Med. Theol. I 19, 11. Leydecker, de verit. relig. ref. IV 9, 3. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 102. Philippi, [339] Kirchl. Gl. IV 2 S. 5. 6. Ebrard, Dogm. § 399. Heraut 509v.

9. This Christ is, in his whole person and in his entire work, a revelation of God's love. The Gnostics and especially Marcion made a sharp contrast between the God of wrath, of vengeance, of righteousness, who revealed himself in the O. T., and the God of love and of grace, who in the N. T. had made himself known in Christ, part II 200. But such a contrast is unknown to Scripture. Ihvh Elohim in the O. T. is indeed righteous, holy, zealous for his honor and wrathful against sin, but He is also gracious, merciful, readily forgiving and great in lovingkindness, Ex. 20:5, 6, 34:6, 7, Deut. 4:31, Ps. 86:15 etc. In the N. T. God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is the God of all grace and mercy, Luk. 6:36, 2 Cor. 1:3, 1 Petr. 5:10; there is no contrast between the Father and Christ; as loving, merciful, and readily

forgiving as Christ is, so also is the Father; they are his words that Christ speaks, his works that He does. The Father is himself the Savior, σωτηρ, Luk. 1:47, 1 Tim. 1:1, Tit. 3:4, 5, the one who in Christ reconciled the world with himself and did not impute its sins to it, 2 Cor. 5:18, 19. Christ therefore did not first move the Father by his work to love and grace, but the love of the Father precedes and comes to revelation in Christ; Christ is a gift of God's love, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 5:8, 8:32, 1 Joh. 4:9, 10. To be sure, Paul says in Rom. 3:25, 26, that God publicly, before all eyes, set forth Christ Jesus as a reconciliation through faith in his blood εἰς ἔνδειξιν της δικαιοσυνης αὐτου; and here, without doubt, righteousness as a virtue of God is to be thought of, which, because of the passing over without reconciliation of the sins formerly committed by Jews and Gentiles under God's forbearance, seemed not to come to revelation and therefore seemed not to exist; it was thus necessary that God, in the present time, in the fullness of time, set forth Christ as a reconciliation through his blood, in order that He himself might appear to be righteous and might also justify the one who is of the faith of Jesus. But also here God's righteousness is not conceived as in conflict with his grace and love. For God's righteousness showed itself not in this, that it [340] punished sinners for their transgressions, but that it set forth in Christ a reconciliation through his blood, so that God now, in the forgiveness of sins, nevertheless appeared himself righteous and at the same time could justify the believer. God's righteousness, namely, consists in Scripture first of all in this, that He judges righteously, does not hold the guilty for innocent and the innocent for guilty; and then subsequently, that He helps and saves the poor, the wretched, those who personally are indeed guilty but objectively have the right on their side, and acknowledges them in their right. In this latter sense

righteousness is then related to mercy, faithfulness, truth; but it is always distinguished from these in that it especially pays attention to the anomaly that exists between the right that someone has and the condition in which he finds himself, part II 194v. Also here with Paul God's righteousness is not identical with his goodness, mercy, faithfulness, truth, but it is still much less opposed to them. For it is precisely that virtue of God which gave Christ as a reconciliation, so that God could forgive sins out of grace. Of a conflict of God's righteousness and love, as the evangelical hymn 125:5 represents it, there is therefore no question. In our sinful condition this can indeed appear so to us; but in God all virtues are one and in full harmony. On the one hand, therefore, the representation is to be rejected, as if Christ were only a revelation of God's punishing righteousness. The God of revelation, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is no pagan god, whose envy and hatred against human beings must be averted by all kinds of sacrifices; the sacrifice in Scripture, also in the O. Test., bears an entirely different character; it presupposes the covenant of grace. Then there would also arise a gnostic contrast between Father and Son, which would exalt the Son as the God of grace far above the Father as the God of vengeance and would tear apart Old and New Test., creation and re-creation, nature and grace. But on the other hand Christ is also not to be conceived as a manifestation of God's love alone, at least not of a love such as we often imagine it and which differs entirely from the love of God in Scripture. In that case, not only would the suffering and death of Christ, which Scripture undoubtedly presents as a punishment for our sin, remain wholly [341] unexplained; but Paul's word would also be directly contradicted, that God gave Christ for that purpose as a reconciliation, in order that He himself might appear to be righteous and might justify the one who is of the faith of Jesus. Scripture

teaches us rather that in Christ and his offering all God's virtues came to glorious revelation. Grace takes the lead there, but it is followed by all the others. It realizes itself in the way of right and righteousness, Jes. 1:27, 5:16. Hinter dem Zorne ist als letztes Agens die Liebe geborgen, wie hinter Gewitterwolken die Sonne (Delitzsch). Cf. on Rom. 3:25, 26, besides the commentaries of Philippi, Tholuck, Meyer etc., Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 143 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 100. Fricke, Der Paulin. Grundbegriff der δικ. θεου, erörtert auf Grund von Röm. 3:21-26, Leipzig 1888.

10. This naturally leads to the question much discussed in theology, whether this way of justice before God was necessary in order to reveal his grace, or whether He could also forgive without satisfaction. Scotus proceeded from the absolutum dominium Dei and considered incarnation and satisfaction to be determined only by God's arbitrariness; Athanasius, Augustine, Thomas, Calvin, Musculus, Zanchius, Twissus, and others judged them not absolutely necessary but nevertheless in accordance with God's wisdom as most fitting and suitable; Irenaeus, Basilius, Ambrosius, Anselmus, Beza, Piscator, Voetius, Turretinus, Owen, de Moor, and others inclined to hold them to be absolutely necessary, cf. deel II 207-216 and Voetius, Disp. II 238. It is understandable that many preferred to walk the middle way rather than to elevate arbitrariness to the throne in God or to limit his omnipotence by an absolute necessitas. Yet there is no objection to speaking here of necessity, provided this is rightly understood. The will in God is neither a formal arbitrariness separated from all virtues and from the whole being of God, nor also a choice bound by all those virtues and by that whole being and therefore unfree. The will of God is often for us the final ground of things and we have to acquiesce in it, even if we do not know

why God has acted thus and not otherwise. But in God that will always has wise and holy reasons for his acting thus and not otherwise, for He [342] never acts except in accordance with all his virtues, with his love, wisdom, righteousness, etc. And this accordance of the will of God with all his virtues is no compulsion, no limitation for that will, but precisely the true, highest freedom. To will and to act as his holy, wise, almighty, loving nature itself wills, that is for God both the highest freedom and the highest necessity. So it is also with the incarnation and satisfaction; they may be called necessary, not as a compulsion imposed on God from without and from which He cannot escape, but indeed as deeds and acts that are in accordance with his virtues and bring these to revelation in the most glorious manner. For first of all Scripture teaches that God does everything for his own sake, Spr. 16:4, Rom. 11:36; the final ground and the final goal, also of incarnation and satisfaction, cannot lie in the creature, in the salvation of the sinner, but must lie in God himself. For his own sake He has sent his Son into the world as an atonement for our sins, in order that thus his virtues might come to revelation. And indeed there is no fact that sets those perfections of God so in the light as the incarnation and the satisfaction. Not a single virtue comes thereby into the clearest light, but all together, his wisdom, grace, love, mercy, longsuffering, righteousness, holiness, power, etc. Even if there is usually only mention of God's grace and righteousness, yet the other virtues may not be forgotten. Christ is in his person, word, and work the highest, most perfect, most all-sided revelation of God, his servant, his image, his Son; He has declared the Father to us. If God wished to reveal himself in the most glorious manner, then for that the creation and the re-creation, the incarnation and the satisfaction, were necessary. In creation his virtues were already made manifest, but much

more richly and more highly still in the re-creation; sin He knows how to use omnipotently as a means to glorify himself. Secondly, it is the teaching of Scripture that God as the absolutely righteous and holy hates sin with divine hatred, Gen. 18:25, Ex. 20:5, 23:7, Ps. 5:6, 7, Nah. 1:2, Rom. 1:18, 32. There is an absolute antithesis between God and sin, necessarily coming to expression in this, that He reacts against it with all his virtues; He does not will sin, He has no desire and pleasure in it, He hates it and is wrathful against it. Sin cannot exist without its being hated and punished by God. God cannot deny himself; He cannot acknowledge the right of sin; He cannot give Satan equal rights with himself. Precisely because He is the absolutely holy, He must hate sin. Actually everyone concedes that; even if one says that God can forgive sin without satisfaction and as the highest love also must forgive; yet everyone still acknowledges that God forgives sin, i.e. that He out of grace does not punish it, but does possess the right and the power to that punishment. Even Mr. Chavannes found at the meeting of modern theologians little assent to his thesis that the expression "forgiving love" is a contradictio in adjectis and means nothing, Bijbl. v. d. Herv. 28 Juni 1895. Thirdly, God is very certainly Father of men, but this name by no means represents the whole relation in which God stands to his creatures. He is also Creator, Preserver, Ruler, Sovereign, Lawgiver, Judge, etc., and it is one-sided and leading to error if one, in one of these names with overlooking of the others, beholds the full revelation of God. Thus God with respect to sin is not a creditor and not an offended party only, who can remit the debt and forget and forgive the offense. But He is himself the Giver, Protector, Avenger of the law, personal righteousness, and as such He cannot forgive sin without satisfaction, Hebr. 9:22. In that quality He cannot nullify the right of the law; for here it is not a personal, private right, of

which one can renounce, but the righteousness, i.e. the virtues and the honor of God himself. One could indeed appeal against this to the right of pardon, which the earthly government exercises many times; but this right of pardon is granted to it only because it is fallible and in many cases imposes a too heavy or even undeserved punishment. In God such a thing cannot occur; He is righteousness itself, does not need by grace to restore the justitia, does not by it also nullify it, but lets it come to revelation together in the cross of Christ. Fourthly, the moral law as such is not an arbitrary, positive law, but grounded in the nature of God himself; it is also not an impersonal power independent of God, resting in itself [344] power, so that Christ satisfied not God but its demand, cf. Dale, The atonement, lect. 9; but it is expression of his being. God, maintaining the law, maintains himself and conversely. Therefore it is unbreakable and inviolable. Throughout the whole of Scripture it bears that character; our own conscience bears witness to it; and the whole so-called moral world-order with its phenomena of responsibility, sense of duty, guilt, remorse, fear, compunction, punishment, etc., is built on this inviolability of the moral law. Christ, then, has not come to dissolve the law but to fulfill it, Mt. 5:17, 18, Rom. 10:4; He has maintained its majesty and glory; and faith does not nullify the law but confirms it, Rom. 3:31. Fifthly, sin bears in Scripture manifold character; it is lack of understanding, folly, guilt, stain, uncleanness, shame, etc., it is compared with a money debt, and under another viewpoint is again an offense against God. But thus it also occurs in Scripture as a crime, crimen, a transgression against righteousness, a violation of the majesty of God, which brings us under his judgment, Rom. 3:19, and makes us worthy of death, Rom. 1:32. In this character it demands punishment and without satisfaction there is no forgiveness; only in the way

of justice is it, both as regards its guilt and stain and as regards its power and dominion, completely to be overcome. Sixthly, it may still be added to this, that sin is so great that God, before He let it remain unpunished, punished it upon his beloved Son Jesus Christ with the bitter and shameful death of the cross. If righteousness could have been obtained in another way, Christ would have died in vain, Gal. 2:21, 3:21, Hebr. 2:10. To summarize everything, incarnation and satisfaction have occurred for this, that God would again be acknowledged and honored as God by his creatures. Sin was non-recognition of God and of all his virtues, turning away to and worship of the creature. But in Christ God has again revealed himself, restored his sovereignty, justified all his virtues, glorified his name, maintained his Godhead. It was God, also in the work of redemption, first of all about himself, about his own glory. Cf. Voetius, Disp. I 372 II 238 sq. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 34. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV 10. Id. de satisf. Christi, disp. 1 en 2. [345] Heidegger, Corpus Theol. XIX 80 sq. Heppe, Dogm. 341. Ebrard, Dogm. § 427. Martensen, Christl. Ethik II2 155 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 614. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 487. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 48. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 378. Hugh Martin, The atonement, Edinb. z. j. p. 172 enz.

11. The Socinians and their kindred spirits, however, have very seriously contested this necessity of satisfaction; their arguments all come down to this, that justice and grace, satisfaction and forgiveness, and thus further also law and gospel, Old and New Testament, creation and re-creation etc., are in conflict with one another and exclude one another. The Christian religion is namely, according to them, the absolutely spiritual and moral religion, freed from all natural and sensuous elements. God is not to be conceived as Judge but as Father; punitive justice, holiness, hatred, wrath

against sin are no virtues in God but only love. The O. T. religion still stood on the standpoint of the law, conceived the relation of man to God as a legal relation; Pharisaism drove this to the extreme and Paul still made use of this Pharisaic manner of speaking and did not combat the Pharisaic combination of law-fulfilment, righteousness and reward. But yet Paul does not derive the unfulfillableness of the law from man's sinfulness but from the nature of the law itself, which does not serve to give life but to increase sin. The Christian religion he thus nevertheless conceives purely as Erlösungsreligion, as grace, forgiveness, faith. And that it is indeed. It is purely religious-ethical, has no cosmic, juridical, metaphysical constituents any more, it is purely doctrine of salvation, and all the other, the doctrine of God, man, sin, the world etc., must from this standpoint, christologically and soteriologically, be revised and reworked. The state is the sphere of law, but religion and law stand diametrically opposed to each other. Cf. above p. 322v. and further Wegscheider, § 142. Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 181. Scholten, L. H. K. II 46v., 57v. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. § 63 f. Christl. Glaub. § 94 f. Pfleiderer, Paulinismus2 86-110, 150-159. Holtzmann, Neutest. Theol. II 108 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 8-14, 223-265. Kaftan, Dogm. 544 f. v. Hartmann, Religionsphilos. I 546 f. This whole antithesis, however, is false and has in Christian theology always been rejected as [346] Marcionitic. In the first place, it is untrue that righteousness and grace (love) in God would be an antithesis; not only does the whole of Scripture also ascribe to God the virtues of righteousness, holiness, wrath and hatred against sin, vol. II 195v., but grace even presupposes righteousness in God and cannot be maintained without it. For grace is that virtue in God by which He for one reason or another relinquishes his right; if He thus does not as the righteous and holy One

have the right to punish, there can be no question of grace with Him. Likewise the highest love in God, i.e. forgiving love, which has been revealed in Christ, is no longer love, if sin according to God's righteous judgment deserved no punishment. Whoever denies right, also denies grace. In the second place, law and religion (morality) are absolutely no antithesis. Religion and morality are themselves a right that God has over us; He demands in his law that man love Him above all and the neighbour as himself. Thereby religion and morality are not lowered or externalized, but on the contrary maintained in their true meaning. God wills that man shall love Him with his whole heart and with his whole understanding and with all his powers; He claims the whole man for his service of love. Religion and morality could not exist if they did not root in God's right over his creature. The moral order is in this sense borne by the legal order. Much deeper than the religious and the ethical consciousness, there roots in man still the sense of right. Even in those who have shaken off all religion and all morality, it often still lives up powerfully. And indeed it is true that the perfect man loves God and the neighbour spontaneously and according to the prompting of his holy nature; but this changes nothing about the fact that precisely that service out of love corresponds with God's law and is prescribed therein. The moral law is indeed an exigency and a right of God, even though it claims the whole man and demands a service in spirit and truth. For just as religion and morality root in a right of God, so conversely that right of God is no abstract, formal arbitrariness, but is grounded precisely in God's nature; the legal order itself in turn bears an ethical character and finds in the moral order confirmation and support, part II 201. In the third place, therefore, the assertion is incorrect, [347] that the moral world-order has first become a legal one through sin, Kaftan, Dogm. 370.

545. Legal it has indeed become for man through sin, in the sense that the love to God and the neighbour now stands as a command outside and over against him, to which he cannot correspond, which he has transgressed, and whose punishment he deserves. But legal it has not become through sin, as though it did not rest in a right and a law of God. Lutheran theology has indeed taught it thus, part II 556. 558, but the Reformed has judged otherwise and better. The law is indeed the norm for the whole moral world-order, grounded in God's being, even apart from sin. This is not even conceivable without a law. All religion and morality presupposes a law. Where there is no law, there is also no transgression. Whoever detaches the moral world-order from the law, makes it objectively and subjectively into arbitrariness and digs away the foundation from under its feet. In the fourth place, whoever thus places law and grace dualistically over against each other, comes into conflict with Scripture at all points. The status integritatis, as life of man created after God's image in accordance with the moral law, is no longer to be maintained. Sin is no guilt and deserves no punishment, other than in the consciousness of the sinner. The law has no eternal but only a temporal, transitory, paedagogical significance. The O. Test. as religion of the law, no longer concerns us. The doctrine of the righteousness of God and of the satisfaction in Christ is a Jewish, Pharisaic intrusion into the theology of the N. Test. The forgiveness of sins is a subjective coming to insight that they are no guilt and deserve no punishment. Sanctification is moral, autonomous self-development. The church is only a religious-ethical community and has nothing to do with law and statute. Under the appearance of conceiving the Christian religion more purely, it is robbed of its heart and core. Finally, in the fifth place, if, however, grace, love, forgiveness are wholly undeserved and all presuppose the voluntary

relinquishing of a right, then very certainly with Socinus, de Christo Servatore I 1, the question can still be asked whether God cannot relinquish that right without demanding satisfaction; God is nevertheless slow to anger, long-suffering and merciful and in Scripture forgives many times, without there being any mention of any satisfaction, if only sincere repentance [348] is present, Deut. 30:1-3, Jerem. 3:13, 14, 18:8, Mt. 18:24v., Luk. 15:11v. With this question, if it is really meant seriously, there is then no difference any more de jure but only de facto. God had the right to demand satisfaction; grace and forgiveness presuppose it; only there is difference over whether God has demanded that satisfaction. It will appear presently that suffering and dying in truth bears a satisfactorisch character. Over against this reality, the question about the possibility, whether God could not have relinquished his right to satisfaction, is of very subordinate significance. But in any case it is impermissible, with forgiveness, to combat satisfaction, as though the one excluded the other. For not only are they connected with one another in Scripture, Lev. 4:31, Rom. 3:24-26, Hebr. 9:22, but they are also placed in that relation to one another, that satisfaction precisely opens the way to forgiveness. With money debts satisfaction does indeed cancel forgiveness, because here it does not matter at all about the person who pays, but only about the sum that is paid. But with moral debts that is wholly different. These are personal and must be punished in the guilty person himself. If here a substitute is at all admitted, then the admitting of such a substitute and the letting of his merits count for those of the guilty person is nevertheless always an act of grace. Satisfaction Christ renders to God, but forgiveness God grants to us; forgiveness is not with a view to Christ but with a view to us grace. The satisfaction of Christ opens for God the way, without violation of his right,

out of grace to forgive sins and to justify the ungodly. If sin is of such a nature that right and righteousness, law and truth suffer not the least damage even if it is not punished, then the grace of forgiveness is also not great. But if sin is so great that God, before He left it unpunished, has punished it with the bitter and shameful death of the cross upon his beloved Son Jesus Christ, then the riches of God's grace, the power of his forgiving love, comes to light. Then man also finds in that satisfaction rest and comfort for his accusing conscience and can without any fear rejoice in the forgiveness of his sins; for the perfect satisfaction guarantees the absolute, unrepentable, [349] eternal forgiveness. Cf. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 274. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 35. Turretinus, Th. El. XIV qu. 10, 8. Id. De satisfactione p. 44. Hoornbeek, Socin. Confut. II 629. Petrus de Witte, Wederlegginge der Socin. Dwalingen, Amst. 1662 II 90v. Leydecker, Vis verit. p. 82. Moor III 1031. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 382. Martin, The atonement 183 etc.

12. The work which Christ accomplished for his own consisted in general in his absolute and perfect obedience to God's will, Mt. 3:15, 20:28, 26:42, Joh. 4:34, 5:30, 6:38, Rom. 5:19, Gal. 4:4, Phil. 2:7, 8, Hebr. 5:8, 10:5-10 etc. This rich thought has in theology many times not come into its own. The suffering of Christ has often been detached from the act of obedience which expressed itself therein, and thus made an object of pious meditation. In the Christian church, successively the martyrs, the monks, the beggars, the flagellants have been regarded as the true disciples of Jesus; asceticism and self-torment in every form were the Christian virtues par excellence; the imitation of Christ consisted in a copying and imitating of deeds and conditions from his life, specifically from his suffering; Christ was the great sufferer, the exalted martyr, whose suffering had to be an object of

contemplation and imitation, Zöckler, Askese und Mönchthum, I 1897 S. 145 f. Moll, Joh. Brugman II 1-97. With Anselm the satisfaction of Christ, since he was already obligated for himself to obedience to God's law, consisted only in his suffering and dying, which by him was added to his life as an opus supererogationis and offered as a voluntary gift to the Father. Roman theology does not express itself unanimously and unambiguously about the active obedience of Christ. Trent does indeed make mention of the sanctissima passio of Christ, VI c. 7, but the theologians reject it entirely or at least construe it in such a way that Christ did not fulfill God's law in our place, Bellarminus, de justif. I 2, de Christo V 9. Bossuet, Gesch. der veranderingen v. d. Prot. kerken, trans. by Berends 1829 II 340. Scheeben, Dogm. III 321. 341. Also among the Protestants, among Mystics, Anabaptists, Herrnhutters etc., there occur conceptions of the suffering of Christ as Etwas Sachliches, which do injustice to his active obedience [350]. Even Parsimonius and Piscator denied it, because Christ was already obligated for himself to this obedience and this obedience thus was indeed a necessarium requisitum personale, to our benefit, nostro bono, but no constituent part of his satisfaction, accomplished nostro loco; because Holy Scripture always connects our entire salvation, both the forgiveness of sins and eternal life, only with the suffering and dying of Christ; and because believers, even though they have forgiveness and eternal life, nevertheless remain obligated to the keeping of the law. The Lutherans saw in this Nestorianism and said that the person of Christ according to both natures was Lord of the law and thus also as man was not of himself subject to the law for his person, Gerhard, XVI 57. 59. Quenstedt III 284. Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 58-73. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers I2 274. But the Reformed could not speak thus, because Christ as true man

was certainly obligated to keep the law, and to love God above all and the neighbor as himself. Yet they rightly rejected the opinion of Piscator. For in the first place, Holy Scripture conceives the whole life and work of Christ as one whole and never makes a separation between an obedientia vitae, which he accomplished for himself, and an obedientia mortis, which he accomplished for us. It is one work which the Father has assigned to him and which he brings to completion in his death, Joh. 4:34, 17:4, 19:30. His service is completed in the giving of his soul as a ransom for many, Mt. 20:28. Even Paul, who lays all emphasis on the cross of Christ, sees in his death not his entire but the completion of his obedience. He has become under the law, Gal. 4:4, in the likeness of sinful flesh, Rom. 8:3, has not lived to please himself, οὐχ ἑαυτῳ ἠρεσεν, Rom. 15:3, has already annihilated himself at his incarnation and assumed the form of a servant, has continually humbled himself and has become obedient unto death, μεχρι θανατου, Phil. 2:7, 8, 2 Cor. 8:9, and thus it is one δικαιωμα and one ὑπακοη, which grants to many the δικαιωσις ζωης, Rom. 5:18, 19. It is therefore wholly in conflict with Scripture to limit the satisfactorial work of Christ to his suffering, or even, as Jac. Alting did, Op. V 393-395, cf. however p. 478-480, to the suffering during the three hours of darkness on the cross. The [351] appeal to passages such as Zach. 3:9, Joh. 19:30, Rom. 6:10, Hebr. 7:27, 1 Petr. 3:18, where it is said that Christ has suffered once, on the wood, and has cried out: it is finished, proves nothing against this, because in the suffering and dying the whole preceding life of Christ is taken up, summarized, and completed, cf. Moor III 985 sq. Mastricht V 11, 34. 18, 29. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 6. Misc. S. II 771. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IX 46. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. X 467-471. Rather, the whole life and work of Christ from his conception up to and including his death is substitutionary

in nature. The assumption of human nature itself and in itself does not yet bear this character, because all mediatorial works presuppose the two natures; but his holy conception and birth and all his holy works are included in the one work of Christ, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 18, 2. Heid. Cat. qu. 36 and 60. Ned. Gel. art. 22, cf. Acta Syn. Dordr. sess. 172. 173. Voetius, Disp. II 282. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 91. 122 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 287. In the second place it is certainly true that Christ as man, for himself, was subject to the law; only, his incarnation and his being-man did not take place for himself but for us. Christ has never been and may never be regarded as a persona privata, an individual alongside and on an equal line with others; he was from the beginning a persona publica, the second Adam, sponsor et caput electorum. Just as Adam sinned for himself and thereby loaded guilt and death upon all whose representative he was; so Christ by his righteousness and obedience has acquired forgiveness and life for all his own. More still, certainly Christ as man was subject to God's law as rule of life; even believers are never released from the law in that sense. But Christ has placed himself in a wholly different relation to the law, namely to it as law of the covenant of works. Adam was not only obligated to keep the law, but in the covenant of works the law was held before him under another forma, namely as way to eternal life, which he did not yet possess. Christ, however, by his union with the divine nature had the eternal and blessed life. Of that he voluntarily renounced; he has subjected himself to the law of the covenant of works as way to eternal life for himself [352] and his own. The obedience which Christ rendered to the law was thus an entirely voluntary one. Not his death alone, as Anselm said, but his whole life was a self-denial, one self-offering, brought by him as Head in the place of his own. In the third place, that believers are still always

obligated to keep the law as rule of life proves nothing against this. If this proved anything, all that is satisfactorial from Jesus' life and suffering would disappear. For believers still have to bear all kinds of suffering as a consequence of sins, they are still tempted by Satan and enticed by the world, they still sin time and again and still must die etc., and thus Christ would have freed them from nothing, neither from sin nor from its consequences. Jac. Alting reasoned thus and therefore said that Christ had freed his own only from eternal death by his hellish agonies during the three hours of darkness on the cross, but not from suffering, bodily death etc. But this view of the work of redemption is without doubt wrong. The redemption is complete, a redemption of the whole man according to soul and body, from all sins and consequences of sin. And this has been accomplished in and through Christ's life and dying. But just as his kingdom is by him distinguished into an invisible, spiritual and a visible kingdom to be established on earth one day; just as he himself has once come to suffer and will soon come again to judge the living and the dead; so the redemption brought by Christ is gradually worked out and applied, first spiritually, thereafter bodily. Now in this dispensation believers are spiritually freed from every guilt and power of sin and its consequences, from world, Satan, death; they have the forgiveness of sins and eternal life; law, Satan, death can no longer rob them of these; and one day they will also outwardly, bodily be freed from all sin and power of sin. The whole re-creation, as it will be completed in the new heaven and the new earth, is fruit of the work of Christ. Just as it is one-sided, with Alting, to see the fruit of Christ's work only in the redemption from eternal death; just as one-sided is it, with Ritschl, to limit that fruit to the spiritual, ethical dominion of the Christian over sin and world in the Diesseits. The whole person of

Christ, both with his active and passive [353] obedience, is the surety for the whole redemption. Cf. on the active obedience. Calvijn, Inst. II 16, 5. III 14, 12. Comm. on Rom. 5:19, Gal. 4:4. Gomarus, Theses theol. disp. 19, 9. Junius, Theses theol. 36, 8. Synopsis pur. theol. 29, 35. Turretinus, Th. El. XI 22. XIV 13. Cloppenburg, Op. I 504 sq. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 3, 18 sq. Coccejus, de foedere V 93. Quenstedt, Theol. III 281. Gerhard, XVI 57 sq. Walch, Comm. de obed. Christi activa 1755. Baur, Versöhnung 478v. Philippi, Der thätige Gehorsam Christi 1841. Id., Kirchl. Gl. IV 2 S. 142 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II 172. Id., Neue kirchl. Zeits. 1892 S. 856. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers I2 271 f. A. A. Hodge, The atonement 248-264 etc.

13. While Piscator and many others excluded the obedientia activa from the satisfaction, in more recent theology the obedientia passiva does not come into its own. After Socinianism and Rationalism had subjected the ecclesiastical doctrine of satisfaction to a sharp criticism, many in the present time attempted still to maintain it, by recasting it in a mystical or ethical sense, above p. 327v. The representation is then in the main this, that Christ's suffering and death was not necessary in order to satisfy God's justice nor was it demanded by God as a sacrifice for our sins, but that it was the consequence of his life in obedience to God's will, the proof that He in his religious-ethical calling remained faithful to God even unto death, the historically necessary result of his holy life in the midst of a sinful world. Over against such conceptions, which detach the suffering and death of Christ entirely from the person and set it up as Etwas Sachliches in itself, this representation possesses an unmistakable right. Christ is, after all, the faithful witness, Op. 1:5, He has under Pontius Pilate testified the good confession, 1 Tim. 6:13, his suffering and death is no fate but an act, He has power to lay down his life, as also to take it again, Joh. 10:18. But yet it

itself is pressed by no less serious objections. 1o Already this is of significance, that the mystical and ethical theories with Jesus speak only of a calling and no longer of an office. Herein already lies all the difference. If Christ exercised a calling, then He himself by his disposition, upbringing etc. developed himself thereto, He does not stand above but alongside us, He has only [354] advanced beyond us in a religious and ethical sense, and we can and must conform ourselves as much as possible to his example. If, on the other hand, Christ is anointed to the office of prophet, priest, and king, then He is appointed by God, has received from Him a work to do, stands with authority above us, to teach us, to represent us before God's face, to govern us according to his will, Martin, The atonement 105. 2o Consequence of this conception is, that the suffering and death of Christ remains totally unexplained. Schleiermacher derived it from this, that Christ as holy entered into our sinful community; he let it consist in Mitgefühl mit menschlicher Schuld und Strafwürdigkeit and saw in his death a consequence of his Eifer für seinen Beruf, Chr. Gl. § 104, 4. Ritschl likewise says, that it is the faithfulness to his calling which qualifies Christ as a sacrifice; his death was no sacrifice but an unintended consequence of the conflict between Him, the holy one, and sinful humanity, das Accidens seiner positiven Treue im Berufe, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 525, cf. 415 f. 441 f. II 334 f., Kaftan, Dogm. 565-569. Kühl, Die Heilsbedeutung des Todes Christi 190 f. The Groningen theologians saw in the death of Christ a matter done by men, suffered by Jesus and permitted by God, and interpreted the δει in Mt. 16:21, Mk. 8:31, Luk. 9:22 in a moral sense, Pareau et H. de Groot, Lineam. theol. christ. ed. 3 p. 153. H. de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 181. A theory now, which declares the suffering and death of Christ to be accidental, is thereby already fully judged. 3o Scripture, after all, says

clearly, that Jesus' suffering and death was determined beforehand and was necessary. To be sure, in more recent times one attempts to show, that Jesus at first appeared gladly and with great expectations among his people and first perceived the necessity of his death since the day at Caesarea Philippi, Mt. 16:20v., as a consequence of the hostility which gradually developed against his person, e.g. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 284-295. But Kähler rightly calls this a legend. The Messianic consciousness, which Jesus, as appears from his baptism by John, possessed from the beginning of his public appearance; the name Son of Man, which He with clear consciousness and a definite intention ascribed to himself; the application to himself of Isaiah's prophecy, Luk. 4:21; the prediction, that He as the bridegroom of his [355] disciples would be taken away, Mk. 2:20; the comparison of himself with Jonah, Mt. 12:40 and with the serpent in the wilderness, Joh. 3:14; the preaching of the kingdom of heaven in a spiritual sense, of self-denial and bearing the cross, of the hatred and hostility of the world, Mt. 5, 10, 11:16v., 12:25v., prove abundantly, that for Jesus' consciousness death stood fixed from the beginning as the goal of his life; thus prophecy had instructed Him, Nösgen, Gesch. d. neut. Offenbarung I 1891 S. 395 f. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 1898 S. 159 f. The day of Caesarea Philippi brought only this change, that Jesus openly proclaimed to his disciples, that He was the Messiah, that He would be delivered up and would rise on the third day, Mk. 16:21, Mk. 8:31, Luk. 9:22. And He adds thereto, that this must be so, not because He was morally obligated to die or could only thus remain faithful to his calling, for a moral obligation to be delivered up, killed, and even raised, does not exist, but because it was thus determined in God's counsel and was foretold in Scripture, Mt. 26:54, Luk. 22:22, 24:26, 44, 46, Joh. 3:14, 7:30, 8:20, 10:18, 11:9, 12:23, 17:1, 20:9,

Hd. 2:23, 4:28, 1 Cor. 15:3, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. II 45. 4o The two texts Mt. 26:39 and Hebr. 5:7 are by no means in conflict with this. According to Hebr. 5:7 He did not pray for deliverance from death, as if He had not acknowledged this as necessary; for it is stated clearly, that his prayer, notwithstanding his death, was heard by God; but Christ prayed, that He might not perish in death but might be delivered from it and raised and glorified; He came precisely, to do God's will by his dying and sanctified us by that will, Hebr. 10:5-10. This throws light on Mt. 26:39-42; Jesus there prays not according to his will, which He precisely subjects to that of the Father, but according to the inclination which is implanted in human nature to flee its own destruction, Kantt. St. Vert.; He looks upon death as death, but prays precisely, that God might strengthen Him, to do God's will in his dying, that God's will might take place not only to Him but through Him. 5o The suffering and death of Christ takes such a place in Scripture, that it cannot be conceived as the accidens of his faithfulness to his calling. To the description thereof the [356] greatest part of the gospels is devoted. And it is not described as a martyrdom but as a judgment of God, as the will of the Father, as the offering of a priest. He does not die for his faith, but is judicially condemned, because He claims to be the Son of God, the Messiah. He does not go joyfully to meet death, but is moved, sorrowful, astonished, anxious unto death and is in heavy struggle, so that his sweat became like drops of blood, Mt. 26:37, 38, Mk. 14:33, Luk. 22:44, Joh. 12:27, Si la vie et la mort de Socrate sont d'un sage, la vie et la mort de Jésus sont d'un Dieu (Rousseau). In the preaching of the apostles the cross of Christ is the center and the cause of all benefits of salvation. Much more than on the life, the emphasis falls on the death of Christ; and that death is always brought into connection with our sins; for the sake of sins Christ has

died and thereby He has acquired for his own righteousness and life. Even though that suffering and death may not be detached from the person, it is nevertheless determined by God as such willed, accomplished by the Son; it forms in the life of Christ not an accidental component, become necessary only through the circumstances, but an essential, indispensable constituent; thereby in the first place the reconciliation of sins, righteousness, and salvation has been acquired. 6o To be sure, it is objected against this, that God does not propter but only per Christum bestow upon us the benefits of the covenant of grace; thus earlier already Socinus et al. and now e.g. Scholten, L. H. K. I 20 II 426v. Gottschick, Propter Christum, Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche 1897 S. 352-384. The Lutherans even took pleasure in accusing the Reformed, that by virtue of their doctrine of predestination they had to deny the satisfaction of Christ and could only regard Him as causa instrumentalis of salvation; the Reformed themselves, after all, also said, that Christ was not fundamentum and causa electionis, part II 380; the elect were already objects of God's love before Christ was designated as their mediator and were elected not because of but in and unto Christ, Gerhard, Loc. XVI de justif. § 36. Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 1848 S. 45 f. Id. Vergl. Darst. II 264 f. Schweizer, Gl. d. ev. ref. K. II 379. 389. But this accusation is untrue. Christ is most certainly proof and revelation of the love [357] of the Father; logically our election to salvation precedes his election to mediator; God therefore is not first moved by Christ to love sinners. But precisely herein consists the love of God, that He has that salvation, which He wills to bestow upon sinners, acquired for them in time by his own Son, and thus bestows it upon them in accordance with his justice. God's grace therefore does not nullify the satisfaction and the merit of Christ, but is precisely the ultimate ground for that merit, quia mero

beneplacito mediatorem statuit, qui nobis salutem acquireret, Calv. Inst. II 17, 1. Imo quia prius diligit, postea nos sibi reconciliat, ib. 16, 3. Jam nos diligenti reconciliati sumus, ib. 4. And these two, God's love and the satisfaction of Christ, had to and could therefore go together, because we were at the same time as creatures the object of his love and as sinners the object of his wrath, ib. 3. Thus it is therefore pure grace, out of which God forgives sins, He does it for his own sake, for the sake of his great name, Jes. 43:23-25, Ezech. 36:21, Ef. 1:17, 1 Joh. 2:12, but this is so little in conflict with it, that God forgives us sins for Christ's sake, that the name of God has first been revealed to us in Christ. That God forgives sins and bestows life only out of grace, for his own sake and not because of anything that is in us, that Christ has proclaimed to us, that He has acquired for us. Forgiveness out of grace, as disposition in God eternally present and preceding the election and sending of Christ (amor benevolentiae), is nevertheless first made possible in time by Christ's offering (amor complacentiae). The benefits themselves have been acquired by Christ, even though the inclination to bestow them upon the elect has been present in God from all eternity. Christ is made to be sin, that we might be God's righteousness in Him. He is become of a woman and become under the law, that He might redeem us from the curse of the law and that we might receive the adoption as children. As Adam is the cause of sin and death, so Christ is the source of righteousness and life, Mt. 20:28, 27:28, Joh. 1:18, 15:13, Rom. 5:12v., 1 Cor. 15:21, 22, 2 Cor. 5:19-21, Gal. 3:13, 4:4, 1 Joh. 4:9. Thus understood, the expression, that God forgives us sins and bestows eternal life propter Christum, for Christ's sake, is scriptural and taught by [358] the whole of Christendom, also by the Reformed, Calvin, Inst. II 16 and 17. Comm. on Joh. 15:13, Rom. 5:10, 2 Cor. 5:19, 1 Joh. 4:19 etc. Ned.

Gel. art 21. 22. 23, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. I 20. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. I 190. Heid. Cat. qu. 37. Petrus de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwalingen II 170v. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 20. 41v. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV 40 X 30. Turretinus, de satisf. p. 7. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 265 f. Finally 7o, the mystical and the moral theory come into conflict at all points with Scripture and with the Christian religion. The former considers the essence of religion to lie in the mystical unity of God and man. This has been disturbed by sin but restored by Christ, and indeed not so much by what He does as by what He is, by his person more than by his work, by his birth more than by his cross. How that mystical unity of God and man has now been restored by Christ is, from this standpoint, difficult to say. Hegel said, that that unity exists objectively, but by Christ was first clearly perceived and expressed. Schleiermacher represents it thus, that Christ, first entering into our sinful community, thereafter takes us up into the community of his holiness and blessedness. The mediation theology often expresses itself thus, that Christ pours into us a new divine-human life. All these modes of representation are derived from pantheism and are, without this philosophical system, simply unintelligible. The moral theory proceeds from the thought, that God demands no satisfaction but in his love gave us Christ, in order that this one by his teaching, life, and dying might assure us of God’s love, change us in our hostile disposition, and frighten us away from sin. And also the governmental theory of Grotius sees in God the Rector mundi, who personally indeed could and would forgive, yet in the interest of the world order must punish sin exemplarily, as a deterrent for others. With all these theories now one can indeed continue to speak of Christ as Son of God, of his priesthood and offering, but one then speaks in a figurative sense, uses the words in an unusual meaning and gives occasion to misunderstanding.

For it is clear, that in pantheism and deism there is no place for the Christ of the Scriptures. The high priesthood of Christ then changes into a martyrdom, his offering into an example, the [359] Christian religion into a pedagogy and the church into a school. Justice is no virtue of God, but only in the state in its place. Sin is no guilt and punishment no restoration of right. Man is not so evil, or he can be changed for the better by a moral example, by a shock or an impression, cf. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 566 etc. A. A. Hodge, The atonement, ch. 21. The objective satisfaction is transformed into the subjective reconciliation; the proper, true reconciliation then first takes place, when man follows the example of Jesus and changes himself. The believers under the O. T. did not yet have the example of Jesus, thus are either all lost or have become blessed in another way than we, and Christ is not the only name, under heaven given to men for salvation. Above all, with all the theories mentioned the connection remains unexplained, which Scripture lays between the death of Christ and the forgiveness of our sins and eternal life. It is not to be seen, how the death of Christ as an example of these benefits can be the ground why God for Christ's sake forgives us sins and bestows life. In fact everything comes down to this, that Christ by his image makes a deep impression on the understanding or on the will or also on the feeling of man, and thus delivers him from the opinion, that God is angry with him on account of his sin, or from the selfishness which holds him bound, or from the feeling of unblessedness which weighs him down. But in none of these cases is true peace and rest bestowed upon man. For the conscience is not thereby cleansed and the feeling of guilt is not thereby taken away. Peace exists only in the blood of the cross!

14. This active and passive obedience of Christ, which is taught so clearly in Scripture, cannot be maintained except by conceiving it as satisfactio vicaria. The opponents of this doctrine, however, often represent it in such a way that, with respect to the work, just as with respect to the person of Christ, one must distinguish between the pure facts and the theories which have been set up in explanation thereof. First this distinction is made with a view to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the satisfactio vicaria, but soon thereafter also with a view to the teaching of the apostles. Finally, then, nothing remains but the [360] naked fact of the death of Christ itself; the interpretation and appreciation of the fact is left to each person's arbitrariness. The matter, however, is not so. Word and fact go together in God's revelation; Christ is priest but also prophet; He has explained His own person and work; He Himself has interpreted His death in His word, and Christian theology is bound to that. There are therefore not many theories, the moral, the governmental, the mystical, the private- and the public-juridical, which are set up by theology by way of hypotheses in explanation of the facts and phenomena and, as different attempts at solution, all have an equal right to exist. But the question is, what in all these opinions and doctrines corresponds with Scripture and is grounded therein. If the question is posed thus, there is scarcely any doubt possible that the satisfactio vicaria is taught by Scripture. The exegesis which the Socinians and the Rationalists applied in order to remove it from Scripture, no one any longer takes upon himself. And the interpretation of Ritschl, however much it may for a time have captivated by its acuteness, its untenability is scarcely doubted by anyone any longer, cf. Kreibig, Die Versöhnungslehre auf Grund d. chr. Bew. 1878. Frank, Die Theol. Ritschls 1891. Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl'sche Theologie, Jahrb. f. pr. Theol. 1889. Id.

Entw. der prot. Theol. 228 f. Orr, The Ritschlian theology, London 1897. Impartial reading of Holy Scripture always finds in it again the ecclesiastical doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, Wegscheider, Instit. theol. § 136. Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 136 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 68. II 97. 313 f. enz.

Holy Scripture, however, shows us in the whole work of Christ a fulfilment of God's law, a satisfaction of his demand, above p. 310. As prophet, priest, and king, in his birth and death, in his life and suffering, in his words and miracles, in his speaking and acting, he always accomplishes God's will; he has come to do that will; the law of God was in the inward parts of his bowels; his whole life is one perfect offering, to God for a sweet-smelling savour. That will of God is one, and one also is the will of Christ, and one his offering. But yet, in it a double side can be distinguished very clearly. Twofold, namely, was the demand set by God to fallen man, viz. that he should keep the law perfectly [361] and also restore its transgression by punishment, above p. 220. Twofold are the benefits which Christ has acquired for us, viz. the forgiveness of sins and eternal life. Both are not identical; justification does not of itself coincide with heavenly blessedness. Adam was indeed righteous before his disobedience, but nevertheless still had to acquire eternal life in the way of works. The bearing of punishment is in itself still by no means one with the fulfilment of the law; the criminal who is punished but hardens himself under the punishment fulfils justice but in no way answers to the whole demand of the law. Moreover, Christ was the second Adam; he came not only to bear the punishment for us but also to acquire for us that righteousness and that life which Adam had to acquire by his obedience; he did not deliver us from guilt and punishment only and place us not at the beginning but at the end

of the way which Adam had to walk. He bestows on us much more than we lost in Adam, not only the forgiveness of sins and the remission of punishment, but also immediately in faith the non posse peccare and the non posse mori, part II 557: he who believes in him is not condemned and has eternal life, Joh. 3:16, 18. Both kinds of benefits are therefore also, although in concreto they are never to be separated, yet often named separately alongside one another, Dan. 9:24, Joh. 3:36, Hd. 26:18, Rom. 5:17, 18, Gal. 4:5, Op. 1:5, 6. And so it is also with the active and passive obedience of Christ. They are distinct, but in concreto, in the life and death of Christ, always coincide. The active obedience is no external addition to the passive, nor conversely. No single act and no single event in the life or suffering of Christ is to be brought exclusively under the one or under the other. Just as Christ always and in everything is at the same time prophet, priest, and king, so he is also continually active for reconciliation of the guilt of sins and for acquisition of eternal life. Indeed it is not good to say that the forgiveness of sins has been acquired only by his passive, and eternal life only by his active obedience. For his suffering was not a bearing of punishment only but also fulfilment of the law; and his working was not fulfilment of the law merely but also a bearing of its punishment. His doing was suffering and his suffering was [362] act. It was one work that Christ accomplished, but so rich, so valuable in God's eye, that the righteousness of God is completely satisfied by it, every demand of the law is fully fulfilled by it, and the whole, eternal blessedness is acquired by it. The satisfactorious element of Christ's obedience does not consist in this, that he satisfied a vengeful deity by blood, stilled its hatred and envy by a quantity of suffering; but it lies herein, that from the beginning to the end of his life he subjected his will to the whole, perfect, holy, and loving will of God, and

consecrated himself with body and soul and all powers to God as a perfect offering. But that will of God, according to the teaching of Scripture, included not only the life but also the suffering of Christ; and that offering consisted not only in his "moral vocation" but also in his death on the cross. What God has united, man shall not separate. Cf. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV 13, 11 sq. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 14. Moor III 960 sq. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 326. 341. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 104, 2. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 279 f. III2 61.

The obedience of Christ, however, is not only a satisfactio; it is a satisfactio vicaria. On this too Scripture expresses itself clearly. Properly speaking, in every sin offering the idea of substitution is enclosed; it puts in the place of the offerer, who is worthy of the wrath of God, something else that can again make Him favorable. In Israel's history we already encounter the idea of substitution with Abraham, when, at the command of the Angel of the Lord, he does not stretch out his hand toward his son, but offers a ram as a burnt offering in his son's place, Gen. 22:12, 13. In the Old Test. cultus, in the case of the sin offerings, the laying on of hands transferred the sins of the offerer onto the sacrificial animal, Lev. 16:21; the reconciliation itself comes about not in one but in three acts, viz. slaughtering, sprinkling of blood, and burning; although laden with the sins of the offerer and thus worthy of death, the sacrificial animal is nevertheless not simply killed but slaughtered. It is not a matter of death as such, without more, for the sacrificial animal is destined to make reconciliation and to restore the offerer into God's favor. That favor is not to be obtained by the death of the sacrificial animal without more, but by the fact that the blood, the soul, the life of the sacrificial animal, which indeed is laden with the sins of the offerer and therefore killed, but nevertheless in itself completely innocent,

is brought and consecrated to God. Thus that blood, as the self-offering of a living being, which therefore is not killed but slaughtered, makes reconciliation over the sins of the offerer; it causes that the whole animal in the burning is to God for a pleasing odor; the offerer himself then shares completely in His favor, the animal has from the beginning to the end replaced his place and thus reconciled him and restored him into God's communion. From this cultus Isaiah borrowed the features for his depiction of the servant of the Lord; the poena vicaria cannot be expressed more strongly than in Jes. 53; the servant of the Lord has taken our sicknesses upon himself and borne our pains; He is wounded for our transgressions, for our iniquities He is crushed; the punishment that brings us peace was upon Him, and by his stripes healing has come to us. The Lord has caused the iniquities of us all to meet upon Him. For the transgression of the people the plague was upon Him. He has set his soul as a guilt offering. Himself a righteous one, without injustice or deceit, He bears the iniquities of his own. All this becomes still clearer in the N. Test. In the first place the expression λυτρον comes into consideration here, Mt. 20:28, Mk. 10:45, 1 Tim. 2:6; it is, according to its derivation, from λυειν, to loosen, the means to loosen someone, to free from prison, and hence often ransom money. In the LXX it is the translation of גְּאֻלָּה, Lev. 25:51, 52 or פְּדוּי, Num. 3:46 or כֹּפֶר, Ex. 21:30, 30:12, Num. 35:31, 32, Spr. 6:35, 13:8, which, however, elsewhere is translated by ἐξιλασμα, 1 Sam. 12:3, Ps. 49:8 or ἀλλαγμα, Am. 5:12, Jes. 43:3, or δωρον, Jos. 36:18. Now it is true that in the word λυτρον the substitutive and aequivalente is not yet understood of itself. But nevertheless it is incorrect, with Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 69, to understand the words in Mk. 10:45 in such a way that Jesus' voluntary death is a gift, a covering, a protective means, by which many remain

preserved, not from death as the lot of all creatures, but from full annihilation and the purposelessness of life and thus are freed from the fear of death. For although the word λυτρον may in itself not yet express that the ransom price outweighs what is bought free by it; yet the thought lies at hand that someone who has a right to something will in general not relinquish it except for proper compensation; in Jes. 43:3, Spr. 21:18 it therefore alternates with תחת, in the place of. And then especially, the ransom price that Christ brought is elsewhere called a τιμη, a costly price, 1 Cor. 6:20, 7:23, 1 Petr. 1:18. 19; it is expressly said that a man cannot give an ἀνταλλαγμα, ransom price, compensation, aequivalent, for his soul, Mt. 16:26, Mk. 8:37, cf. Ps. 49:8; and the word λυτρον is in the N. T. further strengthened by the praepositie ἀντι, Jesus gives his life as a ransom price in the place of many, who indeed ought to but could not do it, cf. Cremer s. v. But besides the expression λυτρον, in the second place the whole N. T. doctrine of the offering of Christ comes into consideration here. The praeposities that indicate the relation of that offering to us and our sins, ὑπερ, περι, δια, above p. 312, do not in themselves mean: in the place of, but for the benefit of, for the sake of, on account of, in order to, because of; yet they establish between Christ's offering and our sins such a connection that the mystical, moral, and symbolic interpretation does not at all exhaust the sense of Scripture. Naturally it is indeed true that Christ also suffered and died for us as an example, and that all in Him have been crucified, have died, and have been buried. But the sense of Scripture is not exhausted in that; indeed the mystical and moral conception of Christ's suffering and dying cannot be maintained unless it is previously acknowledged that He, in a legal sense, suffered and died substitutively for us. And that Scripture teaches as clearly as possible, even though it uses the expression satisfactio

vicaria no more than that of trinity, incarnation, God-man, etc. For when it says that Christ, although personally without any sin, according to the will of God has taken our sin upon himself and borne it, has been made sin for us and has become a curse, according to that same will of God has been punished for that with the accursed death of the cross, and thereby as causa meritoria has acquired for us the reconciliation, the forgiveness, the righteousness, the life, the whole salvation for us, then that cannot be thought otherwise than that He has placed himself in our stead and has borne our punishment. Cf. Weiss, Lehrb. der bibl. Theol. § 49 b. 80 etc. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 64 f. II 97 f. etc. On the praep. ὑπερ, Holwerda, Jaarb. v. wet. Theol. 1862 p. 521v. [365]

15. However, from of old very weighty objections have been raised against this satisfactio vicaria. Monetary debts one person can take over from another and pay for him; but sins are moral debts and adhere to the person. They cannot, by the nature of the case, be taken over by another. It conflicts with God's justice, which does not hold the guilty innocent and the innocent guilty. It conflicts with the nature of sin, for whoever would wish to bear them for another would nevertheless never be able to take over the most dreadful thing in sin, i.e. self-accusation, repentance, remorse, but only the outward suffering and dying, and this would then for him be no punishment of sin but a chastisement, a trial, a martyrdom. It conflicts with reality, for Christ did not bear the wrath of God but always shared in his love and favor; He did not bear the whole punishment of sin, for He died neither the spiritual nor the eternal death; and if He had borne it as well, then in any case only for one single human being, never for many, for He has then borne that punishment only once; even if He was God, this cannot increase the value of his offering, since his Godhead could not suffer, above

324. Many of these objections flow from misunderstanding, which therefore must first be removed out of the way. In the first place, then, it is completely true that Christ has never personally, in and for himself, been the object of God's wrath; He has never in his own person been a sinner. Gnostics and Anabaptists did indeed many times distinguish between a divine, heavenly, immortal, holy and a human, earthly, unclean, mortal corporeality in Christ, above 275v. And the Antinomians understood the substitution in such a way that upon Christ not only the guilt and punishment but also the stain and uncleanness of sin had been transferred; the exchange between Christ and the elect was so absolute that He himself is sin and they are righteousness; in Christ they have been sorrowful over their sins, justified, born again; the sins which they themselves do are no sins any more, no longer torment them in the conscience, have no need of forgiveness any more and are only deeds of the flesh, of the old man, Hulsius, De hedendaagsche Antinomianery, 2e dr. 1738 bl. 377v. Hoornbeek, Summa Controv. [366] 1653 p. 704. Witsius, Misc. S. II 758-780. And in later time these sentiments have sometimes been renewed by the Methodists, Schneckenburger, Vorles. über die kleineren protest. Parteien 146, by the Irvingians, Herzog2 7, 154, by some followers of Kohlbrugge, Bula, Die Versöhnung des Menschen mit Gott durch Christum 1874. Böhl, Von der Incarnation des göttl. Wortes 1884 Id. Dogmatik 299 f., cf. Kuyper, De vleeschw. des Woords Amst. 1887, Inleiding en bl. 155v. But Scripture teaches as decisively and clearly as possible that Christ personally was free from all sins, above 296, and the few passages to which one appeals for the contrary, Joh. 1:14, Rom. 8:3, Hebr. 2:14 speak only of this, that the Son of God assumed a weak nature subject to suffering and death, but not that He himself in a subjective sense was a sinner. Some theologians

such as Chrysostomus, Oecumenius, Luther, Marlorat, also Calvin on Gal. 3:13, have indeed called Christ a sinner, but meant that only in an objective sense, as Paul says that Christ was made sin and became a curse, 2 Cor. 5:21, Gal. 3:13, cf. Jes. 53:12. Thereby the apostle does not indicate that Christ in himself was a sinner and accursed, but that He was regarded and treated by God as one who was guilty of the transgression of the law and had loaded its curse upon himself. Self-accusation, repentance, remorse, confession of personal sins could therefore not occur in Christ; spiritual death, as incapacity for good and inclination to all evil, was not suffered by Him. Precisely in order to bear the sins of others and to make satisfaction for these, He could and might himself not be a sinner. The permutatio personarum, which took place between Christ and his own, is not to be understood in a pantheistic physical or mystical sense, but bears a legal character; Christ has voluntarily come to stand in that relation to the law and its demands in which we stood to it through our transgression. In the second place, the substitutionary character of Christ's obedience of itself also brings with it that it is aequivalent, fully answering to the demand of the law. But this equivalence was nevertheless conceived by the Reformation differently than by Rome. Duns Scotus judged that also a holy man or an angel could have made satisfaction for our sins, if God had approved it, [367] for tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro quanto Deus acceptat illud et non plus, 8ent. III dist. 20 qu. un. n. 9 cf. dist. 19 qu. un. n. 7. And likewise later the Remonstrants taught that not the justitia Dei but only the aequitas demanded some satisfaction and that meritum quod Christus persolvit juxta Dei Patris aestimationem persolutum est, Limborch, Theol. Chr. III 21, 6. 8. 9. 22, 2. Episc., Inst. Theol. IV sect. 5 c. 3. Directly over against that Thomas called, S. Theol. III qu. 48 art. 2 the passio Christi

not only sufficiens sed superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis humani generis, cf. Cat. Rom. I 5 qu. 13, 2. Theol. Wirceb. IV 317. Billuart, Summa S. Thomae Pars III tom. 2 p. 206-226. Scheeben III 206. 343 etc. One even treated the question whether not one drop of Christ's blood would have been sufficient for reconciliation, cf. Quenstedt, Theol. III 327. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi II 843. This whole conception both in Thomas and in Duns Scotus rests on a sensuous, quantitative calculation of the suffering of Christ. In principle the Reformation broke with this system of calculation. That appears from this, that it rejected both the acceptilatio (from acceptum ferre) of Scotus and the superabundance of Thomas, Voetius, Disp. II. 247. Mastricht V 18, 38. Moor III 1084. Alting, Theol. probl. pr. 41; that it included in the work of Christ alongside the passive also the active obedience; that it called the offering of Christ indeed aequivalent but not identical with what we were obligated to render; that it held it to be perfectly sufficient, so that neither in a Roman nor in a Remonstrant way was an addition by our faith and our good works necessary; and that in particular the Reformed said that Christ's work in itself was perfectly sufficient for reconciliation of the sins of the whole world, that it, if He had wished to save a smaller number, could not be less, and if He had wished to save a greater number or all men, would not have needed to be greater. Sins are also indeed no monetary debts, and the satisfaction is no arithmetic sum. The transfer of our sins to Christ did not proceed so mechanically that these were first accurately added together from all the elect, thus laid upon Christ and each separately satisfied by Him. Christ also did not pass through all human ages nor did He therein separately make satisfaction for the sins [368] of each age, as Irenaeus, adv. haer. II 22, 4 and others represented it. He also did not suffer precisely the

same, idem, as we nor in the same way; for consciousness of guilt etc., could not occur in Him, spiritual death as inclination to evil He did not know, and eternal death He suffered not in form and duration but only intensively and qualitatively, as abandonment by God, Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 46 art. 5. qu. 48 art. 2. Calvin, Inst. II 16, 12. Mastricht, Theol. V 12, 9. 21. Moor IV 122-133. Witsius, Misc. S. II 770. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 454. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 239. Phillippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2, 29. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe II 75. v. Oosterzee, Dogm. II 586. There is even some truth in the acceptilation, for the strict justice of God demanded that each human being personally for himself made satisfaction; and it was his grace which gave Christ as a mediator of the covenant and imputed his righteousness to the covenant partners. With a quantitative calculation we therefore do not get out of the satisfactio vicaria. They are other than measurable and weighable magnitudes with which we have to do in the doctrine of satisfaction. Sin is a principle governing and corrupting the whole creation, a power, a kingdom, which extends and organizes itself in many actual sins. The wrath of God is an indignation which is directed against the sin of the whole human race, Heid. Cat. 37. His justice is that virtue by which He cannot tolerate that He is as God unacknowledged or dishonored by his creatures. Therefore the satisfactio vicaria consists in this, that Christ as surety and head has come to stand in that relation to God, to his wrath, his justice, his law, in which the human race stood over against it. He has for that humanity which is given to Him for reconciliation been made to be sin, become a curse and has taken its guilt and punishment upon himself. When the Socinians say that Christ in any case could only make satisfaction for one human being and not for many, since He has borne the punishment of sin only once, then this reasoning proceeds from the same

quantitative calculation as the acceptilation of Duns Scotus and the superabundance of Thomas. For although the sin that has come into the world through Adam manifests itself in an innumerable series of sinful thoughts, words and deeds; although the wrath of God is individually felt by every guilty human child; it is and remains nevertheless always the one, indivisible law that has been violated, the one indivisible wrath of God that has been kindled against the sin of the whole human race, the one, indivisible justice of God that has been injured by sin, the one, unchangeable, eternal God who has been mocked by sin. And therefore the punishment of Christ is also one, but one that intensively and qualitatively outweighs the sin and guilt of the whole human race, reconciles the wrath of God against that whole human race, fulfills the whole law, fully restores God's justice and brings God himself in all his virtues of truth and justice, of love and grace again to recognition in the human race. For that punishment was also laid upon Him who was not merely an individual alongside others, but the second Adam, head of the human race, the Son of man and the Son of God at the same time.

