

REFORMED DOGMATICS



VOLUME TWO:
GOD AND CREATION

HERMAN BAVINCK

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VOL. 2. GOD AND CREATION

HERMAN BAVINCK

MONERGISM BOOKS

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Published by Monergism Books

P.O. Box 491

West Linn Oregon 97068

www.monergism.com

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Monergism.

CHAPTER IV. ON GOD.

MONERGISM BOOKS

§ 20. THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD.

1 . Mystery is the element of life of dogmatics. To be sure, Scripture by *μυστηριον* does not understand an abstract-supernatural truth in the Roman sense; but it is just as far removed from the thought that the believer would understand and comprehend the revealed mysteries in a scientific sense, cf. deel I 532. Rather, the knowledge which God has revealed of himself in nature and Scripture far surpasses the representation and the concept of man. Insofar, it is all mystery with which dogmatics deals. For it has not to do with finite creatures, but from the beginning to the end it raises itself above all creature to the Eternal and the Infinite himself. Already immediately when it makes a beginning, it stands before the Incomprehensible. From Him it takes its beginning, for out of Him are all things. But also in the further loci, when it descends to the creatures, it considers these no otherwise than in their relation to God, as they are out of and through and unto Him. Thus then the knowledge of God is the only dogma, the exclusive content of the whole dogmatics. All doctrines that are treated in it, about the world, about man, about Christ etc., are but the

explication of the one, central dogma of the *cognitio Dei*. From Him everything is considered. Under Him everything is subsumed. To Him everything is led back. It is always God and God alone, whose glory in creation and [2] re-creation, in nature and grace, in world and church it has to ponder and to describe. It is his knowledge alone, which it must display and spread out for view. Thereby dogmatics does not become a dry, scholastic science, without fruit for life. The more it ponders Him, whose knowledge is its only content, the more it will pass over into admiration and adoration. If only it never forgets, to think and to speak about the things instead of about the words; if only it remains a *Theologie der Thatsachen* and does not degenerate into a *Theologie der Rhetorik*, it is, as scientific description of the knowledge of God, also in the highest degree fruitful for life. The knowledge of God in Christ is, after all, life itself, Ps. 89:16; Jes. 11:9; Jer. 31:34; Joh. 17:3. Therefore Augustine desired to know nothing else and nothing more than God and himself: *Deum et animam scire cupio*. *Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino*. Therefore Calvin began his *Institutie* with the knowledge of God and of ourselves. And therefore the Catechism of Geneva gave, to the first question: *quis humanae vitae praecipuus est finis?* the answer: *ut Deum, a quo conditi sunt homines, ipsi noverint*, cf. also den Catech. van Westminster.

But as soon as we undertake to speak about God, the question arises how we shall be able to do that. We are human beings and He is the Lord our God. There seems to exist between Him and us no kinship and no communion, such that we could name Him in truth. Between Him and us there is a distance as between the infinite and the finite, between eternity and time, between being and becoming, between the all and the not. However little we know of God, even the weakest notion implies that He is

a being infinitely far exalted above every creature. And Scripture confirms that not only; it sets that majesty and exaltation of the Lord of lords before us first in the full light. Already the first chapter of Genesis depicts His incomprehensible exaltation; He speaks and it is there. And although Scripture then subsequently describes God to us in His condescending love, and says that He dwells with him who is of a contrite and humble spirit, nevertheless He is the High and the Exalted One, who dwells in eternity, Jes. 57:15. God is great and we do not comprehend it, Job 26:14, 36:26, 37:5. He is incomparable, Jes. 40:18, 25, 46:5, dwelling in the [3] darkness, 1 Kon. 8:12; Jes. 45:15, in an inaccessible light, 1 Tim. 6:16. No one has seen Him or can see Him, Ex. 33:20; Joh. 1:18, 6:46; 1 Tim. 6:16. The hidden ground, the depth of God, הַקֶּךְ, and the boundary, the extremity, the essence of the Almighty, תְּקֵלִית, is not to be reached, Job 11:7; Eccl. Sir. 43:34, 35. He is spirit, without form, Deut. 4:12, 15; Joh. 4:24, 5:37, above all that is creaturely, above need, Job 22:2, 3; Hd. 17:25; change, Jak. 1:17; time, Jes. 41:4, 44:6, 48:12; Op. 1:8, 22:13; space, Hd. 17:27, 28 etc., infinitely far exalted. He is not to be described and to be named with no name. He is without name, His name is wonderful, Gen. 32:29; Richt. 13:18; Spr. 30:4.

2. Even outside the domain of special revelation this majesty of God has been acknowledged. Among the Brahmins God is the Unknowable, without names and attributes, known only by him who does not know, Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. II 2. Hartmann, Religionsphilos. I 278 f. The Koran describes Allah many times in a very anthropomorphic way, but among the followers of Mohammed there arose many who interpreted this description spiritually and even denied all attributes to God, Dozy, Het Islamisme bl. 131 v. Houtsma, De strijd over het dogma in den Islam tot op El-Ash'ari

1875 bl. 120 v. Saussaye, *Lehrb. der Rel.* II 385. Greek philosophy too has many times clearly acknowledged and expressed this unknowability of God. According to the well-known story the philosopher Simonides repeatedly requested a longer postponement for the answer to the question of the tyrant Hiero, who God was, *Cic. de nat. deor.* I 22. According to Diogenes Protagoras began his book on the gods thus: *περι μεν θεων ουκ έχω εἶδεναι ουδ’ ὥς εἰσιν ουδ’ ὥς ουκ εἰσιν πολλα γαρ τα κωλυοντα εἶδεναι, ἢ τ’ ἀδηλοτης και βραχυς ὦν ὁ βιος των ἀνθρωπων*, Ritter et Preller, *Hist. phil. gr.* 183. *Cic. de nat. deor.* I 63. Carneades of Cyrene subjected belief in the gods not only to a sharp critique, but also contested the possibility of forming a conception of God. Plato rejected every anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representation of the Deity and declared in the *Timaeus* § 34: *τον μεν οὖν ποιητην και πατερα τονδε του παντος εὐρειν τε ἔργον και εὐροντα εἰς παντας ἀδυνατον λεγειν*, Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* II 4 928 f. And in a similar [4] sense he says in the *Republic* VI 19, that the Deity or the idea of the good is elevated not only above all that exists, but also above being itself, *ἐπεκεινα πασες οὐσιας*. Philo connected this Platonic philosophy with the doctrine of the O. Test. and found the same thought expressed in the name *Ihvh*. Not only is God free from every imperfection that is present in finite, changeable, dependent creatures; no, God also far surpasses all perfection of creatures. He is better than virtue, knowledge, beauty, purer than unity, more blessed than blessedness. He is properly without attributes, *ἀποιος*, and without names, and therefore also cannot be comprehended and described. According to his essence God is unknowable. We can know that He is, but not what He is. Only being can in the proper sense be ascribed to Him; the name *Ihvh* is the only one that indicates his essence, Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* V3 353 f. Dähne,

Gesch. Darstellung der jüdisch-alex. Religionsphilos. 1834 I 114 f. Schürer, Neutest. Zeitgesch. 1874 S. 655 f. Plotinus went the farthest. Plato still ascribed many attributes to God. Philo supplemented his negative theology with a positive one, in which he describes God as a personal, almighty, perfect being. But with Plotinus there is nothing to be said of God except only negatively. God is absolutely one, elevated above all multiplicity and therefore also not to be defined by thought, the good, not even by being, for all these determinations still include a multiplicity. God as pure unity is indeed the cause of thought, being, the good, but He is himself distinct from them and stands transcendent above them. He is unbounded, infinite, without form, and so much distinguished from every creature that even activity, life, thought, consciousness, being, cannot be ascribed to Him. He is inaccessible to our thought and to our language. We cannot say what He is, but only what He is not. Even the designations of *τὸ ἓν* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, of which Plotinus generally makes use, are no description of God's essence, but only of his relation to the creatures, and indicate nothing other than his absolute causality, Zeller, *ib.* 476-496. Still greater did the distance between God and his creature become in Gnosticism. It made an absolute separation between the highest God and the world. In nature, in Israel, in Christianity there was [5] no essential revelation of God but only of the aeons. There was therefore no *theologia naturalis*, neither *insita* nor *acquisita*, and likewise no *theologia revelata*. The highest God was absolutely unknowable and unapproachable for the creature; He was *βυθος ἄγνωστος, ἄρρητος*, eternal *σὺν*, Iren., *adv. haer.* I 11. 24.

3. But this doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God and of the unknowability of his essence has also been the point of departure and the fundamental idea of Christian theology. God is not exhausted in his

revelation, neither in creation nor in re-creation. He cannot communicate himself fully to creatures, because then these themselves would have to be God. Therefore there is no adequate knowledge of God. There is no name that makes his essence known to us. There is no concept that fully comprehends Him. There is no description that completely determines Him. What lies behind the revelation is utterly unknowable. We can approach it neither with our thought or imagination, nor with our language. Already the epistle of Barnabas c. 5 asks: if the Son of God had not come in the flesh, how then would men have seen Him and remained preserved? Justin Martyr calls God inexpressible, immovable, nameless, Apol. I 61; also words such as Father, God, Lord are not proper names ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εὐποΐων καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρησεις, Apol. II 6. God cannot appear, not go, not be seen, etc.; if there is mention of this in the O. Test., this refers to the Son, who is his envoy, Dial. 127. Also in Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV 20, there occurs the in his time very common but nevertheless incorrect and partly gnostic antithesis between the Father, who is hidden, invisible, unknowable, and the Son, who has revealed Him. In Clemens Alex. God is pure μονας, Strom. V 11. If we think away all that is creaturely, we do not reach what God is, but what He is not. Form, movement, place, number, property, name, etc. cannot be ascribed to Him. If we nevertheless call Him one, good, Father, Creator, Lord, etc., then we do not thereby express his proper essence but only indicate his power, Strom. V 12. He is even exalted above the one, ὑπερ αὐτὴν τὴν μοναδα, Paedag. I 8. In one word, God is, as Athanasius, c. gent. 2 says, ἐπεκεῖνα πασης οὐσίας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐννοίας. And likewise speak Orig., de princ. I [6] 1, 5. sq. c. Cels. VI 65. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. V 1. Theophilus, ad Autol. I 3. Tatianus. c. Gr. 5. Minucius Felix. Octav. c. 18. Novatianus, de trin. 2. Cyprianus, de idol. vanit. 5. Lactantius, Instit.

div. I 6. Cf. Münscher- v. Coelln, Dogmengesch. I 132 f. Hagenbach, Dogm. § 37. Schwane, Dogmengesch. I2 72 f. We also encounter the same conception in Augustine and Joh. Damascenus. Augustine, in the description of God, proceeds from the concept of being. He is the one who is, as his name Iahv also makes known; this is his proper name, his nomen in se; all other names are ad nos, Serm. 6 n. 4. Serm. 7 n. 7. Therefore, if we want to say what He is, we say only what He, in distinction from all finite substances, is not. He is ineffabilis. Facilius dicemus quid non sit quam quid sit. He is not earth, sea, heaven, angel, etc., nothing of all that the creature is; hoc solum potui dicere quid non sit, Enarr. in Ps. 85 n. 12. de doctr. chr. I 6, de ord. II 47. He is thus thought, ut aliquid quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere, de doctr. chr. I 7. But He cannot be thought as He is. For He is exalted above all that is bodily, changeable, become, tract. 23 in Ev. Joh. n. 9. Quis est autem, qui sic cogitat Deum, quemadmodum ille est? quaest. in Jos. VI 29. He is incomprehensible and must be so, si enim comprehendis, non est Deus, Serm. 117 n. 5. And if we then finally want to say what we think of Him, then we struggle with language. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur, de trin. VII 4, de doctr. chr. I 6. If we nevertheless express something concerning Him, then that is not adequate, but it serves only to make us say something and to make us think of a being that surpasses everything, de doctr. chr. I 6. Sicut Deus a nullo intellectu valet proprie cogitari, ita nulla definitione potest proprie definiri aut determinari, de cogn. verae vitae 7. Deus scitur melius nesciendo, de ord. II 44. Likewise Damascenus says that God το θειον, ἀρρητον και ἀκαταληπτον is, de fide orth. I c. 1. We speak of God in our way and know what God has revealed of himself; but what God's essence is and how He is in all, we do

not know, ib. c. 2. That God is, is clear; but τι ἔστιν κατ' οὐσίαν και φυσιν, ἀκαταληπτον τουτο παντελως και ἀγνωστον. That God is unbegotten, unchangeable, without beginning, etc., says [7] only what He is not. To say what He is, is impossible. He is nothing of all that is, not because He is not, but because He is ὑπερ παντα τα ὄντα και ὑπερ αὐτο το εἶναι. What we say positively of God does not indicate his nature, but the relations of his nature, τα περι την φυσιν, ib. c. 4 cf. c. 9.

4. This unknowability of God's essence was taught even more strongly by Pseudo-Dionysius, to whom Damascenus already appeals, and by Scotus Erigena. According to the Areopagite there is no concept, no expression, no word, which utters God's essence, de div. nom. c. 1 § 1. With unusual, figurative names God is therefore designated. He is ὑπερουσιος ἀοριστια, suprasubstantialis infinitas, ἡ ὑπερ νῶν ἐνοτης, supra mentem unitas, το ὑπερ διανοιαν ἐν, illud supra ratiocinationem unum, ὑπερουσιος οὐσια και νους ἀνοητος και λογος ἀρρητος, ἀλογια και ἀνοησια και ἀνωνυμια, κατα μηδεν των ὄντων οὐσα, ib. We can neither utter nor think that one, unknown, above being, above the good, above every name and word and understanding, above all the finite exalted essence, ib. c. 1 § 5. Only because He is the cause and the principle of everything, can we, like Scripture, name Him according to his workings, ib. c. 1 § 4. He is thus on the one hand ἀνωνυμος and on the other hand πολωνυμος, ib. 1 § 6. But also the positive names, which we ascribe to God on the ground of his works, do not make us know Him in his essence, for they belong to Him in a wholly different and infinitely more perfect manner than to the creatures, de myst. theol. c. 1 § 2. Therefore negative theology is more excellent than positive, for it makes us know God as exalted above every creature. Yet it, too, provides us with no knowledge of God's essence. For in the end God

surpasses both every negation and every affirmation, every θεσις and every ἀφαιρεσις, de myst. theol. c. 5. In entirely the same spirit Erigena reasons. God is exalted above all that is creaturely, also above being and knowing, de div. nat. I 7 sq. II 23. We know only that He is, not what He is, ib. I 13, II 28, V 26. What we predicate of Him, He is only in an improper manner, and thus He again is it not, I 36. The affirmative theology is improper, metaphorical I 14 sq. 37. It is surpassed by the negative. Verius enim negatur Deus quid eorum, quod de eo praedicatur, quam affirmatur esse, [8] I 76, II 30, III 20. Melius nesciendo scitur, cujus ignorantia vera est sapientia I 66. Therefore his predicates are best supplemented by super or plusquam. He is superessentialis, plusquam veritas, plusquam sapientia etc. I 14. Yes, so greatly does He surpass everything that is creature, that He can not unjustly be designated with the name of the nothing, nihilum, III 19. Cf. Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. I 45 f. Baur, Die christl. Lehre von der Dreiein. und Menschw. Gottes II 274 f. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer van God 133 v.

5. Although Scholasticism now expressed itself more cautiously on various points and, in particular, assigned a higher value to positive theology than Pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena; yet it too entirely agreed with the doctrine that the being of God an sich was unknowable for man. Anselm says that the names of God's being only indicate it per similitudinem, Monol. c. 63, that the relative properties of his being cannot be predicated, and the absolute only in a quidditative, not in a qualitative sense, Monol. c. 15-17. According to Albertus Magnus, God is exalted above all being and thinking. He cannot be attained by human thought, attingitur sed non capitur per comprehensionem. No name expresses his being. He is incomprehensible and unnameable, cf. Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. II 370. Thomas distinguishes a threefold knowledge of God, visio Dei per

essentiam, cognitio per fidem and cognitio per rationem naturalem. The first far surpasses man's natural knowledge and can be obtained only by supernatural grace. It is reserved for heaven, is granted here on earth only a single time, and yet also never makes a comprehending of God possible, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 1-11. Here on earth the knowledge of God is mediate. We cannot know God as He is in Himself, but only secundum quod omnium prima et eminentissima causa is. From the workings we can ascend to the cause, ib. art. 12. And likewise it is the case with the knowledge that we obtain of God from his special revelation through faith. We know Him thereby better, in quantum plures et excellentiores effectus ejus nobis demonstrantur, ib. art. 13. But it gives no knowledge of God per essentiam. There is no knowledge of [9] God's being, of his quidditas, per speciem propriam; but we know only habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, ib. art. 12. There is no name that expresses his being adaequate. His essentia stands high supra id, quod de Deo intelligimus et voce significamus, ib. qu. 13 art. 1. The positive names may indicate God's being, yet they do so in a very imperfect manner, just as the creatures from which they are derived represent Him imperfectly. God is knowable only, secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum, ib. art. 2. But with the further development of scholasticism this truth of the incomprehensibility of God was pushed into the background. The doctrine of God was unfolded more and more broadly. Existence, names, being, persons, properties were developed so finely and precisely that no place remained for the incomprehensibility of God. It became an ordinary property alongside the others, treated just as prolixly and dialectically. Duns Scotus asserted against Thomas that there was indeed a quidditative, albeit also imperfect, knowledge of God, Sent. I dist. 3 qu. 2. Against that nominalism already

raised objection and became more or less skeptical. Durandus said that there was no *cognitio abstractiva* of the divine being. And Occam declared: *nec divina essentia, nec divina quidditas nec aliquid intrinsecum Deus, nec aliquid, quod est realiter Deus, potest hic cognosci a nobis, ita quod nihil aliud a Deo occurrat in ratione objecti*, Stöckl, *Philos. des M. A.* II 1009. Mysticism sought to obtain yet another knowledge of God than along the path of dialectic. And toward the end of the Middle Ages Nic. Cusanus argued in his writing *de docta ignorantia*, that no truth could be obtained by reason, but only by faith, which was mystically conceived as a new organ in man. After the Reformation Roman theology returned to scholasticism and also adopted the doctrine of the unknowability of God's being in the sense of Thomas, e.g. Sylvius, *Comm. in Thomam*, ed. 4 Antv. 1693 I p. 96 sq. Billuart, *Cursus theol.* I 1747 p. 228 sq. Petavius, *Theol. dogm.* I c. 5 VIII c. 6. Theol. Wirceb. ed. Paris. 1880 III 73 sq. Jansen, *Praelect. Theol.* II 78 sq. C. Pesch, *Praelect. dogm.* 1895 II p. 46 sq. etc. At the Lateran council under Innocentius III this doctrine was even ecclesiastically established and pronounced by Rome: *Deus ineffabilis est*. [10]

6. Reformation theology has brought no change in this. Luther, in his work *de servo arbitrio*, made the distinction between *Deus absconditus* and *revelatus*, between *Deus ipse* and *verbum Dei*. And later he came more and more to hold only to the latter, i.e. to God as He has revealed Himself in Christ; *quod supra nos, nihil ad nos*. But yet the full being of God did not, for him, come to expression in that. And there remained in God a dark, hidden background, viz. *Deus ut est in sua natura et majestate, Deus absolutus*. And this, according to Luther, was plane *incognoscibilis, incomprehensibilis, inaccessibilis*, Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.* I 47. 76 f. 314 f. Later Lutheran theologians did not speak of such a sharp distinction

between God's being and His revelation, but all nevertheless teach that no adequate name and no proper definition of God can be given, Gerhard, *Loci theol.* II c. 5. cf. Schmid, *Dogm. der ev. luth. K.* § 17. Bretschneider, *Dogm.* I 4 443. The Reformed thought in agreement with this. Their deep aversion to all creature-idolatry led them everywhere sharply to distinguish between what is God's and what is of the creature. More than any other theology they took seriously the proposition that *finitum non est capax infiniti*. Zwingli said: *quid Deus sit, tam ex nobis ipsis* (these words may not be omitted, as Hoekstra does, *Wijsg. Godsd.* II 14) *ignoramus, quam ignorat scarabeus, quid sit homo*, *Opera* III 157. Calvin considered it a vain speculation to investigate *quid sit Deus*; for us it is enough to know, *qualis sit et quid ejus naturae conveniat*, *Inst.* I 2, 2. I 5,-9. *Comm. in Rom.* 1:19. Later theologians expressed the unknowability of the divine being still much more strongly. Because the finite cannot grasp the infinite, all names of God serve, not to make His being known to us, but to indicate, in some measure according to our capacity, that of God which we need to know. The propositions: *Deus definiri nequit, Deo nomen non est, finitum non est capax infiniti*, recur with all theologians. They all teach unanimously that God infinitely far surpasses our concept, our representation, our language. Thus, e.g., Polanus says, the attributes which are ascribed to God in Holy Scripture do not explain His nature and being. Much more they make known to us *quis et [11] quomodo non sit, quam quis et quomodo sit. Quidquid de Deo dicitur, non est Deus, quia est ineffabilis. Nulla attributa divina essentiam naturamque Dei sufficienter explicant, quia illa est infinita. Infinitum autem per id quod finitum est digne satis pleneque explicari non potest*, *Synt Theol.* II c. 6 p. 137, cf. also Zanchius, *de natura Dei seu de attributis*, *Op.* II col. 9-10. Hyperius, *Methodus theol.* 1574 p.

83-84. Ursinus, *Tract. theol.* 1584. p. 35, 36, 49. *Synopsis par. theol.* VI 2. Maresius, *Syst. theol.* p. 48. Alsted, *Theol. schol. did.* p. 56 sq. Moor, *Comm. in Marckii Comp.* I 505 sq.

7. But also in Reformation theology the significance of this incomprehensibility of God was perceived less and less as time went on. It was indeed still taught, but stood entirely by itself and exercised no influence. The schema in which the doctrine of God was treated soon stood almost unalterably fixed. Much worse was it with other directions. Socinianism did not enter at all into the question of the knowability of God. It did not take the least interest in the knowledge of God's essence. To know God stood approximately equal to knowing that He is absolute Lord, Fock, *Der Socin.* S. 414-416. Crell wrote a work *de Deo ejusque attributis*, and in it indeed proved God's existence with all kinds of arguments, but refrained from all questions concerning God's essence, knowability, etc. *Conr. Vorstius* wrote a *Tractatus de Deo s. de natura et attributis Dei* 1610, which fell into the same Socinian errors, cf. *Acta Syn. Dord. sess.* 149 sq. The Remonstrants also felt no need to enter into metaphysical questions; they rather warned against idle speculation and urged simplicity. That which was strictly necessary to know was only the will of God. The *cultus Dei* is much more necessary than the *cognitio Dei*, *Episc., Instit. theol. Lib.* 4 sect. 2 cap. 1. *Limborch, Theol. Chr. Lib.* II c. 1. Rationalism thought itself certain of God's existence and attached little value to the knowledge of his essence. It is as if the majesty and the greatness of God is no longer perceived at all. Leaving aside all so-called metaphysical questions, one hastens to the will of God, in order to know and to do it. Not in knowing God, but in doing his will lies eternal life. *Bretschneider* calls [12] the question entirely superfluous, whether God can be defined, *Dogm.* I4 443. *Syst. Entw.* 341.

But when this truth of the unknowability of the divine being had been almost entirely forgotten by theology, it was brought back to remembrance by philosophy. Rationalism supposed that, with its proofs for God's existence and with its doctrine of God's attributes, it stood on firm, scientific ground. But Kant, although with his doctrine of God, virtue, and immortality still wholly caught up in rationalism and moralism, nevertheless brought about a great change in the foundation on which this doctrine rested. Just as sensibility brings with it a priori the forms of space and time, and the understanding the categories, so reason also contains a priori, synthetic Grundsätze und Regeln, especially this Grundsatz, that it ascends from the conditioned to the unconditioned, Kr. d. r. Vern. ed. Kirchmann S. 300. Thereby it forms three transcendent ideas, soul, world, God, S. 308-318. But these three ideas cannot be demonstrated objectively, but can only be derived subjectively from the nature of reason, S. 319. We cannot perceive the object of those ideas; we therefore also cannot obtain any scientific knowledge of them, S. 321, 322. Scientifically judged, they are paralogisms, antinomies, ideals, S. 322. Our knowledge does not reach further than the domain of experience, S. 469, 475, 508. These ideas therefore do not increase our knowledge, but only regulate it; they bring unity into our concepts and cause us to consider everything as if there were God, the soul, the world, S. 512, 530, 537, 541. Science can neither prove nor deny the reality of those ideas, S. 532. Psychology, cosmology (teleology), and theology are therefore not science, S. 547. The critique of pure reason ends with a negative result. Now practical Vernunft does indeed cause us to assume the reality of those ideas, Kr. der prakt. Vern. ed. Kirchmann S. 149 f. And indeed Kant ascribes to God understanding and will and other attributes, S. 150, 157, but nevertheless the being of God

remains hidden. Practical reason does indeed know that those three ideas have objective reality, but nothing more. It does not increase the content of our scientific knowledge. Speculative reason can do nothing with those ideas except regulate and purify our knowledge, and makes use of the idea of God in order to counteract and ward off anthropomorphism as a source of superstition and [13] fanaticism, S. 162 f. If understanding and will are ascribed to God, then that is only a knowledge of God in praktischer Beziehung, but in no respect a speculative knowledge, S. 165. Whoever abstracts from the anthropomorphistic element of it retains nothing but the word, S. 166. The idea of God does not belong in metaphysics, which does not exist, but in morality, S. 166 f. Fichte at first stood wholly on the same standpoint as Kant. In his Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, Königsberg 1792, he lets faith in God rest on the postulates of reason, also ascribes to God definite attributes such as holiness, blessedness, omnipotence, righteousness, omniscience, eternity, S. 3 f. 104. But with that we still have no definite concept of God, and do not know his being as it is an sich; that would also not promote but harm pure morality, S. 105. Religion always represents God in human fashion, in time and space, and even bodily, and does no harm by that, provided only that it does not come into conflict with morality and provided that this sensible representation is not held to be objectively valid, S. 124 f. Everything must be understood as Herablassung zu unserm subjectiven Bedürfniss, S. 127. Nur eine solche Offenbarung also kann göttlichen Ursprungs seyn, die einen anthropomorphisirten Gott, nicht als objectiv sondern blos für subjectiv gültig giebt, S. 129. And Schleiermacher too, although in many respects deviating from Kant and Fichte and attaching himself more closely to Spinoza, nevertheless agreed with them in the doctrine of the unknowability

of God. The idea of the unity of being and thinking, of the real and the ideal, i.e. the idea of God, is the presupposition of all our knowing, *Dialektik herausg. von Jonas* 1839 S. 397, the ground of our thinking, S. 60, 163; but is not to be grasped in thought and remains hinter dem Vorhang, S. 78, 79. As soon as we want to bring the Absolute nearer to us, it is made finite in our thinking, S. 69 and we speak in image. S. 78. It is in one word unattainable for knowing, S. 87. In his *Glaubenslehre* Schleiermacher presented the same thoughts, be it also in a more religious and less elaborated form. God is the Woher of our Daseyn; and as such an absolute causality He is no object of our knowing but only content of the feeling of absolute dependence, § 4, 4. [14]

8. Since then the doctrine of the unknowability of God has penetrated more and more into the consciousness of the modern age. Hegel indeed stood on another standpoint. Acknowledging that the religious representation was inadequate and suitable only for the people, he nevertheless considered philosophy capable of stripping this representation of its sensuous form, and thus of elevating it to an adequate concept. Reason, in his opinion, gradually raised itself through various stages to the absolute being, then sees the truth face to face, and knows as its essence reason, thinking, the concept itself. Philosophy, pure science, or more specifically logic, is the description of God in his essence, an sich. It comprehends the Absolute in its fitting, adequate form, as thinking, in the form of the concept, *Werke* III, S. 33 f. In his spirit many, such as Strauss, *Gl.* I 523 f. 547 f. 609 f., Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II 2 S. 516 f. Hartmann, *Philos. des Unbew.* II 9 155 f. 175 f. *Religionsphilos.* 608 f., Scholten, *Initia* p. 109 sq. L. H. K. II 199, 200, attempted, by purification and deepening of the concepts, to come ever nearer to the transcendent reality. But with

others Hegel's philosophy led to a wholly different outcome; they asserted that in the idea of God the representation could never be overcome, and therefore came to atheism. Feuerbach said that the personal God was nothing other than the essence of man himself, and theology nothing but anthropology. All that is predicated of God is derived from man, not only personality but all attributes and names. Religion is a deification of man himself. Man cannot rise above his own essence and therefore God is and remains always a sensuous, human being, not only in Christ. dogmatics but also in philosophy, *Wesen des Christ.* 1841. And many spoke likewise and, together with the anthropomorphic representation, threw away the whole idea of God, e.g. Büchner, *Kraft u. Stoff* 16 S. 392 f. Id. *Der Gottesbegriff und dessen Bedeutung in der Gegenwart* 2 1874. Haeckel, *Nat. Schöpfungsgesch.* 5 S. 30 f. Strauss, *Der alte u. d. neue Glaube* 2 S. 122. 144 f. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral* S. 179. But this atheism went too far for others. Taking note of the limitation of human cognitive capacity, which always remains moving within the finite, these thought that man must confine himself to what is given under [15] observation (positivism), refrain from every statement about existence and nature of the supersensuous (abstentionism), and thus in this respect must only confess his absolute ignorance (agnosticism). In France the task of science was limited to the establishing and explaining of phenomena by Auguste Comte, who therefore also excluded theology from the circle of the sciences, cf. *deel I* 151v. In England it was especially Herbert Spencer who, with all kinds of arguments, contested the knowability of God, *First Principles*, 5th ed. 1887 p. 68-97. And in Germany, after being satiated with Hegel's panlogism, one returned to the critical philosophy of Kant. Thus agnosticism in the last half of this century has become almost universally

dominant. All metaphysics is distrusted; one has an aversion to speculation; only what is positive and belongs to the domain of the sciences exactes stands firm. Theology has come so much under the fear of this agnosticism that it scarcely dares any longer to speak of knowledge of God; it tries as much as possible to exclude all metaphysics and to confine itself to the religious; it is ashamed of its own name and has allowed itself to be rechristened into a science of religion. For, although agnosticism is in fact death for theology, this has nevertheless still been maintained by many under another form. Kant regained by practical reason what he had lost by theoretical reason. Spencer leaves room for a religious veneration of the Unknowable. Already before him Sir William Hamilton, in his writing *On the philosophy of the unconditioned*, Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1829, and Dr. Henry Longueville Mansel in his work *The limits of religious thought examined in eight lectures*, preached before the university of Oxford 1858, had asserted that our thinking, because always bound to space, time, distinction, opposition, etc., can never penetrate to the absolute, even though on religious grounds the representation of God as a personal being must be maintained, cf. Dorner, *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* VI 1861 S. 320 f. 347 f. To a similar dualism the Neo-Kantians in Germany also came. Thinking may at its best bring us to the concept of the Absolute, yet in religion we do not have enough with that. Here we have need of a God who is like us, whom we represent as a person, and who, as a Father, cares for [16] his children. Such a religious representation is indeed always subject to criticism from the side of science; it is not the highest and the true, but there is no more to be attained, Lipsius, *Dogm.* § 229 f. 243 f. Ritschl, *Metaph. u. Rel.* 8 f. *Rechtf. u. Vers.* III 2 211 f. Rauwenhoff, *Wijsb. v. d. godsd.* 611 v. Hoekstra, *Wijsg. godsd.* II 11 v. And likewise others have sought in humanity, moral

idealism, ideal-formation, spiritism, theosophy, buddhism, etc. a compensation for what science in Christian theology had taken from them, cf. deel I 156. 202.

9. The grounds on which this agnosticism can rely are of very great weight. In the first place it can avail itself of the argument that was from ancient times advanced by the sophists and sceptics against the possibility of all knowledge, namely, that all human knowledge is subjective and relative. Nothing in the world stands by itself independently; object and subject are dependent on one another. Things and their properties exist only then and so, as they stand in relation to someone's perception; something first becomes something through the relation to the senses of the subject. We therefore can never say what a thing is in its essence, independently of our perception; we can only pronounce that something at a given moment thus appears to us; *ἄνθρωπος μετρον παντων*. This argument is indeed of great significance; but it proves too much; if it were valid, it would make impossible not only the knowledge of God but all knowledge of man and world; moreover this idealism has already been discussed in part I 145-151 and can therefore here further remain out of consideration. But agnosticism has various grounds that are advanced specifically against the knowability of God. Philosophy and theology were indeed, as appeared above, at all times convinced of the inadequacy of our knowledge of God. Negative predicates say only what God is not, and positive ones belong to Him in an entirely different way than they are found in creatures. The limitation, the finitude, the anthropomorphism of our knowledge of God was acknowledged by all. But in more recent times the unreachability of the knowledge of God has been argued in still other and more drastic fashion. Subjectively, namely, attention has been drawn to the limited nature of the

human faculty of knowledge; and [17] objectively to the inner contradiction from which every concept of God suffers. The first was done by Kant, the second by Fichte. Kant investigated the human faculty of knowledge and came to the conclusion that the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding were brought along by the subject itself, had validity in the world of phenomena, but also made all true knowledge of the noumena impossible for us. The transcendent ideas of God, world, soul are indeed rules for our acting, and a moral human being cannot act otherwise than as if an objective reality corresponds to those three ideas; but to prove this is not possible. Fichte added to that still the objection that the concepts of absolute and personality can never be united with one another. Spinoza already said that all determination was a negation, Epist. 50, that a thing therefore, in proportion as it became more determined and concrete, was also all the more finite and limited. Thereby it nevertheless ceases to be that which other things are: if something is white, it can no longer be red or black. God therefore cannot be something determinate alongside and in distinction from the creatures, but He is the substance of all creatures, the one, infinite being, so that all that is, is in Him, Eth. I prop. 14. 15. This philosophical premise was applied by Fichte to the concept of personality; personality and self-consciousness were things that we had found in ourselves and that cannot be thought without limitation and finitude. If we transfer them to God, we make Him into a finite, limited, human being. The moral world-order is therefore also the one essentially necessary thing in religion; more we do not need; a special, personal existence of God is unnecessary for religion, and it is also unprovable, indeed impossible and in conflict with itself; whoever desires such a God is still caught in eudaemonism, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche

Weltregierung 1798, Werke V 184 f. cf. Kuno Fischer, Gesch. der neuern Philos. V2 628 f. This reasoning has then been disseminated in wide circles, and returns at every moment, cf. Schelling in his first period, Werke I 1 S. 200, Hegel, Werke V 18, Schleiermacher, Reden über die Religion³ S. 167 f. Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paral. I5 123 f. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. II9 175 f. Id. Religionsphil. II 145-163, Id. Lotzes Philos. 1888 S. 168 f. Strauss, Christl. Gl. I 502 f. Biedermann, Dogm. II2 457-472, 537-547 etc. In the essence [18] of the matter this opposition between absolute and personal is no other than that which in Christian theology was always felt and was expressed in the negative and positive, the apophatic and the cataphatic theology. However much the proofs against the knowability of God are each time presented in another form, in fact they are always the same and always come down to this. Man is bound to sensible perception and always derives the material of his thought from the visible world; he does not intuit the spiritual and cannot raise himself to the world of the invisible things, because he always remains bound to space and time. Also his thinking is material and finite and limited; just as the eagle remains enclosed within the atmosphere (Hamilton) and the fish within the pond (Lange), so our thinking always moves within the circle of the finite. More still, thinking is of such a nature that it of itself presupposes a separation between subject and object, which, standing over against one another and limiting one another, can neither of them be absolute. To think is to condition, therefore Hamilton said; and Mansel expressed the same thus: distinction is necessarily limitation; knowledge of the absolute is therefore a contradiction, for it indicates that one has knowledge concerning something that is absolute, thus stands in no relation, and precisely as known by a subject nevertheless again does stand in relation. If now the nature of

thinking is so constituted, and if we then nevertheless still want to think and know God, then we always do one of two things: either we draw the absolute down within the circle of the finite and we make God into a personal, limited, human being; or we attempt in our thinking to raise ourselves above all bounds of space and time, strip our thought concerning God of all conformity to the finite creature, but then also retain nothing in our thinking except an empty, abstract, contentless concept, which has not the least value for religion. Yes, even that concept escapes us; under our thinking the absolute becomes nothing. Absoluteness and personality, infinity and causality, immutability and communicability, absolute exaltation above and conformity to the creature seem in the concept of God to be irreconcilable. We find ourselves in an insoluble antinomy. It is as if only the choice is left to us between a coarse realism and a tenuous idealism, between a God who is nothing but a man on a grand scale, or a [19] cold abstraction that causes the religion of the heart to freeze and die.

10. To a considerable extent this doctrine of the unknowability of God can be assented to and wholeheartedly affirmed. Scripture and church both emphatically maintain the unsearchable majesty and the sovereign exaltedness of God. There is no knowledge of God as He is in Himself. We are human beings and He is the Lord our God. There is no name that fully expresses his being; no definition that circumscribes Him. He is infinitely far exalted above our imagination, above our thought, above our language. He cannot be compared with any creature; all nations are esteemed by Him as less than nothing and vanity. *Deo nomen non est. Deus definiri nequit.* He can be apprehendi, not comprehendi. There is some γνῶσις but no καταληψις of God. Thus it is said throughout the whole of Scripture and throughout the entire Christian theology. And when a superficial rationalism

deemed an adaequate knowledge of God possible, Christian theology has always most strongly contested this. According to Socrates, Hist. Eccl. IV 7, Eunomius, a follower of Arius, would have taught that he knew God just as well as himself. God's essence consisted according to him solely in the ἄγεννησια, and in that he had a clear, distinct, adaequate concept of the divine essence; God was no more and man no less known than was expressed in this praedicaat. Later Spinoza said that he had as clear a concept of God as of a triangle, although he did not thereby wish to assert *Deum omnino cognoscere*, Epist. 60. And in this century Hegel taught that the absolute in the philosophy of concepts came to complete self-consciousness and thus was known completely and adaequately by the philosopher; the consciousness of God in us is nothing but the consciousness of God of Himself. God is, insofar as He is known by us, i.e. insofar as He knows Himself in us. This rationalism has been opposed and rejected in the Christian church with all force, Basilius, Hexaem. hom. 1. Gregor. Naz. Orat. 28 etc. cf. Schwane, D. G. II 27 f. Indeed, a deep religious interest is involved here. Augustine once expressed it in this way: *de Deo loquimur, quid mirum si non comprehendis? Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantiae magis, quam temeraria professio scientiae. Attingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna beatitudo est; comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile*, Serm. 38 in Ev. Joan. Therefore [20] God is precisely the sole object of all our love, because He is the Infinite and Incomprehensible. Although, however, Scripture and church thus as it were accept the praemisses of agnosticism and are even more deeply than Kant or Spencer penetrated by the limitation of man and the incomparable greatness of God, yet they draw from this another conclusion, a conclusion that was expressed by Hilarius de trin. II 7 as follows: *perfecta*

scientia est, sic Deum scire, ut licet non ignorabilem, tamen inenarrabilem scias. The knowledge that we have of God is a wholly peculiar one. It can be called positive, insofar as by it we acknowledge a being that is infinite and essentially distinct from all finite creatures. On the other side it is negative, because we cannot ascribe a single praedicaat to God as we think it in creatures. And it is therefore an analogical one, because it is the knowledge of a being that in itself is unknowable, nevertheless can make something of Himself known in creatures.

Herein indeed lies something of an antinomy; or rather, agnosticism suffers from a confusion of concepts and therefore sees here an irreconcilable contradiction, but Christian theology beholds here an adorable mystery. It is completely incomprehensible to us, that and how God in the creature, eternity in time, immeasurability in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in change, being in becoming, the all as it were in the nothing can reveal itself and make itself known in some measure. This mystery is not to be understood, it can only be acknowledged with thanksgiving. But mystery is something other than contradiction. Pantheistic philosophy has made it into that. If it identifies the absolute with the indeterminate and calls every determination a limitation and negation, then it makes itself guilty of a confusion of concepts. There is a world-wide difference between infinite and endless, between almighty and the sum of all power, between absolute being and the sum of all being, between eternity and the totality of all moments of time etc., and so also between the absolute and the indeterminate, unbounded, boundless. Pantheism first inserts its own concept of God into these words and can then easily accuse theism of being in conflict with it. That God is the Infinite and nevertheless can [21] reveal himself in finite creatures and has also actually revealed

himself, is indeed the recognition of an incomprehensible mystery, namely of the wonder of creation, but by no means the admission of a palpable absurdity. Finite being cannot detract from the infinity of God, if only it has its absolute subsistence in the being of God. And so also our knowledge is no limitation of God, because it is grounded in Him himself, is sustainable only through Him, and has Him himself precisely as Infinite for its object and content. Moreover, if the absolute excludes all limitation and every determination is a negation, then it is not only impermissible to speak of God as personality, but then it is equally wrong still to call Him the absolute, the one, the good, the being, the substance etc. Pantheism labors under the delusion that it is finished with the concept of God when it has removed personality and self-consciousness from it as contradictory elements. And the theistic philosophers from the first half of this century, such as J. H. Fichte, Carus, Steffens, Weisse, Ulrici e. a. have, in reaction, all too much clung to this concept of personality, and thought that in the concept of absolute personality they possessed an adequate description of the essence of God. Certainly many good remarks have been made over against pantheism as proof that personality is not in conflict with the absolute essence of God. If absolute is not conceived as boundless, as endlessly extended on all sides, then it is not to be seen how personality would be in conflict with it. Then there is only enclosed in it, that the self-consciousness of God is as rich and deep, as infinite, as his being. Personality may then also in us human beings awaken over against a not-I, in God it is the eternal synthesis of himself with himself, the infinite self-knowledge and self-determination and therefore not dependent on a not-I, J. H. Fichte, *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit u. der indiv. Fortdauer*, 1855 S. 52 f. J. W. Hanne, *Die Idee der absol. Persönl.* 2e Aufl. 1865. Weisse, *Philos.*

Dogm. I 552 f. Lotze, Mikrok. III3 549-580. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 39. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 213-223. Kaftan, das Wesen der Chr. Religion 378 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 229. Martensen, Dogm. 75. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 11 f. Lange, Dogm. I 167 II 53. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl. Eigensch. 122 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 53 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 391. Bovon, [22] Dogm. Chrét. I 229 s. Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer van God 74 v. But yet it is true, what the older Fichte said, that personality is a concept borrowed from ourselves and therefore, transferred to God, always contains something imperfect. The concept of personality, used of God, is inadequate and in principle nothing better than all other anthropomorphisms, in which we speak of God. The Christian church and theology has also never used this word for the essence of God and has, with the three modi subsistendi in that essence, spoken of persons only hesitantly and for lack of something better. But at the same time it is thereby clear that pantheism has still gained nothing when it points to the incongruity of this concept. The opposition between absoluteness and personality is essentially the same as that between negative and positive theology. Even if the word personality is wrong, thereby in fact nothing has yet been decided. The same question therefore returns again and again. If every determination is a negation, then God also may not be called the one, the being, the absolute. Then all thinking and speaking about God is forbidden. If we, who are human beings, may not speak of God in an analogous, human way, then nothing else remains for us than to be silent. For in a divine way to think and speak about God, we cannot. But then all religion also falls. If God cannot be known, He also cannot be felt and enjoyed in feeling. Feeling is as finite as the understanding, and finitizes and humanizes God in the same way. There is then no possibility that God reveals himself objectively in his creatures or

that we subjectively perceive Him through any organ. All religion is then sacrilege, and all theology is then blasphemy of God.

11. The question concerning the knowability of God is thereby reduced to this other one, whether God has willed and been able to reveal himself in the world of creatures. For it is perfectly true, what Kant says, that our knowledge does not extend further than our experience, Kr. der r. Vern. ed. Kirchmann 508. If God has not revealed himself, then there is also no knowledge of Him. But if He has revealed himself, then there is something, however little it may be, that falls under our observation and thus can lead to knowledge. Then, however, it speaks for itself, that the denial of the [23] knowability of God entirely coincides with the denial that God has revealed himself in the works of his hands. Agnosticism falls back into the error of the old gnosticism. God is ὁ Βυθος ἀρρητος, eternal σιγη; there is no communion and no kinship between Him and his creatures. The whole world is in an absolute sense ἄθεος; there is no trace of God to be noticed in the world; the world is the product of a lower God, of a demiurge, of a chance; man is not created after God's image but is simply a product of nature without God in the world; no religio, no theologia is possible, neither from creation nor from re-creation. God and world are absolutely separated. Yes, worse still, agnosticism cannot escape the consequence that God cannot reveal himself. It shuts Him up in himself, it makes Him into an unknown, invisible power, which has no consciousness and no will, which cannot communicate itself in any way, which is eternal σιγη. And the world, as likewise in Manichaeism, is elevated to a power alongside and over against God, which cannot in any way take Him up into itself, and is completely unfit to radiate anything of his glory. Agnosticism thus ends in fact in atheism, of which it is only the nineteenth-century form and name.

Yet agnosticism usually does not go so far, and still maintains the existence of The Unknowable. But then it also immediately suffers from an inner inconsistency, which is untenable: Augustine already observed, that the proposition that we know nothing of God already presupposes a great degree of knowledge concerning God, and that there was thus a pugna verborum. For if we call God ineffabilis, then at that same moment we say something and much of Him, so that He again is not ineffabilis, de doctr. chr. I 6. Non enim parvae notitiae pars est.... si antequam scire possimus quid sit Deus, possumus jam scire quid non sit, de trin. VIII 2. Not-knowing is itself a positive, an all-embracing knowing, it is non parva inchoatio cognitionis Dei, Ep. ad Consent. It says already so much, namely, that He is nothing of all that which is creature. And so it is also with the agnostics. Spencer e.g. says, that we are driven by our thinking to assume the existence of an absolute being as ground of the universe, although on account of our finitude and limitation we can form no concept of it. But if we are so finite and [24] limited, how do we then come to form the thought of such an absolute being and to assume its existence. And if we really must assume the existence of such an absolute being, why would any knowledge of that being be wholly impossible? No single agnostic therefore confines himself to the non liquet. Spencer e.g. says at every moment, that we do not know the absolute, and yet he has an idea of it, proves its existence and also ascribes all sorts of properties to it. He says, that it is not a negative but a positive concept, that it is the cause of everything, that it is a power, most analogous to our will, that it is infinite, eternal, omnipresent etc. This truly is no longer agnosticism but a very definite knowledge and a fairly well-defined concept of God. Agnosticism, in itself untenable and afraid of atheism, in the end serves to justify a pantheistic concept of God. Cf. on and

against agnosticism: Flint, *Antitheistic theories* 3 ed. 1885 p. 14. James Orr, *The christ. view of God and the world* 1893 p. 96. A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, Edinb. Clark 1892 p. 146. John Caird, *An introduction to the philos. of religion*, Glasgow 1880 p. 8-38. G. J. Lucas, *Agnosticism and religion, being an examination of Spencers religion of the unknowable preceded by a history of agnosticism*. Baltimore, Murphy and Co. 1895. Art. *Sekularismus* in Herzog2.

§ 21. THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD. (COGNITIO DEI INSITA.)

1 . Just as formerly with religion I 209 v., so it also appeared now with the knowledge of God, that it cannot have its origin except in revelation. If God is not revealed in his creatures, then of itself no knowledge of Him is possible. But if He displays his virtues in the world of creatures, then the knowability of God can no longer be contested. Naturally, thereby the nature and the measure of that knowledge [25] are not determined. All who teach the knowability of God readily agree that that knowledge is wholly of its own kind and of very limited extent. For, although God is revealed to some extent in his creatures, there remains in Him an infinite fullness of power and life behind, which does not come to light. His knowledge and power do not coincide with the world and do not pour themselves out into it in full. He cannot even reveal himself completely to and in creatures, for the finite does not contain the infinite; no one knows the Father except the Son, Mt. 11:27 cf. Deut. 29:29. Moreover, that which God reveals of himself in and through creatures is already so rich and so deep that it can never be fully known by any human being. We

do not understand the world of created things in so many respects and stand every moment on all sides before riddles and mysteries; how then should we understand the revelation of God in all its richness and depth? But thereby the knowability of God is nevertheless not nullified. The incomprehensibility of God nullifies this knowability so little that it rather presupposes and confirms it; the richness of the divine being, surpassing all knowledge, precisely constitutes a necessary and important element of our knowledge of God. It remains established that God is knowable for us in that same way and in that same measure as He reveals himself to us in creatures.

That there is now a revelation of God in the world can really hardly be denied. In the first place, Holy Scripture leaves us not a moment in doubt on that point. It does not set up an altar for the unknown God, but proclaims that God who made the world, Hd. 17:23, whose power and divinity can be perceived from the creatures by the human *vouç*, Rom. 1:19, who above all created man after his image and likeness, Gen. 1:26, as his offspring, which lives and moves in Him, Hd. 17:28, has spoken to him through prophets and apostles, above all through his Son himself, Hebr. 1:1, and now continually reveals himself to and in him through Word and Spirit, Mt. 16:17, Joh. 14:23 etc. According to Holy Scripture the whole world is a creation and thus also a revelation of God; there is in an absolute sense nothing atheistic. And this testimony of Scripture is confirmed from all sides. There is no atheistic world, there are no atheistic peoples, there are also no atheistic [26] human beings. The world cannot be conceived as *ἄθεος*, because then it could not be the work of God but would have to be the creation of an *ἀντιθεος*. And now dualism, which has repeatedly appeared in religion and philosophy, has indeed discerned in matter a daemonic principle, but in the

world has nevertheless always acknowledged a connection of idea and matter, a struggle of light and darkness. There is no one who can in an absolute sense and consistently deny the knowability of God, and thus His revelation in the world, wholly and entirely. Agnosticism itself is proof of that, just as scepticism cannot maintain itself except with the help of what it combats. And precisely therefore, because the world is not to be conceived as *ἀθεος*, therefore there are also no atheistic and religionless peoples. Indeed this has been asserted by Socinus, Tract. Theol. c. 2, de auctor. Script. c. 2, Locke, Essay on human understanding I ch. 4 § 8, and by many in this century, e. g. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 16 380 f., Darwin, Abst. des menschen 1884 I 127. But this opinion has been sufficiently refuted and is now almost generally abandoned, Moor, Comm. I 57. M. Vitranga, Comm. I 16. Flint, Antitheistic theories, 3 ed. p. 250-289, 519-532. Peschel, Völkerkunde S 260. Zöckler, Das Kreuz Christi 1875 S. 417 f. The well-known saying of Cicero, that there is no people so barbarous that it believes not in the gods, has been confirmed from century to century. This fact is of great significance. That which all men agree upon by virtue of their nature cannot be false, Cic. de nat. deor. I 17. *Opinionum enim commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat*, ib. II 2. And so finally there are also no atheistic human beings. There is not so much difference about the existence as about the essence of God. Indeed there is a practical atheism, a life without God in the world, Ps. 14:1, 53:2, Ef. 2:12. But conscious theoretical atheism in an absolute sense is rare, if it ever occurs. The word atheism, however, has often been used in a relative sense, not as a denial of the Godhead überhaupt, but of a particular Godhead. The Greeks accused Socrates of atheism, Xenophon, Memor. I 1. Cicero counted Protagoras, Prodicus among the atheists, because they denied the popular gods, de nat.

deor. I 42. The Christians were therefore many times accused of atheism by the Heathens, Suicerus s. v. ἄθεος. And the Christians in their turn used that name for those who denied the God of revelation, ib. The Romans have sometimes reckoned Luther, Melanchton, Calvijn among the atheists, Buddeus, de Atheismo 1747 p. 116 sq. In more recent times J. G. Fichte was openly accused of atheism, because he held the moral world-order itself to be God. And even now the name of atheist is sometimes given to those who know no other power than matter, such as Feuerbach, Strauss, Büchner, Haeckel, Czolbe, Dühring, cf. A. Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant II 235 f. And indeed, if the materialists recognize nothing other than matter and change of matter, then they are atheists and want themselves to be regarded as such. But this almost never occurs. Taken in an absolute sense, as denial of an absolute power, atheism is almost unthinkable. All finally again recognize a power that is venerated as God. Strauss asks for his universe a piety, as the believer for his God, Der alte u. d. neue Gl2. 141 f. Atheism and materialism repeatedly turns into pantheism, Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 3, 70, 71 f., Haeckel, Nat. Schöpfungsgesch. 20, 32, 64 Id. Der Monismus als Band zw. Rel. u. Wiss. 1893. That comes about because man cannot withdraw from the recognition of a highest power. At the same moment that he denies the true God, he invents for himself a false God. Religion sits too deep in man's nature for that, and the revelation of God speaks too loudly. Even if in some times religious indifferentism and scepticism takes hold deeply and far around itself, as e. g. in the age of Pericles, of emperor Augustus, of the Renaissance, and also in this century, then religion nevertheless always comes up again. Rather does man seize upon the coarsest superstition than that he can in the long run endure the naked, cold unbelief. But we can go

even further. Not only does atheism in an absolute sense almost never occur, but even in that sense it is rare that it would deny a personal God who lays claim to our veneration. Naturalism, hylozoism, pantheism are without doubt directions that repeatedly present themselves. But they are directions, not so much in the religious as in the philosophical domain. They have never arisen of themselves, spontaneously, but owe their origin to criticism of the religious representations in others. They are not dogmatic but critical; and they therefore always serve only for a time and in a limited circle. A people, a [28] society, a church, a congregation of such naturalists and pantheists is unthinkable and untenable; the pantheists themselves acknowledge this, the religious representation is necessary for the lesser man, but only the philosopher raises himself to the pure concept. From that it follows that belief in a personal God is natural and normal; it arises everywhere of itself and in all men. But atheism, even as denial of a personal God, is an exception. It is philosophy, not religion. There is truth in the sharp word of Schopenhauer: ein unpersönlicher Gott ist gar kein Gott, sondern bloss ein missbrauchtes Wort, ein Unbegriff, eine contradictio in adjecto, ein Shiboleth für Philosophieprofessoren, welche, nachdem sie die Sache haben aufgeben müssen, mit dem Worte durchzuschleichen bemüht sind, Par. u. Parel. I 5 123. cf. Welt als Wille u. Vorst. II 6 398, 406, 739. Therefore a certain will is also necessary, in order not to believe in a God, in a personal God. Deum non esse non credit, nisi cui Deum non esse expedit. There are no atheists who are firmly and certainly convinced of their unbelief, even unto martyrdom. Because it is abnormal and unnatural, does not rest on immediate consciousnesses but on mediate proofs and fallible reasonings, therefore it is never certain of its case. The proofs for the existence of a personal God may be weak, they are always still stronger

than those for the denial. To prove that there is no God is even impossible; for that one would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, i.e. oneself would have to be God, cf. Voetius, *de atheismo*, Disp. I 114-225. G. J. Vossius, *de origine et progressu idol.* I c. 3. Leydecker, *Fax Veritatis* III contr. 3. Turretinus, *Theol. El.* III qu. 2. Maresius, *Syst. Theol.* 1673 p. 44. Buddeus, *Theses theol. de atheismo et superst.*, ed. Lulofs L. B. 1747. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* I 198, 242. Flint, *Antith. theories*³, lecture I, Hoekstra, *Des Christens godsvrucht* bl. 6. Doedes, *Inl. tot de leer v. God.* 57v.

2. This naturalness, universality, and necessity of religion and knowledge of God has already early led to the thought that it was implanted in man by nature and inborn. The fact is there, after all, that all human beings from earliest youth onward have consciousness not only of a physical but also of a psychical, spiritual, invisible world. True and false, [29] good and evil, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly are indeed no measurable and calculable magnitudes and cannot be perceived with the five senses, but they are a reality which for our consciousness stands much more firmly than that of matter and of force. Materialism may reckon only with gravity and heat and electricity; but faith and hope and love are still wholly other forces, which have governed humanity and have preserved it from sinking away into bestiality. Augustine has rightly said that the truth of spiritual things is actually much more certain and firmer than that of the visible. *Nihil absurdius dici potest, quam ea esse quae oculis videmus, ea vero non esse quae intelligentia cernimus, cum dubitare dementis sit intelligentiam incomparabiliter oculis anteferri*, *de immort. an.* c. 10 n. 17. *de civ.* XIX c. 18. The truths of mathematics, of logic, the first principles of ethics, law, religion stand indubitably firm for all. They bear a character of naturalness,

universality, and necessity, which can be denied by no one. They seem, as *ideae innatae*, to be enclosed in man's nature, to be given with his birth.

The doctrine of innate concepts is already rooted in Greek philosophy. There it constituted a great problem for thought, how learning is nevertheless possible. For one of two things seemed to be the case: either we already know something and then we can no longer learn it, or we do not know it, but how is it then to be explained that we strive to learn it, Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* I4 996, II4 823, III 189. Plato solved this problem by his doctrine of recollection; the soul, before its connection with the body, had beheld the ideas in all their beauty and had preserved the images of them deep in its memory. He proved this especially by mathematics, which we can build up entirely out of our mind without help of sensible perception, but otherwise thought that all learning presupposed the *praeexistence* of the soul, Zeller, *ib.* II4 639, 643 f. 823 f. Aristotle did indeed regard sensible perception as the way to knowledge, but nevertheless judged that reason potentially brought with it some highest, general principles, which stand firm by themselves, lie at the basis of all proofs, and are acknowledged by all, *ib.* III 188 f. The Stoics spoke of *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, *φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι*, *ἐμφυτοὶ προληψεις*, i.e. such concepts as, by virtue of the [30] nature of our thinking, are derived by all from perception, *ib.* IV3 74 f. 389 f. With all these philosophers there is as yet no question of innate ideas in the strict sense. Plato does not limit recollection to a few innate concepts but extends it to all knowledge; and Aristotle and others do indeed speak of general principles but expressly teach that these are not given as ideas with birth but are found specifically by means of perception and thinking, yet in such a way that every normal human being must then also find them. In the proper sense the doctrine of innate concepts first occurs with Cicero. He

speaks of *notiones impressae, cogitationes insitae, innatae* and assumes a knowing of all kinds of truths prior to all experience and investigation. There are according to him *semina innata virtutum*, Tusc. III 1, 2, *notitiae parvae rerum maximarum*, which nature planted *sine doctrina* in our soul, de fin. V 21, 59, an innate knowledge of God, *Deos esse natura opinamur*, Tusc. I 16, 36. Nat. D. I 1, 2 etc. Zeller, IV3 659 f.

3. In more recent philosophy the doctrine of the *ideae innatae* was advanced by Descartes, who was also the first to use this term and thus began to employ *idea* in a sense unusual up to that time. With Descartes this doctrine was connected with his dualism between soul and body. The *cognitio intellectualis* cannot be derived from sensible perception; this gives only the *occasio*, whereby our mind per *innatam facultatem* forms the representations and concepts, *Renati Descartes, Notae* p. 185. The *cognitio* proceeds from a principle of its own, i.e. from *ideae innatae*. Among those *ideae innatae* that of God is the chief, which, as it were, is a *nota artificis, operi suo impressa*. *Medit. tertia* p. 24. But he conceives the innate character of those ideas in such a way that the soul by nature possesses the power, the *facultas*, the *dispositio*, to bring them forth out of itself. The ideas are therefore not actual but potential in our mind, *Object. et Respons.* p. 102, *Notae* p. 184, 185. Also according to Leibniz the necessary and universal truths do not come to us from without, but they proceed from ourselves, such as e.g. those of substance, duration, change, cause, the mathematical truths and especially also the idea of God. Together these truths form the natural light of reason. But the innate character of those truths is explained by Leibniz [31] more extensively and more clearly than by Descartes. The latter said only that those ideas were potential in our mind. Leibniz, however, says that they are innately present *virtualiter*,

comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles et non pas comme des actions. The human mind does not merely have the receptivity to know them, for then all knowledge could be called innate, but it is the source of those truths, it can bring them forth out of itself, les tirer lui-même de son fond. The ideas thus lie, as it were, preformed in the human soul. And this is possible, because there is a representing and thinking without consciousness. They come to consciousness when sensible perception gives occasion for it. This also brings the ideas virtually present in us actually into our mind, cf. Spruijt, *Proeve van de leer der aangeb. begrippen* 144, Stöckl, *Gesch. d. n. Phil.* I 426, Malebranche thought he could explain learning and knowing in man in no other way than by the supposition that we see the ideas in God and that God therefore, as the universal and infinite being, is immediately present in our understanding. In his footsteps the ontologism of Gioberti, Gratry, Ubaghs e. a. taught that we immediately behold God in our mind as the absolute being and that therefore an intuitive knowledge of God is present in man, Stöckl, *Gesch. d. neuern Philos.* II 568 f. 620 f. By Kant this doctrine of innate concepts was importantly modified. In connection with the terminology of Wolff he spoke of knowledge apriori and aposteriori, and now taught no innate concepts but indeed innate forms, namely forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, forms of the understanding, i.e. categories, and forms of reason, i.e. the ideas God, virtue and immortality. The idealism of Fichte and Hegel drove this doctrine to such a point that they constructed not only the knowledge of the necessary and universal truths, but all knowledge, and even all being, the whole material world, out of thinking. The grounds on which this doctrine of the *ideae innatae* chiefly rests are these: Learning, the ability to learn, presupposes that what is

learned is already present in some way in our mind. Reasoning and proof are built on principia that must be established per se and apriori. Experience gives only δοξα, contingent truths; universal and necessary truths can proceed only from the human mind itself. [32] That there are such universal and necessary truths is proved by the consensus gentium. And above all the opposition between soul and body is of such a nature that representations and concepts cannot have their origin in sensible perception; they must either be explained from the human mind or from the Spirit of God, in whom man beholds all ideas. On the other hand the doctrine of innate concepts was opposed by the Socinians, who rejected natural religion, Fock, Der Socin. 307 f., cf. also Episcopius, Inst. theol. I c. 3, Locke, Essay concerning human understanding I ch. 2-4, Hobbes, de cive c. 14 n. 19 etc. They appealed to the following considerations: The doctrine of the *ideae innatae* is completely superfluous, because the origin of those ideas can also be well explained in another way. History teaches that no single representation and no single concept is the same among all men and peoples. Even innate moral principles do not exist; concerning good and evil the greatest possible difference prevails; and the concept of God is so little innate that there even exist atheistic men and peoples. Children, idiots, the insane therefore also know nothing of such innate concepts. All knowledge in man stems from sensible perception; *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. This refutation of the *ideae innatae* made much headway in England and France in the previous century. The materialism of this century joined it. The doctrine of innate concepts has generally been abandoned and replaced by the theory of the inheritance of characteristics, Darwin, Afst. v. d. mensch, hoofdst. 3, 4. Spencer, bij Spruyt Proeve 342. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 16 S. 344 f.

4. It is important to know what attitude Christian theology has adopted toward this doctrine of the *ideae innatae*. Prof. Spruyt finds it strange that the scholastics, with rare unanimity, declared themselves against that doctrine, and suspects that for that there must have been a theological reason, which, however, he cannot indicate, Proeve bl. 60. This is indeed the case and will become clear in what follows. Although Christian theology generally assumed that there were truths known not by revelation but by nature, and obtained not by deliberate investigation and reflection but, as it were, involuntarily [33], it nevertheless decisively rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. To be sure, the proponents of the *ideae innatae* in later times, such as Thomassinus, Theol. dogm. I c. 4, Staudenmaier, Chr. Dogm. II 57 f. Kuhn, Gotteslehre 2de Aufl. 542 f., Klee, Dogm. II 1-4 and the ontologists such as Malebranche, Gioberti, Ubaghs etc., appealed to some church fathers, but wrongly. Justin Martyr, Apol. II 6 does indeed speak of the idea of God as a *πραγματος δυσεξηγητου εμφυτος τη φυσηι των ανθρωπων δοξα*, but does not further say how he means this *εμφυτος*. Irenaeus, adv. haer. II 1 sq. does indeed argue against the Gnostics that the world was created by God and reveals Him and makes Him known, but does not mention a *cognitio innata*. Clement of Alexandria also says that the Father and Creator of all things is known by all by nature and without instruction, *εμφυτως και αδιδακτως*, but he himself explains repeatedly that that knowledge is obtained from the contemplation of God's works, Strom. V 13. 14. Tertullianus lays very strong emphasis on natural knowledge of God. All men, in spite of their idolatry, in danger and distress call upon the one God. And they have not learned this from Moses or the Prophets, but their own soul taught them therein. *Animae enim a primordio conscientia Dei dos est*. This is the same among all peoples, adv. Marc. 10. The soul is

by nature Christian, Apol. 17. By that Tertullianus means nothing else than that some truths, such as that of the existence and unity of God, are known not first by special revelation but by nature: *quaedam enim et natura nota sunt, ut immortalitas animae penes plures, ut Deus noster penes omnes, de resurr.* 3. With more right one appeals to Augustine, who in many respects stood under Plato's influence and also acknowledges this himself, *de beata vita* 4. Indeed he attaches much more value to thinking than to sensory perception. The senses perceive only changeable things, but reason, although distinct in each human being, sees and knows general, necessary, unchangeable truths. And that is only to be explained by the fact that the reason of each human being sees those general truths in the one general reason, the one unchangeable truth, which God himself is. And thus Augustine then repeatedly explains that we, just as we see sensible objects by the light of the sun, so contemplate intelligible truths in [34] the light of God, *de civ.* VIII 7, *de trin.* XII 15. He is nearer to us than the creatures and easier to find than these, *de Gen. ad litt.* V 16. He is the *veritas super omnia praesidens*, *Conf.* X 41. He even says, *Deus et Dominus rerum omnium humanis mentibus, nulla natura interposita, praesidet*, *de musica* VI 1. From this it is clearly evident that Augustine considers it much better and easier to ascend to God by thinking into the eternal truths than by contemplation of external nature. But it may nevertheless not be inferred from this that the soul of man here on earth would already contemplate God directly and immediately and then in this way would come to the knowledge of the eternal truths. For elsewhere he clearly says that the *visio Dei* is reserved for heaven, *de trin.* II 17, that here on earth the *cognitio vespertina* has been allotted to us, *de Gen. ad litt.* IV 32, that the eternal truths which man recognizes are to be distinguished from God as truth itself, *de lib. arb.* II 13,

Solil. I 5, that man gradually ascends from the contemplation of nature, from the knowledge of reason and its laws to God, Conf. VII 10. de lib. arb. II c. 3-13 Cf. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit, I2 756 f. Schwane, D. G. II2 54-67, Gangauf, Aug. Lehre v. Gott dem Dreieinigen 1883 S. 137 f. Spruyt, Proeve 43-57. Mysticism, however, had in Augustine a powerful support, and it taught that man originally, besides an *oculus carnis* and an *oculus rationis*, had also received an *oculus contemplationis*, which, restored by grace, would already here at moments and in glory perfectly contemplate God, Bonaventura, Brevil. II c. 12. By Bonaventura the proposition is therefore also contested that *omnis cognitio sit a sensu*; the soul knows God and itself without the help of the senses, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Yet mysticism in Bonaventura, though on this point deviating from Thomas, remains within the bounds. *Quamvis Deus sit praesens, tamen propter caecitatem et caliginem intellectus nostri, in qua sumus, ipsum cognoscimus ut absentem*, Sent. II dist. 10 art. 1 qu. 1. The contemplation of God is not given to every human being, but is only a gift of grace, which can raise a Paul thereto, Sent. II dist. 23 art. 2 qu. 3. And even as regards the knowledge of the *prima principia*, this is indeed called innate in Bonaventura, but he explains in addition, *quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda post [35] receptionem specierum sine aliqua persuasione superaddita propter sui evidentiam.... Naturale enim habeo lumen, quod sufficit ad cognoscendum quod parentes sunt honorandi, et quod proximi non sunt laedendi, non tamen habeo naturaliter mihi impressam speciem patris vel speciem proximi*, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Although Bonaventura thus also assumes that there are truths which we do not obtain through sensory perception but through inward contemplation and through communion with God, yet even in him there is no question of innate ideas

in the proper sense, cf. the Freiburg edition of the Breviloquium, 1881 p. 79 sq. 148 sq. Schwane, D. G. III 111 f. Sanseverino, Philos. Christ. Neap. III art. 41. The whole scholasticism unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. In distinction from that, it taught that the essence of things is the proper object of intellectual knowledge. All knowledge begins with sensory perception. But when this sees the things, then the understanding has the aptitude to abstract the general from them, and indeed first of all the so-called innate concepts. These are thus not brought along ready-made by the intellectus but, in accordance with its nature, abstracted from the perception of sensible things. That also holds for the idea of God. God is not the substance of things but their causa, and therefore He can, from His works, by perception and thinking, be known to some extent in His existence and in His virtues. Innate knowledge exists only insofar as a natural habitus has been implanted in our understanding, to ascend from the finite to the infinite, from the particular to the general, cf. deel I 158 v., and further Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 1, c. Gent. I c. 10, 11. Theol. Wirceb. III 5 sq. C. Pesch, Theol. dogm. II 10-13, Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit I2 67 f. 587 f., Beilagen, 3tes Heft S. 3-47, Denzinger, Vier Bücher v. d. relig. Erk. II 28 f. The ontologism of Gioberti and Ubaghs was condemned at Rome 18 Sept. 1861 and 21 Sept. 1866.

5. Among the Lutherans the good and true element that lay enclosed in the doctrine of innate concepts could not come into its own. The theologia naturalis, as well insita as acquisita, found little favor with them, cf. already vol. I 222. By the combating of the scholastic doctrine, naturalia adhuc esse integra, [36] Luther allowed himself to be led into an opposite extreme. The image of God was wholly lost. Ratio sine Spiritu Sancto est simpliciter sine cognitione Dei. Homo in rebus divinis nihil habet quam tenebras. Properly

speaking, for man there has remained only the *aptitudo passiva*, i.e. the possibility of being saved. For the rest, his understanding, will, inclination are limited only to the *civilia*; in the spiritual he is wholly blind and dead. Luther does indeed acknowledge that God still reveals himself in his works, creation is a *Larve Gottes*; but man no longer knows Him from it. Luther even sometimes goes so far that he calls sin *essentia hominis*, and that man is *nihil quam peccatum*; expressions which one certainly must not unfairly press and force, but which nevertheless are of significance for his view of the *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita*, Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.* II 244 f. 287 f. 367 f. The same negative standpoint is taken by the Lutheran symbols, ed. Müller⁵ 522, 585, 589, 594; and some theologians such as Flacius and Chemnitz went so far that they rejected the whole *cognitio Dei naturalis*, Zöckler, *Theol. Natur.* 1860 S. 64. But soon one nevertheless returned from this one-sidedness. Luther himself often spoke differently, and saw and praised in nature a work of God, Zöckler, *ib.* 60 f. Melancthon taught a *cognitio Dei* both *insita* and *acquisita*; there are traces of God in all his works, but these would be insufficient, *nisi etiam insita esset menti quaedam notitia seu προληψις de Deo*, *Corpus Ref.* XIII 137 sq. And this example is followed by the later theologians. Gerhard, *Loci Theol. Prooemium* § 17, *Loc.* II c. 4, Quenstedt, *Theol. did. polem.* I 250 sq., Hollaz, *Exam. Theol.* p. 187 sq., Calovius, *Isag. ad S. Theol.* c. 4, Buddeus, *de atheismo* 1767 p. 225 sq. etc. discuss the *theologia naturalis* and defend it expressly against the Socinians. Later it was even treated separately by some, such as Jaeger et al. The *cognitio Dei insita* was now variously defined by the Lutheran theologians, as a *facultas* or *dispositio* or *habitus* or *perfectio* or *lumen congenitum et habitui analogum*. But on this all were agreed, that it did not consist in a *species impressa*, which would already be

present in man prior to all use of reason, Hollaz 189, Quenstedt 253, Calovius 77. Therefore Descartes' doctrine of the *ideae innatae* was rejected, Hollaz 195, and likewise the mystical doctrine of the inner light [37] and of contemplation, *ib.* 198-220. And over against that the *theologia insita* was then conceived as a natural aptitude and inclination implanted in the *intellectus humanus*, to come *sine discursu et mentis ratiocinatione* to knowledge of God and to give to this an undoubted, firm and certain testimony, Hollaz 188-190, Quenstedt 253. *Ante sensualem perceptionem nihil est in intellectu, quoad idealem rerum repraesentationem, est tamen aliquid in intellectu, quoad notitiam habituaalem*, Hollaz, *Ex. theol.* 193. Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* I 260.

The Reformed, from the beginning, adopted a friendlier attitude toward the *theologia naturalis*. Calvin distinguished between a general and a special grace and explained from the former all the good that has still remained even in sinful man, cf. my address on *De Algem. Genade* bl. 27 v. He also definitely assumed that a *sensus divinitatis* had been implanted in the human spirit, and indeed *naturali instinctu*. God has implanted in all *numinis sui intelligentiam, cujus memoriam assidue renovans, novas subinde guttas instillat*, *Inst.* I 3, 1. He also calls this *semen religionis*, and explains from it the universality of religion, *ib.* The conviction that there is a God is *naturaliter ingenta*; it can never be eradicated, I 3, 3. But yet scarcely one in a hundred is found, *qui conceptum in suo corde foveat, nullus autem in quo maturescat*, I, 4, 1. And to that *semen religionis* there now comes the revelation of God in his works, so that *aperire oculos nequeant quin aspicere eum cogantur*, I 5, 1. There is no little piece of the world, *nulla mundi particula*, in which not at least some sparks of his glory are seen to shine forth, I 5, 1. First of all man himself as a microcosm is an

officina innumeris Dei operibus nobilis, I 5, 3, 4, but then further the whole of nature, which can piously even be called God, I 5, 5. Cf. II, 2, 18 and comm. on Ps. 8; 19; Hd. 17:27, 28. Rom. 1:19. Hebr. 11:3. And thus all Reformed symbols and theologians speak. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 says that God reveals himself to man cum notitiis de se menti hominum impressis, tum creaturis omnibus tanquam speculis et documentis suae divinitatis propositis p. 35, and among the notitiae nobiscum nascentes he also counts the sensus that there is a God, as the universality of religion proves, p. 39. Zanchius, Op. III 636 sq. rejects both Plato and Aristotle and teaches with the [38] Stoa and Cicero, that the κοινὰ ἐννοιαὶ nobiscum nasci, non autem usu comparari; children immediately know that three is more than two, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 325 understands by the recta ratio the vera notitia voluntatis et operum Dei, ut et ordinis iudiciiue divini, a Deo menti humanae inscripta; whose author is the Logos, whose form and norm are the principia naturalia, and which is increased by the contemplation of God's works; cf. further P. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 2 sq. Maresius, Syst. theol. p. 41. H. Alting, Theol. elenctica 1654 p. 2 sq. Leydecker, Fax Verit. Loc. 3 contr. 1. Alsted, Theol. polem. 1620 p. 185-187. Turretinus, Theol. El. I qu. 3 n. 2. Moor, Comm. I 41 etc. And yet, notwithstanding that the theologia insita was so powerfully advocated, Cartesius' doctrine of the ideae innatae was decisively rejected by Voetius, Disp. V 477-525. He accuses Cartesius especially of three things, that he uses the word idea in an unusual sense and thus falsifies it; that he does not clearly say what is to be understood under that idea Dei innata, whether it belongs to the theologia insita or acquisita, whether it is a facultas or actus, an ens reale or ens intentionale, etc.; and that he deprives the knowledge that comes to us through the senses

of its value and certainty. In what sense the *theologia insita* is then to be understood is clearly defined by Voetius. It is a *facultas seu vis seu aptitudo facultatum rationalium, seu lumen naturale in eo, quod intellectus veritatem principiorum potest sine ullo labore, praevio studio aut ratiocinatione comprehendere, et positis ponendis (cognitione scil. terminorum) de facto sic comprehendit, ex naturali quadam necessitate et insito sibi pondere in hunc veritatis sensum atque assensum dilatus et inclinans*; in the same way as the will by a natural disposition pursues the good and the eye of itself beholds the light and the visible, Disp. I 141 cf. V 516, 525. The well-known saying: *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* is then also recognized as truth insofar as the world around us, on the one side or the other, as direct object or as product or as part or as antithesis, etc., is necessarily required in order to bring us to conscious knowledge, ib. V 525.

6. From all the above-mentioned, the reason becomes clear to us, [39] why Christian theology so unanimously rejected the doctrine of the *ideae innatae*. It was the fear of rationalism and mysticism that guided it in this. If man already at his birth brought with him in his mind a perfectly clear and distinct knowledge, whether of all the ideas (Plato), or of God (Cartesius), or of being (Gioberti), then he thereby became independent of the world; he could produce perfectly pure knowledge out of his own mind and was sufficient unto himself; he could even dispense with the revelation which God had given in his word; better and more clearly than in nature and Scripture he found perfect knowledge in his own mind. Yes, more still, by the doctrine of the *ideae innatae* an unquenchable chasm was dug between spirit and matter, between soul and body. The visible world was then not a creation and revelation of God, no embodiment of divine thoughts; from it the eternal truths, intellectual knowledge could not be derived; man found

these only, through self-reflection and recollection, when he separated himself from the world and withdrew into his own soul-life. And indeed the danger is hereby indicated, which always threatens from the side of the *ideae innatae*. The dualism of Plato has in Neoplatonism and thereby again in the Christian, specifically the Roman church led to a mysticism which indeed at first on the lower steps of meditation made use of the revelation of God in nature and Scripture but then, having risen higher to contemplation, could indeed dispense with all those external aids and had in the inward word, the spiritual light, the vision and communion of God in the inmost existence of the soul perfectly enough. And the dualism that in more recent philosophy arose again through Cartesius and the doctrine of the *idea Dei innata* connected therewith has with Leibniz and Wolff first, thereafter with Kant, Fichte and Hegel led to a rationalism that constructed the whole world of being out of the immanent thought of the human mind. Now it is clear as day that Scripture will know nothing of such an *αὐτάρκεια* of man and of such a contempt for body and world. It teaches that man in soul and body is bearer of the image of God and that through his body he is akin and connected to the whole visible world. But this bond is no slave-chain; on the contrary, the world in which man is placed leads him [40] not away from God but up to God; it is a creation of God, a mirror of his virtues, a manifestation of his thoughts. There is, according to the beautiful word of Calvin, *nulla mundi particula, in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae ipsius emicare cernantur*, Inst. I 5, 1. And because Christian theology understood that, therefore it unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. And then there were added the objections, drawn from psychology and history, which against this doctrine were advanced, among others, by Locke. Empiricism defended, over against mysticism and

rationalism, a precious truth. For, if these directions asserted that the essence, the idea of things could not come to us from sensible perception but could arise only in God (Malebranche), in the soul through ἀνάμνησις (Plato) or through thinking out of man's own mind (Cartesius-Hegel), then they too thereby had a good intention. God is indeed the sun of spirits. In his light we see the light. The Logos enlightens every man, coming into the world. But yet it is true that we here on earth do not see face to face, that we walk in faith, and see through a mirror in a dark reason. Only through contemplation of God's revelation in nature and Scripture do we come to knowledge of God, Rom. 1:19, 1 Cor. 13:22, 2 Cor. 3:18. There is here on earth no direct, immediate knowledge of God and of his thoughts to be obtained, but only a mediate, per speculum and in speculo. The feeling of the mystics, rationalists and ontologists is therefore not theistic but pantheistic; it confuses the lumen rationis with the lumen Dei, the general truths in us with the ideas in the consciousness of God, our logos with the Λογος του θεου. And over against that Christian theology set the doctrine of Holy Scripture, that all our knowledge of God, since his essence in itself is unknowable for us, is obtained through mediate revelation and bears an analogical character. In fact, then, no single man comes to the knowledge of the prima principia and to the thought of God apart from the world. The little child, that is born unconscious, gradually receives all kinds of representations and ideas from the environment in which it is brought up. With the first man this may by the nature of the case have been otherwise; all who are born after him have come to conscious and clear knowledge, both of visible and invisible things, not each on his own occasion and by his own reflection, but through their parents and through their circle of life. Therefore there is no knowledge of the invisible, except under the symbol

of the visible. Whoever lacks a sense also receives no representation of the phenomena corresponding thereto. A blind man does not know what light is and therefore also does not understand that God is a light, otherwise than only negatively and by contrast. Therefore there is also in law and custom, in religion and art so much difference among men and peoples possible. This would be inexplicable if the ideas in the proper sense were innate and had been implanted immediately by God himself in our mind. Now, however, we see that all men indeed have the capacity of speech but nevertheless speak very different languages; that all indeed have an idea of God but clothe it in all kinds of representations; that there are men who in their heart say that there is no God; that the distinction of good and evil is everywhere known but the content of both is determined very divergently; that concerning right and wrong, concerning beautiful and ugly the opinions differ very far from one another. In one word, there is not a single religious or ethical truth that *ubique, semper et ab omnibus* has been acknowledged; there has never existed a *theologia naturalis* in an actual sense, any more than a natural law and a natural morality.

7. Therewith, however, only the one side of the truth has been shown. There is still a reverse side, which is of no less importance. For it cannot be denied, that just as objectively the light of the sun, so also subjectively the eye is necessary in order to see. That human beings in fact learn, and acquire knowledge from their environment, is certain; but it presupposes that they bring with them a capacity, an aptitude and inclination to learn. Language is taught to us by the people among whom we are born, but it presupposes in every human being a disposition and an inclination to speak. Thus it is in every domain, in religion, art, morality, law, science etc. The *semina scientiarum* lie by nature in the human being. All science proceeds

from general principia, which stand firm by themselves and of themselves. All knowledge rests in faith. All proof presupposes in the end an ἀρχὴ ἀποδειξέως. There are logical, mathematical, philosophical, ethical and thus also [42] religious and theological principia, which indeed are very general and abstract, but which nevertheless are accepted by all human beings and in all centuries and which bear a character of naturalness and necessity. The laws of thought are the same for all; the doctrine of numbers is everywhere the same; the distinction of good and evil is known to all; there is no people without religion and knowledge of God. This is not otherwise to be explained than by the assumption of principia per se nota, κοινὰ ἔννοια, veritates aeternae, which have been imprinted by nature upon the human spirit. With religion one must, whether one will or not, always again go back to a semen religionis, a sensus divinitatis, an instinctus divinus, a cognitio insita. Scripture itself goes before us in this. It binds the human being as strongly as possible to the objective revelation in nature and grace, but it acknowledges at the same time, that the human being is God's image and offspring, that he possesses in the νοῦς a capacity to see God in his works and that he bears the work of the law written in his heart, Gen. 1:26, Hd. 17:27, Rom. 1:19, 2:15. Yet everything depends on understanding well this originality of the κοινὰ ἔννοια. They have been designated in various ways and one has spoken of ἔμφυτος, ingenitus, insculptus, insitus, inborn, in-created, implanted etc. And no one uses those words in a literal sense; as soon as these expressions are thought through, almost all hasten to declare that they do not mean that these ideae innatae are at once brought along with birth fix und fertig and are present in consciousness as species impressae. In that sense there are then also no inborn concepts. God does not let the human being come into the world adult in any respect but lets

him be born as a helpless and needy child. And that child would perish, if it were not fed and cared for by its environment. Yet in the child the future man already lies hidden. And thus it is in the intellectual, ethical and religious domain. *Cognitio Dei insita* does not mean that the human being immediately, by God himself, is equipped with a sufficient knowledge and no longer has any need of revelation. It does not indicate that he is capable, on his own, of deriving any conscious, clear and true knowledge of God from his own spirit. But it indicates that the human being possesses both the *potentia* (*aptitudo, vis, facultas*) and the *inclinatio* (*habitus, dispositio*), in order in the [43] normal course of development and in the midst of the environment in which God granted him life, of himself and without compulsion, without scientific reasoning and proof, *ἐμφυτῶς καὶ ἀδιδασκῶς*, to come to some firm, certain, indubitable knowledge of God. The words *ἐμφυτος*, *ingenitus*, *inborn* etc. thus do not intend to express that which a human being is born with, but they only wish to make known that the knowledge of God is born from the human being himself by a natural way, without scientific reasoning. They are not to be understood as *opposita* of the doctrine that the human being is born as *tabula rasa*, without a definite, material content in his consciousness; but they are opposed to the opinion that the human being was first brought externally, by a particular revelation, by scientific proof, as it were artificially and by compulsion, to knowledge of God. Thus those expressions have always been meant in Christian theology. They therefore alternated with *ἀδιδασκῶς, φύσει, vi insita, sine praevio studio, sine discursu operoso* etc. *Dei cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse*, Thomas in Kleutgen, *Phil. der Vorzeit* I 348. Therefore Locke's remark is also incorrect, that, if under *ideae innatae* only

the capacity of knowledge were understood, then all knowledge could be called inborn. For the *cognitio Dei* is therefore called *insita* or *innata*, because every human being with normal development must come to it. Just as a human being, opening the eyes, of himself beholds the sun and by its light the objects, so must the human being by virtue of his nature, as soon as he hears that there is a God, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc., give his assent to that. He cannot do without that. He accepts those truths of himself, without compulsion or proof, because they stand firm by themselves. Therefore the knowledge of God is called inborn, and the expression of an inborn *potentia* or *facultas* was unsatisfactory. There is expressed on the one hand, over against the doctrine of the *ideae innatae*, that the knowledge of God is not brought along by the human being clear and ready but comes about mediately, through the operation of revelation in his consciousness, and on the other hand there is indicated over against empiricism, that that revelation of God speaks so loudly and powerfully and finds so deep an echo in everyone's mind, that it can be called as it were natural and in-created to the human being. And hereby theology has not only done full justice to Scripture, but also to psychology and history. Revelation is there from God in all his works, not only outside but especially also in the human being. Of nature, from which God is known, the human being himself constitutes the principal part. And from that whole nature, both outside and in him, the human being receives impressions and sensations, which in his consciousness, prior to all reasoning and proof, cultivate the awareness of a Supreme Being. It is God himself, who leaves himself without witness to no human being. Cf. I 16. 157v. 212v., and further still Kleutgen, *Theol. der Vorzeit* I2 587-792. Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.* I 195. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* I 197. Mc Cosh, *The intuition of the mind*,

inductively investigated, 1860. John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of religion 1880 p. 39. 160. Lotze, Mikrok. III 580 f.

§ 22. THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD. (COGNITIO DEI ACQUISITA.)

1 . Although there may be no antithesis between the *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita*, there is nevertheless undoubtedly a distinction between the two. Often this distinction is conceived in such a way that the first denotes the knowledge of God which is innate to man and accrues to him from his own being, and the second that which, for the increase and extension of the first, comes to man in part from without, from the contemplation of the world. But the difference between the two is not thereby indicated clearly and precisely. For, in the proper sense, there is no knowledge innate, neither of God nor of the world. All knowledge comes from without into man's consciousness. What is innate is only the capacity for knowledge; but this capacity comes to operation and act only through the influence of the world in and around us. The seed of religion does indeed lie in man, but it germinates only in the field of the whole of human life. Just as the eye is brought along by man at his birth but sees the objects only in the light of the sun, so the believer beholds God only in all the works of his hands. Furthermore, it has become clear to us in the previous §

that Christian theology has never understood by the innate and implanted character of the knowledge of God that man at birth brought along any conscious knowledge of God; but it thereby only indicated that the knowledge of God does not need to be imparted to man by coercion or violence, and also not by logical reasoning or compelling proofs, but that it is by nature, spontaneous, of itself proper to man. A man, developing normally, comes without coercion or effort, of himself to some knowledge of God. Therefore the *cognitio Dei insita* is also not in antithesis with the *acquisita*, for in a broader sense the first too can be called *acquisita*. For the revelation of God precedes the *cognitio Dei*, both *insita* and *acquisita*. He does not leave himself without witness. He works with his eternal power and divinity upon man from all sides, not only from without but also from within; in nature and the world of men, in heart and conscience, in prosperity and adversity, God as it were comes to meet man. And man, created after God's image, received the capacity to take up the impressions thereof and thereby to come to some awareness and to some knowledge of the Eternal Being. The *cognitio insita*, as soon as it is *cognitio* and thus not only *potentia* but *actus*, has never arisen otherwise than under the influence of the revelation of God in and outside man and is therefore in so far always *acquisita*. For these reasons the distinction between the *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita* was formerly usually indicated differently. It consisted in these two things. First, in this, that the *cognitio Dei innata* was obtained of itself, spontaneously, without effort or coercion, whereas the *cognitio Dei acquisita* was acquired by reasoning and argument, by reflection and proof along the *viae causalitatis*, *eminentiae* and *negationis*; the former was *noetica*, the latter *dianoetica*. And second, from that there also flowed this difference, that the first consisted only in principles and was general and

necessary, but the second was more elaborated and developed, yielded more concrete propositions and was therefore also subject to all manner of doubt and contestation. That there is a God stood and stands nearly for all as certain. [46] But the proofs for the existence of God have been found by thought and are therefore alternately despised and highly esteemed, Moor, Comm. I 41. 44. And thereby the distinction is precisely indicated. It does not lie in this, that the innate knowledge of God would arise from man and the acquired from the world. The moral proof too is derived from the moral consciousness which is within man. In both it is the same and the whole revelation of God, from which the *cognitio Dei* penetrates into our consciousness. But in the *cognitio Dei insita* that revelation works upon the consciousness of man and cultivates there impressions and awarenesses. In the *cognitio Dei acquisita* that revelation of God is thought through by man; his understanding sets to work, his reflection awakens, and with clear, lucid consciousness he seeks by reasoning and proof to ascend from the creatures to God. For man has, in no domain of knowledge, enough with impressions and awarenesses. He is not satisfied with consciousness alone. It is not sufficient for him that he knows. He also wants to know that he knows; he seeks to explain the how and why of his knowing. And hence it is that ordinary, everyday, empirical knowing always seeks to pass over into proper, scientific knowing; that faith raises itself to theology, and the *cognitio Dei insita* completes itself in the *cognitio Dei acquisita*.

2. The division into *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita* is usually applied only to the *theologia naturalis*. And this is then distinguished from and often set in opposition to the *theologia revelata*. Already earlier this view has been contested at length, I 219-244. There is no separate *theologia naturalis*, which, apart from all revelation, could be obtained by man from the

thinking contemplation of the world. That knowledge of God which is summarized in the *theologia naturalis* is no product of human reason. It presupposes, in the first place, that God himself reveals himself in the works of his hands; it is not man who seeks God, but God who seeks man also through his works in nature. Further, it is not man who, with the natural light of reason, understands and knows this revelation of God; all religions of the Heathen are positive; but on man's side a sanctified understanding and an opened eye are needed, in order to take note of God, the true and [47] living God, in his creatures. And even this is not enough. Even the believer, even the Christian, would not understand God's revelation in nature and would not be able to reproduce it purely, if God himself had not described in his Word how and what he reveals of himself in the whole world. The *cognitio Dei naturalis* is included in Scripture itself and is therein unfolded at length. Therefore it is also an altogether wrong method that the Christian, in the treatment of the *theologia naturalis*, as it were divests himself of the special revelation in Scripture and of the illumination of the H. Spirit, discusses it without any Christian *Voraussetzung*, and thereafter proceeds to the *theologia revelata*. The Christian, also as dogmatician, from the beginning stands with both feet on the foundation of the special revelation; not only first in the *locus de Christo* but also in the *locus de Deo* is he a believer in Christ. But standing thus, he looks around him, and armed with the spectacles of the H. Scripture he sees in the whole world a revelation of that same God whom he knows and confesses in Christ as his Father in the heavens. Then, however, under the *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita* is not to be understood that knowledge which we obtain from creation apart from the special revelation. From our earliest youth onward God's special revelation in Christ has worked upon us all; we are

born in the covenant of grace and thus as Christians; all manner of Christian influences have formed the knowledge of God which is now our portion, to a much greater extent than the working that has proceeded from God's revelation in nature upon our heart; and in the light of that special revelation we have all also learned to contemplate nature and the world around us. We all owe the knowledge of God from nature to God's special revelation in his Word. Nature would let us hear voices just as confused as the Heathen, if we had not listened to God's speech in the works of grace and thereby now understood his voice also in the works of nature. But now that revelation of God in nature is also of high value. It is the same God who in nature and in grace, in creation and re-creation, in the Logos and in Christ, in the Spirit of God and in the Spirit of Christ speaks to us. Nature and grace are no antithesis; we have one God, from whom and through whom and unto whom they both are. [48]

3. This applies to both the *cognitio Dei insita* and *acquisita*; both we owe to Holy Scripture. It is true that it makes no effort to prove the existence of God. It proceeds from that existence and presupposes that man knows and acknowledges God. It does not consider man to have sunk so deeply that, in order to believe, he beforehand has need of a proof. For he is still bearer of the image of God, God's offspring, and endowed with a *voûς*, in order to observe in the creation God's eternal power and divinity. The denial of God's existence is in the eyes of Scripture a sign of folly, of deep moral decay, Ps. 14:2. Such people are exception, not rule. As a rule Scripture reckons with such as acknowledge the existence of God unforcedly and by virtue of the prompting of their nature. It does not appeal to the reasoning intellect, but to the rational and moral consciousness. It does not analyze and demonstrate, but shows God in all the works of his hands. But it does

do that, then. Heaven and earth together with all creatures, foliage and grass, rain and drought, fruitful and unfruitful years, food and drink, health and sickness, riches and poverty, and all things speak of God to the pious. There is no part, no little piece of the world, in which his power and divinity is not beheld. To heaven and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies man is referred, in order to behold and acknowledge God. Scripture does not reason in the abstract and does not make God into the conclusion of a syllogism, now leaving it to us whether we shall find that proof compelling. But it speaks with authority, it proceeds theologically and religiously from God, it shows his virtues in his works and it demands that we shall acknowledge God. An ox knows its owner, and a donkey the manger of its lord, but Israel has no knowledge, my people does not understand, Jes. 1:3. It is certain for it that God reveals himself in the creatures and that He leaves himself without witness to no one, Hd. 14:17, Rom. 1:19. And thus, appealing to the whole creation as a testimony and revelation of God, it contains in germ everything that was later worked out broadly in the proofs and was unfolded dialectically. There is truth in the remark of C. J. Nitzsch, *Syst. der Chr. Lehre*, 6te Aufl. S. 142, that Holy Scripture gives us a beginning and analogy of the aitiological proof in Rom. 1:20, of the teleological in Ps. 8; 19; [49] Hd. 14:17, of the moral in Rom. 2:14 and of the ontological in Hand. 17:24, Rom. 1:19, 32. But speaking thus, not in dialectical demonstration but in the language of testimony, not appealing to the reasoning intellect but making an appeal to heart and conscience, to the whole rational and moral consciousness of man, Scripture has never been without power and influence. In this too it is a powerful word, sharp as a two-edged sharp sword, penetrating to the division of soul and spirit, a judge of the thoughts and deliberations of the heart. Even without logical

demonstration and philosophical proof Scripture in this its testimony is powerful, because it is the word of God and finds support in the rational and moral nature of every man. It is God himself who leaves himself without witness to no one. And it is man himself who, because he was created after God's image, in spite of himself must give heed and assent to this testimony. In this light the so-called proofs for God's existence must also be considered. That will preserve us both from overestimation and from contempt of the proofs.

4. Already among the ancient sages, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Seneca, Cicero, we encounter the proofs that are adduced for the existence of God. From the beauty, the harmony, the motion, the purposiveness of the world, from reason and the innate consciousness, from the importance of religion for state and society, from the agreement of the peoples, one concludes to the existence of a self-conscious, rational, Divine being, Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* I4 885 f. II4 771 f. III3 357 f. IV3 133 f. Christian theology adopted all these proofs and treated them with preference; Augustine added yet one from the general concepts, *de lib. arb.* II c. 3-15. Münscher—v. Coelln, *D. G.* I 125-129. It did not disdain the support that was offered to it by pagan science, and, with rejection of dualistic Gnosticism and Manichaeism, saw in nature a work of God. This standpoint of Christian theology is the more noteworthy, because Christianity was in part hostile over against the cosmos and laid all emphasis on the salvation of man. But nature was and remained for Christian theology, in spite of all asceticism, [50] that penetrated into the church, a creation of that same God who in Christ had revealed himself as Re-Creator and Saviour. Indeed, the value and force of the proofs were very soon overestimated. To be sure, some church fathers express that the

Heathens never came to a pure *religio naturalis* and that the way of these proofs is very difficult for the sinner, Athanasius, c. Gent. c. 35 sq. But gradually the proofs lose their religious character; they are detached from all moral conditions; the *cognitio Dei acquisita* comes to stand separately alongside the *insita*; and Christian theology received more and more the conviction that the truths of the *religio naturalis* were provable in the same sense as those of *mathesis* or *logika*. They were actually not *articuli fidei* but *praeambula ad articulos*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 2. c. Gent. I 10-13. The ontological argument of Anselm, in his *Proslogium*, although taken over by some such as Halesius, Bonaventura, *Itiner.* c. 5, was indeed rejected by most, because we can ascend to God only through the creatures, Thomas, c. Gent. I 10-12. But otherwise great value was attached to the proofs and much care expended; in the *theologia naturalis* one stood on rational, scientific ground before and outside faith, Schwane, D. G. III 107 f. And on that same rationalistic standpoint Rome and Roman theology still stand to the present day, Petavius, Theol. I cap. 2. Sylvius, Comm. in totam pr. p. S. Thomae, ed. 4a 1693 I p. 22-26. Theol. Wirceb. 1880 III 1-20. Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 3-41. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. I2 673 f. II2 668 f. Schwetz, Theol. fund. I § 4-8. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 1-20. Hettinger, Apol. des Christ. I7 103 f. Jansen, Prael. I 39-51 etc. The Vatican declared that God can be known with certainty from the creation by the natural light of reason, cf. deel I 221.

The Reformation did indeed adopt this *theologia naturalis* with its proofs, but did not let them precede [faith]; rather, it incorporated them into the doctrine of faith. Calvin proceeded from the *semen religionis* and then indeed saw in every *particula mundi*, in the starry heaven, in the human body, in the soul, in the preservation of all things, etc., irrefutable *signa* and

testimonia of God's majesty, Inst. I 5, 1-10, but then immediately again acknowledges that the [51] semen religionis, although implanted in all in an ineradicable way, can nevertheless be stifled and can bring forth no good fruit; man no longer has an eye to behold God, for that he has need of faith, I 4, 1. 5, 11-15. This same place is occupied by the theol. naturalis in Ursinus, Tract. theol. 1584 p. 37-44, Martyr, Loci p. 2 sq., Musculus, Loci p. 2-5, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 4, cf. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. I 156 f. But soon protest. theol. set out upon the rationalistic path. While the theol. nat. was at first a description, on the basis of Scripture, of what the Christian could know about God from creation, it soon became an exposition of what the unbelieving, rational man could come to know from nature by his own thinking. The theologia naturalis became theologia rationalis. Cartesius found in the innate idea an incontrovertible proof for the existence of God. Voetius still perceived the difference between this rationalistic argumentation and the Reformed doctrine of the theol. nat., Disp. V 455-525. But this awareness, in Alsted, Theol. nat. 1623, Maastricht, Theol. II c. 2, Marck, Merch I 1, 14, Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 1 e. a., was lost more and more. Rationalism made its entry everywhere. The theologia naturalis became the proper, scientific, demonstrable theology, over against which the theologia revelata came to stand increasingly in the shadow and finally disappeared entirely. The proofs were divided into classes and elaborated at length; one distinguished metaphysical proofs from motion, causality, contingency of the world; physical from harmony, order, purpose of the universe and of particular creatures, such as sun, moon, stars, fire, light, earth, water, animal, plant, man, body, soul, ear, eye, hand, instinct, etc.; historical from the consensus gentium, the societas, arts, sciences, revelation, prophecy, miracle; moral from conscience, freedom,

morality, judgment, reward and punishment, etc., and finally also mathematical proofs, Buddeus, *de atheismo et superst.*, ed. Lulofs, 1767 p. 224-318, and further litt. in M. Vitringa I p. 11 sq. Walch, *Bibl. theol. sel.* I 676-744, Doedes, *Inl. tot de Leer v. God* 200-217.

This self-satisfaction of *theologia naturalis* lasted until Kant. He subjected the proofs to a strict criticism, argued that theoretical reason here had to end with a *non liquet* [52], Kr. d. r. V. ed. Kirchmann S. 470 f., but built the existence of God on the postulate of practical reason, cf. *deel* I 447 f. Since then the proofs have fallen into discredit with many philosophers and theologians. Jacobi even considered it impossible to prove God's existence, because God would then depend as a conclusion on the grounds of proof, *Von den göttl. Dingen*, Werke III 368. 567 f. As unnecessary for the believer and as useless for the unbeliever the proofs were rejected or despised by Reinhard, *Dogm.* § 30. Schleiermacher II § 33. Twisten II 19 f. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I 2 62. Beck, *Vorles. über die Glaubenslehre* I, 63 f. Frank, *Syst. d. chr. Wahrh.* I 2 102-109. Philippi, K. Gl. II 1-17. Bovon, *Dogm. Chrét.* I 216. Böhl, *Dogm.* 16 f. Rauwenhoff, *Wijsb. v. d. godsd.* 499 v. etc. Others did not go so far, but at least assigned to the moral proof in the sense of Kant an important place, as Köstlin, *Die Beweise für das Dasein Gottes*, Stud. u. Kr. 1875 S. 601-655, 1876 S. 7-80. cf. also Herzog² 5, 308. Ritschl, *Theol. u. Met.* 8 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III 2 200 f. Kaftan, *Wahrh. d. chr. Rel.* 490 f. The proofs acquired a much greater significance in the philosophy of Hegel; he let them count as God's self-proof in the human spirit and therefore attached great value especially to the ontological proof, *Ueber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes*, Werke XII 291 f. Biedermann regards them as proofs not for the existence of a personal God but indeed of an *einheitlichen, absoluten Grund der Welt*, *Dogm.* § 645 f., cf. also Hartmann,

Religionsphil. II 114 f. Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 239 f. etc. Herbert Spencer considers the essence of the Absolute unknowable but its existence nevertheless provable, First Principles 5th ed. p. 1-123, especially p. 87-97, cf. Spruyt, Gids April 1886, Molenaar, Bijbl. v. d. Herv. 21 Mei 1885. Furthermore, from various sides the attempt has been made to present the old proofs in a new form and to maintain them, either as proofs or as grounds for faith in a personal God, Dorner, Gl. I 199 f. Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I2 118 f. Lange, Dogm. I 207 f. Ulrici, Gott. u. die Natur 2e Aufl. 431 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 301 f. Lotze, Mikrok. III3 553 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss 1886 S. 65. Barry, Die natürl. Theol. 1882. Kennedy, Gottesglaube u. mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Zöckler, Theol. naturalis 1860. Fricke, Ist Gott persönlich, Leipzig Wigand [53] 1896. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 202. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 222. Bruce, Apologetics 1892 p. 149-163. Caird, Introd. to the philos. of religion 1880. Flint, Theism, Edinb. 1877. James Orr, Chr. view of God and the world 1893 p. 104-137. Land, Godg. Bijdr. 1856 bl. 353 v. Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer v. God 236 v. Leer v. God 50 v. Bruining, The existence of God 1892. Maronier, What we know of God. 1889. Graswinckel, Faith and Freedom 1890 bl. 144-185 etc.

5. The ontological proof occurs in threefold form. The conclusion from the general ideas and forms in the human mind, i.e. from reason, which stands above our individual reason and above the whole world, to absolute reason, the sum-total of all those ideas and forms, the absolutely true and good and beautiful, i.e. to God (Plato, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm in his Monologium). Or it proceeds from the necessary thinking of the highest, absolute idea, i.e. of God, and concludes from that to the existence of that idea, because otherwise it would not be the absolute, the highest idea, since an idea which at the same time does exist is greater and higher than one

which does not actually exist (Anselm in his *Proslogium*). Or it sees in the innate character of the idea of God a fact that cannot be explained otherwise than by the existence of God, who has implanted this idea in man (Descartes). The forms differ, but the proof is one, insofar as it concludes from thinking to being. Now this does not apply with respect to creatures, as everyone acknowledges. For these exist contingently; they can, without any logical contradiction, be thought as non-existing. Thinking and being belong to an entirely different category and are wholly different things. From the thinking of something, e. g. a winged horse, it by no means follows that that something actually exists. Being is not a product of thinking. No one has meant this, then, by the ontological proof. But the question is whether precisely with the idea of God one may not conclude from thinking to being. To that the answer is, in the first place: yes, but under one condition, namely if God exists. If God exists, then He exists necessarily, and *essentia* and *existentia* are one in Him. But this condition was precisely what had to be proved; it had to be shown that God exists, Schelling, *Werke* II 3 S. 156 f. In the second place it must be answered that from our [54] thinking, even from our necessary thinking, of the idea of God one nevertheless cannot conclude to the existence of God, because the being of God after all is not, or can be, a product of our thinking of the idea of God. The world of ideas and forms, including also the idea of God, is not to be identified with God; it is something in us. With those ideas the existence of God is therefore not yet given of itself. At most one can conclude from the presence of those ideas in us to the existence of God, but then this is properly not an ontological but a cosmological proof. But the being itself of the idea of God in us, however necessary this may also be, never includes and cannot as such already include the existence of God. The

ontological proof is therefore no proof in the strict sense. It only contains: 1o that the world of ideas and forms, and thus also the highest idea, is not thought by us arbitrarily, but necessarily, and 2o that that world of ideas and forms, and specifically also the idea of God, as soon as we think it, is by us also thought as really existing and must be thought as such. The necessary thinking of the idea of God also entails the necessary thinking of that idea as really existing. But it does not take us further. We remain moving within the circle of thinking. It does not carry us across the chasm from thinking to being. It would do that only then, when from those ideas not as ideas but from the being of those ideas in us one might be allowed to conclude to a being that created and maintained those ideas in us and itself had to be the highest idea; but then it would, as has been said, be no ontological but a cosmological proof, cf. Runze, *Der ontol. Gottesbeweis, krit. Darst. seiner Gesch. seit Ans. bis auf die Gegenwart*, Halle 1882. Körber, *das ontol. Argument*, Bamberg 1884.