16. Thus understood, the doctrine of the satisfactio vicaria can only still be defended against the objection that in the moral sphere such a substitution is not possible. In the first place, however, it is to be remarked against this, that the idea of substitution is also deeply grounded in human nature in the moral sphere, and among all peoples has embodied itself in priesthood and sacrifice and has also been expressed in all sorts of ways in poetry and mythology. Origen compared Christ in his death already with those who, according to classical traditions, have died for their fatherland in order to deliver it from plague or other disasters, for it seems, according to hidden laws, to lie in the nature of things that the voluntary death of a

righteous man for the common good breaks the power of the evil spirits, c. Cels. I 31. Christian theology also many times adduced the examples of Codrus, Curtius, Kratinus, Zaleucus, Damon and Phintias and the hostages, in order thereby to elucidate the vicarious suffering of Christ. Naturally these examples have no other value than to show that the idea of substitution occupied a great place in the world of thought of Greeks and Romans. The same is the case with tragedy, whose fundamental thought certainly is not always to be rendered by Schuld und Sühne but indeed by Leidenschaft und Leid. The death of the hero is in many tragedies not an actual reconciliation for committed sin, but yet always a deliverance, made necessary by some or other mistake, error, etc., and therefore in the end reconciling us and granting satisfaction. But even thus conceived, tragedy proclaims a great truth: all that is great in humanity walks along abysses of guilt, and satisfaction is there only then, when the noble and great perishes in death. The downfall of Orestes, Oedipus, Antigone, Romeo and Julia, Max and Thekla, Iphigenie etc., reconciles us with them and with their race; alle menschlichen Gebrechen sühnet reine Menschlichheit (Goethe). And so it is also often in history: the last, noble Constantine is, fighting and dying for his people and land, an atonement for the horrors of the Byzantine emperors, and the in comparison with his predecessors innocent Louis XVI expiates in his death for the sins of his house. If the history of the families and lineages were known to us, it would furnish us with numerous such examples. In the de mortuis nil nisi bene we all honour the reconciling power of suffering and death. Yes, all life and joy here on earth is fruit of pain and death. Everything lives from one another’s death. The grain of wheat must die in order to bear fruit. What the one has sown is reaped by the other. The mother gives, in labour-pain and sometimes dying, life to her

child. All birth, also in the sphere of thought and of art, is from darkness to light. Some work, struggle, suffer, and others enjoy their labour. We all live from the treasures of the forefathers acquired with exertion. All noble goods of humanity have been conquered under struggle and suffering by some for all. Above all, love bears a vicarious character; here on earth it is scarcely conceivable otherwise than as co-suffering, συμπαθεια; whoever loves most, suffers most. The mother suffers for, in, with her child; the father bears mourning in the heart over the wandering of his son. Nature and humanity teach that there are stellvertretende Kräfte. Cf. above p. 135 and furthermore also Maresius, Syst. Theol. X 24. Turretinus, de satisf. 51. Petrus de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwal. II 221v. Bushnell, Vicarious sacrifice 1866. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 622. de Maistre, Soirées de St. Petersbourg, éclairc. sur les sacrifices.

All these examples and reasonings are without doubt suitable, [371] to elucidate to some extent the vicarious suffering of Christ. Over against the individualism and atomism that tear humanity apart and know nothing of the mysticism of love, they are of excellent value. But yet they are not able to explain the suffering of Christ. Many indeed remain with these examples and attempt to understand the suffering of Christ as a natural consequence of his entering into our sinful community, e. g. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 104, 4. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. § 876. Lange, Dogm. II 840. 841. H. Schultz, Der Begriff des stellvertr. Leidens, Basel 1864 etc. But thus the sacrifice of Christ does not come into its own. Indeed human sympathy for Christ, and above all for Him as the holy and merciful High Priest, has been the cause of deep, painful suffering, Mt. 8:17, 9:36, 14:14 etc., but it is not the only and the principal cause, any more than hunger and thirst, persecution by his enemies, temptation by Satan, abandonment by his disciples. For then the

suffering for Christ would be only suffering and no punishment, and He himself no more than a witness, a martyr, a sufferer, only differing in degree from others. But Christ himself regarded his suffering as a punishment, laid upon Him by God for our sins, Mt. 20:28, 26:28, 27:46, and the whole of Scripture teaches that He was made sin for us and became a curse, 2 Cor. 5:21, Gal. 3:13. One step further go those who explain the suffering of Christ in a realistic way from the place which He occupies in the human race. He is namely not an individual alongside others, but Centralindividuum; He did not assume a human person but the human nature; that nature bore sin and lay under the curse; and thus Christ with that nature also took its guilt and punishment upon himself. Just as Adam therefore could be our representative, because he was the progenitor of the whole human race, so Christ is substitute of the congregation, which as his body is born from Him as the head and is one with Him. And just as we e. g. are punished on our back for what we have done wrong with our hand, so Christ is punished for our sins because He is one with us, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 48 art. 1. 2. Suppl. qu. 13 art. 2. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 57v. 533v. Dale, The atonement, lect. 10. Scott Lidgett, The spiritual principle [372] of the atonement, ch. 7. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe II 67 f. Bilderdijk, Opst. v. godg. en zedek. inhoud, I 1-15 etc. This realistic-mystical conception of Christ's substitution is in itself completely correct and is also clearly taught by Scripture; for the believers themselves are crucified, died, buried, raised, and set in heaven with Christ, Rom. 6-8, Gal. 2:20, Ef. 2:6, Col. 2:11, 3:3 etc., cf. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 114-121. Because Christ is not only reconciler but also redeemer, not only had to remove objectively the guilt of sin but also had to break subjectively the power of sin, this mystical union of Christ and the believers in the work of salvation forms an essential and

indispensable constituent. But yet it is not the only and the first relation which exists between Christ and his own. In Scripture it is built upon the federal; Rom. 6-8 follows upon Rom. 3-5. When it is detached from that, it loses the foundation on which it must rest; it goes to seek its support in pantheism, which changes the re-creation into a process; and it shifts the objective reconciliation more and more into the subjective redemption; Shedd e. g. already makes the imputation of Christ's righteousness depend on regeneration and faith, ib. 534, cf. Dale 422 etc. Only then is this mystical union in its scriptural meaning to be maintained together with the objective reconciliation of Christ's sacrifice, when Christ is first of all regarded as Head of the covenant and in a federalistic, legal sense has taken the place of his own. The covenant of grace precedes the person and the sacrifice of Christ. For that covenant does not begin after Christ has completed his work, with the H. Spirit, with the benefits of regeneration and faith; but Christ himself also stands in that covenant, He is its surety and mediator, Hebr. 7:22, 8:6, 12:24; his blood is covenant blood and therefore reconciling, Mt. 26:28. Yes more still, the covenant of grace is not first established in time, but it has its foundation in eternity, it rests in the pactum salutis, it is in the first place a covenant of the three persons in the Divine being itself. Father and Son and Spirit are all three active in that covenant; and so little does it begin first in time with the activity of the H. Spirit, that it rather has from eternity in the counsel of God triune its existence and [373] stability. And from that the satisfactio vicaria of Christ is also explained. It rests on an ordinance, on a free, almighty, gracious disposition of God. That absolutely does not mean that it is arbitrary and unreasonable. All kinds of relations in nature and humanity offer analogy of the substitution in Christ. But analogy is here and can here, just as little as

with Adam, above p. 129v. be identity. Both occupy a peculiar place in humanity; they alone are heads of the whole human race; their influence and operation extend to all places and times. And above Adam Christ stands yet again. For Adam was representative, Christ is substitute of humanity. Adam acted in our name but took over nothing of us; Christ came to us, put himself in our place, bore our guilt and punishment and acquired our righteousness. Adam was head of a covenant of works, which was unstable; Christ is head of a better covenant, which knows of no instability. Adam was a man, though without sin, earthly out of the earth; Christ was the Word made flesh, the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, the Lord from heaven. Adam spoiled what was good, Christ restored and perfected what was spoiled. As far as the covenant of grace goes beyond the covenant of works, and the gospel beyond the law, so high does Christ stand above Adam. His satisfactio vicaria is not even to be understood according to the covenant of works with its law; it is indeed not contra legem, for it confirms the law, but it is nevertheless supra legem and goes very far beyond all our thoughts. It is not to be reduced to any general rule nor to be explained by any general law, for it is no phenomenon alongside others, but it is a concrete fact, wholly unique in the history of humanity, explained by nothing and itself explaining everything, resting in a special ordinance of God. And this ordinance of God is no isolated act of will, but bears a covenantal character. The satisfactio vicaria has its foundation in the counsel of God triune, in the life of the highest, the perfect and eternal love, in the unshakable covenant of redemption. According to the ordinances of that covenant Christ takes the place of his own and exchanges their sin for his righteousness, their death for his life. Ὢ της γλυκειας άνταλλαγης, ὠ της άνεξιχνιαστου δημιουργιας, [374] ὠ των άπροσδοκητων είεργεσιων, ἱνα

ἀνομια μεν πολλων ἐν δικαιῳ ἐνι κρυβῃ, δικαιοσυνη δε ἐνος πολλους ἀνομους δικαιωσῃ, Ep. ad Diogn. 9. Cf. A. A. Hodge, The atonement 198 etc. Hugh Martin, The atonement p. 9 etc.

17. This obedience Christ fulfilled in the whole state of his humiliation. The formal treatment of the doctrine of the two states arose among the Lutherans, in order to bring the communicatio idiomatum into agreement with Jesus' humiliation, but was soon also taken over by the Reformed, Olevianus, Subst. foed. II 5. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 13. Junius, Theses Theol. c. 29. Synopsis pur. theol. c. 27. 28 etc. Since Schleiermacher's critique, Chr. Gl. § 105, it has, however, either been entirely abandoned or importantly modified. Those who deny the pre-existence and the resurrection of Christ have, with this doctrine, no interest any longer either, Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 824 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 567 f. Others, who accept these testimonies of Scripture, have often transformed it into a description of the gradually being completed incarnation of the Logos, or of the divine-human development and perfection of Christ; his humiliation is then conceived as eine stete Erhöhung seines inneren Lebens, which had as a consequence the exaltation of the same, Martensen § 139 f. Dorner § 104. Lange II 635. Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. The doctrine of the two states is replaced by a biography of Jesus, which, however, with a view to the sources is impossible, with a view to the person is impermissible, and therefore always results in a false antithesis between the historical Jesus and the apostolic Christ, Strauss, Leben Jesu 1864 § 1. Weiss, Leben Jesu I 180. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III1 3. 63. Kähler, Der sogen. histor. Jezus und der geschichtliche, bibl. Christus 1892. Id. Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 68 f. Kuyper, Enc. III 158. No separation can be made between a vita Christi and an officium Christi, as Ebrard wishes, Dogm. § 408. His entire life stood in

the service of the office to which he had been appointed by the Father and sent into the world. The dogma of the apostolic preaching is the only key to unlock the evangelical tradition of Christ; the only means to provide us with an image full of life of the Savior of the world, Kähler, Versöhnung 69. Christ did not live a moment [375] for himself, Rom. 15:3, but always for his church, in order to give her an example, Mt. 11:29, Joh. 13:14-16 etc., in order to serve her and to give his life as a ransom for many, Mt. 20:28, in order to share with her his grace and truth, his light and his life, Joh. 1:16, 6:33v., Col. 3:4. The incarnation itself was already a κενωσις, consisting in this, that he who ἐν μορφῃ θεου ὑπαρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμον ἡγησατο το εἰναι ἱσα θεῳ, i.e., who in the form of God existed, in the same manner as God, and did not regard this as something robbed or usurped, nevertheless relinquished this divine mode of existence and assumed the μορφη δουλου, so that he truly became like a human being and was found in appearance as a human being, Phil. 2:7, 8, 2 Cor. 8:9, cf. Weiffenbach, Zur Auslegung der Stelle Phil. 2:5-11, Karlsruhe u. Leipzig 1884. In the exchange of the μορφη θεου with the μορφη δουλου, of the divine mode of existence with the human, consisted his κενωσις, exinanitio. And as soon as this had taken place, his ταπεινωσις, humiliatio, began, consisting in this, that he was and remained obedient to God unto death. The whole life of Christ from the conception on to death was thus a humiliation as a consequence of his obedience, an ever deeper entering into the fellowship of our sin and an ever further removing of himself from the heavenly joy. His circumcision, Luk. 2:21, served as proof that he was truly human and Abraham's seed, that he as such stood in the fellowship of our sin and had to receive the sign of the cutting off of that sin, and that God was his God and he was God's Son. His baptism, which he as the Holy One no more than circumcision

needed for himself, Mt. 3:14, took place because it befitted him as mediator, πληρωσαι πασαν δικαιοσυνην, to satisfy all the right of the law and to bring about the whole, full righteousness which the law demanded of him; because he, as such standing in the fellowship of sinners, had to receive the sign and seal of his fellowship with God, as the Son in whom the Father had all his good pleasure; and because he had to be anointed and qualified with the H. Spirit and thus inaugurated for his public appearance as the Christ who alone himself can baptize with the H. Spirit and with fire, Mt. 3:11-17, cf. parall., Hd. 10:38, Bornemann, Die Taufe Christi durch Joh. in der dogm. [376] Beurteilang der christl. Theologen der vier ersten Jahrh., Leipzig 1896. The temptation, which took place immediately after the baptism and further repeatedly repeated itself up to Gethsemane, cf. ἀχρι καιρου, Luk. 4:13, Joh. 12:27, Mt. 26:39, Hebr. 4:15, 5:7, 1 Petr. 2:23, had as its purpose that Christ, who had just received the sign and seal of his fellowship with God and the gifts of the H. S., would also maintain this fellowship over against all temptation of Satan and world, as the second Adam would not break the covenant with God but would maintain and confirm it for himself and his own, and as the merciful High Priest, having been tempted in all things as we are, would come to our aid in our weaknesses and temptations. All the words and works which Christ during his life spoke and did are an execution of God's will, Joh. 5:19v., 6:38 and have as their purpose to make known the name, the virtues, the counsel and the good pleasure of God both in law and gospel, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 1:18; to show his priestly mercy to all poor, sick, and lost, Mt. 8:17, 11:5; to prove his kingly power over Satan, world, sin, and all their workings. Luk. 10:18, Joh. 12:31, 14:30, 16:33, 18:37. The suffering of Christ, which begins with his incarnation but is completed in the passio magna, is the will and the

command of the Father, Mt. 26:39, 42, Joh. 10:17, 18, proof of his absolute obedience, Phil. 2:8, Hebr. 5:8, and for his own as an example for their life, 1 Petr. 2:21, as a ransom for their sins, Mt. 20:28, 26:28, as a victory over the world, Joh. 16:33, Col. 2:15. His condemnation, not only by the sanhedrin but also by the secular Roman judge Pontius Pilate, took place for this purpose, that he would not die secretly by an assassination or in a riot, but according to the verdict of the then best and most virtuous law, after proper investigation, would be killed publicly, in the way of justice, and that thereby both his personal innocence, Mt. 27:18-24, and the ground of his condemnation, namely his confession to be the Son of God and the Messiah of Israel, Mt. 26:63, 27:11, and the will of God, Hd. 2:23, 4:27, 28, and the character of his death as a dying for others, Mt. 20:28, would come to light clearly and incontrovertibly before everyone's eyes. The death of crucifixion, crudelissimum teterrimumque supplicium, and [377] usually applied only to slaves and serious criminals, had this meaning, that Christ, in the name of the law having been condemned to the most dreadful and most disgraceful punishment, has satisfied the strictest demand of the law, as one hanged has become a curse to God, but thereby has also taken away from us the curse of the law, Deut. 21:23, Gal. 3:13, and has completely delivered us from all evil to which the law condemns us on account of our sins; the cross is therefore the center and the core of the gospel, 1 Cor. 1:23, 2:2, Gal. 6:14. The blood that Christ shed—non infirmitate, sed potestate mortuus est, Aug., de nat. et gr. 26—proves that he voluntarily consecrated his life to God, that he brought it as an offering, and thereby brought reconciliation and peace into being, Mt. 26:27, Hd. 20:28, Rom. 3:25, 5:9, Ef. 1:7, Col. 1:20, Hebr. 9:12, 22. Finally, the burial of Christ also has a special significance; it is repeatedly mentioned, Jes. 53:9, Mt. 12:40, 27:59,

60, Luk. 11:29, 23:53, Joh. 19:40-42, Hd. 13:29, 1 Cor. 15:3, 4. It is not only proof of the fact that he truly died and thus also rose from the dead, but its significance lies especially herein, that Christ, although giving up his spirit into the hands of his Father, who received him into paradise, Luk. 23:43, 46, nevertheless for three days remained in the state of death, belonged to the realm of the dead, and thus bore the punishment of sin, Gen. 3:19, in full. To that state of death, Hades, he was not abandoned, his flesh did not see corruption, for he was raised on the third day; but he nevertheless was in Hades, Mt. 12:40, Hd. 2:27, 31.

No other places of Scripture exist that speak of the burial of Christ or of his sojourn in the state of death, for the descent εἰς τα κατωτερα της γης, Eph. 4:9, as is evident from the contrast, points to his descent to the earth by his incarnation, cf. Meyer t. p.; and 1 Pet. 3:19-22 in no case speaks of what Christ did between his death and resurrection, but either of what he did after his resurrection or before his incarnation; the words ζωοποιηθεις δε πνευματι indicate that Christ, who, because he partook of a sarkic body, was put to death, yet, because the πνευμα was proper to him, was raised again, [378] so that his life after the resurrection was not a sarkic but a pneumatic life. The descensus ad inferos, τα κατωτατα, Hades, not hell, gehenna, in the Greek, Roman, Lutheran sense therefore nevertheless finds no support in this text. But soon in the Christian church the thought arose that Christ in the time between his death and resurrection had gone to Hades. The Evangelium Petri vs. 41 42, discovered some time ago, has a voice from heaven say to Jesus: ἐκηρυξας τοις κοιμωμενοις, to which the answer is: γυμναι, the infernal powers are laid bare. According to Hermas, Sim. IX 16, 5-7, the apostles after their death continued their preaching, and indeed to those who formerly had fallen asleep in righteousness, cf. also

Clemens Alex. Strom. VI 6, 45. 46. And Tertullianus, de an. 55. Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 27, 3. IV 27, 2 and V 31, 1-2, teach that Christ descended apud inferos or in ea quae sunt sub terra, in order to make the believers of the O. T. share in the benefits of his work. According to Rufinus †410 the symbol of the church at Aquileia also had this article: crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato et sepultus descendit in inferno; probably from here this article passed over into various confessions, into that of the synod at Sirmium 359, Nice 359, Constantinople 360, Toledo 633, into the symbolum Quicumque and thus also into various later forms of the so-called apostolic symbol, cf. besides the many dogmatics-historical works of Harnack, Hagenbach etc., the works on the apost. symbol of Caspari, Harnack art. Apost S. in Herzog2, Zahn, Das ap. Symbol, Erlangen 1893. Kattenbusch, Das apost. Symbol I 1894 S. 103 f. Id. Christl. Welt 1889 n. 27. 28. Id. Zur Würdigung des Apostolikums, Hefte zur Chr. Welt n. 2, Leipzig 1892 S. 29. Hahn, Bibl. der Symb. u. Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche3 1897. The Greek church, Conf. Orthod. qu. 49, understands by the descensus ad inferos, that Christ with his divine nature and with his soul went to Hades and freed the souls of the holy forefathers and, with the murderer on the cross, transferred them to paradise. The Roman church, Cat. Rom. I c. 6, cf. Bellarminus, de Christo IV 6-16. Petavius, de incarn. XII 19. 20 XIII 15-18 Scheeben III 298 f. etc., teaches that Christ, really, with his soul, after his death, descended ad inferos and remained there as long as his body rested in the grave, in order to free the souls of the pious, [379] who there sine ullo doloris sensu, beata redemptionis spe sustentati, quieta habitatione fruebantur, but nevertheless lacked the vision of God, in order as victor to strike down the demons and to wrest from them the booty of souls. The Lutheran church, Symb. B. ed. Müller 550. 696 confesses that Christ according to both natures, with soul

and body after the burial went to hell, overcame the devil, disturbed the power of hell and took from the devil all force and power; the theologians extended this so far that Christ on the morning of the third day, after the vivificatio, resurrectio interna and before the resurrectio externa, with soul and body went to hell, and there to Satan and all condemned spirits, by a praedicatio non evangelica sed legalis, elenctica, terribilis, made known his victory over death and Satan, Frank, Theologie der Concondienformel III 397-454. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 277. 288 f. The Reformed confessions are not unanimous and understand by the descent into hell the infernal pains that Christ suffered on the cross, Calvin, Inst. I 16, 8-12, Cat. Genev. 1, Cat. Heid. qu. 44, and thus Beza, Danaeus, Pareus, etc.; or the actual going of Christ with his soul alone to hell, in order there to make known his power, Repet. Anh. 9, and likewise Zanchius, Aretius, Alsted; or the going of Christ to hell with soul and body both with the same purpose, Coll. Lips. 9; or the state of death, in which Christ was for three days, Cat. Westm. bij Niemeyer 55, and thus Olevianus, Perkins, Amesius, Molinaeus, Bronghton, Vossius, Bochartus, Pearson, Schultens, Vriemoet etc.; while some tried to unite these different opinions, Sohnius, Op. III 311. Witsius, Explanation of the apost. symbol, 18 § 9v. Burmannus, Synopsis theol. V 21 § 13-14. Mastricht V 13, 5. Synopsis pur. theol. 27, 32. Heidegger, Corpus theol. 18, 32. etc. The great diversity of opinions explains that many did not know how to attach a good sense to the article and rejected it entirely, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 99, 1, or also seized upon this article in order to give a churchly stamp to their doctrine of a continuing preaching of the gospel and of a Missionsanstalt in place of the intermediate state, cf. especially Güder, Die Lehre v. d. Erscheinung Jesu Chr. unter den Todten 1853. Spitta, Christi Predigt an die Geister, Göttingen 1890. [380] In fact

the matter stands with this article thus, that 1o the expression descended into hell, insofar as it might have been derived from texts such as Acts 2:27, 31, Eph. 4:9, historically has acquired a wholly different meaning than that which is contained in those texts; 2o that the Greek and Roman explanation of this article, as though Christ had gone to Hades in order to free the pious of the O. T., finds not the least support in Scripture; 3o that the Lutheran conception, that Christ made known his power to Satan, indeed, as will later appear, is grounded on definite statements of Scripture, but cannot be regarded as a correct explanation of the words: descended into hell, since these in that case would not belong to the state of humiliation but to that of exaltation, which begins only with the resurrection; 4o that the more recent opinion, as though Christ had gone into hell in order to preach the gospel to all who have not heard it here on earth, likewise for the same reason cannot be considered a correct explanation of this article of faith; 5o that 1 Pet. 3:19 at most says, although it will later be shown that this too is not the correct opinion, that Christ after his resurrection proclaimed the gospel to the contemporaries of Noah but gives absolutely no right to an extension of the preaching of the gospel to all or to other lost ones; and 6o that the words descended into hell, in agreement also with what Rufinus says, that they are an expansion of Jesus' burial, are still best understood of the state of death, in which Christ as mediator was for three days, in order to bear the punishment of sin to the end and to deliver us from it. Thus the whole life of Christ has issued in his death as the perfect satisfaction to the righteousness of God. And by that one offering he has perfected for ever all those who are sanctified.

18. The fruit of this obedience of Christ is no less than the whole salvation. Under this concept are comprised all the benefits which Christ

has acquired for his own. God is called in Scripture σωτηρ, Luke 1:47 etc., but Christ also bears that name, because He saves his people from their sins, Mt. 1:21, Luke 2:11. He is the ἀρχηγος της [381] σωτηριας, Hebr. 2:10, αἴτιος σωτηριας αἰωνιου, Hebr. 5:9, and his gospel is the gospel της σωτηριας, Eph. 1:13. This σωτηρια is a deliverance from sin and all its consequences and a participation in the highest blessedness; it therefore stands over against θανατος, 2 Cor. 7:10, ἀπωλεια, Phil. 1:28, ὀργη, 1 Thess. 5:9, and endures unto eternity, Hebr. 5:9. Therefore it comprises many particular benefits under itself, which are all also mentioned separately in Scripture. At the top stands the καταλλαγη, reconciliatio, reconciliation. The offering of Christ has namely according to Scripture objective significance, also valid for God. In the O. T. the sacrifices had the intention to cover the sins of the offerer before God's face, כפר, LXX ἐξιλασκεσθαι. This reconciliation now indeed nowhere has God as direct object, but it nevertheless takes place with reference to Him, occurs before his face, Lev. 1:3, 6:7, 10:17, 15:15, 30, 19:22, Num. 15:28, 31:50, and intends, by the covering of sin, to avert his wrath, Num. 8:19, 16:46, and to render Him gracious, ἱλασκεσθαι, ἱλαον ποιειν, propitium reddere, placare. Likewise Christ in the N. T. is ἱλαστηριον, Rom. 3:25, ἱλασμος, 1 John 2:2, 4:10, a merciful and faithful high priest with reference to the things with God, εἰς το ἱλασκεσθαι τας ἁμαρτιας του λαου, Hebr. 2:17; as high priest He has with the offering of his perfect obedience covered the sins of his people and thus averted God's wrath and acquired his grace. Indeed by Socinians, Remonstrants, Rationalists and also most newer theologians, cf. e.g. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 104, 4. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 230 f. Kaftan, Dogm. 460, it has been asserted that God is love, does not need to be reconciled but is himself the author of reconciliation. But this rests in

part on misunderstanding and is otherwise contradicted by Scripture. For this teaches clearly, also in the N. T., that God is wrathful over sins, Rom. 1:18, Gal. 3:10, Eph. 2:3, that He also on his part had to be reconciled, Rom. 5:9, 10, 2 Cor. 15:18, 19, Gal. 3:13, and that Christ to that end has been a ἱλασμος, Rom. 3:25, Hebr. 2:17, 1 John 2:2, 4:10. This, however, absolutely does not conflict with the fact that God is love and has himself given the Christ as a reconciliation for our sins. For his wrath is no evil passion of hatred or envy, his righteousness is no thirst for vengeance, but [382] both are compatible with the highest love. Just as a mother has the more pain over the straying of her son, the more she loves him; just as a judge sometimes must condemn a blood relative or friend, to whom he as a person feels intimately bound, so also in God the wrath against sin can go together with the love toward his creatures. Odit in unoquoque nostrum quod feceramus, amavit quod fecerat, Bede in Turret., de satisf. 86. Diligit omnes homines quantum ad naturam quam ipse fecit, odit tamen eos quantum ad culpam, quam contra eum homines contraxerunt, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 49 art. 4. Because of our sins we are indeed objects of God's wrath, verum quia Dominus quod suum est in nobis perdere non vult, adhuc aliquid invenit, quod pro sua benignitate amet, Calvin, Inst. II 16, 3. And this again is not to be thought in such a way as if God at the moment of Christ's offering suddenly changed disposition and mood. For in God there is no change nor shadow of turning; all his attributes are one with his being; in eternity there is no before and no after. When Scripture speaks of God's wrath and of his reconciliation with us, then it speaks not untruthfully but yet according to our human comprehension. There is no change in the being of God, but there is in the relation in which He stands to his creatures. He also does not set himself in relation to the creature as if this would in any

way exist outside Him, but He himself sets all things and all men in those relations to himself which He eternally and unchangeably wills and precisely thus, in that way and in that moment of time, in which they take place in reality, cf. part II 125v. Therefore it is also God himself who in Christ brings about the reconciliation, 2 Cor. 5:19; He reconciles himself through the offering of the cross; He brings in the obedience of Christ himself and all his virtues to recognition and maintains himself as God before the eye of all his creatures; it is, because Christ is true God and for this divine work also had to be true God, it is God himself, who through the cross reconciles all things with himself. He places in Christ the church in that relation to himself, that it no longer beholds Him, the unchangeable one, in his wrath but in his grace. Jam diligenti nos sibi reconciliavit. Quia prius diligit, postea nos sibi reconciliat. Cf. Augustine, de trin. V 16. Enchir. 33. Lombardus and others on Sent. [383] III dist. 19, 6. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 49 art. 4. Calvin, Inst. II 16, 2-4. Turretinus, de satisf. p. 49. 86. 87. Moor III 448-450. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2, 263. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 612. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II 181 f. 194 f. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Vers. 362 f. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 401 etc. A. A. Hodge, The atonement ch. 9 etc.

By the offering of Christ, therefore, a relationship of reconciliation and peace has been brought about between God and man. Christ, as ἱλασμος, has expiated sin and thereby reconciled God. The distinction between ἱλασμος and καταλλαγη does not consist in this, that the former is objective and the latter subjective. The καταλλαγη also is an objective relation, brought about by God himself, between Him and the world, 2 Cor. 5:18, 19. But in the ἱλασκεσθαι Christ as mediator is the subject, turns away, by his offering covering sins, God's wrath and acquires his grace. But in the καταλλασσειν God himself is the subject, 2 Cor. 5:19; by giving Christ as

ἱλαστηριον, He brings about between himself and the world a relationship of peace. He is no longer wrathful; what made Him our ἀντιδικος, namely sin, has been covered by Christ's offering; He established in Christ such a relationship, in which we no longer have Him against us; He laid aside his enmity, because its cause, sin, has been removed by the death of Christ, and now stands toward the world in a relationship of friendship and peace; καταλλαγη is therefore the reconciliatio, Versöhnung, brought about by expiatio, placatio, Versühnung. This καταλλαγη is the content of the gospel; all is accomplished, God is reconciled, there is on our side nothing more to do; and the whole διακονια κης καταλλαγης consists in the invitation to men: καταλλαγητε τῳ θεῳ, you too on your side lay aside the enmity, enter into that relationship of peace, in which God through the offering of Christ has placed himself toward sinners, believe the gospel, Rom. 5:9, 10, 2 Cor. 5:18-21, cf. Ef. 2:16, Col. 1:20-22, Cremer s. v. ἱλ. and καταλλ., Philippi on Rom. 5:10, Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 99 f. Already by this the whole representation is judged, which separates satisfaction and reconciliation and has the latter come into being only when man believes and repents. Men do not reconcile themselves with God, as if they, with and alongside God, were the subject of reconciliation; [384] but God has reconciled the world with himself, without its cooperation, apart from it, without its having contributed the least to it or needing to contribute to it; men only receive the reconciliation as a gift, Rom. 5:11, and accept it by faith, 2 Cor. 5:20. But from this one benefaction of reconciliation, acquired by Christ, all kinds of benefactions flow forth. That cannot be otherwise. If the relationship between God and the world is set right, then in due time everything comes into order, also the relationship between heaven and earth, angels and men, men among themselves, and also the relationship of men to sin, death,

world, Satan etc. In the sphere of justice the case is decided. God is in the right and therefore He will sooner or later everywhere, on every terrain, and for all creatures be put in the right. The right is on his side and it will once be acknowledged by all, willingly or unwillingly. In the καταλλαγη, the peace-relationship of God in Christ to the world, therefore all kinds of other benefactions are enclosed. The fruits of Christ's offering are not limited to any one terrain; they do not confine themselves, as so many nowadays think, to the religious-ethical life, to the heart, the inner chamber, the church, but they extend to the whole world. For mighty though sin may be, not as the trespass is the gift of grace; the grace of God and the gift through grace is exceedingly abundant, Rom. 5:15. The benefactions, which come to us from the καταλλαγη of God in Christ, are too many to name, above p. 312v. They can be divided into: juridical, namely forgiveness of sins, Mk. 14:24, Hebr. 9:22, justification, Rom. 3:24, 4:25, 5:9, 8:34, 1 Cor. 1:30, 2 Cor. 5:21, adoption as children, Gal. 3:26, 4:5, 6, right to eternal life and the heavenly inheritance, Rom. 8:17, 1 Petr. 1:4, also redemption, ἀπολυτρωσις, Ef. 1:7, Col. 1:14, Hebr. 9:15, which however sometimes has a broader meaning, Rom. 3:24, 8:21, 23, 1 Cor. 1:30, Ef. 1:14, 4:30, 1 Petr. 1:18, 19; mystical, consisting in being crucified, buried, raised, and set in heaven with Christ, Rom. 6-8, Gal. 2:20, Col. 3:1-13; ethical, namely regeneration, Joh. 1:12, 13, making alive, Ef. 2:1, 5, sanctification, 1 Cor, 1:30, 6:4, washing, 1 Cor. 6:11, cleansing, 1 Joh. 2:9, sprinkling, 1 Petr. 1:2, according to body, soul and spirit, 2 Cor. 5:17, 1 Thess. 5:23; moral, consisting in the imitation [385] of Christ, who has left us his example, Mt. 10:38, 16:24, Luk. 9:33, Joh. 8:12, 12:26, 2 Cor. 8:9, Phil. 2:5, Ef. 2:10, 1 Petr. 2:21, 4:1; oeconomical, namely the fulfilment of the Old Test. covenant, the inauguration of a new covenant, Mk. 14:24, Hebr. 7:22, 9:15,

12:24, the freedom from the law, Rom. 7:1v., Gal. 2:19, 3:13, 25, 4:5, 5:1 etc., the blotting out of the handwriting of the law, the breaking down of the wall of partition, the reconciliation of Jew and Gentile and of all other oppositions existing in humanity to the unity in Christ, Gal. 3:28, Ef. 2:11-22, Col. 2:21; physical, namely the victory over the world, Joh. 16:33, over death, 2 Tim. 1:10, Hebr. 2:15, over hell, 1 Cor. 15:15, Op. 1:18, 20:14, over Satan, Luk. 10:8, 11:22, Joh. 14:30, Hebr. 2:14, 1 Cor. 15:55, 56, Col. 2:15, 1 Petr. 3:22, 1 Joh. 3:8, Op. 12:10, 20:2 etc. In one word: the entire re-creation, the complete restoration of the world and humanity, burdened with guilt, corrupted and shattered by sin, is the fruit of Christ's work. Objectively, in principle, in the sphere of justice, He brought about that re-creation by his cross. Then between God and world the καταλλαγη was established. And therefore Christ in due time—for everything proceeds in fixed order—will once present the church without spot or wrinkle to the Father, deliver the kingdom to God and God will be all in all, 1 Cor. 15:22-28.

In theology this richness of the benefits of Christ has always been acknowledged. Through Christ, said Clemens Alex., the earth has become a πελαγος ἀγαθων. People spoke of Christ as mediator, redemptor, reconciliator, liberator, dispensator, salvator, medicus, dominus, pastor, rex etc., designated the work brought to pass by Him as θεοποιησις, θειωσις, deificatio, vivificatio, salvatio, liberatio, redemptio, restitutio, purgatio, regeneratio, illuminatio, resurrectio etc., and sometimes attempted also to classify all those benefits in some measure, as in the well-known lines of verse: Propitians, purgans, redimens, ut victima, sponsor Salvavit, sic jura Dei verumque requirunt, or under the heads expiatio, remissio, consummatio etc., cf. Athan., de incarn. 54. Greg. Naz., Or. 2. Eusebius,

Dem. Ev. IV 21. Aug. de pecc. mer. I 26. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 48. 49. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 1. Petavius, de incarn. XII c. 6. 7. Polanus, [386] Synt. VI c. 18. Voetius, Disp. II 229 sq. Mastricht, V 18, 22. Turretinus, de satisf. 317. M. Vitringa VI 121. But it nevertheless usually did not come to a logical order and regulated treatment. The consideration of the work of Christ as satisfactio and meritum, which arose since Anselmus, could not make good this lack; both are only logically distinguished, for the same work of Christ is satisfactio, insofar as He brought His offering to God and satisfied His demand, and it is meritum, insofar as Christ thereby acquired salvation for us with God, Thomas, III qu. 48 art. 1 and 2. Petavius, de incarn. XII 9. Perrone, Prael. IV 311. Calvijn, Inst. II 17 1. Voetius, Disp. II 228. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 14. 20. Quenstedt III 225. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 283 etc. Both concepts also place the work of Christ too one-sidedly under the category of work and merit; it is much more the question what Christ has “merited” and how this stands in connection with His offering. In more recent times one has therefore almost entirely dropped these terms and in their place designated the fruit of Christ’s work as Erlösung or Versöhnung. The first description came especially into honor through Schleiermacher; to be sure he also speaks of a new creation, which is brought to pass through Christ, but this nevertheless coincides for him with the Erlösung, Chr. Gl. § 89, 1. 2; and by it he understands the communication of His sinless perfection, § 88, the reception of believers into the power of His God-consciousness, § 100, which takes place not magically, nor empirically, but mystically through creative divine activity, through the self-revelation of Christ in His congregation, § 100, 2, 3. Alongside this Schleiermacher then still assumes a reconciling activity of Christ, consisting in this, that He receives believers into the communion of

His undisturbed blessedness and through means of His life-communion with Him makes them share in the forgiveness of sins, § 101. Ritschl, on the other hand, comprehends the working of Christ under justification and reconciliation; the fruits of His life do not consist in Umstimmung of God from an angry judge into a gracious Father, II 208 f. 217 f. III 439, not in actual ransoming, II 221, not in deliverance from death, II 86, nor also in the mystical dying and rising with Christ, for Rom. 6 is strong symbolism and provides no material for a [387] dogma, II 226 f.; but Christ assures and guarantees us through His whole person and life that God is love; He admits us, in spite of our sins, to communion with God, III 506 f. The justification which Christ grants us is not remission of guilt and punishment, not imputation of His righteousness, but removal of the consciousness of guilt, and thereby of the separation between us and God, III 51, 61, the removal of the thought that sin hinders communion with God, III 60. Consequence and working of this justification is reconciliation; this consists in this, that he who accepts in faith the justification, which is properly a good of the congregation, now also subjectively enters into that new relation to God, on his part lays aside enmity and places himself in a relation of peace to God; it is an ethical change in us, II 230 f. 342 f. III 74-76. Unterricht § 37. There is a great difference between Schleiermacher and Ritschl: with the former the person, with the latter the work of Christ stands in the foreground; with the first the subjective change of man comes to pass by a mystical way, through communication of life, with the second by an ethical way, through teaching and example; the first benefit with Schleiermacher is the Erlösung, the communication of Christ's sinless perfection, and with Ritschl the objective, synthetic justification, which in the first place is a good of the congregation. But with that difference the agreement is still greater: with

both Christ is the sinless man, who stands in special communion with God; passive obedience is denied by both in the work of Christ; His suffering and death is only the necessary consequence of His faithfulness to God maintained to the end; the connection between Christ's work and the fruits thereof in the believer, in the congregation, remains unclear with both; both shift the center of gravity of redemption and of reconciliation from the objective work of Christ into the subjective change of believers; and even, although Ritschl seems to let justification as an objective benefit of the congregation and as a synthetic judgment precede faith, in fact with him too, not for the congregation as a whole but indeed for each individual, justification is made dependent on subjective reconciliation, cf. Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1888 S. 21. 22. Kübel, Ueber den Unterschied der posit. u. der liber. Richtung in der mod. [388] Theol.2 1893 S. 150. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 32 f. Above all, however, both agree in this, that they limit the working of Christ's life and suffering to the religious and ethical domain. Now it is true that even with this limitation neither of them sets clearly in the light how the person and the work of Christ can bring about this change in the religious and ethical domain. But yet on the other side it is to a certain extent understandable that, if the fruit of Christ's work is limited to this terrain, His work and His person are also conceived as happened with Schleiermacher and Ritschl; for it is true what the former says: die eigenthümliche Thätigkeit und die ausschliessliche Würde des Erlösers weisen auf einander zurück und sind im Selbstbewusstsein der Gläubigen unzertrennlich eins, Chr. Gl. § 92. With this conception it is understandable that passive obedience is denied, that the Godhead of Christ is only a being of God in Him, that resurrection, ascension etc., are unnecessary; a

pantheistic-mystical or a deistic-moral working of Christ's person and work is then sufficient unto salvation.

But that is truly not in accordance with the doctrine of Holy Scripture; it is a failure to recognize the person of Christ and a belittling of his work. Christ is not merely an ἀνθρωπος ἐνθεος but the eternal and only-begotten Son of God, the radiance of his glory and the expressed image of his substance, himself God, above all to be praised unto eternity. And the fruit of his life and death is not merely a certain magical or moral influence that proceeds from him into the world, but is no less than the ἀποκαταστασις παντων, Hd. 3:21, the ἀνακεφαλαιωσις των παντων ἐν τῳ Χριστῳ, τα ἐπι τοις οὐρανοις και ἐπι της γης, Ef. 1:10. This work of re-creation has its principle and origin in the perfect offering of Christ, or rather still in the καταλλαγη, which God in Christ has brought about between himself and the world. God does not wish to win by overpowering force. Easy it would have been for him to destroy the whole world in his wrath and to grant the prospect to another world and humanity, Num. 14:12. But God exalts himself in judgment and sanctifies himself in righteousness, Jes. 5:16. Sin is not a physical, but an ethical power. Satan has in sin his ungodly [389] power over the world, and sin has its power in the law, 1 Cor. 15:56. Thus it has pleased God to overcome this power in a moral way, in the way of right and righteousness. Not by violence or power, but by the cross, which made void the certificate of debt of the law, has God triumphed over the principalities and powers, stripped them of their armor, and publicly displayed them in their shame, Col. 2:15. And therefore now, because God in the way of right has overcome sin and all its power, therefore he is free, even while his adversaries are judges, to justify the ungodly, Rom. 4:5; no one can bring an accusation against the elect of God, Rom. 8:33. It is God

who justifies, and who in the justification of him who is of the faith of Jesus himself appears to be the righteous one, Rom. 3:26. God can do that, without prejudice to, indeed to the glory of his righteousness, because Christ has died and has been raised, Rom. 8:34. On the ground of that offering he can wrest world and humanity away from sin, extend his kingdom, gather all things together under Christ as head and once be all in all. No one, not even Satan, can bring anything against that; at the end each will have to acknowledge that God is righteous and that Christ is the lawful, the legitimate Lord, Phil. 2:11. Between the benefits that Christ has acquired and his person and offering, there exists therefore no physical or magical connection, as if some substance of God-human life, divine nature, etc. were poured over from him into us, as theosophists imagine it. But God has himself in Christ paved the royal way of right, in order to glorify to his fallen creature the riches of his grace. From the objective καταλλαγη established by him himself, apart from the world, all the above-mentioned benefits flow to humanity for Christ's sake, justification, sanctification, complete redemption, the entire re-creation. And because this work of re-creation is so great, greater still than that of creation and of preservation, therefore he to whom this work was entrusted had to be not only true and righteous man, but also stronger than all creatures, i.e. at the same time true God. The same one through whom God created the world could also alone be the mediator of the re-creation, Bonaventura, Brevil. IV c. 1. [390]

19. Intensively the work of Christ is of infinite worth, but also extensively it extends to the whole world. Just as the world has been the object of God's love, Joh. 3:16, so Christ has come in order not to condemn that world but to save it, Joh. 3:17, 4:42, 6:33, 51, 12:47; in him God has reconciled the world, all things in heaven and on earth, to himself, Joh. 1:29, 2 Cor, 5:19,

Col. 1:20 and gathers them in this dispensation into one, Ef. 1:10; the world, created by the Son, is also destined for the Son as its heir, Col. 1:16, Hebr. 1:2, Op. 11:15. From this Origen derived that Christ by his suffering and death has redeemed the whole world, not only all human beings but also all other rational beings, namely the fallen angels, and furthermore all creatures, de princ. I 6.; Christus οἱ μονον ὑπερ ἀνθρωπων ἀπεθανεν, ἀλλα και ὑπερ των λοιπων λογικων, in Joann. I 40. He indeed died only once, in the consummation of the ages, Hebr. 9:26, but the power of his death is sufficient for redemption not only of the present world but also of that which existed earlier or will exist later, and not only of human beings but also of the heavenly spirits, de princ. II 3, 5. Hom. in Lev. I 3, cf. Schwane, D. G. I2 254. This universalism, however, has always been rejected by the Christian churches, e. g. Const. 543 can. 7. 12; and in fact these have always been particularistic insofar as they limit τα παντα in Col. 1:20 and do not extend it to the fallen angels. But nevertheless from these and other passages, where the word world or all is brought into connection with the offering of Christ, Jes. 53:6, Rom. 5:18, 8:32, 1 Cor. 15:22, 2 Cor. 5:15, Hebr. 2:9, 1 Tim. 2:4, 6, 2 Petr. 3:9, 1 Joh. 2:2, the conclusion has been drawn that Christ had made satisfaction for all human beings, head for head, and that the satisfactio vicaria therefore had to be understood as universal. The church fathers before Augustine commonly speak very universalistically about the saving will of God and about the reconciliation of Christ, cf. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c. I. 2; but the actual question did not yet exist in that time and could then also not yet arise, because on God's side one assumed only a praescientia and on man's side one laid the emphasis on his freedom of will, though weakened by sin, part II 319. In the Pelagian struggle, however, it had to come onto the agenda; and

Augustine was the first who clearly taught the particular satisfaction. To be sure Augustine says repeatedly with Scripture that God wills the salvation of all, that, if one has died for all, all have died, that those who perish have not wanted to believe, that whoever believes does so voluntarily, Petavius, ib. c. 3, that Christ is a reconciliation for the whole world and has reconciled all things, heavenly and earthly, with one another, Kühner, Augustins Anschauung v. d. Erlösungsbedeutung Christi 1890 S. 62. But all this proves absolutely nothing over against this other, expressed by Augustine just as clearly and distinctly, that the saving will of God and the reconciliation in Christ is limited to the praedestinati. In the first place this already follows in general from Augustine's doctrine of predestination and of grace, part II 320; if the number of those who will be saved is eternally and unchangeably determined by God and to them alone the grace of faith and of perseverance is bestowed, then in between the proposition can no longer be maintained that Christ has made satisfaction for all human beings head for head. In the second place Augustine always takes 1 Tim. 2:4 in a restricted sense; to be sure he gives of that text different explanations, now once, that omnes qui salvi fiunt nisi ipso volente non fiunt, Epist. 107, de civ. XIII 23, and then, that by all human beings are to be understood all praedestinati, who are chosen from all peoples and classes of the human race, Enchir. 103. de corr. et gr. 14. c. Jul. IV 8, but everywhere, where he deliberately explains the text, he understands it in a restricted sense, cf. Petavius, de Deo XI 7, 10. de incarn. XII 4. And in the third place he connects the person and the work of Christ time and again only with the elect; God called through Christ populum credentium to adoption, Conf. IX 1; Christ by his resurrection called nos praedestinatos to a new life, by his blood redeemed justificandos peccatores, de trin. IV c. 13. Omnis, qui

Christi sanguine redemptus est, homo est, non tamen omnis, qui homo est, etiam sanguine Christi redemptus est, de conj. adult. I 15. Non perit unus ex illis, pro quibus Christus mortuus est, Epist. 102 ad Evod., cf. Wiggers, August. und Pelag. I 313. Vitringa VI 147. Although semipelagianism soon gained the upper hand, there nevertheless remained many who on this point too remained faithful to Augustine. With appeal to 1 Tim. 2:4 the Semipelagians said [392] that God embraces all human beings with equal love and assigns to all an equal measure of grace. To that Prosper answered, that omnium cura est Deo, et nemo est, quem non aut evangelica praedicatio aut legis testificatio aut ipsa etiam natura conveniat; sed infidelitatem hominum ipsis adscribimus hominibus; fidem autem hominum donum Dei esse fatemur, sine cujus gratia nemo currit ad gratiam. And as regards the particularity of the satisfaction, Christ indeed is pro totius mundi redemptione crucifixus, propter veram humanae naturae susceptionem et propter communem in primo homine omnium perditionem; potest tamen dici pro his tantum crucifixus, quibus mors profuit, Resp. ad cap. cal. Gall. 8. 9. However moderately this may be expressed, all followers of Augustine, Prosper, Lucidus, Fulgentius etc., nevertheless agreed in this, that, however much God cares for all human beings and bestows on them all kinds of benefits, he nevertheless does not in the same way will the salvation of all; that he does not grant all the same measure of grace; and that Christ, though in a certain sense having died for all, yet efficaciter has died only for those to whom his death actually benefits. But the synod of Arles 475 compelled Lucidus to retract his doctrine that Christ had died only for those who actually are saved. And the synod of Orange 529 said only that omnes baptizati can fulfill what is necessary for salvation, cf. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c. 5-7. Schwane, D. G. II2 571-582.

In the 9th century the question came up again; Gottschalk taught that Christ baptismi sacramento (reprobos) luit, non tamen pro eis crucem subiit neque mortem tulit neque sanguinem fudit. Lupus said that Christ did not die for all human beings, but indeed for all believers, also for those who later lose the faith again. Remigius made a similar distinction. And the synod of Valence 855 spoke in the same spirit; it rejected that Christ had poured out his blood etiam pro illis impiis, qui a mundi exordio usque ad passionem Domini in sua impietate mortui aeterna damnatione puniti sunt, and confessed that that price was paid only for those, de quibus ipse Dominus noster dicit: sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita exaltari oportet Filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in ipso non pereat sed habeat vitam aeternam, can. 4. Scholasticism too in the main remained faithful to Augustine; 1 Tim. [393] 2:4 must not be understood as if God indeed willed what does not happen, as if he willed that those also be saved who in fact are not, but this text means, nullum hominum fieri salvum nisi quem salvum fieri ipse voluerit, or that all kinds of people from all peoples and estates will be saved, or also, more in the sense of Damascenus, that God wills the salvation of all, namely voluntate antecedente, conditional, i.e. if they themselves will and come to him, but then this will was magis velleitas quam absoluta voluntas, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 46, 2 and also on 1 Tim. 2:4. Bonaventura, ib. art. 1 qu. 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19 art. 7 qu. 23 art. 4 ad 3. And as regards the satisfaction, scholasticism did indeed teach that it was superabundans and occurred pro peccato humani generis, totius humanae naturae etc., Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 46 art 1, but it argued the possibility of the satisfaction especially with this, that Christ was the head and the believers the members of his body, and therefore connected the satisfaction time and again only with the believers; thus Thomas says, caput

et menbra sunt quasi una persona mystica et ideo satisfactio Christi ad ommes fideles pertinet sicut ad membra, III qu. 48 art. 2; quia ipse est caput nostrum, per passionem suam liberavit nos tanquam membra sua a peccatis, quasi per pretium suae passionis, sicut si homo per aliquod opus meritorium quod manu exerceret, redimeret se a peccato quod pedibus commisisset, III qu. 49 art. 1. And in III qu. 79 art. 7. he says: passio Christi prodest quidem omnibus quantum ad sufficientiam, sed effectum non habet nisi in illis qui Christi conjunguntur per fidem et charitatem. That this efficacitas does not depend on man's free will, but on God's election and Christ's offering itself, appears in general from Thomas' doctrine of gratia and in particular also from this, that he says in III qu. 48 art. 6: passio Christi efficienter causat salutem humanam; cf. also Lombardus: Christus electos tantum sicut se dilexit eorumque salutem optavit, Sent. III dist. 31, 4. Christus se trinitati obtulit pro omnibus, quantum ad pretii sufficientiam, sed pro electis tantum quantum ad efficaciam, quia praedestinatis tantum salutem effecit, ib. III dist. 20, 3. Later this same view was still defended in the Roman church by Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel. and even also by Tapper, Estius, Sonnius and others, cf. Rivetus, Op. III 438. M. Vitringa VI 155-159. But [394] semipelagianism penetrated ever more deeply into Rome's church, and thereby it became especially after Trent the almost general doctrine that God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, that Christ has made satisfaction for all, and that the voluntas consequens takes account of the good or bad use that human beings make of their freedom and of grace, part II 325, and further Trid. VI c. 2 and 3. Cat. Rom. I 3, 7. Innoc. X in damn. 5 propos. Jans. Bellarminus, de sacrif. missae I 25. de poenit. I 2. de amiss. gr. IV 4. Becanus, Manuale Controv. III 1 qu. 1. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c. 14. Theol. Wirceb. IV 322. Scheeben, Dogm. III 356. Jansen, Prael. theol. II

748 etc. And with this in the essence of the matter are in agreement the Greek church, Damascemus, de fide orthod. II c. 29. Conf. orthod. qu. 34. 47; the Lutherans, Symb. ed. Müller p. 781. Gerhard, Loc. VII c. 6. Quenstedt, III 311-324. Hollaz, Ex. 745. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 824; the Remonstrants, Conf. en Apol. conf. VIII 10. Arminius, Op. 153. Episcopius on 1 Joh. 2:2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. IV c. 3-5; and further the Mennonites, Quakers, Herrnhutters, Methodists etc.

The Reformed therefore stand almost alone with their doctrine of particular satisfaction. And in addition to that, it then also comes about that among themselves they were absolutely not unanimous and gradually diverged ever further from one another. Various confessions speak moderately and generally, e.g. the conf. Anhalt., in Niemeyer p. 635. 639, March., ib. 650. 651, Lips., ib. 662, Thorun., ib. p. 674; the Anglicana is silent about it; the Cat. Heid. also does not express it directly, although qu. 37 has wrongly been cited as a proof for the general satisfaction, cf. M. Vitringa VI 136; the French, Dutch, Scottish confession teach it only per consequentiam. In the canons of Dordrecht it is clearly taught, but at the same time it is said that the offering of Christ was infiniti valoris et pretii, abunde sufficiens ad totius mundi peccata expianda, II 3, and furthermore it also occurs in the Westm. conf. VIII 1. 5. 8. Cat. major et minor Cons. Helv. 13. Walch. art. 1693. Also among the theologians there was no unanimity. Some thought that it was indeed good to say that Christ's offering would have been sufficient for all men, if God had wanted to make it efficax for all; but one could nevertheless actually not [395] say that it was sufficient for all; for if Christ had not died efficaciter for all, then He had also not done so sufficienter; and if one nevertheless began to speak in that way, one gave occasion for misunderstanding and prepared the dangerous distinction

of voluntas antecedens and consequens, of gratia sufficiens and efficax, Beza, Piscator, Twissus, Voetius, Disp. II 251 sq. Others, however, spoke with Augustine and the scholastics in such a way that Christ had died sufficienter for all, efficaciter only for the elect, Calvin on 1 Joh. 2:2. H. Alting, Probl. theol. 174. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 14. Mastricht, V 18, 21. 39. Moor III 1035-1075 etc. At the Synod of Dordrecht the foreign delegates spoke about the dignitas and sufficientia of Christ's offering as broadly as possible; the English divines even said that Christ in a certain sense had died for all; sic Christus pro omnibus mortuus est, ut omnes et singuli, mediante fide, possint virtute ἀντιλυτρου hujus remissionem peccatorum et vitam aeternam consequi, thesis 3. In England, over against the strictly Reformed school of Twissus, Rutherford et al., there was a more moderate direction, represented by Davenant, Calamy, Reynolds, Arrowsmith, Seaman etc., and especially by Richard Baxter. Their view corresponded in substance entirely with that of the French theologians, Camero, Testardus, Amyraldus etc.; there was a preceding decree, according to which Christ had made satisfaction for all conditionally, under the condition of faith, and another subsequent particular decree, according to which He had made satisfaction for the elect in such a way that He in due time also grants them faith and infallibly leads them to salvation, part II 341. In the Scottish church the doctrine of particular satisfaction in connection with the general offer of grace repeatedly came up; it was even also one of the causes for the separation of the Erskines in 1733. In order to avoid the neonomian direction, which made faith into a legal condition and therefore let the gospel be intended only for certain, qualified persons, the so-called Marrowmen (James Hog, Thomas Boston, Ralph and Ebenezer Erskine, Alexander Moncrieff etc., cf. part I 128) taught that Christ's

offering possessed a legal, federal sufficiency for all men and grounded upon that the general offer of grace. Some went still further, [396] made a distinction between a general and special grace, an external and internal covenant (Thomas Mair 1754), or taught a general satisfaction (James Fraser, †1698, but his treatise on justifying faith was first published in two parts 1722 and 1749), or even denied satisfaction entirely (Dr. M. Gill, Practical essay on the death of Christ, 1786). In this century the particular satisfaction in Scotland again became the subject of a prolonged struggle. In 1820 the United Associate Synod of the Secession Church issued a declaration, by which it did indeed condemn the general satisfaction, but nevertheless taught that Christ's offering was sufficient for all and had brought all into a salvable state. Both on the right and on the left this declaration met with objection; some denied that all had a right to Christ, and contested the general satisfaction in every sense, Palaemon in his Letters upon Theron and Aspasio, Symington, Haldane, and especially Dr. Marshall; others decidedly taught the general satisfaction, William Pringle, John Mc Leod Campbell, James Morison, Robert Morison, A. C. Rutherford, John Guthrie; the two professors Balmer † 1844 and Brown were even accused by Marshall, but nevertheless were acquitted by the synod in 1845, cf. Andrew Robertson, History of the atonement controversy in connexion with the Secession Church from its origin to the present time, Edinb. 1846. Likewise in other countries the doctrine of the special satisfaction was weakened in the spirit of Grotius or of Amyraldus or also decidedly rejected, in England by Daniel Whitby, against whom Jonathan Edwards came forward; in America by the Edwardean or New-England theologians, Emmons, Taylor, Park, Fiske etc.; in Germany by P. Volckmann et al.; in this country especially by Venema, cf. Ypey, Gesch. der

chr. kerk in de 18e eeuw VII 133v. At present the doctrine of the special satisfaction has almost generally been abandoned, also by Van Oosterzee, § 111, 6. Leer der Zal. n. 66. Heid. Cat, p. 176. Ebrard, Dogm. § 430. On the other hand it is still defended by Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 544-562. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 347-429. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 464-480. W. Cunningham, Historical Theology, 2 ed. Edinb. Clark 1864 II 323-370. Robert S. Candlish, The atonement, its reality, completeness and extent, London 1861. Hugh Martin, The atonement, Edinb. Hunter z. j. Kuyper, That the [397] grace is particular. And in recent times it again found support with Ritschl, according to whom the correlate of Christ's offering is not the individual man nor also all men but specifically the congregation; it alone is in possession of justification and full of forgiveness of sins, it is in Scripture always presented as the object of the operations which proceed from Christ, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 47-67. 205 f. 305 f. II2 216 f. III2 103 f.