6. The cosmological proof also appears in various forms. The inference from motion to a *primum movens*, *quod a nullo movetur* (Aristotle), from the changeable to the unchangeable (Damascenus), from the relative to the absolutely perfect (Boethius, Anselmus), from the series *causarum*, which cannot be infinite, to a *prima causa efficiens* (Thomas), from the contingent existence of the world to an *ens necessarium* (id.), from what does not exist of itself to what exists through itself [55] (Richard Vict.), from the existence of the relative to that of the absolute (Spinoza, Hegel, Hartmann, Scholten) etc. But in all these forms the cosmological proof nevertheless always comes down to the same thing, namely, to the inference from an effect to a cause. In itself this is also a perfectly lawful inference, in spite of the criticism of Hume and Kant; if we are no longer permitted to apply the law

of causality, all science is impossible. But the cosmological proof proceeds from various presuppositions which are not established in themselves and for all. It presupposes, not only that the particular things in the world but that also the entire universe is contingent, finite, relative, imperfect; that a series *causarum in infinitum* is unthinkable; that the law of causality also applies to the world as a whole. Only when all these presuppositions were correct would the cosmological proof have force. It rightly concludes that, like all things, so also the world as a whole, as composed of those things, must have a cause. But it does not carry us further; it says nothing about the character and nature of that cause. Whoever infers from the world to a cause which itself again needs a cause has done enough to the logical force of this proof. That that cause is infinite, absolute, perfect does not follow directly from the cosmological proof, but flows from other considerations. Thus indeed a series *causarum infinita* is unthinkable and impossible; there is no one who accepts it; all acknowledge an absolute ground, a first being, whether this bears the name of God or of the absolute, of substance or force, of matter or will etc. If this presupposition is now correct, as it is in fact acknowledged by all, then the cosmological proof brings us one step further, namely, to a cause of the world which exists of itself and is therefore infinite, eternal, absolute. But whether that cause is now also transcendent or only immanent, whether it is personal or impersonal, conscious or unconscious, is hereby absolutely not decided. Many, however, have tried to derive something more from the cosmological proof, whether directly or indirectly. Directly they tried to do this in such a way that they, because an effect cannot contain more than lies in the cause, from the personal, the conscious, the free, the ideas that were in the world, inferred to a personal, conscious, free being, which at the same time [56] was the

highest idea, the absolute reason. This reasoning, however, runs aground on the fact that the relation of cause and effect is then arbitrarily conceived as an emanation and, applied to God, would also demand that He would be material, bodily, indeed even impure and unholy. Others have therefore taken a by-path and reasoned that an infinite, absolute cause, a being that exists from, in and through itself, cannot exist otherwise than as spirit, person, e.g. Dorner, Gl. I 243 f. Kohn, Luth. Dogm. II 122. Doederlein, Zeits. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik 1886 S. 52 f. But against this the objection holds that by the cosmological proof we know nothing of the inner nature of such a first cause, that we have no right to begin to apply the law of causality again to such a first cause and therefore can determine nothing concerning it. And thus it remains that the cosmological proof leads us at most, namely, with the acknowledgment that an infinite series of causes is impossible, to a first, self-existing, absolute world-cause, Strauss, Der alte u. d. neue Gl. 1872 S. 214 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II 288 f.

7. The teleological proof proceeds from the order and beauty, the harmony and the purpose, which in the world, whether in its entirety, or in particular creatures, starry heaven, elements, earth, man, animal, plant, hand, eye etc., are to be observed, and concludes from that to an intelligent cause. Although the teleological proof never fails to make an impression and was also mentioned by Kant with respect, yet especially in the present time many objections have been raised against it. First, from the materialistic side it is asserted that there is no purpose in things and that the teleological explanation of nature must make way for the mechanical, e.g. Haeckel, Nat. Schöpf. 1874 S. 16 f. Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 570 f. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff, 16de Aufl. S. 214 f. Second, pantheism objects that the presence of order and purpose in the world gives absolutely no right to

assume a conscious, intelligent cause, because the unconscious, just as in every human being, so also in the world-whole, works much more wisely and more surely than conscious reflection and deliberate calculation, Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. 9de Aufl. 1882 passim. And finally Kant still raised the objection that this proof at most led [57] to a world-former but not to a world-creator, Kr. d. reinen Vern. ed. Kirchmann S. 500. Now against these objections quite a number of other considerations weigh up. Scripture everywhere acknowledges a purpose in creation, Gen. 1, Spr. 8, Ps. 8, 1 Cor. 3:21-23, Rom. 8:28 etc. The teleological view of the world has been embraced by almost all philosophers, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle etc. and repeatedly presses itself upon every human being, in spite of the misuse that has repeatedly been made of it especially in the previous century. Purposes are to be observed, both in particular phenomena, climate, seasons, temperature of the water, fertilization of plants, blood circulation, organisms, hand, eye etc., and in the world-whole. All atoms obey one law; everything rests on thought, which can be understood by man; the universe is no more to be explained from a chance than the Iliad from a throw of letters. And even the fact that we often cannot demonstrate a purpose proves that we, where we observe it, do so rightly. Moreover, the teleological view of the world does not exclude the mechanical in physical nature; only this latter goes beyond its power and competence when it wants to explain all phenomena in the world, also the conscious and spiritual, from matter and metabolism, Ulrici, Gott u. die Natur 1866, Id. Gott u. d. Mensch 1874. P. Janet, Les causes finales 1882. Ebrard, Apolog. § 74 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel I2 241 f. 310 f. 788 f. Kennedy, Gottesgl. und mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Doedes, de Leer van God bl. 118 v. etc. If now the presence of order and purpose stood firm for all and in this

time did not itself have such powerful and prolix demonstration needful, then indeed the teleological proof would give us the right to conclude from the beauty and harmony of the world to a conscious being, for an unconscious purpose does not exist. Hartmann has indeed tried to argue the contrary, but his proofs for the purposive operation of the unconscious are therefore not valid, because it is one thing whether a man does something with consciousness and with an intentional purpose, and another thing whether in an unconscious action a purpose can be observed. Instinct works unconsciously, but nevertheless in the unconscious action of instinct a purpose is to be discerned that points back to a being which with consciousness has produced such an instinct. If there is a [58] purpose in the world, it must also have been thought beforehand. Even if it should be true that we also with the teleological proof do not get further than to a world-former, then that proof would nevertheless be of no small significance. Yes, even if this proof did not specifically lead to one intelligent being, but left open the possibility for the existence of many Divine beings, who together had produced the world, then still the teleological proof would not be devoid of all value. The intelligence would then nevertheless be required in the first cause or causes by the arrangement of the world, and this proof would have delivered what it could deliver. Only one would then, having by this way come to one or more world-formers, stand before the difficulty how a being that did not produce matter could nevertheless give to that matter form and shape, or also, how more than one being could be *prima causa* of the world. Logically these objections may still have some value, practically they no longer have any significance for our consciousness. Everything here depends on the presence of a purpose in the world; if that stands firm, thereby the

consciousness of the highest being is given, Pesch, *Die grossen Welträthsel* II2 305 f.

8. The moral proof finally pays attention to the moral phenomena that occur in man and humanity, conscience, responsibility, remorse, reward and punishment, virtue and happiness, fear of death and judgment, triumph of the good, etc., and concludes from them to a moral being, who created and maintains that entire moral world-order. Some in this connection direct attention more to the conscience, which speaks in every human being, to the moral law, to which everyone feels bound, and conclude from that to a highest, sovereign lawgiver. Others pay attention especially to the disharmony of virtue and happiness, of sin and punishment, and postulate from that a being, who in the hereafter will bring about just harmony. Or one also takes the whole moral world-order into view in its inner connection and in its supremacy above the order of nature and concludes from that to a being, who created that moral order and placed it above the order of nature. Always, however, this argument is based on the ethical phenomena in the human world and thereby arrives at God as the highest moral being. Also against this proof exceptions [59] have been raised. In the first place materialism adduces against it, that the moral, just like conscious life, is not an independent order but has gradually arisen through evolution, appears here thus and elsewhere so, and in the end rests on accidental change of matter, Darwin, *Afst. v. d. mensch, hfdst.* 4. Hellwald, *Kulturgesch.* I3 26 f. Büchner, *Kraft u. Stoff* 462 f. 478 f. And in the second place Fichte taught, that the moral world-order rests and subsists in itself and has no more need of a God above and outside it; and the advocates of autonomous and independent morality have followed him in that, C. Coignet, *La morale indép.* Paris 1869. Again, against this materialistic and

autonomous conception all kinds of weighty objections can be raised. It is even being recognized more and more generally, that materialism has not explained the moral phenomena of freedom, responsibility, remorse, etc., Du Bois Reymond, Die sieben Welträtsel 1882 S. 84. Carneri, Sittl. u. Darw. 1877. Weygoldt, Darwin. Relig. Sittl. 1878 etc. And also the morale indépendante has been contested with strong arguments, Caro, La morale indép. Paris 1876. Cramer, Christ. en Hum. bl. 159 v. But this is nevertheless certain, that the premises of this proof themselves first need so much strong support, that it hardly comes to the conclusion. Nevertheless this proof, especially through the influence of Kant, has found with many so much sympathy, that the other proofs have thereby almost entirely been neglected, cf. above bl. 52 and further the litt. on the moral world-order, Zeller, Vortr. u. Abh. III 1884 S. 189 f. Carrière, De zedelijke wereldorde 1880. Hartmann, Das sittl. Bewusstsein 1886 S. 570 f. Christ, Die sittl. Weltordnung 1894, Traub, Die sittl. Weltordnung 1892, Pierson, Gids Nov. 1895 bl. 248. Yet this proof cannot be called stronger than the others. It even bears a much more personal character than the previous arguments. Even if in the world around us often little of a moral world-order is to be perceived, in his conscience each person feels, in spite of himself, bound to a moral order, just as strongly as in his understanding to the laws of thinking. This moral order, which each person discovers in his own inner life, does not coincide immediately with the idea of God, also does not compel to the recognition of the existence of God, even allows for whoever wants to escape from it all kinds of exceptions, but nevertheless remains a powerful testimony, that always again [60] leads to the recognition of a holy and righteous being.

9. It is regrettable that these arguments for the existence of God in theology have received the name of proofs. Yet not for the reason mentioned by Jacobi. Although proving is the deriving of a proposition from another, the proving of God's existence is therefore not yet a *contradictio in adjecto*. Dependence in a proof is something quite different from dependence in reality. The *causa cognoscendi* is absolutely not the same as the *causa essendi*. Although the existence of God in a syllogism can be the conclusion, just as in general one can infer from the work to the workmaster, that existence in reality is nevertheless beginning and ground of the being of all things; indeed, as such it is precisely posited in the conclusion. But the name of proofs is for the above-mentioned arguments therefore less well chosen, because it has transferred them into a category where they do not belong, namely into that of logical, mathematical, exact, compelling demonstrations, and thus has deprived them of their ethical and religious character. It now has the appearance as if faith in the existence of God would rest on those proofs and would stand or fall with them. And that would yet be *ein elender Glaube, der sich Gott erst beweisen müsste, ehe er zu ihm betete*, Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I 128. But rather the opposite is the case. The existence of no single thing is for us first established on the ground of proofs. Of the existence of ourselves, of the external world, of the laws of thought and morals, etc., we are convinced firmly and certainly before all reasoning and demonstration by the impressions which all these things irresistibly make upon our consciousness. We accept that existence of itself, spontaneously, without compulsion or violence. And so it is also with the existence of God. The so-called proofs may bring about more clarity and lucidity, but the certainty concerning the existence of God is not in the least strengthened by them. This is determined only by faith, i.e. by the

spontaneity with which our consciousness bears witness to the existence of God, which from all sides presses itself upon us. The proofs are therefore also not grounds, but rather products of faith. Faith namely tries to give itself an account of the religious impressions and emotions which every human being receives and carries about in his soul. Faith also works upon the understanding and this gradually seeks to bring order into that chaos of impressions and apprehensions; it rubrics and classifies them and reduces them to a few kinds. Impressions come to us from the world of ideas (ontol. proof), from that of finite, contingent, changeable things (kosmol. proof), from that of beauty and harmony (teleol. proof), from that of the moral order (moral proof). But although they can thus be classified, it must nevertheless never be thought that these four proofs are the only and isolated testimonies which God causes to go forth to us. No, all things speak to the pious person of God, the whole world is a mirror of His virtues, there is *nulla mundi particula*, in which His eternal power and divinity is not beheld. From within and from without us God's testimony comes to us. He does not leave Himself without witness, in nature nor history, in heart nor conscience, in life nor lot. And therefore that testimony of God is so powerful that it is scarcely denied by anyone. All human beings and peoples have heard something of the voice of the Lord. The consensus gentium, by many still reckoned a fifth proof, is a confirmation of this that God does not leave Himself without witness; it is the answer of humanity to the call of God. These testimonies which go forth from God and which throughout the whole world are directed to the human being, are ordered and ranked in the proofs. They receive through the syllogistic form in which they are clothed no greater force. But as proofs weak, they are strong as testimonies. They are no arguments that compel the understanding of the unbeliever, but signa

and testimonia, which never fail to make an impression on everyone's mind. Analyzed, isolated, detached from one another and placed next to each other, they can be contested at every point of the reasoning and they stop the believing, which happens spontaneously and of itself. But conceived as testimony and preached as revelation of that God, of whose existence every human being by nature, before reasoning and study, is assured in the deepest of his soul, they are of no small value. For even if it is the case that, thus preached, they meet objections and scruples, thereby they are nevertheless not nullified. Just as no one believes in God's love because everything discovers His love but despite everything that awakens doubt, so also everyone is convinced beforehand of the existence of God; through the proofs he does not [62] come to his faith and through the objections he suffers no shipwreck in his faith. In every domain it is so that in reflection the difficulties first arise, but no one therefore casts away the moral law, the law of thought, religion, art, science as folly, because his thinking does not know how to explain the phenomena which it acknowledges and does not know how to defend against all objections. But nonetheless reflection, although no certainty concerning existence, does bring clarity and lucidity. The so-called proofs for the existence of God give the believer an account of his own religious and ethical consciousness; they place weapons in his hand with which the opponent, who in any case is not better armed, can be repelled; they are for the Christian a sign that it is one and the same God who reveals Himself in nature and grace and that therefore creation and recreation, physis and ethos, do not stand manichaeian and dualistic next to each other; the virtues of God, which there shine in the world, are the same which also glitter in the kingdom of heaven. And together the testimonies, which from God in the world go forth to us and are comprehended in the

so-called proofs, are nothing other than revelation of the Name of the Lord, by which He designates Himself to the ear of His creatures, and by which He gives us the right to address Him. In connection with one another they make us know Him as the Divine being, which by us must necessarily and necessarily as existing be thought, which is the only, first, absolute cause of all creatures, which with consciousness and purposively governs all things, and which above all in the conscientie reveals Himself as the Holy One to each and every one who believes.

§ 23. THE NAMES OF GOD.

1 . All that becomes knowable to us of God in his revelation is designated in Holy Scripture by the Name of God. The original meaning of the word $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$ is probably that of sign, distinguishing mark, $\sigma\eta\mu\alpha$, signum, just as the gr. $\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha$ and the lat. nomen are derived from the stem gno and thus denote that by which something is known, distinguishing mark. A name is a [63] sign of him who bears it, a designation according to one or another property in which he reveals himself and becomes knowable. There is a connection between the name and its bearer, and that connection is not arbitrary but grounded in the bearer himself. Even among us, and still now, when names have mostly become sounds without meaning, that connection is still felt. A name is something personal and wholly something other than a number or a specimen of its kind. It always makes a more or less unpleasant impression when our name is written or used incorrectly. On the name hangs our honor, our worth, our person and individuality. But much stronger was that connection in earlier times, when names still had a transparent meaning and were a revelation of the person or the thing that

received it. So it is also in Scripture. Adam had to give the animals names according to their nature, Gen. 2:19, 20. Of many names in Scripture the meaning is indicated and at the same time the reason why they are given, e. g. Eve, Gen. 3:20, Cain, 4:1, Seth, 4:25, Noah, 5:29, Babel, 11:9, Ishmael, 16:11, Esau and Jacob, 25:25, Moses, Ex. 2:10, Jesus, Mt. 1:21 etc. More than once a name is changed or a byname added, when a person appears in another quality, Abraham, Gen. 17:5, Sarah, 17:15, Israel, 32:28, Joshua, Num. 13:16, Jedidjah, 2 Sam. 12:25, Mara, Ruth 1:20, Peter, Mk. 3:16, etc. After his ascension Christ has received a name above every name, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 1:4, and to the believers in the new Jerusalem a new name is given, Op. 2:17, 3:12, 22:4. The same holds for the name of God. There is an intimate connection between God and his name. This connection too is according to Scripture not accidental or arbitrary but established by God himself. Human beings do not name him: he gives himself a name. In the foreground therefore stands the name as revelation from God's side, in an active and objective sense, as *nomen editum*. Then the name of God is identical with the virtues or perfections which he reveals outwardly, with his glory, Ps. 8:2, 72:19, his honor, Lev. 18:21, Ps. 86:11, 102:16, his redeeming power, Ex. 15:3. Jes. 47:4, his service, Jes. 56:6, Jer. 23:27, his holiness, 1 Chr. 18:10, Ps. 105:3, 3:21 etc. The name is God himself, as he reveals himself in one relation or another. That name as revelation of God is therefore great, [64] Ezech. 36:23, holy, Ezech. 36:20, fearful, Ps. 111:9, a high refuge, Ps. 20:2, a strong tower, Spr. 18:10. With proper names, specifically with the name *Ihvh*, God has made himself known to Israel. Through the Malak, in whose inward part his name is, Ex. 23:20, he has revealed himself to Israel. And through him he has laid his name upon the children of Israel, Num. 6:27, established the remembrance of his name

among them, Ex. 20:24, set his name among them and caused it to dwell, Deut. 11:14, 12:5, especially in the temple that is built for his name, 2 S. 7:13. In that temple now his name dwells, 2 Chr. 20:9, 33:4. By that name he delivers, Ps. 54:3 and for the sake of that name he cannot forsake Israel, 1 S. 12:22, Jes. 48:9, 11, Ps. 31:4, 23:3, 143:11 v. But Israel then also may not blaspheme, profane, or use that name in vain. Ex. 20:7, Lev. 18:21, 24:11. On the contrary, that name must be invoked, recounted, magnified, known, confessed, feared, exalted, awaited, sought, hallowed, Gen. 4:26, 12:2, Ex. 9:16, Deut. 28:58, 1 K. 8:33, Ps. 5:12, 34:4, 52:11, 83:17, 122:4, Jes. 26:8, Mt. 6:9, Joh. 12:28 etc. In the N. Test. there is but one name by which God grants salvation; it is the name of Jesus Christ, Hd. 4:12. But in that one name he has also revealed himself fully; in it is included all that God is and will be for his own; in that name he communicates himself, with all his benefits, to his people, Mt. 28:19, Luk. 24:47, Joh. 20:31, Hd. 2:38, 1 Cor. 6:11, Jak. 5:14. And still richer revelation the believers have to await in the new Jerusalem, Op. 3:12, when his name will be on everyone's forehead, Op. 22:4. The name of God in Holy Scripture is the designation, not of God as he exists in himself, but of God in his revelation, in his manifold relations to the creatures. This name, however, is not arbitrary, but God reveals himself thus and in that manner, because he is who he is. On his name therefore hangs his honor, his renown, all his virtues, his whole revelation, his own divine being. But that name therefore grants to him to whom it is revealed special privileges and at the same time imposes on him peculiar obligations. The name of God includes that he, revealing himself therein, is now also named accordingly by creatures. The *nomen editum* passes over into the *nomen inditum*. The εἶναι and καλεῖσθαι are in [65] Holy Scripture two sides of the same thing. God is what he is called, and he

is called what he is. What he reveals of himself is expressed and represented in definite names. He grants to his creatures the privilege, on the basis of and in accordance with his revelation, to name and address him. The one name of God, as the comprehending whole of his entire revelation both in nature and grace, for us falls apart into many, many names. Only in that way do we obtain an overview of the richness of his revelation and the deep significance of his name. We name him and may name him according to all that of his being becomes manifest in creation and re-creation. But all those names, as designations of God, impose on us the obligation to hallow and glorify them. It is the one name, the full revelation, and insofar the very being of God himself, with which we have to do in all those names. God places himself by his name in a definite relation to us; to that we ought in our relation to him to correspond, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 513 f. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 56. art. Name in Herzog2. Smend, Lehrb. S. 281 f. Cremer, s. v. ὄνομα.

2. The names by which God is named and addressed by us are therefore not arbitrary; they have not been devised by us according to our own pleasure. It is God himself, who in nature and grace consciously and freely reveals himself, who grants us the right, on the ground of this revelation, to name Him, indeed who in his Word has made known to us his own names on the ground of his revelation. All these names now without distinction bear this character, that they are derived from the revelation. There is not a single name that designates God's essence an sich. The nomen editum is the foundation of all nomina indita. And because the revelation of God in nature and Scripture is specifically directed to human beings, therefore it is a human language in which God speaks of himself to us; therefore they are human words of which He makes use; therefore they are human forms

under which He appears. In Scripture, therefore, there do not occur here and there a few anthropomorphisms; the whole of Scripture is anthropomorphic. From the first to the last page it testifies of a coming of God to and a seeking of man. The whole revelation of God concentrates itself in the Logos, who has become σαρξ, and is [66] as it were one humanization, one incarnation of God. If God spoke to us in a divine manner, no creature would understand Him, but this is his grace, which already began with the creation, that He bends down to his creatures and speaks to them and appears to them in a human manner. Therefore all the names by which God names himself and allows himself to be named by us are derived from earthly and human relations. Thus in Scripture He is called El, the Strong One, Elschaddai the Mighty One, Jahveh, the Being One, further Father, Son, Spirit, good, merciful, gracious, righteous, holy etc., all concepts that first apply to creatures and then are transferred to God in an eminent sense. Even the so-called incommunicable attributes, such as immutability, independence, simplicity, eternity, omnipresence, are presented in Scripture in forms and expressions borrowed from the finite and therefore also in a negative sense; eternity cannot be presented except as a negation of time. Scripture does not even make a single attempt to describe these perfections of God positively, according to their own essence, abstracted from their relation to the finite. But the anthropomorphism goes in Scripture much further. Everything that is proper to human beings and even to creatures is also ascribed to God, in particular *partes hominis*, *membra corporis*, *sensus*, *affectus*, *actiones*, *subjecta* and *adjuncta humana*. God has a soul, Lev. 26:11, Mt. 12:28, and a Spirit, Gen. 1:2 etc. Of a body of God there is never any mention, although God in Christ also assumed a true body, Joh. 1:14, Col. 2:17, and the church is

called Christ's body, Ef. 1:22. But all bodily organs are nevertheless attributed to God. There is spoken of his face, Ex. 33:20, 23, Jes. 63:9, Ps. 16:11, Mt. 18:10, Op. 22:4, of his eyes, Ps. 11:4, Hebr. 4:13, of his eyelids, Ps. 11:4, of his eyeball, Deut. 32:10, Ps. 17:8, Zach. 2:8, of his ears, Ps. 55:2, of his nose, Deut. 33:10, of his mouth, Deut. 8:3, of his lips, Job 11:5, of his tongue, Jes. 30:27, of his neck, Jer. 18:17, of his arm, Ex. 15:16, of his hand, Num. 11:23, of his right hand, Ex. 15:12, of his finger, Ex. 8:19, of his heart, Gen. 6:6, of his inward parts, Jes. 63:15, Jer. 31:20, Luk. 1:78, of his bosom, Ps. 74:4, of his lap, Joh. 1:28, [67] of his foot, Jes. 66:1. Further, there is no human emotion or it is also present in God, such as joyfulness, Jes. 62:5, rejoicing, Jes. 65:19, sorrow, Ps. 78:40, Jes. 63:10, grief, Ps. 95:10, Jer. 7:18, 19, fear, Deut. 32:27, love with all its modifications such as mercy, compassion, grace, long-suffering etc., further zeal and jealousy, Deut. 32:21, repentance, Gen. 6:6, hatred, Deut. 16:22, wrath, Ps. 2:5, vengeance, Deut. 32:35. Further, all human actions are also transferred to God, such as taking knowledge, Gen. 18:21, investigating, Ps. 7:10, knowing, Gen. 3:5, thinking, Gen. 50:20, forgetting, 1 Sam. 1:11, remembering, Gen. 8:1, Ex. 2:24, speaking, Gen. 2:16, calling, Rom. 4:17, commanding, Jes. 5:6, scolding, (= rebuking, reproofing) Ps. 18:16, 104:7, answering, Ps. 3:5, testifying, Mal. 2:14; resting, Gen. 2:2, working, Joh. 5:17; seeing, Gen. 1:10, hearing, Ex. 2:24, smelling, Gen. 8:21, tasting, Ps. 11:4, 5; sitting, Ps. 9:8, rising, Ps. 68:2, going, Ex. 34:9, coming, Ex. 25:22, walking, Lev. 26:12, descending, Gen. 11:5, meeting, Ex. 3:18, visiting, Gen. 21:1, passing by, Ex. 12:13, leaving, Richt. 6:13; writing, Ex. 34:1, sealing, Joh. 6:27, engraving, Jes. 49:16; striking, Jes. 11:4, chastising, Deut. 8:5, punishing, Job 5:17, binding up, Ps. 147:3, healing, Ps. 103:3, making whole, Deut. 32:39, killing and making alive, Deut. 32:39; wiping

away, Jes. 25:8, blotting out, 2 Kon. 21:13, washing, Ps. 51:4, cleansing, Ps. 51:4, anointing, Ps. 2:6, adorning, Ezech. 16:11, clothing, Ps. 132:16, crowning, Ps. 8:6, girding, Ps. 18:33; destroying, Gen. 6:7, laying waste, Lev. 26:31, killing, Gen. 38:7, plaguing, Gen. 12:17, judging, Ps. 58:12, condemning, Job 10:2 etc. Further, God is also very often designated with names that make known a certain profession, office, relation, relationship among human beings. He is a bridegroom, Jes. 61:10, a man, Jes. 54:5, a father, Deut. 32:6, a judge, king, lawgiver, Jes. 33:22, a warrior, Ex. 15:3, a hero, Ps. 78:65, Zef. 3:17, an artist and builder, Hebr. 11:10, a husbandman, Joh. 15:1, a shepherd, Ps. 23:1, a physician, Ex. 15:26 etc.; while then in these capacities there is again mention of his seat, throne, footstool, rod, scepter, weapons, bow, arrow, sword, shield, chariot, banner, book, seal, treasure, inheritance etc. Yes, even, in order to express what God is for his own, [68] all kinds of images are borrowed from animate and inanimate creation. He is compared to a lion, Jes. 31:4, an eagle, Deut. 32:11, a lamb, Jes. 53:7, a hen, Mt. 23:37, to the sun, Ps. 84:12, the morning star, Op. 22:16, to a light, Ps. 27:1, a candle, Op. 21:23, a fire, Hebr. 12:29, a spring or fountain, Ps. 36:10, a vein of water, Jer. 2:13, to food, bread, drink, water, ointment, Jes. 55:1, Joh. 4:10, 6:35, 55, to a rock, Deut. 32:4, a hiding place, Ps. 119:114, tower, Spr. 18:10, an upper chamber, Ps. 9:10, a shadow, Ps. 91:1, 121:5, a shield, Ps. 84:12, a way, Joh. 14:6, a temple, Op. 21:22 etc., Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 35, Alsted, Theol. schol. 104 sq. Glassius, Philol. Sacra 1691 p. 1116-1181.

3. The whole creation, the entire nature with all its kingdoms, the world of men above all, are in Holy Scripture made serviceable to the description of the knowledge of God. No limit is set to anthropomorphism. All creatures, living and lifeless, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic, offer

names, in order to bring the greatness of God in some measure to our consciousness. Although ἄνωυμος in himself, God is nevertheless πολυωνυμος in his revelation. Omnia possunt dici de Deo, et nihil digne dicitur de Deo. Nihil latius hac inopia. Quaeris congruum nomen, non invenis; quaeris quoquo modo dicere, omnia invenis, August., tract. 13 in Ev. Joh. n. 5. And for elucidation, why God can be named in so many ways, Augustine made use of a striking image. Our body has manifold needs, for light and air, food and drink, dwelling and clothes etc., and all these things are different and lie alongside one another in the creatures. Our spirit also has many and manifold needs, but what provides for them is not manifold but is always the one and the same Divine being. In terra aliud est fons, aliud lumen. Sitiens quaeris fontem, et ut pervenias ad fontem, quaeris lucem, et si dies non est, accendis lucernam, ut ad fontem pervenias. Fons ille ipse est lux: sitiendi fons est, caeco lux est; aperiantur oculi ut videant lucem, aperiantur fauces cordis ut bibant fontem; quod bibis hoc vides, hoc audis. Totum sit tibi Deus, quia horum quae diligis totum tibi est. Si visibilia attendis, nec panis est Deus, nec aqua est Deus, nec lux ista est Deus, nec vestis est Deus, nec domus est Deus. Omnia enim [69] haec visibilia sunt et singula sunt; quod est panis non hoc est aqua, et quod est vestis, non hoc est domus, et quod sunt ista, non hoc est Deus, visibilia enim sunt. Deus tibi totum est; si esuris, panis tibi est; si sitis, aqua tibi est; si in tenebris es, lumen tibi est, quia incorruptibilis manet; si nudus es, immortalitatis vestis tibi est, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, tract. 13 in Ev. Joh. Likewise Pseudodionysius says that God is ἄνωυμος and at the same time πολυωνυμος, He is at the same time παντα τα ὄντα και οὔδεν των ὄντων, de div. nom. c. I. § 6. 7. With Thomas we read, quod Deus in se prae-habet

omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. And more beautifully still with Bonaventure: ut laudibus Deum possimus extollere, atque ad Dei cognitionem promoveamur, necessaria nobis sunt translationes ad divina. Ratio vel finis translationis duplex est. Una in qua est laus Dei, alia manuductio intellectus nostri. Propter laudem Dei necessaria est translatio. Et quoniam Deus multum est laudabilis, ne propter inopiam vocabulorum contingeret cessari a laude, sacra Scriptura docuit nomina creaturarum ad Deum transferri; et hoc in numero indefinito, ut sicut omnis creatura laudat Deum, sic Deus laudatur ex omni nomine creaturae, et qui non poterit uno nomine laudari, tamquam superexcellens omne nomen, laudaretur ex omni nomine. Alia ratio est manuductio intellectus nostri. Quia cum per creaturas ad cognoscendum creatorem venimus, ut plurimum, fere omnes creaturae habent proprietates nobiles, quae sunt ratio intelligendi Deum, ut leo fortitudinem, agnus mansuetudinem, petra soliditatem, serpens prudentiam et consimilia; ideo oportuit plura nomina transferri ad Deum, Sent. I dist. 34 art. 1 qu. 4. And Calvin agreed with that, when he said: nulla est mundi particula, in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae ipsius emicare cernantur. God is immanent in all that is created. The pure in heart sees God everywhere. Everything is full of God. Fateor pie hoc posse dici, modo apio animo proficiscatur, naturam esse Deum, Inst. I 5, 1. 5. But there is ascent in the creatures. The place and the rank which the creatures occupy is determined by their affinity to God. All creatures name a name of God. But among all creatures man stands at the top. He alone bears the high name of image, son, child of God. He alone [70] is called God's offspring. And therefore the most and the most exalted names of God are derived from man. Never, however, may man be detached from nature. And never may

any creature or any part of the world be placed alongside or over against God. There is nothing outside and without God. To be sure, there has repeatedly been sinned against here. The dualism of Plato, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, Manichaeism restricted God's revelation and set a matter hostile over against Him. And in all kinds of forms this exercised influence and worked on in theology. When in more recent times under the influence of Kant and Jacobi the revelation of God is limited to the religious and ethical; when Scripture is acknowledged only in its religious-moral content; when the seat of religion is sought only in heart or conscience, in feeling or will, there is in all this the same dualistic principle speaking. Nature, with its elements and forces, man in his social and political life, art and science come to stand outside the revelation of God and become neutral, i.e. God-less terrains. Naturally, then, the O. Test. and a very great part of the N. Test. can no longer be appreciated; that nature and world have nothing more to say to the believer; that the revelation, that the Word of God loses all influence on public life; that religion, pushed back into a hidden refuge of heart and inner chamber, forfeits every claim to respect; that dogmatics, specifically also the locus de Deo, shrinks from day to day, and that theology no longer knows how to maintain its place. Theology no longer knows how to speak of God, because it does not speak from and through Him. It has no more names with which it can name God. God becomes the great Unknown and the world first becomes *ἀθεος*, then *ἀντιθεος*.

4. The names by which God in his revelation calls himself, however, bring with them for thought a peculiar difficulty. For, earlier it appeared to us that God is incomprehensible and exalted far above all that is finite; here, however, in his names, he descends to all that is finite and becomes like the creatures. There presents itself here an antinomy, which seems insoluble.

Ἀνῶνυμος on the one hand, God is yet πολωνυμος on the other hand. After first all anthropomorphism has been banished, it is here [71] nevertheless brought in again. With what right then can these names be used of God? On what ground are they ascribed to Him, who stands infinitely high above all creature and cannot be comprehended by the finite? That ground can lie only in this, that the whole creation, although as creature infinitely far removed from God, is nevertheless a creature, a work of God and akin to Him. The world is no antithesis alongside and over against God, no independent power, no second God, but wholly and entirely God's work in its being and its thus being: it is from the beginning designed to reveal God. The whole people of Israel is in all its laws and institutions, offices and ministries, character and customs etc. arranged to proclaim God's virtues, and the human nature of Christ has been made capable by the H. Spirit, to declare the Father and to make his name known to men. The apostolic band with its diversity of upbringing, preparation, gift and calling is destined, to tell the μεγαλεια του θεου. And therefore God can and may be named by us in a creaturely way. The right of anthropomorphism rests on this, that God himself has descended in and to his creatures and has revealed his name in and through creatures. Anthropomorphism thus by no means resides only, as was already remarked, in a single word such as personality. Of God there is no other way of speaking than in an anthropomorphic way. For Him himself we do not see. We can see Him only in his works and, according to the revelation in those works, name Him. More still, we cannot see God, at least here on earth, face to face. If God then nevertheless wills that we shall know Him, then He must descend to us, accommodate himself to our limited, finite, human consciousness, speak to us in human language. Whoever therefore contests the right of the anthropomorphisms, in principle

thereby denies the possibility that God reveals himself in his creatures, must from there proceed to the denial of creation and in the end retains nothing but an eternal dualism between God and world, between the infinite and the finite. If indeed our naming of God with anthropomorphic names includes a finiting of God, then this holds much more of the revelation in creation. God as the Infinite is then powerless, to bring forth another being outside his [72] own essence; the world is in no respect a revelation, it is solely and only a concealment of God; man is solely and only opposed to God and not akin to Him; and God is eternal βυθος, nameless σιγη, both for himself and for man. Naturally then too no knowledge of God is any longer possible. If anthropomorphic, creaturely names fall short of God's essence, then He cannot and may not be named by us with any name, then we must be absolutely silent; every name, with which we would wish to designate Him, is then a dishonouring of God, an assault on his majesty, a blasphemy, cf. above p. 22. One has sought to evade this consequence, which however lies close at hand, by making a distinction between representation and concept. Plato already began with that. Neoplatonism and gnosticism continued this. And Hegel has come forward with it again. But thereby one nevertheless does not get a step further. Even the highest speculation and the most profound philosophy must nevertheless think and speak about God; even if they now cast away all representations and retain only pure, abstract concepts, they do not thereby rise above human, creaturely thinking and speaking and do not approach the Infinite himself. Even the most abstract names, such as being, substance, the absolute, the one, spirit, reason, are and remain anthropomorphisms. For man there is only a choice between these two: absolute silence or human thinking and speaking about God, between agnosticism, i.e. theoretical atheism, or anthropomorphism.

Philosophy has therefore also always again returned to anthropomorphism, otherwise it would naturally also have ended with a negative critique. Plato, Philo, Plotinus, Pseudodionysius, Damascenus, Erigena have in the end nevertheless again ascribed all sorts of names to God. Cataphatic theology built up what apophatic had broken down. The substance of Spinoza received many attributes and modes. With Hegel God nevertheless again became life, spirit, thinking, reason, subject. Rauwenhoff lets the imagination appear, where the understanding must end, *Wijsb. v. d. godsd.* 611 v. By many philosophers therefore the right of anthropomorphism is defended, Kant, *Kr. der Urtheilskraft* ed. Kirchmann S. 346 f. Jacobi, *Werke* III 276 f. Paulsen, *Einl. in die Philos.* 1892 S. 262 f. Hartmann, [73] *Philos. d. Unbew.* II 9 414 etc. And thus naturally also Christian theology has always judged. God therein walks the way of men, *דְּרַךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם*, as the Jews expressed it. *Incomprehensibilia sunt Dei opera et actiones, neque nos assequi aliquid de iis possemus, nisi Sacra Scriptura iis uteretur loquendi de Deo formulis, quae rebus humanis propinqua sunt. Itaque Spiritui Sancto, Scripturarum auctori, placet, propter captus nostri imbecillitatem nostro more balbutire et blandius humilisque quam majestati tantae convenit, nobiscum per signa et verba agere*, Flacius bij Glassius p. 116, cf. Luther bij Oehler S. 169. Gerhard, *Loci Theol.* II c. 8 sect. 1. Ursinus, *Tract. theol.* 49, Polanus, *Synt.* p. 192 sq. Martyr, *Loci* p. 2, Alsted, *Theol. schol.* 148, Bretschneider, *Dogm.* I 477, Id. *Syst. Entw.* 365 f. Hengstenberg, *Auth. d. Pent.* II 445 f. Philippi II 27 f. Twisten II 16. Lange, II 32 f. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I 337. Beck, *Vorles.* II 3 f. Dr. Graue, on reaching an understanding concerning the analogical character of the knowledge of God, *Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.* Oct. 1888 S. 481-503.

5. The right of these names may thus be established, but what is their value? What and what kind of knowledge do they provide us concerning the Divine being? There can be no question of it, that this knowledge is an adaequate one. It is in every respect finite and limited, but for that reason it is nevertheless not impure and untrue. Adaequate knowledge we have very little; everywhere and in every domain we finally run up against a mystery; the inner being of things, the Ding an sich, escapes our observation. We perceive phaenomena and from that conclude to the being, we come to know properties and thereby climb up to the substance, but this itself lies behind the appearance and is unknown to us. Natural science assumes atoms as the last constituents of reality but has not the least empirical knowledge of them. A definition can be given only of the very simplest things; as soon as they are of a somewhat higher order, they cannot be fully described in any concept. That already holds for the visible world; but still more it is applicable in the world of the invisible things. Man is namely a bodily, sensuous being. All his knowledge begins with and arises out of sensuous perception. Our thinking is bound to the senses, as our soul to the body. The spiritual [74] things we never perceive directly but only through the medium of material things. We see everything ἐν αἰνιγματι. Not only God, but also the soul and the whole spiritual world comes to our knowledge only through the sensuous world. Hence it is that we designate all the spiritual with names, which in the first place apply in the visible world. The soul of man we name after bodily phenomena. Its activities, such as knowing, thinking, understanding, comprehending, judging, deciding, feeling etc. we bring to consciousness in ourselves and others by means of words, which originally indicate a bodily action. All our speaking of invisible things is thus metaphora, image, likeness, poetry. Τα γαρ

νοητα.... προσηγορίας δε πασης ἑκτος, ἔπειδῃ κυριον ὄνομα τῶν νοητῶν τε
καὶ ἄσωματων οὐδεν, Greg. Naz., Orat. 45. But for that reason we
nevertheless do not speak untruthfully and incorrectly. On the contrary,
genuine poetry is truth, for it rests on the likeness, the correspondence, the
affinity of the different groups of phenomena. The whole of language is
built on that, all figures proceed from that. If speaking in images were
untrue, all our thinking, and all our knowing would be appearance, and
speaking itself would be impossible. This same also holds in religion and
theology. Adequate knowledge of God does not exist. We cannot name
Him, as He exists in himself. All his names are borrowed from the
creatures. But for that reason they are not untrue, a fruit of human
imagination. Just as there exists likeness and thus comparison is possible
between the different parts of the world, so there is also affinity between
God and his creatures, which gives us the right to speak of Him in a
creaturely way. More still, temporally, in reality, the natural does indeed
precede the spiritual; but logically and ideally the spiritual is first and
thereafter the natural. The natural would not be able to lead us to the
spiritual, if it had not itself proceeded from it. Plato saw in the cosmos a
realization of the ideas. And Scripture teaches, that all things have been
made through the Logos and have not come into being out of things that
appear before the eyes, Joh. 1:3, Hebr. 11:3. It is God himself, who has
made the whole creation, also the material, serviceable to the revelation of
his virtues. He could do that, because He is the almighty creator and has
absolute dominion also over matter. Even if it is then also the case, that we
[75] call God with names borrowed from the creatures, in those creatures
they have first been placed by God himself. We do indeed use the names
with which we designate God first of the creatures, because we know these

earlier than God. But materially they apply first to God and thereafter to the creatures. All virtues are first in Him, then in the creatures. He possesses them per essentiam, these have them only per participationem. Just as the temple is made according to the *τυπος*, shown to Moses on the mountain, Hebr. 8:5, so every creature is first eternally thought and thereafter created in time. All *πατρια* i.e. not every lineage but all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named from the *Πατηρ* who created all things, Ef. 3:15, cf. Mt. 23:9, Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 9. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3 art. 2, qu. 13 art. 3 and 6. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 22 art. 1 qu. 3. Zanchius, Op. II col. 11-14 etc. All heavenly things are in Scripture painted for us in earthly paints and colors. God himself comes to us through the whole creation and has dwelt among us in the human nature of Christ. This human nature was certainly no adaequate organ of his Godhead; it was even a concealment of his glory. And yet the fullness of the Godhead has dwelt bodily in Him; whoever saw Him, beheld the Father. Both thus can be very well united, a knowledge, which is inadaequate, finite, limited and yet at the same time true, pure, sufficient. God reveals himself in his works, and according to that revelation He is named by us. He permits us to name Him in our weak, human language, because He himself in the creatures has displayed his virtues before us. We are thus actually not the ones who give God a name; how could we do and may we do that? It is God himself, who through nature and Scripture lays his glorious names upon our lips. According to an old distinction the names of God are no product of the *ratio ratiocinans*, the subjective reason of man, but of the *ratio ratiocinata*, the objective reason in revelation. God's self-consciousness is the archetype, and our knowledge of God, drawn from his Word, is the ectype.

6. By this the character is indicated which the knowledge of God always bears in creatures. Two extremes are thereby avoided. On the one side stand those who deem an essential, [76] quidditative, adequate knowledge of God possible, whether through mystical contemplation (Plotinus, Malebranche, the ontologists and the Roman Catholics as teaching the visio Dei per essentiam in the state of glory), or through logical thinking (Eunomius, Scotus, Spinoza, Hegel). Against all these the word remains true: no one has ever seen God; only the Son, who was in the bosom of the Father, has declared Him to us. Moses saw God's glory only when it had passed by. The prophets beheld God only in vision. Both in the creation outside us and in our own life of the soul, the created always remains standing in between God and our consciousness; *ideae innatae* do not exist. We see in a mirror and walk by faith. An absolute, an adequate knowledge of God is therefore impossible. The conversion of representation into concept, of the language of imagination into that of thought, of kataphatic into apophatic theology, of the Semitic-concrete into the Japhetic-abstract, always ends in the loss of all knowledge of God. But on the other hand, by the name of ectypal theology the feeling is also rejected of those who indeed deem the creaturely names for the designation of the being of God unavoidable, but in them see nothing but symbols, products of the poetic imagination. In a certain sense even Damascenus belongs here, *de fide orthod.* I 12 and Pseudodionysius, *de div. nom.* c. 1, cf. also Mozes Maimon., *More Neb.* I c. 58, Cusanus, *de docta ignor.* I c. 24. They asserted namely, that all those names made God known to us only as cause of all things, so that e.g. the name of wisdom ascribed to God contained nothing more than that He was the cause of all wisdom. But Thomas already rightly remarked against that, that God could then just as well be called gold, silver, sun, moon, body, etc., since He is

nevertheless the cause of all those creatures; and furthermore we all mean something else and more when we call God good, than when we call Him the cause of the good. The virtues of God are not all to be seen in all creatures and in all in the same way, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. Zanchius, Op. II col. 11-13. Yet later that feeling was especially renewed again by Schleiermacher. God is only absolute causality; his attributes are subjective designations; the character of theology is not to be called ectypal or analogical but symbolic, Schleiermacher, Reden über die Relig. S. 46, [77] Bretschneider, Dogm. I 4 477, Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 263. The religious representations are then products of the poetic imagination, aesthetically to be valued ideals (Rauwenhoff, Pierson, F. A. Lange etc.) In some modern circles in recent times the tendency is to be perceived, to continue to use the biblical and ecclesiastical names as symbols of higher, spiritual truths. This conception of the character of theology, however, is not tenable. Symbolic can indeed be called that theological science which occupies itself with the explanation of the sacred symbols occurring in Scripture and in the church, as e.g. Vitringa gives to that the name of *theologia symbolica* 1726, cf. d'Outrein, *Proefstukken van heilige Sinnebeelden* 1700. A symbol is always a sensible object or a sensible action for the designation of a spiritual truth. But theology as such does not have to do with such symbols, but with spiritual realities. When consciousness, will, holiness etc. is ascribed to God, no one understands this in a symbolic sense. Not a single religious person sees in such representations products of his imagination, as everyone gladly acknowledges this in works of art. The religious person, on the contrary, holds those religious representations to be objectively true, and his religion languishes and dies away as soon as he begins to doubt that. If they then are

products of the imagination, their objective truth is not to be maintained. Aesthetically they may then still be valued, religiously and ethically they have lost their value; religion can no more be converted into art than into philosophy. Attempts to maintain them then still as symbols always end in disappointment; he who, like Hegel, makes a distinction between representation and concept, no longer lets himself be satisfied with the representation; he always tries to come to the pure concept and then later in vain reaches back to the religious representations as symbols. The symbolic character of theology makes the names of God into a reflex of one's own life of feeling, deprives them of all truth, and seeks their ground only in the ever-changing ratio ratiocinans. Man is then the measure of religion; as man is, so is his God. For these reasons theology is not to be called symbolic, but ectypal or analogical. Herein is enclosed: 1o. that all our knowledge of God is from and through God, is grounded on his revelation, i.e. [78] on the ratio ratiocinata; 2o. that God, in order to communicate his knowledge to creatures, must descend to those creatures and accommodate himself to their capacity; 3o. that the possibility of this συγκαταβασις cannot be denied, since it is given of itself with the creation, i.e. with the existence of a finite being; 4o. that our knowledge of God therefore nevertheless is always only analogical, i.e. formed according to analogy of what of God is to be perceived in his creatures; has as its object not God himself in his unknowable being but God in his revelation, in his relation to us, in τα περι την φυσιν, Damasc., de fide orthod. I 4, in his habitudo ad creaturas, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 12; and thus is only a finite image, weak likeness and creaturely imprint of that perfect knowledge which God possesses of himself; and 5o. that our knowledge of God nevertheless is yet true and pure and reliable, because it has the self-consciousness of God as

archetype and his self-revelation in the cosmos as foundation, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 5 c. Gent. I c. 32-34. Zanchius, Op. II col. 23. 24. Junius, de theologia, Op. 1607 I 1378 sq. ed. Kuyper p. 51 sq. Gomarus, Disp. theol. I. Owen, Θεολογουμένα 1661 p. 10 sq. Calovius, Isag. ad theol. 1652 p. 25 sq. Kuyper, Enc. II 201 v.

§ 24. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NAMES OF GOD.

1 . Holy Scripture calls God by many names, but never proceeds from an abstract concept of God. Never does it elevate the one attribute of God at the expense of the other. Indeed, now the one, then again the other attribute comes more to the foreground, but between all attributes there is complete harmony. It is the intention of Scripture to bring all virtues of God equally to their honour. Just as the person of Christ does not represent a particular one-sided character or temperament and yet is a person full of life and reality, so also God in his revelation is always unfolding all his virtues in harmonious coherence. Nowhere is there any mention of the essence of God in abstracto. The Hebr. word *תִּשְׁבָּחָהּ* a rad. *יָשָׁה*; existence, being, arab. III to help, to set up, denotes that which endures, is lasting, [79] provides advantage, in concreto especially true wisdom and happiness, Job 5:12, 6:13, 12:16, 26:3 (30:22), Spr. 2:7, 3:21, 8:14 and further only still Jes. 28:29, Mich. 6:9, but in none of these places stands for the essence of God, cf. Delitzsch on Job 5:12. Nor can the N. T. words *θεοτης* Col. 2:9, *θειοτης* Rom. 1:29, *μορφη θεου* Phil. 2:6, *θεια φυσικς* 2 Petr. 1:4 cf. Gal. 4:8 prove

that there the essence or the nature of God is spoken of in distinction from his attributes, as Polanus wishes, Synt. theol. p. 135. God's essence becomes knowable to us in his revelation, i.e. in his names. The names of God are designations of his ἄρεται, 1 Petr. 2:9. This manner of speaking connects itself with Jes. 42:8, 12. 43:21. 63:5, where the Hebr. הָלֵלָהּ praise, honour, in the LXX has been translated by ἄρετη, cf. Hab. 3:3. Zach. 6:13. The congregation has the calling to proclaim God's virtues, i.e. to give him honour for the δόξα, which is displayed in all his works. Of a description of God's essence, apart from the attributes, there is never any mention in Holy Scripture. In the first period, something of that sort was also not attempted in Christian theology. Under the nomina Dei everything was comprehended that one had to say of God. The names of God were indication not only of the nomina propria but also of the attributes so called later and even of the persons in the Divine essence, Clemens Alex. Strom. V 12. Augustinus, de doctr. chr. I 5. Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 1 sq. Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 12. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13. Catech. Rom. I c. 2 qu. 11. 13. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I 2 S. 211 f. Gerhard, Loci Theol. loc. 2. Hyperius, Meth. Theol. p. 89 sq. c. 3. Polanus, Synt. Theol. Lib. 2 c. 6. Zanchius, Op. II col. 9. 10. Walaeus, Op. I p. 152 sq. Alsted, Theol. did. schol. p. 61. The attributes were then also immediately included in the idea of God; thus e.g. with Irenaeus, adv. haer. I c. 14. II c. 13., 35 etc. Augustinus does indeed speak of God's essentia, but he understands by that the fullness of the being of God and immediately includes all attributes, simplicity, eternity, goodness, wisdom etc. in it. In the confessions, God is also spoken of more than once in that way, without distinction of essence and attributes, and without classification of the attributes, Conc. Lateran. bij Denzinger, Enchir. symb. n. 355, Conc. Vatic. de fide c. 1. Conf. August. art. 1. Conf.

Gall. art. 1. [80] Scot. art. 1. Belg. art. 1. Conf. Westm. cap. 2. And even later still various theologians do not enter into these distinctions and treat the attributes, without speaking beforehand about the nature of God, e.g. Thomas. S. Theol. I qu. 3 sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 46-70.

2. But soon a distinction nevertheless arose. To that end one was led by the question what the attribute was which at once distinguished God from all creatures, what the principal concept was and from which, therefore, one had to proceed in the doctrine of God. Now the Platonic philosophy had already sought that principal concept in being, and Philo had connected this with the name *Ihvh*, the only name which indicated not an operation or power but the essence of God himself, and therefore often called God *ὁ ὢν* or *το ὄν*, Zeller, Philos. V3 356. This circumscription of the essence of God was adopted in Christian theology. Irenaeus describes God repeatedly as absolutely simple, adv. haer. II c. 13. 28 IV 11 and even calls Him *inexcogitabilis et insubstantivus*, I c. 14, but over against Gnosticism nevertheless lays the emphasis especially on this, that God is the creator of all things and that He has revealed himself in his works, Harnack D. G. I 485 f. On the other hand, with Origenes, de princ. I 1 sq. c. Cels. VI 64. VII 42-51, Athanasius, de decr. nic. syn. c. 11, Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 2. 4. 9. etc. cf. Harnack D. G. II 119 f. Schwane, Dogm. I 132 II 35, Kattenbusch, Vergl. Confessionskunde I 310 f., God is the one, the being, indeed the one exalted above all being, *ὁ ὢν, ὁ ὢν καθ' ἑαυτον, το ὄν*, who is being itself, who has being from and through himself. And in the footsteps of Philo all this was derived from or fastened to the name of *Ihvh* in the O. Test. In the West these determinations were adopted. Augustine repeatedly circumscribes God as *summum esse, summum bonum, verum, pulchrum* etc. God is a *substantia*, for what is no substance does not exist,

Enarr. in Ps. 67. But, because the word *substantia* is often used in contrast with *accidentia*, which are in the substance and have it as bearer, Augustine, of God, prefers to use the word *essentia*, quam Graeci οὐσίαν vocant and for which the word *natura* is also sometimes used, de trin. V 2 VII 5 sq. de civ. XII, 2. de doctr. chr. I 6. With God, after all [81] there is no distinction between substance and accidents; his being is no bearer of the attributes, but these are identical with being itself. God is the highest, best, most beautiful, most perfect being, quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit, de lib. arb. II 6. de doctr. chr. I 7. He is Deus, supra quem nihil, extra quem nihil, sine quo nihil est; summa vita, summa veritas, summa beatitudo, summa sapientia, summa essentia, de civ. XII 2. Solil. I 1. And Augustine too appeals for this circumscription of God to the name *Ihvh*, de trin. V 2. VII 5. de doctr. chr. I 32. We then later find this same circumscription repeatedly again, with Hilarius, de trin. I c. 1 sq. Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 1. § 6, who however in cap. 4 § 1 proceeds from the idea of the good and in c. 5 § 1 says that this extends still further than that of being, Anselmus, Monol. c. 28. Prosl. c. 17 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 3 and qu. 3. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. Bonaventura, Brevil. I cap. 2. Sent. I dist. 8. etc. Petavius, Theol. lib. 1 c. 6. Perrone, Prael. theol. II 81-90. C. Pesch, Prael. II 46-70. Jansen II p. 26-46. Although this now did indeed become the usual opinion, there were nevertheless some who chose another point of departure. They sought the principal concept with the idea of God not in absolute being, in the *esse a se* (*aseitas*), but in infinity; and they therefore preferred to circumscribe the essence of God as an *ens infinitum*. Thus did Duns Scotus, who asserted that being could be ascribed univoce, in the same sense, to God and to the creature, but that the distinguishing mark between God and the creature lay in this, that God was an *ens infinitum* and

the creatures were finite, Sent. I dist. 3 qu. 1. and dist. 8 qu. 3. Further, there were still some Thomists who thought that the proper essence of God lay in the intellectual nature and they therefore circumscribed God as *ens intelligens*, as e.g. with Gotti, cf. Perrone, *Prael. theol.* II p. 82. Kleutgen, *Theol. der Vorzeit* I2 229.

3. The Reformation brought no change in this conception. People aligned themselves with one or another description. The Reformed, at least in the first period, for the most part adopted the description of Augustine and Thomas. They proceeded from the concept of *aseitas* or of *independentia* and often defined God as an *ens independens*, Zwingli, *Op.* III 155 sq. IV 81 sq. Hyperius, [82] *Meth. Theol.* p. 87. Martyr, *Loci Comm.* p. 39b. Polanus *Synt. Theol. lib.* II c. 5. Zanchius, *Op.* II col. 49 sq. Ursinus, *Tract. theol.* 1584 p. 46 sq. Alongside this there also occur the descriptions of God as *spiritus increatus*, *spiritus simplicissimus*, *spiritus a se ipso existens*, sometimes further supplemented with the trinitarian formula *unus essentia, trinus personis*, Heppe, *Dogm. der ev. ref. K.* S. 35 f. Schweizer, *Gl. der ev. ref. K.* I 244 f. The Lutherans used the definition *essentia spiritualis infinita, ens spirituale a se subsistens, spiritus independens*, Schmid, *Dogm. der ev. luth.* K6. S. 73-77. Hase, *Hutt. red.* § 54. By contrast, Socinianism adopted another standpoint. Disregarding all metaphysical questions, it laid emphasis only on the will of God. The knowledge of God consists only in knowing his will. Religion loses all mysticism and is absorbed into cultus. God comes to stand ever farther away from world and humanity. In Remonstrantism, rationalism and English deism this is continued, cf. above bl. 15. 16. Against this cold, moralistic concept of God there again came a reaction from the side of philosophy. Spinoza reverted to the idea of being, conceived God as *substantia unica, infinita, necessario existens, ens*

absolute infinitum, absolute causa prima et immanens, Eth. I prop. 7 sq. and again spoke of a love of God, amor Dei intellectualis, which bestowed the highest blessedness, Eth. V prop. 15 sq. To be sure, rationalism and deism also remained dominant after Spinoza, but around the middle of the 18th century people became more and more weary of this. The great spirits, Goethe, Lessing, Herder felt themselves attracted to Spinoza, and soon his pantheism made its entry into philosophy. Kant already undermined the foundations of rationalism, although he nevertheless still called himself a deist, Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation. I 104. Fichte undertook the struggle against the concepts God and immortality as products of eudaemonism. In his exaggerated moralism God was for him identical with the pure I, with the moral world-order; God was no being, no substance but absolute Thun, Thätigkeit; thus in his Wissenschaftslehre 1794, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung 1798, Appellation an das Publikum 1799. Later he partially retreated from this and aligned himself more closely with Spinoza, Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre 1806. Schleiermacher displayed an even [83] stronger resemblance to Spinoza. God and world are correlata, Dialektik S. 162. God is the Woher unseres empfänglichen und selbstthätigen Daseins, Glaub. I S. 20. Schelling distinguished himself from both in that he took account not only of the spiritual, religion, morality but also of objective nature. It was his aim to raise natural science out of the deplorable condition in which it found itself. And thus he then comprehends both, nature and spirit together; nature is visible spirit, spirit invisible nature; in both he sees a continuous, organic revelation of the Absolute, which is exalted above all oppositions, one, simple, eternal, without praedikaten, unity of the infinite and the finite, of God and world, ἐν καὶ παν, Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation. I S. 201 f.

Finally Hegel transformed this system into a logical idealism. Nature and history are a logically necessary self-unfolding of the idea. Everything is rational, everything is embodied thought. Reason is thus the absolute substance, it is God himself. For God is nothing other than the one, living world-idea developing itself to self-consciousness. God is thus in Hegel indeed reason, thinking, spirit, subject, but not in the sense that He would have a life of his own before and outside the world. Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott, the world is an essential moment in the life of God, Drews, *Die deutsche Spekulation*. I 229 f.

4. Nor did opposition to this pantheism fail to appear. A whole series of theistic philosophers arose, in order to demonstrate the untenability of pantheism and to maintain the right of theism. They sought their strength in the idea of absolute personality, connected this with the idea of becoming, and thus introduced into God a theogonic process, whether in a Unitarian (Jacobi, Herbart, Drobisch, Rothe, Lotze, Ulrici, Carrière etc.), or in a Trinitarian sense (Baader, Schelling, J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Dorner etc.). But this theistic speculation too has had its time. Separation of theology and philosophy, of religion and metaphysics has become the watchword. On the one hand science withdraws more and more from the terrain of religion and of theology; it becomes exact, positive. On the other hand religion too seeks more and more to detach itself from science and to banish all metaphysics and philosophy. [84] For the locus de Deo this has as a consequence that the essence of the Godhead is sought exclusively in the ethically good. The Groningen theology placed the fatherhood and the love in God in the foreground, Hofstede de Groot, *De Gron. Godg.* 1855 bl. 177 v. Scholten did indeed proceed from God's absolute sovereignty, L. H. K. II4, but the ethical moderns rose up in opposition to his speculative intellectualism and

monistic determinism, and conceived God as Father, Hoekstra, Des Christens godsvrucht 1866 bl. 103 v. Bronnen en grondslagen 1864 bl. 265 v., as the moral ideal, the power of the good, holy power, Hooykaas, God in de geschiedenis 1870. Hooykaas, H. Herderschee, Oort, Van Hamel, Godsd. volg. de beginselen der eth. rigting onder de modernen 1876. In Germany, in the same way, the neo-Kantianism of Ritschl has come forward against the speculative Vermittelungstheologie. Ritschl denies that religion is a legal relationship. According to Duns Scotus, the socin. and the armin. God is the unlimited ruler, who nevertheless treats human beings with fairness, although they have no rights over against Him. Arbitrariness, dominium absolutum is the essence of God and the law of the world; God can do the one just as well as the other. The relationship between God and man is private-law in character, and finds its image in the slaveholder who treats his slave fairly, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 223-229. According to the orthodox Protestants God's relationship to the world is determined by justice. Man has a right to eternal life if he keeps God's law and otherwise deserves punishment. This theory is public-law in character; it is derived from the O. Test., especially from Pharisaism and was taken over by Paul and thus entered into the christ. church, ib. III2 229-245. Cf. also his studies on God, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1865 and 1868, now reissued in Gesammelte Aufsätze, Neue Folge 1896. But both representations are wrong. Law and religion stand over against each other. No dualism may be introduced into God between justice and grace. The whole abstract, Areopagitic concept of God must be given up, which places God negatively above the world and assumes no communion between God and man, ib. S. 253. Religion is a moral relationship, and Christianity is the vollendet geistige and absolut sittliche Religion, ib. III2 S. 8 f. The relationship of [85] God and man finds

its image not in the relation of a master to his servant or of the government to its subjects but in that of a father to his child. The family is its model, III2 90. God must therefore be conceived as love; alongside it no other concept of equal value comes into consideration, ib. S. 255. From that one must proceed at once. The Christian dogmatician should not begin, according to synthetic method, with all kinds of metaphysical abstractions about God as the Absolute, Theol. u. Methaph. 12 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 2-8. 32, nor also with a so-called *theologia naturalis* which does not exist, III2 S. 200 f. Theol. u. Met. S. 8 f., nor also with the concept of personality or with the attribute of holiness, III2 255, but at once and entirely with love. From that everything, creation, providence, reconciliation, justification etc. must be derived, ib. 255. Theol. u. Met. 20. Cf. Kaftan, *Das Wesen der chr. Relig.* S. 383. Herrmann, *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit* S. 121 f. Gottschick, *Die Kirchlichkeit der s. g. kirchl. Theol.* S. 152 f. And thus every direction is recognizable by its concept of God. In turn God is defined as the being, the absolute being, substance; or as the Sovereign, the Lord, the Supreme Being; or as infinite Spirit, absolute causality, absolute personality; or as the Father, love, goodness etc. It is so difficult to proceed from the harmony of all God's virtues and to maintain these to the end. Every human being is limited and lays the emphasis on one attribute at the expense of the others; Jansenius saw in God especially truth, François de Sales love, Vincentius goodness, Saint Cyran omnipotence, Quack, *Port-Royal*, reprint from the Gids of 1872 bl. 49. And yet it is the calling of theology, after the example of Holy Scripture, to honor all virtues of God equally.

5. But because theology in this way defined the essence of God and made one attribute into the chief concept, it ran the risk of making a distinction

between the essence of God and the attributes that were later added alongside it. In doing so, of course, it could not take the path of polytheism, which made so many divine persons out of the different attributes, as these were revealed in creatures. Plato too gave to the ideas, [86] as archetypes of real things, an existence of their own, independent, alongside God. Gnosticism defined God as the unknowable and unnameable, but made the Platonic ideas into aeons, which emanated from God and in a descending series removed themselves from God. They were called *έννοια*, *νοϋς*, *λογος*, *ζωη*, *σοφια* etc. and were the personified attributes of God, emanating from God, presented as divine beings, Iren. adv. haer. I 11. 24. Philo, under Plato's influence, often represented the divine powers, especially goodness, power, and the logos, as hypostases, Zeller, Philos. der Gr. V3 S. 358 f. Jewish theology assumed various hypostases, such as metatron, memra, schechina, ruach, bath kol, Weber, System der altsyn. pal. Theol. S. 172; and in the kabbalah the ten sefiroth or attributes of God were often described as emanations from the Divine essence, Franck, La Kabbale ou la philos. religieuse des Hébreux, Paris Hachette 1873. Ueberweg, Gesch. der Philos. II § 27. Herzog² 7, 375 f. Dr. Th. Bloch, Gesch. der Entw. der Kabbala u. der jüd. Rel. Philos. Trier Mayer 1894. Later too this gnostic and kabbalistic philosophy has still often exercised great influence. In Arianism something of this gnosticism still continued to have an effect, insofar as it assumed a gradation among the Divine persons. Monotheism, no longer supported and maintained by the doctrine of the Trinity, easily passes over into polytheism. We hear it daily, that state, science, art, fortune, chance, fate, etc. are by many regarded and venerated as independent powers alongside and in the place of God.

Although Christian theology did not go so far, it nevertheless soon made a distinction between God's essence and attributes. The church fathers had already long spoken of the essence of God in distinction from the three persons, but gradually the word essence was also set over against his attributes. Especially through the struggle against Eunomius this distinction arose. Eunomius in his *liber apologeticus* repeatedly expressed that the names were an indication of the essence of the thing, τας προσηγορίας εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν σημαντικὰς, *ib. c. 18. Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II p. 598.* Over against this Basilus and Gregorius Nyss. asserted that there was not a single name that expressed God's essence, but that there nevertheless were many ὀνόματα, ἰδιώματα, ἐννοιαί, νοήματα, ἀξιώματα, through which χαρακτηρ τις ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται τοῦ θεοῦ, *Bibl. patr. gr. [87] dogm. II p. 42.* And Greg. Nyss. spoke of οὐσία of God as το ὑποκειμενον and of ποιότητες or ἰδιωμάτων διαφοραὶ in relation to that essence, Dieckamp, *Die Gotteslehre des h. Gregor. van Nyssa, Münster 1896 I 190 f.* As soon as this distinction arose, the question necessarily had to be asked, what belonged to the essence and what to the attributes. Therewith the good path was abandoned. If the church fathers in the description of God proceeded from the name *Ihvh* and described Him as being, then with that they did not have in view the essence of God in distinction from his attributes, but the whole essence of God as it reveals itself in his attributes. The being that was ascribed to God was thus no abstractum, but a living, infinitely full, concrete being, a *summum esse*, which at once and in one was identical with *summa vita*, *summa veritas*, *summa sapientia*, *summus amor* etc., as Augustine repeatedly said, a πελαγος οὐσίας ἀπειρον καὶ ἀοριστον, *mare substantiae infinitum et interminatum*, *Greg. Naz. Or. 38. Damasc., de fide orth. I 9.* The description of God as *essentia* indicated that He was the

comprehending whole of all reality, and absolutely not that He was the abstract being, in the philosophical sense of that word. Baur, *Gesch. der Lehre von der Dreiein.* II 644 f., and Ritschl in his studies on God, *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1865 S. 275-318. 1868 S. 67-133 and S. 251-302 have not kept this difference sufficiently in view. Also in Basilus and Gregorius Nyss. the distinction of essence and attributes still served chiefly, in order over against Eunomius to maintain the incomprehensibility of God's essence.

6. But when the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God later came to stand in the background, the distinction between essence and attributes acquired another significance. As in creatures between their substance and their attributes, so one also made in God a distinction between his essence and his perfections. This, however, led to all kinds of difficulties. In the first place one came into conflict with one's own point of departure. It was the unanimous doctrine of the whole Christian church and theology, that God's essence an sich was unknowable, that no name and no definition could be given of it and that God could be known only from his revelation, by his own light. Therewith theology [88] from the beginning adopted a positive standpoint and cut off all philosophical speculation at the root. Now, however, it imperceptibly brought philosophy in again. The essence of God was distinguished from his attributes. Of that essence, therefore, something could and had to be said apart from the attributes. The incomprehensibility of God was in fact denied. But there was more. This distinction between God's essence and attributes entailed that that essence could not be defined except in very abstract terms, as *ens spirituale*, *ens infinitum*, *ens absolutum*, without further *praedikaten*. That might now be a philosophical definition, but that was no longer the Christian, the biblical concept of God. God never confronted us thus in Scripture. The theological and the

philosophical concept of God resembled each other remarkably. The first chapters of Christian dogmatics gave a schema of concepts that was all too much borrowed from Plato and Aristotle and that was then later supplemented by Christian ideas. Especially when in this century theology took over the idea of the Absolute from philosophy, the mixing of both clearly emerged. It is the merit of Ritschl that he saw that. He was completely right when he demanded that dogmatics should at once proceed from the Christian concept of God. Only he too again was guilty of one-sidedness, when on that ground he demanded that God might be conceived only as love. In Scripture, which in its entirety and not merely for a part, e.g. the gospels, the words of Jesus, the sermon on the mount, is the principium of dogmatics, God confronts us in a fullness of attributes. And it is the demand of dogmatics to proceed equally not from one but from all virtues of God. Only then does there come harmony in our knowledge of God and thus also in our whole doctrine and in our whole life. Further, the incorrectness of that distinction between essence and attributes came out in this, that it, once adopted, was nevertheless at once revoked again. By the doctrine of the *simplicitas Dei*, Christian theology was after all safeguarded against the error of assuming an essential difference between the two. It said in general that there was no distinction. Every attribute is God's essence. God is what he has. In creatures there is a distinction between what they are and what they have; a human being is still a human being, even if he has lost the image of God and has [89] become a sinner. But in God all attributes are his essence itself. God is wholly light, wholly understanding, wholly wisdom, wholly logos, wholly spirit etc. Iren. adv. haer. II 28 IV 11. In God is the *esse quod sapere, quod bonum esse, quod potentem esse*. *Una eademque res dicitur sive dicatur aeternus Deus sive immortalis sive bonus*

sive justus enz., August., de trin. VI 7. Damascenus, I 9. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 3. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 42. 51-53. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 81. God is everything together at the same time and wholly. Deus habet nullas proprietates sed mera est essentia. Proprietates Dei sunt realiter ipsamet Dei essentia nec ab essentia Dei nec inter se re ipsa differunt. All this was well and beautifully said. Only, why make a distinction that was at once again annulled and presently once again in the doctrine of the simplicitas Dei was shown in its incorrectness? Worse was that others, proceeding from the distinction between essence and attributes acknowledged by all, now also sought an objective and real distinction, and thus more or less made the attributes independent over against the essence. Thus Gilbert Porretanus made a distinction between the essence, the nature of God, the divinitas and God, Deus; the divinitas was the forma, by which God is God, but not itself God, Divinitate Deus est sed divinitas non est Deus, Petavius, de Deo I cap. 8, art. Herzog² 5, 168. Duns Scotus did indeed deny that there was a distinctio realis between essence and attributes, but nevertheless said that the attributes were distinguished formaliter from God's essence and from one another, with appeal to Damascenus and Augustinus, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 4 n. 17 sq. Socinianism spoke of accidentia in God and considered a different conception and description of the attributes necessary for the subject, Fock, Der Socin. S. 427. Many have gone still further and have even assumed an objective distinction in God, at the expense of the simplicity and the immutability of God, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 38. Martensen, Chr. Dogm. § 85. Vilmar, Dogm. I 190 f. Dorner, Chr. Glaub. I 181 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I 34 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 371-374. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. § 47. Proceeding further on this line, Doedes first treated those determinations

which are of themselves given with the idea God, such as unity, communicability, incomparability, incomprehensibility, self-subsistence etc., and subsequently the attributes [90] which now in addition accrue to that divine essence, and are only five in number, omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, love, holiness. The Roman Catholic theologian C. Pesch likewise speaks of *attributa, substantiae divinae superaddita*, *Praelect. theol. II 72*. The disadvantage of the separation comes out most strongly in F. A. B. Nitzsch, who first treats the essence of God with the *aseitas*, holiness, unity etc., *Ev. Dogm. S. 351-367*, then the works of creation *S. 367-396* and only thereafter the attributes according to the division of Schleiermacher, *S. 396-423*.

For these reasons the distinction between essence and attributes is not to be approved. Of course it is not thereby denied that God is a being, a substance, nor is the use of the word essence disapproved; in the doctrine of the Trinity it is even indispensable. But the rejection of the distinction means that the essence of God is in no respect knowable apart from the attributes, and that no division may be given which makes some attributes appear as given with the essence and others as added thereto. Therefore Christian theology has at all times rightly taught that the attributes are identical with the essence of God. Each attribute is the Divine essence itself. Therefore it is impossible, with one attribute or one name, to describe the whole essence of God, as has often been attempted, e.g. with the idea of absolute personality or of love. Love is in no greater or lesser degree an attribute of God and a description of his essence than any other virtue or perfection. It stands on an equal line with all attributes, as Nitzsch, *Ev. Dogm. S. 351 f.* also rightly remarks. Whether God has still more virtues than those which He reveals to us in creation and dominion can remain an

open question. Spinoza said that a substance, in proportion as it had more reality, also possessed more attributes, Eth. I prop. 9, and that God as the infinite substance therefore also had infinitely many attributes, ib. prop. 11, although only two, thought and extension, are known to us. And Reinhard, Dogm. S. 100 found it very probable that Gott eine Menge von Eigenschaften besitzen könne, wovon wir gar keinen Begriff haben, weil die unendliche Vollkommenheit in so eingeschränkten Geschöpfen, wie wir sind, unmöglich alle Aehnlichkeiten mit sich hat vereinigen können, cf. also L. Meijer, [91] Treatises on the divine attributes, Gron. 1783 I 186 v. But however this may be, the calling of dogmatics is to show the harmonious unity of all the virtues which God has displayed in his works.

7. If, accordingly, no distinction can be made between essence and attributes, because every attribute is the essence of God itself, then it still does not follow from that that the distinction also among the attributes mutually is only nominal and subjective, without any ground in reality. Many, however, have judged thus. Aëtius and Eunomius reasoned as follows: God is simple and without any composition; what is in Him or is predicated of Him cannot differ from his essence; goodness, wisdom, power, etc., especially the ἀγεννησία, are distinguished from the essence neither realiter nor in our thought; whoever therefore names one attribute, e.g. the agennesia, thereby expresses the whole divine essence; the Son therefore also cannot be God like the Father; see Eunomius, Liber apologeticus, Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II 581-615. In the Middle Ages many arrived at the same thought. The perfections of God are distinguished from the essence and from one another neither virtualiter nor formaliter (Duns Scotus), but only in name. The concept of the one is contained in that of the other, involvitur unum in altero. Whoever calls God good, calls Him

therein at the same time just, powerful, etc., Stöckl., Phil. des M. A. II 968. Also in the Arabic and Jewish philosophy this subjective conception of God's attributes occurs, Stöckl., ib. 18. 27. 60. 88. 268 f., Kaufmann, Gesch. der Attributenlehre in der jüd. Rel. Philos. des M. A. von Saadja bis Maimuni 1877. Spinoza understood by attribute *id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens*, Eth. I def. 4. According as the emphasis is laid on the first or second part of this definition, the judgment diverges whether Spinoza regarded the attributes as subjective conceptions of the understanding or as objective, real properties of the substance, Falckenberg, Gesch. d. neuern Philos. S. 90. The pantheism, which through him found entrance into philosophy, has no place any longer for the attributes of God. God has no being distinct from the world, no proper life any more. His attributes are identical with the laws of the world, Strauss, Gl. I 613. [92] Schleiermacher therefore also defined them wholly subjectively, as *etwas Besonderes in der Art, das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf Gott zu beziehen*; their origin lies in the religious Dichtung, they are without speculative content, they express neither God's essence, which is unknowable, nor his relations to the world, because God then would have to stand in manifold relations to the world; they are simply subjective conceptions, without objective ground. And he therefore also treated the doctrine of the attributes not separately but throughout the whole dogmatics, Chr. Gl. § 50.

Against this conception of the names of God it is now, on the ground of God's revelation, to be maintained that very certainly every attribute is identical with the Divine essence, but that for that reason the attributes are nevertheless still distinct. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa taught thus in their writings against Eunomius. They said on the one hand that the attributes did

not differ really, τῷ πραγματι, since God was simple and exalted above all composition, but on the other hand that they were nevertheless not distinguished only in name, λογῷ. Avoiding these two extremes, they judged that the names of God differed κατ' ἐπινοίαν, that we in our understanding had different ἐννοίαι, ἐπινοίαι, ἐπενθυμῆσεις of the one and the same Divine essence, and that with the different attributes, such as goodness, wisdom, etc., we thus did not merely use different names, but in doing so really also thought something different. The concepts, therefore, which we place in the names of God, are mutually distinct. The names of God therefore ought not to be mixed or confused with one another; each could be considered by itself. Thus God was very certainly identical with the attributes divinitas, bonitas, sapientia, paternitas, filietas etc., but for that reason these are not equal among themselves in conception. The one attribute is therefore not so involved in the other that we cannot think the one without the other; but each attribute expresses something particular, Petavius, I c. 7-10. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II2 S. 19-31. Augustine expresses himself still more strongly, that every attribute is God's essence and in so far is identical with every other attribute. Quidquid enim secundum qualitates, n. of God, dici videtur. secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intelligendum, de trin. XV 5. Deo autem hoc est esse, quod est fortem esse aut justum esse aut sapientem esse etc., de trin. VI, 4, cf. above p. 89. [93] Also the attributes are not mutually different, quae justitia ipsa bonitas et quae bonitas ipsa beatitudo, de trin. XV 8. Eadem magnitudo ejus est, quae sapientia, non enim mole magnus est sed virtute; et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum, aut bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse, de trin. VI 6. Yes, he says expressly

that these praedicamenta or qualitates, used of God, are properly affectiones of our mind; quidquid horum de Deo dicis, neque aliud et aliud intelligitur et nihil digne dicitur, quia haec animarum sunt, quas illa lux perfundit quodam modo et pro suis qualitatibus afficit, quomodo cum oritur corporibus lux ista visibilis. Si auferatur, unus est corporibus omnibus color, qui potius dicendus est nullus color. Cum autem illata illustraverit corpora, quamvis ipsa unius modi sit, pro diversis tamen corporum qualitatibus diverso eos nitore adspergit. Ergo animarum sunt istae affectiones, quae bene sunt affectae ab illa luce quae non afficitur et formatae ab illa quae non formatur, Serm. 341 n. 8. But however strongly Augustine speaks here, he nevertheless fully maintains that all these praedicamenta are rightly and truly used of God. God is all that He has and that is ascribed to Him in the names. With this simplicitas Dei Augustine is not concerned to take anything away from God, but on the contrary always to conceive Him in the fullness of his being. Therefore he also speaks of the simplex multiplicitas or multiplex simplicitas in God, de trin. VI 4 and he calls God's wisdom simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis, de civ. XII 18. In later time the distinction of the ratio ratiocinans and the ratio ratiocinata was used, in order to bring the difficulty that presented itself with the doctrine of the attributes to some solution. The distinction of the attributes might on the one hand detract nothing from the unity, the simplicity, the immutability of God's essence, and yet on the other hand could also not be conceived as a subjective, arbitrary, and untrue invention of man. And therefore it was rightly said that this distinction was grounded in God's revelation itself. For it is not we who thus name God. We do not invent those names. On the contrary, if it depended on us, we would be silent about Him, try to forget Him, and deny all his [94] names. We have no desire for the knowledge of

his ways. We repeatedly set ourselves in opposition to all his names, to his independence, his sovereignty, his righteousness, his love, and we rebel against all his perfections. But it is God himself who reveals all his virtues and lays his names upon our lips. He gives himself his names and maintains them in spite of our resistance. It is of little use whether we deny his righteousness; He shows it to us every day in history. And so it is with all virtues. In spite of us He brings them to revelation. The final goal of all his ways is that his name may shine in all his works and be written upon everyone's forehead, Op. 22:4. Therefore we cannot name Him otherwise than with the many names that his revelation itself puts into our hand. With the simplicity of God this distinction of the attributes is also not in contradiction. For the *simplicitas* does not designate God as an abstract concept, as the absolute, the being, the idea, etc., but precisely makes known that He is an absolute fullness of being. And therefore God cannot reveal himself to finite creatures otherwise than under many names. The Divine essence is so infinitely rich that no creature can survey it all at once. Just as a child cannot imagine the value of a large coin but then first gets some notion of it when it is broken down into a number of smaller coins, so also we can form no idea of the infinite fullness of God's essence unless it repeatedly reveals itself to us in another relation and under another point of view, Augustine, tract. 13 in Ev. Joan. Martyr, Loci p. 39. Moor, Comm. I 582 etc. God remains eternally and immutably one and the same, but the relation differs in which He stands to his creatures and these stand to Him. The light remains the same, even though it breaks into different colors, (Augustine). The fire does not change, whether it warms, illuminates, or burns, (Moses Maimonides). And grain remains grain, even though we call it according to the different relations now fruit, then seed, then food,

(Basil). God is named differently, on account of the *varii effectus*, which He brings about in the creatures through his always one and the same essence. In this connection it must be remembered that God can appear in such different attributes and be called with such different names, because there is affinity between [95] Him and his creatures. If this did not exist, all names would be untrue. But now there is in the creatures analogy of what is present in God himself. The names do not merely designate God as cause of things, but they give, however weak and defective, yet some conception of the Divine essence. Thus, indicating God with all these names, we speak indeed imperfectly, finitely, limitedly, humanly, but yet not falsely and untruly. For although knowing and willing, righteousness and grace in God are one and always the same full entire essence, yet God, as it were, spreads out that one rich essence in these many virtues, as if next to and alongside one another, before our eyes. Even if it is always the same essence that meets us in those names, in each name a comprehension is granted to us of what that essence truly is in infinite fullness. In God, according to the essence, holiness and mercy may be the same, yet our conception of both, formed from God's own revelation, is nevertheless different. There is no name that can express God's essence *adaequat*; thus many names serve to give us an impression of his greatness that surpasses all. Cf. besides those mentioned, Damascenus, *de fide orth.* I c. 10. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 3. art. 3 qu. 13 art. 4. c. Gent. I c. 5. Sent. I dist. 2. qu. 1 art. 2. Petavius, *de Deo* I cap. 7-13. C. Pesch, *Praelect. dogm.* II 71-76. Zanchius, *Op.* II 49 sq. Polanus, *Synt. theol. lib.* 2. c. 7. Voetius, *Disp.* I 233 sq. Heppe, *Dogm. der ev. ref. K.* 51-53. Schmid, *Dogm. der ev. luth. K.* § 18.

8. As has already been said above, in the earliest period everything that could be thought and spoken of God was summarized under his names. But

the richness of the material made ordering necessary. There came at once some delimitation, because the term names gradually came into use for the nomina propria, God, Lord, etc. Next, the doctrine of the Trinity was soon treated separately, whether before or after the so-called attributes, and in an entirely proper terminology. Further, the distinction between essence and attributes brought with it that the former was separated from the latter, and thus the doctrine of the attributes came to stand alone. The division which now lay most to hand for these attributes and which is also the oldest and first, was that into negative and positive names. As soon as one, after all, [96] began to reflect on the way in which one had arrived at those names, one saw that they had been obtained from the creatures either via negationis or via eminentiae and causalitatis. We find this division or at least this twofold respectively threefold way, to come to know God, already in Philo and Plotinus, Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* S. 355 f. 483. cf. also Herzog² 10, 521. With the church fathers God was both unknowable and knowable, unknowable according to his essence, knowable according to his revelation; on the one hand only what He is not could be said of God, but on the other hand something positive could nevertheless be predicated of Him in an imperfect and inadequate way. Pseudodionysius, *de myst. theol.* I 2, Damascenus, *de fide orth.* I 2. 4, Erigena, *de div. nat.* I 78 worked out this thought expressly into a division, into a twofold theology, the apo- and the kataphatic. The former indicates the three ways in so many words, when he says that we come to knowledge of God ἐν τῇ παντῶν ἀφαιρέσει καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ παντῶν αἰτίᾳ, *de div. nom.* c. 7 § 3. And scholasticism came to speak of three viae, by which one came to knowledge of God, via negationis, eminentiae and causalitatis, especially since Durandus de S. Porciano. These three viae were acknowledged in dogmatics down to the

most recent time. Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed have all adopted them and sometimes treated them at length. But they have also been sharply criticized more than once. Spinoza rejected the *via eminentiae* with the remark that a triangle, if it could speak, would say *Deum eminenter triangularem esse*, Epist. 60, cf. Xenophanes in Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* I 490. Kant thought that the way of causality could only be trodden within the circle of the *phaenomena*. Schleiermacher disapproved of the *via negationis* and *eminentiae* and retained only the *via causalitatis*, *Chr. Gl.* § 50. 51. cf. further Twisten II 30 f. Strauss, *Gl.* I 536 f. Bruch, *Lehre v. d. göttl. Eigensch.* 83 f. Dorner I 188 f. Vilmar I 190. Doedes, *L. v. God* 208. Frank, *Syst. d. chr. Wahrh.* I2 228. Lange, *Dogm.* II 42 f. Hodge, I 339. Wichelhaus, *Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom Worte Gottes u. s. w.* 1892 S. 332 f. etc. Now it is certainly true that the names of God existed long before these three *viae* were devised, that these were born only later from reflection on the names, that the *via eminentiae* and *causalitatis* are actually one and thus together as *via positionis* can be set over against the *via negationis*; but it is [97] nevertheless just as certain that there is no knowledge of God except from the creatures, that all names of God are borrowed from the creatures, and that all those names either deny something in God or posit something in God in a perfect way of that which is in creatures. Only, in doing so, it may never be forgotten that the *ratio cognoscendi* is not identical with the *ratio essendi*. In reality it is not the creature but God who is the first. He is archetype, the creature is ectype. In Him everything is original, absolute; in the creatures everything is derived, relative. God is therefore properly not named after what is in creatures, but creatures are named after what exists in God, cf. above p. 74 v. Keeping this in view, one can nevertheless say that Holy Scripture also treads these two

ways. And everyone who wishes to think and speak about God does so according to the negative or positive relation in which God stands to the world, F. A. B. Nitzsch, *Ev. Dogm.* S. 400. To this it is certainly also to be ascribed that the division of the names of God into negative and positive arose so quickly, found such general acceptance, and in fact underlies all other divisions that arose later. This division is already to be found in Philo, Plotinus and the church fathers, and is then employed by Damascenus, *de fide orthod.* I c. 4. 9. 12. Anselmus, *Monol.* c. 15. *Prosl.* c. 5. 6. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 13 art. 2. Petavius, *Theol. dogm.* I c. 5. Perrone, *Prael. theol.* II p. 91 etc. Among the Roman Catholics this division is the most usual, although also some Reformed and Lutherans have adopted it. In that division other distinctions are then also made. Augustinus, *serm.* 38 *de tempore* already made the remark that some names of God were used *proprie*, others *metaphorice* and still others *relative*. Accordingly the *nomina negativa* were again divided into purely negative and relative, and the *nomina positiva* into *propria* and *metaphorica*, Thomas I qu. 13 art. 2 and 3. Alongside this division into negative and positive attributes another arose. Plato already taught that God is good through himself, but the creatures only through *μετοχη*. In Christian theology this thought, especially with Augustine, has borne ripe fruits. Over against pantheism it was maintained that God's essence is incommunicable and that the soul was *no pars Dei*, Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 90 art. 1. Zanchius, *Op.* II col. 53 sq. But it was [98] at the same time taught that all creatures were akin to God and that in particular man was his image and likeness. There was analogy between Creator and creatura. This led to the division of *attributa communicabilia* and *incommunicabilia*. These two names were first already in use in the doctrine of the Trinity, for the essence of God, the *deitas*, was

communicabilis, namely communicated by the Father in generation to the Son, but the persons and the personal properties, e.g. the paternitas, were incommunicabiles, Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 2 § 5. Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 4. Id. Sent. I dist. 27 p. 1 art. 1 qu. 3 etc. From there these two names were also taken over into the doctrine of the attributes in order to maintain both God's transcendence and God's immanence, Anselmus, Monol. c. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 9. 10. This division now found acceptance especially among the Reformed theologians, without doubt also because it offered a suitable opportunity to combat the ubiquity doctrine of the Lutherans, Sohnius, Op. I 97. Zanchius, Op. II col. 50-51. Polanus, Synt. Theol. lib. II c. 7 and 14. Mastricht, II 5, 12 etc., and now still in Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 337 and Gravemeyer, Geref. Geloofsleer, 3e stuk bl. 62 etc. Yet all concede that the communicable attributes in an absolute sense, as they are in God, are just as incommunicable as the others, cf. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 52 f. The Lutherans mostly gave preference to another division, namely that into attributa quiescentia and operativa, or immanentia and extra se exserentia, which was also employed in defense of the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 78. Under the first group (negative, incommunicable, metaphysical, quiescent) there were then usually treated the attributes of unity, simplicity, independence, immutability, eternity, omnipresence. The second group (positive, communicable, operative, personal) was mostly again divided into attributes of understanding, will and power. The division into attributes of being, of understanding and of will in Bretschneider I 480, Thomasius I 14 f. Vilmar I 195, Oosterzee § 47, cf. Frank I 232 f. Philippi II 23, to which Hase, Lehrb. S. 271 still adds that of feeling, deviates only little from the above-mentioned divisions. By contrast, the division of Schleiermacher

proceeds from another standpoint. The [99] attributes with him are only subjective conceptions and grounded only in the ratio ratiocinans. And thus he divides them according to the relation of God to world, sin and redemption, into such as are present in the feeling of dependence, as the antithesis of sin has not yet arisen in it (eternal, omnipresent, almighty, omniscient), as that antithesis is indeed felt (holy, righteous), and as it is overcome (love and wisdom). In agreement with this many divide the attributes according to the relation of God to the world, and then specifically to the world in general (infinite, eternal, omnipresent), to the ethical world (holy, righteous; grace, mercy) and to the ethical-physical world (wisdom, blessedness), Wegscheider § 60. Böhme, Lehre v. d. göttl. Eig. 1826. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl. Eig. S. 110 f. Lange, Dogm. II 61 f. Martensen § 47. Luthardt, Komp. der Dogm. § 29. Lipsius, Dogm. § 298. Grétilat, Exposé de theol. syst. III 220. Hoekstra, Wijsg. godsd. II 92-99 etc.

9. All the above-mentioned divisions apparently differ widely from one another and make use of entirely different names. But in substance they correspond very closely with each other. Whether one speaks of negative and positive, incommunicable and communicable, quiescent and operative, absolute and relative, of properties of the substance and of the subject, in relation to the world and to man, in fact one nevertheless always gives the same order in which the attributes are treated. Against all divisions, therefore, essentially the same objections hold. They all give the appearance that the being of God is divided into two halves, that first the absoluteness, then the personality is treated, that first the being an sich, then in its relation to the creatures is discussed, that the first group of names is obtained apart from the creation and the second group of names from the creatures, and

that thus no unity and harmony of all God's virtues comes about, Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I 228 f. Now, however, it is the incontrovertible teaching of Scripture, that God in his hidden being is unknowable and unnameable and that all names of God presuppose the revelation, i.e. the creation. Of the being and life of God outside of and without the creation we know nothing, for the simple reason that we ourselves are creatures and thus are always bound to the [100] creation. Clearly that was formerly seen and expressed with respect to the relative, metaphorical and positive names of God. The relative names such as Lord, Creator, Sustainer, Saviour etc., accrue to God only after and through the creation; no one can be called lord, unless he has servants; men, the servants of God, have come to be in time, and thus God has become our Lord in time, August., de trin. V 16, cf. de ord. II 7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 7. Anselmus, Monol. 15. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 30. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 30 art. 1. Zanchius, Op. II 24-26. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 192. Of the metaphorical names, to which the anthropomorphisms also belong, it is clear that they presuppose the creation. And the positive names of good, holy, wise etc., therefore have for our consciousness some content, because we perceive ectypes of them in the creatures, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 12. But all these names, though relative, metaphorical and positive, on the other hand nevertheless do indeed make known something in God, which in Him exists absolutely, proprie and thus again also negatively, in another sense than in the creatures. Augustine attempted to show that, although God becomes Lord in time, his being nevertheless is immutable and all change falls only in the creature. That which God begins to be called temporally, which previously was not said, is manifestly said relatively; yet not according to an accident of God, as though something had happened to him, but plainly according to

an accident of that to which God begins to be said relatively, de trin. V 16. The reverse holds of the second group of names, whether these are called negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute or otherwise. For although they deny to God something that is in creatures, they are nevertheless all in a certain sense again also positive, communicable, transeunt, relative. If they were not that, if they were completely incommunicable, they would also be absolutely unknowable and unnameable. That we can think and name them proves that they have been revealed in one way or another by God in his works. The negative names therefore also have a positive content; even if it is the case that we learn to know the eternity of God only from and in time, his omnipresence from and in space, his infinity and immutability only from and amid all the finite and mutable creatures; yet they do give us some, [101] and even important, knowledge of God. Even if we cannot positively comprehend eternity, it nevertheless says so much, to know that God is exalted above all time. And therefore it is incorrect to divide the attributes of God in such a way that on the one side there comes to stand a group that is negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute etc., and on the other side one that is positive, communicable, operative, relative etc. For all attributes are both at the same time. All attributes are absolute and all are nevertheless first known from the relation of God to his creatures. And again, we can name God only according to what of Him is manifest in his creatures, but we nevertheless name Him who is the source of all good and the cause of all creatures. More still, precisely because the attributes are identical with the being of God and mutually in God, no division is to be found that would be grounded objectively in the attributes themselves, Doedes, Leer v. God 217. What can be obtained is only a certain order in the treatment of the many names of God. Among these,

those names at once set themselves apart which later were more specifically indicated as names and which as names of address and designation in a broader sense may be called *nomina propria*. Next, there are names that make known the divine being in all its relations to the creatures and that formerly were mostly called attributes, virtues, perfections etc. The word attributes is for this the least preferable, because it always again makes one think of a being to which the attributes have been added; the name virtues, on the other hand, finds support in Scripture itself, 1 Petr. 2:9. This second group can bear the name of *nomina essentialia*, because they all make known to us the being of God, not an sich, but as it descends to us in the revelation and communicates itself to us. Finally there is still a third group of names, which all have reference to the self-distinctions in the being of God and which therefore can be called *nomina personalia*. The most difficult thing now is to bring order into the treatment of the names that belong to the second group. Yet that order is precisely indicated in the relation in which God stands to his creatures. The whole world is a revelation of God. There is no part of the universe in which not something of his virtues is revealed. But there is distinction among the creatures. Not all proclaim all his virtues, and not all with the same [102] clarity. There is rank order and ascent; all creatures display *vestigia Dei*, but only man is image and likeness of God. He not only shares being with the lower creatures, and life and spirit with the higher; but in this communion with the material and spiritual world he is also in a wholly special way akin to God himself, created as prophet, priest and king in knowledge, holiness and righteousness. Thus God, the source of all being and the archetype of man, is then himself also all that which creatures share. In Him all that is indeed in an original, divine way; in every virtue of God both his absolute

exaltation above and his kinship to the creature is to be noticed; every attribute is in a certain respect incommunicable and in another again communicable. But nevertheless there is from the creature, especially from man, analogy in the divine being. Thus there are then first names by which God reveals himself to us as the One Who Is in the strictest sense: *aseitas*, *immutabilitas*, *infinitas* (*aeternitas* and *immensitas*). Second, there are names that make known to us God as the Living One, as Spirit: *spiritualitas*, *invisibilitas*, *simplicitas*. Third, there are names that describe the divine being as perfectly self-conscious, as Light: *scientia*, *sapientia*, *veracitas*. Fourth, there are names that point us to the ethical nature of that being and designate God as the Holy One: *bonitas*, *justitia*, *sanctitas*. And finally, fifth, there are names in which God appears for us as the absolute power, as Lord, King, Sovereign: *voluntas*, *libertas*, *omnipotentia*. This division is on the one hand connected with the knowledge of God, which in the so-called proofs for his existence is summarized; and on the other hand points forward to the *vestigia* and the *imago Dei*, which have been impressed in the creatures. No knowledge of God except through revelation, and thus always analogical and ectypal; but through that revelation then nevertheless true and pure knowledge of the incomprehensible and adorable being of God!

§ 25. THE PROPER NAMES OF GOD.

1 . Among the names of God, in the first place those names clearly set themselves apart by which He, as a proper personal being in [103] distinction from all creatures, is indicated, named, addressed. All languages possess such names for the Divine being. Although God in himself has no name, we have need to designate Him and for that have no other means than a name. *Nisi enim nomen scieris, rerum cognitio perit*, Isidorus in Moor I 504. The Greek word θεός, formerly derived from τιθεσθαι, θεειν, θεασθαι, Suicerus, s.v., M. Vitranga I 134, is nowadays by some philologists brought into connection with Ζεύς, Διός, Jupiter, Deus, Diana, Juno, Dio, Dieu; then it is identical with the Sanskrit name dêva, bright heaven and derived from the stem div, to shine, to glitter. The interchange of the designation heaven and God occurs in many languages; the oldest Greek god was called Uranus, certainly identical with the Sanskrit name Varuna; Taengri among the Tartars and Turks, Thian among the Chinese denotes both heaven and God; and also in Scripture the name God is replaced by that of heaven, e.g. in the expression kingdom of the heavens or of God. Another Greek name is

δαῖμων, from the verb δαίω, and designates God as distributor and disposer of fate; on the other hand κυριος, from κυρος, is the mighty one, the lord, the owner, the ruler. Our word God is of uncertain origin. It has been brought into connection with the word good; with the Zend khodâ, a se datus, per se ipsum existens; with the Sanskrit gudha or gutha, κευδω, which would designate God as the hidden one, or with a stem, κοδω, κοσμος, which would mean to order, to arrange, or with the Aryan çuddhas, pure, good etc., but all these derivations are uncertain. The name Asura among the Indians, and Ahura among the Persians designates God as the living one. Cf. Kluge, Etymol. Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, s. v. Gott. Cremer, Wört. der neut. Gr. s.v. Herzog² 5, 290. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. I 309 S.

2. Scripture speaks many times of the name of God in a very broad sense. The Jews therefore counted no fewer than seventy of them, Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum I 455; and in Christian theology, under the names of God his perfections also were at first included. But gradually a distinction arose; already Hieronymus limited the names of God to a dozen, viz. El, Elohim, Elohe, Tzebaoth, Eljon, Escher ehje, Adonai, Iah, Ihvh, Schaddai, and in this he was followed by many, Alsted, Theol. [104] schol. 71 sq. Moor, I 511. The simplest name by which God is designated in Holy Scripture is אֱלֹהִים. Concerning the derivation there is disagreement. Lagarde connects the word with the root אֱלִי and the preposition אֶל and thinks that the word designates God as the one who is the goal and the object of human desire. But this derivation is as improbable as that which connects the word with אֱלֹהֵי, the sacred tree. According to by far the most, the word is derived from the stem אֱלֹהִי, either in the sense of being in front, the first, being lord (Nöldeke), or in that of being strong, mighty (Gesenius), litt. bij M. Vitranga

I 132. Moor I 515 sq. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 508. Smend, Altt. Theol. 26. The name אֱלֹהִים plur. אֱלֹהִים is derived from the same stem אָל or from אֵל, to be frightened, and thus makes God known either as the strong one or as object of fright and fear. The singularis is little in use and poetic, e.g. Ps. 18:32, Job 3:4; on the other hand, the pluralis is the usual name for God. This pluralis is not to be explained as a pluralis majestatis, since this is nowhere in Scripture customary of God; neither can an indication of the Trinity be seen in it, as since Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 2 was done by many, Zanchius, Op. I 25. Voetius, Disp. V 27. M. Vitringa I 209 sq., for Elohim almost always has the adjectivum and the verbum in singulari with it, Augustinus, de trin. II 11. Bellarminus, de Christo, c. 6. Calvin, Inst. I 13, 9. Gomarus, Theses Theol., disp. 5. Moor I 796. The modern critics mostly see in it a remnant of the earlier polytheism, but this explanation runs up not only against the same objection as the earlier trinitarian one, but also, as later investigations show, outside Israel it has been customary as a name for one single God, Noordtzij, Oost. Lichtstralen over West. Schriftbeschouwing 1897 bl. 41 v. Therefore this pluralis is better to be understood as a pluralis of abstraction (Ewald), or as a pluralis of quantity, which like מִים and שָׁמַיִם indicates an unbounded magnitude (Oehler), or as an intensive pluralis, which makes known a fullness of power (Delitzsch). In a few instances Elohim is construed with an adjectivum or verbum in plurali, Gen. 20:13, 28:13 v., 35:7, Ex. 32:4, 8, Joz. 24:19, 1 Sam. 4:8, 17:26, 2 Sam. 7:23, 1 Kon. 12:28, Ps. 58:12, 121:5, Job 35:10, Jeremia 10:10; and a similar pluralis is also to be noted [105] in the pron. personale, Gen. 1:26, 3:22, 11:7, Jes. 6:8, 41:22, in קִדְשֵׁי, Spr. 9:10, Hos. 12:1, עֲשִׂים, Job 35:10, Jes. 54:5, בְּרָאִים Pred. 12:1, Ps. 149:2, and in אֱלֹהֵי. All these plural forms designate God as the fullness of life and of power. Durch Elohim wird das

göttliche Wesen in seinem Urverhältniss und in seinem stetigen Grundverhältniss zur Welt bezeichnet. Es ist eine Verhältnissbestimmung, nicht eine unmittelbare innere Wesensbestimmung, und zwar ist es Bestimmung des absoluten Hoheitsbegriffs in Bezug auf die ganze Welt, Beck, Gl. II 22, cf. litt. bij M. Vitranga I 133, Moor I 518, Oehler, Theol. § 36, Schultz, Altt. Th. 516. The name עֲלִיּוֹן, LXX ὑψιστος, points to God as the Most High, exalted above everything; it occurs in the mouth of Melchizedek, Gen. 14:18, of Balaam, Num. 24:16, of the king of Babylon, Jes. 14:14, cf. also Mk. 5:7, Luk. 1:32, 35, Hd. 16:17 and further especially in poetry. אֱלֹהֵי, alternating with האֱלֹהִים, which in turn is strengthened to אֱלֹהִים or אֱלֹהֵי כָל הָאָרֶץ, makes God known as the Lord, to whom everything is subject and over against whom man stands as a servant, Gen. 18:27. In earlier time God in this same sense was also called בַּעַל, Hos. 2:18, but later this name acquired an idolatrous character and therefore fell out of use, Robertson, Israels oude godsdienst bl. 200 v. All these names are not yet nomina propria in the narrower sense; they are also sometimes used of the idols, of men, Gen. 33:10, Ex. 7:1, 4:16, and of the authorities, Ex. 12:12, 21:5, 6, 22:7, Lev. 19:32, Num. 33:4, Richt. 5:8, 1 Sam. 2:25, Ps. 58:2, 82:1, but they are nevertheless the usual names by which God is named and addressed. They are also general Semitic names, which make God known in his exaltedness above all creature. The Semites gladly call God Lord, King; they feel themselves deeply dependent on him and bow themselves humbly, as servants, before him, yet in those names they do not express a philosophical view about the being of God but place his relation to the creatures, specifically to men, in the foreground.