20. In this important dispute over the value of Christ's sacrifice there is complete agreement, on the one hand, on this, that not all but only some human beings actually become partakers of the benefits of Christ, and on the other hand on this, that the sacrifice of Christ in itself would be perfectly sufficient, to cause not only some but all human beings to share in the forgiveness of sins and eternal life. The universalists are therefore in practice all devoted to the particularity of grace; and the particularists all without exception confess the universality of the sacrifice of Christ, as regards its intrinsic value. Even those who have objections to the words, that Christ has died sufficienter for all and efficaciter for the elect, nevertheless readily acknowledge that the materia meriti of Christ is perfectly sufficient for the reconciliation of the sins of all human beings, and what they want is only this, that the forma meriti, i.e. the merit of

Christ, considered not in itself but in ordine ad reprobos, can be called not only not efficax but also not sufficiens, Voetius, Disp. II 254. The difference therefore concerns only the question, whether it was the will and the intention of God that Christ brought his sacrifice for the sins of all human beings without exception, or only for the sins of those who have been given to him by the Father. So stated, the question seems hardly susceptible of a twofold answer. For in the first place, Scripture throughout connects the sacrifice of Christ only with the church, whether this is indicated by many, Jes. 53:11, 12, Mt. 20:28, 26:28, Rom. 5:15, 19, Hebr. 2:10, 9:28, by his people, Mt. 1:21, Tit. 2:14, Hebr. 2:17, 7:27, 13:12, by his sheep, Joh. 10:11, 15, 25v., Hebr. 13:20, by his brethren, Hebr. 2:11, by children of God, Joh. 11:52, Hebr. 2:31-45; [398] by those given to him by the Father, Joh. 6:37, 39, 44, 17:2, 9, 24, by his church, Hd. 20:28, Ef. 5:25, by his body, Ef. 5:23, or also by us as believers, Rom. 5:9, 8:32, 1 Cor. 5:7, Ef. 1:7, 2:18, 3:12, Col. 1:14, Tit. 2:14, Hebr. 4:14-16, 7:26, 8:1, 9:14, 10:15, 1 Joh. 4:10, 1 Petr. 3:18, 2 Petr. 1:3, Op. 1:5, 6, 5:9, 10 etc. Ritschl has rightly again drawn attention to this; for, even if it is also the case that he came to this through entirely different considerations, the fact itself nevertheless stands firm: in Scripture it is not all human beings head for head, but the church is das Correlat aller an den Opfertod Christi geknüpften Wirkungen, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 216. The considerations in Ritschl, however, are different from those in the Reformed; the latter said: not all but the church of the elect. Ritschl says: not the individual but the church and thus attempts to remove the unio mystica, the communion of believers individually with Christ, from Scripture. But in the matter itself there is nevertheless agreement. Over against this clear, continuous teaching of Scripture, the few texts on which the universalists appeal have little weight.

The expression all in Jes. 53:6, Rom. 5:18, 1 Cor. 15:22, 2 Cor. 5:15, Hebr. 2:9, cf. 10 proves nothing, or it proves much more than the universalists assert and would come to the benefit of the doctrine of Origen concerning the restoration of all things. The universalists are therefore themselves compelled to restrict the word all in these places. Of more weight are texts such as Ezech. 18:23, 33:11, Joh. 1:29, 3:16, 4:42, 13:22, 1 Tim. 2:4, 6, Tit. 2:11, Hebr. 2:9, 2 Petr. 3:9, 1 Joh. 2:2, 4:14, where the will of God or the sacrifice of Christ is brought into connection with the salvation of all or of the world. But none of these texts is in conflict with the above-mentioned statements, which restrict Christ's benefits to the church. For the N. Test. is an entirely different dispensation than the O. Covenant; the gospel is not limited to one people but must be preached to all creatures, Mt. 28:19; there is no respect of persons with God, there is no longer any distinction of Gentile and Jew, Hd. 10:34, 35, Rom. 3:29, 10:11-13. Yes even, when in Jes. 53:11, 12, Mt. 20:28, 26:28, Rom. 5:15, 19, Hebr. 2:10, 9:28 there is mention of many, for whom Christ has died, then underlying that is not the contrast [399] which has later often been smuggled in, that not all but only many will be saved. But the thought from which this speaking of many arises is an entirely different one, namely: Christ has not died for a few, but for many, for very many. He gives his life for many, he pours out his blood for many, he will make many righteous; it is not few, but many, who by the obedience of one are constituted righteous. Scripture is not afraid that too many will be saved. And therefore, from that same consideration, it says that God has no pleasure in the death of the ungodly, that he wills that all come to repentance and be saved, that Christ is a reconciliation and has given his life for the world and that the gospel must be preached to all creatures. If the universalists infer from this that the satisfaction is wholly

general, then they come into conflict both with Scripture and with reality; for these both teach, as it were in competition, that not all but only many become acquainted with the gospel and come to true repentance. In all those places there is therefore mention, not of the voluntas beneplaciti which is unknown to us and cannot or may not be a rule of our conduct; nor also of a voluntas antecedens, which precedes our decision of will and then directs itself according to it; but of the voluntas signi, which tells us how we are to conduct ourselves in the N. Covenant. It gives us the right and imposes on us the duty to bring the gospel to all human beings without exception. We have no need of any other ground than this clearly revealed will of God for the general offer of grace. For whom Christ has specifically died, we have no more need to know beforehand than who are chosen by God unto eternal life. The calling does indeed rest on a particular basis, for it belongs to and proceeds from the covenant, yet it is directed, in accordance with God's revealed will and with the in itself all-sufficient value of Christ's sacrifice, also to those who are outside the covenant, in order that they too may be incorporated into that covenant and in their faith itself receive the proof of their election, cf. deel II 216-222. In the second place Scripture maintains that the sacrifice and the intercession of Christ, and thus also the acquisition and the application of salvation, hang together inseparably. The sacrifice is the ground of Christ's [400] intercession; the latter therefore extends as far as the former. Limborch, Theol. Chr. III 19. 11 accordingly also acknowledges, intercessionem non esse actum reipsa ab oblatione, quatenus in coelo peragitur, distinctum. If the intercession is therefore particular, as it is, Joh. 17:9, 24, Rom. 8:34, Hebr. 7:25, 1 Joh. 2:1, 2, then the sacrifice is also. Limborch IV 4, 7 does indeed appeal against this to Luk. 23:34, but here Jesus prays not for the salvation of his enemies but only for the non-

imputation of that dreadful crime, of which in their ignorance they made themselves guilty, when they crucified the Messiah. And likewise there is an indissoluble connection between the acquisition and the application of salvation. All benefits of the covenant of grace hang together, Rom. 8:28-34, and find their ground in the death of Christ, Rom. 5:8-11. The reconciliation in Christ brings preservation and salvation with it. For Christ is the head and the believers are his body, which receives its growth from him, Ef. 4:16, Col. 2:19; he is the cornerstone and they are the building, Ef. 2:20, 21. He is the firstborn and they are his brethren, Rom. 8:29. The believers are therefore also objectively with and in him dead, crucified, buried, raised, set in heaven. That is: the church is not an accidental arbitrary aggregate of individuals, which can just as well be smaller as larger, but it forms with Christ an organic whole, which is enclosed in him as second Adam, just as the whole of humanity proceeds from the first Adam, cf. Rothe, Theol. Ethik I S. 501. The application must therefore extend as far as the acquisition of salvation; it is included in this and is its necessary effect. Moreover, that also lies in the nature of the case. If Jesus is truly Saviour, then he must also truly save his people, not in possibility but in reality. The universalists, however, are compelled to conceive salvation itself in a wholly different way and to do injustice to the name of Jesus. In logic the rule holds: quo major extensio, minor comprehensio. And this rule is also applicable on many another terrain, it is also applicable here. Under the appearance of honouring the work of Christ, it is weakened and limited by the doctrine of general satisfaction. For if Christ has satisfied for all, the acquisition does not necessarily include the application of salvation. The latter is then something that perhaps accidentally [401] is added, but that is not of itself given along with it and does not naturally flow from it. The

application of salvation is then not and cannot be the work of Christ, but in the end always depends on the will of man. This must supplement the work of Christ, apply it, cause it to pass over into reality. That is, for Christ there remains only the acquisition, not of the reality but only of the possibility of salvation, not of the actual reconciliatio but of the potential reconciliabilitas. Christ acquired for God only the possibility to enter into a covenant of grace with us, to grant us the forgiveness of sins and eternal life, if we, namely, believe. The principal part of the work of salvation, that which truly makes us saved, remains for us still to do. Christ did not make the covenant of grace itself firm in his blood, he did not make it that the sins of his people are forgiven, but he only declared that from God's side there is no objection to entering into a covenant with us and forgiving us sins, if we and after we on our side believe. For us Christ has therefore actually acquired nothing, but only for God the possibility to forgive us, if we fulfil the commands of the gospel. The universalists therefore all come to diminish the value and power of Christ's work. What they, and then only seemingly, gain in quantity, they lose in quality. Rome teaches that the sins committed before baptism, i.e. as a rule original sin, are forgiven in baptism. But after baptism the concupiscentia remains, which indeed is itself no sin but becomes an occasion for sinning. The sins then committed are indeed forgiven in the sacrament of penance, as regards guilt and eternal punishment; but the temporal punishment must be borne by the human being himself here or in purgatory, Trid. VI 30. XIV c. 8. 9. can. 12-14 etc. The Remonstrants said that God in the death of Christ has reconciled all sinners with himself in such a way, ut per et propter hoc ipsum λυτρον ac sacrificium in gratiam cum iis redire et ostium salutis aeternae viamque immortalitatis pandere ipsis voluerit, Conf. VIII 9. The Quakers let Christ's

work consist in this, that he has offered reconciliation to us and has made God inclined to forgiveness, Barclay, Verantwoording 1757 bl. 153. And to the same conclusion must [402] all come who teach a general satisfaction. The centre of gravity is shifted out of Christ into the Christian; faith is the true reconciliation with God, cf. Kübel, Unterschied 135 f. The Reformed, however, were of a different mind. The satisfactio vicaria is no fertige Grösse, but in principle includes the whole re-creation in itself. The work of Christ is only then finished, when he delivers the kingdom to the Father. He did not open the possibility of becoming saved, but always saves through, on the ground of his sacrifice accomplished on the cross. Saviour is he who not only died for our sins but therefore also was raised and ascended into heaven and now as the exalted Saviour prays for his church. He sanctified himself, in order that his own also may be sanctified in truth, Joh. 17:19, he gave himself over for the church, in order that he might sanctify it and present it to himself glorious, Ef. 5:25-27. Both are out of one, namely God, Hebr. 2:11, and are as it were one Christ, 1 Cor. 12:12. In and with Christ God grants to believers everything that they need, Rom. 8:32v., Ef. 1:3, 4, 2 Petr. 1:3; election in Christ brings with it all blessings in Christ, adoption as children, redemption through his blood, Ef. 1:3v., the gift of the H. Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:3, faith, Phil. 1:29, conversion, Hd. 5:31, 11:18, 2 Tim. 2:25, a new heart and a new spirit, Jer. 31:33, 34, Ezech. 36:25-27, Hebr. 8:8-12, 10:16. Cf. Can. Dordr. II 8v. Prof. Leidenses in Censura Conf. Rem. VIII 9. Trigland, Antapologia c. 16. Mastricht, V 18, 42. Voetius, Disp. II 9. 269 V 270. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 7. Misc. Sacra II 781. Vitringa VI 126. Moor III 1086 sq. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 26. In the third place it is still to be added to this, that universalism leads to all kinds of false propositions. It brings separation between the three persons of the Divine being, for the

Father wills the salvation of all, the Son satisfies for all, but the H. Spirit restricts the gift of faith and of salvation to few. It brings conflict between the intention of God, who wishes the preservation of all, and the will or the power of God, who in fact does not will or cannot make salvation partaken of by all. It lets the person and the work of Christ precede election and the covenant, so that Christ comes to stand wholly outside it and cannot satisfy vicariously, because there is no communion between him and us. It does injustice to the righteousness of God, which lets forgiveness and life be acquired for all and yet does not distribute them. It sets up free will, which has the power to believe, can make the work of Christ undone or not, and has the decision, indeed the whole result of world history, in its hands. It leads to the doctrine, as the Quakers rightly observed, Barclay, Verantw. van de Ware Christ. Godg. bl. 92, that if Christ has died for all, then all here or hereafter must be placed in the opportunity to accept or reject him; for it would be wholly unjust to condemn and punish those whose sins are all reconciled, only because they were outside the opportunity to accept Christ by faith. And it comes to the proposition, in clear contradiction with the whole of Holy Scripture, that the only sin for which someone can be lost and punished is unbelief; all other sins are after all reconciled; even those of the man of sin, the antichrist, included.

21. Although, therefore, the satisfactio vicaria as acquisition of perfect salvation cannot be extended to all men head for head, it is not thereby asserted that it has not the least significance for those who perish. There is here between the church and the world not merely separation and antithesis. It is not so, that Christ has acquired everything for the former, nothing for the latter. In rejecting universalism it must not be forgotten that the merit of Christ also has its limits with respect to the former and its value and

significance with respect to the latter. In the first place, it must indeed be borne in mind that Christ as such is indeed the Re-Creator but not the Creator of all things. Just as the Son follows upon the Father, so creation is presupposed by re-creation, nature by grace, birth by rebirth. Under the merits of Christ, therefore, it is not included in the strict sense that the elect are born and live, that they receive food, covering, clothing and all kinds of natural benefits. It can indeed be said that God would no longer have let world and humanity continue to exist after the fall, if He had not had another higher purpose with it. There is indeed the gratia [404] communis for the gratia specialis; and God also grants to the elect with salvation in Christ also many other natural blessings, Mt. 6:33, Rom. 8:28, 32, 1 Tim. 4:8, 2 Petr. 1:3. But nevertheless it is wrong, with Herrnhuters and Pietists, to erase the boundaries between nature and grace, creation and redemption, and to set Christ in the Father's place upon the throne of the universe. Even election and the covenant of grace, which both presuppose the objects and participants, have not been acquired by Christ but precede his merits. The Father prepares with his creation the work of re-creation and leads toward it; the Son, with his labor, goes deep, as far as sin reaches, back into the work of creation. But nevertheless both works are distinct and not to be mixed, Voetius, Disp. II 271-273. In the second place, Christ has not acquired the same for each of his own. There is distinction among believers, before they come to faith, in sex, age, station, rank, character, gift, etc., distinction also in measure and degree of wickedness and corruption. And when they come to faith, there is distinction in the grace that is bestowed upon them; to each one grace is given according to the measure of the gift of Christ, Rom. 12:3, 1 Cor. 12:11, Ef. 3:7, 4:7. The natural distinction among men is indeed purified by grace but not erased; it is even increased

by distinction of spiritual gifts, for the body of Christ consists of many members, in order that it may be one organism, a creation and a work of art of God. Third, the church is not of, but nevertheless in the world; it lives and moves in the midst of that world and is connected with it in all kinds of ways. Believers are brought in from the human race, and conversely there is much chaff among the wheat, there are branches on the vine that bear no fruit and are cut out. If Christ therefore took the place of his own, he had to assume the flesh and blood in which all men share. By his incarnation he has honored the whole human race; according to the flesh he is brother of all men. And even his work has value for all, also for those who never believe in him. For although it is the case that Christ has not, in the proper sense, acquired natural life by his suffering and [405] death, the human race is nevertheless spared because Christ would come to save it. Christ is not the head of all men, not the prophet, priest, and king of all, for he is head of the church and as king he is anointed over Zion. But all men do indeed have much to thank Christ for. The light shines in the darkness and enlightens every man coming into the world; the world was made through him and remains so, although it has not known him; also as Christ he grants to unbelievers many benefits, calling through the gospel, admonition to repentance, historical faith, an honorable life, all kinds of gifts and powers, offices and ministries in the midst of the church, such as e.g. even the apostolic office to a Judas. Sans Jésus-Christ le monde ne subsisterait pas, car il faudrait, ou qu'il fut détruit ou qu'il fut comme un enfer (Pascal). Even when he hangs on the cross, he still prays for forgiveness for that dreadful sin of which the Jews at that moment make themselves guilty. Cf. Voetius, Disp. II 275. 276. Fourth, the work extends to the irrational creatures. One cannot, with Origen, say that he suffered something for them

and merited something for them. But when Christ was made sin and bore the sin of the world, then he also nullified sin with all its consequences. The liberation of the creature from the bondage of corruption, the glorification of creation, the renewal of heaven and earth is a fruit of the cross of Christ, Rom. 8:19v. Voetius, Disp. II 264. 265. Fifth, the angels in heaven also have use and benefit from the work of Christ. There is no sufficient ground for the assertion that Christ acquired for them perseverance and glory, although many have thus taught with appeal to Job 4:18, 15:15, Ef. 1:10, Col. 1:20, 1 Tim. 5:21, Hebr. 12:22, 23, Augustinus, de cons. evang. 35. Cyvillus, de ador. 9. Gregorius, Bernardus, Diez, Valentia, Suarez and also Calvin on Ef. 1:10 and Col. 1:20. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 27. Zanchius, Op. III 159-164. Bucanus, Inst. theol. VI qu. 30. Davenantius on Col. 1:20. Walaeus, Synopsis pur. theol. XII 33 and Loci Comm. Op. I 195 etc. For angels do not need Christ for themselves as Reconciler or Savior; they are essentially distinct from men, who alone are made after God's image. [406] If Christ had to acquire gratia and gloria for them, this would lead to the thought that the Son of God nevertheless would have had to assume human nature, or, better still, the nature of the angels, even if man had not fallen, cf. part II 444, and further Lombardus, Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus on Sent. II dist. 5. III dist. 13. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 62 III qu. 8 art. 4. Petavius, de incarn. XII 10. Becanus, Theol. schol. I p. 305. Quenstedt, Theol. I 476. Gerhard, Loc. XXXI § 42. Gomarus on Col. 1:20. Voetius, Disp. II 263. Alting, Theol. probl. nova XII 24. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 3. Moor II 353. Vitringa III 26 VI 178. Yet simple denial that Christ has merited anything for the angels does not do justice to Ef. 1:10 and Col. 1:20. For it is stated clearly that God all things, τα παντα, i.e. not men or angels only but in general all that is created, the whole creation, the world, the universe,

further described by εἴτε τα ἐπι της γης εἴτε τα ἐν τοις οὐρανοις, that God has reconciled that whole creation through Christ, not mutually but to himself, εἰς αὐτον, and in him again brings together and into unity for himself. The doctrine of the restoration of all things finds no support in these texts; it is rejected by the whole of Scripture and has found in the Christian church only now and then a defense. If this is thus excluded, then these two texts can be understood in no other way than that, according to Paul's conception, the devils and the ungodly will one day be consigned to hell and that then in the new heaven and the new earth with its inhabitants the whole creation will be restored. This creation now, thought of in an organic sense, had as a whole been set in enmity against God by sin and shattered and destroyed among itself. It does not lie herein that the good angels personally and individually needed reconciliation, nor also that Christ had to suffer and die for the irrational creatures. But there does lie at its foundation the presupposition that sin has altered and disturbed the relation of all creatures both to God and to one another. And that is indeed also so. Sin has made the world of men an object of God's wrath and has divided and destroyed it within itself. The relation of the angels to God has been altered, not only insofar as many have become apostate, but also [407] because the good angels formed only a part of the whole of the spirits that had served God. Augustinus, Enchir. 61. 62 and others were of the opinion that this breach struck in the angelic world was healed by the elect from humanity and that therein the significance of Christ's reconciliation for humanity consisted. This opinion is not acceptable; men are specifically different from the angels and an equation of the number of the elect men with that of the fallen angels lacks all ground in Scripture. But nevertheless it is true that the fall of so many angels must have disturbed the whole

organism of the angelic world; just as an army is wholly thrown into disorder, and made unfit for battle, if many officers and soldiers go over from the ranks to the enemy. So also the angelic world as God's army for his service has been shattered. It has lost its head, its organization. And this it now receives back in the Son, and indeed in the Son not only according to his divine nature but also according to his human nature. For not only the relation to God, also that to the world of men was disturbed by sin. And now it is Christ, who as Lord of the angels and as Head of the church places angels and men both in the right relation to God and likewise to one another. By his cross he restores the organism of creation, in heaven and on earth, and these two also again together. The inanimate and irrational in creation, i.e. heaven and earth themselves, are not thereby excluded. That cannot be, for the relation of the angels to heaven and that of men to earth is not mechanical but organic. Heaven and earth themselves have, with the fall of the angels and of men, sunk below their original state; the whole creation, πασα ἡ κτισις, groans together and is together in labor pains. Die gesammte Creatur führt gleichsam eine grosze Seufzersymphonie aus (Philippi); all members of that creation groan and have pain, in common, in connection with one another, Rom. 8:22. Just as also in the old covenant the tabernacle and all implements for the service were sprinkled with blood, Ex. 24:3-8, Hebr. 9:21, so also Christ by his cross has reconciled all things and acquired a new heaven and a new earth. The whole creation, as it will once stand perfect, without [408] spot and wrinkle, before God's face, is the work of Christ, the Lord of lords and the King of kings, Hebr. 12:22-28.

22. If this now is the great work, entrusted by the Father to Christ, namely, to be Savior in the full sense and to bring the entire re-creation to realization, then it at once becomes evident that the state of exaltation is for

that just as necessary as the state of humiliation. They must indeed have a poor conception of Christ's person and work, who think they can relinquish the resurrection, the ascension, and the session at the right hand of God without harm to faith and life, and have enough with the historical image of Jesus, which in the same way as that of other great men lives on in history and exerts influence. Conversely, it is understandable that whoever sees in Jesus no more than a particularly pious man and in his work nothing other than a religious-ethical reformation, deems the entire state of exaltation worthless for the Christian life and denies and combats the facts of the resurrection and of the ascension. Scripture, however, proceeds from an altogether different thought. It is the crucified but also the risen and exalted Christ whom the apostles proclaim. From that standpoint of exaltation they view and describe his earthly life, his suffering and dying. In the work that he now carries out as the exalted mediator, he has laid the foundations in his cross. The cross has been his only weapon in the struggle against sin, world, Satan. Through the cross he has triumphed in the sphere of justice over every power hostile to God. But for that very reason he has in the state of exaltation also received the divine right, the divine appointment, the royal power and authority, to carry out the work of re-creation in full, to overcome all his enemies, to save all those given to him, and to complete the entire kingdom of God. On the basis of the one, perfect offering, accomplished on the cross, he, in accordance with the will of the Father, distributes all his benefits. Those benefits are no physical or magical after-effect of his earthly life and dying; the history of the kingdom of God is no evolutionistic process. It is the living Christ, exalted at the right hand of God, who with consciousness, [409] with freedom, distributes all these benefits, gathers his elect, conquers his enemies, and guides world history

toward the day of his parousia. He is still active in heaven as mediator; he was not only but is still our highest prophet, our only high priest, and our eternal king. Yesterday and today he is the same unto eternity. In the state of humiliation he by his life and dying fulfilled the condition, in order now in the state of exaltation, on the basis of his perfect offering, to set God's creation free from the bondage of sin and of corruption, and to gather all things together under himself as the head. The re-creation is the continuing act of the mediator. Christ is the one exalted at God's right hand, but yet always on earth, in his church, in office, word, sacrament, in forgiveness, regeneration, faith, etc., present and active Lord from heaven. In this light the state of exaltation receives a significance, indeed often misunderstood but yet of the highest importance for doctrine and life; resurrection and ascension are for the work of re-creation just as necessary as incarnation and death on the cross. In Scripture these facts are therefore not only mentioned but repeatedly placed in the foreground and explained in their rich significance. The resurrection of Christ, according to the whole N. T., took place on the third day; in Mt. 12:40, Mk. 8:31 etc., for the sake of the comparison with Jonah the parts of the days and nights are counted as whole, M. Vitringa V 597, or are intended only as a general description of a very short time, Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 207 f. It consisted in the rising again of that same body that had been taken down from the cross and buried in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea; it was indeed changed and glorified, so that it became no σωμα ψυχικον but a σωμα πνευματικον, Luk. 24:16, 36, Joh. 12:14, 19, 1 Cor. 15:44v., Phil. 3:21, but it nevertheless remained a human σωμα, Mt. 28:5, 9, Luk. 24:39, 40, 43, Joh. 20:27, 21:25, Hd. 1:11, 1 Cor. 15:37v., Op. 1:7. The various attempts to explain this resurrection in another way (Reimarus), as apparent death (Rationalists,

Schleiermacher, Hase, Herder, Gfrörer), vision, whether then entirely subjective (Strauss, Lang, Holsten, Hausrath, Renan), or as objective, effected by God (Keim, Schweizer, Schenkel) have to the present day proved vain, Steude, [410] Stud. u. Krit. 1887 S. 203-294. Nösgen, Neut. Offenbarung I 637 f. Loofs, Die Auferstehungsberichte und ihr Wert, Christl. Welt 33, Leipzig Mohr 1898. After the resurrection Christ remained for some time longer on earth, both in order by various appearances to convince his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and also to prepare them for their office and to furnish them the proof that he, although he would no longer open the former intercourse with them, because after the resurrection he no longer belonged to the earth but to heaven, Joh. 20:17, would nevertheless remain unchangeably the same in love toward them, 13:1, and would be with them eternally until the consummation of the world, Mt. 28:20. The appearances took place the first eight days at Jerusalem, Joh. 20:26, where the disciples still had to remain for the Passover feast, and ended with this, that Jesus gave his disciples the H. Spirit and granted the apostolic authority, Joh. 20:22, 23. Later followed his appearances in Galilee, whither the disciples returned and where most followers of Jesus lived, Joh. 21, Mt. 28:16, 1 Cor. 15:6. Matthew and John conclude their gospel with these appearances of Jesus in Galilee and do not mention the ascension. According to Luk. 24:49, Hd. 1:4 the disciples had to remain in Jerusalem until they were clothed with power from on high; Luk. 24 speaks of no appearances in Galilee, Hd. 1:3 presupposes them. Certainly Jesus at one of the appearances in Galilee also again commanded his disciples to go to Jerusalem and there to await the promise of the Father. When he then in Jerusalem again appears to them for the last time, he says that they must remain in Jerusalem until that promise is fulfilled. Then he

leads them out as far as Bethany, Luk. 24:50, to the Mount of Olives, Hd. 1:12. And there he parted from them, διεστη, and was taken up from them into heaven, ἀνεφερετο είς τον ούρανον, wrongly omitted by Tischendorf in Luk. 24:51, ἐπηρθη, Hd. 1:9, ἀνεληφθη, Hd. 1:2, 11, 22, 1 Tim. 3:16. Though not mentioned by Joh. Mt. and Mk., whose gospel according to many ends with 16:8, the ascension nevertheless stands firm on the basis of many clear testimonies of Scripture. John presupposes it, 6:62, 14:2, 20:17, Paul points to it, Rom. 10:6, Ef. 2:6, 4:9, 10, Col. 3:1 and mentions it in 1 Tim. 3:16. Peter makes mention of it, 1 Petr. 3:22, cf. [411] Hd. 2:33, 3:21, 7:56; the epistle to the Hebrews knows it, 6:20, 9:24. Furthermore, it lies at the foundation of the N. T. doctrine of Jesus' session at the right hand of God, Hd. 2:33, 5:31, 7:56, Rom. 8:34, Ef. 1:20, Col. 3:1, Hebr. 1:3, 8:1, 12:2, 1 Petr. 3:21, of his intercession in heaven, Rom. 8:34, Hebr. 7:25, 9:24-28, 1 Joh. 1:1, 2, of all the activities that he performs from heaven on earth, chiefly, in his congregation, and of the expectation of his return, Mt. 24:3 etc.

This exaltation has, in the first place, the greatest significance for Christ himself. Formerly, in dogmatics, the question was usually also discussed whether Christ, by his perfect obedience, had also merited something for himself. Anselm said that Christ had indeed merited a reward for his non-obligatory death but had transferred it to his own, Cur Deus homo II 19. Most scholastics, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 18. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 19 art. 3 qu. 48 art. 1 qu. 49 art. 6. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV c. 7; furthermore most Roman Catholics, Bellarminus, de Christo V c. 9. 10, Becanus, Theol. schol. III tr. 1 c. 14 qu. 5. Id., Manuale Controv. III 2 qu. 4; and very many Reformed theologians, Zanchius, Op. VI 121, VIII 477, 502. Piscator on Phil. 2:9. Gomarus on Phil. 2, Op. I 530 sq., Cloppenburg, Op. I 305. 888,

Rivetus, Op. II 836. Voetius, Disp. II 265-267. Mastricht, Theol. V 14, 7. Heidegger, Corp. Theol. XVIII 39. Moor III 600 e. a., gave an affirmative answer to the above-mentioned question, and then judged that the hearing of prayer, Joh. 11:42, Hebr. 5:7 and especially the whole state of exaltation, the resurrection, ascension, session at the right hand of God and return for judgment, had to be regarded as reward for his merits, Jes. 53:11, Luk. 24:26, Joh. 17:4, 5, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 2:10, 12:2. Others, however, said that Christ merited nothing for himself but everything for us, Joh. 17:19, 1 Cor. 1:30, 1 Tim. 1:15 etc., and that therefore the exaltation was indeed a consequence but not a reward for his humiliation, Calvijn, Inst. II 17, 6. Comm. on Phil. 2:9. Polanus, Syst. VI 26. Junius, Theses theol. 29, 11. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II 7, 8, Maresius, Syst. Theol. 45. Kantt. Stat. V. at Phil. 2:9 etc., and likewise the Lutheran theologians, Gerhard Loc. IV 329. Quenstedt, Theol. III 324. Buddeus, Inst. p. 787. [412] Hollaz, Examen p. 748 etc. With Scripture in hand, however, the above question can be answered only affirmatively. For it repeatedly presents the state of humiliation as the way and the means for Christ to obtain the state of exaltation, Jes. 53:10-12, Mt. 23:12, Luk. 24:26, Joh. 10:17. The διο in Phil. 2:9 indicates not merely the ordo and consequentia but specifically the causa meritoria; because Christ humbled himself so deeply, vv. 5-8, therefore God also exalted him so exceedingly. The Epistle to the Hebrews in particular repeatedly lays strong emphasis on this meritorious connection between Christ's humiliation and exaltation, 1:3, 2:9, 10, 5:7-10, 10:12, 12:2; Christ himself has been sanctified through suffering, i.e. not dedicated to God or made morally perfect, but completed, brought to full growth and maturity, become τελειος, consisting in this, that he is now crowned with honor and glory, 2:9, and has become an ἀρχηγος, a cause of eternal

salvation, 2:10, 5:9. The reason why many had objections to speaking of a merit of Christ for himself lay in the opposition to the Socinians, who let Christ attain the rank of divinity only in the state of exaltation. But even if this representation is also incorrect, Scripture clearly says that the exaltation has also been of great significance for Christ and stands in a meritorious connection with his state of humiliation. Reformed theology has precisely the advantage that it can do much better justice to this doctrine of Scripture than the Lutheran. For, on the Lutheran standpoint, there remains no place open for a merit of Christ for himself and even for a state of exaltation. The Logos, after all, in the first moment of the incarnation, by assuming the human nature, made it capable of the indwelling of the fullness of the Godhead and of the communication of the divine attributes. Even if the God-man, in a second moment, again laid aside these attributes, with respect to the use or at least to the public use, he nevertheless retained them, above p. 245. And the state of exaltation can therefore, among the Lutherans, be nothing other than a taking up again into use or into public use of the divine attributes laid aside in that sense. Christ therefore received in his exaltation nothing that he did not already have; non data est [413] Christo in exaltatione nova potentia, virtus aut majestas, quam antea non habuit, sed collata ei tantum fuit plena facultas administrandi ejus regni, quod per ipsam unionem acceperat, Quenstedt III 368, cf. Gerhard Loc. IV § 306 sq. 329. Hollaz, Ex. 774. Buddeus, Inst. 788. Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 93-114. According to the Lutherans, this resumption of the use of the divine attributes took place in the moment of the reviviscentia or vivificatio, and this is thus actually the first step of the exaltation. Indeed, by Gerhard, Quenstedt e. a., the descensus ad inferos is called the first step; but because this descensus has taken place specifically according to the

human nature of Christ, according to soul and body both, the vivificatio must precede it; and Buddeus, Inst. p. 789 and others, cf. Vitringa V 573, therefore rightly give it the first place in the state of exaltation. Concerning this vivificatio the Lutherans further teach that it took place not only through Christ's divine but also through his human nature; this indeed did not have the power for that of itself, but it nevertheless possessed from the moment of the incarnation the divine attributes, specifically also the vis vivificans; and thus anima Christi, virtute divinitatis personaliter sibi communicata, corpus utpote proprium suum templum vivificavit, Quenstedt III 435. Furthermore, Christ, according to his human nature, in that same moment of vivification again took into use all those divine attributes which it had received in the incarnation but in the exinanitio, at least as far as the use or the public use is concerned, had laid aside; i.e. it had at that same moment again the use of the omniscientia, omnipotentia, omnipraesentia and vis vivificans, Quenstedt III 154-198. From that it follows that the gradus exaltationis among the Lutherans actually cannot be different, successive steps in the exaltation. In the moment of vivification the human nature of Christ was immediately, through its union with the Logos, almighty, all-knowing, omnipresent. The descensus ad inferos, which is reckoned by the Lutherans to the exaltation, is a manifestation of Christ's majestas divina in hell; the resurrectio is only a resurrectionis manifestatio for men, Buddeus p. 789; both therefore also took place clauso sepulcro, just as the appearance of Jesus to the disciples, Joh. 20:19, took place occlusis foribus, Quenstedt III [414] 441; the ascension is indeed called a vera et realis loci mutatio, insofar as Christ visibly before the eyes of his disciples ascended, but is nevertheless only a visibilis and localis, by no means an invisibilis absentia corporis Christi in terris, for also according to

his human nature Christ is and remains omnipresent, even if in an invisible manner, Gerhard, Loc. IV § 219. XXVIII § 24. Quenstedt, III 380. Buddeus, Inst. 796. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV2 1 S. 185, cf. Vitringa V 601. Moor IV 246; and the sessio ad dextram Dei finally consists in this, that Christ, specifically according to his human nature, shares in the divina, infinita ac immensa virtus et majestas Dei, especially also in his omnipresence, and exercises this in his kingdom of grace and of power, Quenstedt, III 383-388, 443-450. Gerhard, Loc. IV § 218. Buddeus p. 797. If one now considers that all these attributes have already been communicated to the human nature of Christ in the moment of the incarnation and that he indeed laid aside the use but never the possession of them; then it appears that according to the Lutheran representation nothing has been communicated to Christ in the state of exaltation that he did not already possess from his conception onward. Christ is immediately at his incarnation that which he can become; he is at once also according to his human nature completed, τελειος; no development is possible in him; the exaltation was already there at his conception and therefore cannot be conceived as a reward. The Lutheran doctrine is on this point akin to the Roman, which lets Christ already on earth be comprehensor and lets all gifts for which the human nature is capable be communicated to Christ already at the incarnation; and it serves in defense of the same religious interest, namely the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper.

Reformed theology, however, had a different view. While it maintains against the Socinians and also against many more recent theologians, that Christ did not first become prophet, priest, and king through his resurrection and was elevated to the rank of divinity. For Scripture testifies repeatedly that He was in the beginning with God and Himself was God, Joh. 1:1,

17:5, Rom. 8:3, 2 Cor. 8:9, Gal. 4:4, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 1:3 etc., and that He was already from eternity anointed by the Father as prophet, priest, and king and as such was active in the days of the O. T. and during [415] his walk on earth, 2 Tim. 1:9, Tit. 3:4, Hebr. 13:8, 1 Petr. 1:11, 20. What Christ therefore received for Himself in the state of exaltation cannot have consisted in the divine nature or the rank of divinity, nor also in the office of prophet, priest, and king, which rests on divine election and appointment; but it consisted in the exaltation itself, in the resurrection, ascension, session at the right hand of God and return for judgment, in the mediatorial glory, to which He was exalted according to both natures, Jes. 53:10-12, Luk. 24:26, Joh. 17:5, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 2:10, 12:2, cf. Voetius, Disp. II 277. According to Rom. 1:3 Christ is κατα σαρκα, i.e. in the way of the flesh, by birth from a woman, Gal. 4:4, become from David; but κατα πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης, by virtue of the Spirit of holiness, who dwelt in Him and had guided Him throughout his whole life, He was, from and through the resurrection, ordained and appointed by God, ὁρισθεις, cf. Hd. 17:31, as Son of God in power. Birth and resurrection stand here over against each other. Through birth Christ became the seed of David, Rom. 9:5, He assumed ὁμοιωμα σαρκος ἁμαρτιας, Rom. 8:3, He became weak, 2 Cor. 13:4; but through the resurrection He was publicly appointed as Son of God. That does not mean and cannot mean that He then first received the divine nature or the rank and the name of God, for the contrary appears from Rom. 1:3, 8:3, 32, Gal. 4:4, etc.; but while at his incarnation He exchanged the μορφη θεου for the μορφη δουλου, Phil. 2:9, He now at the resurrection receives back the glory which He previously had with the Father, Joh. 17:2, He now becomes κυριος της δοξης, 1 Cor. 2:8, θεου δυναμις, 1 Cor. 1:24, He receives a name above every name, i.e. the name

of κυριος, Joh. 20:28, Hd. 2:36, 1 Cor. 12:3, Phil. 2:9, 10, and therein the κυριοτης, the right, the competence and the power, to rule as mediator, as prophet, priest, and king over all creatures, to subject his enemies, to gather his people and to recover the fallen creation for God, Ps. 2, 72, 110, Mt. 28:18, 1 Cor. 15:21v., Ef. 1:20-23, Phil. 2:9-11, Hebr. 1:3v., 1 Petr. 3:22, Op. 1:5 etc. In the resurrection God publicly appointed Him as Son of God, Lord, King, Mediator and said to Him: You are my Son, today I have generated you, Hd. [416] 2:36, 13:33, 17:31, Hebr. 1:5. Indeed Christ by his resurrection entered into a new state; as mediator He has been exalted above all creatures at God's right hand. In that exaltation, in a certain sense, his divine nature also shares. Just as not merely the human nature of Christ but the person of the Son was the subject of the humiliation, so also that same person according to both natures is the subject of the exaltation. For He had laid aside his μορφη θεου and had hidden his divine nature behind the garment of a weak human nature; no one saw in Him or could see in Him the Only-begotten of the Father, unless with the eye of faith, Joh. 1:14. But now, in the state of exaltation, his divine glory shines into everyone's eyes; whoever now sees Him must confess that Christ is the Lord to the glory of God the Father. But further, in that exaltation his human nature also shares. The πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης already dwelt in Christ before his resurrection, from his conception onward, for He was conceived of the H. Spirit, Luk. 1:35, was full of the H. Spirit, Luk. 4:1, received Him without measure, Joh. 3:34, etc., cf. Mt. 12:18, 28, Luk. 4:14, Hd. 1:2, 4:27, Hd. 10:38. But this glory, which Christ possessed inwardly, could nevertheless not reveal itself outwardly; He was flesh, and by virtue of the weakness of the flesh was also put to death on the cross, 2 Cor. 13:4. But in death He laid aside that weakness, and He broke all connection with sin and death.

God, who gave his own Son for us in death and therein carried out the judgment over sin, raised Him from the dead by his Spirit, who as πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης dwells in Christ Himself and also in all believers, Rom. 8:11, so that He would now live no longer in weakness of the flesh but in power of the Spirit. Put to death, therefore, He was indeed in flesh, but He was made alive in Spirit, 1 Petr. 3:18. For the Spirit of God has dwelt in Christ, even when He was flesh, as the governing power of his life, as πνευμα ἁγωσυνης, so that Christ always allowed Himself to be led by that Spirit and remained obedient to the Father even unto death; and therefore that Spirit must now also reveal itself in Christ at the resurrection as πνευμα ζωης, which completely overcomes death in Christ and also one day in the believers, Rom. 8:11. So far has Christ now been exalted above all [417] weakness of the flesh, that through the resurrection He has become a πνευμα ζωοποιουν, 1 Cor. 15:45; He also after the resurrection still has a σωμα, He is the same Jesus, Hd. 9:5, Rom. 4:24, 8:11, 1 Cor. 12:3, 2 Cor. 1:14, 4:5v. He is the second and last Adam, 1 Cor. 15:45; He has that same σωμα with which He rose, but it is a σωμα πνευματικον, instead of the φθορα, ἀτιμια and ἀσθενεια, which are proper to the σωμα ψυχικον, the σαρξ, it partakes of wholly other properties, namely the ἀρθαρσια, δοξα, δυναμις, 1 Cor. 15:42v., Phil. 3:21. Yes, in 2 Cor. 3:17 Paul says: ὁδε κυριος το πνευμα ἐστιν; the apostle does not thereby wish to give a description of the substantial being of Christ; but he comes to this statement because he wishes to argue that Christians are free from the law. For that freedom finds its ground in this, that the Lord, i.e. the exalted Christ, is the Spirit, i.e. that the Spirit of God now dwells in Christ so absolutely and is so most intimately one with Him, that thereby an end is made to all unfreedom, ὁυ δε το πνευμα κυριου, ἐλευθεριa. The expression πνευμα κυριου proves that

Paul at the beginning of the verse is not thinking of an identification of Christ and the H. Spirit; the H. Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, because He dwells in Christ Himself and because Christ communicates Himself to his own through Him, vs. 18. And thus Christ is now the one in whom παν το πληρωμα της θεοτητος σωματικως dwells, Col. 2:9, cf. 1:19. He is the visible εἰκων του ἀορατου θεου, Col. 1:19. Divine glory becomes manifest in his human nature and shines forth from his face, 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:4, 6.

23. But just as in the state of humiliation, so Christ is all that He has become in the state of exaltation, for the good of His church. What He received for Himself and for His own as a reward for His labor is not to be separated. He is παντα και ἐν πασιν, Col. 3:11. The pleroma, which dwells in Christ, must also dwell in the church; it is filled εἰς παν το πληρωμα του θεου, Ef. 3:19, Col. 2:2, 10. God is He who fills Christ, Col. 1:19, Christ is He who fills the church, Ef. 1:23. The church is therefore His pleroma, which, what He perfectly and from Himself (πληρουμενος), gradually, Ef. 4:10, fills with Himself, and which therefore [418] little by little becomes full and filled and thus in its turn fills Christ, Ef. 1:23; the completum becomes a complementum. For the church is not there without Christ, but Christ is also not there without the church; He is her κεφαλη ὑπερ παντα, Ef. 1:22, Col. 1:18, and she is His σωμα, which is formed out of Him and obtains its growth, Ef. 4:16, Col. 2:19 and thus grows up εἰς μετρον ἡλικιας του πληρωματος του Χριστου, Ef. 4:13. The union between Christ and the church is as close as between vine and branches, bridegroom and bride, man and wife, cornerstone and building. She can with Him be called the one Christ, 1 Cor. 12:12. In order to perfect her, He has been exalted at the Father's right hand and continues His prophetic, priestly, and kingly activity in heaven.

Just as in the days of the O. T. and of his walk on earth, Christ is also now still the only prophet and teacher of his church. There is no other master, Mt. 23:8, 10; there is, alongside, above, or in the place of Christ for the church, no need of any soothsaying, any oracle, any enthusiasm, any spiritism, any infallible papacy. For Christ is the wisdom, all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge are hidden in Him, 1 Cor. 1:24, 30, Col. 2:3; and it is Christ himself, who by his Word and Spirit instructs his church, in order that they all, taught of God, would be prophets and would proclaim the great deeds of God, Num. 11:29, Jer. 31:33, 34, Mt. 11:25-27, Joh. 6:45. Heb. 8:10, 11, 1 Joh. 2:20. And thus He also remains, in the state of exaltation, still active as priest. After He on Golgotha has accomplished his offering, He, as high priest, not with the blood of goats and calves but with his own blood, Hebr. 9:12-14, through the tabernacle of his body, 9:11 and through the veil of his flesh, 10:20, entered into the heavenly sanctuary, which in the holy of holies on Zion had its pattern, 6:20, 9:12, 24, in order there to make intercession for his own and to appear before God's face, 7:25, 9:24. The Socinians tried to infer from this, that Christ was not yet in the proper sense priest on earth, that his offering on the cross was not the true sacrifice but only its introduction and preparation; just as under the O. Test. the act of atonement did not consist in the slaughtering of the sacrificial animal but in the sprinkling of the blood [419] on the altar or on the mercy seat, Lev. 16:11-16, so Christ brings the atonement to completion not on earth but in heaven, cf. Socinus de J. Christo Servatore, Bibl. Fr. Pol. II 164. Volkelius, de verit. relig. III 37. Fock, Der Socin. 635. 646 f., and now still W. Milligan, The ascension and heavenly priesthood of our Lord, London 1892, Doedes, Jaarb. v. Wet Theol. 1846 bl. 293v. 313 f. Seeberg, Der Tod Christi in s. Bedeutung für die Erlösung 1895 S. 14. 16 f. etc. This

has rightly been contested by others, for in the O. T. sacrifice the different atoning acts are indeed temporally separated but they nevertheless form one whole; it is the blood of a slaughtered animal, which by its pouring out and sprinkling restored the offerer to God's favor and delivered him from sin and its punishment. In the epistle to the Hebr. therefore, just as in the whole N. T., the atoning power is also ascribed to the offering once brought by Christ on the cross, 2:17, 7:27, 8:3, 9:12, 26, 28, 10:10, 14, 18, 13:12; thereby all benefits, forgiveness, cleansing, sanctification, perfection have been acquired. Because Christ has now once sacrificed himself on the cross and has died, He cannot even do it for the second time, for every human being dies only once, his offering in death is not susceptible of repetition, 9:26-28. The entering of Christ with his blood into the heavenly sanctuary therefore cannot, in the opinion of the epistle to the Hebrews, be conceived as an offering. It is indeed said once, in 9:7, that the high priest offered the blood with which he entered into the most holy place, προσφερει, for himself and for the people's transgressions; but this offering of the blood is then nevertheless essentially distinguished from that which took place outside, in the court; and thus also only the bringing of the blood is so called in the O. Test. But of Christ's entering with his blood into heaven it is nowhere said that it is an offering; it is not that and it cannot be; by the one offering He has accomplished everything, 9:26-28, 10:12, 14. The entering of Christ with his blood into the inner sanctuary therefore has only the purpose, to cause the salvation acquired by his death to count for our benefit before God's face. Precisely because by the shedding of blood, i.e. by the offering on the cross, the atonement has been accomplished, Christ as high priest can enter into heaven with his blood and appear before [420] God's face, 9:12-14, 26. His priestly activity in heaven therefore also

consists not in any offering, but in his intercession and appearance before God's face for the benefit of his people, 7:25, 9:24, cf. Rom. 8:34, 1 Joh. 2:2. Yet there lies truth in the representation derived by Thalhofer, Handbuch der kath. Liturgik I2 1894 S. 223-236 from Hebr. 8:1-4, that Christ, although having accomplished everything with one offering, nevertheless in heaven continues that offering in a heavenly manner and continually renews his act of obedience on Golgotha at the right hand of the Father. For the offering of Christ, once done on the cross, lives on not merely in the memory, but in the disposition from which it proceeded. There is in heaven no repetition, no renewal, no reproduction of the offering on the cross; but that offering, once accomplished, continues to work in the appearance before God's face and in the intercession for us, 7:25, 9:24. Therefore it can on the one hand be said, that Christ by one offering has perfected all, 10:24, and on the other hand, that He will make completely blessed all who through Him go to God, inasmuch as He always lives, to pray for them, 7:25. Cf. Cloppenburg, Op. II 889-902. Nic. Arnoldus, Religio Socin. Fran. 1654 p. 678-706. de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwal. II 152v. Mastricht, Theol. V 7, 15 sq. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 240 sq. Jaarb. v. Wet. Theol. IV 18v. Weiss, Bibl. Theol. d. N. T. § 121. Scheeben, Dogm. III 443 f. Martin, Atonement 115. Therefore also, because Christ was and is priest and remains so eternally, the church on earth has no priest any longer needed; all believers are priests, Rom. 12:1, 1 Petr. 2:5, Op. 1:6. No offering for sin needs any longer to be brought, also no unbloody one in the mass, for from the one offering, accomplished on the cross, there proceeds in the intercession of Christ a continual speaking to God, not for vengeance, as from the blood of Abel, but for grace and forgiveness, Hebr. 12:24. The intercession of Christ is no longer a supplication as in the days of his flesh,

Calvin, Inst. III 20, 20, but is the steadfast and gracious will of Christ, Joh. 17:24, on the ground of his offering to lead all his people to the heavenly blessedness. Thus Christ is our only priest, who according to the order of Melchizedek remains forever, with his offering continually covers our sins, always appears with the Father as our [421] Paraclete, over against all accusations of Satan, world and one's own heart takes up our cause, makes our prayers and thanksgivings acceptable to the Father, continually assures us a bold access to the throne of grace, and causes all blessings of grace out of his fullness to come to us, Luk. 22:32, Joh. 14:16, 17:9v., Rom. 1:7, 8:32v., 1 Cor. 1:3, 2 Cor. 1:2, Ef. 1:3, 1 Tim. 4:8, Hebr. 7:25, 9:24, 1 Joh. 2:2.

And so Christ also is and remains our eternal king. Although also anointed to this office from eternity, He nevertheless, according to His human nature, first appeared as king at His exaltation. Then He received the name of Lord, was ordained Son of God, and received all power in heaven and on earth. Christ is king in the first place over His people, in the regnum gratiae, Ps. 2:6, Isa. 9:5, 11:1-5, Luke 1:33, 19:21-23, 23:42, 43, John 18:33, 19:19; and He manifests this kingship in that He gathers, protects, governs, and leads His church to eternal salvation, Mt. 16:18, 28:20, John 10:28. But because His kingship bears an entirely different character than that of the princes of the earth, in the N. T. He is much more called the head of the church, 1 Cor. 11:3, Eph. 1:22, 4:15, 5:23, Col. 1:18, 2:19; He does not rule by violence, but by right and righteousness, by grace and love, by Word and Spirit. Then in the N. T. He is also described especially as king, when there is mention of the victory over His enemies. For in order that He may truly gather, protect, and lead His church to eternal salvation, He must also as mediator have power over all creatures, Ps. 2:9, 72:8, 110:1-3, Mt. 28:18, 1 Cor.

15:24, 27, Eph. 1:22, Phil. 2:9-11, 1 Petr. 3:22, Rev. 1:5, 17:14. It does not lie herein that the world is positively governed by Christ, but indeed that it stands under His power, is subject to Him, and once, even if unwillingly, will acknowledge and pay homage to Him as Lord. Specifically there also belongs here His power over the kingdom of Satan. The representation of many church fathers, that Christ brought His offering to Satan and by cunning took his spoil from him, is unscriptural. But nevertheless Christ by His cross has also achieved the triumph over the world of the fallen spirits. He came to earth, to break the works of the devil, 1 John [422] 3:8, and fought against him His whole life, Luke 4:13, especially in the last time, when it was the hour and the power of darkness, Luke 22:53. He was the stronger, Luke 11:22, and the devil had nothing in Him, John 14:30. He already saw him fall like lightning from heaven and took from him his armor, Luke 10:18, 11:22. Especially by the cross He triumphed over the principalities and powers, Col. 2:15, took from him the weapons of sin, death and world, John 16:33, 1 John 4:4, 1 Cor. 15:55, 56, Hebr. 2:14 and cast him outside the domain of his kingdom, John 12:31. And His triumph He celebrated over the evil spirits specifically in the resurrection. In 1 Petr. 3:19-22 this is clearly taught. There is there no mention of a descent of Christ into hell, in order to proclaim the gospel to the lost. For it says that Christ was first made alive i.e. had risen and then went to preach. All ground is lacking to make, with the Lutherans, a temporal distinction between the vivificatio and the resurrectio and then in that intervening time to place the descent into hell. Nor is there anywhere in Scripture any indication that Christ after His resurrection, before He ascended into heaven, first still went to hell. On the other hand, the exegesis is also untenable, that Christ in the Spirit went to the contemporaries of Noah and

preached to them; ἐν ᾧ clearly refers to the Christ made alive; πορευθεις, cf. v. 22 allows no other interpretation; the preaching of Christ in the Spirit to Noah's contemporaries many centuries before is here irrelevant. The pericope therefore contains something quite different. Peter exhorts the believers to suffer while doing good and therein to follow Christ. For He suffered while doing good, because He suffered for sins, as a righteous one for the unrighteous, and indeed with this purpose, that He would bring us, the unrighteous, to God. That is suffering while doing good! And now Christ was indeed killed in the flesh, but He was made alive and rose in Spirit, i.e. because the πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης was the principle of His whole life, as Spirit. And as such, as made alive, risen Spirit, as Lord and King, going, πορευθεις, i.e. not to hell, but according to v. 22 going to heaven, He preached to the spirits in prison. That is: His going to heaven as risen Lord, Acts 2:36, was a κηρυγμα to the spirits in the [423] prison. What the content of that κηρυγμα was, is not said and need not be said. The rising and ascending into heaven was itself the rich, mighty, triumphant κηρυγμα of Christ to the spirits in prison. That Peter now specifically has Christ bring that κηρυγμα by His ascension to those spirits in prison, who in Noah's days, in spite of God's longsuffering and notwithstanding that they saw the building of the ark, were disobedient, has a double reason. First, those contemporaries of Noah in Scripture have always been the most godless of all men; and second, they perished and Noah with his own were saved by one and the same water. Likewise the water of baptism, by the resurrection of Christ, is the destruction for the godless and the salvation for the believers. For Christ who has risen and instituted that baptism and imparts power to it, sits at God's right hand, after by the ascension all angels and forces and powers have been made subject to Him. Christ

suffered while doing good and overcame; let the believers press His footsteps! And just as over all fallen spirits, so Christ as mediator also has power in His regnum potentiae over all His enemies. And He will not rest, before they all have been laid under His feet.

When Christ at the end of days will have overcome his church and all his enemies, then he will deliver the βασιλεια, the kingship, the royal office, to the Father. His mediatorial work is then completed. The work which the Father assigned to him is perfectly accomplished. God himself is then king eternally and always. Concerning the nature of this subjection of Christ to the Father, a difference already arose early. Marcellus of Ancyra wrote a treatise on the subjection of the Lord Christ, and was accused of the doctrine that the kingdom of Christ and also the union of the human nature with the Logos would come to an end, Schwane, D. G. II 136. 148. Marcellus was opposed by Eusebius and later by Basilius; the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum added to the confession that Christ would return to judge the living and the dead, the words: οὗ της βασιλειας οὐκ ἐσται τελος, cujus regni non erit finis, Hahn, Bibl. d. Symbole u. s. w. 164-166, cf. Petavius, de incarn. XII 18. Pesch, Prael. IV 84. Later the Socinians taught [424] that Christ, whom the Father had temporarily appointed as stadtholder, would one day step down, just as a field commander, after having achieved the victory, gives back his power and dominion to the prince, and from that they inferred that the Son of God, because he would one day be subjected to the Father, could not be the highest God, cf. against that Petavius, de trin. III 5. Bisterfeldius, de uno Deo, Patre, Filio ac Spiritu So I 2, 26. Vitringa V 443-446. Among the Reformed there was also difference; some said that the kingship of Christ was oeconomic and temporary, Calvijn, Inst. II 14, 3. 15, 5. comm. on 1 Cor. 15:28. Alting,

Theol. probl. nova XII 36. Pareus on 1 Cor. 15, Kuyper, Enc. II 321; others were of the opinion that there indeed comes a change in the manner of governing but that his kingship is nevertheless eternal, Mastricht, V 8, 9. Moor III 1129. Vitringa V 443. The difference is easily resolved in this sense, that the mediatorship of reconciliation, and thus insofar also the prophetic, priestly, and kingly office of Christ, comes to an end; God will be king and all in all; but what remains is the mediatorship of union, Christ remains prophet, priest, and king, as this, with the human nature, is of itself given, enclosed in the image of God, and in the highest and richest manner realized in Christ as Image of God. Christ is and remains the head of the church, from whom all life and salvation eternally flow to her. Whoever would want to deny this, would also have to come to the doctrine that the Son would one day lay aside and destroy his human nature; and for that all ground is lacking in Scripture.

CHAPTER VIII. ON THE BENEFITS OF THE COVENANT.

Monergism Books

§ 43. The Order of Salvation.

1. Our heart is created for God, and it does not rest until it finds rest in Him. Insofar as every human being, consciously or unconsciously, strives after an unchangeable good and a lasting happiness, it can be said that every human being also seeks after God, who alone is the highest good and eternal blessedness, Hd. 17:27. But then they nevertheless do not seek Him in the right way and not there where He is to be found. The heathen religions know of no covenant of grace, they do not know the person of Christ, and all hold the way of works to be the via salutis. The principle of Heathendom is, negatively, the denial of the true God and of the gift of his grace, and, positively, the delusion of being able, by one's own power and wisdom, to acquire salvation for oneself. Come, let us build a city and a tower, whose top be in heaven, and let us make a name for ourselves, Gen. 11:4. Whether the works by which Heathendom seeks the way to salvation bear a more ceremonial or a more ethical character, whether they are more positive or more negative in nature, always the human being is nevertheless his own savior; all religions, outside the Christian, are autosoteric. In the

lowest religions the consciousness of sin is almost entirely lost and peace, reconciliation, happiness are obtained by magical acts and formal ceremonies; higher religions add to them all kinds of moral duties and make salvation dependent on their fulfillment. Islam too knows no proper [426] redemption but binds entrance into paradise to orthodox faith and to the observance of the prescribed prayers and good works. In Buddhism salvation consists in the killing, to be effected by various means, of the desire for being, Falke, Buddha, Moh., Christus II 1897 S. 103 f. And philosophy has not brought it any further; the only way to salvation is the path of virtue, moral self-perfection; even Kant and Schopenhauer, who with a view to innate sinfulness deemed a rebirth necessary, have nevertheless again ended by making an appeal to the will, the wisdom, and the power of the human being.