3. This high, exalted God, however, also descends from his transcendence to the creature. He reveals himself not only in general through creation to

all peoples, but has also made himself known to Israel in a particular sense. The [106] first name with which God now appears in the special revelation is that of יְשׁוּעַ or אֱלֹהֵי יְשׁוּעַ . As such God reveals himself to Abraham, when he appoints him to be a father of many nations and seals his covenant with circumcision, Gen. 17:1. In the time of the patriarchs this name accordingly occurs repeatedly, Gen. 28:3, 35:11, 43:14, 48:3, 49:25, Ex. 6:3, Num. 24:4, but further also in Job, in some psalms and a couple of times with the prophets. In the N. Test. it is rendered by $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\omega\rho$, 2 Cor. 6:18, Op. 4:8 etc. The origin of the name is still obscure. Nöldeke derived it from יְשׁוּ , lord, and punctuated it as יְשׁוּ , but in view of Gen. 43:14, 49:25, Ezech. 10:5 the name is nevertheless undoubtedly an adjective. Formerly it was derived from שׁ for אֵשׁ and י , ἰκανος , and then translated as *qui est sufficiens*, all-sufficient; or from שׁ in the sense of being strong, destroying; or also from שׁ or אֵשׁ to pour out, so that God is thereby designated as the one who communicates everything abundantly. Everywhere, however, with this name the idea of power and of invincible strength stands in the foreground, and Jes. 13:6 brings, even if only in a pun, this name into connection with שׁ , to destroy, cf. Joel 1:15. Therefore this name makes known to us God as the one who possesses all power and thus can break all resistance and can make everything serviceable to his will. While Elohim is the God of creation and of nature, Elschaddai is the God who makes all the forces of that nature subordinate to and places them in the service of grace, cf. marginal note on Gen. 17:1, Zanchius, Op. II 43. M. Vitringa I 132. Moor I 522 sq. Oehler, Theol. § 37. Delitzsch on Gen. 17:1 etc. In this name the $\theta\epsilon\iota\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$ and $\alpha\iota\delta\iota\omicron\varsigma \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ of God is no longer an object of terror and fear, but a source of salvation and of consolation. God gives himself to his people and, with his invincible power, stands surety for the fulfilment of his

promises, for the maintenance of his covenant. Therefore from now on he is also each time called the God of Abraham, Gen. 24:12, Isaac, Gen. 28:13, Jacob, Ex. 3:6, the God of the fathers, Ex. 3:13, 15, the God of the Hebrews, Ex. 3:18, the God of Israel, Gen. 33:20, and with Isaiah often the Holy One of Israel. God is the Exalted One, Creator of heaven and earth, the Almighty, but who at the same time also stands in a special, favorable relationship to his people. [107]

As the God of grace, however, He appears especially under the name יהוה. The Jews called this name the name par excellence, the essential name, the proper name, the glorious name, the name of the four letters, τετραγραμματον etc., and from Lev. 24:16 and Ex. 3:15, where one read לֹא יִשָּׁר , in order to conceal, inferred that it was forbidden to pronounce it. It is unknown when this opinion arose among the Jews. But it is certain that the LXX already regularly read Adonai and therefore rendered the name by κυριος; other translations followed this example and translated the name by Dominus, The Lord, der Herr, Heere, Syn. Dordr. sess. 12 etc.; French has l'Éternel. Thereby the original, correct pronunciation has also been lost. The church fathers called the name ἀπορρητον, ἄλεκτον, ἀφραστον, probably not because they held the pronunciation of this name to be unlawful, but because the Jews so judged and the pronunciation had in fact been lost, Moor I 534, Buddeus, Inst. theol. dogm. I 188. In Greek the four letters were written as ΠΙΠΙ, or also, according to Diodorus Siculus and Origen, rendered by Ιᾰω or Ιᾰη, according to Hieronymus by Jaho, according to Philo Byblius by Ιευω, according to Clemens Alex. by Ιαου. Theodoret relates that the Jews pronounced Αἰᾰ and the Samaritans Ιᾰβε. All this points back to an old pronunciation Iahveh, Schultz, Altt. Theol. 4 523. With appeal to the tradition among the Jews, by some the name was

pronounced as Jeve, e.g. by Joachim of Floris in his *Evangelium aeternum*. Indeed this punctuation is to be found in Samuel b. Meir, and was later still defended by Hottinger, Reland e. a., Delitzsch, *Neuer Comm. über die Genesis* 1887 S. 546 f. The pronunciation Jehovah is of recent date: it found entrance especially through the Franciscan Petrus Galatinus, who, however, was opposed by many, e.g. by Genebrardus, Petavius, *de Deo* VIII c. 9, Herzog² 4, 173. Later men such as Drusius, Amama, Scaliger, Vriemoet e. a. also asserted that the pronunciation Jehovah could not be the true one, but had borrowed the vowels from Adonai, Voetius, *Disp.* V 55, cf. litt. in M. Vitranga I 130. In fact this punctuation is burdened by very serious objections. First, *Ihvh* in the Hebr. Bible is a *keri perpetuum* and has now the vowels of Adonai, then those of Elohim; further, the form Jehovah is un-Hebrew [108] and inexplicable; and finally this punctuation dates from a time when the Jews had long considered the pronunciation of the name forbidden. If this vocalization is now incorrect, the question arises how then the name is to be explained. The assertion that it is of Egyptian origin (Voltaire, Schiller, Wegscheider, Heeren, Brugsch) is contradicted by Ex. 5:2 and finds scarcely any defense any longer. Also the opinion of Hartmann, Bohlen, Colenso, Dozy, Land, that it is Canaanite or Phoenician and was adopted by the Israelites after their entry into Canaan, has proved untenable and has been conclusively refuted, Kuenen, *G. v. I.* I 397-401. Valeton, *De Isr. Godsamen*, *Theol. Stud.* VII 1889 bl. 173-221, especially bl. 176 v. The Israelite origin of the name may thus be regarded as established. Then, however, there is also no doubt possible that it comes from the stem *=הוה=* or *היה*, and, since the pronunciation of Jaho, advocated by von Hartmann, *Religionsphilos.* I 370 f., cannot be taken into consideration, Kuenen, *Volksgodsd. en Wereldgodsd.* 261 v., there remains

only a difference as to whether it is a 3 pers. impf. of qal or of hiphil. The latter explanation has been defended by Gesenius, Schrader, Lagarde, Schultz, Land, Kuenen, G. v. I. I 275, actually only on the ground that so exalted a concept of God as would be expressed in the qal form is not yet conceivable in the time of Moses. The name Jahveh would then not mean, He who is, but He who causes to be, who gives life, Creator. But Smend, Altt. Rel. Gesch. 21 says from his standpoint rightly that this name too is still far too high for that time; and he also calls this explanation improbable for the reason that the hiphil of the verb הוה never occurs. Thus only the derivation remains which is given of the name in Ex. 3. Yet even then there is still difference over the meaning of the name. The church fathers thought with this name especially of the aseitas; God was the being one, the eternal, unchangeable being over against the οὐκ Ὄν of the idols and the μη ὄν of the creatures. Others, such as W. R. Smith, Smend t. a. p. 21, appeal to Ex. 3:12, and take the name as He who will be with you. Both interpretations are unacceptable; the latter, because the addition with you, עִמָּךְ, then could not be lacking, and the former, because it sounds too philosophical and also finds no support in Ex. 3. For in verses 13-15 the meaning of the name is clearly [109] indicated. In full it reads אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה; and thereby the Lord says that He who now calls Moses and wants to save his people is the same as He who appeared to their fathers. He is who He is, yesterday and today the same forever. This meaning is set in still clearer light in verse 15: Ihvh, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob sends Moses, and that is his name eternally. God does not call himself here the being one without more and gives no explanation of his aseitas, but He says expressly what and how He is. How and what then will He be? That is not to be said in one word, that is not to be described by one single epithet, but He will be

who He will be. In that everything is enclosed; general and indefinite this addition is, but therefore also so rich and deep in meaning. He will be who He has been for the patriarchs, who He now is, who He will remain; He will be everything for his people. It is no new and no strange God who comes to them through Moses, but it is the God of the fathers, the unchangeable one, the steadfast one, the faithful one, the always remaining like himself, who does not forsake or abandon his people, but always seeks it out again and saves it, unchangeable in his grace, in his love, in his help, who will be what He is, because He is always himself; **אני הוּא** therefore He calls himself in Isaiah, the first and the last, ch. 41:4. 43:10, 13, 25. 44:6. 48:12. Naturally the *aseitas* does lie here as a foundation, but it nevertheless does not come to the foreground and is not directly expressed in the name. From this explanation it also appears whether and to what extent the name *Ihvh* was already known before the time of Moses. Ex. 6:3 does not say that the name as a name was then communicated to Moses, but that the Lord with or with respect to his name was not known to the fathers. The name is therefore also already found repeatedly before Ex. 6, occurs in many proper names, such as Jochebed, Achija, Abija, 1 Chron. 2:24, 25, and for that reason too could not be an entirely new name, because Moses, in order to find a hearing with his people, precisely had to appear not with a foreign name but in the name of the God of the fathers, Ex. 3:12. The intention of Ex. 6:3 therefore can be no other than that the sense and meaning of this name was first then made known by the Lord himself to Moses. And this is indeed also so. Only in Ex. 3 does the Lord himself give an explanation of [110] this name; here He says how He wants this name to be understood. The name already existed earlier, was also then already used several times by the Lord himself, Gen. 15:7, 28:13, and used as a form of address, Gen.

14:22, 24:3, 28:16, 15:2, 8, 32:9. But nowhere is an explanation of that name given. It is in the abstract quite possible that the name *Ihvh* originally, according to its derivation, meant something entirely different from what is said in Ex. 3. Ex. 3 gives no etymology, no word-, but a thing-explanation. Just as God in his special revelation to Israel took over all kinds of religious usages, circumcision, sabbath, sacrifice, priesthood etc., and bestowed on them a special meaning, so He has also done with this name. Apart from origin and original meaning, the Lord says in Ex. 6 how and in what sense He is *Iahveh*, the I will be who I will be. The name *Ihvh* is from now on the description and the guarantee of this, that God is and remains the God of his people, unchangeable in his grace and faithfulness. And that could also only now, in Moses' time, come to light. There had to elapse precisely a long time, in order to prove that God was faithful and unchangeable; someone's faithfulness can only in the long run and especially in times of misery be tested. So it was with Israel. Centuries had elapsed after the time of the patriarchs; Israel was oppressed and sat down in misery. And now God says: I am who I am, *Iahveh*, the unchangeably faithful, the God of the fathers, the God also now still of you and unto eternity. Now God lays in an old name an entirely new meaning, which also only now can be understood by the people. And therefore *Ihvh* is Israel's God from the land of Egypt, Hos. 12:10, 13:4.

4. The name *Ihvh* is in the Old Testament the highest revelation of God. No new names are added. *Ihvh* is God's proper name, Ex. 15:3, Ps. 83:19, Hos. 12:6, Jes. 42:8; is therefore never used of anyone other than Israel's God and also never occurs in *statu constructo*, in *plurali*, or with *suffixa*. Indeed this name is repeatedly altered in form or strengthened by one or another addition. By shortening there arose the form *יְהוָה*, *יְהוֹה*, *יְה*, which is

used especially in compounds, and from that there arose again the independent nomen יה. This shortened name is regularly used in the [111] exclamation הֵלֵלֵנוּ־יְה, but furthermore also occurs repeatedly independently, Ex. 15:2 Ps. 68:5, 89:9, 94:7, 12, 118:14, Jes. 12:2, 38:11, sometimes in connection with יהוה, Jes. 26:4. Very common also is the combination Adonai Ihvh, e.g. Ezech. 23:12. A special strengthening the name Ihvh also receives through the addition Zebaoth, יהוה צבאות, Ps. 69:7, 84:2, Hagg. 2:7-9, once יהוה הצבאות, Am. 9:5, properly shortened from יהוה אלהי צבאות, 1 Sam. 1:3, 4:4, Jes. 1:24, or יהוה אלהים צבאות, Ps. 80:5, 84:9. Because Zebaoth was connected with Ihvh, which allows no status constructus, and sometimes with Elohim in statu absoluto, Origenes, Hieronymus e. a. inferred from that that Zebaoth was an apposition; and they were still further strengthened in this by the fact that the word in the LXX, especially in 1 Sam. and Jes., and also in Rom. 9:29, Jak. 5:4 has remained untranslated, Moor I 512 sq. But this opinion lacks all foundation. Elsewhere Zebaoth is rendered by παντοκράτωρ or κυριος των δυναμεων, and the name Ihvh, who Zebaoth, i.e. armies, hosts is, yields no sense. It is difficult, however, to say what must be understood by those Zebaoth. Some have thereby thought of the war-armies of Israel and think that the name Lord of hosts designates God as God of war. But most of the passages cited for that, such as 1 S. 1:3, 11, 4:4, 15:2, 17:45, 2 S. 5:10, 6:2, 18, 7:8, 26, 27, 1 Kon. 17:1 LXX 18:15, 19:10, 14, 2 Kon. 19:31, Ps. 24:10 prove nothing; only a trio of passages, 1 S. 4:4, 17:45, 2 S. 6:2 provide an appearance of proof; and 2 Kon. 19:31 is much more in conflict with it. Further, the pluralis Zebaoth is indeed in use for the multitudes of the people of Israel, Ex. 6:25, 7:4, 12:17, 41, 51, Num. 1:3, 2:3, 10:14, 33:1, Deut. 20:9, but the war-army of Israel is always designated with the singularis zaba, Richt. 8:6,

9:29, 2 S. 3:23, 8:16, 10:7, 17:25, 20:23, 1 Kon. 2:35. And finally all agree that the name Lord of hosts with the prophets no longer has this meaning of God of war; but they then leave unexplained how and whereby this expression has thus changed in meaning. Others, with the word hosts, think of the stars with appeal to texts such as Deut. 4:19, Ps. 33:6, Jer. 19:13, 33:22, Jes. 34:4, 40:26, Neh. 9:6; Smend extends this still further and understands by it the powers and elements of the cosmos, on the basis of [112] passages such as Gen. 2:1, Ps. 103:21, Jes. 34:2. And indeed Scripture speaks repeatedly of the stars as the host of heaven, Deut. 4:19, and of all creatures as the host of heaven and earth, Gen. 2:1, but in the first place then never the pluralis but only the singularis is customary; further, the stars are indeed called the host of heaven but never called the host of God; and finally, indeed all creatures, but never so abstract a concept as powers and elements of the cosmos, are designated with the name of host. The implausibility of these newer explanations causes the old interpretation, which with the hosts thought of the angels, to rise in value. And this interpretation finds abundant support in Scripture. The name Lord of hosts is repeatedly brought into connection with the angels, 1 S. 4:4, 2 S. 6:2, Jes. 37:16, Hos. 12:5, 6, Ps. 80:2, 5 v., 89:6-9, and the angels are time and again represented as a host that surrounds the throne of God, Gen. 28:12, 13, 32:2, Jos. 5:14, 1 Kon. 22:19, Job 1:6, Ps. 68:18, 89:8, 103:21, 148:2, Jes. 6:2. Even if it is the case that zaba usually stands of the host of the angels in singulari, this can nevertheless be no objection, because Scripture repeatedly makes mention of many hosts of angels, Gen. 32:2, Deut. 33:2, Ps. 68:18, 148:2. And with this the meaning of the name agrees. This bears absolutely no warlike or bellicose character; even from 1 Sam. 4:4, 17:45, 2 Sam. 6:2 this is not to be inferred. But in this name there is everywhere

expressed the glory of God as King, Deut. 33:2, 1 Kon. 22:19, Ps. 24:10, Jes. 6:2, 24:23, Zach. 14:16, Zach. 1:14. The angels belong with the δόξα of God or of Christ, they heighten and spread it, Mt. 25:31, Mk. 8:38, 2 Thess. 1:7, Op. 7:11. Iahveh Zebaoth is throughout the whole of Scripture the solemn royal name of God, full of majesty and glory. Elohim designates God as Creator and Sustainer of all things; El Schaddai makes Him known as the Strong One, who makes nature subservient to grace; Iahveh describes Him as the one who in his grace keeps faith forever; Iahveh Zebaoth depicts Him as the King full of glory, who, surrounded by his ordered hosts, in his temple receives honor and homage from all his creatures. Cf. on Ihvh Zebaoth, Delitzsch, Luth. Zeits. 1869 and 1874 and on Ps. 24:10, Schrader, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1875 S. 316-320, [113] Oehler, Theol. § 195 f. Schultz, Theol. 529 f. Smend, Altt. Rel. 185 f. König, Die Hauptprobl. der altisr. Rel. S. 49 f., Kuenen, G. v. I. II 46. Stade, Gesch. Isr. I 437. Valetton, t. a. p. bl. 208 v. art. Zebaoth in Herzog² en Riehm, Handwörterbuch. Borchert, Der Gottesname Jahve Zebaoth, Stud. u. Kr. 1896 S. 619-642.

5. In the N. Test. all these names have been retained. El and Elohim are rendered by θεός, Eljon is translated by ὁψιστος θεός, Mk. 5:7, Luk. 1:32, 35, 76, 8:28, Hd. 7:48, 16:17, Hebr. 7:1, cf. ἐν ὁψιστοις θεός, Luk. 2:14. Also the designation of God as God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or as God of Israel passes over into the N. Test., Mt. 15:31, 22:32, Mk. 12:26, Luk. 1:68, 20:37, Hd. 3:13, 7:32, 46, 22:14, 24:14, Hebr. 11:16. But for the most part these appositions are replaced by the genitives μου, σου, ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, for in Christ God has become the God and Father of his people, and of each of his children, Hebr. 8:10, Op. 7:12, 19:5, 21:3. The name Jahveh is in the N. T. a few times explicated by το ἄλφα και το ω, ὁ ὢν και ὁ ἦν και ὁ ἐρχομενος, ἡ ἀρχη και το τέλος, ὁ πρωτος και ὁ ἐσχατος, Op. 1:4, 8, 11,

17, 2:8, 21:6, 22:13. Otherwise it is, in the footsteps of the LXX, which already read Adonai, translated by κυριος, from κυρος, power. Κυριος makes God known as the Mighty One, the Lord, the Owner, the Ruler, who by right possesses power and authority, in distinction from δεσποτης, the lord, who in fact exercises power, and is in the N. T. used now of God, then of Christ. Also the combinations of Ihvh Elohim, Ihvh Elohim Zebaoth are found again in the N. T., as κυριος ὁ θεος, Luk. 1:16, Hd. 7:37, 1 Petr. 3:15, Op. 1:8, 22:5, κυριος ὁ θεος παντοκρατωρ, Op. 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 16:7, 21:22; while in Rom. 9:29, Jak. 5:4 Zebaoth has remained untranslated. One new name seems to be added in the N. Test., it is the name of Πατηρ. Yet this name is also already used of God in the O. Test. several times, Deut. 32:6, Ps. 103:13, Jes. 63:16, 64:8, Jer. 3:4, 19, 31:9, Mal. 1:6, 2:10, just as Israel is also called his son several times, Ex. 4:22, Deut. 14:1, 32:19, Jes. 1:2, Jer. 31:20, Hos. 1:10, 11:1. The name here expresses the special, theocratic [114] relationship in which God stands to his people Israel; He has formed that people in a wondrous way out of Abraham. In the more general sense of Origin and Creator of all things the Father-name is used in the N. Test. in 1 Cor. 8:6, Ef. 3:15, Hebr. 12:9, Jak. 1:18, cf. Luk. 3:38, Hd. 17:18. But otherwise the name expresses the ethical relationship in which God now through Christ stands to all his children. The relationship which in the O. T. existed between God and Israel is type and example of this; it has now been deepened and expanded, ethicized and individualized. The name of Father now becomes the ordinary name of God in the N. Test. The designation Jahveh is insufficiently rendered by κυριος; it is, as it were, supplemented by the Father-name. This is the highest revelation of God. God is not merely the Creator, the Almighty, the Faithful One, the King and Lord; He is also the Father of his people. The theocratic kingdom under

Israel passes over into a kingdom of the Father, who is in the heavens. The subjects are at the same time children; the citizens members of the household. Both, right and love, state and household come in the New-Testament relationship of God to his people to complete fulfillment. Here is the perfect Kingship, for here is a King who is at the same time Father, who does not subject his subjects by force but who himself creates and preserves his subjects. They are as children born from Him, they bear his image, they are his family. This relationship has in the N. Test. become possible through Christ, who is the own, only-begotten and beloved Son of the Father. And the believers become partakers of this sonship and also become conscious of it through the H. Spirit, Joh. 3:5, 8, Rom. 8:15 v. In the name Father, Son and Spirit God has revealed himself most richly. The fullness which from the beginning lay enclosed in Elohim has gradually unfolded itself and in the trinitarian name of God has unfolded itself most gloriously and most completely. Lit. on the names of God, Hieronymus, *de decem nominibus*. Pseudodion., *de div. nom.* Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 13. Petavius, *de Deo* VIII c. 8, 9. Gerhard, *Loci theol.* II c. 1-3. Bretschneider, *Syst. Entw.* 345 f. Zanchius, *Op.* II 26-50. Voetius, *Disp.* V 48 sq. Buxtorf, *de nominibus Dei*, *Dissert. philol. theol.*, diss. 5. Hottinger, *de nominibus Dei orient.*, *Diss. phil. theol.* 1660. Moor I 505-552. M. Vitringa I 127-135, and further of the more recent, besides the [115] already above-mentioned, Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I 76-89. Beck, *Chr. Gl.* II 14 f. Grau, *Gottes Volk und sein Gesetz* 1895.

§ 26. THE ESSENTIAL NAMES OF GOD.

A. God as the Being.

1 . Among some, the locus de trinitate precedes that concerning the virtues of God. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 6 sq., Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 2 sq., Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 2 sq., Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 36 sq. etc.; and Frank has even serious objection to the reversed order, Syst. der chr. Wahrh. I 151 f. If, by treating the virtues of God before the doctrine of the Trinity, it were intended gradually to ascend from theologia naturalis to theologia revelata and from the natural to the Christian concept of God, it would without doubt deserve disapproval. But this is by no means the case. In the doctrine of the perfections of God the divine nature is treated, as it has been revealed to us in Scripture, is confessed by the Christian faith, and, as will presently appear in the locus de trinitate, exists in a threefold manner. In order, in that locus, to understand that Father, Son, and Spirit

partake of the same divine nature, it is necessary to know what that divine nature contains in itself and wherein it is distinguished from all created nature. Scripture also goes before us in this. The being of God is there taught to us earlier and more clearly than his trinitarian existence; the Trinity first comes to clear revelation in the N. Test.; the names Ihvh, Elohim precede those of Father, Son, and Spirit. The first thing that Scripture makes known to us of God is that He has a proper being and life, distinct from all creatures, self-subsistent and independent. He has a proper essence, a proper φύσις, natura, substantia, essentia, not in distinction from his virtues, but confronting us and becoming knowable in all virtues and perfections. He bears proper names, which belong to no creature. [116] Among these the name Ihvh stands at the head, Ex. 3:14. By this name He is designated as the one who is and will be what He was, who eternally, in relation to his people, remains like himself. He exists of himself. He existed before all things, and these exist only through Him, Ps. 90:2, 1 Cor. 8:6, Openb. 4:11. He is ἰδὼς κυριος, δεσποτης in the absolute sense, Lord of the whole earth, Ex. 23:17, Deut. 10:17, Jos. 3:13. He is from nothing, everything is dependent on Him, Rom. 11:36. He kills and makes alive, creates the light and the darkness, peace and evil, Deut. 32:39, Jes. 45:5-7, 54:16. He does with the host of heaven and with the inhabitants of the earth according to his will, Dan. 4:35, so that men are in his hand as clay in the hand of the potter, Jes. 64:8, Jer. 18:1 v., Rom. 9:21. His counsel, his good pleasure is the ultimate ground of all that is and happens, Ps. 33:11, Spr. 19:21, Jes. 46:10, Mt. 11:26, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, Ef. 1:5, 9, 11. He therefore also does everything for his own sake, for his name's sake, for his glory's sake, Deut. 32:27, Jos. 7:9, 1 Sam. 12:22, Ps. 25:11, 31:4, 79:9, 106:8, 109:21, 143:11, Spr. 16:4, Jes. 48:9, Jer. 14:7, 21, Ezech. 20:9, 14, 22, 44. He also

needs nothing, is all-sufficient, Job 22:2, 3, Ps. 50:19 v., Hd. 17:25, and has life in himself, Joh. 5:26. And thus He is the first and the last, the alpha and the omega, who is and who was and who is to come, Jes. 41:4, 44:6, 48:12, Openb. 1:8 etc.; absolutely independent, not only in his existence, but as a consequence thereof also in all his virtues and perfections, in all his decrees and deeds. Independent He is in his understanding, Rom. 11:34, 35, in his will, Dan. 4:35, Rom. 9:19, Ef. 1:5, Op. 4:11, in his counsel, Ps. 33:11, Jes. 46:10, in his love, Hos. 14:5, in his power, Ps. 115:3 etc. And thus all-sufficient in himself, and receiving nothing from outside himself, He is, on the contrary, the only source of all being and life, of all light and love, the abundant fountain of all goods, Ps. 36:10, Hd. 17:25. This independence of God is acknowledged more or less by all men. The Heathen indeed draw the divine down into the creaturely and teach a theogony, but behind and above their gods they nevertheless often again assume a power to which everything is subjected in the absolute sense. Many speak of nature, chance, fate, or fortune as a power that is exalted above everything; and philosophers [117] preferably designate God by the name of the Absolute. In Christian theology this virtue of God bore the name of αὐτάρκεια, aseitas, omnisufficientia, independentia, magnitudo. In the East one spoke of θεος ἀναρχος, ἀναιτιος, ἀγεννητος and one preferably called God αὐτογεννητος, αὐτοφυης, αὐτουσιος, αὐτοθεος, αὐτοφως, αὐτοσοφια, αὐτοαρπη, αὐταγαθος etc., cf. Suicerus, Thes. Eccl. s. v. God is all that He is through himself. He is ipsa per se bonitas, sanctitas, sapientia, vita, lux, veritas etc. As was already said earlier, the church fathers, in imitation of Philo, in the description of God mostly proceeded from the name Ihvh. That was his essential name par excellence. God was the Being. In this name: I will be who I will be, everything is enclosed. All other virtues of God were

derived from it. God is *summum esse*, *summum bonum*, *summum verum*, *summum pulchrum*. He is the perfect, the highest best being, *quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit*. He has the whole being in himself, He is an infinite and unbounded sea of being. Si bonum, si magnum, si beatum, si sapientem vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, in hoc verbo instauratur quod est Est. Nempe hoc est ei esse, quod haec omnia esse. Si et centum talia addas, non recessisti ab esse; si ea dixeris, nihil addixisti; si non dixeris nihil minuisti, Bernardus, de consid. I c. 6. Scholasticism joined in with this, Anselmus, Monol. 6. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 3 and qu. 3 and qu. 13 art. 11. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. and also treated this virtue under the name of the *infinitas* or *spiritualis magnitudo Dei*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 7. S. c. Gent. I c. 43, or under that of the *aseitas Dei*, by which it was indicated that God as *summa substantia per se ipsam aut ex se ipsa est quidquid est*, Anselmus, Monol. 6. Later Roman Catholic theologians likewise mostly proceed from this *aseitas* or *independentia*, Petavius, de Deo I c. 6. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 38 sq. Perrone, Prael. theol. II p. 88-90. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. II 26 sq. The Reformation brought no change in this. Luther too, on the basis of the name *Ihvh*, describes God as the absolutely being; He is pure being. But Luther nevertheless does not linger long over abstract, metaphysical descriptions and soon passes from the *Deus absconditus* to the *Deus revelatus* in Christus, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 302 f. Melanchton in his *Loci* describes God as *essentia* [118] *spiritualis*. The Lutherans have mostly adopted this description but then often added to it the further determination *infinita*, a *se subsistens* or *independens*, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. Luth. K. § 17. Among the Reformed this perfection of God comes still more strongly to the foreground, although the name *aseitas* is later mostly exchanged for that of

independentia. Aseitas expresses only the independence of God in his existence, but independentia has a broader sense and includes that God is independent in everything, in his being, in his virtues, in his decrees, in his works. While earlier writers therefore mostly proceed from the name *Ihvh*, Hyperius, *Meth. Theol.* p. 87, 135. Sohnius, *Op.* II 48. III 261. Polanus, *Synt. Theol.* p. 135 etc., later the independentia mostly occurs as the first of the incommunicable attributes, Mastricht, *Theol.* II c. 3, Heidegger, *Corpus Theol.* III § 30. Maresius, *Syst. theol.* loc. 2 § 17. Marck, *Merg der Godg.* IV § 20. L. Meyer, *Verhand. over de Godd. eigensch.* 1783 I bl. 39-110 etc. If now God in Scripture ascribes this aseitas to himself, then by it He makes himself known as absolute being, as the being in the absolute sense. By this perfection He is at once essentially and absolutely distinguished from all creature. For all the creature is not a *se* but *ab alio*, and thus is and has nothing of itself; it is absolutely dependent in its origin and thus also in its whole further existence and development. But God, according to this name, is only of himself, a *se*, not in the sense as if He had caused himself, but as being from eternity to eternity who He is, being not becoming, absolute being, the fullness of being, and thus also eternally and absolutely independent in his existence, in his virtues, in all his works, the first and the last, the only cause and final end of all things. In this aseitas of God all other virtues are enclosed; they are given with it and are its rich, many-sided unfolding. And yet, while with this virtue the immeasurable distinction between Creator and creature at once comes to light clearly and plainly, there is nevertheless also of this perfection of God a weak likeness in all the creature. Pantheism cannot acknowledge this, but theism confesses that the creature, though absolutely dependent, nevertheless has a proper, distinct being. And in this being perseverance in its existence is

implanted, the *conatus in suo esse perseverandi*, the *Selbsterhaltungstrieb*, the [119] urge to self-preservation. All creature, insofar as it is, fears death; and even the smallest atom offers resistance to every attempt at destruction. It is a shadow of the independent, immutable being of our God.

2. From God's aseity his immutability flows of itself. Yet this seems to find little support in Scripture. For there God always stands in the most living intercourse with the world. In the beginning he created heaven and earth and thus passed from not-creating to creating. And from that beginning he lives, as it were, the life of the world and especially of his people Israel along with it; he comes and he goes, he reveals and conceals himself, he turns his face away and turns it toward in grace. He repents, Gen. 6:6, 1 Sam. 15:11, Amos 7:3, 6, Joel 2:13, Jon. 3:9, 4:2, and changes his intention, Ex. 32:10-14, Jon. 3:10. He becomes angry, Num. 11:1, 10, Ps. 106:40, Zach. 10:3, and lays aside his anger, Deut. 13:17, 2 Chr. 12:12, 30:8, Jer. 18:8, 10, 26:3, 19, 36:3. He is different toward the pious than toward the ungodly, Spr. 11:20, 12:22; with the pure he keeps himself pure but with the perverse he shows himself a wrestler, Ps. 18:26, 27. In the fullness of time he even becomes man in Christ and comes to dwell through the H. Spirit in the congregation; he rejects Israel and accepts the Gentiles. And in the life of the children of God there remains a continual alternation of feeling of guilt and consciousness of forgiveness, of experiences of God's wrath and of his love, of his abandonment and of his nearness. But at the same time that same Scripture testifies that God under all that is the same and remains the same. Everything changes but he remains standing, he remains who he is, Ps. 102:26-28. He is *Ihvh*, the being and ever remaining like himself; the first and with the last still the same God, Jes. 41:4, 43:10, 46:4, 48:12. He is who he is, Deut. 32:39, cf. Joh. 8:58, Hebr.

13:8, ἀφθαρτος, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, altijd ὁ αἰτός, Rom 1:23, 1 Tim. 1:17, 6:16, Hebr. 1:11, 12. And immutable in his existence and being, he is so also in his thought and will, in all his intentions and decisions. He is not a man that he should lie or repent. What he says, he does, Num. 15:29, 1 Sam. 15:29. His charismata and calling are ἀμεταμελητά, Rom. 11:29. He does not cast off his people, Rom. [120] 11:1. He completes what he began, Ps. 138:8, Phil. 1:6. In one word, he, Iahv, does not change, Mal. 3:6; with him οὐκ ἐνὶ παραλλαγῇ ἢ τροπῇ ἀποσκίασμα, Jak. 1:17. Upon this, in Christian theology, the doctrine of the immutabilitas Dei was built. Mythological theogony could not raise itself to this height, but philosophy named and described God many times as the only, eternal, immutable, unmoved, self-like ruler of all things, Philolaus et al., in Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. I 4 425, 488 f. II 928. Aristotle concluded from the motion of the world to a primum movens, an αἰδιος οὐσία ἀκίνητος, which was one and eternal, necessary, immutable, free of all composition, without any possibility, ὕλη, δύναμις, but only ἐνέργεια, pure εἶδος, mere being, absolute form, το τι ἦν εἶναι το πρῶτον, ib 359-365. Philo called God ἀτρέπτος, ἰσαιοτάτος ἑαυτῷ, ἀκλινής, παγίος, βεβαίος, ἀμεταβλητός, ἔστως, Dähne, Gesch. Darst. der jüd.-alex. Rel. Philos. I 118. And with this Christian theology agreed. God is according to Irenaeus, semper idem, sibi aequalis et similis, adv. haer. IV c. 11, cf. Orig. c. Cels. I 21. IV 14. With Augustine the immutability of God flowed directly from the fact that he was the highest, perfect being. To every rational creature it is naturaliter et veraciter insitum, esse omnino incommutabilem et incorruptibilem Deum, de Gen. ad litt. VII 11. Through the senses this concept of an eternal and immutable being is not to be obtained, for every creature, also man himself, is mutable; but within himself he sees and finds that immutable, which is better and greater than

all that changes, de lib. arb. II 6, de doct. chr. I 9. If God were not immutable, he would not be God, Conf. VII 4. His name is being and this name is a nomen incommutabilitatis. All that changes ceases to be what it was. But true being belongs only to him who does not change. What truly is, that remains. Quod est, manet. But what changes fuit aliquid et aliquid erit; non tamen est, quia mutabile est, de trin. V 2. God, however, who is, cannot change, since every change would be a diminution of being. And as immutable as God is in his being, so is he also in his knowing, willing, and deciding. Dei essentia, qua est, nihil mutabile habet, nec in aeternitate, nec in veritate, nec in voluntate, de trin. IV prooem. As he is, so he knows and wills, [121] in an immutable manner. Essentia tua scit et vult incommutabiliter et scientia tua est et vult incommutabiliter et tua voluntas est et scit incommutabiliter, Conf. XIII, 16. Creation, revelation, incarnation, affections, etc. brought about no change in God. In God there has never come a novum consilium, de ord. II 17. There has always been in God a single, immutable will. Una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt, de civ. XII, 17. Only there is change in the creature from non-being to being, from good to evil, etc. The same thought we then later find again time and again, with Joh. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I c. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu 9. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8, 3. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 8 art. 2 qu 1-2. Petavius, de Deo III c. 1-2. and thus also with Luth. and Reformed theologians, Gerhard, Loc. II cap. 8 sect. 5. Zanchius, Op. II col. 77-83. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 13, cf. Conf. Gall. art. 1. Conf. Belg. 1 enz.

But this immutability of God found much opposition, both from the deistic and from the pantheistic side. With Epicurus the gods are wholly like

excellent men, who change of place, activity, thought, etc., Zeller IV 430 f., and with the Stoa the Deity, just as formerly with Heraclitus, was taken up as the immanent cause of the world in its unceasing change, ib. IV 133 f. Of the same nature was the opposition to the immutability of God in Christian theology. On the one side stands Pelagianism, Socinianism, Remonstrantism, rationalism, which especially opposes the immutability of God's knowing and willing, and makes the will of God dependent on and thus lets it change according to the conduct of man. In particular Vorstius in his work *de Deo et ejus attributis* opposed the immutability of God. He distinguished between the *essentia* of God, which is simple and immutable, and the *voluntas Dei*, which as *libera* also does not will everything eternally and not always the same, Dorner, *Gesammelte Schriften* 278. But much more serious still is the opposition to the immutability of God, from the pantheistic side. Common to this opposition is that the idea of becoming is transferred to God and thus the boundary between Creator and creature is wholly erased. The idea of God as *substantia*, as it occurs with Spinoza, [122] proved to be an abstract concept without content. In order to bring life into that concept, philosophy often replaced being with becoming. Naturally there is in that still a great difference, according as one conceives this process, through which God himself becomes, unitarily or trinitarily and lets it be accomplished immanently in the being of God or transeunt in the world. To this belongs in the first place Gnosticism, but then further the theosophy of the kabbala, of Böhme, Baader, Schelling, Rothe, Hamberger, etc., working on in the doctrine of the kenosis, and finally the pantheistic philosophy of Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Hartmann etc. However differently worked out, the fundamental thought is one. God is not but becomes. An sich, in the first moment, He is *βυθος άγνωστος*, an

abstract purely potential being, nature without more, contentless thinking, a dark urge, a blind alogical will, in one word, a being that is nothing but can become everything. But out of that potential being God brings himself in the form of a process gradually to actuality. He is his own Creator. He produces himself. He gradually comes, whether then in himself or in the world, to personality, to self-consciousness, to spirit. God is *causa sui*. Under the influence of this philosophical idea of absolute becoming, the immutability of God has also in more recent theology been repeatedly denied or limited, and God has with preference been called *causa sui*, self-actualising power, Rothe, *Theol. Ethik* § 16-38. Martensen, *Chr. Dogm.* 1856 S. 86. 116, cf. *Chr. Ethik.* I 90 f. Luthardt says, *Gott ist seine eigene That*, *Apol. Vortr. über die Grundwahrh. des Chr.* 1870 I 45, cf. Müller, *Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde* II 5 171 f. Others speak of a *Selbstsetzung Gottes*, Dorner, *Chr. Gl.* I 244. 245. Frank, *Syst. der chr. Wahrh.* I 2 116 f. In his treatise *Ueber die richtige Fassung des dogm. Begriffs der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes*, *Ges. Schriften* 1883 S. 188-377, Dorner attempts to avoid deism and pantheism (acosmism) both and to unite the immutability and the *Lebendigkeit* of God with one another. He thinks to attain this goal by placing the immutability of God in the ethical, S. 340 f. Ethically God is immutable and always like himself, He remains holy love, S. 352. But otherwise Dorner thinks that through the creation, the incarnation and satisfaction etc. indeed change has come in God, S. 309. 311 f. 358 f. 364, [123] that He stands in *Wechselverhältniss* to man, S. 319. 362, that He knows reality only from the world, S. 320, that there is also for Him a past, present and future, S. 322, that He is wrathful, justifies, and has a disposition corresponding to man, S. 324 etc. And thus essentially also Weisse, *Philos. Dogm.* I 573. F. A. B. Nitzsch, *Ev. Dogm.* 365 e. a. Many

also in the doctrine of God do not express themselves about this important attribute, but let it first be noticed at the creation or at the incarnation or at the kenosis etc., that they assume change in God, as e.g. Ebrard, Hofmann, Thomasius e. a.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of the immutability of God is of the highest importance for religion. The distinction between Creator and creature lies in the antithesis of being and becoming. All that is creature is becoming. It is changeable, strives continually, seeks rest and satisfaction and finds that rest only in Him, who is pure being without becoming. Therefore God is so often called in Scripture the rock, Deut. 32:4, 15, 18, 30, 31, 37. 1 Sam. 2:2, 2 Sam. 22:3, 32, Ps. 19:15, 31:3, 62:3, 7, 73:26 etc. On Him man can rely, He does not change in his essence, nor in his knowing or willing, He remains who He is eternally. Every change is foreign to God. There is in Him no change of time, for He is eternal; nor of place for He is omnipresent; nor also of essence for He is pure being. Christian theology also expressed this latter many times by the term *purus actus*. Aristotle had thus conceived the essence of God, as *πρῶτον εἶδος* without any *δυναμῖς*, as absolute *ἐνέργεια*. Scholasticism therefore came to speak of God as *actus purissimus et simplicissimus*, in order to indicate that He is the perfect, absolute being without any *potentia* to non-being or to other-being. Thus Boethius says, *de cons. philos. lib. III*, that God does not change in essence (*forma*), *quia purus actus est*, cf. Thomas, *S. Theol. I qu. 3*. Therefore the expression *causa sui* was also avoided of God. The idea of absolute becoming was first clearly expressed by Heraclitus and thereafter repeatedly returned in philosophy. Plotinus in particular makes use of this concept, not only in application to matter, but also to that which he holds for absolute being. He teaches concerning God, that He has produced his

own [124] being, that He was active before He was, Thilo, Kurze pragm. Gesch. d. Philos. I 352 f. Now Christian theology did indeed speak of God that He was an ens a se, and thus of his aseitas. And Lactantius, Synesius and Hieronymus also employed the expression causa sui; the latter wrote: Deus qui semper est nec habet aliunde principium et ipse sui origo est suaeque causa substantiae, non potest intelligi aliunde habere quod subsistit, Comm. ad Eph. cap. 3:15. But this expression was nevertheless always understood thus, that God indeed existed of himself but not that He had become and been produced of himself, Klee, Kath. Dogm. II 43. When later Cartesius accorded precedence to the will of God above the understanding and made the essentia of all things depend on that will, indeed even made God's existence a product of his will, so that he said, Deus se revera conservat, God is causa sui and a se, not in a negative but in a positive sense, God is causa efficiens sui ipsius, He has being a reali potentiae immensitate, Resp. ad primas objectiones p. 57, 58; then indeed some followers adopted this expression, such as e.g. Burmannus, Synopsis theol. I c. 15 § 2, but the Reformed theologians wanted the expression causa sui, existentia a se to be understood in no other than a purely negative sense, Ryssenius, De oude rechtsinnige waerheyt enz. Middelb. z.j. bl. 24. Maastricht Theol. theor. pract. II c. 3 § 22. Moor, I 590 sq. A causa sui in a positive sense is not possible, because then one and the same thing would at the same moment be said to exist, insofar as it produces itself, and not to exist, insofar as it is produced. Now it is understandable that monistic philosophy has taken refuge in this idea of absolute becoming, in order to give at least an appearance of explanation of reality. But Herbart has rightly subjected this idea to a sharp critique, and his adherents Thilo, Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der mod. Theol. S. 25 and Flügel, Die spekul. Theol.

in der Gegenwart 1888 S. 201. f., Die Probleme der Philos. und ihre Lösungen 1888 S. 10 f. have not without reason expressed their astonishment over the fact that this idea has made such progress in speculative theology. For there is, in theology, with application to the Divine essence, nothing to be done with it. Not only does Scripture testify that there is in God no change nor shadow of [125] turning, but thinking leads to the same conclusion. With becoming one must ask after a cause, for there is no becoming without cause. But being, in an absolute sense, no longer permits the question after a cause. Absolute being is, because it is. The idea of God brings immutability of itself along. No increase or decrease is conceivable in Him. He cannot change for the better or for the worse. For He is the absolute, perfect, true being. Becoming is proper to the creature and is a form of change in space and time. But God is who He is, eternally, above space and time, far exalted above all the creature. He rests in himself and is therefore the goal and the point of rest of all creatures, the rock of salvation, whose work is perfect. Whoever ascribes change to God, of essence, knowledge or will, does injury to all his virtues, the independence, the simplicity, the eternity, the omniscience, the omnipotence. He robs God of his Divine nature and religion of its firm ground and sure comfort. Yet this immutability is no monotonous unity, no rigid immovable being. Scripture itself goes before us, to describe God to us in the most manifold relations to all his creatures. Immutable in himself, He nevertheless as it were lives along the life of his creatures and takes part in their alternations. Scripture speaks of God in a human way and cannot do otherwise. But however humanly it may speak, it at the same time forbids us to posit any change in God himself. There is change around Him and outside Him, there is change in the relation to Him, but there is no change in God himself. And

herein consists precisely the incomprehensible greatness of God and at the same time the glory of the Christian confession, that God, immutable in himself, can nevertheless call changeable creatures into being; that He, eternal in himself, can nevertheless enter into time; that He, immeasurable in himself, can nevertheless penetrate every point of space with his essence; that He who is absolute being, can nevertheless also grant to the becoming creature a place of its own. In the eternity of God no moment of time, in his immeasurability no point of space, in his being no element of becoming is to be discovered. But conversely it is God who posits the creature, it is eternity that posits time, it is immeasurability that posits space, it is being that posits becoming, it is immutability that posits change [126]. A transition between the two does not exist; there is a deep chasm between the being of God and the being of all creature. It is Divine greatness, that He can descend to the creature; that He, transcendent, can nevertheless dwell immanently in all that is created; that He, preserving himself, can give himself and, absolutely maintaining his immutability, can nevertheless enter into an infinite number of relations to his creatures. With various examples one attempted to elucidate this. The sun remains the same, whether it scorches or warms, causes pain or refreshes (Augustine). A coin does not change, although it is now called a prize and then a pledge (id.). A pillar remains standing, whether someone now sees it at his right hand, then at his left hand (Thomas). An artist does not change, when he gives form to his conception in word or tone, in voice or color, and a scholar does not, when he sets down his thoughts in a book. All these comparisons limp, but they nevertheless give some idea how something, remaining the same in essence, can change in relation. With God this now holds so much the more, because He, the immutable, is himself the sole cause of all that changes. He does not

place himself in relation to any creature, as if this would in any way exist without Him, but He himself places all things in those relations to himself, which He eternally and immutably wills and precisely thus, in that manner and in that moment of time, in which they actually take place. Every prius and posterius does not fall in God, but in rebus prius non existentibus et posterius existentibus, Aug. de civ. XII 17. It is immutable being itself, that places changing becoming with an entirely own order and law outside itself and brings it, as it were for itself, onto the stage.

3. The immutability of God is called eternity with respect to time and omnipresence with respect to space. Both were indeed sometimes brought together under the name *infinitas Dei*. The concept of infinity, however, is in itself unclear. In the first place it can be taken negatively in the sense of endless. Something is then called infinite because it in fact has no end but nevertheless can have one. Often in philosophy God has been called infinite in this sense. Neoplatonism conceived God in this sense as without boundary and form, without any determinateness, οὐ πεπερασμενος, [127] ὄρος οἷκ ἔχων, ἀπειρος etc., an overflowing fullness, from which the world has emanated, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. V 485 f. 497. In the same sense the kabbalah spoke of God as אין סוף, the infinite, without boundary and form, but who in the ten sefiroth created a transition from the infinite to the finite, Frank, La Kabbale 179. Later the philosophy of Spinoza gave currency to this concept of the infinity of God. The substance, God, in Spinoza is not a being proper, distinct from the world; it is that which in creatures constitutes reality, and therefore of itself infinite, ens absolute infinitum, Eth. I prop. 8. All determination is therefore negation, a deprivation, a lack of existence, Epist. 50 and 41, God, however, is free from all limitation and delimitation, He is *substantia non determinata*. Extension is one of his

attributes. With Hegel the concept of infinity again received another meaning, because he conceived the substance of Spinoza not as an eternal immutable being but as an absolute becoming. God was therefore called infinite, because He could become everything, approximately in the same way as the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander, which itself is indeterminate but can bring forth all kinds of things. The error of this conception consists in this, that the most universal, which the understanding obtains by abstraction from finite being, is identified with the infinite. For it was precisely the striving of the philosophy of identity, to let the particular proceed from the universal, the determinate from the indeterminate, the finite from the endless by a process. God is an *sich infinitus potentiâ*, He becomes *finitus*, personal, conscious, determinate in the creatures as his revelation. But this conception is untenable. Infinite is not a negative but a positive concept; it does not indicate that God has no being proper, distinct from the creatures, but that He is limited by nothing finite and creaturely. Now of course in different ways such a creaturely limitation can be denied of God. If one means that God *non tempore finiri potest*, then *infinitas* coincides with *aeternitas*. If one wishes to make known that God *non loco finiri potest*, then *infinitas* is the same as *omnipraesentia*. And thus the *infinitas Dei* is also often defined, Polanus, *Synt. theol.* II c. 10. 11. Zanchius, *Op.* II 90. But *infinitas* can also be understood in this sense, that God is infinite in his virtues, that every virtue [128] is present in Him in an absolute way; then *infinitas* is as much as *perfectio*, Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 7. But even then the infinity of God must be well understood. The infinity of God is no *infinitas magnitudinis*, as one sometimes speaks of the infinite or endless size of the world, for God is not a body and has no extension. It is also no *infinitas multitudinis*, as mathematics speaks of infinitely small and

infinitely great, for God is one and simple. But it is an *infinitas essentiae*. God is infinite according to his essence, absolutely perfect, infinite in an intensive, qualitative, positive sense. But thus the infinity of God entirely coincides with perfection, and it does not need to be discussed separately.

Infinity in the sense of not being determined by time is the eternity of God. In Scripture there is nowhere any mention of a beginning or an end of God's existence. Although He is often very vividly represented as entering into time, He is nevertheless exalted above it. He is the First and the Last, Jes. 41:4, Op. 1:8, existing before the world, Gen. 1:1, Joh. 1:1, 17:5, 24, and remaining despite all change, Ps. 102:27, 28. He is God from eternity to eternity, Ps. 90:2, 93:2. There is no searching out of the number of his years, Job 36:26. A thousand years are for Him as little as for us the day of yesterday, Ps. 90:4, 2 Petr. 3:8. He is the eternal God, Jes. 40:28, Rom. 16:26, dwelling in eternity, Jes. 57:15, living for ever, Deut. 32:40, Op. 10:6, 15:7, who swears by his life, Num. 14:21, 28, the *θεος ζων και μενων*, 1 Petr. 1:23, incorruptible, Rom. 1:23, immortal, 1 Tim. 6:16, who is and was and shall be, Ex. 3:14, Op. 1:4, 8. Most certainly Scripture here too speaks of God in a human way, and of eternity in the forms of time, but it nevertheless at the same time clearly indicates that God is exalted above time and is not to be measured or determined by this standard. The deism of earlier and later times, however, understands by eternity a time endlessly extended forward and backward; the difference between time and eternity lies only in quantity, not in quality; it is gradual, not essential. The distinction does not lie in this, that in eternity there is no succession of moments, but that it is without beginning and end. Past, present, and future are there not only for man, but are there also for and in [129] God. Thus the Socinians taught, Socinus, *Prael. theol. c. 8*. Crell, *De Deo et ejus attributis*

c. 18. Catech. Racov. qu. 60, cf. Fock, Der Socinianismus S. 427 f.; likewise Reinhard, Dogm. S. 106. Wegscheider, Instit. theol. § 63. Dorner, Glaub. I 132. Ges. Schriften 322 etc. From the other side, eternity and time are likewise mingled by pantheism. God and world here relate as *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, Spinoza, Eth. I prop. 29. Eternity is not essentially distinguished from time, but is the substance, the immanent cause of time, and this is the mode, the accidents of eternity, just as the surge of waves is the form of appearance of the ocean; God himself is dragged down into the stream of time and only in time comes to his full reality, Spinoza, Cog. Metaph. I c. 4. II c. 1. Hegel, Encycl. der philos. Wiss. § 257 f. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. I 9 S. 281 f. 298f. Biedermann, Dogm. II 518 f. Strauss expressed it clearly in his Glaub. I 562: Ewigkeit und Zeit verhalten sich wie die Substanz und ihre Accidentien. And Schleiermacher cautiously defined the eternity of God as seine mit allem Zeitlichen auch die Zeit selbst bedingende schlechthin zeitlose Ursächlichkeit Gottes. Now Christian theology, with respect to this perfection of God as well, has to avoid both deism and pantheism. Naturally the distinction between eternity and time also lies in the fact that the latter has a beginning and end or at least can have them and the former does not. But the whole difference is nevertheless not exhausted in that. There are three *notae* of the concept of eternity, namely that it excludes *principium*, *finem* and also *successionem*. God is ἀγεννητος, ἀφθαρτος but also immutabilis, Petavius, de Deo III c. 3 § 6. There is between eternity and time a distinction not only in quantity and degree, but also in quality and essence. For indeed, already Aristotle observed that time was indeed not one but nevertheless stood in the closest connection with motion, with becoming, i.e. with the transition from *potentia* to *actus*, although he thought that a motion in the world without

beginning was conceivable. Augustine expressed this in another way thus, that there is time only where the present becomes past, and the future becomes present. Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; fidenter tamen dico, scire me. Quod si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum [130] tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus, Conf. XI 14. Time is not a substance alongside others, no real quid, but a mode of existence of things. If there were no creatures, there would be no time. Time began a creatura, much more than creatura coepit a tempore, Aug., de Gen. ad litt. V 5, de civ. XI, 6. On the other hand, time is also not merely a subjective form of perception, as Kant thought, Kr. d. r. V. 81 f. Indeed, truth also lies here, and Augustine reasoned that there is indeed, in order to measure and calculate time, need of a thinking spirit, which holds fast the past by memory, stands in the present, and expects the future, and which insofar measures the times in itself, Conf. XI, 23-28. Thereby, however, Augustine did not deny that there would be no measurable and divisible motion of things if there were no thinking spirit that counted and measured it. But a distinction must be made between external and internal time, tempus extrinsecum and intrinsecum. By external time we understand the standard by which we measure motion. This is in a certain sense accidental and arbitrary. We derive it from the motion of the heavenly bodies, which is constant and known to all men, Gen. 1:14 v. This time will once cease, Op. 10:6, 21:23 v. But something else is the case with internal time. This is that mode of existence of things by which they have a past, present, and future and thus parts, which, by whatever standard, can be measured or counted. Now what can be measured or counted is subject to measure and number and thereby bounded; for there is always still a measure and number greater

than what is measured or counted. The essence of time therefore does not lie in this, that it is a *parte ante* and a *parte post* finite or endless, but in this that it contains succession of moments, that there is an earlier, a now, and a later in it. But from that it follows that time, *tempus intrinsecum*, is the mode of existence of all that is created, and is essentially proper to all finite being. Whoever says time, says motion, change, measurability, countability, boundedness, finitude, creature. Time is the duration of creaturely being; *tempus est mensura motus in re mobili*. But therefore no time can fall in God. He is who He is from eternity to eternity. There is in Him no change nor shadow of turning. He is not a becoming but an eternal being. [131] He has no beginning and no end, but also no earlier and later. He cannot be measured nor counted in his duration. A thousand years are for Him as one day. He is the eternal *ἐγὼ εἰμι*, Joh. 8:58. The eternity of God is therefore rather to be thought of as an eternal present, without past or future. *Omne praesens est apud Deum. Hodiernus tuus (dies est) aeternitas. Aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est, quae nihil habet mutabile*, Aug. Conf. XI 10-13. de vera relig. c. 49. Boethius defined the eternity of God by this, that He *interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet*, de cons. philos. V, and Thomas as *interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*, S. Theol. I qu. 10 art. 1. And thus all theologians speak, Tertull. adv. Marc. I 8. Greg. Nyss. adv. Eunomium I. Greg. Naz. orat. 38, 11. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 5 § 4. Anselmus, Monol. c. 18-24. Prosl. c. 18. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8, 2. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 10. Petavius, de Deo III c. 3-6. Gerhard, Loci II c. 8. Zanchius, Op. II 73-77. Alting, Theol. problem. loc. 3 probl. 20 etc. Yet the eternity of God may therefore not be thought of as an eternally standing still, immovable moment of time. But it is one with God's essence, and thus a fullness of being. God is not only

eternal, but He himself is sua aeternitas, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu 10 art. 2. It has its analogy not in the contentless being of man, for whom through idleness or boredom, through pain or anxiety the minutes stretch into hours and the days do not go but creep, but rather in the rich, full life of that man, for whom through labor and enjoyment time as it were does not exist, and the hours and days fly by. Therefore there is truth in the assertion that in hell there is no eternity, but only time, Thomas, S. Theol. I. qu. 10 art. 3 ad 3, and that a creature the more loses the imperfect in time and approaches eternity, as it is akin to God and is his image, ib art. 4 and 5. Therefore the eternity of God also does not stand abstract and transcendent above time, but is present and immanent in every moment of time. There is an essential distinction between eternity and time, but there is nevertheless also analogy and kinship, so that the former can dwell and work in the latter. Time was created with the things, it has no origin in itself; an eternal time, a time without beginning, is inconceivable. God, the eternal, is the only absolute cause of time. But [132] that time also has no subsistence in itself, it is a continual becoming and must rest in an unchangeable being. It is God who with his eternal power bears time in its entirety and in every moment. God permeates time and every moment of time with his eternity. In every second the pulsebeat of eternity beats. God therefore stands in relation to time. He enters with his eternity into time. Time is also objective for Him. He knows in his eternal consciousness the whole of time and the succession of all its moments. He himself thereby does not become temporal, not subjected to time, measure, number; He remains eternal and dwells in eternity. But He uses time, in order therein to bring his eternal thoughts and virtues to revelation; He makes time subservient to eternity and thus proves himself to be the βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων, Rex seculorum, 1 Tim. 1:17.

4. Infinity, as not being limited by space, is the omnipresence of God. This too is described in Holy Scripture in a very vivid manner. God is the Creator, and all that exists is and remains his in an absolute sense. He is the Lord, the Possessor of heaven and earth, Gen. 14:19, 22, Deut. 10:14, and is exalted above all creature, also above place and space. Heaven and earth do not contain Him, much less an earthly temple, 1 Kon. 8:27, 2 Chron. 2:6, Jes. 66:1, Hd. 7:48. Yet He is also not shut out by space. He fills heaven and earth; no one can hide himself from his face; He is a God from afar and from near, Jer. 23:23, 24, Ps. 139:7-10, Hd. 17:27, ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινουμέθα καὶ ἑσμεν, Hd. 17:28. Indeed, He is present in different places of creation in different degree and manner. The whole of Scripture proceeds from the thought that heaven, which nevertheless is also created, since its existence is in a special sense God's dwelling and throne, Deut. 26:15, 2 Sam. 22:7, 1 Kon. 8:32, Ps. 11:4, 33:13, 115:3, 16, Jes. 63:15, Mt. 5:34, 6:9, Joh. 14:2, Ef. 1:20, Hebr. 1:3, Op. 4:1 v. etc. But from there He descends, Gen. 11:5, 7, 18:21, Es. 3:8, walks in the garden, Gen. 3:8, appears repeatedly and in definite places, Gen. 12, 15, 18, 19, etc., comes down especially to his people on Mount Sinai, Ex. 19:9, 11, 18, 20, Deut. 33:2, Richt. 5:4. While He lets the Gentiles walk [133] in their ways, Hd. 14:16, He dwells in a special manner among his people Israel, Ex. 19:6, 25:8, Deut. 7:6, 14:2, 26:19, Jer. 11:4, Ezech. 11:20, 37:27, in the land of Canaan, Richt. 11:24, 1 Sam. 26:19, 2 Sam. 14:16, 2 Kon. 1:3, 16, 5:17, in Jerusalem, Ex. 20:24, Deut. 12:11, 14:23 etc., 2 Kon. 21:7, 1 Chron. 23:25, 2 Chr. 6:6, Ezra 1:3, 5:16, 7:15, Ps. 135:21, Jes. 24:23, Jer. 3:17, Joël 3:16 etc., Mt. 5:34, Op. 21:10, in the tabernacle and in the temple on Zion, which is called his house, Ex. 40:34, 35, 1 Kon. 8:10, 11:2, 2 Chr. 5:14, Ps. 9:12, Jes. 8:18, Mt. 23:21, above the ark between cherubim, 1 Sam. 4:4, 2 Sam.

6:2, 2 Kon. 19:15, 1 Chron. 13:6, Ps. 80:2, 99:1, Jes. 37:16. But the prophets repeatedly warn against a fleshly trust in this dwelling of God in the midst of Israel, Jes. 48:1, 2, Jer. 3:16, 7:4, 14, 27:16. For the Lord is far from the ungodly, Ps. 11:5, 37:10 v., 50:16 v., 145:20, but his face beholds the upright, Ps. 11:7. He dwells with him who is of a broken and humble spirit, Jes. 57:15, Ps. 51:19. When Israel forsakes Him, then He returns to them in Christ, in whom the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily, Col. 2:9. Through Him and through the Spirit whom He sends, He dwells in the congregation as in his temple. Joh. 14:23, Rom. 8:9, 11, 1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19, Ef. 2:21, 3:17, until He shall one day dwell with his people and shall be all in all, 1 Cor. 15:28, Op. 21:3. In polytheism, gnosticism and manichaeism this omnipresence of God could not be acknowledged. But also in the Christian church there were many who indeed wanted to know of an *omnipraesentia* of God's power but not of his essence. The anthropomorphites could not think of God without a definite form and place. In order to preserve God from mixture with material substance and the impurity of the world, some church fathers, over against the Stoa, went so far as to assert that God πορρω κατ' οίσιαν, ἐγγυτατω δε δυναμει was, Clemens Alex. Strom. II c. 2, that He dwelt in heaven, like the human spirit in the head, Lactantius, de opif. Dei c. 16. Inst. div. VIII 3. But by this they nevertheless did not deny the essential presence of God in every place. Only later was this decisively denied and contested by Augustinus Steuchus, bishop of Eugubium † 1550 in his commentary on Ps. 138 and further by [134] Crell, de Deo ejusque attributis c. 27, who assumed indeed an *omnipraesentia operativa* but not *essentialis* and restricted this latter to heaven. Remonstrantism expressed itself cautiously, called the question of less importance and preferably refrained from decision just as with the

eternity of God, Episcopius, *Inst. theol.* IV, 2, 13. Limborch, *Theol. Christ.* II, 6. Coccejus too was accused that under the omnipresence of God he understood only the *efficacissima Dei voluntas omnia sustentans ac gubernans*, but defended himself against that in a couple of letters to Anslar and Alting, *Opera* VIII p. 137 sq. *epist.* 169, 170, 176. The Cartesians said that God was omnipresent not by extension of his essence but by a simple act of his thinking or by a powerful act of his will, which were one with his essence, and denied that an *ubi* could be ascribed to God, Burmannus, *Synopsis* I, 26, 6. Wittichius, *Theol. pacifica* c. 14. Rationalism went still further, which restricted God's essential presence to heaven and deistically separated Him from the world, Reinhard, *Vorles.* S. 106, 120. Wegscheider, *Instit.* § 63. Deism came to this restriction of the omnipresence of God out of fear of the pantheistic mixing of God and world and of the defilement of the Divine essence with the moral and material impurity of created things. Indeed that fear is also not imaginary. The Stoa already taught that the Godhead as fire, aether, air, breath penetrates all things, also the bad and the ugly, Zeller IV 138. Spinoza spoke of the *substantia* as *corporea*, *Eth.* I prop. 15, called God a *res extensa*, *ib.* II prop. 2 and taught a presence of God that coincides with the being of the world, *Cog. metaph.* II c. 3. With Hegel, *Werke* XI 268 God's omnipresence is identical with his absolute substantiality. On this line also lies the definition of the omnipresence of God by Schleiermacher as *die mit allem Räumlichen auch den Raum bedingende schlechthin raumlose Ursächlichkeit Gottes*, *Gl.* § 53. Likewise Biedermann says, *Chr. Dogm.* § 702, that the pure *In-sich-sein* Gottes is pure antithesis of all space and place and insofar transcendent, but that God as ground of the world is immanent to it and that this *Grundsein* is his being itself, cf. also Scholten, *Initia* p. 124.

Christian theology has here too once again avoided deism [135] and pantheism. For Scripture taught clearly that God is exalted above space and place and therefore cannot be determined or enclosed, 1 Kon. 8:27, 2 Chron. 2:6, Jer. 23:24. Even where Scripture speaks in human fashion and, in order to give us a conception of the being of God, as it were enlarges space infinitely, Jes. 66:1, Ps. 139:7, Am. 9:2, Hd. 17:24, the thought nevertheless lies at the foundation of this, that God stands outside all bounds of space. There is then also, just as between eternity and time, so between the immensitas Dei and space an essential distinction. Space or place was defined by Aristotle as the immovable boundary of something surrounding or enclosing, το του περιεχοντος περας ακινητον, Phys. IV c. 5. This definition, however, proceeds from an overly external concept of space. For very certainly space is the distance of a particular object to other fixed points. But even if we were to think only one single simple object, space and place would nevertheless belong to it on account of the relation to imaginary points, which we could assume in thought. Space and place is therefore a property of all finite being and is, with the finite as such, given of itself. A finite being exists of itself in space. Its limitedness brings with it the concept of a ubi. It is always somewhere and not at the same time in another place. Abstracted from all measurable distance to other points (locus extrinsecus), a locus intrinsecus is proper to all creatures. Spiritual beings too are not excepted from this. In another dispensation the distances can be wholly different than we know them here on earth, just as now steam and electricity have already brought about a great change in this for our perception. But limited, local being remains proper to all creatures. Space is therefore not a form of perception, as Kant asserted, but a mode of existence of all that is created. And still much less correct is it, that space

would be a form of external, time a form of internal perception, and thus the representation of space would apply only to the bodily and that of time only to the spiritual world. Both, time and space, are inner modes of existence of all finite being. But from that it follows, that just as time, so also space cannot apply to God, the Infinite. He is transcendent, exalted above all space. Already Philo and Plotinus [136] spoke in this sense, Zeller, V 354, 483, and Christian theology likewise said that God *παντα χωρων, μονος δε ἀχωρητος* was, Hermas, Pastor mand. 1. Iren., adv. haer. II 1. IV 19. Clemens Alex. Strom. VII c. 7. Orig., c. Cels. VII 34. Athanasius, de decr. Nic. Syn. c. 11. Greg. Naz. Orat. 34. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 9. Augustine formerly thought in his Manichaeian period that God, like a fine ether, was spread through the whole world and through endless space, Conf. VII 1. But later he saw it differently. God is exalted above all space and place. He is not somewhere and yet He fills heaven and earth; He is not spread through space like the light and the air, but He is at all places with His whole being, *ubique totus and nusquam locorum*, Conf. VI 3. de civ. VII 30. He is enclosed by no space or place; and therefore it would be better to say that all things are in Him than that He is in the things. But yet this too is again not to be understood as if He were the space in which the things were located, for He is no locus. Just as the soul *tota in toto corpore et in qualibet parte* is, just as the one and the same truth is known everywhere, so by way of comparison God is in all things and all things in God, Enarr. in Ps. 74. And these thoughts of Augustine later return with all theologians, Anselmus, Monol. c. 20-23. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 36 en 37. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 8. S. c. Gent. III, 68. Sent. I dist. 37. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 37. And Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians have added nothing essentially new to it. Petavius, de Deo III c. 7-10. Gerhard, Loci I c. 8 sect.

8. Polanus, Synt. II c. 12. Zanchius, Op. II col. 90-138 enz. Indeed, of God too no space and place can be predicated. Space is a form of existence of finite being; the immensitas is a property of God alone and proper to no single creature, not even to the human nature of Christ. It contains, first of all, that God is outside all space and place, and infinitely exalted above it. Deus sibi ipsi locus, αὐτός ἑαυτοῦ τοπος, Tert. adv. Prax. c. 5. Theophilus, ad Autol. II, 10. Damasc. de fide orthod. I 13. He is in Himself, in se ipso ubique totus. In this sense God can just as well be said to be nowhere as somewhere (Philo, Plotinus). For a ubi, a locus does not apply to Him. The omnipresence of God expresses not only and even [137] not in the first place this being of God in Himself, but indicates especially a certain relation of God to space, which has been created with the world. Here too we can speak of God only on the ground of creation. Scripture even speaks of a going, coming, walking, descending of God. It speaks in human fashion and we too do not get beyond that. Difficile invenitur ubi sit, difficilior ubi non sit, August. de quant. an. c. 34. Therefore it is not useless, cf. e.g. Lipsius Dogm. § 306. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. II 121-128, to remind ourselves with every attribute that we thus speak humanly of God. Precisely the awareness that God is measured by no time or space, even if this is purely negative, preserves us from robbing God of His exaltation above all creature. In the negation there nevertheless lies again a strong position. The relation of God to space cannot consist in this, that He is in space and is enclosed by it, as Uranos and Kronos were powers above Zeus. For God is no creature. Si in aliquo loco esset, non esset Deus, August. Enarr. in Ps. 74. Not only is He no body, which extends itself through space and is circumscriptive in space, but He is also no finite, created spirit, which is always bound to a ubi and thus is definitive in space. Nor can the

relation be of such a nature that space is within Him and is enclosed by Him as the greater, infinite space, as some formerly did call God τοπος των ὀλων, and Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I § 492 f. speaks of infinite space as immanent to God. For space is by nature a form of existence of the finite creature and does not apply to God, the Infinite. But God is in space in such a way that He, as the Infinite existing in Himself, nevertheless repletively fills and upholds every point of space by His immensitas. Indeed pantheism is to be avoided here, which makes God's being into the substance of things and thereby also makes the divine being spatial. But equally deism is to be resisted, which lets God be omnipresent per potentiam but not per essentiam et naturam. There is essential distinction, but no separation between God and the creature. For every part of being and every point of space, in order to exist, needs nothing less than His immensitas. The deistic representation as if God dwells in a particular place and from there now governs all things by His [138] omnipotence, is in conflict with the being of God. It actually denies all His virtues, His simplicity, His immutability, His independence; it makes God into a man and creation independent. Not like a king in his realm or a captain on his ship is God present in His creation. His activity is no actio in distans. But He is, as Gregory the Great expressed it, present in all things, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam; enter, praesenter Deus hic et ubique potenter, His omnipresence is ἀδιαστασία, adessentia. He is in hell just as well as in heaven; in the godless as well as in the pious; in the places of uncleanness and of darkness just as well as in the halls of light. For He is not defiled by that uncleanness, because His essentia, although omnipresent, is nevertheless another than that of the creatures. Therefore Anselm said that it was actually better to say that God was cum tempore et loco than in tempore et loco, Monol. c. 22. Yet this

does not take away that God in another sense is again present in the creatures in different ways. There is a distinction between His physical and His ethical immanence. People too can in a natural sense be right next to one another and yet in sympathy and direction of spirit differ from one another by a world's breadth, Mt. 24:40, 41. The soul is present in the whole body and in all parts, but in each of them in its own way, in the head differently than in the heart, and in the hand differently than in the foot. *Haec autem facit atque agit unus verus Deus; sed sicut idem Deus, ubique totus, nullis inclusus locis, nullis vinculis alligatus, in nullas partes sectilis, ex nulla parte mutabilis, implens coelum et terram praesente potentia, non indigente natura. Sic itaque administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. Quamvis enim nihil esse possit sine ipso, non tamen sunt ulla quod ipse, Aug. de civ. VII, 30.* God's immanence is no unconscious emanation, but a conscious praesentie of His being in all creatures. And therefore that presence of God differs according to the nature of those creatures. Certainly every being, even the smallest and least, arises and exists only by divine power. There is nothing less than the being of God needed, to grant the smallest creature arising and subsistence. God dwells in all creatures but not in all [139] *aequaliter*, August. Epist. 187 c. 5 n. 16. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 37 pars 1 art. 3 qu. 1-2. All things are indeed in eo but not cum eo, Lomb. Sent. I dist. 37. God dwells in heaven differently than on earth, in the animals differently than in human beings, in the inanimate creatures differently than in the animate, in the godless differently than in the pious, in Christ differently than in the church. The creatures are different, according as God dwells in them in a different way. Nature and being of the creatures is determined by their relation to God. Therefore they all reveal God, but in different measure and according to

different sides. With the pure You keep Yourself pure, but with the perverse You show Yourself a wrestler, Ps. 18:27. In all creatures God is present per essentiam, but in no one except only in Christ does the fullness of the Godhead dwell bodily. In Christ He dwells in an entirely unique way, per unionem. In other creatures He dwells according to the measure of their being, in these per naturam, in others per justitiam, in others per gratiam, in others per gloriam. There is endless diversity, so that they all together would reveal the glory of God. It helps little, whether we deny this omnipresence of God. He makes us feel it in heart and conscience. He is not far from each one of us. What separates us from Him is only sin. It removes us not locally, but spiritually from God, Jes. 59:2. To forsake God, to flee from Him, as Cain did, does not consist in local separation but in spiritual unlikeness. Non loco quisque longe est a Deo, sed dissimilitudine, Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 94. And conversely, to go to Him, to seek His face, does not consist in a pilgrimage but in humiliation and repentance. And whoever seeks Him, finds Him, not far away, but in His immediate nearness. For in Him we live, move, and are. Propinquare illi, est similem illi fieri; recedere ab illo, dissimilem illi fieri, Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 34. Noli ergo cogitare Deum in locis; ille tecum est talis, qualis fueris. Quid est talis, qualis fueris? Bonus, si bonus fueris; et malus tibi videtur, si malus fueris; sed opitulator, si bonus fueris; ultor, si malus fueris. Ibi habes judicem in secreto tuo. Volens facere aliquid mali, de publico recipis te in domum tuam, ubi nemo inimicorum videat; de locis domus tuae promptis et in faciem constitutis, removis te in cubiculum; times et in cubiculo aliunde conscium, secedis in [140] cor tuum, ibi meditaris: ille in corde tuo interior est. Quocumque ergo fugeris, ibi est. Te ipsum quo fugies? Nonne quocumque fugeris, te sequeris? Quando autem et te ipso interior est, non est quo fugias a Deo

irato nisi ad Deum placatum. Prorsus non est quo fugias. Vis fugere ab ipso? Fuge ad ipsum, Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 74.

B. God as Spirit.

5. This being, however, is not to be conceived in God as an abstract being without content, but as a rich, full, Divine life. Holy Scripture, in order to indicate the fullness of the life of God, makes use not only of adjectives but also of substantives and calls God truth, righteousness, life, light, love, wisdom, Jer. 10:10, 23:6, Joh. 1:4, 5, 9, 1 Cor. 1:30, 1 Joh. 1:5, 4:8. And theology treated this doctrine under the name of the *simplicitas Dei*. With Irenaeus, *adv. haer.* I 12. II 13. 28. IV 4, God is called *totus cogitatus*, *totus sensus*, *totus oculus*, *totus auditus*, *totus fons omnium bonorum*, cf. Clemens, *Strom.* V 12. Orig. *de princ.* I 1, 6. Athanasius, *de decr. Nic. syn.* c. 22. c. Ar. II 38. The three Cappadocians, over against Eunomius, had especially to maintain the right of the different Divine names. But Augustine returned again and again to the *simplicitas Dei*. God is pure *essentia*, without *accidens*, *de trin.* V 4. Compared with Him all created being is a non-being, *de trin.* VII, 5 Enarr. in Ps. 134. Conf. VII, 11. XI, 4. In creatures there is a difference between being, living, knowing, willing; there is a difference of degree among them; there are creatures that only are, others that also live, still others that also think. But in God all that is one, *de civ.* VIII, 6, *de trin.* XV, 5. God is all that He has, *de civ.* X, 10. He is his own wisdom, his own life. Being and life are one in Him, cf. above 88 v. 92 v. and Gangauf, *Des h. Aug. specul. Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen* 1883 S. 147-157. And furthermore we find them with Damascenus, *de fide orth.* I

9, who adduces different proofs for this doctrine, with Anselmus, Monol. c. 15, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8 n. 4-9, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3, who in art. 3 expresses it briefly thus, Deus est Deitas, Id. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 8 art. 3 and further [141] with all Roman Catholic, Luth. and Ref. theologians, Petavius, de Deo Lib. II c. 1-8. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 64. Perrone, Prael. theol. II 92 sq. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. II 60 sq. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I 183 f. Philos. der Vorzeit II 742 f. Gerhard, Loci theol. Loc. 2 cap. 8 sect. 3. Baier, Comp. theol. posit. I c. 1 § 9. Buddeus, Inst. theol. II c. 1 § 17. Hyperius, Meth. theol. p. 88, 89. Zanchius, Op. II 63-73. Polanus, Synt. theol. lib. 2 c. 8. Trigland, Antapologia cap. 4. Voetius, Disp. I 226-246. H. Alting, Theol. Elenct. p. 119 sq. Moor I p. 604-618. L. Meijer, treatise on the Div. attributes IV 517-552 etc. On the other hand, this simplicity of God was opposed from various sides. Eunomius did indeed teach the absolute simplicity of God, but concluded from it that all names of God were only sounds and that the essence of God coincided with the ἀγεννησία. This one property made all others superfluous and useless, Schwane, D. G. II 21. The anthropomorphites of earlier and later times opposed the simplicity of God, because they ascribe a body to God. The Arabic sages taught the simplicity of God, but thereby opposed the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, because the three persons were denominationes additae super substantiam, Stöckl Gesch. der Philos. des M. A. II 89. Duns Scotus came into contradiction with the simplicity of God, which he otherwise expressly teaches, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 1-2, insofar as he assumed that the attributes were formaliter distinct from one another and from God's essence, ib. qu. 4. Nominalism went still much further and assumed a real distinction of the attributes. In the century of the Reformation this track was followed by the Socinians.

These came to it, in the interest of the independence of man, to limit the Divine essence and thus knew no way with the simplicity of God. Socinus doubted whether simplicity could be ascribed to God according to Scripture. The catechism of Rakow omits it entirely. Schlichting, Volkeliuſ and others denied that the attributes were one with God's essence, and asserted that a fullness of attributes was not in conflict with his unity, Hoornbeek, Socin. conf. I p. 368-369. Vorstius agreed with this and said, especially on the ground of the doctrine of the Trinity, that in God a distinction must be made between *materia* and *forma*, essence and attributes, genus and *differentiae*. Scripture therefore also says that God swears by his [142] soul, Jer. 51:14, that the Spirit is in Him, 1 Cor. 2:11. There is a distinction between knowing and willing, between the subject that lives and the life by which he lives, cf. Trigland, Kerk. Gesch. IV 576, 585 v. Schweizer in de Theol. Jahrb. 1856 S. 435 f. 1857 S. 153 f. Dorner, Gesammelte Schriften 1883 S. 278 f. The Remonstrants were of the same opinion. In their Apol. Conf. cap. 2 they said that of the *simplicitas Dei* not a jot stood in Scripture, that it was purely metaphysical doctrine and absolutely not necessary to believe. As an objection it was especially urged that with the simplicity of God the freedom of his will and the change of his disposition could not be reconciled. Episcopius still included the *simplicitas Dei* among the *attributa*, and thought that the *relationes*, the *volitiones* and *decreta libera* could indeed be united with it, Instit. Theol. Lib. 4 sect. 2 cap. 7, but Limborch no longer mentioned this property. With rationalism it receded entirely into the background, or even remained undiscussed, Wegscheider, Inst. Theol. § 61. Reinhard Dogm. § 33. Bretschneider, Handb. der Dogm. I 4 486. The latter says that Scripture does not know these subtleties of philosophy. Pantheism too could not recognize or

appreciate the doctrine of the simplicity of God. It identified God and world and, by the mouth of Spinoza, even ascribed to God the property of extension. Thus the *simplicitas Dei* has almost entirely disappeared from more recent theology; its significance is not seen; sometimes it is strongly opposed. Schleiermacher did not place the simplicity of God on one line with the other attributes and held it only for *das ungetrennte und untrennbare Ineinandersein aller göttlichen Eigenschaften und Thätigkeiten*, Chr. Gl. § 56. With Lange, Kahnis, Philippi, Ebrard, Lipsius, Biedermann, F. A. B. Nitzsch, Oosterzee and others this property is no longer mentioned. By Vilmar, Dogm. I 208 f. Dorner, Glaub. I 221 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften S. 305. Frank, Syst. de chr. Wahrh. I2 124. Ritschl, Theol. u. Metaph. S. 12 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 S. 2 f. Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1865 S. 275 f. 1868 S. 67 f. S. 251 f. Doedes Ned. Geloofsbel. bl. 9 it is strongly opposed, especially on these two grounds, that it is a metaphysical abstraction and conflicts with the doctrine of the Trinity, cf. against that Schweizer, Chr. Gl. I 256-259. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 338. Kuyper, *Ex ungue leonem* 1882.

Yet this *simplicitas Dei* is of the greatest significance for the knowledge of God. Not only is it taught in Scripture where God is called light, life, love, etc., but it also flows from the idea of God itself and is necessarily given with the other attributes. Simple here is the opposite of composite. If God is composite of parts, like a body, or also of genus and differentia, substantia and accidentia, materia and forma, potentia and actus, essentia and existentia, then his perfection, his unity, his independence, his immutability cannot be maintained. For then He is not the highest love, because something other than in Him is the subject that loves and something other the love by which He loves, and so with respect to all the other attributes. God then is not the one, *quo melius nihil cogitari potest*.

But God is of himself and has nothing above himself; He is therefore completely one with wisdom, with grace, with love, etc.; He is absolutely perfect, something higher than God cannot be thought, August. de trin. V 10 VI 1. Hugo a St. Victor, de trin. I 12. With creatures all that is different. Here there is a distinction between existence, essence, life, knowing, willing, acting, etc., *omne quod compositum est creatum est*, no creature can be absolutely simplex, for every creature is finite. But God is the infinite, and all that is in Him is infinite. All his attributes are divine and therefore infinite, one with his essence. Therefore He is and can also alone be sufficient, supremely blessed and supremely glorious in himself, Petavius, de Deo lib. II 2. From this it already appears that this simplicity of God is absolutely no metaphysical abstraction. It is essentially distinct from the philosophical idea of *το ὄν*, *το ἔν*, *το μοναχον*, *το ἄπλουν* or of the substance, of the absolute, etc., with which Xenophanes, Plato, Philo, Plotinus and later Spinoza and Hegel designate God. It is not found by abstraction, by going out above all oppositions and distinctions in creatures, and by defining the idea of God as the being elevated above all oppositions. But rather one has arrived at this attribute by positing all perfections of creatures in God in a perfect, divine way. The definition of God as *simplicissima essentia* indicates that He is the perfect, infinitely-full being, that He is an infinite and unbounded *πελαγος ούσιας*. And far from promoting pantheism, as Baur, chr. Lehre van d. Dreiein. Gottes [144] II 635 thinks, this doctrine of the *simplicissima essentia Dei* stands directly opposite to it. For in pantheism God has no own existence and life outside of and without the world. With Hegel, for example, the absolute, pure being, thinking, the idea exists not before, but only logically and potentially earlier than the world. All the determinations of the absolute being are

without content, being is nothing but abstract, logical forms of thought, Drews, *Die deutsche Spekulation* I 249. But the definition of God as *simplicissima essentia* in Christian theology maintains precisely that God has an own, infinite, supremely blessed life in himself, even if it is also the case that we can only designate that essence of God with names borrowed from creatures. The substance, the highest being, the absolute, etc., with which pantheistic philosophy by preference names the divine essence, is obtained by abstraction; one proceeded to think away everything from things until one retained nothing but the last, most general concept, namely pure being, naked existence. This being is indeed an abstractum, a concept, to which no reality corresponds and that may not be further determined. Every further determination would make it finite, make it into something particular and thus destroy the generality. *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. But the being that in theology is ascribed to God is an own, particular being, distinct from the world. It designates God, not as a being of which we can think absolutely nothing except that it is, but as a being in which everything is essence, as the absolute fullness of being. This simple essence therefore does not exclude the many names, as Eunomius asserted, but requires them. God is so rich that we cannot obtain any conception of his richness except with many names. Each name names the same full, divine essence, but each time from another side, according to which it reveals itself to us in his works. God is therefore simplex in his multiplicitas and multiplex in his simplicitas (Augustinus). Every determination, every name, with which we designate God, is therefore not a negation, but an enrichment of the knowledge of his essence. *Divinum esse est determinatum in se et ab omnibus aliis divisum per hoc quod sibi nulla additio fieri potest*, Thomas, *Sent.* I dist. 8 qu. 4 art. 1 ad 1. Kleutgen,

Theol. der Vorzeit I2 204 f. Understood thus, this simplicity of God is also not in conflict with the Trinity. For simple, simplex here does not stand opposite [145] to two- or threefold, duplex, triplex, but opposite to composite, compositus. And now the divine essence is not composed of three persons, nor is each person composed of the essence and the *proprietas personalis*; but the one same simple essence exists in the three persons, each person or personal property is distinguished from the essence not *re* but only *ratione*, each personal property is indeed a *relatio realis* but nevertheless adds not *aliquid reale* to the *essentia*. The personal properties *non component sed solum distinguunt*, Petavius, lib. 2. cap. 3-4. Zanchius, Op. II col. 68. 69.

6. The simplicity of God includes his spiritual nature, for everything bodily is composite. Scripture does indeed always speak of God in a human way, and ascribes to Him all kinds of bodily organs and activities, but even in this it nevertheless observes a certain limit. Of the internal organs of the human body only heart and bowels are ascribed to Him. Organs of nourishment, digestion, and reproduction are never transferred to Him. There is indeed in God mention of seeing and hearing, and also of smelling, but not of tasting and touching. A body is nowhere attributed to Him. Although the O. T. also nowhere says in so many words that God is spirit, yet this conception underlies the whole description of God. God is Jahveh, who descends to his people and reveals himself in a human way, but from the beginning He is also Elohim, who is far exalted above all that is creaturely. He exists of himself, Ex. 3:13, Jes. 41:4, 44:6, is eternal, Deut. 32:40, Ps. 90:1 v., 102:28, omnipresent, Deut. 10:14, Ps. 139:1 v., Jer. 23:23, 24, incomparable, Jes. 40:18, 25, 46:5, Ps. 89:7, 9, invisible, Ex. 33:20, 23, incapable of being imaged, Ex. 20:4, Deut. 5:8, because without

likeness, תְּמוּנָה, Deut. 4:12, 15. God and human beings stand over against one another as spirit and flesh, Jes. 31:3. Although He reveals himself many times in appearance, dream, vision and in so far makes himself visible, Gen. 32:30, Ex. 24:10, 33:11, Num. 12:8, Deut. 5:24, Judg. 13:22, 1 Kings 22:19, Jes. 6:1, it is nevertheless by his Spirit, and thus in a spiritual way, that He is present in creation and creates and sustains all things, Ps. 139:7, Gen. 2:7, Job 33:4, Ps. 33:6, 104:30 [146] etc., Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 46. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 496-504. More clearly the spiritual being of God comes to light in the N. Test. Not only is it evident from this, that God is eternal, Rom. 16:26, 1 Tim. 6:16, 1 Petr. 1:23, Rev. 1:8, 10:6, 15:7, and omnipresent, Acts 27:27, 28, Eph. 4:6, and incomparable, Acts 17:29, Rom. 1:22, 23, but Jesus also expresses it directly, when He calls God πνεῦμα and therefore demands a spiritual and true worship of God, John 4:24. And indeed this statement is not repeated literally by the apostles, but nevertheless they have the same conception of the being of God, when they call Him invisible, John 1:18, cf. 6:46, Rom. 1:20, Col. 1:15, 1 Tim. 1:17, 6:16, 1 John 4:12, 20; something which does not conflict with the promise of the beholding of God in the status gloriae, Job 19:26, Ps. 17:15, Mt. 5:8, 1 Cor. 13:12, 1 John 3:2, Rev. 22:4. This spiritual being of God has been misunderstood and denied in paganism, Rom. 1:23. Even philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the sensible representations of God. Materialism holds the material atoms to be the ultimate ground of being. Deism finite-izes God and makes Him in essence like human beings; with Epicurus the gods are a company of reasoning philosophers, with a fine etheric body, and distinguished by sex, Zeller, IV 3 433. But pantheism too encroaches upon this spiritual being of God. According to Heraclitus and the Stoa the first cause is to be thought of as material and bodily; God is at the same time the original power, which

in the course of time brings forth everything out of itself and thus also takes it back again into itself, Zeller IV3 133-146. All these directions also worked in the Christian church and down to the present day. With the realistic-eschatological representations, which in the second half of the second century prevailed in a wide circle, the thought of a certain corporeality of God was not far away. Of Tertullian it is not entirely certain whether he ascribed to God a material body. For he does indeed say, *quis enim negabit, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie*, *adv. Prax.* 7, but he seems to take *corpus* in the sense of substance, when he says: *omne quod est, corpus est sui generis, nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est, de carne* 11, and elsewhere speaks just as realistically of the soul, *de an.* 6. Yet the identification [147] of *corpus* and *substantia* is remarkable; it proves that Tertullian could think of no substance except as *corpus*. And elsewhere he then also says that God is no more free from affects than the human being, even though they are also present in Him in a perfect way. He even goes so far that he wants to take the hands and eyes ascribed to God in Scripture not spiritually but literally, though in a perfect way, *adv. Marc.* II 16. Tertullian can therefore be called the father of biblical realism. The danger of the spiritualism of the Alexandrian school, obtained by allegorical exegesis, drove many in the direction of anthropomorphism. Melito, bishop of Sardis, according to Origen ascribed a body to God, although it cannot be determined to what extent this report is correct, Herzog² 9, 539. In the fourth century such an anthropomorphism was taught by Audius and his followers, and by many Egyptian monks, who were especially opposed in the writing attributed to Cyril *contra anthropomorphitas*. Later this man-shaped representation of God was renewed by Socinianism. Here God is only a Lord, who has power

over us. Of his simple, infinite, independent, spiritual being no mention is made, Socinus, Christ. relig. instit. Catech. Racov. qu. 53. Crell asserted that the word spirit of God, angel and soul was used not aequivoce and analogice but univoce, de Deo et attrib. lib. 1 c. 15. And Vorstius said in the sense of Tertullian, vere corpus Deo attribui, si per corpus vera et solida substantia intelligatur, Dorner, Ges. Schriften 279. Furthermore, theosophy also teaches that God indeed in a certain sense has a body and that therefore the human being also was created bodily after God's image. In the kabbalah the ten sefiroth, that is, the attributes or modes, in which God reveals himself, together bear the name of Adam Kadmon, the first heavenly man, because the human form is the highest and most perfect revelation of God and God is thus represented in Scripture, Franck, La Kabbale 1843 p. 179. From that there developed among the Christian theosophists, in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, the representation that God, who is not a resting being, but an eternally becoming life, not only inwardly raises himself from darkness to light, from nature to spirit, but also outwardly surrounds himself with a certain nature, corporeality, glory, heaven, and in that gives form [148] to himself for himself and glorifies himself. Thus we find it with Böhme, cf. Joh. Claassen, Jakob Böhme, Sein Leben und seine theos. Werke, 3 Bde Stuttgart 1885 I S. XXXII, 157 II 61. Oetinger, Die Theologie aus der Idee des Lebens usw. 1852 S. 109 f. Baader, cf. Joh. Claassen, Franz v. Baaders Leben und theos. Werke usw. 2 Bde Stuttgart 1887 II 110-112. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psychol. S. 48 f. Auberlen, Die Philos. Oetingers 1847 S. 147. Hamberger, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. VIII 1863 S. 448 etc. Finally, even in pantheism the spiritual nature of God does not come into its own. Spinoza ascribed to substance the property of extensio, Eth. II prop. 1, 2. And in the philosophy of Hegel, Schleiermacher,

Hartmann e. a. the world is an essential moment in the infinite. Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott, Hegel, Werke XI 122. God and world are correlata, they express the same being, first as unity then as totality, Schleiermacher, Dialektik S. 162. To be sure, this pantheism, and even with a certain predilection, continues to speak of God as Spirit. But what is to be understood by that is difficult to comprehend. Hegel uses the name spirit especially for the last and highest Stufe, which the idea through nature in the human being, specifically in philosophy, reaches. Das Logische wird zur Natur und die Natur zum Geiste, Werke VII, 2 S. 468. Hegel still seeks the essence of spirit in ideality, in the einfache Insichseyn, in the ikness, ib. S. 14 f. 18 f., but God nevertheless becomes spirit only after a long process through and in the human being. Others have begun to use that word spirit for the last immanent cause of things, without thereby thinking of a proper, distinct existence and of a personal, conscious life. Hartmann designates the unconscious as pure, unconscious, impersonal, absolute spirit, and therefore calls his philosophy spiritualistic monism and panpneumatism, Philos. des Unbew. II 9 457. Philos. Fragen der Gegenwart 1885 S. 61.

Against all these tendencies the Christian church and theology have always held fast to the spiritualitas Dei, Iren. adv. haer. II c. 13. Orig. de princ. I 1, 6. c. Cels. VII 33 sq. VIII 49. Augustine, de trin. XV 5. de civ. VIII 5. Conf. VI 3 etc. John of Damascus, de fide orthod. I c. 11. II c. 3 etc. The spiritualitas Dei is often not treated separately, but is brought up under the simplicitas Dei, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8, 4 sq. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3. art. 1-2. S. c. Gent. I c. [149] 20. Petavius, de Deo II c. 1. The spiritual being is likewise maintained and defended by Roman Catholic, Luth., and Reformed theologians, Theol. Wirceb. III 27-34. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 68. Gerhard, Loci theol. II c. 8 sect. 1. Forbesius a Corse, Instruct. histor.

theol. lib. 1 c. 36. Maastricht, Theol. theor. pract. II c. 6. Under this spiritualitas Dei it was now understood that God was a proper substance, distinct from the being of the world, and that this substance was immaterial, imperceptible to bodily senses, without composition or extension. Of the nature of such an immaterial substance man can form only some faint notion from the analogy of the spiritual being that he finds in himself. But the being of his own soul is unknown to man in a positive sense; he observes in himself all kinds of psychic phenomena and from these concludes to a spiritual substance as their bearer, but this being of the soul itself escapes his observation. And even then the spiritualitas Dei is of a wholly different and unique kind. The designation spirit for God, angel, and soul is not to be understood univoce and synonymously, but analogice. This is already evident from the fact that the spirit in angels and men is composite, indeed not out of material parts but nevertheless out of substantia and accidentia, out of potentia and actus, and is thus subject to change. In God, however, this composition is no more present than that out of bodily parts; He is pure being. But furthermore it also comes clearly to light in this, that God as πνευμα is not only the Πατηρ των πνευματων, Hebr. 12:9, but equally the Creator and Father of all visible things. These too have come to be out of things that do not appear before the eyes, Hebr. 11:3, and have their origin in God as πνευμα. God as spiritual being is the author not only of all that among creatures is called πνευμα and ψυχη, but also of all that is called σωμα and σαρξ. And thus the spiritualitas makes known that perfection of God by which He is to be conceived both negatively, in analogy with the spirit of the angels and the soul of man, as immaterial and invisible, and also positively as the hidden, simple, absolute ground of all creaturely, somatic and pneumatic, being. This was also

perceived earlier, and hence some proposed to call even the spirits of the angels and the souls of men still bodies, while God [150] then alone was spirit in an entirely unique sense, cf. Augustine, Epist. 28, or also, to apply to God neither the predicate of corporeality nor that of incorporeality, because He is exalted above both, Petavius, de Deo II c. 1 § 14-16. But this deserves no recommendation, because it promotes misunderstanding and also forgets that, although all knowledge of God is analogical, that analogy nevertheless comes out more clearly in the one group of creatures than in the other, and speaks more strongly in the world of invisible things than in that of visible. Equally incorrect is it on the other side, with Cartesius to place the essence of spirit in cogitatio, de meth. c. 4, and with Cartesian theologians to define the essence of God as res cogitans, Wittichius, Theol. c. 15 § 218, or as perfectissima et purissima intellectio, Burmannus, Synopsis I 17, 4. For thereby the spiritual nature of God is at once identified with personality, as indeed also happened with Reinhard, Dogm. 111, Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 64, and others. Pantheism therefore knew no way with this spiritual nature of God, and made it into a sound without meaning, into a word without reality. It is therefore of importance to maintain the spiritualitas Dei as an indication of his substantia incorporea. Personality, self-consciousness and self-determination, is thereby not yet given of itself; indeed naturally in God, because He is a simple being; but not in the concept considered in itself. Animal consciousness and the unconscious representations in man prove sufficiently that spiritualitas and personalitas are not identical concepts. That which is expressed in the personalitas comes up later in the doctrine of the scientia and voluntas Dei. Here, with the spiritualitas, it is a matter of maintaining the spiritual being of God. And this is of such great importance, that upon it rests the whole

manner in which we must serve God. Worship in spirit and truth rests on the spirituality of God. Only thereby is all image-worship in principle and for ever cut off.

7. From this *spiritualitas Dei* there follows directly his *invisibilitas*. Scripture teaches this explicitly, above p. 145 f. And in the Christian church there was therefore little difference of opinion about whether God could be beheld with bodily eyes. Both for this dispensation and for that in glory this was generally [151] denied; only a few, the Audians, the Socinians, Vorstius, and also some Lutherans, such as Quenstedt, Theol. I 554 sq. 566, Hollaz, Ex. theol. 458, Hulsemann, Majus, Jaeger e. a., accepted it and also appealed to the Reformed Alsted, Theol. schol. 849, Bucanus, Instit. theol. 1648 p. 443; but Gerhard, Loc. XXXI § 144 left it undecided; and Baier, Comp. I c. 6, Buddeus, Inst. theol. II c. 3 § 4 restricted it to the *cognitio intellectualis*. Moreover, it was taught by all that God as spirit was invisible to bodily senses, Iren. adv. haer. II 6. IV 20. Orig. c. Cels. VII 33 sq. Augustinus, de civ. XXII 29. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 12 art. 3 ad 3. Martyr, Loci, p. 8, 9. Zanchius, Op. I 225 etc. If there can be talk of a seeing of God, this is possible only with eyes of the soul or of the spirit. In that connection, however, the question could arise whether a beholding of God is possible, directly, without the medium of creatures, face to face? Can God, as scholasticism said, be seen, *ut est in se per essentiam*, in *substantia vel essentia sua*? Now it was generally taught that such a beholding of God *per essentiam* in any case was possible only in the *status gloriae*. Here on earth such a seeing of God was attainable for no one. At most this was, by a special grace and only for a moment, permitted to Moses, Ex. 34, Isaiah, c. 6, Paul, 2 Cor. 12, August. Epist. 112, de Gen. ad litt. XII 27. Basil. Hexaem. hom. 1. Hilarius, de trin. V. But by far the most judged also with

respect to the beholding of God that had fallen to the lot of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles, that it had always taken place mediately, through a cloud, in some sign or other, under some form or other, Petavius, *de Deo* VII c. 12. In discussion, therefore, in fact only the question was whether in the status gloriae there is a visio Dei per essentiam. Now the church fathers do indeed speak many times of a seeing of God that is laid up for believers in heaven, e.g. Iren. *adv. haer.* IV 20. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* V c. 1. Greg. Naz. *Orat.* 34. August, *de civ.* XXII 29, *de Gen. ad lit.* XII 26, but they do not mention a seeing of God per essentiam. They only say with Scripture that the blessed will see God, not through a mirror, but face to face. And they add that God is invisible, but that he can make himself visible and can reveal himself to [152] man, Iren. *ib.* In potestate nostra non est eum videre, sed in potestate illius est apparere, Ambrosius, in Petavius, VII c. 7. Others therefore also denied that God per essentiam would be beheld in the hereafter, such as Chrysostom, Gregorius Nyss., Cyrillus Hier., Theodoretus, Hieronymus, Isidorus e. a. The Roman theologians are embarrassed by the statements of these patres. Vasquez acknowledged outright: hos patres, si sincere loqui volumus, vix possumus in bonum sensum interpretari. But others try to weaken these statements and to explain them in the sense that they deal with the bodily beholding of God or with the beholding of God in this life or with the absolute knowledge of God, which is also in heaven unattainable and remains so, Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 12 art. 1 ad 1. Sent. IV dist. 49 qu. 1 art. 1 ad 1. Petavius, *de Deo* VII c. 5. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 82-86. Gradually, however, under the influence of the neoplatonic mysticism that acted upon Pseudodionysius, another conception of the visio Dei arose. It was now conceived as a beholding of God in his being, ut in se est. God no longer descended to

man, but man was raised up to God by a supernatural gift and thus deified. Greg. Magnus, *Moral.* l. 18 c. 28 already said that God will be seen not only in his glory but also in his nature, for *ipsa ei natura sua claritas, ipsa claritas natura est*. Prosper, *de vita contempl.* 1 c. 4 spoke of the blessed as *sui creatoris substantiam mundis cordibus contemplantes*. Bernardus, *serm.* 4 in *festum omnium sanctorum*, says that God will be seen in all his creatures, but that the trinitas will also be seen in *semetipsa*. And the council at Florence declared that souls in *coelum mox recipi et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum sicuti est, pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius*, cf. Denzinger, *Enchir. symb. et defin.* n. 403, 456, 588, 870, 875. Scholasticism found here ample material for all kinds of speculation and also made ample use of it. In connection with the doctrine of the *dona superaddita* it was taught that man with his natural gifts was not capable of this beholding of God, but that a *divinum auxilium* was necessary for it, which supplemented, elevated, and completed the natural gifts. That supernatural help was usually designated by the name of *lumen gloriae*. But there arose great difference about the nature of this *lumen*, whether it was objective or [153] subjective, whether it was the Word or the Spirit, a gift of the H. Spirit or this himself, although it was also mostly assumed that it was *aliquid creatum, intellectui datum in ratione habitus*. Moreover, it became the general doctrine that God in his being was the object of the beholding, and that the blessed therefore saw in God everything that cannot be separated from his being, thus both the attributes and the persons. But the Thomists asserted that the being could not be beheld without the persons and the one attribute not without the other, while the nominalists and Scotists maintained the opposite. Further, according to everyone's opinion, God himself and all that was *formaliter* in him, i.e. belonged to his being,

was the object of the beholding; but there was again difference whether to that also belonged that which was eminenter in him, i.e. what is called into existence by God in accordance with his decrees. Usually this was maintained in order thereby to justify the invocation of the angels and of the blessed, who in God saw everything that would happen and thus knew the needs of believers on earth. Even though it was now also added that the visio Dei was no comprehensio and differed in the blessed according to the measure of their merits, yet this doctrine ended in the deification of man. The creature, on the ground of a supernatural gift, raises itself upward by its own merits and becomes like God, Lombardus, Sent. 4 dist. 49. Thomas S. Theol. I qu. 12, I 2 qu. 3, especially art. 12. qu. 4 art. 2. S. c. Gent. III c. 38-63. Sent. IV dist. 49 qu. 1, 2. Bonaventura, Brevil. VII c. 7. Hugo Vict. de Sacr. lib. 2 pars 18 c. 16. Petavius, De Deo VII c. 1-14. Becanus, Theol. Schol. I c. 9. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 67-90. Perrone, Prael. theol. III p. 266-276. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. III p. 913-935. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. III p. 23-44. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. II S. 122-134. Scheeben, Dogm. I 562 f. II 294 f.

The Reformation adopted a different position over against this visio Dei. The Lutherans tended to assume a visio Dei per essentiam, and not only mentalis but even also corporalis. God's power was so great that He could grant to the blessed an illumination, whereby they can also see Him with the eyes of the body in his essence, above p. 151. Also some Reformed theologians did not consider such a visio Dei per essentiam impossible, Bullinger on Joh. 1:18. Polanus, Synt. [154] Theol. p. 9, 518. Synopsis pur. theol. LII 11-24. Forbesius a Corse, de visione beatifica, Op. Amst. 1703 I 282-289. etc. But most, holding to the glory prepared for believers which surpasses all knowledge, set aside the spinosae quaestiones of scholasticism

or also rejected the visio Dei per essentiam entirely, Calvin, Inst. III 25, 11. Pareus on 1 Cor. 13 12. Rivetus on Ps. 16:11, Op. II 68. Danaeus on 1 Tim. 6:16. Gomarus on Joh. 1:18. Op. p. 249-252. Maccovius redivivus, Theol. pol. 162. Hoornbeek, Instit. theol. XVI 20 Turretinus, Theol. El. XX qu. 8. Heidegger, Corpus theol. III 37, XXVIII 138. Moor, VI 720. M. Vitringa IV 18-25, especially Voetius, Disp. II 1193-1217 etc.; cf. also Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV sect. 2 c. 4, Limborch, Theol. Chr. VI 13, 6. This modesty is certainly in accordance with Scripture, which indeed speaks of a beholding of God by the blessed, but declares nothing further about it and elsewhere expressly calls God invisible. The beholding that awaits believers is called by Paul a knowing as we are known. If God, as all assume, cannot be known perfectly, in his essence, but is incomprehensible, He also cannot be seen in his essence. Visio per essentiam and comprehensio are, after all, completely the same. Moreover, God is infinite and man remains finite, also in the status gloriae. God therefore can always be seen by man only in a finite, human manner. The objectum may thus be infinitum, the repraesentatio in human consciousness is and remains finita. But then the seeing of God is also not per essentiam. Then from God's side there is always a συγκαταβασις necessary, a revelation, whereby He from his side descends to us and makes himself known to us; Mt. 11:27 also remains in force in glory. The beholding of God in his essence would entail that man would be deified and the boundary between Creator and creature would be erased. That indeed lies on the line of the Neoplatonic mysticism, which was taken up by Rome, but not on that of the Reformation, and at least not of the Reformed church and theology. For with Rome man is raised by the donum supernaturale above his own nature; he thereby in fact becomes another being, a homo divinus and supernaturalis, Bellarminus, de justif. V

12; but however high and glorious the [155] Reformed also thought of the status gloriae, there too man nevertheless remained man, indeed elevated *supra gradum suum naturalem*, but not *supra speciem suam et objectum illi analogum*, Turret., Th. El. XX qu. 8, 12. The blessedness of man is certainly situated in the *visio Dei beatifica*, but nevertheless always in such a *visio* as for which the finite and limited human nature is capable. A *θεωσις*, as Rome teaches it, fits into the system of the Pseudodionysian hierarchy but finds no support in Scripture, cf. later the locus on the image of God, and also Stuckert, *Vom Schauen Gottes*, Zeits. f. Th. u. K. von Gottschick VI 6 S. 492-544.

C. God as Light.

8. The whole of Scripture proceeds from the assumption that consciousness and knowledge belong to God. He is pure *φως* without any *σκοτία*, 1 Joh. 1:5, dwelling in an inaccessible light, 1 Tim. 6:16, and source of all light in nature and grace, Ps. 4:7, 27:1, 36:10, 43:3, Joh. 1:4, 9, 8:12, Jak. 1:17 etc. In this designation of light is included that God is perfectly conscious of himself, that He surveys himself in his whole being and that nothing in that being is hidden from his consciousness. Also the trinitarian life of God is a perfectly conscious life, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 1:17, 10:15, 1 Cor. 2:10. But further, God has consciousness and knowledge of all that exists outside his being. Nowhere in Scripture is it even indicated that anything would be unknown to Him. Indeed the manner in which He takes knowledge is sometimes described very humanly, Gen. 3:9 v., 11:5, 18:21 etc., but He nevertheless knows everything. The thought that something would be

unknown to Him is rejected as absurd; would He who plants the ear not hear, and He who forms the eye not see, Ps. 94:9. Repeatedly there is mention of his חִכְמָה, גְּבוּרָה, עֲצָה, תְּבוּנָה, γνῶσις, σοφία, Job 12:13, 28:12-27, Spr. 8:12 v., Ps. 147:5, Rom. 11:33, 16:27, Ef. 3:10 etc. And this knowledge of God has every creature as its object. It extends to everything, and is thus omniscience in the strict sense. His eyes run through the whole earth, 2 Chron. 16:9; everything is known to Him and lies naked spread out before his eye, Hebr. 4:13. The smallest and least, [156] Mt. 6:8, 32, 10:30, the most hidden, heart and kidneys, Jer. 11:20, 17:9, 10, 20:12, Ps. 7:10, 1 Kon. 8:39, Luk. 16:15, Hd. 1:24, Rom. 8:27, thoughts and deliberations, Ps. 139:2, Ezech. 11:5, 1 Cor. 3:20, 1 Thess. 2:4, Op. 2:23, the human being in his origin and being and in all his ways, Ps. 139, night and darkness, Ps. 139:11, 12, hell and destruction, Spr. 15:11, the evil and sinful, Ps. 69:6, Jer. 16:17, 18:23, 32:19, the conditional, 1 Sam. 23:10-13, 2 Sam. 12:8, 2 Kon. 13:19, Ps. 81:14, 15, Jer. 26:2, 3, 38:17-20, Ezech. 3:6, Mt. 11:21 and the future, Jes. 41:22 v., 42:9, 43:9-12, 44:7, 46:10, specifically also the end of life, Ps. 31:16, 39:6, 139:6, 16, Job 14:5, Hd. 17:26 etc., it is all known to God. He knows everything, 1 Joh. 3:20. And He knows all that not aposteriori, by observation, but apriori, from eternity, 1 Cor. 2:7, Rom. 8:29, Ef. 1:4, 5, 2 Tim. 1:9. His knowledge is not susceptible of increase, Jes. 40:13 v., Rom. 11:34, is certain and determinate, Ps. 139:1-3, Hebr. 4:13, so that all God's revelations are true, Joh. 8:26, 17:17, Tit. 1:2, all the works of God make his wisdom known to us, Ps. 104:24, 136:5, Ef. 3:10, Rom. 11:33, and dispose us to worship and admiration, Ps. 139:17 v., Jes. 40:28, Job 11:7 v., Rom. 11:33, 1 Cor. 2:11. The knowledge of God both of himself and of the world is taught in Scripture so decisively and clearly, that it was at all times acknowledged within the Christian church. But pantheism has

come into opposition to that. It ascribed to God no being of his own, distinct from the world, and therefore could also assume in God no consciousness of his own. Spinoza did indeed still speak of the *cogitatio* as an *attributum Dei* and called God a *res cogitans*, *Eth.* II prop. 1. But from that *cogitatio* he distinguished the *intellectus* as *certus modus cogitandi*, and this does not fall in the *natura naturans* but only in the *natura naturata*, *Eth.* I prop. 31, and all these *modi cogitandi* together constitute God's eternal and infinite intellect, *Eth.* V prop. 40 schol. This pantheism led through Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer to the *Philosophie des Unbewussten* of Eduard von Hartmann. In the first part of his work he indicates at length the significance which belongs to the unconscious everywhere in the world, and then says that that unconscious being is one in all things II 9 155 f. And this Unconscious, although preferably not called God II [157] 201, nevertheless with Hartmann fills the place of God. Now this Unconscious is sometimes conceived by Hartmann in such a way that it is not blind and alogical, like the will in Schopenhauer, but rather clear-sighted, clairvoyant, just like instinct in animal and human being, and possesses an omniscient, all-wise, *überbewusste Intelligenz*, II 176 f. But he denies that consciousness belongs to the Unconscious. For consciousness consists in a splitting of subject and object, is thus always a limitation and presupposes individualization, indeed even the body, II 177 f. As soon as consciousness is taken absolutely, it loses its form and of itself becomes unconscious, II 179. If the absolute still had a consciousness of its own outside the individual consciousnesses, it would at once devour these. Monism is incompatible with a conscious Divine being. Such a being would not be immanent in but separated from the world. It is indeed the cause of all consciousness but is not itself conscious, II 178 f. And self-consciousness in particular cannot be ascribed

to the absolute, for this presupposes a distinction of subject and object, a reflection upon itself, which cannot occur in the absolute, II 187 f. Pantheism thus denies to God both knowledge of the world, Weltbewusstsein, innerweltliches Selbstbewusstsein, and knowledge of himself, self-consciousness, ausserweltliches or innergöttliches Selbstbewusstsein. Even where He comes to consciousness in the individual consciousnesses, He knows only the world but not himself, Hartmann II. 176. Now to Hartmann almost everything that he says about the power and significance of the unconscious in creatures can be conceded. The unconscious indeed plays a great role in animal and human life. But it is remarkable that Hartmann does not even pose the question whether that extensive power of the unconscious does not precisely presuppose and require the intelligence of God. For very certainly there is many a time an unconscious and yet purposive action. But the unconscious in animal and human being then does not itself act with a purpose; rather, the conscious spirit of the human being sees in that action a purpose, toward which it is directed precisely by a higher consciousness standing above it, Thomas, S. c. Gent. I 44, 5. From of old, therefore, the observation of the purposive in the world has led to the recognition of a Divine being. Anaxagoras therefore already assumed a νοῦς, which possessed an infinite knowing, in order to order everything in the best way. Socrates defines the Deity thus, that it sees and hears everything [158] and is present everywhere. With Plato God is the world-former, who creates everything according to the ideas. Aristotle reasons that the Deity is the primum movens, the absolute being, actus purus, and absolutely incorporeal. It is therefore thinking, νοῦς, and has as its content itself. God cannot derive the content of his thought from without; He can only think the best, and that is Himself. God thus thinks himself, He

is the thinking of the thinking; the thinking and its object is in Him one, God is νοησις νοησεως, Metaph. XII 9. And even the Stoa concluded teleologically from the purpose in the world to an intelligent cause. Zeno already reasoned thus: Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu mundus, Cic. N. D. II, 8, 22. cf. III, 9, 22: quod ratione utitur melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. So also Thomas, S. c. Gent. I c. 28 and 44. Whoever recognizes no purpose in the world also has no need of a self-conscious God and has enough with materialism. But whoever, with von Hartmann, defends the teleological worldview, must assume in God a consciousness, and does not explain the conscious by the unconscious. For in the effect there cannot be more present than lies in the cause. Would He who plants the ear not hear, and He who forms the eye not behold? A perfection in the creature points back to a perfection in God. If the rational being in value surpasses all others, if thinking, the human being, otherwise weak as a reed, nevertheless elevates above all creatures, God cannot be thought of as unconscious. Religion resists that, which always and everywhere presupposes a personal, self-conscious God, but philosophy too registers protest against that. Pantheism may be able to appeal to Spinoza and Hegel; theism has all the philosophers of antiquity on its side and also finds in more recent philosophy still support with Cartesius, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling (2nd period), J. H. Fichte, Herbart, Lotze, Ulrichi, Carrière etc. That now the Divine self-consciousness differs specifically from that of the human being and has in this only a weak analogy, certainly stands beyond all doubt. In so far there would be no objection to calling God überbewusst. But precisely therefore one cannot conclude from the limitation of human

self-consciousness to Divine knowledge. In spite of all reasonings from the pantheistic side about limitation, individuality, and the sensory basis as necessarily proper to self-consciousness, it is not to be seen why God's self-knowledge would be a limitation of his being. With us self-consciousness is finite and limited, because we ourselves are finite and because it never covers our being. Our being is much richer than our self-consciousness. But God is the eternal, pure being. And his self-knowledge has nothing less than that full, eternal, Divine being itself as its content. Being and knowing are one in God. He knows himself through his own being. He also does not come to consciousness gradually, and is not now more than less conscious of himself. For in Him there is no becoming, no process, no development. He is pure being, mere light without darkness, Augustinus, *de trin.* XV 14. Thomas, *S. c. Gent.* I c. 57-48.