Wholly different is the opinion of Scripture. Already in the O. T. it is God, who immediately after the fall out of grace sets enmity between man and serpent and transfers man to his side, Gen. 3:15, who chooses Abraham and the people of Israel born from him as his possession, Gen. 12:1, Ex. 15:13, 16, 19:4, 20:2, Deut. 7:6v., who establishes the covenant with it and bestows his laws upon it, Gen 15:1, 17:2, Ex. 2:24, 25, Deut. 4:5-13, who gives the blood upon the altar for atonement, Lev. 17:11, and expends everything upon his vineyard, Jes. 5, Jer. 2:21. But by virtue of that election and on the foundation of that covenant the people are now also obligated, on pain of the curse of the law, Deut. 27:6, to walk before God in uprightness and to keep his commandments, Gen. 17:1, Ex. 20, Deut. 10:15, 16 etc. The covenant relationship did not depend on that keeping of the law as a preceding condition; it was no covenant of works but rested only on God’s electing love. But it nevertheless had to receive its proof and seal in

the walk according to the Lord's law. For it could, on Israel's side, not be accepted with a perfect heart and thus not become true reality in Israel, except through such a faith as also had love and desire to walk in the way of the covenant. The covenant, if it is not an idea but reality, includes the obligation and the inclination to live according to the demand of the covenant. But therefore it also speaks for itself that the people could assume a very different attitude toward the covenant and its law. There were antinomian godless persons, forerunners of the Sadducees, who cared neither for God nor his commandment, and mocked the pious, Ps. 14:2, [427] 36:2, 42:4, 11, 94:2, Mal. 2:17, 3:14; there were Pharisaically minded persons, who laid the emphasis on outward keeping of the law and connected righteousness and salvation with that, Am. 6:1, Jer. 7:4. But between these two stood the few faithful, the sincere pious, who were by no means indifferent to the Lord's law, on the contrary meditated on it the whole day and loved it with all their soul, but who nevertheless did not let their righteousness and salvation depend on its keeping. For although it is the case that they very often appeal very strongly to their righteousness and call upon God to do them justice, Ps. 7:9, 17:1v., 18:21, 26:1v., 35:34, 41:13, 44:18, 21, 71:2, 119:121, 2 Kon. 20:3, Job 16:17, Neh. 5:19, 13:14 etc., yet those same persons at the same time humbly make confession of their sins, invoke God's forgiveness and plead on his grace, Ps. 31:10, 11, 32:1v., 38:2v., 40:13, 41:5, 130:3, 5, Jes. 6:5, 53:4, 64:6, Jer. 3:25, Mich. 7:9, Neh. 1:6, 9:33, Dan. 9:5, 7, 18, etc. The righteousness of these pious is not a personal quality, but a property of the cause which they uphold; they have the right on their side, because they rely on God, deel II 197. 198. This trust in God is the essential thing which in the O. T. makes the righteous righteous; they believe in God, האמין, Gen. 15:6, Ex. 14:31, 2 Chr. 20:20,

Jes. 28:16, Hab. 2:4, trust in him, בטח, Ps. 4:6, 9:11, take refuge in him, חסה, Ps. 7:2, 18:3, fear him, ירא, Ps. 22:24, 25:12, hope in him, יחל, הוחיל, Ps. 31:25, 33:18, expect it from him, קִוָּה, Ps. 25:21, wait for him, חָכָה, Ps. 33:20, lean on him, סמוך, Ps. 172:8, נכון, Ps. 57:8, cling to him, דבק, חשׁק, Ps. 91:14, 2 Kon. 18:6 etc. This faith is reckoned for righteousness, Gen. 15:6, just as elsewhere the keeping of God's commandments is called righteousness, Deut. 6:25, 24:13. Now that this subjective righteousness, which essentially consists in trust in God, is also a fruit of God's grace and an operation of his Spirit, does not, from the nature of the case, come to light so clearly in the O. T. as yet. But nevertheless the data for this are not lacking either. Of a righteousness of one's own there is never any mention in Israel; it is chosen notwithstanding its stubbornness, Deut. 9:4-6. God is the source of all life and light, [428] of all wisdom, power, salvation, Deut. 8:17, 18, Ps. 36:10, 68:20, 21, 36, 73:25, 26, Jer. 2:13, 31. Not unto us, but unto thy name give honour, is the prayer of Israel's pious, Ps. 115:1; humility is the disposition of their soul, Gen. 32:10, Ps. 116:12, a broken and contrite heart are pleasing to God, Ps. 51:19, Jes. 57:15. Not to man but to God is every gift always ascribed and for everything thanks rendered; everything is called upon to praise him; everything is desired from him in prayer, not only deliverance from dangers but also knowledge of God's law, enlightenment of the eyes etc. God is indeed he who has mercy on whom he will, Ex. 33:19, and writes in his book who shall live, Ex. 32:33. He promises, without any condition, that he will be their God and they his people, Ex. 19:6, Lev. 26:12, and that he will always again, after unfaithfulness and apostasy on Israel's side, have mercy on them, give conversion and life, Ex. 32:30-35, Num. 14, 16:45-50, Lev. 26:40-44, Deut. 4:31, 8:5, 30:1-7, 32:36-43, Neh. 9:31. He forgives the sins for his name's

sake, Ex. 34:7 etc., and sends his H. Spirit, who is the worker of all spiritual life, Num. 11:25, 29, Neh. 9:20, Ps. 51:13, 143:10, Jes. 63:10, cf. deel II 230. And when history then teaches that Israel repeatedly profanes, abandons, destroys the covenant, Deut. 31:20, 1 Kon. 11:11, 19:10, 14, Jer. 22:9, 32:32 etc., then prophecy proclaims that God on his part will never break the covenant and will never forsake his people. He cannot do it for his name's and his glory's sake before the Heathen, Num. 14:16, Deut. 32:26, 27, 1 Sam. 12:22, Joel 2:17-19, Jes. 43:21, 25, 48:8-11, Jer. 14:7, 20, 21, Ezech. 20:43, 44, 36:32. It is an eternal covenant, which cannot totter, because it is fixed in God's lovingkindness, 2 Kon. 13:23, 1 Chron. 16:17, Ps. 89:1-5, 105:20, 106:45, 111:5, Jes. 54:10. He, as it were, stands surety for both parties, not only for himself but also for his people, and he will thus establish a new covenant, not cause his Word and Spirit to depart from them, forgive their sins for his name's sake, pour out his Spirit upon all, grant them a heart of flesh, write the law in their inward parts and cause them to walk in his statutes, Deut. 30:6, Jes. 44:3, 59:21, Jer. 24:7, 31:31v., Ezech. 11:19, 16:60, 18:31, 36:26, 39:29, Joel 2:28, Mich. 7:19 etc., cf. deel II 181. 182. [429]

2. Preceded by John the Baptist, Jesus appears in the N. T. with the preaching of the kingdom of heaven. That kingdom is, on the one hand, represented as a treasure, which is kept in the heavens and is distributed as a reward to the righteous, Mt. 6:20, 13:43, 19:21, 25:46. In order to become partaker of it, another, better righteousness is necessary than that of the Pharisees, Mt. 5:20; it must be sought before all things, Mt. 6:33, be bought at the cost of everything, 13:44-46, 19:21, Mk. 9:43-47, 10:28, 29. But this representation passes over into another; the eschatological significance of the kingdom of God gives way to the religious-ethical. For, work and

reward stand here in no proportion; the kingdom of God in the eschatological sense is indeed called a reward, but it so far surpasses all work in value, that every notion of reward falls away, Mt. 19:29, 20:13-15, 25:21, Mk. 10:30, especially Luk. 17:10. The righteousness which is required in order to enter into the kingdom is itself a good of that kingdom, Mt. 6:33, just as also the forgiveness of sins, Mt. 26:28, Luk. 1:77, 24:47 etc. And this kingdom with all its goods, forgiveness, righteousness, eternal life, is near and comes by God's will, Mk. 1:15, 9:1; it is a gift, which He bestows out of grace, Mt. 25:34, Luk. 12:32; and He bestows it, not upon the righteous but upon the publicans and sinners, Mt. 9:13, upon the lost, Mt. 18:11, upon the poor etc., Mt. 5, upon the little children, Mt. 18:3, Mk. 10:15; and theirs is already here on earth the kingdom of heaven, Mt. 9:15, 11:11, 13:16, 17, 23:13, Mk. 10:15, Luk. 17:21. In order to become partaker of that kingdom, therefore, no righteousness of one's own is necessary, but only conversion, μετανοια, resipiscentia, mentis mutatio, change of mind, and faith, πιστις, i.e. the accepting of and trusting in the gospel of the kingdom as a gift of God to the lost, Mk. 1:15, and thus trust in God, Mk. 11:22, in Jesus' word and power, Mt. 8:10, 9:2, Mk. 4:40, in Jesus' person as Messiah, Mt. 27:42, Mk. 9:42, Joh. 1:12, 2:11, 6:29, 17:8, 20:30, Hd. 9:22, 17:3, 18:5 etc. But also this μετανοια and πιστις are themselves again gifts of grace of God, Mt. 11:25, 27, 15:13, 16:17, Luk. 10:22, Joh. 6:44, 65, 12:32, so that only those who are of the truth, Joh. 8:43, 47, 12:39, 18:37, who have been given by the Father to the Son, 6:37v., 17:2, [430] 6, 9, 10:26, 11:52, who have already been born again, 1:12, 13, 8:47, come to faith.

In the apostolic proclamation all this is worked out much more broadly. The relation of the objective acquisition and the subjective application of

salvation then comes more clearly to light. If Jesus has died and been raised, then it becomes clear to his disciples that the kingdom which he preached, with all its goods of forgiveness, righteousness, and eternal life, has been acquired through his suffering and death; and that precisely to that end he has been raised and glorified by the Father, in order that he might apply these benefits to his own. The application is inseparable from the acquisition. It is one work that has been entrusted to the Mediator; and he will not rest before he can hand over the whole kingdom, completed, to the Father. But yet, however unbreakably acquisition and application of salvation also cohere, there is distinction. The former Christ brought about on earth, in the state of humiliation, through his suffering and death; the latter he accomplishes from heaven, in the state of exaltation, through his prophetic, priestly, and kingly activity at the right hand of the Father. Therefore he also exercises this application of salvation through the H. Spirit. He himself, through his exaltation, has become Lord from heaven, a life-giving Spirit, 1 Cor. 15:45, 47, 2 Cor. 3:17. The Spirit, who from his conception onward had qualified him and had been poured out upon him more and more, has now become the principle of his whole glorified life; all natural, earthly life he has laid aside; he is now the Lord from heaven, the life-giving Spirit; the Spirit of God has become his Spirit, has become Spirit of Christ. Connected with this is the word in Joh. 7:39, that the Spirit was not yet, because Christ was not yet glorified. It cannot be meant by this that the H. Spirit did not yet exist or did not yet work before the glorification of Christ, for already in the O. T. there was no power and no gift except through the H. Spirit, part II 230; Christ himself was anointed with that Spirit without measure, Joh. 3:34; and also Elizabeth and John the Baptist are called filled with that Spirit, Luk. 1:15, 41. The meaning can be no other

than that the Spirit, although he earlier also bestowed many gifts and worked many powers, nevertheless only after the glorification of Christ [431] has personally remained dwelling in the congregation of believers as in his temple. It is with the H. Spirit as with Christ himself. The Son of God was from eternity anointed as Mediator; he worked as prophet, priest, and king already in the days of the O. T.; but he nevertheless became flesh only in the fullness of time. Thus there is also a fullness of time for the H. Spirit. When Christ has completed his work, he has not only himself become a life-giving Spirit, but the Spirit of God, of Father and Son, has also fully become the Spirit of Christ, whom he sends out, through whom he as Lord from heaven carries out his work on earth, who takes his place, takes everything from what is his, glorifies him, and causes him himself to dwell in the congregation in a spiritual manner. The H. Spirit, namely, brings about not a distancing but the most intimate communion between Christ and his congregation. Indeed he is distinguished from Father and Son, ἄλλος παρακλητος, Joh. 14:16, mentioned in particular alongside both, Mt. 28:19, 1 Cor. 12:4, 2 Cor. 13:13, Op. 1:4. But he is also one with them in essence and can therefore fully make their communion shared by the believers. His activity, after all, by no means consists only in the communication of the benefits of Christ. If Christ through his suffering and death had acquired only the forgiveness of sins, then it would be enough that the H. Spirit strengthened the proclamation of this gospel, Joh. 15:26, 27, Hd. 5:32, 1 Cor. 2:4, 2 Cor. 4:13, 1 Thess. 1:5, 6, 1 Petr. 1:12, convinced the world of wrong, Joh. 16:8-11, worked faith in the hearts, 1 Cor. 2:5, 12:3, Ef. 1:19, 20, 2:8, Col. 2:12, Phil. 1:29, 1 Thess. 2:13, and assured the believers of their sonship, Rom. 8:15. 16. But this objective, judicial benefit of forgiveness is not the only one; it is supplemented by the ethical and

mystical benefit of sanctification. Christ not only takes away the guilt of sin but also breaks its power. He has, one for all, died, so that the living would no longer live for themselves but would live for Christ, 2 Cor. 5:15. In the satisfaction to the law, which is the power of sin, i.e. in forgiveness, the power of sin is also in principle broken; where righteousness is, there is also life; Rom. 3-5 is followed by Rom. 6-8. Christ has not only died, but he has also risen and been glorified; [432] he is and remains the Lord from heaven, the life-giving Spirit, who not only died for the congregation but also dwells and works in it. This communion now between Christ and the congregation is brought about and maintained by the H. Spirit. The H. Spirit is therefore not only the one who works faith and assures of sonship, but he is also author of a new life; and faith is not merely acceptance of a testimony of God but also beginning and principle of a holy walk, 2 Cor. 5:17, Ef. 2:10, 4:24, Col. 3:9, 10. In and through the Spirit Christ himself comes to his own, Joh. 14:18, lives in them, Rom. 8:9-11, 2 Cor. 13:5, Gal. 2:20, Ef. 3:17, Col. 3:11, just as conversely the believers through that Spirit are in Christ, live, think, act, Joh. 17:21, Rom. 8:1, 9, 10, 12:5, 1 Cor. 1:30, 2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 3:28, 6:25, Ef. 1:13, Col. 2:6, 10; παντα και ἐν πασιν Χριστος Col. 3:11, cf. Deismann, Die neut. Formel ἐν Χρ. Ιησου 1892, who, however, wrongly takes the formula always in a local sense. And not only Christ, but also God himself comes through that Spirit to make his dwelling in them and fills them with his fullness, so that he may finally be all in all, Joh. 14:23, 1 Cor. 3:16, 17, 6:19, 15:28, 2 Cor. 6:16, Ef. 2:22. And through communion with the person of Christ, the H. Spirit also effects communion with all his benefits, with his σοφια, 1 Cor. 2:6-10, δικαιοσυνη, 1 Cor. 6:11, ἁγιασμος, ib., Rom. 15:16, 2 Thess. 2:13, ἀπολυτρωσις, Rom. 8:2, 23. He assures the believers of their sonship, Rom. 8:14-17, Gal. 4:6 and of the

love of God, Rom. 5:5; he makes them free from the law and causes them together to appear in the world as one congregation, living by a principle of their own, standing under a head of their own, Hd. 2, 2 Cor. 3, Gal. 4:21-6:10, above p. 217. He joins the believers into one body, 1 Cor. 12:13, leads them to one Father, Rom. 8:15, Gal. 4:6, Ef. 2:18, brings all to the confession of Christ as Lord, 1 Cor. 12:3, makes them one of heart and soul, Hd. 4:31, 32, Gal. 5:22, Phil. 2:1, 2, and causes them together to grow up to a perfect man in Christ, 1 Cor. 3:10-15, Ef. 4:1-16, Col. 2:19. He is the author of regeneration, Joh. 3:5, 6, Tit. 3:5, life, Joh. 6:63, 7:38, 39, Rom. 8:2, 2 Cor. 3:6, illumination, Joh. 14:17, 15:26, 16:13, 1 Cor. 2:6-16, 2 Cor. [433] 3:12, 4:6, Ef. 1:17, 1 Joh. 2:20, 4:6, 5:6, gifts, Rom. 12:3-8, 1 Cor. 12:4v., renewal and sanctification, Rom. 8, Gal. 5:16, 22, Ef. 3:16, sealing and glorification, Rom. 8:11, 23, 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5, Ef. 1:13, 14, 4:30.

3. That faith in Christ was the way to salvation was, of course, established in the Christian church from the beginning. He who does not believe in the blood of Christ is condemned, Ign., Smyrn. 6. We are not justified by ourselves, by our wisdom or piety or good works, but by faith, Clem., 1 Cor. 32. Justin says that no one is saved except through the merits of Christ, who took the curse upon himself and made satisfaction for all, Dial. c. 95, who redeems all who do penance and believe, ib. c. 100, and he speaks repeatedly of a grace that precedes our works, enlightens us and leads to faith, Dial. c. 119. Apol. I 10. Irenaeus binds salvation not only to faith in Christ, e.g. adv. haer. IV 2, 7. V 19, 1, but also says that the Holy Spirit has been sent in order to work out the will of the Father in human beings and to renew them, and that that Spirit is necessary like the rain and the dew, to make the land fruitful, III 17, cf. V 10, 2. Even Origen testifies that the will of man is of itself unfit to be converted, nisi divino vel juvetur vel muniatur

auxilio. God is prima et praecipua causa operis, de princ. III 1, 18 cf. 2, 5. Still more strongly the moral corruption of man and the necessity of the grace of the Holy Spirit are expressed by the Latin patres, Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, to whose statements Augustine therefore also appeals, c. duas epist. Pelag. IV 8-10. Thus the first-mentioned says: haec erit vis divinae gratiae, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, de an. 21. From Cyprian, Test. III 4 are the words repeatedly cited by Augustine: in nullo gloriandum quando nostrum nihil sit. Ambrose already knows an inward grace, which works upon the will and prepares it: a Deo praeparatur voluntas hominum; that God is honored by the saints is God's grace, in Lucam I 10. Yet the doctrine of the application of salvation in the early times was very little developed and in part was also already early led into wrong paths. Although there are [434] here and there some testimonia veritatis evangelicae, on the whole the gospel was nevertheless soon conceived as a new law. Faith and conversion were indeed generally regarded as a necessary way to salvation; but these nevertheless ultimately lay in the freedom of man. Salvation was indeed objectively acquired by Christ, but in order to become partaker of it, the free cooperation of man was necessary. Faith was as a rule nothing more than the conviction of the truth of Christianity, and conversion soon took on the character of a penance that made satisfaction for sins. The sins committed before baptism were indeed forgiven in baptism; but those after baptism had to be made good by penance. Indeed the poenitentia was also still many times regarded as a heartfelt sorrow over sin, but the emphasis nevertheless fell ever more on the outward deeds in which it had to manifest itself, such as praying, fasting, giving alms, etc., and these good works were conceived as a satisfactio operis. The whole soteriology was externalized.

As the way of salvation there counted not the application of salvation by the Holy Spirit to the heart of the sinner, but the praestatie of so-called good, often wholly arbitrary works. The imitation of Christ consisted in imitating and copying the life and suffering of Christ, which was vividly painted before the eyes; martyrs, ascetics, monks were the best Christians, Cf. besides the dogmatics-historical works of Münscher-v. Coelln, Hagenbach, Schwane, Harnack etc., Vossius, Hist. Pelag. 1. 3. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 440 f. Suicerus, s. v. πιστις, ἀναγεννησις, μετανοια. Landerer, Das Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit in der Aneignung des Heils, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1857 S. 500-603. Wörter, Die chr. Lehre über das Verhältniss von Gnade u. Freiheit von d. ap. Zeiten bis auf Aug. Freiburg 1856. Dr. H. Wirth, Der Verdienstbegriff in der Chr. Kirche. I Der Verdienstbegriff bei Tert. Leipzig 1892.

Much more than one of his predecessors, Pelagius deviated from the doctrine of grace; he abandoned the Christian foundation on which they all still stood and renewed the self-sufficient principle of paganism, specifically of the Stoa. For not only did he cut off every connection between Adam's and our sin, so that neither guilt nor stain nor even death was a consequence of the first transgression; but Christianity also lost its [435] absolute significance; salvation was not bound to Christ but could also be obtained through the lex naturae and the lex positiva. Of a gratia interna, of a regenerating grace of the H. Spirit, which not only illuminated the understanding but also bent the will, there could therefore, with Pelagius, be no question. To be sure he spoke of grace, but by that he understood only: a) the posse in natura, the gift of being able to will, which God bestowed on every human being, gratia creans, b) the objective grace of the preaching of the law or of the gospel, and of the example of Christ,

which addressed itself to the understanding of the human being and instructed him concerning the way of salvation, gratia illuminans, and c) the forgiveness of sins and the future salvation, which would be bestowed on the human being who believed and did good works. Grace in the first-mentioned sense was thus proper to all human beings; grace in the second sense was not absolutely necessary, but served only to make the acquisition of salvation easier for the human being, it was no gratia operans but only an adjutorium for the human being; it was also not bestowed on all but only on such as had made themselves worthy of it by the good use of their natural powers; it was no gratia praeparans (excitans), nor even a gratia irresistibilis, which rather is a fatum sub nomine gratiae; and finally it was not necessary and was not bestowed by God for every good deed, ad singulos actus, but only for some; many good works were performed by the human being without any grace, Wiggers I 220 f. Semi-Pelagianism moderated this system and taught that the human being, through Adam's sin, had indeed not become spiritually dead but had nevertheless become sick, that his freedom of will had not been lost but had nevertheless been weakened, and that the human being thus, in order to do the good and to obtain salvation, had need of the assistance of divine grace. But that grace, which illuminates the understanding and supports the will, may never be detached from but must always be considered in connection with the freedom of will left to the human being. Grace and will work together, and indeed in such a way that grace, according to God's intention, is universal and destined for all, but in fact benefits only those who make good use of their freedom of will. Nostrum est veile, Dei perficere. Sometimes now, as with Paul, grace may precede; [436] as a rule, however, the will is the first; the beginning of faith and perseverance in it is a matter of the will; grace is

only necessary for the increase of faith; God helps him who helps himself. A gratia operans, irresistibilis does not exist; and even a gratia praeveniens is as a rule denied, Wigers, II 359 f.

4. Proceeding from man's absolute moral corruption through Adam's sin and from his complete incapacity for any spiritual good, Augustine also arrived at a wholly different doctrine of grace. Many times he also designates the objective benefits, the gospel, baptism, the forgiveness of sins, etc., by the name of grace. But this grace is not enough; there is still another needed, a gratia interna, spiritalis, which enlightens the understanding and bends the will. At first Augustine had still taught otherwise, namely, that God called us but that believing was our affair, thus in his writing de diversis quaestionibus from the year 386 and de libero arbitrio 388-395. But later, about 396, he came, especially through 1 Cor. 4:7, to another insight, de div. qu. adv. Simpl. ± 397. And now he says that grace not only consists in an outward preaching of law and gospel, which teaches and admonishes us, and in that sense offers us help, but it is especially an occulta inspiratio Dei, inspiratio fidei et timoris Dei, an adjutorium bene agendi adjunctum naturae atque doctrinae per inspirationem flagrantissimae et luminosissimae caritatis, de gratia Christi 35, a subministratio virtutis, ib. 2, an inspiratio caritatis per Spiritum Sanctum, ib. 39. Itself a fruit of election, ipsius praedestinationis effectus, de praed. sanct. 10, it is distributed, not according to merit but according to God's mercy, de dono pers. 12. c. duas ep. Pelag. I 24. Therefore it is of itself gratuita; it would not be gratia, if it were not bestowed gratis, de pecc. orig. 24. The H. Spirit blows whither He wills, non merita sequens sed merita faciens, ib. Grace precedes all merits, it is a gratia praeveniens, praeparans, antecedens and operans; nolentem praevenit, ut velit, Enchir.

32. It enlightens the understanding inwardly, removes the coecitas from it, de pecc. mer. I 9; works faith, which is a gift of God, and creates in man the good will, the love for the good and the ability to do the good and removes the infirmitas from it; fateamur, [437] interna atque occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum, non solum veras revelationes sed etiam bonas voluntates, de gratia Chr. 24. This grace is moreover irresistibilis, it works indeclinabiliter and insuperabiliter upon the will of man, de corr. et gr. 12; it is rejected by no heart, however hard, a nullo corde duro respuitur, God by grace takes away the heart of stone and gives a heart of flesh in its place, de praed. sanct. 8. The elect, who receive it, can by it not only come to Christ, but they also actually come to Him. But this is not to be understood as if God by grace suppressed or destroyed the free will of man; on the contrary, grace makes the will precisely free from the slavery of sin. Liberum ergo arbitrium evacuamus per gratiam? Absit, sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex per fidem, sic liberum arbitrium per gratiam non evacuatur sed statuitur quia gratia sanat voluntatem, de spir. et litt. 30 cf. 33. 34. de gratia et lib. arb. de civ. XIV 11. c. duas ep. Pel. I 2. Therefore Augustine could also say, consentire vocationi Dei vel ab ea dissentire, propriae voluntatis est, de spir. et litt. 34, for both, he who believes and he who does not believe, do that voluntarily, nemo credit nisi volens. Yet he was so far from, by this statement, finally placing the decision again into the hands of man, that he immediately continues: this word does not weaken but confirms the word of the apostle: what do you have that you have not received. Accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo; ac per hoc, quid habeat et quid accipiat Dei est; accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est. Iamsi ad illam profunditatem scrutandam quisquam nos

coarctet, cur illi suadetur ut persuadeatur, illi autem non ita, duo sola occurrunt interim quae respondere mihi liceat; o altitudo divitiarum, et: numquid iniquitas apud Deum? de spir. et litt. 34. And as the beginning, so also the progress of faith and of love is to be ascribed only to God's grace; the gratia operans passes over into the gratia cooperans, consequens, subsequens, it works not only the willing but also the working and the accomplishing. Without Christ we can do nothing; and therefore, ut incipiamus, dictum est: misericordia ejus praeveniet me, ut perficiamus, dictum est: misericordia [438] ejus subsequetur me, c. duas ep. Pel. II 9. It is God, qui praeparat voluntatem et cooperando perficit quod operando incipit.... Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus vel cooperante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus, de gr. et lib. arb. 17. Volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit, Enchir. 32. And that grace is needed not for a few but for all good deeds; voluntas hominis Dei gratia ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis, cogitationis adjuvatur, c. duas ep. Pel. II 5. Objectively and subjectively the work of salvation from beginning to end is a work of God's grace and of his grace alone. Cf. Wiggers, I 244 f. Luthardt, Die Lehre vom freien Willen 1863 S. 30 f.

Pelagianism was condemned at the Synod of Carthage 418, whose canons were approved by Pope Zosimus and later by Coelestinus I, further at the council of Ephesus 431 and at the synod of Orange 529; at this latter synod semipelagianism was also rejected and its canons were ratified by Bonifacius II, Denzinger, Enchir. n. 64 sq., cf. deel II 322v. Thereby the ecclesiastical doctrine was established, that the whole man has been corrupted by Adam's sin, and that both, initium and augmentum fidei, are to be ascribed not to ourselves, to our natural powers, but to the grace of God,

which not only teaches us what we have to do and to refrain from, but also grants us, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, Denzinger n. 68; to the infusio, operatio, inspiratio, illuminatio of the H. Spirit in us, who anticipates our will, prepares it, restores it from unbelief to faith (corrigens), and makes us will and work, ib. 147 sq. The necessity of the gratia interna, praeveniens has since been taught by all. Also the synod at Chiersy 853, which condemned Gottschalk, confessed: habemus liberum arbitrium ad bonum, praeventum et adjutum gratia,.... gratia liberatum et de corrupto sanatum, ib. 280. just as Rabanus said, that God Spiritu Sancto intus regit et zelo spiritali foris confortat, bij Weiszäcker, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1859 S. 545. Scholasticism walked in this same track. Lombardus says, that man through sin has lost freedom of will, and that he non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum [439] vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adjuvetur; liberatur quidem ut velit et adjuvatur ut perficiat, Sent. II dist. 25, cf. comm. op. Ef. 2:4-10, Rom. 5:1, 2, 6:23 enz. According to Thomas, man without grace can indeed do all sorts of naturally good things, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 109 art. 1 en 2, but he has need of grace, ut sanetur et ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, art. 2, in order to love God, art. 3, in order to keep the law, art. 4, in order to obtain eternal life, art. 5, in order to prepare himself for the grace of justification, art. 6, in order to rise from sins, art. 7, in order to be able not to sin, art. 8, and he has need each time of new grace, in order to know and to do the good, art. 9 and to persevere therein, art. 10. And likewise Trent determined, that adults, in order to prepare themselves for the grace of justification, have need of the gratia praeveniens, so that they, qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus ezeitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem.... disponentur, VI 5.

Rome thus decidedly teaches the necessity of the gratia praeveniens (actualis, excitans) and thus rejects pelagianism and semipelagianism, which ascribed the initium and augmentum fidei to the powers of natural man. Now it can indeed be asked, whether Rome under that gratia praeveniens understands something more than the external calling of the gospel, which works morally upon understanding and will, and which was also acknowledged by Pelagius c. s. Sometimes, to be sure, the description of that grace is very weak; Trent identifies it with the calling, qua nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur, ib. But nevertheless Rome seems to understand under that gratia praeveniens an operation of the H. Spirit upon understanding and will. The synod of Orange spoke of a Sancti Spiritus infusio et operatio in nobis; Trent called it excitans and described it by the words: tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, ib. cf. can. 3. Thomas says, that that grace, by which an adult prepares himself for justification, does not consist in aliqua habitualis gratia but indeed in an operatio Dei ad se animam convertentis, I qu. 62 art. 2 ad 3, an auxilium Dei interius moventis sive inspirantis bonum propositum, II 1 qu. 109 art. 6 qu. 112 art. 2 III qu. 89 art. 1 ad 2. Bonaventura also calls it gratia gratis data and [440] says, that man has need of it for preparation for justification and that it excitat his free will, Brevil. V 3. Bellarminus describes it as a gratia auxilii specialis, as a motio or actio, qua Deus hominem movet ad operandum, de gratia et lib. arb. I c. 2, and sets it as special auxilium, gratia extrinsecus excitans et adjuvans over against the gratia intus inhabitans, de gratia infusa, Spiritus S. in nobis inhabitans, de justif. I c. 13. There was also, concerning the essence of that preparatory grace, great difference among the theologians; the Thomists held it to be a qualitas physica supernaturaliter infusa, entitas quaedam physica; Molina, Lessius, Ripalda

conceived it as an illustratio mentis et inspiratio voluntatis; Suarez, Tanner e. a. thought, that it was not something created, but that the H. Spirit himself immediately moved the will. But nevertheless it is generally conceived as a gratuitum auxilium, donum Dei internum et supernaturale, as an illustratio mentis and motio immediata voluntatis, which adds to man not only vires morales but also vires physicas and enables him to prepare himself for justification, Theol. Wirceb. VII 262, 268. Perrone V p. 6. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. II 152 f. Jansen III p. 8 sq. Pesch, Prael. dogm. V 20. 46. Heinrich, Dogm. Theol. VIII 19 f. Simar 492. Scheeben III 683 f.

5. But with that the rejection of semi-Pelagianism at Rome has also ended; by a detour it is nevertheless brought in again. In the first place, Rome teaches that freedom of the will has been weakened by sin but not lost, Syn. Araus. can. 8. 13. 25. Trid. VI c. 1 and can. 5; man can without grace do many naturally and civilly good works, which are absolutely not sins; he can know and love God as Creator, lead an honorable life; and even if it is difficult, in the long run, to keep the whole law and to resist all temptations, in itself it is nevertheless not impossible. The homo naturalis is in itself a complete man, part II 525, cf. Pesch, V 66. 100. In the second place, Rome departs from Augustine in that it conceives the gratia praeveniens as a grace which indeed grants the ability to believe but not the believing itself. On the contrary, to every adult who lives under the gospel the gratia praeveniens [441] (actualis) is bestowed, but it stands in the power of man to accept or to reject it. Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, said the synod at Orange c. 25, quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere. And Trent declared that man can consent to the gratia

praeveniens and cooperate with it, but can also reject it, VI c. 5 and can. 4. Among the theologians, however, there was great difference about this. The Augustinians, among whom Berti is the principal one, teach that the gratia praeveniens (actualis, sufficiens) indeed gives the posse but not the velle. In order that man not only can but also will to believe and actually believe, and the gratia sufficiens thus indeed become efficax, for that there is needed a delectatio victrix, which overcomes the opposite carnalis delectatio and makes the posse pass over into velle. The will must therefore be transformed by a delectatio victrix, which is stronger than the concupiscentia. The Thomists, Bannez, Gonet, Lemos, Billuart e. a. likewise say that the gratia sufficiens indeed gives the posse but not the velle and, in order to bring about this latter, must be supplemented by an actio Dei physica, promotio or praedeterminatio physica. Augustinians and Thomists thus agree in this, that the efficacia gratiae does not depend on the will of man but on grace itself, and that upon the delectatio victrix or praedeterminatio victrix the act of faith follows infallibly; they differ, however, in this, that the latter assume an essentially objective distinction between the gratia sufficiens and the gratia efficax, while the former judge that these two do not differ essentially, but that there are degrees in grace, by which a grace which in the one is only sufficiens can in the other, by reason of the lesser hardening, be efficax. But one cannot say that this representation does full justice to the Tridentine assentire vel abjicere. The Molinists therefore let the efficacia of grace depend on the will of man, and the Congruists, such as Bellarminus, de gratia et lib. arb. I 12 IV 14-16, let it be determined by the praevisa gratiae congruentia or incongruentia with the condition and the circumstances of those to whom grace at a certain moment came, cf. part I 92v. and further Theol. Wirceb. VII 375. Perrone, V

138. Liebermann, Instit. theol. II8 338. Jansen III 79. Dens, Theol. II 219. Schäzler, Neue Unters. über das Dogma v. d. Gnade, Mainz 1867 S. 87 f. Simar, Dogm. 502. Pesch, Prael. V 136-164. Scheeben, Dogm. IV 1, 1898 S. 202 f.

The Roman doctrine therefore comes down to this: the children born in the church receive in baptism regeneration (justificatio, gratia infusa), but those who hear the gospel at a later age receive the gratia sufficiens, which consists in an illumination of the understanding and a strengthening of the will by the H. Geest. Man can reject this grace, but he can also consent to it. If he consents to it, the gratia excitans passes over into the gratia adjuvans or cooperans; man cooperates with it in order to prepare himself for the justificatio (gratia infusa, habitualis). This preparation comprises these seven moments, that man, helped by God's grace, begins to believe God's Word, begins to see that he is a sinner, obtains hope in God's mercy, begins to love Him, begins to hate sin, resolves to have himself baptized and to lead a new life, Trid. VI c. 6. Faith here does not take a central place but is coordinated with the six other praeparationes ad gratiam justificantem; it is therefore nothing other than an assent to the truth of Christianity, i.e. of the doctrine of the church (fides informis) and receives its justifying power only through love (fides caritate formata), which is communicated in the gratia infusa; in itself and taken alone, it cannot justify, but it is called justifying faith only because it is humanae salutis initium, fundamentum et radix omnis justificationis, i.e. the first of the above-mentioned praeparationes. If man now thus prepares himself and has done quod in se est—whether this consists in the good use of his, by grace supported, Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 109 art. 6 ad 2. qu. 112 art. 3, or also of his natural powers, Thomas, II 1 qu. 98 art. 6. cf. Theol. Wirceb. VII 288. Dens, Theol.

II 209. Pesch, Prael. V 114-120—God cannot refuse him the gratia infusa. Indeed man has not merited this grace by that preparation, for it far surpasses it in value; but it is nevertheless just, that God reward him who thus does his best, according to a meritum de congruo, with the gratia [443] infusa. This is bestowed on him in baptism and consists in the indwelling of the H. Geest, the infusion of supernatural virtues, the participation in the Divine nature, and is followed by the forgiveness of sins, which together with it constitutes the two parts of justification, Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 113. The forgiveness of sins is with Rome thus the negative reverse side of the positive renewal of man; sin is forgiven because and insofar as it has been eradicated. When man has now in baptism become a partaker of this gratia infusa, then he can indeed lose it again through mortal sins, and other sins he has to expiate, not only with contritio cordis but also with confessio oris and satisfactio operis; but in the gratia infusa he has nevertheless received the supernatural power to do good works and thereby to merit all subsequent grace, yes even eternal life, according to a meritum de condigno. For the good works that he does flow forth from a supernatural principle and are therefore worthy of a supernatural reward. And from this it becomes clear what this Roman doctrine of grace is ultimately concerned with. Grace serves only to make possible again for man the meriting of heavenly blessedness. That was in principle even the case with Augustine. Grace, however unmeritedly bestowed, with him consisted not first of all in the forgiveness of sins but in regeneration, in the infusion of love, which enables one to do good works and thus to acquire eternal life. Accepit (homo) justitiam, propter quam beatitudinem accipere mereretur, de trin. XIV 15. The merits do not precede grace and faith, but they nevertheless follow upon them, ad Simplic. I qu. 2. Credendo meritum comparatur, 83

qu. qu. 68. Gratia praevenit meritum, non gratia ex merito sed meritum ex gratia; omnia merita praecedit gratia, ut dona Dei consequantur merita mea, Aug. with Lombardus on Ef. 2:4-10. Ipsa gratia meritur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici, voluntate comitante, non ducente, pedissequa non praevia, Ambrosius with Lombardus on Rom. 5:1, 2. Later, when the doctrine of the image of God as donum superadditum arose, this became still worse. The concept of grace then underwent an important change. Grace became something that was not only necessary for fallen man; but [444] also Adam had to be elevated by it from an ordinary, natural man to the image of God. After the fall grace thus receives a twofold task, first to deliver man from sin (gratia sanationis, medicinalis), and second, to raise him up to the supernatural order (gratia elevans), Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 109 art. 2. For the first, grace is only accidental, only morally necessary; for the second it is absolutely and physically necessary. The latter therefore pushes the former more and more into the background; the ethical antithesis of sin and grace gives way to the physical one of natural and supernatural. Grace with Rome is a supernatural, created, physical power, infused into a natural man in a magical manner, through the mediation of priest and sacrament, which raises him up to the supernatural order and enables him, by good works, to merit all subsequent grace and by this way at the end also heavenly blessedness ex condigno.

6. The Roman penitential system brought Luther to his reforming activity. An entirely new light dawned for him when he came to know the Scriptural meaning of μετανοια. In the first set of seven of his 95 theses, and further in his sermo de poenitentia and Sermon v. Sakr. der Busse, he expounded this meaning of repentance, and taught that the principal part of repentance does not consist in private confession, of which Scripture knows nothing, nor in

satisfaction, for God forgives sins freely, but in a true sorrow over sins, in an earnest resolve to bear Christ's cross, in a new life, and in the word of absolution, i.e. of grace in Christ. The penitent comes to the forgiveness of sins not through satisfaction and priestly absolution, but through trust in the word of God, through faith in God's grace. Not the sacrament, faith justifies. Thus Luther came to place sin and grace in the center of Christian soteriology. The forgiveness of sins does not depend on a repentance which always remains imperfect, but rests in God's promise and becomes ours only through faith, cf. also Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I 44. 190 f. 202 f. 213 f. 223 f. But concerning the relation in which Luther placed repentance and faith to one another, there is [445] great difference. According to Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 198 f. Luther at first indeed thought that true repentance was fruit of faith in the gospel and of love to God; but later, especially after Melanchthon's Unterricht der Visitatoren of 1528, in order not to foster false security, he would have placed the remorse worked by the law before faith, precisely the reverse of Calvin, who in the first edition of the Institutie would have had remorse precede faith but later, in the Catech. Genev. of 1538 and in the second and following editions of the Institutie, would have had faith precede true remorse, cf. also Harnack, D. G. III2 749 f. Herrmann in Gottschick's Zeits. f. Th. u. K. 1891 S. 28-81. The historical investigation of Lipsius, Luthers Lehre v. d. Busse, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1892 S. 161-340, has however brought to light that there can be no question of such a reversal in Luther's doctrine of repentance. The poenitentia with him always consists in two parts: contritio, knowledge of and remorse over sins, worked by the law, and fides, faith in the grace of God in the gospel of Christ. God first breaks the sinner's hard heart through the preaching of the law and then leads him through faith to the comfort of the gospel. But when

the sinner thus comes to know God's grace, then he first receives true love for the good, and from that is born that genuine repentance which remains throughout the whole of life and consists in a dying of the old and rising of the new man. Luther now at one time, over against Roman work-righteousness, lays more emphasis on the fact that true repentance proceeds from faith and embraces the whole of life; and then again, over against antinomianism, more on the fact that true faith is preceded by a breaking of the heart; but in substance Luther's doctrine has always remained the same, contritio (poenitentia in the narrower sense), fides and bona opera are the three parts of the via salutis, cf. Köstlin, ib. I 36. 72, 159. 368. II 75. 493. 496 f., and in Herzog2 3 art. Busse. Sieffert, Die neuesten theol. Forschungen über Busse u. Glauben, Berlin 1896. This representation is also that of the Lutheran confessional writings, ed. Müller 41. 167. 312. 534. 634 and of the first dogmaticians, Brenz, Strigel, Chytraeus and others up to Gerhard; the order of salvation was treated in these three loci. Now Luther in this order of salvation in the first period had always proceeded from absolute praedestinatie; but later, without revoking it, he placed the [446] center of gravity in the revelation of God in Christ, in the general offering of salvation, in word and sacrament. Melanchthon from 1527 came to synergism and taught that in conversion the will also cooperates, assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei, because it has still preserved the facultas applicandi se ad gratiam, Loci, c. de lib. arb. The Formula Concordiae did indeed expressly reject the doctrine that the will by its own, natural powers can accommodate itself to grace, ed. Müller 607, cf. 608. 713. But it nevertheless taught alongside one another predestination and the impotence of man, ib. 594. 705, and the universality and resistibility of grace, 555. 602, and found the reconciliation in this, that man has still

preserved capacitatem non activam sed passivam, can still go to church etc., and especially in this, that he still patitur (and pati potest), ut Deus in se operetur, ib. 609. 610. Later this was usually worked out in Lutheran theology in such a way that God grants to all who live under the gospel, in baptism or through the preaching of the Word, a gratia sufficiens (motus bonos inevitabiles, irresistibiles), by which the will of man is so liberated and renewed that he either can only not resist, let God's grace work in him unto regeneration and conversion and remain wholly passive under it, or can also positively cooperate with it, Gerhard, Loc. XI n. 56. 57. 81. Quenstedt, Theol. III 505. 508. 510. 513. Hollaz, Ex. 794. 861 sq. 872 sq. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 921 sq. Schmid, Dogm. d. ev. l. K. 297-369. Luthardt, Komp. § 57-66. Under the influence of this covert or open synergism the ordo salutis, when it was later expanded and, as with Hollaz with reference to Hd. 26:17, 18, was treated in the loci concerning the gratia vocans, illuminans, convertens, regenerans, justificans, renovans and glorificans, assumed among the Lutherans this form: Christian children, because they cannot yet resist, are regenerated in baptism and receive the gift of faith; others at a later age are first called with a vocatio sufficiens, which is the same for all and provides all with that illumination in the understanding and with that power in the will which enables them not to resist the working of God's grace; in case they do not resist, they are brought by the preaching of the law to contritio (poenitentia, conversio in the narrower sense) and further regenerated and endowed with faith, which is a fruit of regeneration; through faith they are [447] then justified, receive the forgiveness of sins and further successively the adoptio, the unio mystica, the renovatio and the glorificatio. But the Christian life in reality does not proceed so regularly; just as grace in its beginning depends on the will strengthened by

supernatural power, so it remains in its progress and to the end. Grace is always resistible and therefore also, up to the hour of death, losable and also again obtainable, not once but even repeatedly. The center of gravity therefore in this order of salvation lies in man; even if it is ever so strongly expressed that God alone regenerates and converts, it nevertheless depends on man's resisting or not resisting whether God will do that; man has the decision in his hands, he can by resisting nullify the whole work of the Father, the Son and the Spirit; and he keeps that decision in his hands until his death. Still more closely the center of gravity in this order of salvation lies in faith and justification. Calling, remorse, regeneration namely bear only a preparatory character; they are actually not yet benefits of the covenant of grace, they as it were still proceed outside of Christ and serve to lead the sinner to Christ. Only when man believes and through that faith accepts the righteousness of Christ does God see him in Christ, forgive him sins, set him free from the law, adopt him as his child, incorporate him into the communion with Christ etc. Everything depends on faith, and indeed specifically on the act of faith. If man exercises this, then he has everything and everything at once, peace, comfort, life, salvation, but if he neglects this, then everything becomes shaky, unstable, losable. Thus everything is directed to preserving that faith, but just as the Lutheran believer does not let the work of grace arise from eternal election, from the covenant, so he also does not connect it with nature and world and humanity; he is saved in his faith but does not let this have an effect on family and school, society and state. It is enough for him to live in communion with Christ, but he feels no urge to fight under Christ as king. Cf. especially Schneckenburger, Vgl. Darst. d. luth. u. ref. Lehrbegriffs, 2 Th. 1855 passim.

7. With all the agreement, the order of salvation in Reformed [448] theology nevertheless from the outset bore a wholly different character. Calvin does indeed treat justification, Inst. III 12-18, and election ib. 21-24, after faith, regeneration, conversion, Christian life, but by that he by no means wishes to indicate that they then first come into being objectively. The fundamental thought from which Calvin proceeds is a wholly different one; election is an eternal decree, even though man first becomes conscious of it through faith, and the forgiveness of sins rests only in Christ, even though it is first bestowed upon us in faith. For in Calvin the thought repeatedly returns, that there is no communion in the benefits of Christ except through communion in his person, Inst. III 1, 1. 3. 2, 24. 3, 9. 11, 10 etc. Herein in principle all the difference is enclosed, which in the order of salvation exists between Reformed and Lutheran, cf. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. II 311-316. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 195 II 22. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. V 115. If it is nevertheless true, that the very first benefit of grace already presupposes the communion in the person of Christ, then the imputation and bestowal of Christ to the congregation precedes everything. And this is also the Reformed doctrine. Already in eternity, in election, and more closely still in the pactum salutis, a bond has been laid between the mediator and those who have been given to him by the Father. Already then, in the decree of God, a unio mystica has been laid between both and a substitution has come about. By virtue of that covenant Christ has become man and has acquired salvation for his people; he could do that, precisely because he already stood in communion with them, was their surety and mediator, their head and substitute; and the whole congregation, comprehended in him as her head, is objectively with him crucified and died, risen and glorified. All benefits of grace thus lie ready in the person of

Christ for the congregation; everything is accomplished; God is reconciled; nothing is added by man. Reconciliation, forgiveness, justification, unio mystica, sanctification, glorification etc., they do not come into being after and through faith, but in an objective, active sense they are present in Christ; they are fruits of his suffering and dying alone; and on our side they are only accepted through faith. God bestows them and imputes them to the congregation in the decree, in the resurrection of Christ, in the calling [449] through the gospel. In God's time they also come subjectively into the possession of believers. For even though it is the case that man has nothing to add to the work of Christ, Christ himself has by no means yet completed the work assigned to him with the acquisition of salvation. He has undertaken to make his people actually and fully blessed. He does not step down as mediator before he has presented his congregation without spot or wrinkle to the Father. The application of salvation is an equally essential constituent of redemption as the acquisition. Dempta applicatione, redemptio non est redemptio. Christ therefore continues in heaven his prophetic, priestly, and kingly activity. The application of salvation is his work; he is the acting one; he communicates himself and his benefits to his own by a gratia irresistibilis and inamissibilis. Soteriology too is to be considered theologically, as a work of Father, Son, and Spirit. And just as the acquisition of salvation by Christ took place in the way of the covenant, so this also happens with its application. In the first place, the bringing in of the elect is not to be thought individualistically and atomistically, for they have all been given to Christ, are comprehended in the covenant, are in their time born out of Christ, as the body with its members out of the head, and made partakers of all his benefits. The congregation is an organism, not an aggregate; the whole precedes the parts. Some Reformed, Wollebius, Theol.

c. 21-27, Keckermann, Syst. Theol. 1603 p. 370, Brakel, Red. Godsd. I c. 24-29 e. a. therefore even treated the doctrine of the church before that of salvation. This is not necessary, because Reformed theology in the covenant of grace possesses what these theologians meant with this their order; it also confuses the church as body of Christ with the church as institute, as Ritschl also does, when he asserts that Calvin places the church above the order of salvation, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 216. But it nevertheless expresses a true thought; the covenant of grace does not come into being through the order of salvation but precedes it. In the second place, regeneration, faith, conversion are no preparations, which proceed outside Christ and the covenant of grace and first lead man to Christ. But they are benefits, which already flow forth from the covenant of grace, from the unio mystica, from the bestowal of the person of Christ. The Holy Spirit, who is the author of these [450] benefits, has been acquired by Christ for his own; the imputation of Christ thus precedes the gift of the Spirit. Regeneration, conversion, faith do not first lead to Christ, but are derived from him. In the third place, faith and justification in the Reformed order of salvation do not take that central place which is assigned to them by the Lutherans. For faith in no way brings about the benefit of forgiveness, but only accepts it out of Christ. The emphasis does not fall on the subject and his experiences, but on the objective work of Christ. Faith itself is only a link in the long chain of salvation. It is rooted in election, it is a benefit of the covenant of grace, it is a gift of Christ, it is a fruit of regeneration, it is even as habitus in the children of the covenant and remains in principle also in believers in their falling and stumbling present, it is even in those who are brought in at a later age not worked magically but rather prepared by all kinds of leadings of life; special grace connects itself to general grace in nature. In the fourth

place, this faith brings with it the assurance of salvation, for this lies unshakably fixed in the counsel of God, in the person of Christ, in the covenant of grace. And because sanctification is just as much a benefit of Christ as justification, because the good works in which believers must walk have been prepared by God in Christ, faith cannot remain standing with the forgiveness of sins, but it also extends to the perfection that is in Christ, seeks to confirm and strengthen itself out of the good works as its fruits, girds itself with the courage and the strength, in order not only to live with Christ in hidden communion, but also under him as king to fight against sin, world, and flesh on every terrain and to make everything serviceable to the honor of God's name.

8. But alongside these conceptions of the order of salvation many others also arose. Mysticism, which always and everywhere, in India and Arabia, among Jews and Greeks, among Roman Catholics and Protestants, exhibits the same character, causes everything objective and external to recede in the face of the internal process of salvation. It therefore in Christianity takes little account of Holy Scripture, Christ [451] for us, satisfaction, imputed righteousness, justification, church, sacraments, etc., but places all weight on internal grace, illumination, regeneration, Christ in us, infused righteousness, renewal of the Holy Spirit, etc. By three stages it seeks to attain perfection: καθαρσις (via purgativa, ascese), φωτισμος (via illuminativa, meditatio) and ἐποπτεια (via contemplativa, exstase). When, namely, the soul by asceticism has withdrawn itself from the whole world and by meditation has concentrated itself entirely upon one point, then it becomes partaker of the vision of God, deification, transformation in Christ, etc.; then it loses itself and sinks away in God, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. V 599 f. Voetius, Exerc. pietatis 56 sq. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 208. 796. 821.

Erbkam, Gesch. d. prot. Sekten 52 f., and further literature in Herzog2 15, 487-504. Directly over against that stands rationalism, which was prepared by Socinianism and Remonstrantism and in the 18th century dominated minds. It sees in Christ no more than a prophet and teacher, who has proclaimed the truth of God and sealed it with his life and death; by imitating Him, the human being, indeed weakened by sin but not powerless, becomes partaker of salvation. The calling, which in the gospel comes to him, therefore exerts upon his understanding and will only a moral influence. If the human being, out of his own free choice, gives heed to that calling, assents to the truth, trusts in God's grace and fulfils Christ's commandments—for in assensus, fiducia and obedientia consists the essence of faith—then he is justified on account of this faith, which in principle includes the whole obedience and is already by God out of grace, for Christ's sake, reckoned as perfect obedience, and upon perseverance becomes partaker of eternal salvation, cf. Fock, der Socin. 651-689. Conf. Rem. en Apol. Conf. VII. Limborch, Theol. Chr. IV 11 sq. V 8 sq. VI 4 sq. Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 146 sq. Bretschneider, Dogm. § 177 f. Knapp, Glaub. II 323 f. 382 f. Reinhard, Dogm. § 130.

In the same way as mysticism and rationalism, in the order of salvation antinomianism and neonomianism stand over against each other. Antinomianism is in general that tendency which in the first place reduces the application of salvation wholly and entirely to, and identifies it with, the acquisition of salvation. Christ namely [452] has accomplished everything, He has taken over from us not only our guilt but even the stain of sin, He has acquired for us not only righteousness but also regeneration and sanctification; for the human being therefore nothing remains to be done; repentance, conversion, penance, prayer for forgiveness, the doing of good

works, it is all unnecessary, bears a legalistic character and falls short of the perfection of the offering of Christ. The human being needs only to believe, i.e. to come to the insight that he is justified, regenerated, sanctified, that he is perfect in Christ; the sins which he then still commits are no sins any longer, they are works of the old man, which do not concern the believer as such any more, for this one is perfect in Christ, is freed from the law and glories in grace. Usually, however, antinomianism does not stop here but takes yet a step further back; it first reduces the application of salvation to the acquisition and then in turn reduces this again to the decree of God. Christ too has not acquired salvation, for this lay ready eternally in God's decree, but He has only revealed God's love; believing is therefore nothing other than laying aside the delusion that God is angry with us; sin consists only in that delusion. Such feelings were formerly proclaimed by the Gnostics, in the Middle Ages by many libertinistic sects and found entrance in the Reformed church among the Hattemists and Hebrews, cf. Hulsius, De hedendaagsche Antinomianerye, 2e dr. 1738. Fruytier, Klaer en kort vertoog van de valsheit en gedeformeertheit van het gevoelen der sogen. Hebreën 1697. M. Leydecker, Hist. en Godg. Oefeningen over de oorsprong, voortgang en gevoelens v. d. oude en nieuwe Antin. 1700. Ypey, Gesch. d. chr. Kerk in de 18e E. VII 290v. J. van Leeuwen in Ned. Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. VIII 1848 bl. 57-169. van Manen in Gids, Sept. Oct. 1885. It is understandable that this antinomianism found so much entrance precisely in the Reformed church; the Reformed order of salvation shows unmistakably kinship with it. Already from the Reformation onward many, because remissio peccatorum fide non efficitur sed accipitur, had placed justification or the forgiveness of sins before faith and had described the essence of faith as cognitio, certitudo, Luther in Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I 223. Melanchton

in Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 197. Calvin, Inst. III 2, 7. 14. [453] Hyperius, Meth. Theol. 1574 p. 205. Ursinus on q. 21 Heid. Cat. Olevianus, Verklaring der Apost. geloofsbel. 2e dr. Doesburg 1868 bl. 131. 261. 418. 462 and so forth Pareus, Tossanus, Piscator, Twissus e. a. Above all this view in England, over against the neonomianism gaining ground, was developed with clarity by the so-called antinomians, but who are better designated as antineonomians, John Eaton, The honeycombe of free justification bij Christ alone, London 1642. William Eyre, Vindiciae justificationis gratuitae 1654. Tobias Crisp, Christ alone exalted 1643. John Saltmarsh, Free grace 1645. Samuel Crisp, Christ. made sin 1691. Thomas Tully, Justificatio paulina sine operibus 1674. Isaac Chauncy, Neonomianism unmasked 1692. Id. Alexipharmacon, a fresh antidote against neonomian bane 1700, cf. Witsius, Misc. Sacra II 753 sq. Hoornbeek, Summa Contr. 1653 p. 701. Pfaff, Hist. theol. litt. 257 sq. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. II 1069. Id. Einl. in die Religionsstr. auss. d. luth. K. III 999. In this country this conception of justification as preceding faith, whether then in the decree of God or in the resurrection of Christ or in the promise of the gospel or in the internal calling, and correspondingly also the conception of faith as cognitio and certitudo, was defended by Trigland, Antapol. 314. Maccovius, Loci c. 69-72. Coll. theol. p. 128. Loc. Comm. Disp. 1641 p. 309. Voetius, Disp. II 453 sq. V 277 sq. Hoornbeek, Summa Contr. 705, and especially in the 18th century by Holtius, Rechtv. door het geloof 1750. Comrie, Heid. Cat. vr. 21. Id. Brief over de rechtv. des zondaars door de onmidd. toerekening der gerecht, van Christus, nieuwe uitg. Utrecht 1889. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol., voorrede voor de 7e Samenspraak. Walch. art. 3. Brahe, Aanm. over de vijf Walch. art. 1758 bl. 60v. Godgeleerde stellingen over de leer der rechtv. des zondaars voor God,

opgesteld door J. J. Brahe, nieuwe uitgave door A. Capadose, Amst. 1833, cf. also Hartmann, Huisbijbel op Rom. 4:5. van Thuynen, Korte Uitlegging van het Geref. geloof 1722. Vrolikhert, Twee Godg. verh. over werkverbond en toerekening van Christus' dad. gehoorz. en over den aard en het wezen des geloofs 1732. B. S. Cremer, Summa theol. supran. 1730. Id. Evang. Geloofsketen der waarheid 1740. But by no means all could find themselves in this representation. Over against it stood another description of the order of salvation, [454] which can be designated as neonomian and again is to be distinguished into a more rationalistic and into a more pietistic one. The former direction is rooted in principle already in the doctrine of Piscator, that the active obedience of Christ does not belong to satisfaction, and soon became of great significance and influence through the school of Saumur. Camero taught there, that the will always follows the understanding and that therefore for conversion illumination of the understanding is sufficient. Amyraldus made objective grace universal. Pajon considered an internal grace unnecessary and let the efficacia of the calling, in the manner of Bellarminus, depend on its congruity with the circumstances in which it comes to someone. The consequence of that was that natural inability, covenant of works, immediate imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness etc. were denied, faith was joined together with works and thus was conceived as means or ground of justification. This happened inter alia in England through George Bull, Harmonia apostolica 1670, who indeed was opposed by many but was defended by Morus, Glanville, Whitby, Tillotson, Cave etc., M. Vitringa III 296; in Scotland by the Anti-Marrowmen Simson, Hadow e. a., above p. 395; in America by the followers of Jonathan Edwards, above p. 127; and in this country by Vlak, who in his Eeuwig Evangelie 1684 taught a justification

out of the works of faith, by van den Os 1740, who defined faith as trust in Christ and obedience to his commandments, by J. van den Honert, Verh. van de rechtv. des sondaers uyt en door het geloof, and J. J. Schultens, Uitv. Waarschuwing op verscheiden stukken der Kategismusverklaaringe van Al. Comrie 1755 and (Petrus Boddaert), Wolk van getuigen voor de leer de rechtv. door en uit het geloove, verzameld bij gelegenheid van het in 't licht geven der Aanm. over de vijf Walch. art. door J. J. Brahe, who all denied the immediate imputation and placed faith before justification, by Kleman, who in his Orde des heils 1774 assumed such a connection laid by God's wisdom and goodness between the human being's moral actions and the supernatural communication of faith, that all who make a proper use of their natural powers can certainly count on the obtaining of supernatural grace etc. [455]

9. But neo-nomianism also appeared in a pietistic form and then, if not faith and obedience, still made faith and experience a condition of justification. From the beginning there was in the Reformed church and theology a practical direction, which was averse to all scholasticism and laid all emphasis on life. It was especially supported and promoted by the philosopher Petrus Ramus, who was a strong opponent of Aristotle, desired more simplicity in philosophy, and defined theology as doctrina bene vivendi, whose goal is not notitia rerum sed usus et exercitatio, cf. Tideman, in Stud. en Bijdr. op het gebied der hist. Theol. door Moll en de Hoop Scheffer III 1876 bl. 389-429. This view found acceptance with many Reformed theologians, at Strassburg with Sturm, at Heidelberg with Tremellius, at Herborn with Piscator, in the Netherlands with Snellius, Scaliger, Jac. Alting, at Cambridge with Perkins, whose pupil Amesius, later professor at Franeker alongside Maccovius, also defined theology as

doctrina Deo vivendi, studium pietatis, seated in the will, cf. Dr. H. Visscher, Guil. Amesius, Haarlem 1894. Thus there arose a practical, pietistic direction, in England e.g. represented by R. Baxter, A call to the unconverted 1669, Daniel Williams, Gospel truth stated and vindicated 1692, B. Woodbridge, The method of grace in the justification of sinners 1656 and many practical writers, and in this country advocated by many theologians and preachers, Witsius, Vitringa, Lampe, Mel, d'Outrein, Brakel, Hellenbroek, Smytegelt, Francken, Groenewegen, Borstius, van der Groe, Eswijler, Schortinghuis etc., cf. Heppe, Gesch. d. Piet. u. d. Mystik in der ref. K. Leiden 1879. Göbel, Gesch. d. chr. Lebens in der rh.-westph. ev. K. 3 Bde 1849-1860. Ritschl, Gesch. des Pietismus, I in der ref. K. 1880. In proportion as conditions in the church became more sorrowful and a dead orthodoxy gained the upper hand, these writers all laid emphasis on the necessity of a true conversion. Birth from believing parents, membership in the church, baptism, the Lord's Supper, orthodox faith was not enough. One had to partake of the true, saving faith, which bore a wholly different character than temporal faith and miracle faith and historical faith. True faith does not arise until after terror before the law, fear of judgment, anxiety over sin have preceded. The essence of faith is also not assent or conviction [456] but consists much more in trust than in knowledge; it is seated more in the heart and the will than in the understanding. And it is not immediately certitudo, certainty; no, as Gomarus, Op. I 654 sq. had already said, a distinction must be made between a refuge-taking and an assured trust; the former alone constitutes the essence of faith, the latter belongs to its well-being and can be added to it much later. That faith as refuge-taking trust, consisting in a hungering and thirsting after Christ and his righteousness, is a condition which precedes justification; it entrusts itself to

Christ in order to be justified; when it has accepted the righteousness of Christ, then it goes with it to God the Father, points Him to his promises, and is justified by Him. Thus it does not proceed so simply and so easily as many suppose; the gospel is not for all people, the offer of salvation is not general, the law is for all, but the gospel is only for certain "qualified" sinners, for those initially graced. No one may believe except he who has first received the freedom from the Holy Spirit to do so; let one beware of an imagined and of a stolen faith! Therefore continual self-examination remains necessary; one can so easily deceive oneself; the distinction is so fine between the regenerate at his worst and the unregenerate at his best; there is so much similarity between false and true grace. Thus the believer always has again to examine himself and to test himself by the marks of spiritual life; the way of salvation is a narrow, constricted way, along which even the righteous are scarcely saved. It is also a long way. From refuge-taking to assured trust there is a great distance; between them move many classes and groups of people, discovered, convinced, troubled, desirous of salvation, small- and weak-believers etc. The sealing and assurance as a rule follows only after a long time of doubt and struggle, and then often comes about in an extraordinary way, by a voice, a vision, a suddenly occurring word of comfort of Scripture etc. This pietism in the Reformed church is related to the Lutheran, which had been prepared by Musaeus, Arnd etc., and also by Reformed writers, such as Baxter, Dyke, Bayle e. a., and then through Spener 1635-1705 became a mighty movement and obtained a great expansion. By preaching, discipline, collegia pietatis and many writings such as Pia desideria oder herzliches Verlangen nach gottgefälliger Besserung der wahren christlichen Kirche 1675 Spener opposed dead orthodoxy. He wanted a return to the grace of regeneration

received in baptism but later lost. Historical faith is insufficient; a living, active faith is necessary for salvation. And one receives this faith only when one learns to know one's sins through the preaching of the law, and has had a long, anxious struggle with devil, world, and flesh, even to the point of despair (Busskampf); then from that true faith comes to Durchbruch. This faith therefore consists not only in assent, but in trust; it is an experience, an experience of the heart, a life of the soul. And as such it is also first a means to justification, then thereafter to reveal itself in a holy life distinguished from the world, even abstaining from the adiaphora. Cf. Walch, Hist. u. theol. Einl. in die Religionsstreit. der ev. luth. K. II 239-436. Ritschl, Gesch. d. Pietismus II 1884. Riggenbach, Herzog2 11, 672 and the literature cited there. In this pietism Zinzendorf 1700-1760 was brought up, and he remained in agreement with it in aversion to dead orthodoxy; but pietism was nevertheless too legalistic for him. Terror before the law and anxiety over sin, though not wrong and sometimes having a preparatory power, are nevertheless not the true thing. True repentance, although the word repentance is less accurate, because it makes one think of punishment, proceeds from the gospel, from the preaching of the suffering Christ. It consists not so much in anxiety and struggle, in lamenting and weeping, but in trust in God's grace. It is a matter of the heart, of feeling. Therefore the heart must be made sensitive, and that happens best through the vivid portrayal of Christ's form of suffering, of his blood and wounds. Thereby as by immediate contemplation, by a deep, living impression, by a Wundenblick, faith is born in the heart, without one having gone through a Busskampf or knowing precisely the hour of one's regeneration. That faith brings about a union, a betrothal, a marriage between Christ and the soul, makes the heart swim in grace, i.e. in Jesus' blood, as in its element, and

makes the believer always live in the liebe [458] Nähe of the Savior. It justifies and regenerates at the same time; faith and love coincide; more than objective justification, the dynamic communication of the Spirit, the birth from Jesus' side, is of value. Born from Him, believers live without pietistic scrupulosity in his nearness, do everything in his name, place everything, also domestic and social life, under his regiment, and lead a cheerful, Christian life, cf. Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. I 301-453 II 242-420 III 45-215. Spangenberg, Idea fidei fratrum 1778. Becker in Herzog2 17, 513. Ritschl, Gesch. d. Pietismus III 1886. What pietism was for the Lutheran, later the Methodism of Wesley 1703-1791 and Whitefield 1714-1771 became for the Reformed church. It originally wanted nothing else than to shake the sleeping church awake and to animate orthodox Christendom with a new life. To that end, first of all, by a gripping preaching of righteousness, sin, judgment, damnation, people had to be brought suddenly to a deep awareness of their lost condition; then in the same moment, without delay, be led by faith to Christ and assured of their salvation; and thereafter be urged to a new life, active in the service of the kingdom of God, devoting itself to mission and philanthropy, abstaining from all kinds of indifferent things, a sinless life. Methodism betrays, in distinction from pietism, clearly its English origin and Reformed descent. It is indeed just as much a reaction against dead orthodoxy; but it wants to know nothing of preparation, of no gradual progress of conversion; it has no prolonged Busskampf, no finally entering Durchbruch, no later following Versiegelung; it draws everything together into one point, places conversion in the full light of consciousness, and keeps record of the saved souls. And when it has converted people, it does not gather them in quiet, withdrawn circles, in societies and conventicles, in order there to cultivate piety; but it

organizes them into an army, which proceeds in an offensive manner, full of fire enters the wide world and conquers it by storm for Christ, cf. Schaff, Creeds I 882 III 807. Schoell in Herzog2 9, 681. Schneckenburger, Vorl. über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren prot. Kirchenparteien 1863 d. 103-151. Lecky, Entstehungsgesch. u. Charakt. der Methodismus, aus d. Engl. [459] Leipzig 1880. Kolde, Der Methodismus und seine Bekämpfung, Erl. 1886. Id. Die Heilsarmee, Erl. 1885.