From this self-consciousness of God his *Weltbewusstsein* is to be distinguished. Earlier theology therefore divided the knowledge of God into *scientia naturalis* (*necessaria, simplicis intelligentiae*) and *scientia libera* (*contingens, visionis*). The two are not identical, as pantheism teaches, for if the absolute is to be conceived as only logically and potentially prior to the world, it is wholly insufficient for the explanation of the world. God does not need the world, in order to come to personality, to self-consciousness. He has neither, according to Hegel, a logical, nor, according to Schelling, a historical *cursus* to run through, in order to attain his full actuality (von Baader). But yet the self-consciousness and the *Weltbewusstsein* in God cannot stand so separated alongside one another, as it was sometimes represented in the earlier dogmatics. Rather, there exists between the two an organic connection. God has, out of the infinite fullness of ideas, which are present in his absolute self-consciousness, not arbitrarily selected some, in

order to realize them outside himself. He has therein let himself be guided by the goal, to bring to revelation in the world himself, all his virtues and perfections. The *cognitio libera* thus comprises precisely those ideas which in their realization are suited to unfold, in a creaturely manner, the being of God. The *cognitio naturalis* is of course unfit to be communicated to creatures. As God knows himself, he can never be known by creatures, neither as regards the content and the [160] extent, nor also as regards the manner. But the *cognitio libera* comprises all that which is susceptible of realization and suited to bring the virtues of God to revelation in and for creatures. It stands to the *cognitio naturalis* as the ectype to the archetype. Yet also with this *cognitio libera* it must be kept in view that it is in God something wholly different than in the creatures. Even if this *cognitio libera* is communicable, it is nevertheless distinguished not only in extent but also in nature and essence to a great degree in God and in the rational creature. In the first place, Holy Scripture teaches very clearly that this *scientia Dei* comprises all that is; nothing is withdrawn from his omniscience, nothing hidden from his all-seeing eye. Past, present, and future; the least and the most hidden; everything is naked and revealed before Him with whom we have to do. At all times this was also acknowledged in Christian theology. The only one who spoke otherwise was Hieronymus. This one called it in his commentary on Hab. 1:13 absurd, to bring down the Divine majesty so far, *ut sciat per momenta singula quot nascantur culices, quot ue moriantur; quae cimicum et pulicum et muscarum sit in terra multitudo, quanti pisces in aqua natent, et qui de minoribus majorum praedae cedere debeant*. But this limitation of God's omniscience finds no support in Scripture and has been unanimously rejected by Christian theology. And furthermore God knows everything not by observation from the things, but he knows

everything out of and from himself. Our knowledge is posterior; it presupposes being and is derived from it. With God it is the reverse; he knows everything before it is. Scripture also expresses this clearly, when it says that God knows everything before it happens, Jes. 46:10, Am. 3:7, Dan. 2:22, Ps. 139:6, Mt. 6:8 etc. God is after all the Creator of all things; he has thought them before they existed. *Iste mundus nobis notus non esse posset, nisi esset; Deo autem, nisi notus non esset, esse non posset*, August. de civ. XI 10, de Gen. ad lit. V 18. He exists of himself and can also in his consciousness and knowledge not depend on or be determined by anything that is outside him. From his aseitas there flows of itself the absolute independence of his knowing. He knows everything not from the things after their existence, for then these, as with Schopenhauer and Hartmann, would have proceeded out of the unconscious being, cf. August. de civ. XI, 10 [161] Conf. XIII 16. Gen. ad. litt. V 15, but he knows everything in and through and out of himself. And therefore his knowledge is also one, simple, unchangeable, eternal; he knows everything at once, simultaneously, from eternity; and everything stands eternally present before his eye, Iren., adv. haer. I 12. August., de trin. XI 10. XII 18. XV 7, 13, 14. Lombardus, Sent. I. dist. 35, 36. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 14. S. c. Gent. I c. 44 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 195 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 18 etc.

Therefore, of praescientia there can, in the proper sense, be no question with God. With Him there is no *differentia temporis*, Tertull., adv. Marc. III 5. He calls the things that are not as though they were, and sees what is not as though it already existed. *Quid est enim praescientia, nisi scientia futurorum? quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim scientia Dei res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes; ac per hoc non jam praescientia sed tantum scientia dici potest*, August., ad

Simpl. II 2. Omne quod nobis fuit et erit, in ejus prospectu praesto est, Gregorius Magnus, Mor. I. 20 c. 23. Quidquid tempora volvunt, praesens semper habet, Marius Victor, in Petavius, de Deo IV 4. The distinction of God's omniscience into praescientia, scientia visionis (of the present) and reminiscencia is wholly and entirely a human representation, Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 67. Yet Scripture represents it many times in such a way, as though God's omniscience temporally precedes the being of things. And without this auxiliary representation we also cannot speak of God's omniscience. But from that there arose in theology the question, how this omniscience of God was to be reconciled with man's freedom. If God nevertheless foreknows everything, then everything stands fixed from eternity and there remains no place any longer for free and contingent acts. Cicero therefore already came to denial of God's omniscience, because he could not bring it into agreement with the free will, de fato c. 14. de div. II 5-7. Marcion denied to God, together with omnipotence and goodness, also omniscience, because He had let the first man fall into sin, Tertull. adv. Marc. II 5. Later this same was taught by the Socinians. God knows everything but everything according to its nature. He knows the possibly future, the contingent, thus not with absolute certainty, for then it would cease to be contingent, but He knows it as possible and contingent, i.e. He knows the future, insofar as it depends on [162] men, not certainly and infallibly in advance. For otherwise freedom of will was lost, God became author of sin and Himself subjected to necessity, Fock, der Socin. 437-446. But such a limitation of God's omniscience was too much in conflict with Holy Scripture for it to be able to find acceptance otherwise than with a few. Christian theology usually seeks the solution in another direction. Two ways offered themselves for that. On the one hand Origen made a

distinction between the *praescientia* and the *praedestinatio*. God indeed foreknows the things, but this *praescientia* is not the cause and the ground of their happening; rather God only foreknows them certainly, because they will happen in time through the free decision of men; *ὅν γὰρ ἔπει εἰδωσται γινεται, ἀλλ' ἔπει γινεσθαι ἐμελλεν εἰδωσται*, in Gen. I 14. c. Cels. II 20. On the other side stands Augustine, who also wants to maintain both, the *praescientia* and freedom of will. *Religiosus animus utrumque eligit, utrumque confitetur, et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat*, de civ. V 9, 10. But he sees that, if God foreknows something certainly, it must also necessarily happen; otherwise the whole *praescientia* again collapsed. *Praescientia, si non certa praenoscit, utique nulla est*, de lib. arb. III 4. Therefore he says that the will of man, with his whole nature, with all his decisions, is included in the *praescientia* and is not destroyed by it, but rather is posited and maintained. *Cum enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae, cuius est praescius ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis est praescius*, de lib. arb. III 3. *Voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit atque praescivit; et ideo quidquid valent, certissime valent; et quod facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt; quia valituras atque facturas ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli non potest*, de civ. V 9. Scholasticism, although making all kinds of distinctions, in principle aligned itself with Augustine, Anselmus, de concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis necnon gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 38. Bonaventura, ib. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 14. Hugo Vict., de Sacram. I 9 etc. But the Jesuits brought change, cf. deel I 91 v. In connection with semipelagianism, between the *scientia necessaria* and the *scientia libera* they inserted still the so-called *scientia media*, in order by means of this to reconcile God's omniscience with man's freedom. By this they understood

[163] a knowledge of God, logically preceding the decrees, of the conditionally future. The object of this knowledge is not the merely possible, which will never become actuality, nor also that which, as a consequence of a decree of God, will certainly happen, but that possible which under one or another condition can become actuality. God namely in his government of the world lets much depend on conditions, and now knows in advance what He will do, in case the conditions are fulfilled or in case they are not fulfilled by man. God is thus ready in all cases, He foresees and knows all possibilities, and with a view to all those possibilities has taken his measures and made his decisions. He knew in advance what He would do, if Adam fell and also if he remained standing; if David went to Keilah or did not go there; if Tyre and Sidon repented or did not repent etc. The knowledge of the *futura conditionata* thus precedes the decree of the *futura absoluta*; man decides wholly freely and independently at every moment but can nevertheless never surprise God by one decision or another or nullify his plans, for on all possibilities God's *praescientia* has been reckoned. This doctrine of the *scientia media* was supported with many passages of Scripture, which ascribe to God the knowledge of what in a given case would happen, when one condition or another was or was not fulfilled, such as Gen. 11:6, Ex. 3:19, 34:16, Deut. 7:3, 4, 1 Sam. 23:10-13, 25:29 v., 2 Sam. 12:8, 1 Kon. 11:2, 2 Kon. 2:10, 13:19, Ps. 81:14, 15, Jer. 26:2, 3, 38:17-20, Ezech. 2:5-7, 3:4-6, Mt. 11:21, 23, 24:22, 26:53, Luk. 22:66-68, Joh. 4:10, 6:15, Hd. 22:18, Rom. 9:29, 1 Cor. 2:8. It was indeed opposed by the Thomists and Augustinians, e.g. Bannez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, *Summa S. Thomae* 1747 I 464 sq., but by the Molinists and Congruists Suarez, Bellarminus, Lessius etc. also zealously defended. Fear of Calvinism and Jansenism benefited the doctrine

of the *scientia media* in the Roman church, and gradually it found entrance in a more strict or moderate sense with almost all Roman theologians, cf. deel I 93, Karl Werner, *Der h. Thomas v. Aq.* III 389-442. Id. *Gesch. der kath. Theol.* 98 f. G. Schneemann, *Die Entstehung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse*, *Ergänzungshefte zu den Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, no 9. 13. 14. Schwane, *D. G. der neuern Zeit* S. [164] 37-59. Petavius, *de Deo* IV c. 6. 7 etc. The line of Augustine was thereby abandoned and that of Origen taken up again. Thus the Greek theology had done from the beginning, Damasc., *de fide orth.* II c. 30. Roman theology followed. Also the Lutherans, Gerhard, *Loc.* II c. 8 sect. 13, Quenstedt, *Theol.* I 316, Buddeus, *Instit.* 217, Reinhard, *Dogm.* 116 etc., and the Remonstrants, Episc., *Inst.* IV sect. 2 c. 19, Limborch, *Theol. Chr.* II c. 8. § 29 were not disinclined to the *scientia media*. In more recent times many teach, approximately in the same way, that God also actually obtains knowledge from the world as *medium scientiae*. He indeed knows the contingent-future as possible in advance, but first learns from the world that it does or does not become actual. For all cases, however, He knows *sein dem Thun der Creatur, wie es auch ausfalle, angemessenes Thun*; He did indeed establish the schema of the world-plan but leaves the *Ausfüllung* to the creature, Dorner, *Gl.* I 319-323. Rothe, *Ethik* § 42. Martensen, *Dogm.* § 116. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I 343. Grétilat, *Theol. syst.* III 237 s. Sécretan, *La civilisation et la croyance* 1887 p. 260 s. etc. On the other hand, following in the footsteps of Augustine, such a *nuda praescientia* and *scientia media* were rejected by the Reformed, Voetius, *Disp.* I 254-258. Twissus, *de scientia media*, *Op.* III p. 1 sq. Turretinus, *Theol. El.* III qu. 13. Moor, I 659 sq. Ex. v. h. *Ontw. v. Tol.* IV 281 v.

Now with the *scientia media* the question does not concern this, whether things among themselves do not many times stand in a conditional connection to one another, which is known to God and is willed by Him Himself. If only this were meant by the *scientia media*, it could be accepted without objection, as Gomarus, *Disp. theol.* X 30 sq. and Walaeus, *Loci Comm. Op.* I 174-176, cf. Heppe, *Dogm. der ev. r. K.* 64, adopted and acknowledged it in that sense. But the doctrine of the *scientia media* aims at something else; it wants to bring the Pelagian conception of the freedom of the will into agreement with omniscience. The will of creatures namely is by virtue of its nature indifferent. It can do the one as well as the other. It is determined neither by its nature nor by the manifold circumstances in which it is placed. These can exercise influence on the will, but in the end the will remains free and chooses as it pleases. This freedom of the will is of course not to be reconciled with a decree of God; it essentially consists in [165] *independentia a decreto Dei*. God has not determined that will, but has left it free; He could not determine it without destroying it. God must, over against the will of rational creatures, adopt a waiting attitude. He looks on to see what it will do. But now He is omniscient. He thus knows all possibilities, all contingently-future things, and also knows the absolutely future things beforehand. Accordingly He has taken His decrees. If a man in certain circumstances will accept grace, He has elected him to life; if he will not believe, He has rejected him. Now it is clear that such a doctrine in principle deviates from that of Augustine and Thomas. For with these the foreknowledge precedes the things and nothing can come into being except through the will of God. *Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit*, Aug. *Enchir.* 95. Thomas, *S. Th.* I qu. 14 art. 9 ad 3. Not the world but the decrees are the medium from which God knows all things, Thomas, I qu. 14

art. 8. Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 37 art. 1. qu. 1. And the contingent and free can therefore be known in its connection and order certainly and infallibly. It is true that scholasticism on this point sometimes expressed itself somewhat differently than Augustine. Anselm e.g. said that the praescientia brought with it no necessitas interna and antecedens but only a necessitas externa and consequens. Cur Deus homo 16. And Thomas judged that God indeed knows the futura contingentia eternally and certainly secundum statum, quo actu sunt, secundum suam praesentialitatem, but that they in their causae proximae were nevertheless contingent and undetermined, S. Th. I qu. 14 art. 13. But that does not take away that with a view to the causa prima they are perfectly certain and thus cannot be called contingent; and elsewhere Thomas nevertheless also says again, omne quod est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret, cf. Billuart I 440 sq. But in the doctrine of the scientia media the contingent and free things also become contingent and free over against God, and indeed not only over against his praedestinatio but also over against his praescientia. For, just as with Origen, the things here are not because God knows them, but God knows them beforehand because they will be. The order is thus not: scientia necessaria, scientia visionis, decretum creandi etc., but scientia necessaria, scientia media, decretum creandi etc., scientia visionis, Jansen, Prael. II 110 sq. God does not know the free [166] acts of men from his own being, from his decrees, but from the will of the creatures, Schwane, D. G. IV 52. God thus becomes dependent on the world, receives knowledge from the world which He could not have or obtain from himself, and thus in his scientia ceases to be one, simple, independent, i.e. God. The creature conversely becomes for a great part wholly independent of God; it did indeed at one time receive the

esse and the posse from God, but it now has the velle wholly in its own hand. It decides wholly sovereignly and brings something to reality or not, without a decree of God preceding it. Something can thus come to existence without God's will; the creature is creator, autonomous, sovereign; and the whole history of the world is withdrawn from God's government and placed in the hands of man. This one decides and then God comes with his plan corresponding to that decision. If such a decision now occurred once, e.g. with Adam, then that was still conceivable; but such decisions of more or less serious nature occur thousands of times in every human life; what then is to be thought of a God who always waits upon all those decisions and has all possible plans ready for all possibilities; what even remains of the schema of the world-plan, whose Ausfüllung is left to man; and what is a government worth in which the King is the slave of his subjects? And that is the case here with God in the scientia media. God looks on and man decides. It is not God who makes a distinction among men; these distinguish themselves. Grace is distributed according to merits, predestination depends on the good works; what Scripture everywhere combats and Augustine rejected in Pelagius, is by Jesuitism stamped as orthodox, Roman doctrine, Billuart, I 479. For indeed the proponents of the scientia media appeal to many places of Holy Scripture, but wholly without right. For Scripture very certainly acknowledges that things are set by God in all kinds of connection to one another and that this connection is often also of a conditional nature, so that the one cannot happen unless something else is previously fulfilled. Without faith there is no salvation, without labor no food, etc. But all the texts which the Jesuits cited for the scientia media do not prove what had to be proved. They do speak of condition and [167] fulfillment, of obedience and promise, of supposition and consequence, of

what will happen in the one or in the other case. But none of them say that God, even if it is that He speaks to men in a human way and acts and negotiates with them in a human way, would not in each particular case have known and determined what certainly had to happen. Between the merely possible, which exists only as an idea in God and will never become actual, and the certainly actual, which is established by God's decree, there is no longer any domain that can be governed by the will of man. Something always belongs either to the one or to the other. If it is only possible and never becomes actual, it is the object of the *scientia necessaria*; and if it indeed becomes actual once, it is the content of the *scientia libera*. There lies nothing more between, there is no *scientia media*. But moreover, the *scientia media* also does not attain what it wants to attain. It wants to reconcile the freedom of the will in the sense of *indifferentia* with the *praescientia*. Now it says that this, conceived as *scientia media*, does not make the human actions necessary but leaves them wholly free. And that is also so, but then it also ceases to be *praescientia*. If God indeed certainly knows beforehand what a man in a given case will do, then He can only foresee this if the motives determine the will in one direction and this thus does not consist in indifference. Conversely, if this consists in *indifferentia*, then no knowledge, no calculation beforehand is possible, then there is only *scientia post factum*. God's *praescientia* and the will as arbitrariness exclude one another. *Si enim scit*, said therefore Cicero already, *certe illud eveniet; sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est*. Therefore the solution of the problem must with Augustine be sought in another direction. The freedom of the will does not consist, as will later appear, in *indifferentia*, in arbitrariness or chance, but in *lubentia rationalis*. And this is so little in conflict with the *praescientia Dei* that it is rather posited and maintained by it. The will with

its nature, its antecedents and motives, its decisions and consequences is included in the *ordo causarum*, qui certus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur, Aug. de civ. V 9. In the knowledge of God the things among themselves lie precisely in that same connection in which they occur in reality. It is not the praescientia and not the praedestinatio that now and then falls in from above and compels, but every decision and action is motivated by what precedes it. And thus, in that connection, it is included in the scientia Dei. The contingent and free is, in accordance with its own nature known and willed by God, inserted into the *ordo causarum*, which in world history is gradually made manifest to us.

9. The knowledge of God, considered from another point of view, bears the name of wisdom. The distinction between the two is generally known. Almost all languages have different words for these two concepts as well. Everyone knows that erudition, science, knowledge, and wisdom are far from being the same and absolutely do not always go together. A simple man often excels in wisdom above a scholar. Both rest on distinct faculties in man. We obtain knowledge through study, wisdom through insight. The former comes about discursively, the latter intuitively. Knowledge is theoretical; wisdom is practical, teleological, it places knowledge in the service of an end. Knowledge proceeds apart from the will, wisdom is indeed a matter of the intellect but is made serviceable to the will. Knowledge therefore often proceeds entirely apart from life, but wisdom is most closely connected with life, it is ethical in nature, it is "the art of living well," the quality, the act of him who makes a right use of his greater skill, and chooses the best means to the best ends. The etymology already points to this distinction. Wise (*wijs*) comes from *wijzen*, to show, and is the quality of him who indicates the direction; *sapiens*, from *sapere*, cf. *σαφης*,

to taste, indicates that someone through his own experience has obtained a correct independent judgment; σοφος probably also hangs together with σαφης and then has the same basic meaning. Also among the Eastern peoples we encounter this distinction, but with an important modification. Just as in the West knowledge stands in the foreground; so in the East wisdom. The Eastern peoples live much more out of contemplation than out of abstract thinking; they do not work with concepts but with the images of the things themselves; they live subjectively closer to their heart and stand objectively nearer to the immediate reality of life. Not in the head, but in the heart, in the root of the personality, subject and object meet one another, and repel one another in the hardest way or attract [169] one another in the tenderest way. It is as if the substances of things overflow into one another through sympathy of life. We encounter that Eastern character intensely and deeply also in Israel. Here too, in its time, the chokma had to arise, חכמה from חכם to be firm, dense, solid, subst. soundness, Tüchtigkeit. But here it came into the service of revelation. Genuine, true wisdom is no fruit of man's intellect but is rooted in the fear of the Lord and consists in that moral Tüchtigkeit, which is directed according to the Lord's law and reveals itself in a moral life, Deut 4:6-8, Ps. 19:8, 111:10, Job 28:28, Spr. 1:7, 9:10. And when later insight penetrated more deeply into the revelation of God in nature and in law, it obtained an independent place, it developed a literature of its own and rendered its thoughts in a form of its own, in the form of proverbs, מִשְׁלֵוֹת. Alongside understanding and knowledge, wisdom is now also ascribed to God in Scripture. He has, speaking through the word, created the world, Gen. 1:3, Ps. 33:6, 107:20, 119:105, 147:15, 148:5, Jes. 40:8, 48:13. In the first period, in creation especially God's power and exaltedness are noticed. But gradually the Israelite spirit, nourished and

guided by the fear of the Lord, penetrates more deeply into nature and law, and admires in them his adorable wisdom. Both, the world and the revelation of God under Israel, are derived from that wisdom, Job 9:4, 12:13, 17, 37-38, Jes. 40:28, Ps. 104:24, Deut. 4:6-8, Jer. 10:12, Ps. 19:8, and in Spr. 8:22 ff., Job 28:23 ff., that wisdom, through and with which God has brought forth all things, is presented personally. The N. Test. carries this line further and not only ascribes wisdom to God in various places, Rom. 16:27, 1 Tim. 1:17, Judas 25, Op. 5:12, 7:12, but also says that the world has been created through the word of God, Joh. 1:2, Hebr. 11:3, and sees God's wisdom especially revealed in the folly of the cross, 1 Cor. 1:18, in Christ, 1 Cor. 1:24, in the church, Ef. 3:10, in the whole guidance of God with Israel and the Gentiles, Rom. 11:33. Cf. Hooykaas, *Wisdom among Hebrews* 1862, J. F. Bruch, *Die Weisheitslehre der Hebräer* 1851. Burger art. *Weisheit* in Herzog². Oehler, *Die Grundzüge der altt. Weisheit* 1854. Id. *Theol. des A. T.* § 235 f. Schultz, *Alt. Theol.*⁴ 548 f. Delitzsch, *Comm. über das Salom. Spruchbuch*, Einl. Cremer, *Wörterbuch s. v. σοφος*. König, *Der [170] Offenbarungsbegriff des A. T.* 1882 I 194 f. Smend, *Lehrb. der altt. Rel.* S. 508 f. Schleiermacher, *Chr. Gl.* § 168, 169. Frank, *Syst. der chr. Wahrh.* I 254 f.

This doctrine of Scripture concerning the Divine word and the Divine wisdom was in particular brought by Philo into connection with the ἰδεαί. Thereby the foundation was laid for the doctrine of the Logos, which is discussed further in the locus de trinitate. But the doctrine of ideas of Plato later once again had a powerful influence on Christian theology, and now through neo-Platonism. Thus it came to Augustine, who assigned it a place in theology. But naturally he had to modify it on important points for that purpose. In the first place, the ideas are not a world of their own, κόσμος

νοητος, alongside and outside God, but they are in God and constitute the content of his thinking. *Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente creatoris*, 83 qu. qu. 46. *Gen. ad litt.* IV 6, 24, 29. V 13. They are God's thoughts about all that is created, both before and after the creation and thus eternal and unchangeable, for there can be nothing in God except what is eternal and unchangeable, *ib. en de trin.* IV 1. *de civ.* XI 5. *In Deo enim novum exstitisse consilium, ne dicam impium, ineptissimum est dicere*, *de ord.* II 17. Yet those ideas in God's intellect are not one with his self-knowledge nor also with the Logos or the Son, as earlier *patres* had sometimes said. Augustine maintains the essential distinction between God and world and avoids pantheism. *Aliter ergo in illo sunt, quae per illum facta sunt; aliter autem in illo sunt ea, quae ipse est*, *de Gen. ad litt.* II 6. On the other hand, Augustine cannot think otherwise than that God has created all things according to ideas. In that his wisdom is manifested. *Sic ergo sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, secundum artem continet omnia, antequam fabricet omnia*, *tract. 1 in Ev. Joan.* *Omnia ratione sunt condita*, 83 qu. qu. 46 n. 2. *Non enim quidquam fecit ignorans. Nota ergo fecit, non facta cognovit*, *de Gen. ad litt.* V 8. *de trin.* XV 13. *de civ.* XI 10. Creation is a realization of God's thoughts. Therefore there also exists between the ideas and the creatures a close connection. The ideas are the examples and forms of things, *principales formae, rationes rerum, stabiles atque incommutabiles*, 83 qu. qu. 46 n. 2; and therefore not only of the species but of all individual things. *Cum omnia ratione sint condita, [171] singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus*, *ib. en de civ.* XI 10. *de Gen. ad litt.* III 12, 14. V 14, 15. But yet this view is not always maintained. Sometimes the ideas in Augustine also appear again as types and examples, which gradually realize themselves and are first perfectly realized in the new

heaven and the new earth, de Gen. ad litt. V 11. Nor is the connection clear, in which according to Augustine the ideas and the creatures stand. The ideas are in God not only as examples, but they are also active forces, immanent principia in the things. He therefore preferred the translation of ἰδεαὶ by rationes above that of Cicero by formae or species, 83 quaest. qu. 46. de Gen. ad litt. I 18, II 16, IX 18. The ideas are, as it were, laid down in the things themselves. Ideas and creatures do not stand dualistically as παραδειγματα and ὁμοιωματα, as true and untrue, as unchangeable and changeable alongside and over against one another, but the ideas are the soul and the principle of things; the movement belongs to the creatures ex illis insitis rationibus, de Gen. ad litt IV 33. And furthermore the causality of the ideas is nevertheless always again mediated by the will of God; this is the proper and final cause of the being of things, de civ. XXI, 8, cf. Gangauf, Metaph. Psych. des h. Aug. S. 77 f. Ritter, Gesch. der chr. Philos. II 310 f. Dr. E. Melzer, Des Aug. Lehre vom Kausalitätsverhältniss Gottes zur Welt 1892 S. 5 f. Besides in Augustine, we also find this doctrine of ideas in Clemens Alex. Strom. IV c. 25, V c. 3. Tertull. de an. 18. Eusebius, Praep. evang. l. 14 c. 44. Orig. op Joh. 1:1. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 5. and later in Anselmus, Monol. c. 8 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 15. qu. 44 art. 3. S. c. G. 54. Sent. I dist. 36. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 35. Petavius, Theol. dogm. IV c. 9-11. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 657 f. Simar, Lehrb. der Dogm. 3e Aufl. Freiburg 1893 S. 147 f., and also in Reformed theologians such as Polanus, Synt. theol. p. 267. 268. Zanchius, Op. II col. 201. Voetius, Disp. I 258 sq. Twissus, de scientia media 1639 p. 312 sq. Later this doctrine of ideas has almost entirely disappeared from dogmatics. The word idea has also changed in meaning in more recent philosophy. Formerly one understood by idea the example of things in the

creative spirit of God, while concept was the imprint of things in the knowing spirit. But [172] in the new philosophy idea has become the designation for those concepts which are obtained not from sensible perception but by pure thinking (Cartesius), of which there is no experience and thus no scientific certainty (Kant), which can be recognized only immediately in feeling or reason (Jacobi). Yet usage still often recalls, at least in our and in the German language, the old meaning. The word still always, especially in the field of art, includes the thought of an objective example, παραδειγμα, and therefore of an ideal perfection. One then speaks of the idea of God, freedom, art, science, the true, the good, the beautiful, etc. Applied to God, the idea expresses that God has made all things with wisdom, that wisdom is the firstling of his way, ἀρχὴ τῆς κτισσεως is, Spr. 8:22, Col. 1:15, Op. 3:14. God is no less than an artist. Just as this one realizes his idea in the work of art, so God creates all things according to the thoughts which he has formed. The world is a work of art of God. He is artist and builder of the whole universe. God does not work unconsciously, but in all his works is guided by wisdom, by his ideas. But there is also a difference between God and an earthly artist. God's thoughts are absolutely original, taken from his own being, eternal, unchangeable; indeed, they are one with his Divine being. The ideas in God are the essentia Dei itself, insofar as this is the example of created things and can be expressed and imitated in finite creatures. Every creature is a revelation of God and participates in the Divine being. The nature of this participation does not consist in this, that the creatures are modifications of God's being, or that the creatures have received that being of God realiter into themselves. But every creature has its own being, because in its existence it is an ectype of the Divine being. Because of the multiplicity and the richness of God's

ideas, realized in the created, the wisdom of God is to be called πολυποικίλος, Ef. 3:10. But nevertheless the wisdom of God is one and his idea of the world is one, gradually unfolding in the course of the centuries and leading the real onward to the intended goal. By reason of this archetypal character of the ideas in God there is also no proper idea of sin as such. Sin, after all, is not a proper being, but a diminution of being, a deformation; [173] it is indeed object and content of God's knowledge, it is indeed made serviceable by the wisdom of God to his glory; but it is in itself no idea of his wisdom, no ray of his light, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 15 art. 3. Yet that wisdom does come to expression in the creation, the ordering, the guidance and government of all things. It is and remains the ׀מִן , opifex, Spr. 8:30, ἡ τῶν παντῶν τεχνίτις, Wijsh. 7:21, which creates, governs, and leads all things onward to their destination, i.e. to the glorification of God's name.

10. Among the virtues of God's intellect there finally belongs also the truthfulness of God. The Hebr. word אמת, אמונה, adi. מן comes from the verb. מן to make firm, build, support, intr. to be firm, hi. to hold fast to, trust in, be certain of something, and denotes, subj. the holding fast to something, faith, πιστις, and obj. the firmness, reliability, truth of the person or the thing on which one relies. The Hebr. words are in the LXX now rendered by ἀληθεια, ἐν ἀληθεια, then by πιστω, πιστευω, πιστις, πιστος, and thus in Dutch by true, truthful, faithful; the concept ἀληθεια had in ordinary Greek and thus also in LXX and N. T. too definite a meaning for it to be able sufficiently to render the Hebr. words, it therefore had to be supplemented by the words πιστος etc. Already the name Ihvh expresses that He remains who He is. He is truth and without injustice, צדק, wrongness, crookedness, Deut. 32:4, Jer. 10:10, Ps. 31:6, 2 Chron. 15:3.

There lies here both in it, both that He is the true, essential God over against the idols, which are **הַבְּלִיַּם**, Deut. 32:21 etc., and that He as such at all times keeps and makes true His words and promises, so that He is perfectly reliable. For He is not a man, that He should lie or have regret, Num. 23:19, 1 Sam. 15:29. All that proceeds from Him bears the stamp of truth. Repeatedly there is mention of His beneficence, **רַחֲמָיו**, and faithfulness, Gen. 24:49, 47:29, Joz. 2:14, 2 Sam. 2:6, 15:20, Ps. 40:11, of His lovingkindness, **חַסְדּוֹ**, and truth, Gen. 24:27, Ex. 34:6, Ps. 57:4, 61:8, 89:15 etc. His words, ordinances, paths, works, commandments, laws, are all pure truth, 2 Sam. 7:28, Ps. 19:10, 25:10, 33:4, 111:7, 119:86, 142, 151, Dan. 4:37. His truth and faithfulness reveals itself on earth [174] so richly and gloriously, that it reaches unto the clouds, Ps. 36:6, Ex. 34:6. He confirms His word repeatedly by swearing by Himself, Gen. 22:16 etc., Hebr. 6:13. Therefore He is many times called a rock, which by His unchangeable firmness offers support to His favorites, Deut. 32:4, 15, 18, 30, 37 and in many proper names, Num. 1:5, 6, 10, 3:35, 34:28, and further in 2 Sam. 22:3, 32, Ps. 18:3, 32, 19:15, 28:1, 31:3, 71:3, 144:1, Jes. 26:4. And as such a God of truth and of faithfulness He keeps the covenant, Deut. 4:31, 7:9, Ps. 40:11, Hos. 12:1 etc. and He is a perfectly reliable refuge for all His people, Ps. 31:6, 36:6 v., 43:3, 54:7, 57:4, 71:22, 96:13, 143:1, 146:6 etc. Likewise He is called in the N. T. the **ἀληθινός θεός**; i.e. only that God is the true, essential God, who has revealed Himself in Christ, Joh. 17:3, 1 Joh. 5:20. And all that He reveals is pure truth. He is a **θεός ἀληθής** in contrast with all men, Joh. 3:33, Rom. 3:4. His word is the truth, His gospel is truth, Christ is the truth, Joh. 14:6, 17:17, Ef. 1:13. Yes, He is now still, who He always was. The N. Test. is fulfillment and confirmation of His promises in the days of the O. V. He has thought of His covenant and oath, Luk. 1:68-

73. He is faithful, πιστος, in that He is and remains the God of the covenant and grants salvation completely, 1 Cor. 1:9, 10:13, 1 Thess. 5:24, 2 Thess. 3:3, Hebr. 10:23, 11:11, 1 Joh. 1:9. He cannot deny Himself, 2 Tim. 2:13. All His promises are in Christ yes and amen, 2 Cor. 1:18, 20. Christ is ὁ μαρτυς ὁ πιστος, Openb. 1:5, 3:14, 19:11. And therefore He is and can be the unchangeable object of our πιστις, cf. Wendt, Der Gebrauch der Wörter ἀληθεια, ἀληθης und ἀληθινος im N. T., Stud. u. Krit. 1883 S. 511-547. Cremer, Wörterbuch 1895 S. 109-126.

Scripture thus uses the word truth in different senses. And philosophy also usually distinguishes a threefold concept of truth, namely veritas in essendo (in rebus), in significando (in verbis), in cognoscendo (in intellectu), or veritas metaphysica, ethica and logica, Liberatore, Inst. philos. ed. 8, Romae 1855 I 70 sq. Schmid, Der Begriff des Wahren in Gutberlet's Philos. Jahrbuch 1893 S. 35-48, 140-150. Mastricht, Theol. II, 14, 5. Moor, Comm. in Marck I 676. Metaphysical, ontological truth [175] consists in this, that some object, a person or thing, is all that which belongs to its essence. Thus gold, which not only looks like gold, but essentially is, is genuine, true, veritable gold. Truth in this sense stands over against falsity, spuriousness, vanity, non-being. It is a property of all being as being; it is one with the substance. Augustine in particular often spoke of truth in this meaning. All being is as such true and beautiful and good. There is indeed rich diversity in the measure of being; there is a difference of degree among creatures. But all things have nevertheless received being from God pro suo modo and participate in the divine being, cf. e.g. de civ. XI 23, de nat. boni c. Manich. c. 19. But from this being of creatures Augustine ascends to God. In Scripture God is called the true one over against the idols, which are vanity. And thus in Augustine God is the true, only, simple, unchangeable, eternal

being. Compared with his being, the being of creatures is to be regarded as a non-being. God is *summum esse*, *summa veritas*, *summum bonum*. He is pure *essentia*. He does not have, but he is the truth. *O veritas quae vere es*, Conf. X 41. VII 10. XII 25. But further, God is also the truth in the second above-mentioned, i.e. in the ethical sense. By *veritas ethica* is to be understood the agreement between someone's essence and his revelation, in word or in deed. He who says otherwise than he thinks is untruthful, a liar. Truth in this sense stands over against lie. Now in God there is perfect agreement between his being and his revelation, Num. 23:19, 1 Sam. 15:29, Tit. 1:2, Hebr. 6:18. It is impossible that God should lie or deny himself. And finally God is also the truth in the logical sense. This consists in agreement of thinking with reality, *conformitas* or *adaequatio intellectus et rei*. Our concepts are true when they are a pure imprint of reality. In this sense truth stands over against error. God is now also for that reason the truth, because he knows all things as they really are. His knowing is correct, unchangeable, adequate. Yes, in his knowing he is truth itself, just as in his being he is ontological truth. The knowledge of God is living, absolute, adequate truth. It is not obtained from investigation and reflection upon things, but is essential in God and precedes things [176]. It is one with the essence of God and is thus substantial truth. Therefore also his word, his law, his gospel are pure truth. They are all as they must be. Now these three meanings of the concept of truth are indeed distinct, but they are nevertheless also again one. This unity consists in this, that truth always in all three meanings is agreement of thinking and being, of ideal and real being. God is the truth in the metaphysical sense, for he is the unity of thinking and being. He is perfectly self-conscious. He is God in the true sense, fully corresponding to the idea of God, which is in himself. He is the

truth in the ethical sense, for he reveals himself, speaks, acts, appears as he truly is and thinks. And he is the truth in the logical sense, for he thinks things as they are, or rather, things are as he thinks them. He is the truth in the full, absolute sense. And therefore he is the *prima veritas*, the original truth, the source of all truth, the truth in all truth; the ground of truth, of the true being of all things, of their knowability and thinkability; the ideal and the archetype of all truth, of all ethical being, of all rules and laws according to which the essence and the revelation of all things must be judged and normed; the source and the origin of all knowledge of the truth in every domain, the light in which we alone can see the light, the sun of spirits. *Te invoco Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia*, Aug. *Solil.* I 1. Cf. further Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 16 and 17. I, 2 qu. 3 art. 7. S. c. *Gent.* I c. 59-62. III c. 51. Bonaventura, *Sent.* I dist. 8 art. 1. Scheeben, *Kath. Dogm.* I 578 f. 663 f. Gerhard, *Loci Theol.* II c. 8 sect. 16. Polanus, *Synt. theol.* II c. 27. Zanchius, *Op.* II col. 226-242. L. Meyer, *Treatises on the Div. attributes* IV pp. 1-88.

D. God as the Holy One.

11. Among the ethical virtues the first place belongs to the goodness of God. This is also known from nature. With Plato the idea of the good was one with the Deity. But the word good has different senses. The original and first meaning [177] of good seems to indicate not an inner quality but a relation to something else. With Socrates the good was identical with the useful, with what was good, serviceable, useful for another, *Xen., Memor.* IV 6, 8 v.; an absolute good therefore does not exist, there is only a relative

good; utility and harm are the standard of good and evil. Greek ethics remained at this standpoint; the question concerning the highest good coincides with that concerning happiness; good is that which all desire, Plato, Symp. 204 E. v. Arist. Nic. Eth. I 2. Hence the common definition: *bonum est id quod omnia appetunt*, e. g. in Dionys., *de div. nom.* c. 4. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 5 art. 1. qu. 16 art. 1 en 3. S. c. Gent. I c. 38. 40. Sent. I dist. 8 art. 3. Utilitarian morality adheres to this meaning of the word good, and bases its doctrine on it, cf. Paulsen, *System der Ethik* 1889 S. 171 f. Wundt, *Ethik* 1886 S. 18 f. And Fr. Nietzsche has built his whole revolution of morality on it; good originally meant as much as noble, strong, powerful, beautiful, and bad was the designation of the simple, common man, *Zur Genealogie der Moral* S. 6. Now the word good indeed often has this meaning, when we speak of a good house, a good friend, etc., and thereby indicate that a person or thing possesses certain properties and is good for something. Good then has no content of its own, but receives it from the end for which someone or something must serve, and therefore varies in meaning among the different peoples. The Greek thinks of beauty in it, *καλοκαγαθία*, the Roman of noble birth and wealth, the Germanic of what is fitting and *tüchtig*; and in connection with that the meaning of *ἀρετή*, *virtus*, *virtue*, also differs. This good in a general sense contains under itself the useful, the pleasant, the aesthetic and the ethical good, *bonum utile*, *bonum delectabile* and *bonum honestum*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 5 art. 6, I 2 qu. 99 art. 5 etc. In all these meanings good is still a relative concept and denotes *id quod omnia appetunt*. But yet the word does not fit in this meaning. We also speak of a *bonum in se*. The meaning of good as *bonum morale* or *honestum* forms the transition to that. The moral good is good in itself, abstracted from all advantageous or disadvantageous

consequences; it has absolute value. According to Scripture God is the sum of all perfections. All virtues are present in Him in an absolute sense. Scripture calls Him [178] only a few times good in an absolute sense, Οὐδεις ἀγαθος εἰ μὴ εἰς ὃ θεος, Mr. 10:18, Luk. 18:19; He is τελειος, Mt. 5:48. But whatever virtue it ascribes to God, it always proceeds from the presupposition that this belongs to Him in an absolute sense. Knowledge, wisdom, power, love, righteousness, etc. belong to Him in an entirely unique, i.e. divine, way. This His goodness is therefore one with His absolute perfection. In Him idea and reality are one. He is pure εἶδος, actus purissimus. He needs to become nothing, but is what He is eternally. He has no end outside himself, but is self-sufficient, ἐξαρκης, παναρκης, αὐταρκης, Ps. 50:9 v., Jes. 40:28 v., Hab. 2:20. He receives nothing but only gives. Everything has Him, He has need of nothing or no one. He always intends himself, because He cannot rest in something less than himself. Because He himself is the absolutely-good, the perfect, He can and may love something else only in and for himself. He can and may not be satisfied with less than absolute perfection. Where He loves others, He loves in them himself, his own virtues, works, gifts. On the goodness of God, in the sense of perfection, cf. August., de nat. boni c. Manich. 1, de trin. VIII 3. Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 13. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 4-6, c. Gent. I 28. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 1 sq. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 10. 17. Zanchius, Op. II 138 sq. 326 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 9 etc. Therefore He is also absolutely blessed in himself, as the sum of all good, of all perfection. Aristotle already said that God was therefore the blessed one, because He was the unity of thinking and thought and above all desiring, striving, willing, completely exalted, Zeller III 3 367 f. And at all times those who placed the primacy in the intellect have attached themselves to

Aristotle and sought blessedness in thinking, knowing, contemplation, cf. Thomas S. Theol. I 2 qu. 3 art. 4. There was truth in this, insofar as absolute blessedness is a state of rest, is not compatible with any striving toward an end and also presupposes consciousness. Blessedness belongs only to rational beings. The unconscious in von Hartmann, just like the will in Schopenhauer, is absolute unblessedness, which itself needs redemption, Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. II 9 434. Religionsphilosophie II 152 f. Drews therefore also says that the property of perfection cannot be ascribed to God; a perfect God would be a *totes Abstraktum* [179] and would not be able to explain the world; a God who had everything, who was perfectly blessed and sufficient to himself, has no need of change, no world, *Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant*, II 593 f. But precisely this doctrine of the absolute unblessedness of God makes one cautious about ascribing the primacy to the will in God and man, as Duns Scotus and many after him did. Much more correct therefore is the standpoint of Bonaventura, who placed blessedness in both, in intellect and will, *Sent. IV dist. 49 pars 1 art. 1 qu. 4, 5*. Just as the blessedness of man will encompass soul and body and all his faculties, so in God it consists not only in his perfect knowledge but likewise in his perfect power, goodness, holiness, etc. *Beatitudo status est omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus*, Boethius, *de cons. philos.* 4. On the blessedness of God, August. *de civ. Dei XII 1*. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 26, Gerhard, *Loc. II c. 8 sect. 19*. Zanchius, II 155 sq. Polanus, II c. 17. But what is good in itself is good also for others. And God as the perfect and blessed one is the highest good for his creatures, *bonum summum quod omnia appetunt; fons bonorum omnium; bonum omnis boni; bonum unum necessarium et sufficiens, finis bonorum omnium*, Ps. 4:7, 8, 73:25, 26. He alone is the *bonum quo sit fruendum*, but creatures are *bona, quibus sit*

utendum, August. de doctr. chr. I c. 3 sq. de trin. X 10. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 1. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 1. Augustine in particular has often presented God thus as summum bonum, de trin. VIII 3, Enarr. in Ps. 26, de doctr. chr. I 7, cf. Anselmus, Prosl. c. 23-25. In Him is everything and in Him alone is what all creatures seek and need. He is the summum bonum for all creatures, though for these in different measure, according as they share more or less in his goodness, can enjoy Him more or less. He is the one toward whom all creatures consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly strive, the object of all desire. And the creature finds no rest except in God alone, August. Conf. I 1. Thus the highest good was at all times placed in God by Christian theology, and it did not occur to thought to seek that highest good in any moral act or virtue of the creature, in duty (Kant), in the kingdom of God (Ritschl), in love (Drummond) or in any other creature. But further, as summum bonum God is also the abundant fountain of all goods, Ned. [180] Gel. art. 1. Deus, cum perfecte bonus sit, perpetuo beneficus est, Athenagoras, Leg. pro christ. n. 26. There is no good in any creature except from and through Him. He is the causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis of all good, however distinct this may be in the creatures. All natural, moral and spiritual good has its origin in Him. Holy Scripture is a hymn of praise to the goodness of the Lord. From it creation is derived, and all life and blessing for man and for beast, Ps. 8, 19, 36:6-8, 65:12, 147:9, Mt. 5:45, Hd. 14:17, Jak. 1:17. It extends over all his works, Ps. 145:9 and endures forever, Ps. 136. Time and again the whole creation is called upon to praise God's goodness, 1 Chr. 16:34, 2 Chr. 5:13, Ps. 34:9, 106:1, 107:1, 118:1, 136:1, Jer. 33:11 etc. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 545 f. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4, who depicts the goodness of God in an exalted way and compares it to the sun, which illuminates everything, Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 6, especially art. 4. c. Gent. I c. 40, 41. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 3. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 10. Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 20. Zanchius, Op. II col. 326-342 etc. This goodness of God appears in different forms, according to the objects to which it is directed. Closely related to it is lovingkindness, רַחֲמִים a. v. רִבּוּן, stringere, to bind, χρηστοτης, related to πραυτης, 2 Cor. 10:1. Sometimes it is used in a general sense, 1 Chr. 16:34, but mostly it denotes God's special favor toward his people, the affection with which He is bound to his favorites, to Joseph, Gen. 39:21, Israel, Num. 14:19, David, 2 Sam. 7:15, 22:51, Ps. 18:51, 1 Chr. 17:13, the pious, Ps. 5:8. It is connected with God's covenant, Neh. 1:5, is the principle of forgiveness, Ps. 6:5, 31:17, 44:27, 109:26, Lam. 3:22, of grace, Ps. 51:3, of comfort, Ps. 119:76, endures eternally, Jes. 54:8, 10 and is better than life, Ps. 63:4. In all its richness it has been revealed in Christ, Rom. 2:4, 2 Cor. 10:1, Ef. 2:7, Col. 3:12, Tit. 3:4 and now shows itself to believers, leading them to repentance, Rom. 2:4, 11:22, Gal. 5:22, cf. Delitzsch on Ps. 4:4. Cremer s. v. ἔλεος. The goodness of God is called, when it is shown to the wretched, mercy, רַחֲמִים, σπλαγχνα, viscera, misericordia, N. T. ἔλεος, οἰκτιρμος. Of this mercy of God Scripture makes mention at every moment, Ex. 34:6, Deut. 4:31, 2 Chr. 30:9, [181] Ps. 86:15, 103:8, 111:4, 112:4, 145:8 etc., in contrast with men, 2 Sam. 24:14, Spr. 12:10, Dan. 9:9, 18. It is manifold, 2 Sam. 24:14, Ps. 119:156, great, Neh. 9:19, Ps. 51:13, without end, Lam. 3:22, tender as of a father, Ps. 103:13, is shown to thousands, Ex. 20:6 and returns after chastisement, Jes. 14:1, 49:13 v., 54:8, 55:7, 60:10, Jer. 12:15, 30:18, 31:20, Hos. 2:22, Mich. 7:19 etc. In the N. T. God, the Father of mercies, 2 Cor. 1:3, has revealed his mercy in Christ, Luk. 1:50 v., who is a merciful high priest, Mt. 18:27, 20:34 etc. Hebr. 2:17 and He further shows the riches of his mercy, Ef. 2:4 in the salvation of believers,

Rom. 9:23, 11:30, 1 Cor. 7:25, 2 Cor. 4:1, 1 Tim. 1:13, Hebr. 4:16, etc., cf. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 21 art. 3. Zanchius, Op. II 370 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 23. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 11. The sparing goodness of God toward those deserving punishment is called longsuffering, אָרְךָ אַפִּים or רַחֵם, μακροθυμία, ἀνοχή, χρηστοτης. More than once this virtue of God is also spoken of in Scripture, Ex. 34:6, Num. 14:18, Neh. 9:17, Ps. 86:15, 103:8, 145:8, Jon. 4:2, Joel 2:13, Nah. 1:3. It has shown itself in the whole time before Christ, Rom. 3:25, and is also now still, after the example of Christ, 1 Tim. 1:16, 2 Petr. 3:15, often shown to sinners, Rom. 2:4, 9:22, 1 Petr. 3:20, Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 24. Much richer is the goodness of God where it is shown to such as have deserved nothing good but all evil; then it bears the name of grace, חֵן, חַנּוּן a. v. חָנַן to bow, incline, χάρις, v. χαρίζομαι. This word also denotes the favor which is found by one man with another or bestowed on another, Gen. 30:27, 33:8, 10, 47:29, 50:4 etc., Luk. 2:52. Used of God, however, it never has the creatures in general nor the Gentiles either, but only his people as its object. It is shown to Noah, Gen. 6:8, Moses, Ex. 33:12, 17, 34:9, Job, cap. 8:5, 9:15, Daniel, cap. 1:9, to the meek and wretched, Spr. 3:34, Dan. 4:27, and then especially to Israel as a people. His election and guidance, his deliverance and redemption and all the benefits which it received in distinction from other peoples, are due only to God's grace, Ex. 15:13, 16, 19:4, 33:19, 34:6, 7, Deut. 4:37, 7:8, 8:14, 17, 9:5, 27, 10:14 v. 33:3, Jes. [182] 35:10, 42:21, 43:1, 15, 21, 54:5, 63:9, Jer. 3:4, 19, 31:9, 20, Ezech. 16, Hos. 8:14, 11:1 etc. In history and law, in psalmody and prophecy, the ground tone is always: not unto us, O Lord, but unto thy name give glory, Ps. 115:1. He does everything for his name's sake, Num. 14:13 v., Jes. 43:21, 25 v., 48:9, 11, Ezech. 36:22 etc. And therefore that grace is also time and again praised and glorified, Ex. 34:6, 2

Chron. 30:9, Neh. 9:17, Ps. 86:15, 103:8, 111:4, 116:5, Jon. 4:2, Joel 2:13, Zach. 12:10. In the N. Test. that grace appears to be still richer and deeper in content. Χάρις means in an objective sense beauty, pleasantness, grace, Luk. 4:22, Col. 4:6, Ef. 4:29, and subjectively favor, affection on the side of the giver and thanks, veneration on the side of the receiver. In God it denotes his voluntary, unowed, undeserved affection, which is shown to guilty sinners and in place of the sentence of death grants them the δικαιοσύνη and the ζωή. As such it is a virtue and attribute of God, Rom. 5:15, 1 Petr. 5:10, which shows itself in the sending of Christ, who is full of grace, Joh. 1:14 v., 1 Petr. 1:13 and further in the bestowal of all kinds of spiritual and bodily benefits, which are all gifts of grace and are themselves grace, Rom. 5:20, 6:1, Ef. 1:7, 2:5, 8, Phil. 1:2, Col. 1:2, Tit. 3:7 etc. and exclude all merits on man's side altogether, Joh. 1:17, Rom. 4:4, 16, 6:14, 23, 11:5 v., Ef. 2:8, Gal. 5:3, 4, Schultz, Altt. Theol. 425 f. Cremer s. v. The doctrine of grace was first developed in the Christian church by Augustine, but in doing so one usually did not think of grace as a virtue of God, but of the benefits which were bestowed by God out of grace in Christ upon the church. Among the attributes of God grace is usually not treated. Yet this concept of grace, namely as *virtus Dei*, is not lacking; Thomas says e. g. *quandoque tamen gratia Dei dicitur ipsa aeterna dilectio, secundum quod dicitur etiam gratia praedestinationis, in quantum Deus gratuito et non ex meritis aliquos praedestinavit sive elegit*, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 110 art. 1., cf. Schwetz, Theol. dogm. cath. I 1851 p. 193. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 11 qu. 4. Musculus, Loci Communes 1567 p. 317 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 21. Zanchius Op. II 342-358, but immediately grace is nevertheless taken in a broader sense, as it must first later in dogmatics, in [183] the locus de salute, come up for discussion. Cf. also Lange, art. Gnade in Herzog2,

Dogm. II § 18. Further, the goodness of God appears as love, when it gives not only certain benefits, but itself. In the O. Test. this love as an attribute of God is not yet spoken of so often, but nevertheless it is absolutely not lacking, Deut. 4:37, 7:8, 13, 10:15, 23:5, 2 Chron. 2:11, Jes. 31:3, 43:4, 48:14, 63:9, Jer. 31:3, Hos. 11:1, 4, 14:5, Zef. 3:17, Mal. 1:2. And not only virtues and attributes, such as right and righteousness, Ps. 11:7, 33:5, 37:28, 45:8, but also persons are its object, Ps. 78:68, 146:8, Spr. 3:12, Deut. 4:37, 7:8, 13, 23:5, 2 Chron. 2:11, Jer. 31:3, Mal. 1:2. Much more clearly this love of God comes to light in the N. T., now that God has given himself in the Son of his love. The Hebr. אֱהָבָה is not rendered by ἔρως, which is the usual name for sensual love, nor by φιλία, the word for love between blood relatives, but by ἀγάπη, which is foreign to ordinary Greek and also does not occur in Philo and Josephus but is precisely suited to denote the full, pure, divine love, just like the Latin caritas (dilectio) in distinction from amor. The relation of Father and Son is depicted as a life of love, Joh. 3:35, 5:20, 10:17, 14:31, 15:19, 17:24, 26. But in Christ, who himself loves and has shown his love in his surrender, Joh. 15:13, that love also reveals itself toward men, not only the world or the church in general, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 5:7, 8:37, 1 Joh. 4:9, but also individually and personally, Joh. 14:23, 16:27, 17:23, Rom. 9:13, Gal. 2:20. Yes, God does not love, but He is love, 1 Joh. 4:8, and his love is foundation, source, example of ours, 1 Joh. 4:10. Now one can indeed speak of God's love in general toward the creatures and toward men, φιλοκτησία, amor complacentiae and φιλανθρωπία, amor benevolentiae, but Scripture nevertheless mostly uses the word goodness for that, and as a rule speaks of God's love, just like of his grace, only in relation to the people or the church which He has chosen, ἐλεκτοφιλία, amor amicitiae, Oehler, Theol. des Alt. Test. § 81. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 545

f. Smend, *Altt. Religionsgesch.* 197 f. Cremer, s. v. This love is now indeed not in the sense the essence of God, that it constitutes the center and the heart [184] in it and the other attributes are its modes, Schleiermacher, *Chr. Gl.* § 167. Schoeberlein, *Princip u. System der Dogm.* 1881 S. 129. Dorner, *Glaub.* I 437. Oosterzee, *Dogm.* § 50, for all attributes are his essence in an equal sense; in God there is no higher and lower, no less and more, Lange, *Dogm.* II 203. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, I3 S. 105. Doedes, *Leer van God* 231. But nevertheless love is most certainly identical with the divine essence. It is independent, eternal, unchangeable as God himself. It has in Him its origin and also returns through the creatures to Him again. Pseudodionysius therefore spoke of divine love *tamquam sempiternus circulus, propter bonum, ex bono, in bono, et ad bonum indeclinabili conversione circumiens, in eodem et secundum idem et procedens semper et manens et remeans*, *de div. nom.* c. 4 § 14. Cf. Augustinus, *de trin.* VIII 6-12. IX 6. X 1. *Conf.* IV 12. *Solil.* I 2. *de vera relig.* c. 46. Lombardus, *Sent.* III dist. 32, 1. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 20. S. c. *Gent.* I c. 91. Scheeben, *Dogm.* I 692 f. Gerhard, *Loci theol. loc.* II c. 8 sect. 11 qu. 2. Zanchius, *Op.* II 359 sq. Polanus, *Synt. theol.* II c. 22.