10. Also in more recent theology the descriptions of the order of salvation diverge widely. Kant, through his doctrine of radical Böse, came to the recognition that in man a neue Schöpfung had to take place, Religion ed. Rosenkranz 54. Nevertheless he sees in conversion a work of man; concludes, just like Pelagius with his si debet, potest, from the du sollst to the du kannst; and exhorts everyone to do what is in his power to become a better man and then further to hope for höhere Mitwirkung, ib. 58. 59. Even if it is now the case that that conversion remains imperfect on earth, God counts the disposition for the deed and justifies us out of grace. Also, after his conversion man still always atones for the sins that he formerly committed, voluntarily takes the sorrow and punishment for them upon himself, and thus also makes himself worthy of forgiveness, ib. 82. 86 f. Even more strongly than by Kant was the corruption of human nature taught by Schopenhauer; he too therefore said that, in order to improve man radically, illumination of the head, development of the intellect was wholly insufficient, that there had to take place a rebirth of the core of his being, because operari sequitur esse, Die Welt I6 477 f. II6 692 f. But he himself again deviates from this line of his thoughts and seeks deliverance from suffering partly in art and philosophy but especially in this, that man in the light of knowledge lets the whole wretched life work as a quietive for the

will, den will verneine and thus enter into the nirwana, where the will is completely extinguished, ib. I 448 f. In this Schopenhauer agreed with Schelling, whose negative philosophy ended with that, that blessedness is attainable, not along the path of virtue and the keeping of the law, but only in the way of the "beschauliche" life, Werke I 8 S. 235 f. II 1 S. 554 f., but who nevertheless in his positive philosophy expressed that man becomes partaker of justification and blessedness only through religion, through communion with the risen Christ, denn Person sucht Person, ib. 566 f. II 4 S. 217 f. And thus also von Hartmann seeks blessedness not in art, philosophy, religion but in the decision once to be taken by humanity, to destroy willing, in the Universalwillensverneinung, Philos. d. Unb. II9 400 f. With Hegel reconciliation is a process in the Divine being itself. Man is essentially one with God, but he does not know it. Being and consciousness are divided, man is to himself a stranger. But Christ was the first who became conscious of his Divine being, his being-one with God. And whoever, like Christ, in his communion, sees and acknowledges that unity, he is reconciled. What matters here is the disposition; the deed still for a long time lags behind that disposition but this imperfection is a vanishing moment and therefore does not count at all in reconciliation, Philos. d. Rel., Werke XII 266 f. In accordance with this philosophy of Hegel the theology of the moderns teaches that God and man, grace and will in the work of conversion form no antithesis, but that conversion at the same time and wholly is an act of both. Grace namely in fact coincides with the providence of God, works only ethically and pedagogically, itself cultivates and strengthens in the religious community the receptivity for salvation (facultas se applicandi ad gratiam). In the long run it will then also bring all men to salvation and overcome all resistance. Man also in the proper sense

has no need of rebirth; only can conversion be so called, if it is considered from God's side. That conversion itself consists in repentance, i.e. remorse over past sins, disposition to bear the punishment for them willingly and henceforth to improve life, and in faith, i.e. trust in the grace of God in Christ. If man thus converts himself, then he is therein also immediately justified. Justification namely is no transcendent act of God but nothing other than the removal of the consciousness of guilt, change in the consciousness of the relation to God, abolition of the discord between the natural I and its destination. For in conversion man is initially renewed and as such bears the guarantee of perfection in himself, just as in the seed the plant is hidden and in the child the man. Cf. Strauss, Chr. Gl. II 362 f. 463. 492-497. Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 847-911. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 138-164. Lang, Versuch einer chr. Dogm. § 19-25. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 170. Scholten, L. H. K. II 76v. 109v. Initia c. 5. [461]

More in appearance than in reality does the representation which Schleiermacher gives of this order of salvation differ from this. After Christ, so he says, has entered into our fellowship of sin and misery, He has the power and the calling to receive us into His fellowship of holiness and blessedness. That takes place through regeneration and sanctification. Regeneration consists in conversion and justification, which both are one and the same, viewed at one time from our side, at another time from God's side. In conversion, which again has two parts: repentance and faith, man is not cooperating and also not wholly passive but receptive (in the sense of Melanchthon's facultas se applicandi ad gratiam), so that then also the whole of humanity once becomes ripe for grace and partakes of salvation. Justification is that act of God by which man is placed in fellowship with Christ; it consists negatively in forgiveness, i.e. condemnation of the old,

and positively in adoption, i.e. awakening of a new life; and, as the reverse side of conversion, leaves forgiveness in fact separated, because and insofar as man in the fellowship of Christ partakes of a new life. The Vermittelungstheologen have indeed assigned a broader place in dogmatics to the person of Christ and to the activity of the H. Spirit; but in the order of salvation they nevertheless have not wholly gone beyond Schleiermacher's thoughts. In the first place, almost all of them ascribe to man the power to accept or to reject grace, whether that power is derived from the creation or providence of God, or from the gratia praeparans bestowed in baptism or calling, cf. part II 343. And in the second place, they do correct Schleiermacher insofar as they hold justification to be an objective act of God, but they nevertheless all let it take place on the ground, not of the imputed but of the infused righteousness of Christ, so that they teach not only a judicial but also a communicating, sanctifying act of God and a προληψις of the future, cf. e.g. Neander, Gesch. der Pflanzung u. Leitung der chr. K.5 551 f. Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehre § 146. 147. Martensen, Chr. Dogm. § 230. 231. Lange, Chr. Dogm. II § 95. Ebrard, Dogm. § 443. Schöberlein, Prinzip u. Syst. d. Dogm. 652 etc.; also Beck, Chr. Lehrwiss. I 522 f. 533 f. Chr. Glaub. II 595 f., cf. Die Rechtfertigungslehre der Prof. d. Theol. Joh. Tob. Beck, O. F. Myrberg [462] und A. W. Ingman, geprüft u. beleuchtet von mehreren evang. Theologen u. von E. T. Gestrin, Berlin 1892; and even Hengstenberg in the Ev. Kirchenz. of 1866 and 1867, who for his opinion appealed to the epistle of James and also to Luk. 7:36v., cf. Bew. d. Gl. 1868 S. 381 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 644 f.

Over against this justification built on the subject, Ritschl returned again to the person of Christ and sought in his work the ground of forgiveness. To be sure, not in the sense that it had been acquired by Christ and consisted in

a change of God's disposition, for God is eternal love and punitive justice is not found with Him. But Christ, through his perfect fidelity to his calling, through his uninterrupted communion with God, through his complete surrender to God's will, nevertheless proclaimed and proved that God is love, that He does not wrath or punish but forgives. This now was necessary, not because God is far from humanity, but because humanity, through its sin, which is properly ignorance, no objective guilt but subjective consciousness of guilt, is far from God. Therefore Christ, even unto death, proclaimed God's love and, making God's purpose with humanity his own, founded a kingdom of God, a community, in which he transplanted that consciousness that God is love and forgives sin, and that it, without its sin needing to hinder it, can live in communion with God. Justification is therefore with Ritschl a synthetic judgment, not pronounced on the ground of good works but preceding those good works; for first in man the fear of God as the judge must give place to the consciousness of his communion, before he can do good works and fulfil his moral calling. Further, that justification is also no pronouncement about, no experience of, the individual believer, but it is a good of the community, which knows itself, in spite of its sin, to stand in communion with God; it coincides with the founding of the community itself, Rechtf. u. Vers.2 III 26-131. Kaftan, Dogm. 493 f. Schultz, Grundriss der ev. Dogm. § 52. The particular persons become partakers of this benefit of justification only by joining the community and appropriating it to themselves in faith. That faith is free, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 536; election also has not individual human beings but [463] the community as its object, ib. III 114. That faith is also not worked magically, but education is the ordinary form in which someone comes to faith, III 555. It consists essentially in trust, is independent of historical

investigation and its results, and rests on a deep impression that is made by the moral greatness of Jesus on the unprejudiced mind, cf. deel I 453. Through that faith man receives another judgment about God, himself, the world; he learns to know God as love, knows that his sin is no longer any hindrance for communion with God, regards disasters and misfortunes no longer as punishments but rules spiritually over all things; in one word, his consciousness of guilt is taken away and therein consists his justification, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 38 f. Consequence of this justification is reconciliation, the laying aside of enmity toward God on the ground of that justification, ib. III 74-76. And with that justification and reconciliation regeneration is essentially identical, for this does not consist in a hyperphysical change, but in a change of mood and disposition, ib. III 557. 562.

11. By the order of salvation, ordo or via salutis, is to be understood the manner in which, or the way along which, the sinner comes into possession of the benefits of grace, which have been acquired by Christ. In dogmatics it only late received an independent place and a somewhat regulated treatment. Among the scholastics the material for this locus is still scattered; the principal thing that here comes under discussion is to be found in the commentaries on Sent. II dist. 26-29, III dist. 25-27 and Summa II 1 qu. 109-114. The Tridentinum treats all the subjects relating to grace under the title de justificatione, sess. VI. The Roman theologians usually summarize the material in a locus de gratia and bring up therein successively the gratia actualis (natura, necessitas, gratuitas; sufficientia, efficacia etc.), the gratia habitualis (justincatio) and the fructus gratiae (meritum). The Reformation was the cause that this locus was treated much more broadly than formerly; it itself at first indeed spoke therein only of the poenitentia, the fide and the bonis operibus, but gradually expanded the number of subjects and treated

successively the vocatione, the illuminatione, the regeneratione, the conversione, the fide, [464] the justificatione etc. Naturally there was then soon felt the need to bring this extensive, rich material together again under one head. Calvin already led the way in this and gave to the third book of his Institutie the title: de modo percipiendae Christi gratiae, et qui inde fructus nobis proveniant et qui effectus consequantur. Others speak of the gratia Sp. S. applicatrix (Quenstedt), σωτηριοποια seu salutis consequendae modus (Calovius), redemptionis applicatio (Mastricht), ordo salutis seu salutis impetrandae modus (Reinhard) etc. This order of salvation now has to struggle with a peculiar difficulty. For on the one hand everything has been accomplished by Christ, sin reconciled, the law fulfilled, death overcome, Satan subdued, forgiveness acquired, life in incorruptibility brought to light. One would expect that they for whom Christ has died would at once and completely be delivered from sin, suffering, death and would become partakers of holiness and blessedness. This, however, is not the case; on the contrary they are in time admonished to faith and repentance, must be born again, justified, sanctified and glorified, remain in this life subject to sin, suffering and death and only through many tribulations enter into the kingdom of heaven. How is the one to be reconciled with the other? On the one hand everything accomplished, so that for man nothing remains to be done; and on the other hand it seems that to man still the principal thing must yet happen, if he is to become partaker of the acquired salvation. The Christian religion seems to adopt two irreconcilable standpoints, the hetero- and the autosoteric, as it ascribes the acquisition of salvation wholly to Christ and yet exhorts us to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, cf. v. Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie I 569 f. Two rocks there are therefore, on which the

Christian order of salvation always ran the danger of being wrecked, on antinomianism on the one and on pelagianism on the other side.

Pelagianism not only conflicts with the decrees of God, part II 349-357, but it also does injustice to the person and the work of Christ. In proportion as it extends human activity in the acquisition of salvation, it contracts that of Christ. For it is clear that, if faith, conversion, perseverance, stand wholly or in part in man's power and are his work, if the [465] decision concerning actually becoming saved in the end, when it comes down to it, lies in the hands of man, then Christ at most can only have acquired the possibility of becoming saved. He has then indeed opened the opportunity, but whether someone or few or many or all will make use of that opportunity and continue to make use of it, depends in the end on the people themselves. God left them free and placed the decision in their hands. Then it follows that Christ in fact has by no means accomplished everything, but that the principal thing, i.e. that which decides about actually becoming saved, still must be done by man. Christ thus descends from the only place which He occupies in the work of salvation; He comes to stand on one line with all those prophets and teachers through whom God has instructed and educated men; his work becomes akin to and inserted into all those preparatory and pedagogical activities which God has expended upon the human race; the gospel of grace is only gradually distinguished from the lex naturae. And man himself, though helped and supported by all that educating labor of God, is called to self-activity. It depends on him whether he will seize the opportunities that God offers him and thus will become a partaker of salvation. The Pelagian representation of the order of salvation wipes out the specific distinction between Christianity and the heathen religions, comprehends them all together in one process, and can at most honor the

Christian religion as the first among its equals. It falls back into paganism and has salvation acquired by man's own wisdom and power. And thereby it also undermines the certainty of faith. Of the Heathen Paul testifies that they are without Christ and therefore also without God and without hope in the world, Ef. 2:12. From the works of the law there is no justification, there is also no certainty of salvation; in proportion as someone more precisely examines himself and his good works, he comes to the sad discovery that even his best works are imperfect and stained with sin; he must therefore content himself either with an appeal to God's love, which overlooks what is lacking and takes the will for the deed, or with an authority of church and priest, and surrender himself to a false reassurance; certainty he never has and [466] never gets for himself. Indeed, because grace, insofar as bestowed on him and necessary, remains not only resistible but also always amissible, he is at every moment exposed to the danger of again losing what he has and falling away from the hope of salvation. On this standpoint no fixed course, no development of the Christian life is possible. It is even wholly uncertain what the result of world history will be, whether there will come a church, a kingdom of God; the government of the world rests for the principal part, that is, for the eternal final destiny, in the hands of man. The errors of this rationalistic Pelagianism clearly leap to the eye; but they are also present where it wraps itself in pietistic or methodistic garb. Pietism and Methodism were, like so many other attempts at reformation of life in Protestant churches, in their right over against dead orthodoxy. They originally intended nothing else than to shake awake sleeping Christendom, wished to introduce no change in the confession of the Reformation but only to apply this in life. But out of understandable reaction they have in this their striving often gone too far and swung over to

another extreme. They too have gradually shifted the center of gravity from the objective to the subjective work of salvation. Thereby it is then in the essence of the matter indifferent whether one makes salvation dependent on faith and obedience or on faith and experience. In both cases man himself comes to the foreground. Even if pietism and methodism did not deny the acquisition of salvation by Christ, it nevertheless left this standing unused and brought it into no organic connection with the application. It was, so to speak, dead capital. The official activity of the exalted Christ, the Lord from heaven, receded into the shadow behind the experiences and feelings of the subject. In pietism man was referred, instead of to Christ, to himself; he had to traverse a long road, satisfy all kinds of demands and conditions, test himself by many and manifold marks, before he might believe, appropriate Christ to himself, and be assured of his salvation. Methodism attempted to draw all this, conversion, faith, assurance, together into one indivisible moment, but it systematized this method, though very much shortened, in [467] the same way as pietism. In both there is a failure to recognize the activity of the H. Spirit, of the preparation of grace, of the connection of creation and re-creation. And therefore in neither does it come to a true Christian life. Whether this pietistically withdraws from the world or after a methodistic fashion acts aggressively in the world, it is always something separate, something that stands dualistically alongside natural life, and that therefore does not work organically in family and society and state, in science and art. With or without the uniform of the army of salvation, Christians are a special kind of people, who live not in but outside the world. The Reformation antithesis of sin and grace has more or less made room for the Roman antithesis of natural and supernatural. Puritanism has

been exchanged for asceticism. The essence of sanctification lies in abstinence from indifferent things.

On the other hand stands antinomianism. Over against Pelagianism it defends an important truth, which we, precisely in order to overcome antinomianism, must acknowledge not by halves but wholly and completely. It is true that Christ has accomplished everything and that man has nothing to add to his offering unto salvation, nor can he contribute anything at all. But antinomianism (not to be confused with properly antineonomianism in England and in this country) makes use of this truth only in order to give entrance to a wholly different doctrine. For most certainly, Christ has accomplished everything. But does that mean that not we, but that also Christ has nothing more to do, after He has suffered and died? Indeed no, for Christ has also been raised and glorified, He has through and after His resurrection been appointed Son of God in power, Lord from heaven, life-giving Spirit. For Christ there remains in the state of exaltation still much to do; He must also apply and distribute to His church the salvation which He acquired, and to that end has sent out His Spirit, in order that He might regenerate the whole church and lead it into all truth. Antinomianism now fails to recognize this application of the work of salvation; it denies in principle the personality and activity of the H. Spirit. At bottom, according to the law that two extremes touch one another, it agrees with [468] Pelagianism. But precisely because it is inwardly driven by another interest than that of the perfect offering of Christ, it proceeds still further and also denies and combats objective satisfaction. Christ namely by His suffering and dying has not acquired eternal salvation, but He has only made known God's love; reconciliation and justification are from eternity already. Just as in Pelagianism, Christ here descends to the

rank of a prophet and teacher. But while Pelagianism comes to these errors through its deistic principle, antinomianism arises in principle out of pantheism. It resembles as two drops of water the philosophy of Gnosticism, of Spinoza and Hegel. God is essentially one with man; He is from all eternity reconciled; wrath and righteousness are human conceptions. Only man feels himself, through his finitude and limitation, far from God; he thinks that God is far from him, that He is wrathful over sin and demands satisfaction. And that is an erroneous thought which man forms of God. God is eternal love, eternally reconciled, eternally one with man. And the whole redemption therefore consists in this, that man by means of the preaching of the prophets be better informed and enlightened, that he lay aside the delusion of the wrath and the punishment-demanding righteousness of God, that he acknowledge God as his Father, himself as His child. For redemption nothing else is necessary than this enlightenment; in that it consists; it comprises nothing else than faith. There is no conversion, no repentance, no sorrow over sins, no fear of hell, no fear of judgment, no prayer for forgiveness, no sanctification, no good works needed; those are all Pelagian errors, which do injustice to the objective facts of God's grace and reconciliation. On a low, legalistic standpoint one still feels need of that, just as one then still lets satisfaction come about through Christ's offering and speaks of God's wrath and righteousness. But those are religious conceptions, symbolic dressings, which for the common people have their value, but which on the standpoint of the πνευματικοι, of the philosophers, make way for the pure idea and the adequate concept. Just as Pelagianism, so also antinomianism ends with total failure to recognize the essence of Christianity, sinks back to paganism and places [469] the redemption from sin in rationalistic enlightenment or moralistic

improvement of man. Both deny, in Arian or in Sabellian form, the confession of the Trinity.

12. Only on the foundation of the trinitarian confession is there room for an order of salvation in a scriptural, Christian, Reformed sense. From that confession there follows, in the first place, that the application of salvation is distinct from its acquisition. For the Holy Spirit is indeed in essence one with, but nevertheless as person another than, the Father and the Son. He has a proper mode of existence, a proper order of working. Even though all the works of God outwardly are undivided and unseparated, there is nevertheless in creation and re-creation an economy to be observed, which gives us the right to speak of the Father and our creation, of the Son and our redemption, of the Spirit and our sanctification. Why could Christ testify that the H. Spirit was not yet, because He was not yet glorified, and why did the H. Spirit have to be poured out on the day of Pentecost, if sanctification were not a work distinct from creation and redemption, as the Spirit is distinct from Father and Son? The work that had been entrusted to the Mediator was therefore not ended with his suffering and dying. Christ is not in that sense a historical person as others, that He, after having lived and laboured on earth for a time, now still works only through his spirit and exercises influence through his word and example. Although He on earth accomplished all the work that the Father had commissioned Him to do, in heaven He continues his prophetic, priestly, and kingly activity. For that purpose He has precisely been raised and glorified at God's right hand. He is the living Lord from heaven. That activity is another than that which He performed on earth, even though it also stands in the closest connection with it. Through his earthly offering He has accomplished everything that there was to do in the sphere of justice; He has satisfied God's demand,

fulfilled the law, acquired all benefits of grace. That work is finished and is susceptible of no increase or decrease; there is nothing to add to it and nothing to take from it; it is perfect. The Father rests in it and has sealed it with the raising of his Son. All benefits that God grants in the [470] covenant of grace, He grants per et propter Christum. But there is a distinction between ownership and possession. Just as a child, even before his birth, already has a right to all the goods of his father but only at a much later age comes into possession of them, so also all who will later believe have, long before their faith, a right of ownership in Christ to all the benefits that He has acquired; but they enter into possession of them only through faith. The acquisition of salvation thus requires its application; it includes it and brings it forth. Just as the exaltation of Christ stands in connection with his humiliation, just as his activity in heaven with that on earth, so the application of salvation stands in connection with its acquisition. And that application is twofold. The redemption through Christ is, after all, a redemption from sin and all its consequences. He not only took over from us guilt and punishment, but also fulfilled the law in our place. The application of the benefits of Christ must correspondingly consist in justification, i.e. in the assurance of the forgiveness of sins and the right to eternal life, but also in sanctification, i.e. the renewal after the image of Christ. Not only the guilt, also the stain and the power of sin must be taken away. It must be a complete redemption, an entire re-creation. In order to work this out and bring it to pass on the ground of his accomplished offering, for that purpose Christ is exalted at the Father's right hand. For that purpose He has sent out the H. Spirit, who not only testifies with our spirit that we are children of God, but who also regenerates us and re-creates us after the image of God. This work of

application is therefore a divine work, just as much as the creation of the Father and the redemption of the Son; and the Holy Spirit, who brings it to pass, is therefore, with the Father and the Son, one only God, to be praised and extolled unto eternity.

In the second place, the confession of the Trinity implies that the work of sanctification, in the economic sense entrusted to the Holy Spirit, though distinguished, is nevertheless not for a moment separated from the work of redemption and of creation, which are carried out by the Son and the Father. This is already evident from the fact that the Spirit in the Divine being proceeds from the Father and the Son and with them partakes of the same essence. And as He exists, so He works, in creation and also in [471] re-creation. From this it follows first of all that the work of the Spirit is connected with and harmonizes with the work of the Father. There is between the two no opposition and no contradiction. It is not so that the Father wills the salvation of all and the Holy Spirit applies it only to a few, or conversely, but both work together, because they are one in essence. It also follows from this that nature and grace, however distinct, do not exclude one another. The Roman Catholic system of doctrine is wholly and entirely governed by the opposition of nature and supernatural grace; and various Protestant directions and sects have fallen back into that error; pietism and Methodism fail to recognize the right and the value of nature both before and after conversion. But the Reformation in principle knew no other opposition than that of sin and grace. Nature too was a creation of God and stood under his providence; it is in itself of no lesser value than grace. And therefore it could ascribe to nature, i.e. to the guidance of God in natural life both among the peoples and among particular persons, a pedagogical significance. It is God himself who already prepares the

gracious working of the Holy Spirit in the generations, and the Holy Spirit in his activity joins himself to the guidances of God in natural life and seeks by his grace to restore the whole natural life, to deliver it from the power of sin and to consecrate it to God. But from the unity of essence of Father, Son, and Spirit it also follows that the Holy Spirit is connected with the work of the Son. Son and Spirit also do not work against one another, so that the Spirit, e.g., would apply salvation to a few, while the Son would nevertheless have acquired it for all, or conversely. One in essence, they work together with one another in their distinct activity. For through his humiliation the Son himself has become a life-giving Spirit. He lives wholly and entirely by the Spirit. What He has died, that He has once died to sin; what He now lives, He lives to God. He has become fully partaker of immortality, of eternal, spiritual life. There is nothing natural, psychical any longer in Him that can suffer and die. He has, through the Spirit already on earth made fit for his work and anointed with Him without measure, fully acquired that Spirit, received all gifts of that Spirit, lives, rules, and governs now through that Spirit. The [472] Spirit of the Father and of the Son has become his Spirit, the Spirit of Christ. Thus He was not yet, before Christ was glorified. But now he is the Spirit of Christ, his property, his possession. And therefore He sends that Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in order through Him to apply all his benefits to his church. The Holy Spirit does not acquire those benefits, He adds not a single one to them, for Christ has accomplished everything. He is in no respect the meritorious cause of our salvation; this is Christ alone, in whom the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily, and whose work therefore does not need to be supplemented or improved. The Holy Spirit, on the contrary, takes everything from Christ; just as the Son came to glorify the Father, so the Holy Spirit in his turn has

descended, to glorify the Son. Of that Son He testifies, out of his fullness He imparts grace for grace, to that Son He leads, and through the Son to the Father. And all benefits of Christ He applies, to each in his measure, in his time, according to his order. And He does not end his activity before He has caused the fullness of Christ to dwell in his church, and this has become a perfect man and has come to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. Therefore the activity of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than an applying one; the order of salvation an applicatio salutis. The question in that connection is by no means: what does man have to do, in order to become partaker of salvation, but only: what does God do in his grace, in order to make the church partaker of the perfect salvation acquired by Christ. The applicatio salutis too is a work of God, which ought to be regarded theologically, not anthropologically.

Against this conception of the order of salvation, however, from the side of Pelagianism the objection is always raised, that in this way the right of man is denied, his self-activity suppressed, and a godless life promoted. Insofar as this objection would in principle wish to overthrow the testimony of Scripture, that by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, it is not acceptable from a Christian standpoint; whoever would wish to meet it would at that same moment and to that same extent leave the ground of Scripture. Insofar as it is really an objection and deserves consideration, it is untrue and rests on misunderstanding. For the conception of the [473] applicatio salutis as the work of God does not exclude, but includes the full recognition of all those moral factors which, under the guidance of God's providence, act upon the understanding and heart of the unconverted man. Insufficient may they be unto salvation, as Scripture and experience clearly declare; but of any denial of their value, even for the work of grace, there is

from a purely Reformed standpoint no question; for it is God himself, indeed, who thus leads his children of men, bears witness to them, and does good from heaven over them, whether they might seek Him and find Him. Further, it is not to be seen why the Holy Spirit, calling through the Word to faith and conversion, can nullify that moral working of the Word upon heart and conscience which Pelagianism ascribes to it. The Reformed doctrine holds no less, it only includes more, than is acknowledged by Pelagius and his followers. These think to be able to suffice with that moral working; Augustine, however, and his fellow-combatants judged it insufficient but nevertheless fully took it up into the working of grace of the Holy Spirit. Further, the application of salvation is and remains always a work of the Spirit, a work of the Holy Spirit, of the Spirit of Christ, and therefore never coercive and violent, but always spiritual, lovely and gentle, not treating man as a stick or block, but as a rational being, enlightening, convincing, drawing, bending; causing his darkness to yield to light and replacing his spiritual powerlessness with spiritual power. Grace and sin form an antithesis; the latter is overcome only by the power of the former; but as soon and in the same measure as the power of sin is broken, the antithesis between God and man falls away. It is God's Spirit who bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God. I live, yet no longer I, but Christ lives in me, and what I live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God. It is God who works in us both the willing and the working according to his good pleasure, and who himself causes us to work out our salvation with fear and trembling. So far is it from being the case that this theological conception would cultivate a godless life, that it alone guarantees the reality of a new, Christian life, assures believers of the certainty of their salvation, infallibly promises the triumph of the [474] kingdom of God, and causes the

work of the Father and of the Son, in the work of God the Holy Spirit, to attain completion. Pelagianism makes everything shaky and unstable, even the triumph of the good and the triumph of the kingdom of God, because it suspends everything upon the incalculable arbitrariness of man. Coming forward for the rights of man, it tramples the rights of God underfoot and leaves for man only the right of arbitrariness. But the Reformation, coming forward for the rights of God, has therein also again brought the right of man to recognition; for here too the word of Scripture holds: those who honour Me, I will honour, but those who despise Me shall be lightly esteemed. The theological conception of the order of salvation takes up into itself all the good that lies hidden in the anthropological; but the reverse does not take place. God encompasses man, but whoever begins with man excludes God.

13. All the benefits of the covenant, which Christ acquired and the H. Spirit applies, can be summarized under the name of grace. Of grace, however, one can speak in different senses. In the first place it can denote the unmerited favor of God toward his creatures, especially toward sinners; as such it is discussed in the doctrine of God's attributes, part II 182. Next it can be the name for all kinds of bodily and spiritual benefits, which are bestowed by God out of grace upon his creatures and are all gifts of grace, indeed are grace itself, Rom. 5:20, Ef. 1:7, 2:5, 8, Phil. 1:2, Col. 1:2, Tit. 3:7 etc. Furthermore, grace can make known the agreeableness which someone displays through the gifts with which he is adorned in soul or body. And finally χαρις and gratia also have the meaning of thanks, shown by someone to another for received favor (gratias agere). Here we have to do only with grace in the second sense. But even so the concept is still far too broad. For in this locus there are not discussed the objective benefits of grace, which

God has given to human beings in his law, in the gospel, in Christ, church, sacrament etc., and which elsewhere are treated separately in dogmatics. Here in this place belong only those gifts of grace, which are communicated by the H. Spirit subjectively and [475] inwardly to the human being and which stand in connection with his salvation. These gifts of grace are again to be distinguished into gifts of God's general grace, which are bestowed upon all and various human beings in greater or lesser measure; into gifts of God's special grace, which are only the portion of believers, and into extraordinary gifts (charismata), which the H. Spirit distributes in the congregation to each one, likewise as He wills, 1 Cor. 12:4-11. It is clear that especially the second group of gifts of grace in this section of dogmatics has a claim to treatment. Concerning this grace there exists between Rome and the Reformation, specifically in its Reformed development, an important difference. In the first place Rome indeed decidedly teaches the necessity of the gratia actualis (praeveniens, antecedens, excitans, also sometimes called operans) and thus rejects Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism; it also does not understand by that grace the outward calling through the gospel alone with the moral effect on understanding and will connected with it; it thinks in that connection of an illustratio intellectus and inspiratio voluntatis, which adds to the human being not only vires morales but also vires physicas. But it conceives this grace at the beginning and in the progress as resistible and amissible; the decision whether the human being will accept that grace, will with it prepare himself for his justification, receive the grace of justification (gratia infusa) and will preserve it to the end, depends on himself. In the second place the nature of grace is described differently in Rome than in the Reformation. The Roman theologians do indeed expressly say that the

gratia actualis and infusa is not a substance but a quality, Heinrich, Dogm. Theol. VIII 556 f. Pesch, Prael. dogm. V 174, but already of the gratia excitans it is said that it not moraliter but physice elevat facultates nostras, ut supernaturaliter agere possint, Pesch, Prael. dogm. V 19, and thus is entitative supernatural, totum ordinem naturalem transcendens, ib. 21. And still more strongly it is said of the gratia infusa that it is a gift of God, by which the human being in ordinem supernaturalem elevatur et naturae divinae aliquo modo particeps fit, ib. 172. 188. This is connected in the third place with the fact that the intention of grace in Rome is different than in the Reformation. It has there a twofold task, ut elevet et sanet. The first presses [476] the latter entirely into the shadow, munus elevandi est principale et gratiae convenit in omni ordine supernaturali. Munus antem sanandi est secundarium et gratiae accessit in ordine naturae lapsae; in the first sense it is absolutely, in the second only accidentally necessary, ib. 32. 33 and so all the writers cited above p. 441v. Grace in Rome is in the first place a quality added to the human being above the order of nature, by which he is in principle taken up into a supernatural order, becomes a partaker of the divine nature, holiness, sonship, the communion of God, the indwelling of the H. Spirit, the vision of God, and can perform such supernatural works, which ex condigno merit eternal life. The forgiveness of sins is here subordinate, faith has only a praeparatory value; the main thing is the elevation of the human being above his nature, deification, ἡ προς θεον αφομοιωσις τε και ἑνωσις, Dionysius in Heinrich, Dogm. Theol. VIII 595, cf. also part II 152. 518.

The Reformation rejected this Neoplatonic mysticism, returned to the simplicity of Holy Scripture, and therefore obtained a wholly different conception of grace. This does not serve to take man up into a supernatural

order, but to deliver him from sin. Grace stands not over against nature, but only over against sin. In the proper sense it was not necessary for Adam before the fall, but has first become necessary through sin; it is therefore not absolutely, but only accidentally necessary. The physical antithesis of natural and supernatural gives way to the ethical one of sin and grace. When grace wholly takes away sin with its guilt and stain and punishment, then it has accomplished its work. Then man of himself is again the image of God, for the image of God is no donum superadditum but belongs to the essence of man. There is therefore no need, alongside the grace that delivers from sin, for any other grace that then still elevates man above his nature. Indeed, according to the Reformed, grace has bestowed upon us more back again than we have lost through Adam. For Christ acquired not only the posse non peccare and mori, as the Lutherans represent it, but He bestows upon believers at once the non posse peccare and mori; He does not bring us back to that point on the way where Adam stood, [477] but He has traversed the whole way for us to the end. He fulfilled not only passive but also active obedience; He acquired the inalienable blessedness, eternal life, which for Adam still lay in the future. Precisely because Adam's destination lay in eternal blessedness, Christ could acquire this in his place for us. But grace nevertheless gives nothing more than what, if Adam had remained standing, would have been acquired by him in the way of obedience. The covenant of grace differs from the covenant of works in the way, but not in the final goal. It is the same good that was promised in the covenant of works and is bestowed in the covenant of grace. Grace restores nature and leads it up to its highest height, but it adds to it no new, heterogeneous constituent. From this it follows that grace in Reformation theology cannot in any respect bear the character of a substance. The Reformation indeed confessed of grace

that it is not only external but also internal, that it bestows not only moral but also hyperphysical powers, that it is a quality, a habitus. But even if it sometimes expressed itself in the same words as Rome, it nevertheless attached to them a different sense. With Rome grace is a physical power, because it must elevate nature to the supernatural order; if it served only to deliver man from sin, then, with a view to the Roman doctrine of sin, a moral power of grace would probably be enough. But the Reformation thought otherwise about sin; this was guilt and at the same time a total corruption of human nature; man was by nature dead in sins and trespasses; his impotence can in a certain sense be called a natural one, above p. 150, 151. And therefore grace must also be such as enlightens the understanding and bends the will, which thus works not only morally but also hyperphysically and restores the powers. But with Rome this physical operation of grace is an antithesis to the ethical, in any case one far surpassing the ethical; with the Reformation it is and remains ethical. For natural impotence is in its nature a spiritual, moral impotence, an impotence unto good, caused solely and only by sin; it is called only natural, because it is "by nature," i.e. by virtue of the fallen, sinful nature, proper to man, not introduced into him by habit, upbringing [478] etc., and thus also cannot be removed by such moral powers. Grace works hyperphysically only because it removes that fallen-natural impotence and restores the original-natural capacity unto good. With Rome grace in the strict sense gives a physical power which the homo naturalis without the donum superadditum, even if he is completely sinless, does not possess and which must be bestowed upon him separately. It is physically impossible for that man to do supernatural good works, just as it is physically impossible for him to touch the stars with his hand. But the impotence in the Protestant confession is not

of that nature; and therefore grace here is also no physical quality in the Roman sense, even if it restores the original power unto good lost through sin. And since sin is no substance and has taken away from man nothing substantial, grace too can never be thought of as a substance. It is a restoration of the forma, which was originally impressed upon man and upon creatures in general at creation. Re-creation is no second, new creation. It adds no new creatures to what exists, it brings no new substance into it, but it is essentially reformation. But in that connection, intensively, the operation of grace extends just as far as the power of sin extends. Sin has affected everything, corrupted the whole organism of creation, the very nature of creatures; and therefore grace is a power of God which also inwardly, in the core of its being, delivers humanity from sin and one day sets it without spot or wrinkle before the face of God. Therefore a morally working grace is not enough. Rome seems to honor grace when it calls it absolutely necessary, and has it bestow physical powers that far surpass nature. But in the end it makes all that grace again so powerless that its operation depends on the will of man. It accomplishes nothing when the will resists it. And if the will consents to it, it serves only to bestow upon man the powers that are needed for meriting every following grace and eternal life. It is an aid for man unto his deification. But with the Reformation grace is the beginning, middle, and end of the whole work of salvation; nothing of the merit of man enters into it. As creation and redemption, so also sanctification is a work of God. Out of Him and through Him it is, and therefore it also leads to Him. To Him be the glory unto eternity. Cf. on the Reformed concept of grace: Zanchius, Op. II 342 VII 266. 354. Polanus, Synt. II c. 21. Martyr, Loci Comm. 248. Perkins, Werken I 799v. Twissus, Op. I 685 sq. Junius, de natura et gratia, Op. I 302-

305. Gomarus, de gratia conversionis, Op. I 85-126. Moor I 670. M. Vitringa III 173 enz.

14. Under the general name of grace many particular benefits are included. Scripture is inexhaustible in enumerating the blessings which Christ has acquired. Theology at all times found itself at a loss to treat them fully and in an orderly arrangement. When the Reformation again placed the work of the H. Spirit in the foreground, it did indeed discuss this at first in the three loci de poenitentia, de fide et de bonis operibus, but it soon found itself compelled to a more extensive treatment. And not only was the number of loci expanded, but in their content and mutual relation there gradually arose, especially in Reformed theology, all sorts of important modification. Thus regeneration was at first conceived in a very broad sense, as the renewal of man, and thus treated after faith, Calv. Inst. III c. 2. 3. Beza, Tract. theol. I 671. Junius, Theses theol. 34, 1. Ned. Gel. art. 22, or also even taken for the whole re-creation, so that it also included justification or forgiveness, Form. Conc. bij Müller 611; but soon one saw, also with a view to the children of the covenant, whose baptism had to be defended over against anabaptism, that the gratia regenerationis prior in nobis est quam fides, quae illius est effectus, Polanus, Synt. p. 467, and thus came to limit regeneration to the infusion of the first principle of life and thus to let it precede faith. Concerning the time of that regeneration there was and remained great difference; while Roman Catholics and Lutherans let it take place in all children in baptism, the Reformed said that the grace of regeneration was bestowed upon the elect children of the covenant either already before or in or after or also without further determination before, in, or after baptism, Voetius, Disp. II 408 sq. Witsius, Misc. S. II 614. 627. M. Vitringa [480] III 80, and that it was granted to those who were brought in

at a later age, in and after or also before the calling, Voetius, Disp. II 461. From that there again flowed that regeneration in dogmatics came to stand not only before faith but also before the calling; an order which was defended with this, that verbum Dei nemo salutariter andire potest nisi qui sit regenitus, Maccovius, Loci C. p. 710-714. Coll. theol. p. 398. Theses theol. per loc. comm. 1641 p. 320. Voetius, Disp. II 445. Kuyper, Het werk v. d. H. Geest II 128v. A further consequence of this order was that the poenitentia, which with the Reformers preceded faith and was effected by the law, came to fall away almost entirely; moreover, Luther and Calvin had already made a distinction between the sorrow which proceeds from the law and can also occur in the unconverted, and that other which already presupposed faith and was a true sorrow over sin. The Reformed therefore, following the example of Calvin, Inst. III 3, 1. 2, included the poenitentia in the Christian life, and for that soon, because poenitentia, like penance, had acquired a Roman flavor and involuntarily made one think of punishment, began to use another word, viz. resipiscentia, Beza, Tract. theol. I 327 sq. Musculus, Loci Comm. 1567 p. 550. This conversion thus received an entirely different sense. If regeneration as a rule preceded everything and in the children of the covenant took place in youth, then conversion did not always need, as pietism and methodism later demanded, to go together cum notabili concussione et violenta tractione, but it could take place assiduo, successive et suaviter; then it was also not necessary that someone clearly had knowledge of and could give an account of the manner and the time of his conversion, Voetius, Dis, II 415. 460, as e.g. Wesley knew that it took place 24 May 1738 in the evening at 8-3/4 o'clock. Then it was no longer concentrated on one point, but spread itself through the whole Christian life; then it also could no longer, as the poenitentia formerly, have as parts

the contritio and fides, but consisted in a continual dying of the old and rising of the new man, Ursinus in his explanation of Zond. 23. Beza ib. Polanus, Synt. p. 468 etc. And finally, not to mention more and not to speak further here of the distinction of the calling into outward and inward, of faith into [481] habitus and actus—this modification was also introduced into the order of salvation, that justification was even placed before regeneration and calling. One came to that especially in the struggle against neonomism. Faith and conversion could and might after all not be legal conditions, to be fulfilled by man, in order to become partaker of forgiveness and thus to bring it about. They were, after all, gifts of the H. Spirit, benefits of the covenant of grace, fruits of the work of Christ. But then there was also no communion in those benefits possible except after communion in the person of Christ. The imputation of his person with all his benefits thus preceded the bestowal of those benefits: justification received the first place in the order of salvation. Nevertheless this schema in Reformed dogmatics has only rarely been followed through to the end and fully applied; only a few, such as Maccovius, have the order: justificatio activa, regeneratio, fides, justificatio passiva, bona opera. The conditions which gradually entered into the church did not allow the application of the schema. With a pure state of the church it is possible to believe that the children of the covenant are regenerated in their youth and successive et suaviter come to faith and conversion. But when the world penetrates into the church and many grow up and live for years long without showing any fruit worthy of faith and conversion, then the earnest-minded see themselves called to warn against confidence in a regeneration in youth and the historical faith in the forgiveness of sins and to urge true conversion, saving faith, in order thus in truth to become partakers of the forgiveness of

sins. Over against a dead orthodoxy pietism and methodism with their revivals always again have a right to exist.

The order of salvation, however, has been changed by these two directions into a conversion history of the sinner, which served as a model for everyone without distinction. In doing so, weighty truths were disregarded and the order of salvation itself falsified. For it does not have to set forth how man must come to conversion and assurance; for in that way a law is imposed upon the H. Spirit, one method is chosen for all, and the anthropological standpoint is put in the place of the theological. [482] But the order of salvation has to indicate which the benefits are that Christ has acquired and applies through the H. Spirit, and in what order they lie in the Word and in the thought of God. Thus considered, there is now 1o no doubt that all benefits of Christ are benefits of the covenant of grace. That covenant has its foundation in eternity, it rests in the counsel and the good pleasure of God. Christ is mediator of that covenant and has therefore been able in time to make satisfaction vicariously for his own. There has been an imputation of Christ to his church and of the church to Christ, there has taken place between both an exchange, there has been established a unio mystica, which does not first come into being in time but is rooted in eternity. If one wishes to call all this justification, there is no other objection to that than that one uses the word in an unusual sense, deviates from the usage of speech of Scripture, treats one and the same matter twice under a different name (once as pactum salutis, then as justification), and in any case cannot remain faithful to one's point of departure. For even those who in the Geref. church teach an eternal justification have nevertheless never said that that substitution of Christ and his church in the pactum salutis was already the whole, full justification. But they have held it for the first

moment and expressly declared that it had to be continued and completed in the resurrection of Christ, in the gospel, in the calling, in the testimony of the H. Spirit through faith and from works and in the last judgment. None of them has therefore treated or disposed of justification in the locus on the counsel of God or the covenant of redemption; but all of them have brought it up in the order of salvation, and indeed not only before but also then again after faith as justificatio passiva. 2o Neither may there, from a Christian standpoint, be any doubt that all benefits of grace have been acquired by Christ, are present in him and lie ready for his church. There is nothing that needs to be added on the part of man; everything is accomplished. And because these benefits are all benefits of the covenant, have been acquired in the way of the covenant and are distributed in that same way, therefore there is no participation in those benefits except through participation in his person. The covenant, the unio mystica, the [483] imputation of Christ precedes; how otherwise could we receive the H. Spirit, the grace of regeneration, the gift of faith, which after all are all acquired by Christ and are his property? It is therefore not so that we are first regenerated by the H. Spirit apart from Christ and receive faith, in order then with that to go to Christ, accept his righteousness and thus be justified by God. But from the good pleasure of the Father, from the fullness of Christ, from the covenant of grace, these benefits too flow to us. If one now wishes to call this imputation of the person of Christ, which precedes the bestowal of his benefits, thus also of regeneration and faith, justification, then in the main the same objections are to be raised against it that have been mentioned above. But then one moreover forgets that this imputation of Christ is not identical with justification or forgiveness; that all benefits, also regeneration, faith, sanctification etc., just as much as the

forgiveness of sins, lie objectively ready in Christ and thus as such no order is to be derived from them; and that the justificatio passiva through and from faith is an action of God, a testimony of the H. Spirit in and with our spirit, which is not temporally to be separated from the justificatio activa. 3o The way in which these benefits, to be more closely described presently, come into the possession of believers, is that of calling through Word and through Spirit. By that God brought creation into being, by that he also brings re-creation into being. Many have placed this calling after regeneration. And without doubt it precedes this benefit of calling in all children of the covenant who are regenerated in their youth. Yet making these cases into a general rule is just as dangerous as the opposite. For in the first place there has always been difference and freedom of opinion among the Geref. about the time of regeneration, before or under or after baptism. Scripture does not speak clearly enough to make a decision in this. In the second place it is in many cases very difficult to assume that people who have been regenerated in their youth live for years in all kinds of sins and only afterwards come to conversion, cf. also Voetius, Disp. II 410; Scripture gives not a single proof for this. In the third place it is not permissible, in the field of mission, already to presuppose regeneration with the calling through the [484] gospel, because Word and Spirit are thereby separated in a questionable way. In the fourth place the order of existence in the persons in the Divine being and the order of their works in creation and re-creation indicate that the Word preceded the Spirit, Christmas day and Easter festival preceded Pentecost; the H. Spirit is the witness of Christ. And finally the calling is to be conceived much more broadly than can happen when it is placed after regeneration. There is a vocatio universalis, a vocatio generalis, a vocatio specialis. The calling in general absolutely does

not intend only to bring the regenerated to faith and conversion, but has significance for all people. It is by no means only outward but also inward and is already understood early by children. That the deaf cannot hear in that case is absolutely no objection, because God himself is the one calling, and, just as he in creation called everything into appearance out of nothing by his word, so in re-creation he calls the things that are not as though they were. 4o The benefits themselves, which through the calling become the portion of believers, fall apart into two groups. Sin is guilt and stain, breach of the covenant of works and loss of the image of God. Christ satisfied by his passive and active obedience. And thus the benefits of Christ consist in this, that he restores us in our relation to God and all creatures (justification, adoption to children, Christian freedom), and further renews us according to God's image (regeneration in a broader sense, sanctification, perseverance). The first series of benefits is bestowed upon us through the illumination of the H. Spirit, is received by us in faith as cognitio, assensus, certitudo, and transforms our consciousness. The second group of benefits becomes our portion through the regenerating activity of the H. Spirit, in faith as fiducia cordis, and changes our being. With the first our eye is directed to the past, to the historical Christ, to the cross and to the gospel that testifies of it; with the second our gaze is lifted upward, to the living Lord in heaven, the king of the church, the bridegroom of the congregation. Distinguished they are, separated they are not. It is Christ himself, the glorified Savior, who through his Word and Spirit directs our faith to his sacrifice and takes our persons up into his communion. It is [485] one and the same faith by which he assures us in our consciousness and renews us in our being, justifies us and dwells in our hearts. 5o Correspondingly, the order of salvation is to be treated in three loci: calling and regeneration (in the narrower sense), faith

and justification, sanctification and perseverance, cf. Voetius, Disp. II 432 sq. In the first locus Christ appears chiefly as prophet, who by his word instructs us unto salvation; the H. Spirit is therewith the witness of Christ, who exercises his officium elencticum, and by the gratia praeparans, praeveniens and operans bestows upon us the principle of the new life. In the second Christ is chiefly the priest, who through faith bestows upon us his righteousness and delivers us from the guilt of sins; the H. Spirit therewith exercises his munus paracleticum and by the gratia illuminans makes us certain of our salvation. In the third Christ appears chiefly as our king, who governs and protects us through faith; the H. Spirit therewith accomplishes his munus sanctificans and re-creates us by the gratia cooperans, conservans, perficiens according to the image of Christ. In Rom. 8:30 Paul likewise names three benefits in which the προγνωσις realizes itself, namely calling, justification and glorification. All these benefits fall in time; also the ἐδοξασεν does not refer to the glorification after death or the day of judgment, but, as the aorist shows, to the glorification which the believers in Paul's days already received on earth through the indwelling of the Spirit, cf. 2 Cor. 3:18, and which is completed in the glorification at the resurrection on the last day, 1 Cor. 15:53, Phil. 3:21. They are all bestowed at the same time upon the elect in faith, cf. also 1 Cor. 6:11, but therefore there still exists among them a logical order; and this is presented in the ordo salutis, cf. Gennrich, Studien zur Paulin. Heilsordnung, Stud. u. Krit. 1898 S. 377-431.

§ 44. Calling and Regeneration.

1. By Word and Spirit God brings creation, and also re-creation, into being. By speaking, He calls all things out of nothing into existence. Gen. 1, Ps. 33:6, Joh. 1:3, Hebr. [486] 1:3, 11:3; by the word of His power He raises up the fallen world again. He calls Adam, Gen. 3:9, Abram, Gen. 12:1, Jes. 51:2, Israel, Jes. 41:9, 42:6, 43:1, 45:4, 49:1, Hos. 11:1, Jer. 31:3, Ezech. 16:6, and through His servants has invitations issued to repentance and life, Deut. 30, 2 Kon. 17:13, Jes. 1:16v., Jer. 3, Ezech. 18, 33 etc., Rom. 8:28, 29, 2 Cor. 5:20, 1 Thess. 2:12, 5:24, 2 Thess. 2:14, 1 Petr. 2:9, 5:10 etc. Because this calling of God comes to human beings in and through the Son and Christ is the acquirer of salvation, it is also specially ascribed to Him; just as the Father created all things through Him and yet He Himself is also the Creator of all things, so He Himself is also the One calling, Mt. 11:28, Mk. 1:15, 2:17, Luk. 5:32, 19:10, who drives laborers out into His vineyard, Mt. 20:1-7, invites to the wedding, Mt. 22:2, gathers the children as a hen her chicks, Mt. 23:37, appoints apostles and teachers, Mt. 10, 28:19, Luk. 10, Ef. 4:11, whose sound has gone out over the whole earth,

Rom. 10:18. Although the calling thus essentially proceeds from God or from Christ, He nevertheless makes use of human beings in it, not only in the narrower sense of prophets and apostles, pastors and teachers, but also in general of parents and relatives, of instructors and friends. Indeed, a speech comes to us from all the works of God's hands, from the courses of history, from the guidances and experiences of our life. Everything speaks of God to the pious. Even if the calling in the narrower sense also takes place through the word of the gospel, this nevertheless may not be separated from that which comes to us through nature and history. The covenant of grace is borne by the general covenant of nature. Christ, who is the mediator of the covenant, is the same One who as Logos created all things, who as light shines in the darkness and enlightens every human being, coming into the world. God leaves Himself without witness to no one, but does good from heaven and also fills the hearts of the Gentiles with food and gladness, Ps. 19:2-4, Mt. 5:45, Joh. 1:5, 9, 10, Rom. 1:19-21, 2:14, 15, Hd. 14:16, 17, 17:27. Therefore, first of all a vocatio realis is to be distinguished, which comes to the human being not so much in clear words as rather in things (res), through nature, history, environment, guidances and experiences, which does not have the gospel as its means but the law and [487] through the law in family, society and state, in religion and morality, in heart and conscience calls the human being to obedience and submission, cf. Synopsis pur. theol. 30, 2. 3. Mastricht, Theol. VI 2, 15. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 5, 7-15. Marck, Theol. 17, 10. Moor III 386. 387. This calling is indeed insufficient unto salvation, because it does not know of Christ and His grace and thus can lead no one to the Father, Joh. 14:6, Hd. 4:12, Rom. 1:16; the world, with it, in its folly and darkness has not known God, Joh. 1:5, 10, Rom. 1:21v., 1 Cor. 1:21, Ef. 2:12. But it is

nevertheless a rich concern of God with His creature, a testimony of the Logos, an operation of the Spirit of God, which is of great significance for humanity. To it is due that humanity, in spite of sin, has been able to continue to exist, that it has organized itself in families, societies and states, that there has still remained in it a sense of religion and morality and that it has not sunk away into bestiality. All things subsist together in Christ, who bears all things by the word of His power, Col. 1:16, Hebr. 1:13. Specifically it also serves, in order both in the life of the peoples and in that of particular persons, to prepare the way for the higher and better calling through the gospel. Christ as Logos prepares His own work of grace beforehand through all kinds of means and ways. Therefore He Himself appeared in the fullness of times. When the world has not known God through its wisdom, it has pleased God, through the foolishness of preaching, to save those who believe, 1 Cor. 1:21. The gospel does not come at once to all peoples, but in the course of history continues its course through the world; it also comes to particular persons at that moment which has been prepared and determined by God Himself in His providence.

However important this vocatio realis may be, higher stands the vocatio verbalis, which comes to human beings not only through the revealed law but specifically also through the gospel. This calling does not nullify that through nature and history, but takes it up into itself and confirms it; only it goes far above it. For it is a calling which proceeds not from the Logos but specifically from Christ; which makes use not so much of the law as rather of the gospel as its proper means; which invites not to obedience to God's law but to faith in God's grace; [488] and which also is always accompanied by a certain working and testimony of that Spirit, whom Christ as his Spirit has poured out in the church, Joh. 16:8-11, Mt. 12:31,

Hd. 5:3, 7:51, Hebr. 6:4. This calling is not universal in the sense of the old Lutherans, who with appeal to Mt. 28:19, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 10:18, Col. 1:23, 1 Tim. 2:4 asserted that in the time of Adam, Noah, and Christ the gospel had in fact been known to all peoples and through their own fault had again been lost, Form. Conc. bij Müller 709. Gerhard, Loc. VII c. 7. Quenstedt, Theol. III 465-476; cf. also the Remonstrants and others in M. Vitringa III 167; but it may and must nevertheless be brought to all human beings without distinction. Scripture commands this expressly, Mt. 28:19, and moreover says that many who do not come nevertheless were called, Mt. 22:14, Luk. 14:16-18, but rejected the gospel, Joh. 3:36, Hd. 13:46, 2 Thess. 1:8 and therefore stand guilty precisely of the dreadful sin of unbelief, Mt. 10:15, 11:22, 24, Joh. 3:36, 16:8, 9, 2 Thess. 1:8, 1 Joh. 5:10. The universalists, however, object against the Reformed that these, on their standpoint, cannot accept such a general calling through the gospel; for Christ according to them has died not for all but only for the elect; and the preaching therefore cannot sound: Christ has made satisfaction for you, your sins are reconciled, only believe; but for the unconverted can contain only the demand of the law; if we maintain the general offer of grace, this is nevertheless on God's side not seriously meant and moreover useless and vain, cf. e.g. Arminius, Op. 661 sq. Conf. en Apol. Conf. Rem. c. 7. Episcopius, Antidotum c. 9, Op. II 2 p. 38, Limborch, Theol. Chr. IV 3, 12-18. These objections are undoubtedly of great weight, and have elicited from the side of the Reformed various answers. Some came to it, to preach to sinners only the law and to offer the gospel only to those who had already learned to know themselves and felt need of deliverance; others maintained the general offer of grace and justified it thereby, that Christ's offering was sufficient for all or that Christ nevertheless had also acquired

many and manifold blessings for those who would not believe in him, or that the gospel was offered to them only on condition of [489] faith and conversion; still others approached universalism and taught that Christ according to a first, general decree of God had made satisfaction for all, or that he had acquired for all the legal possibility to be saved and had brought all into a "salvable state," or even also that the acquisition of salvation was universal and the application particular, cf. above p. 395v. However much it could also seem that the confession of election and particular satisfaction demanded something else, nevertheless the Reformed as a rule maintained the general offer of grace.

2. And this quite rightly. For 1o Scripture leaves no doubt that the gospel may and must be preached to all creatures. Whether we can reconcile this with the particular outcome is another question. But the command of Christ is the end of all contradiction. The rule for our conduct is only the revealed will of God. The outcome of that preaching is fixed and certain, not only according to those who confess predestination, but also from the standpoint of those who acknowledge only the praescientia. God cannot be disappointed; for Him the result of world history cannot be a disappointment. And, said with reverence, it is not our task, but lies to God's account, to bring this outcome into agreement with the general offer of salvation. This alone we know, that that outcome, precisely according to God's decree, is bound to and is obtained through all those means and ways which have been prescribed to us. And among these also belongs the preaching of the gospel to all creatures. With the decree of election and reprobation we have nothing to do in this connection. The gospel is proclaimed to human beings, not as elect and reprobate, but as sinners, who all have need of deliverance. Administered by human beings, who do not

know the hidden counsel of God, the gospel cannot be otherwise than general in its offer. Just as a net, cast into the sea, catches good and bad fish, just as the sun shines on weeds as well as on wheat, just as the seed of the sower falls not only on good soil but also in stony and barren places, so the gospel in its administration comes to all human beings without distinction. 2o The preaching of that gospel does not say to [490] each human being, head by head: Christ has died in your place, all your sins have been atoned for and forgiven. For, although the universalists think they can and may say this to every human being without any further specification, yet upon some reflection it appears that even from the standpoint of the universalists this is by no means the case. For according to them Christ has only acquired the possibility of forgiveness and of salvation; in reality that forgiveness and salvation come only when the human being believes and continues to believe. Thus they too can preach only as the content of the gospel: believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will receive forgiveness of sins and eternal life. Now the Reformed say this likewise; they too thus offer the gospel to all human beings and can, may, and must do so. The forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation are there, but they become our portion only in the way of faith. But in this there is nevertheless an important difference between the universalists and the Reformed, which is entirely to the advantage of the latter. For among the former Christ acquired only the possibility of salvation; whether this actually becomes someone's portion depends on himself; faith is a condition, a work, which first makes the possible salvation actual, and always, up to death, leaves it uncertain. But among the Reformed Christ acquired the whole, full, actual salvation; faith is therefore not a work, not a condition, not an intellectual assent to the sentence: Christ has died for you, but a leaning on Christ himself, a trust in his sacrifice

alone, a living faith, much simpler than it can be among the universalists, and which brings salvation much more certainly than they can ever promise from their standpoint. The fault lies only with the human being, who is always inclined to reverse the order established by God: he wants to be certain of the outcome before he makes use of the means, and precisely in order to be exempted from the use. But God wills that we shall enter upon the way of faith, and then assures us in Christ infallibly of perfect salvation. 3o Therefore that offer of salvation on God's side is also seriously meant and sincere. For in that offer He does not say what He will do, whether He will grant faith or not. He has reserved that to himself and has not revealed it to us. He declares only what He wills that we shall [491] do, that we shall humble ourselves and seek our salvation in Christ alone. If it is objected against this that God then nevertheless offers salvation to such as He has decided not to grant faith and salvation, then this is an objection that remains equally valid from the standpoint of the opponents. For indeed God then also offers salvation to such as of whom He certainly, firmly, infallibly knows that they will not believe. For not only according to the Reformed but according to all confessors of Christ the outcome of world history stands eternally and unchangeably fixed, part II 352. The difference is only that the Reformed have dared to say: that outcome is in agreement with God's will and intention. What is and happens must God, even if we do not understand it, have been able to will, without prejudice to all his virtues and perfections; otherwise God would no longer be God. History cannot and may not be a party over against God. Furthermore therefore 4o that preaching of the gospel is also not vain or useless. If God out of ignorance or impotence by the general offer really intended the salvation of all, then it would indeed become useless and vain. For how few are they in whom this

goal is achieved! Then it itself includes an antinomy, which in order to be solved leads to ever further deviation from Scripture. For if the will and intention of God, if the satisfaction of Christ is absolutely general, then the offer of salvation must also be general without any limitation. And because it manifestly is not, one then comes to it, with the old Lutherans, to contradict history to its face and to assert that by the apostles the gospel has been brought to all peoples, or with many more recent theologians to assume a gospel-preaching also on yonder side of the grave, cf. e.g. W. Schmidt, Stud. u. Krit 1887 S. 1-44, or worse still with rationalism and mysticism to believe that the law of nature or the inner light is sufficient unto salvation. The further, however, one in this way, in conflict with history, extends the calling, the weaker, more powerless and more vain it becomes; in quality and intensity one loses what one seemingly gains in quantity and extension; the conflict between God's intention and the outcome becomes greater and greater. 5o Even if then through the calling salvation becomes only the portion of few, as everyone must acknowledge [492] it nevertheless therefore also retains for those who reject it its great value and significance. It is for all without distinction the proof of God's infinite love and seals the word that He has no pleasure in the death of the sinner but in this, that he turn and live; it proclaims to all that the sacrifice of Christ is sufficient for the atonement of all sins; that no one is lost because it is not rich and powerful enough; that no right of the law, no power of sin, no dominion of Satan stands in the way of its application; for not as the trespass, so is the gift of grace. Indeed it is often also for those who harden themselves in their unbelief the source of all kinds of blessings; enlightenment of the understanding, heavenly gift, fellowship of the H. Spirit, enjoyment of the word of God, powers of the age to come have

sometimes even been the portion of those who later become apostate and despise Christ, Hebr. 6:4-6. And not only this, but 6o the external calling through law and gospel also attains the goal that God intends with it. Vain and useless is never what God does. His word does not return empty, it does all that pleases Him, it is prosperous in all that for which He sends it. But this is not only and not in the first place the eternal salvation of human beings but the honor of his own name. In the calling through law and gospel God maintains the right over his creature. The sinner thinks by sin to become free from God and discharged from his service. But it is not so. God's right over the human being, even over the most deeply fallen, is inalienable and inviolable. The human being can, dismissing God's service, become deeply miserable, but he remains a creature, and thus dependent. By sin he becomes not less but much more dependent; for he ceases to be a son, and becomes a servant, a slave, a powerless instrument, that is used by God according to his will. God never lets the human being go and never relinquishes his rights over him, over his service, over his complete devotion with understanding and will and all powers. And therefore He calls him through nature and history, through heart and conscience, through blessings and judgments, through law and gospel. The calling in the broadest sense is the preaching of God's right over his fallen creature. 7o As such it maintains in the human being and in humanity all those religious and moral [493] consciousnesses of dependence, reverence, awe, duty, responsibility etc., without which the human race could not exist. Religion, morality, law, art, science, family, society, state, they all have their root and foundation in that calling which goes out from God to all human beings. Take it away, and there arises a war of all against all, the one human being becomes a wolf for the other. The calling through law and gospel restrains

sin, lessens guilt, and checks the corruption and misery of the human being; it is a gratia reprimens. It is a proof that God is God and is indifferent to nothing, that not only the Jenseits but also the Diesseits has value for Him. However much the human being may then be inclined to hide behind his impotence, or with Pelagius and Kant to infer from his duty to his power; even in that he acknowledges that God's right and our duty remain unimpaired, and that he himself is inexcusable. But finally 8o the calling is not only a gratia reprimens but also a gratia praeparans. Christ has come into the world for a κρισις, for a fall but also for a rising, Mk. 4:12, Luk. 2:34, 8:10, Joh. 9:39, 15:22, 2 Cor. 2:16, 1 Pet. 2:7, 8. And the calling through law and gospel also intends, by all that it grants and works, to prepare in humanity and in the individual human being the coming of Christ. In the Remonstrant sense, Conf. en Apol. XI 4 such a gratia praeparans was decisively denied by the Reformed, Can. Dordr. I ref. 4. Trigland, Antapol. c. 25 sq. Mastricht, Theol. VI 3, 19. 28. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 6, 9. The spiritual life that is implanted in regeneration is essentially different from the natural and moral life that precedes it; it comes about not through human activity or evolution but through a creative act of God. Some therefore preferred to call the activities that precede regeneration actus antecedanei rather than actus praeparatorii. But nevertheless in a good sense one can speak of gratia praeparans; over against all methodistic directions, which fail to recognize natural life, it is even of excellent value. For the confession of preparatory grace does not imply that the human being, by doing quod in se est, by diligently going to church, listening with earnestness to God's word, recognizing his sin, desiring deliverance etc., according to a meritum de congruo, can merit the grace of regeneration, or also can make himself receptive and capable for it.

But it implies that God is Creator, Sustainer and Ruler of all things and that He even from far beforehand in the generations orders the life of those whom He will in his time endow with faith. The human being on the sixth day did not arise by evolution from lower creatures but was created by God's hand; yet his creation may be called prepared by the preceding acts of God. Christ himself has come from above, but his coming was prepared for centuries. Nature and grace are distinct and may not be confused or mixed, but God establishes a connection between both. Creation, redemption and sanctification are economically ascribed to Father, Son and Spirit, but these three are the one and true God and together they bring the whole work of redemption to completion. No one can come to Christ unless the Father draw him; and no one receives the H. Spirit except he to whom the Son sends Him. And therefore there is a gratia praeparans. God himself in many ways prepares his work of grace in the hearts. He awakens in Zacchaeus the desire to see Jesus, Luk. 19:3, works contrition among the crowd that hears Peter, Hd. 2:37, causes a Paul to fall to the ground, Hd. 9:4, brings the jailer to perplexity, Hd. 16:27 and thus leads the life of all his children also before and up to the hour of their regeneration. Even if they are not yet on their side partakers of reconciliation and justification, even if they do not yet have regeneration and faith, they are nevertheless already objects of his eternal love, and He himself leads them through his grace to that Spirit who alone can regenerate and comfort. Everything therefore stands, according to God's ordering, in connection with their later bringing in and calling in the congregation. Conception and birth, household and lineage, people and land, upbringing and instruction, development of understanding and heart, preservation from dreadful sins, from the blasphemy against the H. Spirit above all, or also abandonment to

all kinds of wickedness and unrighteousness, disasters and judgments, blessings and benefits, preaching of law and gospel, contrition and fear of judgment, awakening of conscience and need of rescue, it is all a gratia praeparans to regeneration from the H. Spirit and to the place which the believer will later occupy in [495] the congregation. One indeed is the way to heaven, but many are the leadings of God, both before and on that way, and rich and free is the grace of the H. Spirit. Jeremiah and John the Baptist and Timothy are brought in another way than Manasseh or Paul, and each fulfills in the service of God a distinct task. Pietism and methodism fail to recognize those leadings, restrict God's grace, want to convert and form all according to one type. But Reformed theology respects the sovereignty of God and admires the richness of his grace. Cf. on the nature and fruit of the external calling, besides the earlier p. 211 mentioned litt. on common grace: Twissus, Op. I 660 sq. Trigland, Opuscula I 430v. II 809v. Gomarus, Op. I 97 sq. Synopsis pur. theol. 30, 40-46. Voetius, Disp. II 256. Mastricht, Theol. VI 2, 16. Turretinus, Theol. El. XV qu. 2 and also XIV 14, 51. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 9, 4. III 5. 20. Heidegger, Corp. Theol. XXI § 9-11. Alting, Theol. probl. 187. Moor III 1071. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 641v. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 451. II 482v. Candlish, The atonement 1861, p. 169v. A. Robertson, Hist. of the atonement controversy in conn. with the secession Church 1846. On the gratia praeparans one may consult: Musculus, Loci C. §24. Martyr, L. C. 312. Ursinus on q. 88-90. Olevianus e. a. in Heppe, Dogm. d.d. Pr. II 372. Perkins, Works III 127v. Amesius, Casus Consc. II 4 and disp. theol. de praepar. peccatoris ad conversionem, in Dr. H. Visscher, G. Amesius 1894 p. 125. British theologians at the Synod of Dort on the 3rd and 4th art. Synopsis 32, 6. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 6, 11-15. Voetius, Disp. II 402-424. Moor IV 482. Vitringa, Spiritual Life c.

4. Eenhoorn, Welleven I 220. Van Aalst, Geest. Mengelstoffen, 298. 369. Comrie Catech. on q. 20-23. Owen, Justification by faith c. 1 p. 83v. Kuyper, The work v. d. H. G. II 111.

3. Scripture and experience, however, testify that all these operations of the vocatio externa do not always and in all persons lead to sincere faith and salvation. Of itself, therefore, the question arises, what the deepest and ultimate cause of that different outcome is. To that, in the Christian church, in the main a threefold answer was given. Some said that that different outcome was due to the will of man, whether that will by nature [496] or by the grace of the Logos or by that in baptism or also by that in the calling had received the power to accept or to reject the gospel. On this standpoint there is no distinction of vocatio externa and interna, of vocatio sufficiens and efficax. Inwardly and essentially the calling is always and in all persons the same; it is called efficax only according to the outcome, if someone gives heed to it. After all that was said earlier, especially part II 355v. about Pelagianism, this answer no longer needs a prolix refutation. It is clear that it offers no solution. One can indeed in practice remain standing at the proximate cause and specifically ascribe unbelief to the will of man. One then also speaks truthfully, Deut. 30:19, Jos. 24:15, Jes. 65:12, Mt. 22:2, 23:37, Joh. 7:17, Rom. 9:32 etc.; the sinful will of man is the cause of his unbelief. But already in practice all the pious at all times and under all directions ascribe their faith and salvation only to God's grace, part II 351. There is nothing that distinguishes them except that grace alone, 1 Cor. 4:7. And therefore this distinction in the last instance cannot lie in the human will. If one nevertheless remains standing there as the last cause, then at once all the psychological, ethical, historical, and theological objections arise that at all times have been brought against Pelagianism. An

incalculable arbitrariness is introduced, sin is weakened, the decision about the outcome of world history is placed in the hands of man, the government of all things is withdrawn from God, his grace is nullified. Even if one ascribes the power to choose for or against the gospel to the restoration by grace, the matter is nevertheless not made better thereby. One then introduces a grace that consists solely and only in the restoration of the choice of the will, of which Scripture makes no mention with a single word, which actually already presupposes regeneration and yet must first bring it about after a good choice of the will, cf. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. II 325. Also, on this standpoint one becomes embarrassed with all those millions of people who have never heard the gospel or also died away as little children and who therefore were never placed in the opportunity to accept or to reject Christ. The free will of man therefore cannot be the ultimate cause of faith and unbelief. Another [497] answer was therefore given to the above-posed question by Bellarminus; he rejected both the doctrine of Pelagius and of Augustine, sought to walk a middle way, and said that the efficacia of the calling depended on whether it came to someone at a suitable time, when his will was inclined to follow it (congruitas), de grat. et lib. arb. I 12. IV 11, and so further the congruists, and in the Reformed church Pajon, Kleman and also Shedd, Syst. Theol. II 511-528, who calls salvation in the highest degree probable for everyone who makes serious and diligent use of the means of grace. But this answer too is unsatisfactory. There lies in the congruitas indeed an important truth, which, misunderstood by Methodism, comes into its own in the Reformed doctrine of the gratia praeparans. But it is wholly insufficient to explain the efficacia of the calling. For in itself it is nothing other than a suasio moralis, which by nature is powerless to create that spiritual life which according to Scripture arises in man through

regeneration; further, it presupposes that man at one moment is not, at another is, fit to accept grace, and thus seeks sin in the circumstances and weakens it in man; further, it places the decision in the will of man and thereby calls up again all the objections that were named above and were brought by Bellarminus himself against Pelagianism; and finally it places between calling and conversion only a connection of congruitas, which, as moral in nature, can always be broken by the will and therefore cannot guarantee the efficacia of the calling. Therefore by the Augustinians, the Thomists, and the Reformed the cause by which the calling bore fruit in the one and not in the other was sought in the nature of the calling itself. The former said that, in case the calling is efficacious, a delectatio victrix was added, which bestowed not only the posse but also the velle; the Thomists spoke of a physica praedeterminatio or actio Dei physica, which caused the posse agere, bestowed by the vocatio sufficiens, to pass over into an agere; but the Reformed had objections against these terms, especially against the description of the act of God in conversion as a physical one, and spoke rather of a vocatio externa and interna. This distinction already occurs in Augustine, de praed. [498] sanct. c. 8, was taken over from him by Calvin, on Rom. 10:16, Acta Syn. Trid. c. antidoto sess. 6, C. R. 35, 480. Inst. III 24, 8 etc., and then became established in Reformed theology. At first this twofold calling was also still sometimes called otherwise, namely vocatio materialis and formalis, signi and beneplaciti, communis and singularis, universalis and specialis etc., Polanus, Synt. VI c. 32, but the name of outward and inward calling gained the upper hand and has gradually displaced the others.

Although this distinction does not now occur with literal words in Scripture, it is nevertheless grounded upon it. It flows 1o already from the

fact that all men are by nature equal, condemnable before God's countenance, Rom. 3:9-19, 5:12, 9:21, 11:32, dead in sins and trespasses, Ef. 2:2, 3, darkened in the understanding, 1 Cor. 2:14, Ef. 4:18, 5:8, not being able to see the kingdom of God, Joh. 3:3, slaves of sin, Joh. 8:34, Rom. 6:20, enemies of God, Rom. 8:7, Col. 1:21, who cannot subject themselves to the law, Rom. 8:7, out of themselves able to think or do nothing good, Joh. 15:5, 2 Cor. 3:5, and, although the gospel is for man, nevertheless stand hostilely over against it and despise it as an offence or foolishness, 1 Cor. 1:23, 2:14. From man, therefore, the distinction is not to be explained which is to be observed after the calling. God alone and his grace makes a distinction, 1 Cor. 4:7. 2o The preaching of the Word is without more not sufficient, Jes. 6:9, 10, 53:1, Mt. 13:13v, Mk. 4:12, Joh. 12:38-40 etc.; already in the O. T. therefore the H. Spirit was promised, who would teach all and would bestow a new heart, Jes. 32:15, Jer. 31:33, 32:39, Ezech. 11:19, 36:26, Joel 2:28; and to that end he was poured out on the day of Pentecost, in order with and through the apostles to bear witness of Christ, Joh. 15:26, 27, in order to convince the world of sin, righteousness and judgment, Joh. 16:8-11, in order to regenerate, Joh. 3:5v., 6:63, 16:13, and to lead to the confession of Jesus as the Lord, 1 Cor. 12:3. Therefore 3o the work of redemption, both subjectively and objectively, is wholly ascribed to God, and indeed not in a general sense, as he by his providence brings forth all things, but specifically also in that narrower sense, that he by special divine power works regeneration and conversion. It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, Rom. [499] 9:16; the calling is realization of the election, Rom. 8:28, 11:29. It is God, who renews the heart and writes his law in it, Ps. 51:12, Jer. 31:33, Ezech. 36:26, who gives enlightened eyes of the understanding, Ps. 119:18,

Ef. 1:18, Col. 1:9-11 and opens the heart, Hd. 16:14, who makes his Son known as Christ, Mt. 11:25, 16:17, Gal. 1:16 and leads unto him with spiritual power, Joh. 6:44, Col. 1:12, 13, who causes the gospel to be preached, not only in words, but also in power and in the H. Spirit, 1 Cor. 2:4, 1 Thess. 1:5, 6 and himself gives the increase, 1 Cor. 3:6-9, who in one word works in us both the willing and the working according to his good pleasure, Phil. 2:13, and thereto employs a power which is like the working of the strength of his might, when he raised Christ from the dead and set him at his right hand, Ef. 1:18-20. 4o The act itself, whereby God brings about this change in man, is often called regeneration, Joh. 1:13, 3:3v., Tit. 3:5 etc., and the fruit thereof is indicated as a new heart, Jer. 31:33, καινη κτισις, 2 Cor. 5:17, θεου ποιημα, κτισθεντες ἐν Χριστῳ Ιησου, Ef. 2:10, το ἐργον του θεου, Rom. 14:20, his οἰκοδομη, 1 Cor. 3:9, Ef. 2:21 etc., that is, what is brought to pass in man by grace is far too rich and too great for it to be able to be explained from a suasio moralis of the word of preaching. Finally 5o Scripture itself speaks of the calling in a twofold sense. More than once it speaks of a calling and invitation, which is not followed, Jes. 65:12, Mt. 22:3, 14, 23:37, Mk. 16:15, 16, etc., and then it can say, that God has done everything on his side, Jes. 5:4, and that men through their unwillingness have not believed and have resisted God's counsel, the H. Spirit, the calling, Mt. 11:20v., 23:37, Luk. 7:30, Hd. 7:51. But it also knows a calling, which has God as author, realization of the election and is always efficacious; thus specifically with Paul, Rom. 4:17, 8:30, 9:11, 24, 1 Cor. 1:9, 7:15v., Gal. 1:6, 15, 5:8, Ef. 4:1, 4, 1 Thess. 2:12, 2 Tim. 1:9, cf. also 1 Petr. 1:15, 2:9, 5:10, 2 Petr. 1:3; the believers can therefore simply as κλητοι, Rom. 1:7, 1 Cor. 1:2, 24, κλητοι Χριστου, or κλητοι ἐν κυριῳ, 1 Cor. 7:22, i.e. called by God, who belong to Christ and live in his

communion, be designated. Alongside that Paul does indeed know a preaching [500] of the gospel to such as reject it, but to them the gospel is a foolishness, 1 Cor. 1:18, 23, an odour of death unto death, 2 Cor. 2:15, 16, they do not understand it, 1 Cor. 2:14. As a power of God, 1 Cor. 1:18, 24, it proves itself to those who are called by God according to his purpose, Rom. 8:28, 9:11, 11:28, Ef. 1:4, 5.

4. This calling, understood in Paul's sense, thereby of itself comes to stand in the very closest connection with what elsewhere is called regeneration. This is already evident from the fact that Paul, always taking calling as efficacious, speaks of regeneration almost not at all. Only once does he make use of this word, when in Tit. 3:5 he says that God has not saved us out of our works, but in accordance with his mercy δια λουτρου παλιγγενεσιας και ἀνακαινωσεως πνευματος ἁγιου, i.e. by means of the bath of regeneration and renewal wrought by the H. Spirit. Regeneration is here connected with renewal, because it is the beginning and the principle of it; together they are ascribed to the H. Spirit; and both are conceived as a bath, in which the H. Spirit has immersed the believers and out of which He has caused them to rise as new men. According to Rom. 6 this takes place in baptism as sign and seal of the covenant of grace. When the elect, namely, are called, then they immediately receive through faith justification and adoption as children in the juridical sense, Rom. 3:22, 24, 4:5, 5:1, Gal. 3:26, 4:5, etc., but at the same time therewith also communion with Christ, Rom. 6:3v., glorification according to his image, Rom. 8:29, 30, 1 Cor. 4:15, 2 Cor. 3:18, Gal. 4:19, and thus, because Christ himself is life-giving Spirit, 1 Cor. 15:45, 2 Cor. 3:17, the Spirit of Christ as principle of a new life, Gal. 3:2, 4:6, so that the believers are now spiritual, new men, 1 Cor. 2:15, 2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15, Ef. 2:15, 4:24, Col. 3:10, walking in, led by,

and being temples of the H. Spirit, Rom. 8:14, 1 Cor. 6:19, Gal. 5:25 etc. The word regeneration may therefore occur with Paul only once; in substance, however, it nevertheless underlies with him the new life, of which the called person becomes partaker in communion with Christ. Related is the representation with Peter, who I 1:23 exhorts the believers [501] to love one another, because they are ἀναγεγεννημενοι οὐκ ἐκ σπορας φθαρτης ἀλλα ἀφθαρτου, δια λογου ζωντος θεου και μενοντος, i.e. by God, cf. 1:3, born again, not out of perishable seed, as in the first birth, but out of imperishable seed, i.e. the word of God, as it is implanted in man through the calling of God, a λογος ἐμφυτος, Jak. 1:21 and becomes the principle of a new life, and that by means of the living and abiding word of God proclaimed to them cf. vs. 25. Likewise James 1:18 says that God, according to his will, has begotten, brought us forth, ἀπεκυησεν, through the word of truth, in order that we, Christians, should be the firstfruits of God's creatures, i.e. the true Israel, the special possession of God, the rightful heirs of the promise. Everywhere here regeneration is conceived as beginning, principle, ground of sanctification, inwardly wrought by God or his Spirit, and taking place by means of the calling through the word. But John considers regeneration from another point of view. What is born of flesh, that is flesh, 3:6 and stands hostile over against God. Such as are born only in a natural way, 1:13, are out of, 8:23, 15:19 and belong to the world, 14:17, 19, 22 etc., are from below, 8:23, out of the devil, 8:44, do not comprehend the light of the Logos, 1:5, do not receive Him, 1:11, have the darkness dearer than the light, 3:19, 20, do not hear, 8:47, do not know God, 8:19, 15:21, do not see the kingdom of God, 3:3, walk in the darkness, 12:35, hate the light, 3:20, and are servants of sin, 8:34. They also cannot see the kingdom of God, 3:3, cannot believe, 5:44, 12:39, cannot hear the

word of God, 8:43, cannot come to Christ, 6:44, cannot receive the H. Spirit, 14:17. And therefore regeneration is necessary. This is a γεννηθηναι ἄνωθεν, i.e. from above, 3:3, cf. 3:31, 8:23, 19:11, 23, ἐκ θεου, 1:13, I 2, 20, 3:9 etc., out of water and Spirit, 3:5, i.e. out of the Spirit, 3:6, 8, whose cleansing activity has its image in the water, cf. Ezech. 36:25-27, Mt. 3:11, mysterious and wondrous, so that no one knows its origin and essence, 3:8. This regeneration is therefore with John also not brought into connection with the word or with the calling, but rather precedes it. For Christ as Logos also already worked before his incarnation, 1:1-13; He shone [502] as light in the world, but this did not know Him, 1:5, 9, 10. He came to his own, to Israel, and his own did not receive Him, 1:11; but yet even then his coming was not wholly fruitless, for as many as received Him, already then received the power to become children of God. And those were such as had been born of God, 1:12, 13 cf. 1 Joh. 5:1. Before men come to Christ and believe in Him, they are already out of God, 8:47, out of the truth, 18:37; they are given by the Father to the Son, 6:37, 39, 17:2, 9; He draws them to Christ, 6:44; and all who thus come to Christ, He does not cast out and He does not lose, but He keeps to eternal life, 6:39, 10:28, 17:12. Christ comes, in order to bring those, who as sheep already are, given to Him by the Father, 10:27, in order to make them hear his voice and follow and to gather into one flock, 10:16, 11:52; in order to grant to them, who already in a certain sense are children of God, 11:52, the ἐξουσια, the right and the competence, to become it, to manifest themselves as such, as those born of God, as τεκνα του θεου, and especially to show this in brotherly love, i.e. in love toward those who likewise are born of God, 1 Joh. 5:1. From all this it appears that John thinks of regeneration not in the first place as an ethical, but as a metaphysical act of God, wrought by his Spirit in a wondrous

manner, immediately, in order that those thus regenerated should precisely believe in Christ and as children of God should be manifested in brotherly love.

This doctrine of John is wrongly reduced by some to a gnostic dualism, Scholten, Het Ev. naar Joh. 1864 bl. 89v. Holtzmann, Neut. Th. II 468 f. For it is not a dualism that exists by nature, for all things were originally created by the Logos, 1:3; the world wholly in general is the object of God's love, 3:16; God gave his Son, not to condemn the world but to save it, 3:17, 12:47. By nature, however, all men belong to the world, which hates the light, because its works are evil, 3:19, 20. Thus it therefore depends on faith, whether someone receives eternal life, 3:15, 16, 36. That faith is a ἐργον, 6:29, it is a coming, 5:40, 6:35, 37, 44, 7:37, a receiving, 1:11, 12, 3:11v., 5:43, a thirsting and drinking, a hungering and eating, 4:13-15, 6:35, 50v., 7:37, [503] it does not bypass understanding and will but has its root therein, 7:17. Unbelief is therefore also ascribed to the unwillingness of man, 5:40, 8:44; man remains responsible for it, 3:19, 9:41, 12:43, 15:22, 24. And even if it is also the case that believers can no longer be lost, 10:28, 29, they are nevertheless admonished to remain in Christ and in his word, because otherwise they cannot bear fruit, 15:4-10. Although John thus traces the antithesis of faith and unbelief back to an act of God, whereby He gives to the one what He withholds from the other, he by no means intends thereby to nullify the self-activity and the responsibility of man; rather he lets both stand alongside each other, Holtzmann II 494 f. With all difference in presentation, there is therefore agreement in the matter between Paul and John. There is difference in this, that Paul regards regeneration as the ethical beginning of a new, holy life and has it come about through the efficacious calling of God; John apprehends it from its metaphysical side

and explains from it the fact that many hear and receive Jesus' word, go to Him by faith and receive eternal life. In a corresponding way, in the first period of the Reformation regeneration was taken in a broader sense for the entire renewal of man, while in later time it was restricted to the infusion of the principle of the new life, which preceded the act of faith. If we now add to this still the word of Jesus in Mt. 19:28, then it appears that Scripture speaks of regeneration in a threefold sense: as principle of the new life, which is planted in man by the Spirit of God before faith, as the moral renewal of man through the word and the Spirit of Christ, and finally, as restoration of the whole world in its original perfection. Thus regeneration comprises the whole work of re-creation from its very first beginning in man onward to its completion in the new heaven and the new earth. This whole re-creation has in Christ, specifically in his resurrection, its ground, 1 Petr. 1:3, its principle in the word and the Spirit of Christ, its author in Christ himself, who is the reformer of creation.

From this the connection also becomes clear, which exists between regeneration [504] and calling. 1o There is no regeneration without calling. Just as God in the beginning created all things by speaking and still upholds all things by the word of his power, so also Christ brings the re-creation to pass by the power of his word. 2o This calling has as its content not a word of God in general, but specifically the word of Christ. He has by his suffering and death acquired the right to the re-creation of all things. He has in his resurrection realized it in principle; when Christ as mediator speaks, everything obeys his word and life appears out of death; He makes alive whom He will, Joh. 5:21, 25, 28v. The content of the calling is therefore the gospel, the glad message of Christ; by that alone are all things renewed. 3o This word of Christ, leaving aside for a moment whether it is brought

outwardly, audibly by men or not, must in any case become a λογος ἐμφυτος, Jak. 1:21. Only when it is implanted in man, in the creatures, does the new life appear from it as ἐκ σπορας ἀφθαρτου, 1 Petr. 1:23. 4o The gospel, the word of Christ, to proclaim in such a way that it is not only brought to the creatures but implanted in them, can only the H. Spirit. Just as the creation took place through Word and Spirit, so also Christ accomplishes the re-creation through his word and his Spirit. He himself has become into a life-making Spirit, 1 Cor. 15:47, 2 Cor. 3:17, and re-creates all things, speaking through the Spirit, Rom. 8:9v. 5o This regeneration by no means presupposes the conscious life and the active willing. It has, as restoration of the creation in Mt. 19:28, even the irrational creature as object; it occurs, as some examples in Scripture show, in children, before they have come to years of discernment; indeed infant baptism is also built on the presupposition that children without their knowing can be accepted in Christ unto grace; according to John's gospel it precedes the coming to and believing in Christ. In all these cases there is a regeneration only through inward, without outward calling. 6o Also when it temporarily coincides with or takes place after the outward calling, δια λογου ζωντος θεου και μενοντος, 1 Petr. 1:23, it itself is nevertheless always immediate, because it does not proceed from the preached word, but ἐκ πνευματος, Joh. 3:5, 6, 8, ἐκ σπορας ἀφθαρτου, 1 Petr. 1:23. The H. Spirit does work [505] with and through, but his working is not enclosed within the preached word; He himself by the inward calling makes it into a λογος ἐμφυτος and causes the new life to appear from it. 7o Because the new life, however, never proceeds nor can proceed except from the implanted word and the Spirit of Christ, it is, as soon as it awakens to consciousness, bound to the objective, outward word of Christ, which has

the same gospel as content as that inward one. Rule of doctrine and life is only the H. Scripture. 8o Inward calling and regeneration stand in relation as seed and plant, 1 Petr. 1:23, as a speaking through and a hearing and learning of the Father, Joh. 6:45, as drawing and following, 6:44, as giving and receiving, 6:65, as offering and (passive) acceptance of salvation, Amesius, Med. Theol. I 26, 7v. Voetius, Disp. II 452. 463 sq. Heidegger, Corp. Theol. 21, 61. While thus to regeneration there always precedes a speaking of God, a λογος ἐμφυτος, neither Scripture nor experience offers us sufficient data at hand to determine whether regeneration in adults as a rule also takes place after and through the outward calling, or whether it precedes it, Voetius Disp. II 461. From the gospel and the letters of John it can be inferred that it logically, but yet not that it also temporally precedes it; and Paul, Peter, and James always keep outward and inward calling with one another in the closest connection.

5. Against this internal calling and regeneration, however, the objection is always raised from the Pelagian side, that it introduces a physical compulsion into the spiritual, is in conflict with the nature of a rational being, makes man wholly passive, undermines moral freedom and responsibility. Pelagianism is therefore always intent on maintaining the resistibility of the calling and on letting regeneration, conversion, sanctification, perseverance, etc. depend on a decision of the will. Regenerated and justified is he alone who beforehand voluntarily fulfills one or another condition, believes, repents, is disposed to keep God's commandments, etc. It thereby at once entangles itself in a multitude of insoluble difficulties. If man is by nature capable of fulfilling those conditions, he is so good that [506] there is no need at all of regeneration in the sense of Scripture; some moral education and improvement is then more

than sufficient. If man must beforehand receive the power, to accept or not accept the gospel, through the gratia praeveniens in baptism or calling, then here too a gratia irresistibilis precedes believing, for the gratia praeparans is bestowed upon all without their willing or knowing; then in fact regeneration already takes place before the decision of man, for operari sequitur esse, the act follows upon the capacity, the will, which enables the acceptance of the gospel, is according to the gospel of John already a renewed and reborn will. Only then it is not to be seen how, after all that, a free choice of the will is still possible; the will, after all, has already been determined toward the good by the good power bestowed upon it apart from its own doing, and determined toward the good precisely in the same measure as it received power for a good choice; the more one lets the will be weakened by sin and the more power one lets be bestowed upon it in the gratia praeveniens, the more and in the same measure its indifferent freedom also ceases. Besides, it is enigmatic for what such a free choice of the will is still necessary; if God, after all, must already beforehand and irresistibly renew man to such an extent that he can choose for the gospel, to what end does the maintenance of indifferent freedom of the will then still serve otherwise than only to nullify God's grace again, to make his covenant of grace again just as shaky and unstable as that of works before the fall, and to represent Christ as even more powerless and less loving than Adam? For He has accomplished everything and acquired everything, but when He wills to apply it, his power and his love are thwarted by the will of man, indeed a will equipped with new powers! Only in order to save an apparent freedom of man, God is robbed of his sovereignty, the covenant of grace of its firmness, Christ of his royal power.

And even if one were to gain something by it; but in fact one loses everything by it. Not only is indifferent freedom of the will in adults saved only in appearance. But in children the whole doctrine proves insufficient and unmerciful itself. For one of two things: the gratia that is bestowed upon the children is sufficient unto salvation and opens to them, if they die early, the gate [507] of heaven—and then they are saved without their doing and without having themselves chosen and decided; or it is not sufficient, but then all little children are lost who died early, before they could choose; and of the children who grow up, again thousands upon thousands fall away through free choice of the will. Pelagianism in its various forms seems to be merciful; but it is nothing other than the mercy of the Pharisee, who does not concern himself with the publicans. In order to save freedom of the will in a few thousands of adults, and then only in appearance, it, proportionally, gives millions of little children over to damnation. In the end it remains a riddle what Pelagianism can have against this, that God glorifies his efficacious grace in sinners. If it raised the question why God bestows that grace only upon many and not upon all, it would find a benevolent ear with everyone. Who has not felt that question arise within himself and who has not been moved by it to the deepest part of his soul? But that question returns again from every standpoint and is answered by Pelagius no more than by Augustine; all without distinction must rest in the good pleasure of God. The confessors of God's sovereignty are in no case in a more unfavorable condition here than the defenders of free will. For, as was shown above, the gratia externa according to the Reformed bestows upon all who live under the gospel at least as much grace as, according to the Pelagians, is granted to them in the so-called gratia sufficiens and is judged by them to be sufficient for a free choice for or against the gospel. The

doctrine of the inward calling takes away from the outward calling not a single blessing and benefit which, according to Pelagianism or Semipelagianism, according to Roman Catholics, Lutherans, or Remonstrants, is also granted by God. From a Reformed standpoint all who are outwardly called objectively remain in the same condition in which they find themselves according to other confessions. The assertion of the Reformed is only that all that rich grace to and in man, if it is not specifically grace of regeneration, is insufficient to bring man to a free, decisive acceptance of the gospel. In order to believe in Christ, according to the clear teaching of the Gospel of John, no less than regeneration is necessary, an operation of God's [508] power as in the raising of Christ, Ef. 1:19, 20. All lesser grace, however rich and glorious, is insufficient; a grace which, without regenerating, nevertheless restores the will so far that it can choose for the gospel, is taught nowhere in Scripture and is also a psychological absurdity. Even if this their confession were also incorrect, (which no), it brings absolutely no change to the disadvantage in the condition of those who, according to the confessions of all Christians, in the end are lost on account of their unbelief. But above the advocates of free choice of the will, those of the Reformed religion in any case have this advantage, that God's counsel shall stand, that his covenant of grace does not waver, that Christ is truly and completely Savior, that the good i.e. w. once infallibly shall triumph over the evil. What serious objection can be raised against that? If we can, without our knowing, partake of damnation in Adam—a fact that no one can deny—why then should we not much more, without our knowing, be accepted by God in Christ unto grace? For there is no question of compulsion in this grace. To speak strongly for a moment, if this grace by virtue of its nature did not exclude compulsion and

God actually used compulsion; who then would still at the end have the right or even the desire to complain, if he were thus snatched from eternal ruin and transferred into eternal life? Who would give the man right, who complained about it that, without respecting his freedom of the will, one had saved him from mortal danger? But it is not so; there is in the inward calling and regeneration no compulsion with God, βια οὐ προσεστι τῳ θεῳ, Ep. ad Diogn. 7. Not a single pious person, of whatever confession, has spoken of compulsion in the work of grace, even though he was plucked as a brand from the fire. Rather it would be his wish that God with more power broke sin in him and, without the long path of struggle, made him partake of salvation. But God does not do so in grace; all compulsion is in conflict with its essence.

For grace is not a physical power. The Thomists spoke of a physica praedeterminatio, the Romanists conceived the image of God more and more as a substantial addition to the nature of man. But the Reformed did not speak thus. Not only did they regard the image of God [509] as essentially proper to man, but they even refused to describe the grace of God in the vocatio interna as something physical; it was indeed not purely ethical or moral, but it was also not of a physical nature, and therefore is best determined as supernaturalis and divina. For it does not in any respect introduce any new substance into the existing creation, as Manicheans and Anabaptists teach, M. Vitringa III 224 sq. It does not do that objectively, insofar as with grace the person and the work of Christ can be indicated, for Christ, though conceived of the H. Spirit, assumed his human nature from Mary and did not bring it with him from heaven. But it also does not do it in a subjective sense. Grace never creates, it recreates. Regeneration, which it brings about, signifies neither in its first, nor in its second, nor in its third

meaning, that from without any substance is added to man or world or carried into them. They are the same men, who formerly were darkness, Ef. 5:5, dead in sins and trespasses, Ef. 2:2, robbers, covetous persons etc., 1 Cor. 6:11, and who now are washed, sanctified, and justified. The continuity of the I remains maintained. And so it is also the same heaven and the same earth, which at the end of days will be renewed. Christ is not a new, second Creator, but Recreator, Reformer of all things. Since sin is not a substance but has affected and destroyed the forma of things, therefore the recreation cannot consist in creating any substance, but must consist in a restoration of the forma, in reformation. Already by this every thought of physical compulsion in grace is excluded. But there is more. Not only does it introduce no new substance into creation, but it also takes nothing essential away from it, nothing that is essentially proper to it (although indeed "by nature"). Sin does not belong to the essence of creation. And grace takes nothing else away from us than sin alone. It does not suppress, it restores nature; non tollit sed restituit et perficit voluntatem. It takes away from our understanding the darkness, from our will the weakness, the powerlessness. It gives back to us what we, according to our essence, according to the idea, ought to have had but have lost through sin. It recreates us according to the image of him who created us. It is true that it, just as [510] on the one hand it does not consist in the implanting of a new substance, so on the other hand does not amount to an external, moral improvement of disposition and deeds. It is not merely a reformatio vitae, as the Socinians described it, M. Vitringa III 225 cf. 227; Scripture speaks of regeneration in far too strong terms for that; already the O. T. designates it as a circumcision of the heart, Deut. 30:6, a creating of a clean heart and renewing of a steadfast spirit, Ps. 51:12, a taking away of the stony and giving of a fleshy heart, Jer. 31:33v.

Ezech. 11:19, 36:25, and the N. T. uses the words: birth from above, Joh. 3:3, from God, 1:13, from the Spirit, 3:5, 6, 8, regeneration, Tit. 3:5, and says that those who received this benefit thereby are a new creature, 2 Cor. 5:17, God's workmanship, Rom. 14:20, Ef. 2:10, new men, Ef. 2:15, 4:10, 24, have become one plant with Christ in his death and resurrection, Rom. 6:5, live and walk in Christ or in the H. Spirit, etc. The benefit of regeneration is therefore far too great for it to be able to be produced by a suasio moralis of the word of preaching; it rather presupposes a divine almighty power, Ef. 1:19, 20; and it is also too rich for it to consist only in a change of the deeds or expressions of the human faculties. For sin, though having begun with an act, has penetrated into the nature of man itself; it is no substantia but also not an actus alone; it is an inner corruption of the whole man, not only of his thoughts and words and deeds, but also of his understanding and will, and again not only of these but also of his heart, from which all unrighteousnesses proceed, of the innermost, the core, the root of his being, of the I of man himself. And therefore regeneration is such a wholly supernatural, most powerful, hidden and inexpressible working of God, whereby He penetrates into the innermost parts of man, opens the closed heart, softens the hard, circumcises the uncircumcised, pours new qualities into the will and makes it from dead living, from evil good, from unwilling willing, from rebellious obedient, Can. Dordr. III 11. 12. New qualities are therefore indeed what regeneration implants in man, but they are nevertheless no others than those which belong to his essence, habits, dispositions, inclinations, which originally were included in the image of God and corresponded with God's law, and which free fallen, sinful human nature from its darkness and slavery, from its death and misery. Even if it is the case, then, that grace, which works regeneration, is

rightly called irresistibilis or better still insuperabilis, because it overcomes all resistance of sinful man; even if it is a gratia operans, which works in man without any cooperation of his will; yet it is and remains a potentissima simul et suavissima operatio, which does not work in men as in stocks and blocks, does not take away the will and its properties nor compel it with violence, but makes it spiritually alive, heals, improves, and bends it in a manner that is sweet and at the same time powerful. Cf. Can. Dordr. III IV and the judgments of the delegates concerning the 3rd and 4th art. of the Remonstrants, furthermore the works on grace, cited above p. 479, and further still Trigland, Antapol. c. 23-33. Voetius, de statu electorum ante conversionem, Disp. II 402-432, de regeneratione, ib. 432-468, an Christus electis et salvandis specialem gratiam regenerationis et fidei sit meritus, ib. V 270-277. Turretinus, Theol. El. XV qu. 3-6. Spanhemius, Elenchus controv. de religione, Op. III 875 sq. Id. Disp. theol. de quinquarticulanis controversiis, Op. III 1167-1188. Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. lib. 6. Moor IV 442-534 etc.

§ 45. FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION.

1. The spiritual life, which is implanted in regeneration, agrees with natural life in this, that, in order to increase and to grow up, it must be nourished and strengthened. There is otherwise indeed a great difference between the two, for spiritual life has its origin in God, not as Creator but as Saviour; it has been acquired by the resurrection of Christ; it is an eternal life, which cannot sin and cannot die. But nevertheless the regenerate person continually has need to be strengthened with power by the Spirit according to the inner man. This strengthening [512] of the spiritual life, too, is just as much as its origin from God and the riches of his grace. The life of the spiritual man is, even after its coming into being, not for a moment to be conceived apart from God and his communion. It is in the same strict and special sense, in which it is from God, also through and unto God. He is the one who nourishes and maintains it, who never lets it go, who causes it to pass over into deeds and activities, who not only grants the ability but also works the willing and working according to his good pleasure, Phil. 2:13, 2 Cor. 3:5. It is a life in communion with Christ; the

believers have in baptism become one plant with him in his death and also in his resurrection, Rom. 6:5, they are in Christ and Christ lives in them, 2 Cor. 13:5, Gal. 2:20, they can do nothing without him, if they do not abide in him as branches in the vine, Joh. 15:4, 5; they can become strong only ἐν κυριῳ και ἐν τῳ κρατει της ἰσχυος αὐτου, Ef. 6:10, through the Spirit of Christ and in his communion, Rom. 8:13, 26, 2 Cor. 13:13, Ef. 3:16. But that Spirit works in the regenerate in different respects. That can and that ought to be so, because the new man is not at once perfect in "degrees", but indeed in "parts". In regeneration, in principle the whole man is re-created; the I of man himself dies and rises again out of and in Christ, Gal. 2:20; it is at once a καινος ἀνθρωπος, who is created in Christ, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, indeed small and tender but yet complete in all parts. And therefore the Holy Spirit works in different respects, in order to let the new man grow up uniformly and proportionately in all his parts. He works as Spirit of wisdom, of holiness, and of glory and adorns the believers with all kinds of powers and gifts and virtues, Rom. 15:13, 1 Cor. 12:3v., Gal. 5:22. Specifically he works on the side of the understanding the virtues of faith, knowledge, wisdom, etc. Although in mysterious, untraceable manner implanted by the Spirit in man, Joh. 3:8, spiritual life is nevertheless, as soon as it becomes conscious in man, from the first moment onward bound to the Word of God. It has been awakened by the Holy Spirit out of a λογος ἐμφυτος, out of the inward, evangelical calling of Christ; it remains in its growth bound to that word, and thus, as soon as it becomes conscious, also dependent on Holy Scripture, which is the word of [513] Christ. Spiritual life, by virtue of its nature, stands in relation to Scripture, as the plant to the soil in which it is rooted and from which it draws its juices. Not with Scripture only as outwardly written in letters, but also as continually borne,

animated, and spoken in the heart by the Holy Spirit. The vocatio interna is not only necessary at the coming into being but also at the growth of spiritual life. It does not take place once and is not finished with the creation of life, but it always continues; just as God first created all things through the Word and thereafter through that same Word maintains all things, so the vocatio interna is also active in the maintenance and development of spiritual life. The believers are κλητοι, Rom. 1:6, who partake of the heavenly calling, Hebr. 3:1, who are continually called by God to his kingdom, until they will actually have inherited it, 1 Thess. 2:12, 5:24. The act now, by which the Holy Spirit causes the Word of Christ to be understood in its spiritual sense and content and opens consciousness to the truth, still bears in Scripture the special name of illumination. Because sin has darkened the understanding, Rom. 1:21, 1 Cor. 1:21, 2:14, Ef. 4:18, 5:8, there is also needed an ἀποκαλυψις του νοος, Rom. 12:2, Ef. 4:23. This is brought about by God, who through ἀποκαλυψις, in man, ἐν ἐμοι, Gal. 1:16, removes the hindrance which up to now impeded the right knowledge of matters, Mt. 11:25, 16:17, Gal. 1:16, cf. part I 245. He does this by giving the Holy Spirit, who is a πνευμα σοφιας και ἀποκαλυψεως, Ef. 1:17, leads into the truth, Joh. 16:23, teaches all things, Joh. 14:26, 1 Joh. 2:20, and causes the things of God to be understood, 1 Cor. 2:10-16. Just as at creation by his word of power he caused the light to shine out of darkness, so he also through the Son, Mt. 11:27 and through the Spirit causes it to become light in the hearts of men, 2 Cor. 4:6, and makes the eyes of the heart enlightened, Ef. 1:18. Thereby they know the things that were bestowed upon them by God in the gospel, 1 Cor. 2:12, they have a γνωσις and ἐπιγνωσις, i.e. a knowledge concerning them personally and working upon them, of the Father, Mt. 11:27, 2 Cor. 4:6, Ef. 1:17, of Christ, Mt.

16:17, of the things of the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. 2:14 etc., and they are children of the light, Luk. 16:8, Ef. 5:8, 1 Thess. 5:5, citizens of the [514] kingdom of light, 1 Petr. 2:9, Col. 2:12 and walk in the light, Ef. 5:8, 1 Joh. 1:7, 2:9, 10. Through the illumination of the Holy Spirit an entirely new light dawns for man over all things, over God, Christ, sin, grace, Scripture, church, world, death, judgment etc. In God's light he now sees light.

This knowledge is now further described in Scripture as a knowledge of faith. It is wholly in accordance with Scripture to say that the knowledge of God in the face of Christ saves, justifies, grants forgiveness of sins and eternal life, 1 Kon. 8:43, 1 Chr. 28:9, Ps. 89:16, Jes. 1:3, 11:9, 53:11, Jer. 4:22, 31:34, Hos. 2:19, 4:1, 6, Mt. 11:27, Luk. 1:77, Joh. 8:32, 10:4, 14, 17:3, Rom. 10:3, 2 Cor. 2:14, Gal. 4:9, Ef. 4:13, Hebr. 8:11, 1 Joh. 5:20, 2 Petr. 1:2, 3:18. But because by virtue of its origin, essence, and object it bears an altogether special character, it is called a knowledge of faith. Thus defined, however, it is thereby absolutely not indicated as something that is, as such, foreign to human nature and, in the sense of a donum superadditum, is added to it. Darkness, error, lie, etc. are contrary to nature, properties of fallen nature, but the light of knowledge belongs to the image of God, which was originally and essentially proper to man. And also the knowledge of faith is no absolutely supernatural addition to man. Believing quite in general is what every human being does, always and in every domain, especially also in that of science. There is no knowledge without some faith; the dualism between faith and science is theoretically and practically impossible. One even speaks in dogmatics, besides saving, also of historical, Mt. 7:26, Joh. 12:42, 43, 13:17, Hd. 26:27, 28, Jak. 2:19, temporal, Mt. 13:21, and miracle-faith, Mt. 9:2, 17:20, Hd. 14:9, 1 Cor. 13:2, which are indeed essentially distinct from the first and can also occur

in the unregenerate, but must nevertheless have so much agreement with it that they can bear the same name of faith. But even faith in the narrower sense, the fides justificans or salvifica, is no donum superadditum according to the Roman conception. Indeed faith is a gift of God, Hd. 5:31, Ef. 2:8, Phil. 1:29, fruit of his δυναμις, 1 Cor. 2:4, 5, Ef. 1:19, 1 Thess. 2:13, and specifically bestowed by the H. Spirit, [515] 1 Cor. 12:3, 2 Cor. 4:13. But it is nevertheless a gift that is necessary not in an absolute sense, but only accidentally, for the sake of sin. For re-creation never introduces a new substance into world or humanity; also in faith it does not bestow upon man such a new faculty, power, or activity as the original human nature created in God's image did not possess. On the contrary, the Reformed rightly maintained against the Remonstrants, e.g. Arminius, Op. 160, that Adam before the fall possessed in his nature the power to believe in Christ, although he of course did not know Christ and although he then did not need Him as Saviour, Gomarus, Op. I 93. Moor IV 461. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 454. II 482v. And they likewise maintained against the Romanists that Christ as man on earth had lived by faith, above 294. Since now regeneration is in principle a re-creation of the whole man according to the image of him who created him, the capacity for faith (fides potentialis, seminalis, habitualis, semen or radix fidei) is of itself given with and in it. Just as little children are rational beings ante rationem actualem, so are they, if they are children of the covenant, also fideles ante fidem actualem. Indeed it is incorrect, with older Lutheran theologians, to let regeneration be absorbed into donatio fidei, cf. M. Vitringa III 222, for in regeneration the semina spei, caritatis etc. are just as well implanted; but nevertheless in it, as all faculties and powers, so also the capacity for faith is restored. Believing in God, in Christ, etc., is for the regenerate man as such just as

natural as it is natural for every human being to believe in the visible world. Indeed, just as every potentia first passes over into actus through a certain influence from without and a grain of wheat germinates only in the bosom of the earth, so also the capacity for faith, which has been implanted by regeneration, passes over into the act of faith only through the continuing vocatio interna. But in regeneration God nevertheless restores the relation of life that originally existed between Him and man; re-created according to God's image, man is again akin to God himself and to all that is God's, to his Christ, to the things of the Spirit, to his Word, to his church, to his heaven, to the things that are above. Crucified to the world and dead to sin, he lives to God. And [516] therefore, being enlightened by the H. Spirit, he also knows God and is blessed in that knowledge, Joh. 17:3.

But this must not be understood in such a way, as if the regenerate drew this knowledge of God in Christ from his own heart, from the inward instruction of the Holy Spirit. Mysticism has at all times set Word and Spirit over against one another, despised the letter, exalted the inward word at the expense of the outward, and for that has even appealed to Holy Scripture, Jes. 54:13, Jer. 31:34, Mt. 11:25, 27, 16:17, Joh. 6:45, 1 Cor. 2:10, 2 Cor. 3:6, Hebr. 8:10, 1 Joh. 2:20, 27. Against that it should be remarked: 1o that very certainly all knowledge, in the natural and spiritual domain, presupposes a relation, an affinity between object and subject. In order to see an eye is necessary; and object and subject must be illumined by one and the same light. In order to know understanding is necessary, and it is the same Logos, who created the known object and the knowing subject for one another. Thus also, on spiritual terrain, with the Word the Spirit, with the vocatio externa the vocatio interna, with the revelation the illumination must be added, in order to make us know God in the face of Christ. 2o

Scripture expresses this in the above-mentioned and other places decisively and clearly. In God's light alone do we see the light. But it nowhere says that the regenerate can or must draw the material of this knowledge from himself. In 1 Joh. 2:20-27 the apostle most closely connects the anointing of the Spirit, which the believers have received from the Holy One, i.e. from Christ, with the truth which they have heard, vs. 21-24; if they remain in it, they also remain in the Son and the Father and have no further instruction necessary. Everywhere Scripture refers the believer outside himself, to the revelation of God in nature, law, and gospel, Deut. 4:1, Jes. 8:20, Joh. 5:39, Rom. 1:20, 15:4, 2 Tim. 3:15, 1 Petr. 1:25, 2 Petr. 1:19 etc. 3o In the natural it is so, that the human being indeed brings along a consciousness, understanding, reason, but that he nevertheless must obtain all content of knowledge from outside, part I 161v. II 39v. Much more is this the case in the spiritual. For although all believers are also taught by the Lord, they nevertheless still live in the flesh, and remain inclined to error. Time and again thoughts rise up in them, which they have to lead captive to the obedience of Christ. Left to themselves, [517] they would immediately fall into error and falsehood. And therefore here an objective revelation is necessary, which serves as rule of doctrine and life. 4o There is added to that still, that not visible, but invisible, spiritual, eternal things are the object of this religious knowledge. That which no eye has seen and no ear has heard and has not ascended into the human heart, that God has prepared in the gospel for those who love Him. How shall we know these things, firmly and certainly, unless they are placed before our eyes in a faithful image, pure and unmixed? We do not walk here by sight; thus we ought then to behold the glory of the Lord in a mirror, in order to be transformed in form according to that same image. 5o And finally, just as in the natural every

creature seeks food according to its nature, so also in the believer the new life always again draws toward the gospel, toward the word of Christ, toward the Scriptures as toward the ground on which it rests, as toward the food by which it is strengthened. Not less dispensable but ever more indispensable and glorious does Scripture become to him who grows up in the faith. The testimony of the Holy Spirit in his heart binds him in the same measure and power to Scripture as to the person of Christ Himself, part I 502v. From all this it now also becomes clear why religious knowledge in Scripture is described as a knowledge of faith and faith in the subjective work of salvation is placed so strongly in the foreground. Properly speaking, faith or knowledge does not make blessed, but God makes blessed in Christ through the Holy Spirit. He makes blessed, through the benefits of the covenant, through Christ, by giving Himself to the sinner. But what would that salvation avail, if it were not conscious to us and we bore no knowledge of it? Then it would not even exist. Unconscious salvation is indeed for the Buddhist the highest, and many nowadays give preference to non-being above being. But the highest being is for the Christian to know God and through that knowledge to have eternal life. Knowledge is therefore not an accidental, from-outside-coming addition to salvation, but forms in it an indispensable element. There is no salvation that is not known, not enjoyed. What would we have from the forgiveness of sins, from regeneration and complete renewal through the Holy Spirit, from the heavenly [518] glory, if we had no consciousness and no knowledge of it. They could not exist, they presuppose and demand consciousness, knowledge, enjoyment, and give therein salvation. God makes blessed, by making Himself known and enjoyed in Christ. Since, however, the benefits of the covenant of grace here on earth are still only in

part bestowed, since communion with God, regeneration, sanctification are still imperfect, since knowledge is imperfect, has invisible things as object and is bound to Scripture, therefore the knowledge of God here on earth is a knowledge of faith. Faith is the only way along which it is obtained, the only form in which it can appear. Yes, all benefits, forgiveness, regeneration, sanctification, perseverance, heavenly salvation are for us only through faith; only in faith do we enjoy them; we are saved only in hope.

2. In the O. T. there is still lacking a technical term for faith. The thing is not lacking, for many a time salvation appears in the form of a promise, which cannot be accepted otherwise than by faith. Deeds and works of faith are therefore related to us almost on every page. But the religious relation of man to God is usually expressed by other words, such as: to fear God, to serve, to love, to cleave, to trust, to abandon oneself to Him, to lean, to hope, to wait etc., above p. 427. To believe the word most closely related is האמין with ב or ל from אמן, to make firm, to make oneself firm, to hold fast to something, to lean, to trust, Gen. 15:6, Ex. 4:31, 14:31, Deut. 9:23, especially Isa. 7:9, Ahaz, who seeks help from Assyria and leans on that, will not be confirmed, if he does not desist from that and relies only on God, and Hab. 2:4, the Chaldeans make their power into their god and their soul is puffed up, but the righteous shall live by his trust in God and His promise. In later Judaism faith consisted not only in accepting the law as God's gift but also in the opinion that God's goodness would supplement what might be lacking in legal righteousness. Over against that John the Baptist appears with the preaching that such a faith and such a righteousness have no value, that for all μετανοια and baptism are necessary, in order to enter into the kingdom of the [519] Messiah. Jesus

joins in with this, but adds to it that that kingdom has come in Him, the Son of man; He brings the glad message of it and says: repent and believe the gospel. As long as Jesus was on earth and Himself preached, faith consisted, by the nature of the case, first of all in this, that one personally placed an unqualified trust in Jesus and thereby was convinced that God spoke and did miracles in and through Him, e.g. Mt. 8:10, 9:28, 15:28, 17:20, 21:21,22 etc. Jesus' person had its correlate in the words that He spoke, and the works that He did, and conversely these words and deeds were again verified by His person. But when Jesus had departed, there came in this this change, that one could no longer meet Him personally but, in order to get to know Him, was bound to the word of the apostles. Now faith as it were received two sides; 1o the accepting as true of the apostolic testimony concerning Christ, and 2o the personal trust in that Christ, as now still living in heaven, and mighty, to forgive sins etc. Although both sides occur alongside each other in the writings of the apostles, yet John especially lays the emphasis on the first moment, πιστευειν c. acc. or with an object clause or c. dat. rei, Joh. 2:22, 4:50, 5:47, 6:69, 8:24, 11:42, 13:19, 17:8,21, 1 Joh. 5:1,5; Paul on the other hand on the second, and then speaks of πιστις c. gen., of Jesus, Rom. 3:22, Gal. 2:16, 20, 3:22, Ef. 3:12, Phil. 3:9, of the truth, 2 Thess. 2:13, of the gospel Phil. 1:27, προς θεου, 1 Thess. 1:8, εἰς Χριστον, Col. 2:5, Phil. 5, ἐν Χριστῳ, Gal. 3:26, Ef. 1:15, 2 Tim. 3:15, and of πιστευειν τινι, Rom. 4:3, Gal. 4:6, 2 Tim. 1:12, Tit. 3:8, ἐπι τινα, Rom. 4:5, 24, ἐπι τινι, Rom. 9:33, 1 Tim. 1:16 and especially εἰς τινα, Rom. 10:11, Col. 2:5, Phil. 1:29 etc. But an absolute opposition is not this, for John speaks many a time of πιστευειν εἰς τινα, 2:11, 3:16, 18, 36, 4:39, 6:29 etc., εἰς το ὀνομα, 1:12, 2:23, I 5:13 and also τινι, 3:15, 5:24, 38, 46, 6:30 and τῳ ὀνοματι, I 3:23; and Paul construes πιστευειν also with τι and ὀτι,

Rom. 10:9, 1 Cor. 13:7, cf. 15:14,17, 1 Thess. 4:14. Above all it is wrong, to identify the later distinction of Deo credere and in Deum credere or also that of historical and saving faith with the above-mentioned. For many a time the construction [520] of πιστευειν with ὀτι, e.g. that Jesus is the Christ, indeed includes saving faith, Joh. 6:69, 8:24, 11:27, 17:8, I 1:5, Rom. 10:9; and πιστευειν τινι or εἰς τινα is often no more than a historical faith, Joh. 7:31, 40v., 8:30v., 10:42, 11:45, 48, 12:11, 42; in 1 Joh. 5:10 there even stands πιστευειν εἰς την μαρτυριαν. And this is also understandable. Truly to believe the testimony which God has testified concerning His Son can only and does only he who places an unqualified trust in the person of Christ; and conversely, whoever trusts in Christ as Son of God also unconditionally accepts the testimony of God concerning Christ through the mouth of the apostles. Faith thus includes in the N. T. two elements: trust in the person of Christ and acceptance of the apostolic testimony. These two hang together inseparably, they constitute in a subjective sense the essence of Christianity. If Christ were only a historical person, who by His teaching and life had left us an example, then a historical faith in the transmitted testimony would be sufficient, but then it also would not come to true religion, to essential communion with God and would resemble deism. If Christ conversely, according to the opinion of pantheism, were not the historical but only the ideal Christ, then faith in a testimony would be wholly superfluous, Christ would be nothing else than the being of God in us, but then it again would not come to true communion of God and man, since this presupposes the essential distinction of both. But now Christ is both: a historical person, the Christ of the Scriptures, and at the same time the glorified Lord in heaven, who still lives and reigns as the head of His church. He acquired salvation in the past, but applies it

Himself in the present. And these benefits of the covenant comprise the re-creation of being and of consciousness; they consist in justification and in redemption, in light and in life, in truth and in grace. They change man in the world of thought, make him free from lie, error, darkness, make him know God as the gracious One, who forgives sins, place him in the right relation to God and all things, make him think on the things that are above and give him in faith a firm ground of the things that one hopes for, and a proof of the matters that one does not see. And they also change man in his being, make him [521] free from the stain of sin, make him in the hiddenness of his heart live in communion with God through Christ in the H. Spirit, make him a citizen of the heavens, born from above, from God, re-created according to the conformity to the image of the Son, so that He may be the firstborn among many brethren. And these two stand in indissoluble connection. For Christ, who has descended, is the same who has also ascended far above all heavens, in order that He might fill all things, Ef. 4:10. The H. Spirit, who regenerates, is the same who also testifies in us of Christ. Scripture leads us up to Christ, who is above, seated at God's right hand, and Christ, who through the Spirit dwells in our hearts, leads us back to Scripture. With the heart one believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth one confesses unto salvation, Rom. 10:10. Faith according to Scripture excludes both: a faith of the heart that does not confess and a confession that does not root in the faith of the heart. It is mystical and noetic at the same time, an unqualified, unshakable trust in Christ, as He who according to the testimony of Scripture has accomplished everything for me and on that ground now and eternally is my Lord and my God. Cf. on faith in the H. Scripture, besides the handbooks for Bibl. Theology of Weiss, Holtzmann etc., Schlatter, Der Glaube im N. T. Zweite

Bearbeitung. Calw u. Stuttgart 1896. C. Boetticher, Das Wesen des relig. Glaubens im N. T. Berlin Gaertner 1896. Haussleiter, Was versteht Paulus unter Chr. Glauben? Greifsw. Studiën, H. Cremer..... dargebracht, Gütersloh 1895 S. 159-182. Huther, Die Bedeutung der Begriffe ζωη und πιστευειν in d. Joh. Schriften, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1872 S. 1-34. Cremer s. v.

3. What thus occurs undivided and in organic unity in Scripture has in theology and in Christian life many times been torn apart from one another or only mechanically connected. Rome conceives faith as assensus firmus ac certus ad ea omnia, quae Deus credendo proponit and rejects the Protestant definition that it would be a fiducia specialis, that my sins are forgiven; trust is the fruit of faith in the will and can only follow upon justification, since otherwise the Protestants themselves would not be able to maintain that faith alone justifies; for in trust there is also hope and love. [522] This faith as assent is therefore, with Rome, insufficient for justification; together with other activities it is indeed a preparation for it, but in itself it is informis and must through love become a fides formata. With Rome faith is as yet not at all a personal, religious relation to God; it bears an introductory character and is for a great part fides implicita, an accepting as true of everything, quod credit sacrosancta mater ecclesia. The personal relation to God comes into being only in love, and this is then also what justifies and saves, cf. above p. 442 and vol. I 476. In essence the conception of faith in the Greek church, among Socinians, Remonstrants, Rationalists, etc., corresponds with that; it is in itself nothing but a historical holding-for-true, actually not a religious but an epistemological concept, not drawn from Scripture but introduced into theology from ordinary, daily usage. The Reformation, however, did not ask: what is believing in general? and then determine the religious concept of faith accordingly, but it went

back to Scripture, investigated what meaning and place this assigned to faith, thereby arrived at a wholly different conception of the fides salvifica and said antithetically over against Rome: it is not only a firmus assensus but also a certa fiducia; faith is the central, personal, religious relation of man to God. But it cannot be denied that this determination of faith brought with it peculiar difficulties and gave occasion to all kinds of different views. In the first place the question had soon to arise, in what relation these two elements of faith stand to one another. From the beginning some placed the seat of faith in the understanding, defined it preferably by cognitio certa, certitudo, and regarded the fiducia as a consequence and fruit of faith in the will; others sought the essence of faith in the fiducia and made it have its seat in the heart. Later this difference developed into the antithesis of orthodoxy and pietism; orthodoxy wanted to come through the understanding to the heart, through doctrine to life, and often became indifferent to life; pietism trod the reversed path and often considered doctrine of slight significance. In the second place there soon arose difference over the relation of faith and justification. The Reformation had [523] conceived faith as cognitio or fiducia certa, that Christ is my Saviour and that my sins are forgiven. But it seemed that this certainty could not precede justification but had to follow upon it; thus since Gomarus a distinction was made between an actus directus and reflexus of faith, between refuge-taking and assured trust, between essence and well-being of faith. This difference later led to the antithesis of nomism and antinomism; nomism thought that all kinds of conditions and experiences had to precede the certainty of the forgiveness of sins and thus placed the essence of faith in a seeking, hungering, thirsting after Christ, etc.; antinomism considered all this superfluous, a nullification of the work of Christ, and defined faith

as firm conviction that the sins are forgiven. In the third place finally the relation of faith and work was difficult to define. It was a living faith, fides sola but not solitaria, that according to the Reformation justified. Standing in opposition to all works, faith therefore on the one hand absolutely must not be a work. There must, says Comrie, Heid. Cat. Voorrede XXVI Nijkerk Malga 1856, cf. p. 412, be something in the inner nature of faith by which it is distinguished from all works, however they may be named. On the other hand it was nevertheless a living faith and thus indeed a work and an act, for the potentia or habitus fidei, which is implanted in regeneration, is formaliter not yet fides, just as an egg is not already a hen, Voetius, Disp. II 403. 499. This difference over the relation of faith and work led in practice to the antithesis of the passive and the active Christians; the former remain at justification and do not come to sanctification; the latter run the danger of failing to recognize the former and of making themselves dependent on the latter.

All these objections and dangers, however, which are connected with the Reformation conception of faith, plead not against but for it. Rome has a very simple and intelligible definition of faith, but by that very fact does injustice to the richness of this concept in Scripture. For faith is not merely an accepting of the testimony of the apostles concerning Christ, but a bond of the soul to Christ himself, who is above, seated at the right hand of God. It is το ἐργον του θεου par excellence, John 6:29, the one and all in the Christian life, the means by which we become partakers of Christ and all his benefits, the subjective source of all salvation and blessing. While it binds us through Scripture to the historical Christ, it at the same time lifts us up to the invisible world, and makes us live in communion with the Lord from heaven. Wherever it may be seated in man, it acts upon all his

faculties and powers, gives them direction and guidance, governs his understanding and his heart, his thinking and doing, his life and conduct; Christians are believers, πιστοι. It is mystical and noetic, receptive and spontaneous, passive and active, an antithesis of all works and itself the work of God par excellence, means unto justification and principle of sanctification, accompanying our whole life and only at death passing over into sight. It is no more than natural that theology wrestles with it, in order to give a somewhat correct description of this faith. And even if it should succeed in this, it is nevertheless never able to govern life and to prevent all one-sidednesses and errors in practice. Yet it is possible, in the order of salvation, to give to faith that place and significance which, according to Scripture, belongs to it. 1o To that end it must be placed in the foreground that all benefits of salvation have been acquired by Christ and are present in him, and that he himself, as the Lord from heaven, is through his Spirit the distributor and applier thereof. Neither faith nor conversion are conditions which in any way acquire salvation; they are only the way in which the benefits of the covenant come into subjective possession of those for whom they have been acquired. 2o Insofar it is perfectly correct to say that justification, like the other benefits of the covenant, precedes faith. In the pactum salutis the Son already appeared as surety and mediator for his own. According to 2 Cor. 5:19 God reconciled the world with himself in Christ and did not impute to it its sins, and Rom. 4:25 says clearly that Christ, just as he was delivered up for our sins, so also was raised δια την δικαιωσιν ἡμων, i.e. for, on account of our justification, because we were objectively justified in him by his suffering and death in our place. The καταλλαγη is not distinguished from the ἱλασμος in that the latter is objective and the former subjective. The first also is objective; the content of the gospel runs:

God is reconciled, [525] accept that reconciliation, believe the gospel, above p. 383. Reconciliation, forgiveness, sanctification, etc., do not come about through our faith or our conversion, but they have been fully acquired by Christ; and he distributes them according to his will. 3o All the more must this be maintained, because there is no participation in the benefits of Christ except through participation in his person. The benefits of the covenant are not material goods that can be possessed and enjoyed without and outside the mediator of that covenant. But they are enclosed in him and never and nowhere exist independently of him. When it is said that Christ has acquired them, this indicates that God can bestow all those benefits, without violation of his justice, out of grace in the communion of Christ. 4o In particular, among those benefits which Christ has acquired, also belongs the gift of the Holy Spirit. He himself has become Spirit, he has by his suffering and death also made the Spirit of the Father and of the Son into his Spirit, into the Spirit of Christ, and therefore distributes him, in whatever way he wills, while that Spirit himself takes everything from Christ. The gift of the Holy Spirit thus presupposes that God has already communicated and bestowed his Christ and that Christ has already communicated and bestowed himself. Even the very first benefit of salvation is a benefit of the covenant, which presupposes the unio mystica. There is not only no resurrection but also no being crucified and buried, no mortification of the old man, except in the communion of Christ. 5o This imputation and bestowal of Christ and his benefits may now ideally, in the decree, already have taken place from eternity; it may objectively have been realized in Christ as head and mediator, when he became man, died, and was raised; it may also materially be the content of the word of the gospel; yet it is first individually applied and distributed in the vocatio interna, and

passively accepted on man's side in regeneration. 6o This real bestowal of Christ and his benefits in the vocatio interna is of such great significance that in the decree and in the satisfaction there is no objective imputation of Christ unless it also, even if it be before birth, individually realizes itself in the vocatio interna, and that conversely without regeneration there is no share in Christ and his benefits. Antinomianism volatilizes time; for God, however, what happens in [526] time has significance for eternity, because it itself has its foundation and principle in eternity. 7o For those who grow up, however, even regeneration is not enough. Because man is a rational being and the covenant of grace does not kill but rather restores and confirms his independence and freedom, regeneration must pass over into acts of faith. It is Christ himself who through the Holy Spirit brings man into his communion unto the free exercise of faith and conversion. And so much is antinomianism here again erring with its pantheistic volatilization of time, that Scripture precisely binds salvation to faith, which alone can be exercised here on this earth. 8o This faith itself has no conditions which man must first fulfill in order to be allowed to believe, for the freedom of faith is abundantly present for everyone in Scripture and in the offer of grace. Nor is sorrow over sin a condition, because as poenitentia it may only in a certain sense be called gratia praeparans, and as resipiscentia is precisely fruit and proof of faith. Nor is faith itself a condition unto the other benefits, at least not in the sense that these would in any way come about through it, but at most only thus, that faith is subjectively necessary in order to receive and enjoy the benefits present in Christ. 9o Because the bestowal of Christ and his benefits precedes faith and is in no way caused or effected by it, faith cannot be otherwise and is nothing other than the subjective, conscious, and active acceptance of the bestowed benefits. The

description of faith by taking refuge, hungering, thirsting, etc., does not hit the essence, because these are all expressions and activities of faith, and thus already presuppose it. The distinction of faith into refuge-taking and assured trust may, as a distinction, and with a view to practice, in which the believer is repeatedly brought to doubting, have some right of existence; as a separation it is to be rejected and works very harmfully for the growth of spiritual life. 10o Faith as acceptance of the benefits acquired and bestowed by Christ is not temporally separated from assurance of faith, but coincides with it immediately. Just as knowing as knowing of itself brings with it the consciousness of knowing, so faith also by its nature includes immediate certainty. It stands over against anxiety, Mt. 6:31, 8:26, 10:31, fear, Mk. 4:40, 5:36, doubt, Mt. 14:31, 21:21, Rom. 4:20, Jak. 1:6, agitation, Joh. 14:1, it is indefinite trust, Mt. 17:20, ὑποστασις and ἔλεγχος of the unseen things, Hebr. 11:1. From that assurance of faith speak and boast the pious of the O. and N. Covenant, Gen. 49:18, Ps. 16:8-10, 23:4-6, 31:2, 56:5, 10, 57:3 etc., Rom. 4:18, 21, 8:38, 2 Tim. 4:7, 8, Hebr. 11 etc. And when Rome rejected this assurance, Trid. VI c. 9 and can. 13-15, the Reformation, in particular Calvin, Inst. III 2, 14v. etc., again pointed out this assurance in faith according to Scripture. Fides numquam se ipsam ignorat, Sohnius, Op. I 976. 11o The error of antinomianism therefore did not consist in that it defined faith as certainty, but it lay herein, that it erased the distinction of acquisition and application of salvation, of the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, considered regeneration, conversion, etc. unnecessary and unlawful, understood by faith nothing other than an intellectual accepting of the sentence: your sins are forgiven, and finally considered the whole forgiveness, just like sin itself, a delusion without objective reality. 12o As conscious and free acceptance of Christ with all his benefits, faith here on

earth cannot be otherwise than at the same time firmus assensus and certa fiducia. Christ namely is glorified and we know him and his benefits only from his Word. Yet he does not work on, like other historical persons, only through his example, word, and spirit, but, just as he is the only acquirer of the benefits, so he is also the only possessor and distributor of them. He himself has through his suffering and death become a life-giving Spirit and communicates himself with his benefits to believers. Through his Spirit he bestows himself upon them, as he is and as he, because he has been taken up into heaven and can no longer be seen, has had himself described by that same Spirit in his Word. Thereby he recreates our being and our consciousness, our doing and our thinking, our heart and understanding; he regenerates and he justifies us and thus delivers us from all sin, both from its stain and from its guilt and from all its consequences. Himself prophet and priest and king, he makes us into prophets, who proclaim God's thoughts, into priests, [528] who dedicate ourselves to God, into kings, who rule over world and death. And faith accepts Christ as he gives himself, Christum evangelio suo vestitum, Calvin, Inst. III 2, 6. 13o Whether one in that connection defines faith by cognitio or by fiducia is not the main point; both do not form an antithesis. Calvin calls it, Inst. II 6, 7 a firma certaque divinae erga nos benevolentiae cognitio, but at the same time says that it is more cordis quam cerebri, affectus quam intelligentiae, ib. § 8, and speaks of it at Rom. 10:10 as a firma et efficax fiducia. Strictly speaking, in a logical sense a trust precedes faith. We believe someone's testimony because we place trust in his person. Believing as an act of the understanding already rests on a bending of the will; nemo credit nisi volens, Voetius, Disp. II 499. And a trust also follows; if I firmly believe something, then I trust in it and rest in it; fides antecedit, fides generat

fiduciam; Calvin says that the apostle Ef. 3:12 ex fide deducit fiduciam, Inst. III 2, 15, cf. Piscator, bij Heppe, Dogm. 387. Voetius, Disp. V 288-300. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 95 f. But however one determines it, faith is in its essence always certainty, excluding all doubt, fear, despair. In the believer, indeed, all manner of care and doubt repeatedly arises, and his whole life he has to struggle with it; but faith is in itself absolute certainty, Calvin, Inst. III 2, 17v. Zanchius, Op. VIII 712 sq. Assurance does not come later from outside, added to faith, but is at once in it; the different acts of faith (actus fidei, such as knowledge, assent, trust, rest, peace etc., Voetius, Disp. II 499-512. Witsius, Oec. foed. III c. 7. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 8, to be distinguished from fructus fidei or bona opera) are not steps that temporally follow one another, but indeed there are in those acts themselves all manner of degrees: there is small and great, weak and strong faith, there are children and young men, men and fathers in the faith. But faith remains by its nature firm certainty, indefinite trust; it is today still the same as it was in Jesus' time, namely, that with God all things are possible, Mk. 10:27, 11:23, 24, that he who raised Christ from the dead, Rom. 4:24, 10:9, still makes the dead alive, makes sinners blessed, and calls the things that are not as though they were, Rom. 4:17. [529]

4. This character of faith comes out clearly where it appears as fides justificans. Justification is not the only fruit of faith, for faith accepts Christ and all his benefits; conversion also, sanctification, good works, perseverance, etc. become our portion only through faith; but justification is nevertheless one of the most glorious fruits of faith. Some disapproved of the word justification, justificatio, because by the composition with make, facere, it gave occasion for an ethical conception; but just as little as in the expression Deum glorificare, magnificare, to make God great, is a moral

change as such enclosed in the word to justify. If this were so, the word here in this place would be incorrect and would have to be exchanged for vindication. For Scripture places the forensic, juridical meaning of justification beyond all doubt. The Hebrew הצדיק denotes that act of the judge by which he declares a man innocent, and stands over against הרשיע, to condemn, Deut. 25:1, Job 32:2, 33:32; of God it is used thus, Ex. 23:7, 1 Kon. 8:32, 2 Chron. 6:23, Jes. 50:8. The forgiveness of sins is not yet expressed in the O. T. by this word; this is made known by, or in any case is contained under, the words to redeem, Ps. 39:9, 51:16, not to impute, Ps. 32:2, to forget, not to remember, Jes. 43:25, Jer. 31:34, to cast behind the back, Jes. 38:17, to blot out or to wipe away, Ps. 51:3, 11, Jes. 43:25, to forgive, Ex. 34:9, Ps. 32:1. The Greek word δικαιουν means in general: to deem right and equitable, to judge what is right, and can thus be used both in malam partem, to do justice to the ungodly, i.e. to punish, and in bonam partem, to do justice to the righteous, to acknowledge him as such. In the N. T., under the influence of the O. T., it has always acquired a juridical and a favorable meaning. Thus it occurs in general, Mt. 11:19, where Wisdom, naturally not in an ethical but in a juridical sense, is declared righteous with respect to, ἀπο, her children; likewise Luk. 7:29, where the tax collectors justify God, and further Mt. 12:37, Luk. 10:29, 16:15, 18:14. Also with Paul the forensic meaning is fixed; in Rom. 3:4 it can have no ethical meaning, because God is the subject, who is justified in his words; further it alternates [530] with λογιζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσυνην, 4:3, 5, stands over against κρινειν, ἐγκαλειν and κατακρινειν, 8:33, 34, just as δικαιωμα stands over against κατακριμα, 5:16. It means to acquit someone after judicial investigation of the guilt, to declare righteous, δικαιον καθισταναι, Rom. 5:19.

Now the word הצדיק, δικαιουν, to make righteous, can indeed in itself have an ethical meaning. Thus it is used repeatedly by the church fathers, Suicerus s. v.; in Luther and Melanchthon and in the older symbols of the Luth. church, especially the Apol. Conf. Aug., justificari is used in a twofold sense, as justos pronuntiari seu reputari and ex injustis justos effici seu regenerari, Symb. Bücher ed. Müller, p. 100. 108. From this it has wrongly been inferred by some, Loofs, Die Bedeutung der Rechtfertigungslehre der Apologie für die Symbolik der luth. Kirche, Stud. u. Krit. 1884 S. 613-688, Eichhorn, Die Rechtfertigungslehre der Apologie, ib. 1887 S. 415-490 and Zitzlaff, Die wahre Bedeutung der Glaubensrechtfertigung, ib. 1898 S. 522 f., that the Lutheran Reformation originally conceived justification not in a juridical but in an ethical sense and regarded faith as ipsa justitia; but yet, on the other hand, the assertion of the Formula Concordiae, in Müller 528. 613, is not correct, that regeneratio in the Apol. Conf. is the same as justificatio. The contrast between Rome and the Reformation in justification was in the first period not formulated in the words ethical or juridical, but in justification by works (love) or by faith, on account of our own works or on account of the righteousness of Christ accepted in faith. Yet this justificatio on the ground of Christ's righteousness by faith alone, which from the beginning was also conceived by Luther and Melanchthon and in the oldest Lutheran symbols as a declaration of righteousness, was not formally separated from but thought together with a regeneratio of man, consisting in this, that by that same faith he was comforted and uplifted and became pleasing to God; which the Form. Conc. also again acknowledges, when it says: cum enim homo justificatur, id ipsum revera est quaedam regeneratio, quia ex filio irae fit films Dei et hoc modo e morte in vitiam transfertur, ib. p. 614, cf.

further Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. II 274 f. Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 447. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 557. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 583. The Reformed also sometimes said that the [531] word justification could have a broader sense and in Jes. 53:11, Dan. 12:3, 1 Cor. 6:11, Tit. 3:7, Op. 22:11 had to be understood thus, e.g. Synopsis pur. theol. 33, 3; while others also in all those places held fast to the narrower meaning of declaration of righteousness, Witsius, Oec. foed. III 8, 6 sq. 12, 14. Mastricht, Theol. VI 6, 19. Moor IV 550. Owen, On justification by faith, Amst. 1797 p. 140. Indeed the word in itself allows one to understand under it the whole work of redemption. The re-creation, just as it as a whole can be called a regeneration, is also from the beginning to the end a justification, a restoration of the state and the condition of the fallen world and humanity over against God and with respect to itself. But even if this meaning of the word is not impossible, even if there is in itself also nothing against thinking that Scripture sometimes uses the word in the sense of sanctification or at least includes this under it, exegetically this is nevertheless not probable. Jes. 53:11 says that the servant of the Lord by his knowledge, i.e. per cognitionem sui or also per cognitionem suam, will justify many; the juridical meaning is here not only possible but is made probable by the addition: and their transgressions he shall bear. Likewise in Dan. 12:3 it is said of the leaders and teachers of the people of God that they justify many, i.e. by their righteousness, their faithfulness to the law, are for many an example, to follow them and thus also to be reckoned among the righteous. In 1 Cor. 6:11 the juridical meaning of δικαιουν is now almost generally recognized; Paul there reminds the Corinthians that they, formerly ἄδικοι, have been washed, sanctified, justified; in view of the first word P. thinks of baptism, and the three concepts do not indicate that

the Corinthians have received these benefits successively, temporally one after another, but in view of the repeated ἀλλα they contain a climax; then, in baptism, they have not only been washed negatively from the sins of their former walk and sanctified positively, but they have also been placed in a wholly different state, in the state of the δικαιοι, by a judicial judgment of God; and all those benefits have become their portion in the name of the Lord Jesus και ἐν τῳ πνευματι του θεου ἡμων; these last words also refer to justification, which has its objective [532] foundation in Christ and in the Spirit realizes itself to believers, Gloël, Der h. Geist 149 f. Gennrich, Stud. u. Krit. 1898 S. 402 f. Tit. 3:7 contains not a single reason to depart from the usual, juridical meaning of δικαιουν. In Op. 22:11 the reading δικαιωθητω deserves preference on account of the parallel forms and means that he who is righteous, by acting righteously, be recognized still more as righteous. Thus all stringent proof is lacking that the word δικαιουν in Scripture is ever used in an ethical sense; yet even if this were the case a single time, when there is mention of the justification of the sinner before God, it always has a juridical meaning. The Roman Catholics attempt in vain to overthrow this exegetical result, cf. e.g. B. Bartmann, St. Paulus und St. Jacobus über die Rechtfertigung, Freiburg 1897 S. 67 f.

5. Now God says in his law, that the righteous must be declared righteous and the unrighteous must be condemned, Deut. 25:1, and every conscience and sense of justice agrees with that. God himself acts according to this rule; He by no means holds the guilty innocent and He does not condemn the innocent, Ex. 20:5v., 34:7, Num. 14:18. He who justifies the wicked and condemns the righteous, are an abomination to the Lord, yea both of them, Spr. 17:15, cf. Ex. 23:7, Spr. 24:24, Jes. 5:23. And yet, apparently in direct opposition to that and as if in contradiction with himself, Rom. 1:18, 2:13,

Paul says that God justifies the wicked, 4:5. For man has no righteousness in himself, on the ground of which he could be acquitted by God. The Pelagian-minded, who find the ground of acquittal in faith, i.e. in the good disposition, the virtues and good works of man and regard these as perfect, because they carry the guarantee of perfection in themselves or also for Christ's sake are reckoned by God as perfect, come into conflict at all points with the doctrine of Scripture and the Christian confession. For Scripture testifies that from the works of the law no flesh can or will be justified, Jes. 64:6, Rom. 3:19, 20, 8:7, Ef. 2:2 etc. The works, accomplished after justification out of faith, cannot be taken into account for justification, because then the order of salvation [533] would be reversed and justification would be made dependent on sanctification, and also because those good works are still always imperfect and infected with sin, not answering to the full demand of the divine law, Mt. 22:37, Gal. 3:10, Jak. 2:10. God as the truthful one cannot hold for perfect what it is not; as the righteous and holy one He can neither relinquish the demand of the law nor be satisfied with a half-righteousness, which in the ground is none. Scripture therefore also sets one's own righteousness and the righteousness of faith or the righteousness of God over against each other, Rom. 10:3, Phil. 3:9; they exclude each other as works and faith, Rom. 3:28, Gal. 2:16, as wage and grace, Rom. 4:4, 11:6. While the law thus condemns man on account of his sin and must condemn, it has pleased God to reveal another righteousness, which can be the ground of his acquittal. This righteousness is called by Paul δικαιοσυνη θεου. The expression occurs, besides Jak. 1:20 and 2 Petr. 1:1, with Paul in Rom. 1:17, 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26, 10:3, 2 Cor. 5:21, Phil. 3:9 and has with him a peculiar sense. In the O. T. the righteousness of God is that virtue by which He judges

righteously, does not hold the guilty for innocent and the innocent for guilty, and then subsequently especially helps and saves the poor, the wretched, who personally are indeed guilty but in the matter have the right on their side, and acknowledges them in their right, above p. 340. But this righteousness of God seemed at the end of the O. T. economy to have wholly disappeared and been lost; for the whole world was condemnable before God, Rom. 3:19, from the works of the law no one was justified before God, 3:20, the sins previously committed had in God's forbearance passed by unpunished, 3:25. It was therefore necessary that his righteousness should again be revealed. God now did that, not by condemning the whole world, but by giving in Christ an ἱλαστηριον, a means of atonement or atoning sacrifice, for sins. Thereby it appeared that God himself was righteous, but thereby it also became possible that He, without prejudice to, yea in agreement with, his righteousness, could justify him who is of the faith of Jesus, 3:25, 26. For—and thus Paul comes to the modification of the concept of the δικαιοσυνη θεου that is peculiar to him—in Christ, in the gospel, God has, [534] without the law, revealed a "righteousness of God" standing over against the ἰδια δικαιοσυνη. His righteousness as virtue has shown itself most gloriously in this, that He in the gospel has bestowed another righteousness, proceeding outside the works of the law, on the ground of which He can justify him who is of the faith of Jesus. This is called righteousness of God, not because it is a righteousness of man, which is indeed outside him but has been accepted by him in faith and really "before God" (gen. object., with appeal e.g. to Rom. 2:13, Gal. 3:11, παρα τῳ θεῳ, 3:20, ἐνωπιον αὐτου) counts as such, Luther, Calvin, Kantt., Philippi, Umbreit, Fritzsche; nor also because it is a righteousness of man, which has been infused into him and by which he can

stand before God, Osiander, Schleiermacher, Rothe, Martensen, Nitzsch, Beck etc.; but because it is a righteousness which is not of men but of God, which He possesses, which therefore He alone gives and can give, which is not from man but ἐκ θεου is, Rom. 10:3, 5, Phil. 3:9; thus most of the more recent exegetes, whether they take the genitive more as a gen. subjecti (Haussleiter), possessivus (Fricke) or originis, auctoris, causae efficientis (Bengel, Rückert, van Hengel, Winer, Baur, Hofmann, Godet, Weiss, Pfleiderer, Holtzmann etc.); cf. besides the literature already earlier in part II 198v. mentioned: Rauwenhoff, Disq. de loco Paulino, qui est de δικαιωσει, L. B. 1852. Lipsius, Die Paulin. Rechtfertigungslehre, Leipzig, 1853. Ortloph, Zeits. f. luth. Theol. u. Kirche 1860. Schultz, Die Lehre v. d. Gerecht, aus d. Glauben im A. u. N. B., Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1862 S. 510-572. Cremer s. v. δικ. Weiss, Bibl. Theol. §82. Pfleiderer, Der Paulin.2 183. Weiszäcker, Das apost. Zeitalter2 143. H. Beck, Die δικ. θεου bei Paulus, Neue Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1894 S. 249-261. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 127. Häring, Δικ. θεου bei Paulus, Tübingen 1896 (takes δικ. θεου as act, justification of God, just as Kölbing, Stud. u. Krit. 1895 S. 7-17).

Although this righteousness is now a righteousness of God, it is nevertheless communicated to the human being, and the connection between it and the human being is established by Paul in faith. This righteousness of God exists; it is no more brought about by the human being, by faith, than the καταλλαγη, 2 Cor. 5:19, but lies objectively in Christ, Rom. 4:25, 1 Cor. 1:30; it is [535] revealed in the gospel, 1:17, 3:21; it is a gift, a gift of grace, 3:24, 5:15, 16, 17; nevertheless, or rather precisely therefore, 4:16, it is δια πιστεως Ιησου Χριστου, 3:22, Phil. 3:9, ἐκ πιστεως, 9:30, 10:6, a δικαιοσυνη πιστεως, 4:11, 13, in the possession of the human being ἐπι τῃ πιστει, Phil. 3:9; it is revealed in the gospel ἐκ

πιστεως and εἰς πιστιν, 1:17, εἰς παντας τους πιστευοντας, 3:22, cf. 10:4, 10; God justifies τον ἐκ πιστεως Ιησου, 3:26, ἐκ or δια πιστεως, 3:30, Gal. 3:8, and the human being is justified πιστει, 3:28. ἐκ πιστεως, 5:1, Gal. 3:24, δια πιστεως, Gal. 2:16; faith is reckoned εἰς δικαιοσυνην, Rom. 4:3, 5, 9, 11, 22, and the righteous lives ἐκ πιστεως, 1:17, Gal. 3:11. What place, then, according to these expressions, belongs to faith in justification? Apart from those who modernize Paul, conceive faith as a good disposition, and let God take the will for the deed, there are only two views possible. The first is that of Roman Catholics, Remonstrants, Mystics, Ethicists, and many newer Protest. theologians, who say that faith is indeed specifically faith in Christ, but nevertheless conceive it as the whole, or as a part, of that righteousness on the basis of which God acquits the sinner; that faith is indeed imperfect and not answering to the demand of the law; but God nevertheless holds it for a perfect righteousness and is satisfied with it, either for the sake of Christ, or because it is nevertheless an obedience to God's will in the gospel and makes the human being pleasing to God, or because it is in principle perfect and carries within itself the guarantee of future perfection. But this opinion is, for all sorts of reasons, in conflict with Scripture. 1o The righteousness that is the ground of justification is a righteousness of God and not of the human being; it comes to the human being only by a gift of grace; it therefore lies ready before his faith in Christ and has need of no supplementation at all. God, namely, has set forth Christ as a ἱλαστηριον, 3:24, and this Christ has been delivered up for our sins, 4:25, has died for us, 5:6-11, has become a curse, Gal. 3:13, has been made sin, 2 Cor. 5:21, and has thus also been raised for our justification, Rom. 4:25, i.e. because we were justified in Him; He is our righteousness, 1 Cor. 1:30, and we are justified [536] δια της ἀπολυτρωσεως της ἐν Χριστω

Ιησου, 3:34, ἐν τῳ αἰματι αὐτου, 5:9, ἐν Χριστῳ, Gal. 2:16. In Rom. 5:12v. Paul argues that with Christ it proceeds as with Adam. On the basis of one transgression all human beings have been condemned and subjected to death; but so also the gift of grace of righteousness in Christ has come to δικαιωμα, i.e. to an acquitting judgment for many, 5:16. For through one δικαιωμα, i.e. the acquitting judgment over Christ in His resurrection, 4:25, it comes for all human beings to δικαιωσις ζωης, i.e. the act of justification, which brings life with it, 5:18. Through the obedience of one the many are constituted righteous, δικαιοι κατασταθησονται, 5:19. Alongside the righteousness which God bestowed in Christ, and on the basis of which He justified Christ as mediator of the covenant for all His own in His resurrection, there is no place for a righteousness consisting in faith or love. The latter would nullify the former. 2o Nowhere is faith, then, presented as the ground of justification. The righteousness, the justification, is ἐκ or δια πιστεως, but never δια πιστιν. Indeed Phil. 3:9 states that Paul possessed την δια Χριστου, την ἐκ θεου δικαιοσυνην ἐπι τῃ πιστει, on the basis of his faith, but the righteousness which Paul possessed is clearly described as δια πιστεως, ἐκ θεου; he only says that he possessed that righteousness of God for himself on the foundation of faith. Faith never appears as the righteousness itself or as a part of it; on the contrary, precisely because it is according to grace, it is out of faith. Grace and faith do not stand over against one another, but faith and works do, righteousness of faith and righteousness from works, Rom. 3:20-28, 4:4-6, 13, 14, 9:32, 10:5, 6, Gal. 2:16, 3:11, 12, 23, 25, 5:4, 5, Ef. 2:8, 9. Faith does not justify by its essence or act, because it itself is righteousness, but by its content, because faith is in Christ, our righteousness. If faith justified for its own sake, the object of that faith, namely Christ, would wholly lose its value. But the faith that

justifies is precisely that which has Christ as its object and content. If therefore righteousness were from the law, and faith were a work that had merit and value and made the human being pleasing to God, then Christ would have died in vain, Gal. 2:21. [537] So little does faith come into consideration in justification as ground that Paul can say that God justifies the ungodly, Rom. 4:5. Even when his doctrine provokes the accusation that it leads to carelessness and ungodliness, he never defends himself by saying that faith is wholly or in part the ground of justification, Rom. 3:5-8, 6:1, but he maintains that there is no condemnation for those who are in Christ, because Christ has died and been raised for them, Rom. 8:33, 34. 3o Since faith therefore is not a work but a renunciation of all work, an unqualified trust in God, who makes the dead alive, Rom. 4:17, who raised Christ, 4:24, who in Christ has given a δικαιοσυνη θεου, 3:22-26, therefore the expression that faith is imputed to righteousness cannot mean that it itself, as a work of righteousness, is accepted by God in place of or alongside the righteousness of God in Christ. The word λογιζεσθαι can indeed mean: to hold or reckon someone for what he is, 1 Cor. 4:1, 2 Cor. 12:6, but it can also have the sense of: to charge something to someone's account which he does not personally have. Thus sins are not imputed to the one who believes, although he does have them, Rom. 4:8, 2 Cor. 5:19, cf. 2 Tim. 4:16; thus they were indeed imputed to Christ, although He was without any sin, Jes. 53:4, 5, 6, Mt. 20:28, Rom. 3:25, 8:3, 2 Cor. 5:21, Gal. 3:13, 1 Tim. 2:6; and thus in the same way righteousness is imputed to him who believes, which he does not have, Rom. 4:5, and therefore that imputing is κατα χαριν, 4:4, it is a λογιζεσθαι δικαιοσυνην χωρις ἐργων, 4:6. The words: faith is imputed to righteousness, are an abbreviated expression for this, that God imputes to someone, in faith, His righteousness revealed in

Christ and on that ground acquits him. This is confirmed by that other expression: ὁ δικαιος ἐκ πιστεως ζησεται. Faith is actually not principle and source of life, for Christ is the life and gives life, Rom. 5:17, 18, 6:4v., 2 Cor. 4:10, 11, Gal. 2:20, Col. 3:3, 4, 2 Tim. 1:10, cf. Joh. 1:4, 6:33v., 11:25, 1 Joh. 1:2, 5:11 etc. Whoever believes has life, precisely because he receives it from Christ; and so also, whoever believes has the δικαιοσυνη θεου, which God in Christ [538] bestows on him. 4o To this there finally comes still, that, if faith itself is ground of justification, God is satisfied with a lesser righteousness than that which He demands in His law. The gospel then does not confirm, as Rom. 3:31 says, but destroys the law. God renounces His own righteousness and denies Himself. Or else He reckons faith for something that it is not, for a complete and sufficient righteousness, and falls short of His truthfulness. The accusation that is brought by the advocates of the justitia infusa against the justitia imputata, that God holds someone for what he is not, returns upon themselves; they precisely let God reckon something for righteousness which it is not. And moreover they take away the comfort of believers. If our faith, which is often so small and so weak and often wholly hides away under doubt and fear, which according to the defenders of the justitia infusa can even be wholly lost, if that faith is the ground of our justification, the Christian life is a life of continual anxiety and uncertainty; instead of toward Christ, the eye of faith is continually turned inward, toward itself; a true, Christian life in the service of God becomes impossible, for first the fear of God as Judge must have been transformed into the consciousness of His fatherly love, before there can be any question of truly good works.

6. Yet the objection that is raised against the justitia imputata must be seriously considered. 1o Bellarmine, de justif. II c. 7 developed it in this

way: the righteousness of Christ, if only imputed to us and thus remaining outside us, cannot be the forma in which we are justified before God. For God's judgment is according to truth. He cannot declare someone righteous who is not; so long as the righteousness of Christ is only imputed and remains outside the human being, he is not righteous and cannot be declared righteous. One will say: but the sinner is nevertheless clothed with Christ's righteousness through faith! Yet, although that be so, if someone appears in a twofold guise, in a forma extrinseca and a forma inhaerens, then he is named not according to the former but according to the latter. Let an Ethiopian put on a white garment, he nevertheless remains black and is so called, even if he [539] is also white according to the forma extrinseca. Indeed, even stronger: Christ too can be considered in a twofold forma; according to the forma intrinseca He was holy, according to the forma extrinseca He was burdened with our sins; yet He is named not according to this but according to that. And thus also in justification the justitia imputata cannot be our forma; we can be justified only on the ground of a righteousness dwelling in us. This objection of Bellarmine recurs among all opponents of the Reformation doctrine; everything that one has against the doctrine of the justitia imputata comes down to this. Now to begin with the last point, Christ is in Scripture indeed named and treated according to the forma extrinseca; He is even said to have been made sin for us and to have become a curse for us. In a legal, juridical sense Christ can be called a sinner, although, in order to avoid antinomian misunderstanding, the expression deserves no recommendation, above bl. 366. And thus it is said in Rom. 4:5 and 5:6 that God justifies the ungodly. Stronger expressions than these cannot be used. The opponents of the justitia imputata must bring their objection not against Luther and Calvin but against Paul. 2o The

image of the Moor is unhappily chosen. The twofold forma in which the human being appears in justification stand in an entirely different relation to one another than that of the black skin and the white garment in the Ethiopian. The human being is ungodly in an ethical sense, but he becomes, on account of the righteousness of Christ, a righteous person in a juridical sense; the putting on of a white garment, however, brings about absolutely no legal change in the Ethiopian. More accurate is the image of the child that, adopted in grace by a rich man, may already be called rich as a future heir, even though at the moment it still has nothing in its possession. God declares the sinner righteous, adopts him as His child, promises him Christ and all His benefits, and therefore he is righteous and will one day be placed in possession of all the treasures of grace. 3o The imputation of Christ's righteousness, however, is by Bellarmine c. s. conceived entirely wrongly. They imagine it as a fiction that is in conflict with reality; justitia imputata is, according to them, a righteousness that exists only in the imagination, and justitia infusa alone is true, essential righteousness. That, however, is an entirely wrong representation. Justification [540] is just as true as sanctification, the imputation just as real as the infusion. This is the only difference: in justification the righteousness is bestowed upon us in a juridical sense, in sanctification it becomes ours in an ethical sense. Both are equally essential and both equally necessary. First the judge must pronounce someone's right to a certain pledge before he can come into possession of it; the former is no fiction, no imagination that does not matter and conflicts with reality; no, first the imputatio justitiae is necessary, the recognition of the right, and only thereafter can the infusio justitiae follow, the taking possession of that to which one has a right. If all this is already true with the earthly judge, how much more with the

heavenly? If God justifies the ungodly, then that is no fiction, no imputatio putativa, but then it is and becomes so. As God speaks right, so it is and so it remains eternally, and so it will also one day be acknowledged by all in the day of judgment. For God, when He justifies the ungodly, does so on the ground of a δικαιοσυνη which He Himself has brought about in Christ; through Christ's offering He has, over against every hostile power, acquired the right of acquittal of the ungodly; and when He speaks right, He will also carry it out. The ungodly is righteous in a legal sense; he will therefore certainly also become so in an ethical sense. For God is the one who makes the dead alive and who calls the things that are not as though they were. And justifying faith consists precisely in unwavering trust in that God of wonders, with whom all things are possible. 4o The righteousness on the ground of which the ungodly is justified is indeed not his own; it is a δικαιοσυνη θεου, standing over against the ἰδια δικαιοσυνη. But it is nevertheless not in the sense a foreign righteousness standing outside him, that it does not concern him and stands in not the least relation to him. On the contrary, already in the pactum salutis Christ has placed Himself in relation to His own and, as mediator, has taken their place. In the state of humiliation He died for their sins, and He was raised for their justification. There exists a covenant of grace, a unio mystica between Christ and His church, long before the believers are personally incorporated into it; otherwise Christ also could not have made satisfaction for them. There takes place an imputation and bestowal of Christ and all [541] His benefits on God's side before the particular persons come to faith. Specifically, that imputation and bestowal takes place in the vocatio interna, and regeneration is the passive acceptance of this gift of grace. God must also first give, so that we might be able to receive. The very first grace that is bestowed upon

us already presupposes the imputation of Christ, for this is the only source of grace, the acquirer and distributor of the Spirit, who is His Spirit, the Spirit of Christ. A foreign righteousness, therefore, is the righteousness that is the ground of justification only in a certain sense. It is the righteousness of the head but therefore also of all the members, of the mediator but thus also of all the covenant partners.

7. But even by this the Reformed doctrine of justification has not yet been set in full light. Even if it may be true that an imputation and bestowal of Christ upon his own already takes place in the pactum salutis, in incarnation and satisfaction, in external and internal calling; this is nevertheless not yet enough, it is not yet justification proper. It is true that Reformed theology already soon began to distinguish between the justificatio activa, which took place before, and the justificatio passiva, which took place after faith, and began to set the former, as justification proper, over against the latter as a coming to consciousness of the justification already accomplished. Scripture provides some ground for this in Rom. 4:25 and 2 Cor. 5:19, and also in more recent theology the correctness of this Reformed thought has often been acknowledged, even if for another reason and with another intention, cf. e.g. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 217 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 754 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 76 f. Kaftan, Dogm. 493 f. etc. There lies here such an important truth, that the denial of it inevitably leads to Remonstrant conceptions. God does not wait with the acquittal of the sinner until he, as it were apart from Him, has taken up the righteousness of Christ by faith; the imputation and bestowal of Christ and his benefits precedes faith, it has taken place in the decree of the Father, in the satisfaction of Christ, in the vocatio interna of the H. Spirit. But however true all this may be, it is nevertheless remarkable that Scripture never designates this imputation

with the name [542] of justification, but always understands by it that acquittal of God which takes place out of and through faith. At the very least, it is implied herein that justification out of faith occupies a weightier place in the order of salvation than those who lay the center of gravity in the justificatio activa can ascribe to it. Apart from the fact that this presentation of the doctrine of justification deviates from the continuous usage of speech of Holy Scripture, it also gives occasion for misunderstanding, finds itself compelled to exegetical acts of violence, and does not allow justification out of faith to come into its own sufficiently as an acquitting act of God. One can indeed speak of eternal justification and intend and conceive it in a good sense; but the expression is nevertheless not without misgiving; the Reformed rejected it almost without exception, also Maccovius, L. C. 676, Voetius, Disp. V 281, Westm. Syn. XI 4, and even Comrie, Brahe and others accepted it only in a limited and well-defined sense, Comrie, Brief over de regtv. Sneek 1858 bl. 91v. Brahe, Godg. Stellingen over de leer der rechtv. Amst. 1833 bl. 26v. For in God not only justification, but whatever He thinks and does, is eternal. In that sense, as actus immanens, creation too is eternal, part II 411, but whoever therefore would begin to speak of eternal creation would create confusion and introduce a pantheistic terminology. And so it is also with preservation, government, regeneration, calling, sanctification and glorification, and no less justification. One can also in a good sense speak of a justification in the resurrection of Christ and in the gospel; but nevertheless there is between these and that which takes place out of faith and which more particularly in Scripture bears the name of justification, a great difference. The former concerns Christ as surety of his own, but the latter concerns the believers themselves, and not only those believers as a whole, conceived as congregation, as Ritschl asserts, Rechtf.

u. Vers. III 103 f., but also all of them personally, as is incontrovertibly proved from Rom. 3:26, 4:3, 24, 5:19, 8:1, 30, 10:4, 10, 1 Cor. 6:11, Gal. 2:16, Phil. 3:9 etc. This latter justification, then, is not an accidental element that is added to the proper and essential justification in God's decree, in Christ's resurrection, or in the calling through [543] the gospel; but it forms, in justification, which as it were begins in eternity and only in the last judgment receives its full completion, an indispensable and most important moment. The application of salvation by the H. Spirit may in no respect be made into an acquisition of salvation, for the H. Spirit takes everything from Christ; but the application is nevertheless in its sphere just as necessary and of just as great significance as the acquisition. Therefore, of regeneration, faith, and conversion, Scripture makes entrance into the kingdom of heaven dependent. And acquisition and application stand thereby in so close a connection that the former is not thinkable or capable of existing without the latter, and conversely the latter not without the former. The acquisition necessarily brings the application with it; by his suffering and death Christ has also acquired that all his benefits, thus also the forgiveness of sins, would be applied to all his own personally and individually. It is Christ as Savior not only about objective satisfaction but also about subjective deliverance of his own from sin. This now does not come about through an objective justification in God's decree or in the resurrection of Christ, but it only then receives its completion when man is delivered from sin both as to being and as to consciousness, and thus is regenerated and justified. It is to this justification that Scripture ordinarily has regard when it uses this word or also speaks of forgiveness of sins etc. Paul in particular does not think, with justification, of an eternal act in God, for he speaks of it as ἐκ, δια πιστεως. Nor does he by a single word indicate

that it consists in this, that God at a given moment, e.g. when man believes, quietly within himself, in foro coeli, in the heavenly court, acquits him of guilt and punishment and gives him a right to eternal life. For only the counsel of God is an actus immanens, but all other works of God, creation, preservation, government, redemption, justification etc., belong to the actus transeuntes; they are not ratio ordinis but executio ordinis, above p. 6. Nor does Paul, with justification out of faith, think of the so-called justificatio passiva, at least not if this is conceived as temporally separated from the justificatio activa and as a coming to consciousness of the justification that already long [544] beforehand took place; for he lays precisely all emphasis on it, that God justifies out of and through faith. We stand here, as so often, before the mystery of the relation of eternity and time. As Christians we confess that the eternal willing of God, without ceasing to be eternal, can bring forth operations in time, just as his eternal thinking can also have temporal things as its content, part II 413. In justification out of faith, it is not an acquittal pronounced by God centuries ago that finally comes to the consciousness of man; but God, who is unchangeable, is himself the acting one, when He acquits the sinner through faith. From Him there proceeds, without His ceasing to be the Eternal, that activity which is received and enjoyed by man as justification out of faith. The application, just as much as the acquisition of salvation, is from moment to moment an activity of God, of the Father, the Son, and the H. Spirit. Also in justification out of faith all three persons are involved. It is the Father, who through the Son and in the Spirit justifies the sinner, Rom. 8:33, 34, 1 Cor. 6:11. Paul does not think of making a division here and relocating justification by the Father into eternity, that of the Son into the resurrection, and that of the H. Spirit into the consciousness of man. But just as all three cooperated in the acquisition,

so they also cooperate in the application of salvation. In the former guilt and punishment were taken away and life acquired; in the latter man is also by God, on his side and subjectively, placed in that relation in which he objectively already stood in Christ as his surety and mediator. Just as regeneration in the subjective sense delivers from the stain of sin, so justification takes away the guilt of sin. Both are equally necessary, equally real, equally grounded in the offering of Christ, but also in the application of one and the same high significance.

This justification therefore does not take place apart from man but occurs out of and through faith. Scripture in that connection undoubtedly thinks for the most part of faith as actus. But of course thereby faith as habitus is not excluded; regenerated little children and adult believers have and retain in this habitus fidei the acquittal of God, the testimony of the H. [545] Spirit, that they are children of God, even though their spirit does not always testify together. But further Scripture sets this justification out of faith sharply and strictly over against that out of works. This antithesis, however, does not mean that faith is no work and no principle of good works. It does not compel us to keep searching until we find in the inner nature of faith something that is no work, no deed but only passivity. The antithesis which Scripture and especially Paul makes is this, that justification does not come about through the works of the law, i.e. does not have in such works its ground, its causa meritoria. For God in Christ has given another, better δικαιοσυνη than sinful works can offer; and that δικαιοσυνη, that is Christ, is the only and sufficient ground of our justification. In the antithesis οὐκ ἐξ ἐργων ἀλλ' εκ πιστεως the praepositie ἐκ thus has a different meaning both times. In the first member it indicates that works of the law cannot be the δικαιοσυνη on the ground of which God can acquit us; but in the second

member it indicates, not that faith itself can indeed be that righteousness, but that it seeks that righteousness which is necessary in order to be justified, precisely not with man in his works, but outside him in Christ. The antithesis therefore runs purely thus: not one's own righteousness of works, but the righteousness of God in Christ. Although this righteousness has now been perfectly acquired by Christ and lies ready in Him, although it is imputed and bestowed in the vocatio interna and thus in a logical sense before regeneration and faith, it is nevertheless on man's side first accepted in faith (habitus or actus fidei) and only then becomes the ground on which he himself personally is justified by God, in the above-mentioned sense. Faith is therefore no causa materialis or formalis, it is not even a conditio or instrumentum (causa instrumentalis) of justification; for it does not stand to this as e.g. the eye to seeing or the ear to hearing; it is no condition on which and no instrument through which we receive justification, but it is the act of accepting Christ Himself, and indeed of Christ, as He gives Himself to us inwardly through the Spirit and outwardly through the Word, and thus the firm, certain consciousness that He is my Lord and I am his [546] property. Faith is no instrument with which man accepts Christ, but much more a means of the H. Spirit, through which He causes man to accept Christ and causes his spirit to testify with Himself that he is a child of God, Calvijn, Inst. III 11, 5. Heid. Cat. vr. 61. Ned. Gel. art. 22. Witsius, Misc. S. II 792. 797 sq. Trigland, Antapol. p. 515. Mastricht, VI 6, 28. Owen, De rechtv. uit het geloof c. 3. Moor IV 695. M. Vitringa III 295. Jon. Edwards bij Dorner II 752. Therefore faith does not in every respect stand over against all work. It stands over against the works of the law in a double sense, namely in that they can be neither the causa materialis nor the causa instrumentalis of justification. It also stands over against the works of faith

(justitia infusa, obedientia, caritas), as soon as these are even in any measure regarded as ground of justification, as wholly or in part forming that righteousness on the ground of which God justifies us; for that is Christ and Christ alone; faith itself is no ground of justification and thus neither are the good works that proceed from it. But faith does not stand over against the works of faith, insofar as these, as fruits of faith, are used by the H. Spirit as a means to assure the believer of the sincerity of his faith, and thus of his salvation, Heid. Cat. vr. 86. In this sense faith itself is a work, Joh. 6:29, the best work and principle of all good works, the only work through which God can here on earth deliver us from our guilt and assure us of our righteousness in Christ. Therefore the Reformed also said that it is indeed fides sola, quae justificat, fides tamen, quae justificat non est sola, Calvijn, C. R. 7, 477. Inst. III 11, 20, and after the justificatio peccatoris they also still spoke of a justificatio justi. In this sense Paul and James are also not in contradiction with one another. Indeed it is not correct to say that Paul speaks only of the justificatio peccatoris and James of the justificatio justi. But both deny that the ground of justification lies in the works of the law, and both acknowledge that faith, living faith, faith that includes and brings forth good works, is the means through which the H. Spirit assures us of our righteousness in Christ. In that connection there is only this difference, that Paul wages battle against dead works and James is zealous against a dead faith. [547] The faith that justifies is the certainty of our righteousness in Christ worked in our heart by the H. Spirit. And therefore, not the more passive, but the more living and the more powerful it is, the more it justifies us. Faith works together with the works and is perfected out of the works, Jak. 2:22. Cf. on James and Paul: Calvijn, Inst. III 17, 11 sq. Comm. op Jac. 2. Turretinus, de concordia Pauli et Jacobi, de satisf. 384 sq.

Trigland, Antapol. c. 21. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 8, 21-26. M. Vitringa III 317. James Buchanan, The doctrine of justification, Edinb. 1867 p. 491. Usteri, Stud. u. Krit. 1889, 2tes Heft. Schwarz ib. 1891, 4tes Heft. Böhmer, Neue kirchl. Zeits. 1898 S. 251-256.

8. Concerning the parts of justification there was, in the churches of the Reformation, from the beginning some difference. Those who, with Piscator, denied the obedientia activa, had to restrict justification to the forgiveness of sins and thus sooner or later to come to the inference that believers, after having been delivered by Christ from the guilt and punishment of sin, themselves had to fulfill the law, in order to obtain eternal life, above p. 350v. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers.2 I 271. II 61 f. Therefore this opinion was also rather generally rejected; although the forgiveness of sins could also synecdochically, as pars pro toto, be taken for the whole of justification, this nevertheless still included more than forgiveness alone. For Christ has not merely restored us to the state of Adam before the fall, but also for us kept the law and obtained eternal life, cf. above 351v. 361. 373 and especially also Gomarus on Luk. 1:77, Op. 1664 I 175 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. XVI 4. Moor IV 681. Hodge III 125. 127. But although one rather generally acknowledged that justification comprised more than the forgiveness of sins, there was nevertheless again difference as to wherein that more consisted. Older theologians often named, as the second part of justification, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, Luther, Chemniz, Gerhard, Quenstedt, Polanus, Wollebius, Junius, Trelcatius, Rivetus, Ned. Gel. art. 23 etc., cf. M. Vitringa III 311. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 28. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 61. Although this is not precisely incorrect, when here under the imputed righteousness of Christ his active obedience is [548] understood, the parts

are nevertheless not purely coordinated and they also make too strong a separation between Christ's passive and active obedience, cf. Mastricht, VI 6, 17. Better is it therefore, to define justification by the imputation of Christ's entire obedience, just as with Paul the word δικαιουν alternates with λογιζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσυνην, cf. Heid. Cat. q. 60. Synopsis pur. theol. 33, 8; and still more correct is it, to let the two parts of justification consist in the forgiveness of sins and in the granting of the right to eternal life, since these benefits are built upon the imputation of Christ's entire obedience, Voetius, Disp. V 279 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. XVI qu. 4. As a second part there was sometimes also named the adoption as children, Turretinus, ib. XVI qu. 6. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 90. Pfleiderer, Paulinismus 189. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 134; but others, such as Martyr, L. C. p. 354, preferred to regard this as a fruit of justification.

As regards the forgiveness of sins, this does not consist in the removal of the stain of sin, as Rome asserts, insofar as it makes justification consist in the infusio gratiae and makes the forgiveness of sanctification dependent. Nor does it consist only in the removal of the reatus culpae, i.e. in fact in deliverance from eternal punishment, while the punishment for the peccata venialia, committed after the infusio gratiae, must be expiated by man himself here or hereafter in purgatory, for guilt and punishment are correlative concepts, above p. 162 cf. 98. But the forgiveness, which is a part of justification, is nothing less than the complete remission of all guilt and of all punishment of sin, and not only of past and present but also of future sins. Some had, out of fear of antinomianism, objections against this rich and broad conception of forgiveness, and therefore limited it to the remission of the guilt of past and each time confessed sins, with appeal also to Mt. 6:12, 1 Joh. 1:9, 2:1 etc., Rivetus, Op. III 1099. Pictet, Christ. Godg.

XI 11, 3. Brakel, Red. Godsd. 34, 53-62. 56, 6. 62, and furthermore also Claude, Vlak et al. Over against antinomianism they defended an important truth. The fact is that believers, after having received forgiveness, still stumble in many things, [549] sometimes even fall into gross sins, and continue to experience all kinds of adversities in life as punishment. Rome thinks it may infer from this that believers still have themselves to atone for their peccata venialia, and thus falls short of the richness and grace of forgiveness; antinomianism wants to honor the latter and therefore thinks that the sins which believers commit are not charged to the new man but only to the old man, and that believers even no longer have to pray for forgiveness of sins. Over against this all the Reformed maintained that forgiveness indeed removes the reatus actualis but not the reatus potentialis of sin; i.e. forgiveness indeed removes the punishment but not the punishableness of sin. The latter remains as long as sin remains. Sin brings, also and especially in believers, consciousness of guilt, sorrow, regret, estrangement from God, humiliation, etc.; it takes away the rest of conscience, the confidence and assurance of faith. It cannot be otherwise; the nature of sin is such that it necessarily includes consciousness of guilt and punishableness. Even when believers, after having already long received forgiveness, later learn to cast a deeper glance into the corruption of their own heart, they have need to make confession even of the sins of their youth and to trace their guilt back to their conception and birth, Ps. 25:6, 51:6, 7. This confession is then no condition of forgiveness; but whoever truly knows his sin confesses it of himself and feels, over against it, the stronger need for the comfort of forgiveness. Therefore the prayer for forgiveness remains daily necessary for the believer. But then he does not pray in doubt and despair, he does not pray as if he were now no longer a

child of God and had again to await eternal damnation, but he prays out of and in faith, as a child, to his Father who is in the heavens, and says amen to his prayer. And this praying is not only a need, but it is also necessary; for justification does not consist in a transcendent acquittal of the sinner with God in foro coeli, but it is an actus transiens, which is carried by the Holy Spirit into the consciousness of the believer, and in this unity in Scripture bears the name of justification. Confession and prayer is therefore the way by which God again awakens and strengthens this consciousness of forgiveness in the believer. [550] Under sin it lies hidden; faith as habitus indeed remains, but it can no longer express itself in deeds. In order that this faith may revive again, in order that the Spirit of God may again loudly and powerfully bear witness with our spirit that we are children of God; to that end, after sin, humiliation again, confession, petition for forgiveness is necessary. If we stood perfectly in faith, we would never doubt the forgiveness of our sins, our sonship, the future inheritance, and we would also never conceive or feel any disaster in this life as a punishment but only as a chastisement of the Lord. But to stand perfectly in faith would only be possible if we were also raised above sin. Because this is not so and sin always again brings doubt with it, therefore conversion and confession remain the means by which God brings us again into his fellowship and assures us of his favor. From this, however, it may not be inferred with Rivetus et al. that God each time forgives only the past and confessed sins. For all the sins of the church have been transferred to Christ and he has reconciled them all in his blood. In the imputation of Christ to the elect in pactum salutis, incarnation and resurrection, in external and internal calling, he is bestowed upon them with all his benefits. As soon as they accept this gift of God, they are also on their side at once placed in a new relation to

God, which is unchangeable and unbreakable. And though the activities of faith may be lacking for a time, yet the gift of faith, by which they are incorporated into Christ and accept all his benefits, is inalienable, Joh. 3 vs. 36, Rom. 8:30, Gal. 3:27, Hebr. 9:12, 10:12, 14 etc. Therefore believers have the confidence, after every stumbling and after every fall, to go with trust to the throne of grace and to plead on the faithfulness of him whose gift of grace and calling are without repentance, Rom. 11:29, Hebr. 4:12, 1 Joh. 1:9, cf. Calvin, Inst. III 11, 11. 20, 19. Voetius, Disp. V 282. Alting, Theol. probl. nova XVII 10. Witsius, Misc. Sacr. II 806-820. M. Vitringa III 313.

This benefaction of the forgiveness of sin is so great, that it is incredible for the natural man. Heathens did not know it and thought that by all kinds of works they had to acquire the favor of the Gods; Celsus mocked it and considered it a folly, cf. Witsius, de theol. gentilium circa justificationem, [551] Misc. Sacr. II 668-721. Even most Christians make it dependent on faith and good works. Everything also pleads against it, sin itself, which demands punishment, the conscience, which accuses, the law, which condemns, the world, which knows no mercy, Satan, who is an accuser of the whole human race, God himself, whose righteousness and holiness cannot tolerate sin. The forgiveness of sins is a gift, which can be accepted and enjoyed only by faith. It is not an object of sight but of faith. In order to confess it in truth, that same faith is necessary, which also alone makes one capable of accepting the divine authority of Holy Scripture, of the divinity of Christ, of his satisfaction and resurrection. The objections, brought in against all these dogmata, are in the essence of the matter no others than those which also apply against the forgiveness of sins. The appearance is against it. But faith is also a firm ground of the things which one hopes for

and a proof of the matters which one does not see. It is faith in a God, who works miracles, who makes the dead alive, who calls the things which are not as though they were, and who justifies the ungodly. So much does this forgiveness of sins stand in the foreground in Scripture, that it is sometimes identified with justification. Yet with it another benefaction is connected, which is equally rich and glorious and which, though it may not be separated from it, may nevertheless be distinguished. It is the granting of the right to eternal life, or the adoption as children, by Paul immediately named alongside the redemption from the law, Gal. 4:5, cf. Dan. 9:24, Hd. 26:18, Op. 1:5, 6. Already in the O. T. God is called the Father of his people and Israel his son, part II 113. But in the N. T. this fatherhood and sonship receives a much deeper sense. God is now, not in a theocratic but in an ethical sense, the Father of the believers, and these are his children, τεκνα, born of Him, and therefore through faith in Christ obtaining the ἐξουσια, to become it, γενεσθαι, until they will one day be it perfectly, when they will see God as He is, 1 Joh. 3:2. This ethical sonship, which occurs especially with John, however, does not belong here but is to be discussed with regeneration and sanctification. In contrast, Paul speaks of the υἱοθεσια in a juridical sense. Just as the believers on the ground of Christ's righteousness receive the [552] forgiveness of sins, so are they also adopted as children, υἱοι θεου (not τεκνα). This υἱοθεσια, which thus rests on a declaration of God, has been acquired by Christ, Gal. 4:5, and becomes our portion through faith, 3:26. He who has been acquitted of the guilt and punishment of sin is thereby at the same time adopted as a son and set as an object of God's fatherly love. The believers are thereby placed in the same status as Christ, who is the firstborn among many brethren, Rom. 8:29. He was the Son of God by nature, 8:32, and was so declared at his resurrection, 1:3; the

believers become ὑιοι θεου by adoption. And just as Christ at his resurrection has been declared Son of God in power κατα πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης, 1:3, and the believers have been justified ἐν τῳ πνευματι του θεου ἡμων, 1 Cor. 6:11, so are they also by the πνευμα υἱοθεσιας sons of God, Rom. 8:14-16, and thereafter also by that same Spirit assured of this their sonship, ib. Gal. 4:6. As sons they are then at the same time κατ' ἐπαγγελιαν κληρονομοι, Gal. 3:29, 4:7, Rom. 8:17; and because this inheritance still lies in the future, the υἱοθεσια in its full realization is also still an object of hope, Rom, 8:23. Justification, which has its beginning in eternity, realizes itself in the resurrection of Christ and the calling of the believers, receives its completion only when God in the last judgment repeats his sentence of acquittal in the hearing of the whole world and every tongue will have to confess that Christ is the Lord to the glory of God the Father. But even if the "Rechtsfolge der Adoption" still awaits, the believers have nevertheless already on earth been adopted as children; they are sealed by the Holy Spirit as guarantee and pledge unto the day of their redemption, 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5, Ef. 1:13, 14, 4:30, and kept for the heavenly inheritance, as this is for them, 1 Petr. 1:4, 5. By that Spirit they are continually led (ἁγονται, not φεγονται as 2 Petr. 1:21), Rom. 8:14, assured of the love which God has toward them, 5:5, cf. vs. 8, and of their sonship, 8:15, 16, Gal. 4:6, and already now made partakers of peace, Rom. 5:1, Phil. 4:7, 9, 1 Thess. 5:23, and joy, Rom. 14:17, 15:13, 1 Thess. 1:6. [553]

§ 46. SANCTIFICATION AND PERSEVERANCE.

1. With justification sanctification is connected, which is indeed distinct from it in nature but not in time. Concerning the relation of both there has always been difference and conflict in the Christian church, just as in all religions the bond of religion and morality is laid in different ways, and there exists among men a great difference between the religious and the ethical natures. Nomism, standing up for the interests of the moral life, makes justification dependent on sanctification, religion on morality, the relation to God on that to the neighbour. Conversely, antinomism in the first place pays attention to the demands of the religious life, places justification in the foreground and often does not get round to sanctification; the relation to God stands wholly apart from that to the neighbour. In reality it gives rise, both in doctrine and in life, to great difficulty, to set religion and morality, justification and sanctification, in the right connection with one another, cf. deel I 193. Both are distinct; whoever confuses them, undermines the religious life, takes away the comfort of believers and makes God subordinate to man. The distinction of both lies herein, that in

justification the religious relation of man to God is restored, and in sanctification his nature is renewed and freed from the uncleanness of sin. In its deepest essence it rests on this, that God is both righteous and holy. As Righteous One He wills that all creatures shall stand in that relation to Him in which He originally placed them, free from guilt and punishment. As Holy One He demands that they shall all appear pure and unspotted by sin before his countenance. The first man was therefore created after God's image in righteousness and holiness and had no need of justification nor sanctification, although he also had to obey the law and be justified out of its works and receive eternal life (justificatio legalis). But sin has laden man with guilt and made him unclean before God's countenance. In order to be delivered completely from sin, he must therefore be freed from its guilt and cleansed from its stain [554]. And that takes place in justification and sanctification. Both are thus equally necessary and are preached in Scripture with equal emphasis. Justification in that connection takes precedence in logical order, Rom. 8:30, 1 Cor. 1:30, for it is a justificatio evangelica, an acquittal on the ground of a δικαιοσυνη θεου bestowed upon us in faith, and not ἐξ ἐργων νομου; it is a juridical act and completed in one moment. But sanctification is ethical, continues through the whole life, and makes the righteousness of Christ, through the renewing activity of the H. Spirit, gradually into our personal, ethical possession. Rome's doctrine of the gratia or justitia infusa is in itself not incorrect, only it is wrong that it makes the infused righteousness into the ground of forgiveness, and thus builds religion on the foundation of morality. But believers do truly also become partakers of the righteousness of Christ through infusio. Justification and sanctification thus bestow the same benefits, or better still, the whole, full Christ; only they differ in the manner in which they bestow

Him. In justification He is bestowed upon us in a juridical, in sanctification in an ethical sense; through the former we become righteousness of God in Him, through the latter He himself by his Spirit comes to make his dwelling in us and renews us after his image.

Although justification and sanctification are thus distinct in nature, it is of no less importance not to lose sight for a moment of the close connection between the two; whoever separates them undermines the moral life and makes grace subservient to sin. In God, righteousness and holiness are not to be separated; He hates sin wholly and entirely, not only as it renders guilty but also as it makes unclean. The acts of God in justification and sanctification are inseparably connected; οὐς δε ἐδικαιωσεν, τουτους και ἐδοξασεν, Rom. 8:30; the δικαιωσις brings ζωη with it, 5:18; whoever has been justified by God and adopted as his child at once shares in his favor and immediately begins to live. Further, Christ not only bore sin for his own and fulfilled the law, but He could do this only because He had already entered into covenant relation to them and thus was their head and mediator. In Him all his own were included; and with and in [555] Him they themselves have died, been buried, raised, and set in heaven, Rom. 6:2-11, 2 Cor. 5:15, Gal. 2:20, Ef. 2:5, 6, Col. 2:12, 3:1 etc. Christ is their δικαιοσυνη but in the same sense also their ἁγιασμος, 1 Cor. 1:30, i.e. not their holiness, ἁγιοτης, ἁγιωσυνη, but their sanctification. Christ namely has by his suffering and death not only brought about the righteousness on the ground of which believers are acquitted by God. But thus He has also acquired that holiness by which He can consecrate them to God and cleanse them from every stain of sin, Joh. 17:19. His obedience unto death indeed intended redemption in its whole extent, ἀπολυτρωσις, not only as ransom from the jurisdiction of sin, Rom. 3:24, Ef. 1:7, Col. 1:14, but also as

deliverance from its moral dominion, Rom. 8:23, 1 Cor. 1:30, Ef. 1:14, 4:30. To that end Christ gives himself to them not only objectively in justification, but He also communicates himself subjectively in sanctification, and unites himself with them in a spiritual, mystical manner. This unio mystica is by the Lutherans always considered from the anthropological side, and then naturally comes into being only after justification and regeneration in actual faith, Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 182-225. But the theological treatment of the Reformed led to another conception. The unio mystica already has its beginning in the pactum salutis; incarnation and satisfaction presuppose that Christ is head and mediator of the covenant; the covenant does not come into being only after Christ or also after the convincing and regenerating activity of the H. Spirit; but Christ himself stood in the covenant, and all activity of the Spirit as Spirit of Christ takes place out of and in the covenant. For there is no communion in the benefits of Christ except through communion in his person. The imputation and gift of Christ to his own stands in the foreground, and our incorporation into Christ again precedes the active acceptance of Christ and his benefits by the act of faith. Sincere sorrow over sin, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, taking refuge in Christ etc., are acts and operations which presuppose life and thus the unio mystica and proceed from it. This union of believers with Christ is on the one hand no pantheistic [556] mingling of the two, no unio substantialis, as it has been conceived by the mysticism of earlier and later times; but on the other hand it is also no mere agreement in disposition, will, and intention, as rationalism understood it and as Ritschl has now again explained it, Theol. u. Metaph. 1881. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 106. 552 f. Gesch. d. Pietismus, 3 Bde 1880-86 passim. Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit

Gott 1886. Gottschick, Luthers Lehre v. d. Gem. des Gläubigen mit Christus, Zeits. f. Th. u. K. Aug. 1898 S. 406. What Scripture tells us of this unio mystica goes much deeper than a moral agreement in will and disposition; it expressly declares that Christ dwells and lives in believers, Joh. 14:23, 17:23, 26, Rom. 8:10, 2 Cor. 13:5, Gal. 2:20, Ef. 3:17, and that they are in Him, Joh. 15:1-7, Rom. 8:1, 1 Cor. 1:30, 2 Cor. 5:17, Ef. 1:10v.; they are united as branch and vine, Joh. 15, head and members, Rom. 12:4, 1 Cor. 12:12, Ef. 1:23, 4:15, man and woman, 1 Cor. 6:16, 17, Ef. 5:32, cornerstone and building, 1 Cor. 3:11, 16, 6:19, Ef. 2:21, 1 Petr. 2:4, 5, cf. on the unio mystica Calvin, Inst. III 11, 5. Boquinus, Zanchius, Olevianus, Eglin in Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Pr. II 372. Martyr, L. C. 259. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 35. Amesius, Med. Theol. 1 c. 26. Voetius, Disp. II 459. Mastricht VI c. 5. Witsius, Misc. S. II 788. M. Vitringa III 78. Comrie, Catech. op vr. 20-23. Kuyper, Het werk v. d. H. G. II 163. Pfleiderer, Paulinismus2 214 f. Krebs, Ueber die unio mystica, Marburg 1871. Weiss, Das Wesen des pers. Christenstandes, Stud. u. Krit. 1881 S. 377-417. Deismann, Die neutest. Formel ἐν Χρ. I. Marburg 1892. This unio mystica, however, is not immediate but comes into being through the H. Spirit. And also in Him the connection between justification and sanctification lies fixed. The Spirit, whom Jesus promised to his disciples and poured out in the church, is namely not only a Spirit of υἱοθεσια, who assures believers of their sonship, but also the Spirit of renewal and of sanctification. This Spirit has Christ himself qualified for his work and guided Him from his conception to his ascension. Through his humiliation Christ has been exalted at the Father’s right hand, glorified into life-giving Spirit, acquirer and distributor of the Spirit, who now is his Spirit, the Spirit of Christ. Through this Spirit He also forms and [557] equips his church. The very first gift which believers

receive is already communicated to them by the Spirit, who takes everything from Christ, Joh. 16:14. He is the one who regenerates them, Joh. 3:5, 6, 8, Tit. 3:5, grants life, Rom. 8:10, incorporates into the communion with Christ, 1 Cor. 6:15, 17, 19, brings to faith, 1 Cor. 2:9v. 12:3, washes, sanctifies, justifies, 1 Cor. 6:11, 12:13, Tit. 3:5, leads, Rom. 8:14, pours out God's love in their hearts, Rom. 5:5, prays in them, Rom. 8:26, communicates to them all kinds of virtues, Gal. 5:22, Ef. 5:9, and gifts, Rom. 12:6, 1 Cor. 12:4, especially love, 1 Cor. 13, causes them to live according to a new law, the law of the Spirit, Rom. 8:2, 4, 1 Cor. 7:9, Gal. 5:6, 6:2, renews them in understanding and will, in soul and body, Rom. 6:19, 1 Cor. 2:10, 2 Cor. 5:17, 1 Thess. 5:23; in one word, the H. Spirit dwells in them, and they live and walk in the H. Spirit, Rom. 8:1, 4, 9-11, 1 Cor. 6:19, Gal. 4:6 etc. Cf. part II 231. 249 and further also Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 225 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 143 f.

2. In this sense sanctification, just as much as justification, is a gift and a work of God, attributed in turn to the Father, Joh. 17:17, 1 Thess. 5:23, Hebr. 13:20, 21, to the Son as πνευμα ζωοποιουν, 1 Cor. 15:45, Ef. 5:26, Tit. 2:14, and especially also, as appeared above, to the H. Spirit, Tit. 3:5, 1 Petr. 1:2. The believers are passive in this; they are sanctified, Joh. 17:19, 1 Cor. 6:11, they have died and been raised with Christ, Rom. 6:4v., they are ἡγιασμενοι ἐν Χριστῳ Ιησου, 1 Cor. 1:2, God's ποιημα, Ef. 2:10, κτισις, 2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15, ἐργον, Rom. 14:20; τα δε παντα ἐκ του θεου, 2 Cor. 5:18. This sanctification consists first of all in this, that the believers are separated from the world and come to stand in a special relation to God. In the O. T. holiness denoted that relation of God to his people and of the people to God, which was described and regulated in the various laws, part II 184-191. Also in the N. T. the concept holy has retained this meaning of a

relation. There is mention of holy city, Mt. 4:5, holy place, 24:15, holy covenant, Luk. 1:72, holy land, Hd. 7:33, holy Scripture, Rom. 1:2, holy mountain, 2 Petr. 1:18, holy prophets, Luk. 1:70, holy [558] offering, Rom. 12:2; of Christ it is said, although He was without sin, that He sanctified himself, i.e. in his death sacrificed himself to God as a holy offering for his own, Joh. 17:19; and thus the believers are called with a fixed epithet ἁγιοι, because by the calling, cf. Rom. 1:7, 1 Cor. 1:2, κλητοι ἁγιοι, they stand in a special relation to God and, in the place of old Israel, are γενος ἐκλεκτον, βασιλειον ἱερατευμα, ἐθνος ἁγιον, λαος εἰς περιποιησιν, 1 Petr. 2:9. But this relation is not a merely external one; it was not so already under the O. Test., for by virtue of that holiness God had bound himself to give Israel his covenant and law, to save it or also to chastise it, and Israel was obligated to walk in God's ordinances, part II 189. Now in the N. T. the law is fulfilled in Christ; it therefore no longer regulates the holiness-relation which exists between God and his people. In place of the law Christ has entered; in and through Him God regulates the relation between himself and his people; the believers are ἡγιασμενοι ἐν Χριστῳ Ιησου, 1 Cor. 1:2; and He sanctifies his people through the H. Spirit, ἐν πνευματι, 1 Cor. 6:11, who now as such is called πνευμα ἁγιον and is the principle of sanctification. This sanctification consists absolutely not only in this, as many now represent it, e.g. Paul Wernle, Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus, 1897 S. 31, 39, 62, that the Christians are separated from the world and appropriated to God in an external, cultic sense; but it has a deep, ethical significance. For the H. Spirit regenerates, cleanses, renews, Joh. 3:3, 1 Cor. 6:11, Tit. 3:5; with the indwelling of the H. Spirit there begins for the believers a καινοτης ζωης, Rom. 6:4, which forms an antithesis with the former walk in all kinds of sins and unrighteousnesses, 1 Cor. 6:10, Ef. 2:1; they are now new people, 2

Cor. 5:17, Ef. 2:10, 15, 4:24, Gal. 6:15, Col. 3:10, who live to God and present their members as weapons of righteousness unto sanctification, Rom. 6. The relation to God in Christ through the H. Spirit entails that the believers are freed from all guilt and also from all stain of sin. And therefore sanctification in the N. T. consists fully in this, that the believers are made conformed to the image of the Son, Rom. 8:29, Gal. 4:19. Insofar sanctification coincides with glorification; this does not begin only after this life, but takes its beginning at once with the [559] calling; those whom He called, He justified, and those whom He justified, He glorified in that same moment, Rom. 8:30; and this glorification continues in this life, 2 Cor. 3:18, until it is completed at the return of Christ, 1 Cor. 15:49, 51v., Col. 3:4. Phil. 3:21, cf. part II 191.

From this glorious description of the Christian state in the N. T. many in earlier and later times have inferred that Scripture already teaches the perfectibility of believers in this life; thus by the Pelagians, Roman Catholics, Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Schwenckfeld, Weigel, Böhme, Poiret, Labadie, Quietists, Pietists, Quakers, Herrnhutters, Wesleyan Methodists etc., cf. in M. Vitringa III 385-414. Moor IV 805 sq., in more recent times especially by Moody, Sankey and others, cf. Jellinghaus, Das volle, gegenwärtige Heil durch Christum, 1880, more moderate in the later editions, 4e Aufl. Basel 1898. From another side support has been offered to this assertion. Ritschl was the first to remark that Paul himself, after he had been converted, had no consciousness of imperfection, and also does not reflect at all on that of believers, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 365 f. Others worked out this thought and even accused the apostle of an impractical idealism, which under the impression of Jesus' speedy return did not think of any sins among believers, cf. Scholz, Zur Lehre vom

„armen Sünder", Zeits. f. Th. u. K. 1896 S. 463 f. Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 109 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 150, especially Wernle in his above-cited writing, cf. also Karl, Beiträge zum Verständniss der soteriol. Erfahrungen u. Spekulationem des Ap. Paulus, Strassburg 1897. There lies in this assertion a truth, which is not to be contested but must be fully acknowledged. Scripture can scarcely find words enough to describe the glory of the people of God. It calls Israel in the O. T. a priestly kingdom, chosen by God, the object of his love, his portion and inheritance, his son and servant, perfect in beauty through the glory of God, Ex. 19:5, 6, Deut. 7:7v., 32:6, 8, 9, 18, Isa. 41:8, Ezek. 16:14 etc.; and the believers in the N. T. are the salt of the earth, Mt. 5:13, the light of the world, vs. 14, born of God and his children, John 1:12, 13, his chosen race and royal priesthood, 1 Petr. 2:9, 10, partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Petr. 1:4, anointed with the [560] H. Spirit, 1 John 2:20, made by Christ into kings and priests, Rev. 1:5, not able to sin, 1 John 3:9, 5:18v. etc. Whoever rejects the doctrine of Scripture concerning sin and grace can see in all this only exaggeration; a radical change such as regeneration and sanctification is then neither necessary nor intelligible. But Scripture judges otherwise; it assigns to the church a high place, calls her by the fairest names, and ascribes to her a Divine holiness and glory. In Roman dogmatics, cf. e.g. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogm. Theol. VIII 550-643, the virtues and gifts which the H. Spirit bestows on the church usually come into their own better than in the Protestant, which many times deems the doctrine of Scripture concerning the Christian state exhausted in justification by faith and the expectation of heavenly blessedness. The glorification of the church, which begins with regeneration, is, however, just as much an object of faith as justification. That the church in Christ stands free of guilt before God's countenance is

just as hard to believe as that she by the H. Spirit in principle has been sanctified, glorified, and made conformed to the image of the Son. Both are just as much in conflict with the appearance of things; both belong to those matters which one does not see and which are certain only for faith. Scripture itself knows that too. For in spite of the glorious description which it gives of the state of believers, it nevertheless regards them as sinners and does not conceal their transgressions and their confession of guilt, e.g. in Abraham, Gen. 12:11, Isaac, 26:7, Jacob, 26:35, Moses, Num. 20:7-12, Ps. 106:33, David, Ps. 51 etc., Solomon, 1 Kings 8:46, Prov. 20:9, Isaiah, cap. 64:6, Daniel, cap. 9:4 etc. And Paul too knows that, when he wants to do the good, the evil lies close at hand for him. It is true that Paul is always clearly conscious of the great change which has taken place with him. He has been crucified with Christ to the world, and he himself no longer lives now, Christ lives in him. He is free from the law, stands righteous before God, is assured of his sonship, boasts in the grace by which he is able to do all things, sets himself as an example, takes pride in his apostolic labor, and is conscious of his faithful fulfillment of office, e.g. Rom. 15 vs. 17, 1 Cor. 4:3, 9:15, 15:30, 31, II 1:12, 6:3, 11:10, [561] Phil. 2:16, 1 Thess. 2:10, 19. But nevertheless he confesses that he lives in the flesh, Gal. 2:20, that the flesh always desires against the Spirit, Gal. 5:17, that in his flesh no good dwells, Rom. 7:18, and that he has not yet obtained perfection, Phil. 3:12. Especially Rom. 7:7-26 is in this respect of great significance, cf. already above p. 106; however much the Reformation exegesis of this passage is in modern times mostly abandoned, in acting thus one has not known what one was doing. Wernle exaggerates but nevertheless not wholly without reason says: in der That bedeutet das Zurückgehen auf die alte (griechische) Tradition von Röm. 7 einen viel

schwereren Schlag für unsere Dogmatik, als in der Regel von ihr empfunden wird. Gewöhnlich gesteht man zu, dass Röm. 7 sich nicht auf den Wiedergeborenen bezieht, ohne zu merken, dass durch dies Zugeständniss der Paulinismus für uns unbrauchbar wird, t.a.p. 108. Yet this is not the strongest ground for maintaining the Reformation interpretation of Rom. 7. This lies in the text itself. The praesens in which Paul speaks is to be understood only of the present. In Wahrheit macht man den Apostel zum Komödianten, wenn man ihm zutraut, er habe so, wie hier geschieht, nur in der Erinnerung an einen längst vergangenen Zustand reden können, Clemen t.a.p. 112, who also refers to van Manen, Paulus II 1891 p. 71. Yet Clemen sees no way to bring Rom. 7 into agreement with the other statements of Paul and therefore says: sie entstammt wohl einer besonders trüben Stimmung des Apostels, nicht seinem sonst vorherrschenden Bewusstsein! But with this sin and this consciousness of sin in the saints of the O. and N. Covenant there is added still that Scripture everywhere proceeds from the supposition that sin remains in believers to the end of their life; there remains for them continually necessary the petition for forgiveness, Mt. 6:12, 13 and the confession of sins, 1 John 1:9. All the admonitions and warnings in Scripture presuppose that believers still have only a small beginning of perfect obedience; they stumble daily in many things, Jas. 3:2; if they say to have no sin, they deceive themselves, 1 John 1:8. Paul too judges concerning believers no differently. He places them very high, calls them elect, called, saints, notes with joy the Christian virtues that become manifest in them, and gladly and repeatedly gives them an honorable [562] testimony. In this the apostle certainly does not exaggerate; the change must have been great, if he could testify of the believers from among the Gentiles that they formerly lived in all kinds of

dreadful sins but now had been washed, sanctified, justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. 6:11. Nevertheless he has an open eye for the sins that still cling to believers. The Corinthians are still fleshly, 1 Cor. 3:1-4, the Galatians are disobedient, Gal. 5:7v., in the Colossians the good work has indeed begun but not been completed, Col. 1:6, yes, their life is still hidden with Christ in God, 3:3. In Rom. 6 Paul does not say that believers are sinless, but he argues that faith in Christ is incompatible with a life in sin; and therefore he admonishes them precisely to present their members to God as weapons of righteousness, Rom. 6:13. Without repeatedly returning to justification, which once and through faith has taken place, he urges that believers will manifest and prove this their new state in a walk according to the Spirit. And in addition this still deserves our attention, that Scripture, although always presupposing the imperfection of the believer, nevertheless never weakens the demand of the law or adapts it to practice. The advocates of perfectibility can never maintain it, bring the moral law down and make a distinction between mortal sins and venial sins or between doing sin and having sin. But Scripture does not do so and maintains the full, unblemished demand of the law: be holy, for I am holy, 1 Petr. 1:16, be perfect, as your Father in the heavens, Mt. 5:48, Jas. 1:4; believers must follow Christ, who did no sin, 1 Petr. 2:21v. Eph. 5:1, and on the day of Christ be ἀνεγκλητοι, εἰλικρινεις, ἀπροσκοποι, ἀμεμπτοι, ἀμωμοι, 1 Cor. 1:8, Phil. 1:10, 2:15, Col. 1:22, 1 Thess. 3:13, 5:23. With all seriousness and without ceasing they are therefore urged to a holy walk. Above with justification it appeared to us that the Christian is certain of his salvation only through faith, without and independently of works. But in sanctification, in life, according to

appearance, salvation is again made dependent on whether believers do God's will and walk immaculately before his countenance. [563]

Sanctification, which at first was only passive, Phil. 1:5, 1 Thess. 5:23, all at once acquires an active meaning, Rom. 12:1, 2 Cor. 7:1, 1 Thess. 4:3, Hebr. 12:14. Just as in the preaching of the gospel faith is a gift of God and yet man is responsible for his attitude toward God's calling, e.g. Rom. 9:1-29 and 9:30-10:21, so here the possession of all the benefits of the covenant, forgiveness, adoption, life, salvation, is assured before all work and yet good works are urged upon with so much earnestness, as if they had first to be obtained thereby. The kingdom of God is a gift, bestowed by God according to his good pleasure, Mt. 11:26, 16:17, 22:14, 24:22, Luk. 10:20, 12:32, 22:29, and yet it is a reward, a treasure in the heavens, which must be sought with exertion and acquired by labor in the service of God, Mt. 5:12, 20, 6:20, 19:21, 20:1v. etc. The believers are branches on the vine, who without Christ can do nothing and are yet admonished to remain in Him, in his word, in his love, Joh. 15; they are elect, and must yet be diligent to make their calling and election sure, 2 Petr. 1:10; they have been sanctified and perfected by the one offering of Christ, Hebr. 10:10, 14, in whom God works that which is well-pleasing to Him, 13:21, and yet they must persevere in the faith unto the end, 3:6, 14, 4:14, 6:11, 12; they have put on the new man and must yet continually put Him on, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10; they have crucified the flesh with the lusts and must yet put to death their members which are upon the earth, Gal. 5:24, Col. 3:5; or, to summarize all these oppositions: on the one hand it is a fact that Scripture speaks not once but repeatedly of reward, connects reward with the least work done in Jesus' name, at the end has each one recompensed according to his works, and often urges good works with a view to that reward, Mt.

5:12, 6:4, 16:27, 25:34, Rom. 2:6, 1 Tim. 4:7, 8, Op. 22:12 etc.; and alongside this it stands equally firm that there exists no relation of merit and reward between what the believer does and what he will receive, Mt. 20:9, Mk. 10:30, Luk. 12:37, 43, 44; that he, when he does all that he was obliged to do, is still an unprofitable servant, Luk. 17:10, that there is no reward except out of grace, Rom. 4:3, 4, and that all the benefits of the covenant, [564] sanctification and glorification, just as much as justification, have been acquired by Christ, lie ready in Him and thus not only no longer need to be merited by the believers but also can no longer be merited, and can only be accepted childlike in faith. Many have seen a contradiction between this all-activity of God in grace and the self-activity of man nevertheless maintained alongside it, have accused Jesus, Paul, John of inner contradiction and for themselves have sacrificed the one to the other. Thus it was then taught that grace at most serves only to restore the power of will toward the good in man and to set him himself to work and to earning, or also on the other side it was asserted that good works are not necessary or even are harmful for salvation. But high above all these one-sidednesses stands Holy Scripture, as heaven above the earth, as the thoughts of God above the thoughts of men. It holds fast to both, preaches both with equal emphasis and sees between the two no contradiction nor conflict. Precisely because God works in the believers the willing and the working, they have to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, Phil. 2:12, 13. They are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God has prepared, that they should walk in them, Ef. 2:10. God and man, religion and morality, faith and love, justification and sanctification, praying and working, are by nature no opposition. They have become so through sin; and through it man again and again brings conflict between the

two. But they are originally most closely united; they have been restored in their unity by Christ, who is our peace; they are in the Christian life reconciled in principle. Dependence here coincides with freedom; those born of God become children of God because they are it; for them the law holds: werde was du bist! Good works are therefore on the one hand without any merit; they are, after all, not ours, but prepared by God in Christ for us and worked in us by his Spirit; they are through our weakness always imperfect and infected with sin; they are wholly disproportionate to the salvation that is bestowed; ipsa hominis bona merita sunt Dei munera, Augustine, Ench. 107. And nevertheless they are urgently necessary, for the commandment of God, Rom. 6:18, 7:4, 8:12, 13, 1 Thess. 4:3, for the goal of [565] redemption, Ef. 1:4; as fruits of faith, Jak. 2:14, out of gratitude, 1 Cor. 6:20, Col. 1:10, 1 Thess. 2:12, to the glorification of God, Joh. 15:8, as way to salvation, Hebr. 12:14; bona opera via regni, non causa regnandi (Bernardus). Cf. later the locus on the Christian life.

3. In the same way as concerning sanctification, Scripture speaks concerning the perseverance of the saints. It exhorts believers to persevere unto the end, Mt. 24:13, Rom. 2:7, 8, to remain in Christ, in his word, in his love, Joh. 15:1-10, 12:6, 24, 27, 3:6, 24, 4:12v., not to depart but to keep the faith, Col. 1:23, Hebr. 2:1, 3:14, 6:11, to be faithful unto death, Op. 2:10, 26. Sometimes it speaks thus, as if falling away were possible; he who thinks he stands, let him take heed lest he fall, 1 Cor. 10:12; it warns against high-mindedness and threatens, in case of unfaithfulness, with severe punishment, Ezech. 18:24, Mt. 13:20, 21, Joh. 15:2, Rom. 11:20, 22, 2 Tim. 2:12, Hebr. 4:1, 6:4-8, 10:26-31, 2 Petr. 2:18-22. Indeed it even seems to mention various examples, in which falling away has taken place, David in his adultery, Solomon in his idolatry, Hymeneus and Alexander, 1 Tim.

1:19, 20, 2 Tim. 2:17, 18, Demas, 2 Tim. 4:10, false prophets and teachers, who deny the Lord, who bought them, 2 Petr. 2:1. believers, who fall away from grace and faith, Gal. 5:4, 1 Tim. 4:1. Relying on these texts, Pelagians, Roman Catholics, Socinians, Remonstrants, Mennonites, Quakers, Methodists etc., and also even the Lutherans have taught the possibility of a total loss of the grace received, M. Vitringa III 415 sq. In contrast, Augustine came to the confession of the perseverantia sanctorum; but because he considered uncertainty and fear with respect to salvation in believers salutary, he taught that those regenerated by baptism could again lose the grace which they had received, but, if they belonged to the number of the praedestinati, in any case received it back before death; believers could thus lose grace totaliter but the elect could not finaliter lose grace. In the Catholic and Roman church, earlier and later many agreed with him; but nevertheless this doctrine has been maintained only by the Reformed and connected with the certitudo fidei, Zwingli, [566] Op. IV 121. Calvijn, Inst. II 3, 11. 5, 3. III 24, 6. 7 etc. Polanus, Synt. VI 43. Heid. Cat. vr. 1. 53. 54. Can. Dordr. c. 5. Trigland, Antapol. c. 39-41. Gomarus, Op. II 280. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. III 13 c. 20-22. Moor IV 387 V 158. M. Vitringa III 415 etc., and in more recent times Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 111. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. II 368. 509. Scholten, L. H. K. II 505v. Van Oosterzee § 121.

Now in connection with this doctrine of perseverance the question is not whether those who partake of true, saving faith, if left to themselves, would not be able again to lose it through their own fault and sin; nor, likewise, whether in them not sometimes in fact all activity, confidence, and comfort of faith ceases and faith itself, under the cares of life and the enjoyments of the world, withdraws into concealment. But the question is whether God

also maintains, continues, and completes the work of grace which He began, or whether He sometimes allows it to be wholly brought to nothing by the power of sin. The perseverantia is not an act of man but it is a gift of God. Augustine saw this well; only he made a distinction between a twofold grace, and deemed a grace of regeneration and of faith possible, which in itself was losable and to which, in order to continue to exist, from without a second grace, that of the perseverantia, had still to be added. The second grace is then a donum superadditum, has no connection with the first and in fact stands outside the Christian life without any influence. With the Reformed the doctrine of perseverance was a wholly different one; it was a gift of God; He watches and cares that the work of grace may have progress and completion; but He does this not apart from the believers but through them. He gives in regeneration and faith a grace which also in itself bears an inlosable character; He bestows a life which by nature is eternal; He grants benefits of calling, justification, glorification, which hang together mutually unbreakably. All the above-mentioned exhortations and threats, which Scripture addresses to believers, therefore also prove nothing against the doctrine of perseverance. They are precisely the way in which God Himself through the believers confirms His promise and gift; they are the means by which perseverance is realized in life. [567] Perseverance too is not compulsion but, as a gift of God, works in a spiritual way upon man. God wills precisely in a moral way, through exhortation and warning, to lead the believer to heavenly salvation and makes him himself willing, through the grace of the H. Spirit, to persevere in faith and in love. Therefore it is wholly wrong to conclude from the exhortations of H. Scripture to the possibility of the total loss of grace. This conclusion is just as unlawful as when with Christ from His temptation and struggle one

would conclude to His posse peccare. The certainty of the outcome does not make the means superfluous, but in God's ordinance is bound to it unbreakably. Paul knew with certainty that no one in the shipwreck would lose his life; yet he says: if these do not remain in the ship, ye cannot be saved, Hd. 27:22, 31. As to the examples which Scripture would adduce for actual falling away, then it is impossible to prove that all those persons either have had the actual grace of regeneration (Hymeneus, Alexander, Demas, persons in 1 Tim. 4:1, 2 Petr. 2:1) or have actually lost it in their fall and then later have received it back again (David, Solomon) or also have actually had it but never received it back (Hebr. 6:4-8, 10:26-31, 2 Petr. 2:18-22). These latter texts seem to place the greatest objection in the way of the confession of the perseverantia sanctorum. Yet this is only appearance. For also they who teach the possibility of falling away must assume that here a wholly special sin is in view. For according to themselves grace is indeed losable but also after total loss again recoverable. The opinion of the Montanists and Novatians, who from these passages inferred that apostates might never again be received into the church, has been generally rejected by the Christian churches. When Scripture nevertheless expressly says that it is impossible to renew again unto repentance such as are spoken of in those texts, Hebr. 6:4, 10:26, 2 Petr. 18:20, 1 Joh. 5:16, then it is incontrovertible that here a sin is meant which brings with it the judgment of hardening and makes repentance impossible. And such a sin there is, also according to the confession of those who assume the possibility of falling away, only one, viz. the blasphemy against the H. Spirit, above p. 101. If this now is so, the doctrine of the falling away of the saints leads to [568] the inference that the blasphemy against the H. Spirit can also or even only be committed by the

regenerate, Quenstedt, Theol. II 157, or the above-mentioned texts lose all probative force against the perseverantia sanctorum. But in addition still more comes. They who deem total falling away possible must make a distinction between such sins by which the grace of regeneration is not, and others by which it is indeed lost; they are, in other words, compelled to take refuge in the Roman doctrine of the peccata mortalia and venialia, unless they would wish that that grace should be lost through every, even the slightest, sin. By this, however, the whole morality is falsified, the nature of sin is misconstrued, a casuistry ensnaring and distressing to consciences is introduced. Further, on this standpoint it comes to no certainty of faith, to no quiet labor, to no tranquil development and growth of the Christian life. The continuity can be broken at every moment; Hollaz, Ex. 883 attempts to prove that regeneration can be lost and received back three, four, and more times, cf. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 233 f. Finally the doctrine of the falling away of the saints so little escapes the difficulties which it wishes to avoid, that it even enlarges and increases these. For if in doing so it holds fast the immutability of God's praescientia, then in the end only those are saved of whom God has eternally known this with certainty; and the human will cannot nullify this certainty of the outcome. Or else it must proceed to denial of praedestinatio and praescientia in every sense, and then it makes everything shaky and unstable, the love of the Father, the grace of the Son and the communion of the H. Spirit. God may have revealed His love, Christ may have died for sinners, the H. Spirit may have planted regeneration and faith in the heart, the believer may with Paul be able to say: I have a delight in the law of God after the inward man; in the end, up to the hour of death, and why also not yet on yonder side of the grave, the

will of man is the decisive and all-governing power. It will all be as he determines.

Scripture, however, teaches quite otherwise. Already the O. Testament states it clearly, that the covenant of grace does not depend on the obedience of man. Indeed it brings with it the [569] obligation to walk in the way of the covenant, but itself rests only in God's compassion. If nevertheless the Israelites repeatedly make themselves guilty of unfaithfulness and adultery, the prophets do not infer from that that God changes, that his covenant totters and his promise fails. On the contrary, God cannot and may not break his covenant; He has voluntarily bound himself to Israel by it, with a costly oath; his glory, his name, his honour depends on it; He cannot forsake his people; it is an eternal covenant, that knows of no tottering; He will himself give his people a new heart and a new spirit, write the law in their inward parts and cause them to walk in his statutes, above p. 194. And when later Paul stands before that same fact of Israel's unfaithfulness, his heart filled with sorrow, then he does not conclude from it that the word of God has fallen away, but he continues to believe that God has mercy on whom He will, that his gifts of grace and calling are without repentance, and that not all are Israel who are of Israel, Rom. 9-11. And likewise John testifies of those who become apostate: they were not of us, otherwise they would have remained with us, I 2:9. Whatever apostasy therefore may take place under Christendom, it may never cause us to doubt the immutability of God, the firmness of his counsel, the unbreakableness of his covenant, the faithfulness of his promises. One must rather let every creature go than that one should not trust in his word. And that word is one rich promise for the heirs of the kingdom. There are not a few texts that teach perseverance; the whole gospel bears and confirms it. The Father has chosen them before

the foundation of the world, Ef. 1:4, ordained them unto eternal life, Hd. 13:48, unto conformity to the image of his Son, Rom. 8:29; and this election is unchangeable, Rom. 9:11, Hebr. 6:17 and in its time brings with it calling and justification and glorification, Rom. 8:30. Christ, in whom all the promises of God are yea and amen, 2 Cor. 1:20, has died for those who have been given to Him by the Father, Joh. 17:6, 12, in order that He might give them eternal life and lose none of them, Joh. 6:40, 17:2; and therefore He grants them eternal life and they shall not perish unto eternity, no one shall snatch them out of his hand, Joh. 6:39, 10:28: The H. Spirit, who regenerates them, remains with them forever, [570] Joh. 14:16, and seals them unto the day of redemption, Ef. 1:13, 4:30. The covenant of grace is firm and confirmed with an oath, Hebr. 6:16-18, 13:20, unbreakable as a marriage, Ef. 5 vs. 31, 32, as a testament, Hebr. 9:17, and by virtue of that covenant God calls his elect, writes the law in their inward parts, puts his fear in their heart, Hebr. 8:10, 10:14v., does not allow them to be tempted above ability, 1 Cor. 10:13, confirms and completes the good work that He began in them, 1 Cor. 1:9, Phil. 1:6 and preserves them for the coming of Christ, to become partakers of the heavenly inheritance, 1 Thess. 5 vs. 23, 2 Thess. 3:3, 1 Petr. 1:4, 5. By his intercession with the Father Christ is thus active, that their faith does not cease, Luk. 11:32, that they are kept in the world from the Evil One, Joh. 17:11, 20, that they are saved completely, Hebr. 7:20, that their sins are forgiven them, 1 Joh. 2:1 and that they all shall be with Him and behold his glory, Joh. 17:24. The benefits of Christ, of which the H. Spirit makes them partakers, are all without repentance, Rom. 11:29; he who is called is glorified, Rom. 8:30; he who has been adopted as a child is an heir of eternal life, Rom. 8:17, Gal. 4:7; he who believes already has eternal life here, Joh. 3:16. And that life itself is,

because eternal, also incapable of being lost; it cannot die, because it cannot sin, 1 Joh. 3:9. Faith is a firm ground, Hebr. 11:1, hope is an anchor, Hebr. 6:19 and does not put to shame, Rom. 5:5, and love never passes away, 1 Cor. 13:8.

From this perseverance there flows a rich consolation for the believers and an abundant blessing for the Christian life. Because God also, according to his promise, completes the good work that He began, therefore believers can and may at all times be assured of their eternal salvation. Those who contest justification by faith alone or nevertheless, like the Lutherans, reject the perseverantia sanctorum, cannot accept this certitudo fidei. Even Augustine did not dare to embrace this doctrine and said: Deus melius esse judicavit, miscere quosdam non perseveraturos certo numero sanctorum suorum, ut quibus non expedit in hujus vitae tentatione securitas, in Schweizer, Centraldogmen I 42. Rome therefore also determined that no one can know with certainty that he has obtained God's grace, unless [571] by special revelation, Trid. VI c. 9 and can. 13-15, and the Roman theologians therefore speak only of a certitudo moralis, conjecturalis, Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 112 art. 5. Bellarminus, de justif. III c. 2 sq. Möhler said that it would be im höchsten Grade unheimlich to him in the proximity of someone who was always certain of his salvation, and that he would not be able to ward off the thought from himself, dass etwas Diabolisches dabei unterlaufe, Symbolik S. 197. The Remonstrants also and in later times the Lutherans contested the certitudo fidei, at least for the future; but the Reformed confessed election and ascribed to faith the firm assurance of salvation, which indeed could not be obtained from curious investigations into the hidden counsel of God, but nevertheless could be obtained from the nature and the fruits of faith through the testimony of the

H. Spirit. For faith is in its nature in conflict with all doubt; the certainty is not later added to it from outside, but lies in it from the beginning, and in due time proceeds from it; for it is a gift of God, an operation of the H. Spirit. He testifies therein with our spirit that we are children of God, Rom. 8:15, Gal. 4:6, causes believers to glory that nothing shall separate them from the love of God in Christ, Rom. 8:38 and assures them of their future salvation, Rom. 8:23, 2 Cor. 1:22, Ef. 1:13, 14, 4:30. And this certainty of faith gives strength and support to the Christian life. For Ritschl has clearly brought this to light: among the Roman Catholics justification is an enabling for the moral destination, among the Protestants it is the restoration of the religious relation to God. The latter must precede, before there can be any question of a truly Christian life. As long as we still stand over against God as Judge, seek life through the law and are seized with fear of death, love is not in us, which is the fruit of faith, the fulfillment of the law, the bond of perfection and excludes all fear. But when in justification peace with God, adoption, bold access to the throne of grace, freedom from the law, independence from the world has been bestowed upon us, then from that faith the good works flow forth of themselves. They do not serve to acquire eternal life, but are of eternal life, which every believer already possesses, revelation, seal and proof. Faith, which [572] includes the certainty that with God all things are possible, that He makes the dead alive and calls the things that are not as though they were, always enables to great things. It says to the mountain: be lifted up and cast into the sea; and it happens thus, Mt. 21:21. Cf. on the certitudo fidei: Calvin, Inst. III 2, 14v. etc. Acta Syn. Trid. c. antid. C. R. 35, 455. Zanchius, Op. VIII 227. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. III 13 c. 8 sq. Can. Dordr. I 12. V 9-12. Rivetus, Op. III 470-478. Trigland, Antapol. c. 41. Keckermann e. a. in Heppe,

Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 129-131. Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. II 64 sq. Love, Theol. Werken 126v. Erskine, The assurance of faith, Works, Amst. 1856 VI. Marshall, Evang. Sanctification p. 195v. M. Vitringa III 89.

PROJECT GUTENBERG EDITOR'S REMARKS.

Every effort has been made to provide in this file a faithful reproduction of the original version. In the original, æ is rendered as ae, œ as oe; this spelling has been maintained here.

Here and there spacing or punctuation has been silently corrected. Also some compound expressions such as „afaan", „afteleiden", „toetevoegen" etc. have been silently split into „af aan", „af te leiden", „toe te voegen" etc.

Some abbreviations such as LXX, O. T. and N. T. have been provided with an explanation in order to improve readability for the visually impaired.

Any possible typographical errors in the Greek have been reproduced unchanged. Clear typographical errors in the Hebrew have been corrected, and where necessary the diacritical marks have been silently improved or supplemented.

Overly obvious typographical and spelling errors in the original have been corrected as follows.

Corrections.

Pag. 4: “sehepselen” replaced by “creatures” (the lower creatures and the smaller events).

Pag. 8: replace “1I” with “II” (Heid. Cat. X. Zanchius, Op. II 425).

Pag. 17: replace “1:4” with “1:14” (Habakkuk does indeed complain about it in chap. 1:14).

Pag. 38: replace “and” with “and in” (and in 2 Cor. 3:11 Paul is of the same opinion).

Pag. 56: “more” replaced by “down” (with this solution the Pelagians lay down).

Pag. 62: “det” replaced by “der” (the reality of sin).

Pag. 64: “alof” replaced by “as if” (as if God wanted to turn back sin by force).

Pag. 65: “imaginiret” replaced by “imaginiert” (imagined into the abyss of sin).

Pag. 89: “van” replaced by “vom” (Die Lehre v. d. Sünde u. vom Versöhner8 1862).

Pag. 91: “1S82” to be replaced by “1882” (Stud. u. Krit. 1882 S. 284 f.).

Pag. 91: “Biedermaun” replaced by “Biedermann” (Biedermann, Dogm. 614 f.).

Pag. 97: replace “89” with “98” (cf. Dorner, Gl. II 90-98).

Pag. 111: “more abundantly” replaced by “more abundantly” (grace is more abundant and life is more powerful).

Pag. 115: “senipelagianism” replaced by “semipelagianism” (According to semipelagianism the consequences existed).

Pag. 122: “voorvloeide” replaced by “voortvloeide” (in Roman theology voortvloeide).

Pag. 122: “superaddditum” replaced by “superadditum” (gradually the doctrine of the donum superadditum arose).

Pag. 136: “gebäbren” replaced by “gebähren” (dass sie fortwährend Böses muss gebähren).

Pag. 136: “willekenr” replaced by “willekeur” (with incalculable arbitrariness now to the one).

Pag. 140: replace “wetenschapelijken” with “wetenschappelijken” (in the sense of all soberly scientific).

Pag. 144: replace “inbaerent” with “inhaerent” (it is so inherent in human nature).

Pag. 153: replace “ansusehen” with “anzusehen” (sind anzusehen als eben so viele Tiger).

Pag. 156: “Dent.” replaced by “Deut.” (the O. Test. itself, Lev. 19:18, Deut. 32:35).

Pag. 160: “indifferent” replaced by “not indifferent” (he is no more not indifferent to it).

Pag. 163: “schulbewustzijn” replaced by “schuldbewustzijn” (Whoever wants to ascend from the consciousness of guilt to guilt).

Pag. 170: “Verzweifling” replaced by “Verzweiflung” (Kinder der Angst, des Schreckens, ja der Verzweiflung).

Pag. 170: “zondern” replaced by “sondern” (sondern nur zur ewigen Freude).

Pag. 175: “du” replaced by “de la” (Le problème de la douleur, Etudes évang. 1867).

Pag. 176: “Ps. 89:4S” replaced by “Ps. 89:48” (Gen. 3:19, 18:27, Job 4:19, Ps. 89:48v., 90:3, 103:14v., 146:4, Pred. 3:20, 12:7).

Pag. 179: “Authropology” replaced by “Anthropology” (in his Study of Christian Anthropology).

Pag. 179: replace “celni” with “celui” (aussi intact que celui de la vie).

Pag. 179: “protoplasma” replaced by “protoplasm” (La structure du protoplasme etc. 1895).

Pag. 183: replace “voort” with “voorts” (and furthermore Polanus, Synt. V c. 12).

Pag. 185: “I6” replaced by “16” (Hd. 16:17, 19:15. This obsessio now, however dreadful also).

Pag. 185: “analogous” replace with “analog” (see an analogous phenomenon occur).

Pag. 185: “bij” replaced by “by” (With an introduction by Rev. F. F. Ellinwood).

Pag. 197: replace “waarbeid” with “truth” (then image, now truth; then twilight, now light).

Pag. 202: “werel” replaced by “wereld” (yet the altered worldview demanded).

Pag. 208: replace “voorafgang” with “voorafging” (our period preceded another).

Pag. 233: “berschappij” to be replaced by “heerschappij” (but a religious-ethical dominion).

Pag. 244: “immediate” replace with “immediately” (became directly and immediately the part).

Pag. 245: replace “omgerijmd” with “ongerijmd” (omniscience etc. is absurd).

Pag. 249: “Cristus” replaced by “Christus” (the doctrine of Christ in modern dogmatics).

Pag. 258: replace “onmiddelijk” with “onmiddellijk” (that Christ could immediately take his place).

Pag. 272: “preumatisch” replaced by “pneumatic” (psychic and pneumatic life).

Pag. 274: “26:43” to be replaced by “24:43” (a young woman, and especially an unmarried one, Gen. 24:43, Ex. 2:8).

Pag. 278: “philosopie” replaced by “philosophie” (the newer pantheistic philosophy).

Pag. 284: “théeol.” replaced by “théol.” (Revue de théol. et de philos. Mars 1891).

Pag. 290: “apotelesmatum” replaced by “apostelesmatum” (apostelesmatum and charismatum).

Pag. 302: “כֹּהֵן” replaced by “כֹּחֵן” (the names in other languages, such as כֹּחֵן, ἱερευς, sacerdos)

Pag. 305: „מִגְחָה” replaced by „מִנְחָה” (At first the offering was simply מִנְחָה, gift, Gen. 4:3).

Pag. 312: “only” replaced by “all” (the name above all name).

Pag. 316: replace “Augustius” with “Augustinus” (Augustine’s view of the redemptive significance of Christ).

Page 330: “Me” replaced by “Mc” (and Dr. John Mc Leod Campbell).

Pag. 331: “oenvre” replaced by “oeuvre” (Etude sur l’oeuvre de la Rédemption).

Pag. 331: “bij” replaced by “by” (the atonement as taught by Christ Himself).

Pag. 363: replace “53” with “52” (Lev. 25:51, 52).

Pag. 377: replace “11” with “22” (and 1 Petr. 3:19-22 in no case speaks).

Pag. 393: “scholatiek” replaced by “scholastic” (scholasticism did teach indeed).

Pag. 395: “Dordsche” replaced by “Dordtsche” (At the Dordtsche synod).

Pag. 422: “κηρηγμα” replaced by “κηρυγμα” (it was a κηρυγμα to the spirits).

Pag. 424: “eu” replaced by “en” (and the highest and richest in Christ).

Pag. 426: replace “veplicht” with “obliged” (is the people now also obliged).

Pag. 432: “gemeemte” replaced by “gemeente” (did not die only for the congregation).

Pag. 432: “Gol.” replaced by “Col.” (1 Cor. 3:10-15, Ef. 4:1-16, Col. 2:19).

Pag. 434: “his” to be replaced by “bis” (Freiheit von d. ap. Zeiten bis auf Aug. Freiburg 1856).

Pag. 445: replace “poemitentia” with “poenitence” (The poenitence with him always consists of two parts).

Pag. 451: “Remonstantism” replaced by “Remonstrantism” (which was prepared by Socinianism and Remonstrantism).

Pag. 458: “Durchburch” replaced by “Durchbruch” (no ultimately occurring Durchbruch).

Pag. 459: “bebben” to be replaced by “hebben” (a new Creation had to take place).

Pag. 464: “moeielijkheid” replaced by “moeilijkheid” (with a peculiar difficulty).

Pag. 464: “eu” replaced by “en” (ascribes to Christ and nevertheless exhorts us).

Pag. 467: replace “aggressief” with “agressief” (in the Methodist manner aggressive in the world).

Pag. 467: “eu” replaced by “en” (also apply and distribute).

Pag. 509: “ontneent” replaced by “ontneemt” (but it also takes nothing essential away from it).

Pag. 519: “πιστενειν” replaced by “πιστευειν” (for John speaks many times of πιστευειν εἰς τινα).

Pag. 527: “inzon-heid” replaced by “inzonderheid” (has the Reformation, has in particular Calvin).

Pag. 532: “parallele” replaced by “parallelle” (because the parallel forms are preferred).

Pag. 562: “16, 16” replaced by “16” (for I am holy, 1 Petr. 1:16, be perfect).

Pag. 567: replace “aannnemen” with “aannemen” (who accept the possibility of apostasy).