12. Closely related to goodness is the holiness of God. Formerly it was defined as *ab omni scelere libera et omnino perfecta et omni ex parte immaculata puritas*, Pseudodion., *de div. nom.* c. 12 § 2, cf. further Suicerus, s. v. ἁγιος. Often it is not treated separately alongside the *bonitas*, *perfectio* and *pulchritudo Dei*; neither Lombardus nor Thomas bring it up. Among the Protestant theologians the definition of the holiness of God was essentially the same; it consisted in *moralis perfectio*, *puritas*, Polanus, *Synt. theol.* II c. 28. *Synopsis*, VI 40. Mastricht, *Theor. pract. theol.* II c. 19. L. Meyer, *Treatise on the Divine attributes* III 115 ff. and was now

connected more with righteousness, then with goodness, and also sometimes with the truthfulness and wisdom of God, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 73, cf. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 382 f. Hase, Hutt. Rediv. § 63. The investigation of the biblical concept holy, however, has gradually caused another view to arise. All now acknowledge that the concept of holiness in O. and N. T. expresses a relation of God to the world. But there is disagreement about what kind and character that relation is. Menken [185] thought in that connection, with an eye to texts such as Hos. 11:9, Jes. 57:15, Ezech. 20:9 ff., of God's condescending goodness and grace, Versuch einer Anleitung zum eigenen Unterricht in den Wahrh. der h. S. 3te Aufl. 1833 cap. 1 § 9. Baudissin, however, held that in the holiness of God rather his absolute exaltation and power above all creatures was expressed, Stud. zur semit. Religionsgesch., 2tes Heft, Leipzig 1878 S. 3-142, and in this opinion was supported by Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 2 89 f., and also by Prof. H. P. Smith, Presb. and Ref. Rev. Jan. 1890 p. 42 etc. with appeal to passages such as Num. 20:13, Jes. 5:16, Ezech. 20:41, 28:25, 36:20-24, and the connection of glorious, exalted with holy in passages such as Jes. 63:15, 64:11, Jer. 17:12, Ezech. 20:40 etc. Related to that is the view of Schultz, who in the holiness of God thinks of God's consuming majesty, of his unapproachability and inviolability, of the infinite distance that separates him from every creature, and for that refers to Ex. 15:11, 1 Sam. 2:2, 6:20, Jes. 6:3, 8:14, 10:17, Altt. Theol. 4 554 f., cf. also Kuenen, G. v. Isr. I 47 ff. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis II 2 83, in the main also Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 333 f. Because there was thus the greatest difference over which attribute of God was nevertheless indicated by holiness, others have thought that this concept indicates no inner, essential quality at all, but only a relation, and thus is purely and only a Verhältnissbegriff. First holiness

was understood in this way by Diestel, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1859 S. 3-62, and since then it is accepted by many as the correct one, especially by Otto Schmoller, Die Bedeutung von קדש im A. T., in Festgruss an Rudolf von Todt zum Dr. jubiläum, von seinen Freunden u. Schülern, Stuttgart 1893 S. 39-43, cf. also Delitzsch art. Heiligkeit in Herzog2. Cremer, Wörterbuch s. v. Issel, Der Begriff der Heiligkeit im N. T. Leiden, 1887. R. Schröter, Der Begriff der Heiligkeit im A. u. N. T. Leipzig, Fock 1892. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. II 260-280.

The stem קדש, related to קדח, is mostly derived from the root קד with the meaning of cutting, separating, and thus expresses: being cut off, being set apart. The verb occurs in ni. pi. hi. hithp., the adj. is קדוש and the subst. קדש; the oppositum is חל, κοινος of חלל, κοινον facere, Lev. 10:10, 1 Sam. 21:5, 6, Ezech. 48:14, 15. It is related to but yet also clearly [186] distinguished from טהור, clean, which has as oppositum טמא, Lev. 10:10. The word holy is now in the first place used of all kinds of persons and things, which are set apart from common use and are placed in a special relation to God and his service. Thus there is mention of holy land, Ex. 3:5, holy assembly, Ex. 12:16, holy sabbath, Ex. 16:23, holy people, Ex. 19:6, holy place, Ex. 29:31, holy anointing, Ex. 30:25, holy robe, Lev. 16:4, holy jubilee year, Lev. 25:12, holy house, Lev. 27:14, holy field, Lev. 27:21, holy tithe, Lev. 27:30, holy water, Num. 5:17, holy vessels, Num. 16:37, holy cow, Num. 18:17, holy camp, Deut. 23:14, holy gold, Jos. 6:19, holy bread, 1 Sam. 21:4, holy ark, 2 Chron. 35:3, holy seed, Ezra 9:2, holy city, Neh. 11:1, holy covenant, Dan. 11:28, holy word, Ps. 105:42, of the temple as sanctuary, Ex. 15:17 with its holy and holy of holies, and also of the angels or the children of Israel as the holy ones, Deut. 33:2, 3, Job 5:1, 15:15, Ps. 16:3, 10, 32:6, 89:6, 8, 20, Spr. 9:10, 30:3, Dan. 4:17, 7:18, 22, 25, 27, 7:21, Hos.

12:1, Zach. 14:5. In all these cases the concept holy does not yet express an inward, moral quality, but only indicates that the persons or objects thus designated are consecrated to the Lord and stand in a special relation to his service, and thus are set apart from the common sphere. In this peculiar relation to God, however, the persons and things that are called holy do not stand of themselves. There is rather by nature a distance and estrangement, a distinction and opposition between God and his creature. In itself the whole world is כֹּל, profane, not standing in communion with God and not suited to his service. Nor can the persons and things sanctify themselves and place themselves in that special relation to God which is expressed by the word holy. Sanctification proceeds only from God. He is the one who sanctifies Israel, priesthood, temple, altar, special places, persons and objects, transfers them into his service and communion, and separates them from the unholy. I am the Lord, who sanctify you, Ex. 31:13, Lev. 20:8, 21:8, 15, 23, 22:9, 16, 32, Ezech. 20:12, 37:28. This sanctification of persons or things by the Lord now takes place in a twofold way: negatively by choosing a people, person, place, day, object and setting it apart from all others, and [187] positively by consecrating these persons or things according to definite rules and causing them to live. God sanctifies the sabbath, not only by setting it apart from the other days of the week but also by resting on it and blessing it, Gen. 2:2, 3, Ex. 20:11, Deut. 5:12. He has sanctified the whole people of Israel, by choosing it out of all peoples of the earth, by taking it up into his covenant and making his laws known to it, Ex. 19:4-6. The holiness of God is the principle of the whole legislation, of the moral and of the ceremonial commandments, of the whole revelation of salvation to Israel, for this intends nothing other than that Israel be holy, Ex. 19:4-6, Lev. 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:26. Israel is holy, because God takes it as

his possession, comes to the people, dwells among them and is to them a God, Ex. 19:4-6, 29:43-46. And within this circle he now again sanctifies in particular the firstborn, by appropriating them to himself, Ex. 13:2, the people, in that they wash themselves and thus prepare themselves to meet God, Ex. 19:10, 14, the mountain, by marking it off, Ex. 19:23, the priesthood by anointing, offering, sprinkling of blood and special clothing, Ex. 28:3, 41, 29:1 v. 21, the tabernacle and the altar by anointing, Ex. 29:37, 40:9 v. Lev. 8:10, 11, Num. 7:1, the anointing oil, by having it prepared in a special way, Ex. 30:22 v., the Nazirites, by causing them to live according to definite rules, Num. 6:2 v. etc. And what is thus holy shares in a life of its own, bears a character of its own, is distinguished from common life and the common law; it may e.g. not be touched, Ex. 19:23, 24, not be eaten, Ex. 29:33, not be used, Ex. 30:32 v., it sanctifies that which comes into contact with it, Ex. 30:29, Lev. 10:2 v., Num. 1:51, 53, 3:10, 38, Jes. 8:14. Now the positive act by which something becomes holy is not always expressed; sometimes the sanctification seems to consist in nothing other than separation, Lev. 25:10, 27:14, Joz. 7:13, 20:7, Rich. 17:3, 1 Sam. 7:1, 2 Sam. 8:11, 1 Chron. 18:11 etc. But to sanctify is nevertheless something more than only to separate; it is, by means of washing, anointing, offering, sprinkling of blood etc., to strip something of that character which it has in common with all things, and to impress upon it another, proper stamp, which it must bear and display everywhere. Now the ceremonies that were necessary for sanctification clearly indicate that the uncleanness and sinfulness of the creature also come into consideration here, which precisely in that way had to be removed. Washing, offering, sprinkling of blood, anointing served for de-sinners and dedication, Lev. 8:15, 16:16, Job 1:5 etc. Holy and clean are therefore synonyms, Ex. 30:35,

Lev. 16:19. But for that reason the concept holy does not amount to that moral purity. Indeed this is not excluded, but it is not the only nor even the first meaning. Holy in the O. T., especially in the law, is much broader in sense. The whole distinction and opposition of outward and inward purity etc. has been transferred from a later standpoint to that of the Mosaic legislation. But holy is that which is chosen and set apart by Ihvh, which by special ceremonies has been stripped of the common character and has received a character of its own, and now in this new condition lives according to the laws set for it. Israel is a holy people, because it has been chosen and set apart by God, has been taken up into a covenant and now has to live according to all his laws, also the ceremonial etc. Holy is that which in everything corresponds to the special laws which God has given for it; holiness is perfection, not in a moral sense only, but in that whole sense in which the peculiar legislation of Israel conceives it, in a religious, ethical, ceremonial, inward and outward sense.

This concept of holiness, however, only then becomes fully clear when we investigate in what sense it is applied to God. Cremer has rightly pointed out that holiness does not in the first place indicate a relation from below to above, but from above to below, and that it belongs in the first place to God and thereafter, in a derived sense, also to creatures. Creatures are not holy in themselves. Nor can they sanctify themselves. All sanctification and all holiness proceeds from God. Ihvh is holy, and therefore He wills a holy people, a holy priesthood, a holy dwelling, etc., Ex. 19:6, 29:43, Lev. 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:26, 21:8, Deut. 28:9, 10. More than once this predicate is ascribed to Ihvh, Lev. 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:26, 21:8, Joz. 24:19, 1 Sam. 2:2, 6:20, Ps. 22:4, 99:5, 9, Jes. 5:16, 6:3 etc. Isaiah often uses the name of the Holy One of Israel, cap. 29:23, 40:25, 43:15, 49:7, 62:12, cf. 2 Kon. 19:22,

Ezech. 39:7, Hab. 1:12, 3:3. And further there is also mention of God's holy name, Lev. 20:3, [189] 22:32, 1 Chron. 16:35, Ps. 99:3, 103:1, 111:9 etc., holy arm, Jes. 52:10, holy majesty, 2 Chr. 20:21. Now Iahveh is called so in the first place because He has placed Himself in a special relation to Israel; holy is also with God in the first place a Verhältnissbegriff. Jahveh's holiness reveals itself in this, that he has adopted Israel as his people, gave himself to Israel and went to dwell among them, Ex. 29:43-46, Lev. 11:44, 45, 20:26, Ps. 114:1, 2. But this relation is no abstraction, but is rich in content. God Himself has regulated this relation in the laws which He gave to Israel. The whole legislation of Israel has its principle in the holiness of Iahveh and its goal in the sanctification of the people. What the sanctification of Iahveh entails becomes manifest in the whole law; and the people is holy when it corresponds to that. As the Holy One He is the one who gave himself to Israel and dwells among Israel, but now also further holds to his word, remains faithful to his covenant, Ps. 89:35 v. and time and again rescues and delivers Israel. God is the Holy One of Israel, who belongs to Israel and who is such as his law makes Him known. From his holiness there flows forth for Israel: salvation, Ps. 22:4, 5, 89:19, 98:1, 103:1, 105:3, 145:21, the hearing of prayer, Ps. 3:5, 20:7, 28:2, comfort, Jes. 5:16, Hab. 1:12, trust, Ps. 22:4, 5, 33:21, Jes. 10:20. His holiness does not permit that He destroy Israel. As the Holy One He is the Creator, Redeemer and King of Israel, Jes. 43:14, 15, 49:7, 54:5, 62:12. And thus He is thanked and praised by his people, which has been redeemed, as the Holy One, Ps. 30:5, 71:22, 97:12, 1 Chron. 16:10, 35. But at the same time this holiness of God is also principle of punishment and chastisement. If Israel breaks his covenant, profanes his name, transgresses his laws, then it is precisely the holiness of God that urges Him to punishment; his holiness demands that

Israel be holy and sanctify Him, Lev. 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:7, 26, 21:8. In case of disobedience, He chastises Israel, 1 Kon. 9:3-7, 2 Chron. 7:16-20. The same holiness which is principle of deliverance and object of praise is for the transgressors principle of destruction and object of fear. Holy is then synonymous with zealous, Joz. 24:19, great and fearful, Ex. 15:11, Ps. 99:3, 111:9, with glorious and exalted, Jes. 6:3, 57:15. No one is like Him as the Holy One, Ex. 15:11, 1 Sam. 2:2, Jes. 40:25. To sanctify Him is to fear Him, Jes. 8:13, 29:23. When men profane his name and his covenant, then He sanctifies Himself through justice and righteousness, Jes. 5:16, Ezech. 28:22. But even then He does not forget his people. His holiness remains for Israel the cause of deliverance, Jes. 6:13, 10:20, 27:13, 29:23, 24, 43:15, 49:7, 52:10 etc. Jer. 51:5, Hos. 11:8, 9, and will finally reveal itself in this, that He will make the Gentiles know that He is the Lord, Jer. 50:29, Ezech. 36:23, 39:7 and delivers and cleanses Israel from all iniquities, Ezech. 36:25 v., 39:7. This latter now leads directly onward to holiness in the New-Testament sense. Already the choice of the Greek word is of significance. Σεμνος from σεβομαι, denotes what is venerable, Phil. 4:8, 1 Tim. 3:8, 11, Tit. 2:2; ἱερος expresses only a relation to the Deity, 1 Cor. 9:31, 2 Tim. 3:15, Hebr. 8:2, 9:8 etc.; ἄγνος has the meaning of pure, chaste, 2 Cor. 11:2, Tit. 2:5 etc. These words are never used of God. God in the N. T. is only called ὁσιος, Op. 15:4, 16:5, cf. Hebr. 7:26 and especially ἄγιος, Luk. 1:49, Joh. 17:11, 1 Joh. 2:20, 1 Petr. 1:15, 16, Op. 4:8, 6:10. In the O. Test. the holiness of God is not yet clearly determined alongside and in distinction from all other perfections of God. There it still denotes the whole relation in which the Lord stands to Israel and Israel to the Lord. Therefore Ihvh can be called the Holy One of Israel, who has given himself wholly and entirely to Israel and maintains and preserves it as his possession by all manner of

ways. Therefore also on the side of the people the sanctification is not only religious and ethical but also ceremonial, civil, political in nature. Just as holiness in God is not yet delimited alongside other virtues, so it is also on the side of Israel comprehending the whole people in all respects. But when in the N. T. ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ appears, Mk. 1:24, Luk. 4:34, Hd. 3:14, 4:27, who forms with the world the deepest antithesis, Joh. 15:18 and sanctifies and consecrates himself to God in an absolute sense, Joh. 17:19, then the holiness of God ceases to be principle of punishment and chastisement, and it becomes in the Holy Spirit, who in the O. T. is so called only a few times, Ps. 51:13, Jes. 63:10, but now regularly bears that name, the principle of the sanctification of the church. This is now the ἔθνος ἅγιον, 1 Petr. 2:5, 9, Ef. 2:19, 5:27, consisting of ἐκλεκτοί, ἅγιοι, ἄμωμοι, Ef. 1:1, 4, [191] Col. 1:2, 22, 3:12, 1 Cor. 7:24, wholly and entirely freed from sin and cleansed and eternally with soul and body consecrated to God. The holiness which Ihvh causes himself to be given to Israel and wholly and entirely claims Israel for his service, finally reveals itself in the highest degree in this, that God gives himself in Christ to the church and delivers and cleanses it from all iniquities.

13. To the holiness of God belongs also his glory. Scripture uses for this the words כְּבוֹד and δοξα; כְּבוֹד from the verb כָּבַד, to be heavy, weighty, is the appearance of him who is weighty, eminent; alongside this there is also in use הֹד, which denotes the glorious appearance of him whose name is widely spread, and רָדָר, which denotes that appearance in its radiance and beauty, Delitzsch on Ps. 8:6. The Greek word for this in LXX and N. T. is δοξα, the recognition that someone enjoys or to which he has a claim, subjectively therefore the recognition that is due to someone or is in fact bestowed, the fame or honor in which he shares, syn. with τιμη and

εὐλογία, Op. 5:12, opp. ἀτιμία, 2 Cor. 6:8; and objectively the appearance, form, the aspect, the splendor, radiance, glory of a person or thing, which presents itself, or the person or thing itself in their glorious appearance, and then related to εἶδος, εἰκὼν, μορφή, Jes. 53:2, 1 Cor. 11:7. The כְּבוֹד יְהוָה, δόξα του θεου therefore makes known the radiance and glory that is inseparable from all the virtues of God and from his entire self-revelation in nature and above all in grace, the glorious form in which He everywhere appears over against creatures. This glory and majesty with which God is clothed and which marks all his doing, 1 Chron. 16:27, Ps. 29:4, 96:6, 104:1, 111:4, 113:4 etc., reveals itself in the whole creation, Ps. 8, Jes. 6:3, but is nevertheless especially seen on the terrain of grace. It appears to Israel, Ex. 16:7, 10, 24:16, 33:18 v. Lev. 9:6, 23, Num. 14:10, 16:19 etc. Deut. 5:24. It filled the tabernacle and the temple, Ex. 40:34, 1 Kon. 8:11 and communicated itself to the whole people, Ex. 29:43, Ezech. 16:14 etc. Above all it is beheld in Christ, the Only-begotten, Joh. 1:14 and through Him in the church, Rom. 15:7, 2 Cor. 3:18, which expects the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of the great God and of its Savior Jesus Christ, Tit. 2:13. [192] More than once it is brought into connection with the glory of God. Ex. 29:43, Jes. 6:3 and therefore also described as a fire, Ex. 24:17, Lev. 9:24 and as a cloud, 1 Kon. 8:10, 11, Jes. 6:4. Without doubt Scripture, with that cloud and that fire, thinks of sensibly perceptible, creaturely forms under which God's presence made itself known, cf. deel I 249. It is, however, something else with the light with which the glory of God is often compared and under which it is repeatedly represented. Light is in Scripture the image of truth, holiness, and blessedness, Ps. 43:3, Jes. 10:17, Ps. 97:11. This comparison is so simple and natural that truly the supposition is not needed for it that Ihvh originally was a sun-god, Kuenen, G. v. I. I 48 v. 240

v. 249. 267, just as little as the designation rock needs to point to an earlier period of stone-worship, Kuenen, I 392-395. The light of the sun and the fire of heaven provide the Israelite the material for the description of the virtues of Iahveh, but he is clearly conscious in doing so of speaking in image. Just as the thunder is his voice, Ps. 104:7, Am. 1:2, Jes. 30:30, so the light of nature is his garment, Ps. 104:2. What light is in nature, source of knowledge, of purity, of joy, that God is in the spiritual. He is the light of the pious, Ps. 27:1, his countenance, his word spreads light, Ps. 44:4, 89:16, 119:105, in his light alone they see the light, Ps. 36:10. He himself is pure light, without darkness and father of all that is light, 1 Joh. 1:5, 1 Tim. 6:16, Jak. 1:17, and is according to the promise, Jes. 9:1, 60:1, 19, 20, Mich. 7:8, in Christ appeared as the light, Mt. 4:16, Luk. 2:32, Joh. 1:4, 3:19, 8:12, 1 Joh. 2:20, so that now his church is light in Him, Mt. 5:14, Ef. 5:8, 1 Thes. 5:5, and goes to meet the full light, Op. 21:23 v. 22:5, Col. 1:12. The Jews later thought with this *קְבוֹד יְהוָה* of a created, visible radiance, of a Lichtleib, by which He made his presence known in the creation and even conceived it in the *schechina* as a personal subject, Weber, System der altsyn. pal. Theol. 1880 S. 160, 179-184. From Jewish theology this opinion passed over into theosophy. Böhme describes the glory of God as a Leib des Geistes, as a Reich der Herrlichkeit Gottes, das ewige Himmelreich, worin die Kraft Gottes wesentlich ist, tingiert vom [193] Glanz und Kraft des Feuers und des Lichts, as an uncreated heaven, a paradise, Joh. Claassen, Jakob Böhme, sein Leben und seine theos. Werke I 157, II 61, and so also Baader, Joh. Claassen, Fr. v. Baaders Leben u. theos. Werke II 90 f. Oetinger, Die Theol. aus der Idee des Lebens, herausgeg. von J. Hamberger 1852 S. 113 f. 117 f. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych2. S. 49 f. Keerl, Der Mensch das Ebenbild Gottes II 17 f. 113. Id. Die Lehre des N. T. von der

Herrlichkeit Gottes, Basel 1863. Among the Lutheran theologians there was earlier already dispute about whether God in a proper (Dannhauer, Chemniz) or indeed in an improper (Musaeus e. a.) sense was called light, M. Vitringa, Doctr. chr. relig. I 139. In the Eastern church even the council of Constantinople in 1431 attached its approval to the doctrine of an uncreated, divine light that was distinct from the essence of God, Kurtz, Lehrb. der Kirchengesch. § 69, 2. Yet this opinion cannot be approved. Scripture clearly teaches the spirituality and the invisibility of God. The assumption of a glory of God as a place, מקום, form, תמונה, εἶδος, μορφη, as a פנים, of a body, a realm, a heaven, which, even if it were uncreated, would nevertheless be distinct from his essence, is in conflict with the above-mentioned attributes and likewise with the simplicity of God. Also when Scripture speaks of God's countenance, glory, and majesty, it speaks in image. But just as all perfections, so also this one comes out in his creatures. It is communicable. There is in the created a weak radiance of the inexpressible glory and majesty that God possesses. Just as the creatures lead us to speak of God's eternity and omnipresence, of his righteousness and grace, so they make us know something of the glory of God. Yet here too the analogy is not identity. Already in language this comes out. With the creatures we speak of beautiful, fair, fine; but Scripture has for the beauty of God a proper name, that of glory. Therefore it also deserves no recommendation to speak, with the church fathers, scholastics, and Roman Catholic theologians, of the pulchritudo Dei. Augustine already spoke in that sense. He proceeded from the fundamental proposition: Omne quod est, in quantum est, verum, bonum, pulchrum est. Now there is in being and thus also in the true, good, and beautiful distinction, ordering of rank, ascent. In proportion as something has more being, it also has [194] more

truth, goodness, and beauty. Everything is beautiful in its kind. Singula opera Dei.... inveniuntur habere laudabiles mensuras et numeros et ordines in suo quaque genere constituta, de Gen. c. Manich. I 21. Inest enim omnibus quoddam naturae sui generis decus, de Gen. ad litt. III 14. All creatures therefore contribute to the beauty of the whole. But all beauty of the creatures is perishable and changeable; they are not beautiful through themselves, but through participation in a higher, absolute beauty. Question all creatures: Respondent tibi omnia: ecce, vide, pulchra sumus. Pulchritudo eorum, confessio eorum, Serm. 241. That highest beauty, to which all creatures point, is God. He is summum esse, summum verum, summum bonum and also the highest unchangeable beauty. Ista pulchra mutabilia quis fecit, nisi incommutabilis pulcher? ib. God is the highest beauty, because in his being there is absolute unity and measure and order. Nothing is lacking to Him, and there is nothing superfluous in Him, de ord. I 26. II 51. de beata vita 34. c. Acad. II 9. Ritter, Gesch. der christl. Philos. II 289 f. Also in this conception of Augustine the influence of neoplatonism is not to be denied, which likewise regarded the Godhead as the highest beauty and the cause of all that is beautiful, Zeller V2 483 f. But thus this thought of Augustine nevertheless found entrance with Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4 § 7. Bonaventura, Breviloquium Pars I c. 6. Petavius, Theol. dogm. VI c. 8. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 589 f. etc. In contrast, the Prot. theologians preferred to speak of the majestas and gloria Dei, Gerhard, Loci theol. I c. 8 sect. 18. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 31. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c. 22. Synopsis pur. theol. VI 43. In the glory of God his greatness and exaltedness comes out, as it is so many times depicted in the psalms and prophets, Ps. 104, Jes. 40, Hab. 3. It is called greatness and exaltedness, insofar as it awakens in the creature reverent admiration and worship. It is

called glory, insofar as it prompts to thanks and praise and honor. It is called majesty, insofar as it stands in connection with his absolute dignitas and demands subjection from every creature.

14. To God as the Holy One there finally also belongs the virtue of righteousness. The words צִדִּיק, צִדָּקָה, צִדְקָה denote [195] the state of someone who conforms to a law. The first meaning seems to be a forensic one; צִדִּיק is he who in a lawsuit is in the right before the judge and therefore must be acquitted, הַצִּדִּיק oppos. הַרְשִׁיעַ Deut. 25:1. It is also the word for him who is in the right in a dispute or war of words, Job 11:2, 33:12, 32, Isa. 41:26; and the substantive can therefore also denote the correctness or truth of an assertion or utterance, Ps. 52:5, Prov. 16:13, Isa. 45:23. Subsequently it then in general means that someone is in the right, even if no lawsuit and no court is involved; that he has the right on his side, is righteous and good and conforms to the law, Gen. 30:33, 38:26, 1 Sam. 24:18, Ps. 15:2. From here it is also transferred to the religious sphere and applied to God. In the Pentateuch God is still only twice called צִדִּיק, Ex. 9:27, Deut. 32:4. God's righteousness first comes to expression in history, in his government of the world and in his guidance of Israel, and is therefore also developed most by the psalmists and prophets. It reveals itself over the whole world, even in the beasts of the field, Ps. 36:7. God is a Judge of the whole earth, Gen. 18:25. It consists in this, that God recompenses each according to his work, treats the righteous and the wicked differently, Gen. 18:25. But now it is remarkable that the one side of this righteousness, viz. that according to which God punishes the wicked, the *justitia vindicativa*, comes much less to the foreground in Scripture than that other, according to which He confirms the righteous. Diestel in his article, *Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit vorzüglich im A. T.*, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. V 1860, 2tes Heft, S. 173-253 has rightly

drawn attention to this and has found agreement with many, especially with Ritschl, *Rechtf. u. Vers.* II2 102-119. The matter itself, which later in dogmatics was expressed as *justitia vindicativa*, is not absent. On the contrary, God by no means holds the guilty innocent, Ex. 20:7, Nah. 1:3. He does not spare, Ezek. 7:4, 9, 27, 8:18, 9:10. He accepts no person and no gift, Deut. 10:17, and judges impartially, Job 13:6-12, 22:2-4, 34:10-12, 35:6, 7. He is righteous and all his judgments are right, Ps. 119:137, 129:4; also the punishing of the wicked is more than once connected with his righteousness, Ex. 6:5, 7:4, Ps. 7:12, [196] 9:5-9, 28:4, 62:13, 73, 96:10, 13, 2 Chron. 12:5-7, Neh. 9:33, Lam. 1:18, Isa. 5:16, 10:22, Dan. 9:14, Rom. 2:5, 2 Thess. 1:5-10. But yet it is true that the punishing of the wicked is mostly derived from the wrath of God and that righteousness in Scripture especially appears as a principle of salvation for the people of God. The wrath of God is in the Hebrew indicated by many words, זַעַם, כֹּעֵס, הָרוֹן, אַף, קִצְף, רָגַז, mostly translated by wrath, wrathfulness, חֵמָה mostly rendered by fury, עֲבָרָה mostly translated by indignation, LXX and N. T. by θυμος, the inward, and ὀργη, the outwardly manifesting wrath, connected together, Rom. 2:8. This wrath, whose root-words partly are connected with the concept of burning, partly express a violent, not-to-be-restrained movement of the mind, is often compared to a fire, Lev. 10:6, Deut. 32:22, Ps. 21:10, a conflagration, Deut. 32:22, 2 Kings 23:26, Ps. 2:12, Isa. 30:27, Jer. 15:14, 17:4, and is therefore called hot, burning, Ps. 58:10, Deut. 13:17, 2 Chron. 28:11, Job 20:23, Isa. 13:9, 13, and smoking, Deut. 29:30, Ps. 74:1. It is aroused and kindled by Israel's theocratic sins against the covenant of God, such as perjury, Josh. 9:20, profanation of the service of God, Lev. 10:6, Num. 1:53, 16:46, 18:5, idolatry, Deut. 9:19, the sin of Manasseh, 2 Kings 23:26, David, 1 Chron. 27:24, and especially by the sins of which the

people made themselves guilty and by which it has deserved all kinds of punishments, Isa. 42:24, 25, Jer. 7:20, 21:5, 32:31 etc. Lam. 2:2 f., 3:43, Ezek. 5:13 f., 7:3, 13:13 etc. Zech. 7:12 f. This wrath is dreadful, Ps. 76:8, and works terror, Ps. 2:5, 90:7, pain, Job 21:17, Ps. 102:11, punishment, Ps. 6:2, 38:2, Jer. 10:24, devastation, Jer. 42:18, 2 Chron. 29:8 etc. cf. Job 9:5, Ps. 21:10, 56:8, 85:5. According to Deut. 6:15, 29:20, 32:21, Job 16:9, Nah. 1:2, with that wrath hatred, vengeance, and zeal are related. Hatred has almost always the sinful deeds, Deut. 16:22, Ps. 45:8, Prov. 6:16, Jer. 44:4, Hos. 9:15, Am. 5:12, Zech. 8:17, Rev. 2:6, and only a few times the sinful persons, Ps. 5:6, Mal. 1:3, Rom. 9:13, as object. The vengeance נִקְמָה, ἐκδίκησις, which is ascribed to God, Nah. 1:2, 1 Thess. 4:6 and is expressly reserved to Him, Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19, Heb. 10:30, now also sometimes reveals itself in judgment and judicial sentence, Num. 31:2, 3, Judg. 5:2, [197] 11:36, 16:28, 2 Sam. 4:8, 22:48, Ps. 18:48, 99:8, but will nevertheless first reveal itself in all its power in the future, in the day of vengeance, Deut. 32:41, 42, Ps. 94:1, 149:7, Isa. 34:8, 35:4, 59:17, 61:2, 4, Jer. 46:10, 50:15, 28, 51:11, Ezek. 25:14v., Mic. 5:14. The zeal of God, נִסְיָהוּ זֵלוֹס, which occurs repeatedly, Ex. 20:9, 34:14, Deut. 4:24, 5:9, 6:15, Josh. 24:19, Nah. 1:2 is aroused by the fact that Israel, the bride of Iahvê, violates his rights as bridegroom and husband by whoring after other gods, Deut. 32:16, 21, 2 Kings 14:22, Ps. 78:58, Ezek. 8:3, 5 and reveals itself in this, that Iahvê now on his part also provokes Israel to jealousy by choosing another people, Deut. 32:21, Ps. 79:5, Ezek. 5:13, 16:38, 23:25, Rom. 10:19. Alongside all these virtues, the righteousness of God is now for the most part taken in bonam partem and described according to that side according to which it puts the righteous in the right and elevates them to honor and salvation. In that especially consists the נִקְמָה of Iahvê, that He recognizes the

righteousness of the righteous, brings it to light and makes it triumph. He is righteous because He decrees salvation for the pious, confirms them, Ps. 7:10, helps out, 31:2, answers, 65:6, hears, 143:1, delivers, 143:11, makes alive, 119:40, acquits, 34:23, does justice, 35:23 etc., while the wicked do not come to his righteousness, 69:28, 29. The righteousness of Iahvā therefore forms no antithesis with his lovingkindness, as wrath does, Ps. 69:25v., but is related to it and synonymous, Ps. 22:32, 33:5, 35:28, 40:11, 51:16, 89:15, 145:7, Isa. 45:21, Jer. 9:24, Hos. 2:18, Zech. 9:9. The manifestation of the righteousness of God is at the same time manifestation of his grace, Ps. 97:11, 12, 112:4, 116:5, 119:15-19. Even the forgiveness of sins is due to that righteousness of God, Ps. 51:16, 103:17, 1 John 1:9. The manifestations of that righteousness, צִדְקוֹת, are therefore saving benefits, deeds of rescue and deliverance, Judg. 5:11, 1 Sam. 12:7, Ps. 103:6, Isa. 45:24, 25, Mic. 6:5. Especially with Isaiah this soteriological character of the righteousness of God comes strikingly to expression. Israel is indeed a sinful people and is therefore also severely punished, 43:26, 48:1, 53:11, 57:12, 59:4, 64:5, but nevertheless Israel is in the right over against the Gentiles; it has, in spite of all its transgressions, a righteous cause, it nevertheless in the end has the right on its side. [198] When it then also has been chastised enough, God's righteousness will awaken and recognize Israel in this its right and deliver it from all its misery, 40:1v., 54:5, 7v., 57:15v., 61:1v. etc. And so it is with all the pious. Personally they are sinners, they stand guilty of all kinds of unrighteousness and they are a poor and miserable people. But they stand for a righteous cause, they trust in the Lord, and they count on it that God will do them justice, will plead their cause and will crown them with his salvation, Ps. 17:1v. 18:21, 22, 34:16, 103:6, 140:13. And also in the N. Test. God's δικαιοσύνη consists

specifically in this, that in Christ it offers a means of atonement, by which He both himself appears δίκαιος and also can δικαιουν τον ἕκ πίστεως, and further grants to his own forgiveness, 1 John 1:9 and decrees salvation, John 17:25, 2 Tim. 4:8. Still more, finally even wrath and zeal, hatred and vengeance are made serviceable to the rescue and deliverance of his people. His wrath is accomplished after a little time, Ps. 30:6, 78:38, 85:4, 103:9, Isa. 10:25, 48:9, 51:22, 54:8, Jer. 3:12v. 32:37, Ezek. 43:7-9, Dan. 9:16, Hos. 14:5, Mic. 5:18, and his zeal against Israel comes to an end, Ezek. 16:42, 36:6v. Zech. 8:2v. Then his wrath and zeal and vengeance will turn against the enemies of his people in the great day of wrath and vengeance, Deut. 32:41, 42. Isa. 13:2v., 26:11, 30:27v., 34:8, 35:4, 42:11, 59:17, 61:2, 4, 63:3v., Jer. 10:25, 46:10, 50:15, 28, 51:11, Lam. 3:66, Ezek. 25:14v., 38:19, 39:25, Mic. 5:14, Nah. 1:2, Hab. 3:12, Zeph. 1:15v., 2:2 etc., and thereby serve for Israel as blessing and for deliverance, 2 Kings 19:31, Isa. 9:6, 37:32, Joel 2:18, Zech. 1:14, 8:2. And likewise the N. T. says that, although God's wrath already now rests on the wicked, John 3:36, Eph. 2:3, 1 Thess. 2:16, yet that wrath in all its dreadfulness will first be revealed in the future, Mt. 3:7, Luke 3:7, 21:23, Rom. 5:9, 1 Thess. 1:10, 5:9, Eph. 5:6, 3:6, Rev. 6:16, 17, 11:18, 14:10, 16:19, 19:15. On the righteousness of God in Scripture, cf. besides Diestel and Ritschl t. a. p., Ortloph in a treatise on the righteousness of God, Zeits. f. luth. Theol. u. Kirche 1860. Kautzsch, Ueber die Derivata des Stammes קדץ im altt. Sprachgebrauch, Tübingen 1881. Koenig, De vi vocis קדץ in libris prophetarum, Paris 1894. Cremer, s. v. Köstlin, in Herzog² 5, 311 and Stud. u. Krit. 1892, 3tes Heft S. 423-425. [199] Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 47. Schultz, Alt. Theol.⁴ S. 540 f. Smend, Alt. Religionsgesch. 363 f. 410 f. Kuenen, G. v. Isr. I 65v. A. Fricke, Der paulin. Grundbegriff der δικαιοσύνη θεου, erörtert auf Grund

von Rom. 3:21-26. Leipzig Böhme 1888. H. Beck, Die $\delta\iota\kappa.$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ bei Paulus, Neue Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1895, 2tes Heft S. 249-261, and further literature later in the locus de justificatione. On the wrath of God: Lactantius, de ira Dei. Tertull. de ira Dei. Bartholomäi, Vom Zorne Gottes, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1861 v. 256-277. Weber, Vom Zorne Gottes 1862. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 S. 119-156. Diestel, t. a. p. S. 193 f. Lange art. in Herzog1, Kübel in Herzog2. Oehler § 48. Schultz, S. 560 f. Smend S. 99 f. Cremer s. v. etc.

In dogmatics the concept usually acquired a broader sense. Sometimes it was taken so broadly that it also included the perfection or holiness of God; righteousness was then virtue itself and the sum of all virtues; in God consisting in perfect agreement with himself, *justitia divina*. But usually, in imitation of Aristotle, it was nevertheless conceived in a narrower sense. He defined it in his ethics as $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$, $\delta\iota' \eta\nu \tau\alpha \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\iota \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$; it is only possible in a society of beings who can possess a greater or smaller quantity of goods; among the gods it does not exist, because there is no measure for their possession, and among irrational creatures neither, because among them there is no question of property. The *justitia* therefore presupposes, first of all, that there are rights, which have been bestowed by the lawgiver, *justitia dominica*, *legislativa*, *dispositiva*; next, that those rights are mutually respected by treaties, contracts, *justitia commutativa*; and finally that those rights which exist are maintained, *justitia distributiva*, and indeed by reward, *justitia remunerativa*, or by punishment, *justitia vindicativa*; in all those parts righteousness was *constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*. All this was transferred to God; and thus the concept of righteousness in dogmatics acquired a much broader sense than in Scripture. Now there is no overriding objection to this, provided only that

the difference in usage is kept in view, for the matters themselves, which in dogmatics are treated under the *justitia Dei*, all occur clearly in Holy Scripture. Indeed, there is even an advantage connected with it, because it offers opportunity to maintain the righteousness [200] of God in its whole extent against its opponents. The Gnostics in general and especially Marcion made a sharp antithesis between law and gospel, works and faith, flesh and spirit, and thus also between the God of wrath, of vengeance, of righteousness, who revealed himself in the O. T., and the God of love and of grace, who in the N. T. in Christ had made himself known, Harnack, D. G. I 228 f.; and later, essentially in the same sense, righteousness, specifically punitive righteousness, as in conflict with his love, was denied of God by many. Now, with the *justitia Dei* many difficulties present themselves; with God there is, after all, no right conceivable that stands above him and to which he has to adhere, for his will is the highest law; creatures have no rights over against him, for they have received everything from him and have repaid him nothing; they can lay no claim to reward, for even when they have done everything they were obliged to do, they are unprofitable servants; and also nothing in his nature seems to compel him to punish; why should he, who is the Almighty, not be able to forgive without satisfaction or punishment? In order, however, not to stray too far from the biblical concept of righteousness, it is preferable to bring all these questions up not here but presently under the will and the freedom of God. Righteousness in Holy Scripture is not an attribute of the *dominium absolutum* of God but rests on a moral foundation. Even though it is the case that a creature of course cannot have any rights over against God, Rom. 11:35, 1 Cor. 4:7 and even though there is no question of a *justitia commutativa*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 21 art. 1, it is nevertheless God himself who, as it were, gives

rights to his creatures. Every creature has received in creation its own nature; there are laws and ordinances for all created things; there are rights which lie enclosed in the existence and in the nature of all that is. Above all, such rights have been given to rational creatures, and among these again for all the domains in which they move, for intellect and heart, soul and body, art and science, family and society, religion and morality. And when those rights have been forfeited and sinned away by man, then God establishes with Noah a *foedus naturae* and with Abraham a *foedus gratiae*, in which he again out of grace grants to his creatures all kinds of rights [201] and binds himself by oath to the maintenance of those rights. Thus, by God's grace, a whole legal order has been established, both in nature and grace, with all kinds of institutions, ordinances, and laws, which he himself maintains and causes to prevail. These institutions and rights, however, are not derived in Scripture from God's righteousness,—would any righteousness also oblige him to that?—but from his holiness and grace. And certainly this is more correct than that they are designated with the name of *justitia legislativa*. Yet this is not wrong, provided only that it is not thought thereby that God by virtue of some righteousness or other gave and had to give all those rights to his creatures. This, however, is precisely what is involved, that God is the Highest Lawgiver, and that the whole legal order in every domain is rooted in him. All right, whatever it may be, has its ultimate and deepest ground, not in a contract social nor in an independent natural law, nor in history, but only in the will of God, and in that will, not conceived as *dominium absolutum*, but as a will of goodness and grace. God's grace is the source of all right. But further, God also maintains that legal order in every domain of life; he, who is righteousness itself and the source of all right, is also the *judex*, the *vindex justitiae*. His *justitia legislativa* includes

the *justitia judicialis*. Right is no right when it is not maintained, if need be with coercion and punishment. To be sure, this is not given of itself with the legal order. Without sin the legal order would nevertheless have existed; but it would have been obeyed without coercion by every creature voluntarily and out of love. It is sin which necessitates right, in accordance with its nature, to have itself respected with force and coercion. Not right in itself but indeed the character of coercion, which it now must bear, has become necessary through sin. But so little is this character of coercion accidental or arbitrary, that now no right is conceivable without that character and our own conscience itself bears witness to it. The moral order is so little in conflict with the legal order, that it rather bears, demands, and supports it. Right is an important part of morality. Righteousness is precisely the way in which the grace and love of God are maintained and raised to triumph. Those who with Marcion assume an antithesis between righteousness and grace, fail to recognize the connection between moral and legal order, [202] and do not understand the majesty and the glory of right. The *justitia Dei* must therefore by virtue of its nature be a *justitia judicialis* and thus on the one hand a *justitia remunerativa* and on the other hand a *justitia vindicativa*. Not as though the creature could ever of itself lay claim to any reward or could in itself receive forgiveness without punishment; but God is obligated by his covenant, by the right once instituted by him, by his name and honor, to bring his people to salvation and to punish the ungodly. Thus alone can right come to dominion and triumph. There is truth in the *fiat justitia, pereat mundus*; but Scripture nevertheless more beautifully places this thought in the foreground, that right must be done, in order that the world may be saved. Cf. Irenaeus, *adv. haer.* III 25 IV 39 sq. Tertullianus, *adv. Marc.* passim. Orig. *de princ.* II 5, 3. Pseudodion. *de div. nom.* 8 § 7. Anselmus,

Prosl. c. 9 sq. Lombardus, Sent. IV 46 en de comm. van Thomas en Bonaventura, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 21. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 Sect. 12. Quenstedt I 292. Hollaz 268. Zanchius, Op. II 394 sq. Polanus, Synt. II c. 26. Voetius, Disp. I 339-402. Owen, on div. justice, Works 1862 X 481-624. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. V. Moor I 674 sq. 996 sq. Meijer, De Godd. eigensch. IV 89v.

E. God as Sovereign.

15. Along with all the virtues discussed, there finally come also those which are proper to God as Sovereign. God is the Creator, and thus the Owner, Possessor, Lord of all; nothing exists or possesses anything outside of Him; He alone has absolute authority; His will always decides and over everything. Of that sovereign will, *הַפֶּזֶן, רָצוֹן, צָבֹה*, Dan. 4:35, 6:18, *θελημα, βουλημα*, there is therefore also continual mention in Holy Scripture. That will is the final cause of all things, of their being and their being-such. From it everything is derived, creation and preservation, Op. 4:11, government, Spr. 21:1, Dan. 4:35, Ef. 1:11, the suffering of Christ, Luk. 22:42, election and reprobation, Rom. 9:15 v., regeneration, Jak. 1:18, sanctification, Phil. 2:13, the suffering of believers, 1 Petr. 3:17, our life and lot, Jak. 4:15, Hd. 18:21, Rom. 15:32, even the smallest and most insignificant things, Mt. 10:29 etc. And correspondingly, in Christian theology [203] and binds himself under oath to the maintenance of those rights. Thus, by God's grace, an entire legal order has been established, both in nature and in grace, with all kinds of institutions, ordinances, and laws, which He Himself maintains and causes to rule. These institutions and rights,

however, are not derived in Scripture from God's righteousness,—which righteousness would also obligate Him thereto?—but from his holiness and grace. And certainly this is more correct than that they are designated with the name of *justitia legislativa*. Yet this is not wrong, provided only that it is not thought thereby that God, by virtue of some or other righteousness, gave and had to give all those rights to his creatures. This, however, precisely consists in the fact that God is the Highest Lawgiver, and that the whole legal order in every domain is rooted in Him. All right, whatever it may be, has its final and deepest ground, not in a contract social nor in an autonomous natural law, nor in history, but only in the will of God, and in that will, not conceived as *dominium absolutum*, but as a will of goodness and grace. God's grace is the source of all right. But further, God also maintains that legal order on every terrain of life; He, who is righteousness itself and the source of all right, is also the *judex*, the *vindex justitiae*. His *justitia legislativa* includes the *justitia judicialis*. Right is no right when it is not maintained, if need be with coercion and punishment. Indeed, this is not given of itself along with the legal order. Without sin the legal order would nevertheless have existed; but it would have been obeyed without coercion by every creature voluntarily and out of love. It is sin which compels right, in accordance with its nature, to have itself respected with force and coercion. Not right in itself, but rather the character of coercion which it now must bear, has become necessary through sin. But so little is this character of coercion accidental or arbitrary, that now no right is conceivable without that character and our own conscience itself bears witness to it. The moral order is so little in conflict with the legal order, that it rather bears, demands, and supports it. Right is an important part of morality. Righteousness is precisely the way in which the grace and love of

God are maintained and raised to triumph. They who, with Marcion, assume an antithesis between righteousness and grace, fail to recognize the connection between moral and legal order, [204] these over to the kabbalah and neoplatonism. Here Plotinus had already taught that God, *causa sui*, product was of his will and power and that thus the will was the ultimate being and preceded the intellect. And likewise now Schelling made the will into the ultimate principle both of the existence of the infinite and of finite being. Already in his philosophical investigations on the essence of human freedom of the year 1809 he adopted this standpoint. Es gibt, said he, in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein anderes Seyn als Wollen. Wollen ist Urseyn und auf dieses allein passen alle Prädicate desselben: Grundlosigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, Selbstbejahung. Die ganze Philosophie strebt nur dahin, diesen höchsten Ausdruck zu finden, Werke I 7 S. 350. In God and in creatures a distinction must be made between the essence, insofar as it exists, and the essence, insofar as it is only ground of existence, ib. 357. God has the ground of his existence in himself, i.e. in a nature distinct from God himself, ib. 358. This nature is, as it were, that Sehnsucht, die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu gebären; it is will, aber Wille in dem kein Verstand ist, und darum auch nicht selbständiger und vollkommener Wille, indem der Verstand der Wille in dem Willen ist. Dennoch ist sie ein Willen des Verstandes, nämlich Sehnsucht und Begierde desselben; nicht ein bewusster, sondern ein ahnender Wille, dessen Ahndung der Verstand ist, ib. 359. But thus it is now also with all things. They are something other than God and yet cannot be outside God. This contradiction is only to be solved thus, dass die Dinge ihren Grund in dem haben, was in Gott selbst nicht Er selbst ist, d. h. in dem, was Grund seiner Existenz ist, ib. 359. Things have their ground in

this dark nature, in this unconscious will of God. Indeed, in the world rule, order, and form are now to be observed, just as in God also out of the dark nature the light of spirit and of personality has arisen. Aber immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden, ib. 359. The whole world-process is derived by Schelling from the antithesis of nature and spirit, of darkness and light, of the real and the ideal principle, which together from all eternity are present in God himself [205]. By this standpoint Schelling has gone beyond the rationalism of Hegel and has become of the greatest significance for later philosophy. The thoughts which he had already expressed in his investigation on human freedom, he did indeed further elaborate in his later writings, Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen of 1812, Werke I 7 S. 417 f., Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen des Herrn F. H. Jacobi of 1812, Werke I 8 S. 19 f. and especially in his Philosophie der Offenbarung, Werke II 3ter u. 4ter Band, in a more detailed and theistic sense. But he remained faithful to his primacy of the will and in this was followed by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. Now it is true that the will in these philosophers is no will in the proper sense, but nothing but an unconscious desiring, a blind impulse, a dark nature. But in part this was acknowledged by themselves. Schelling says expressly that the will without intellect is no independent and perfect will, indem der Verstand der Wille in dem Willen ist, Werke I 7, 359. Schopenhauer did indeed reckon consciousness to the appearance of the will and considered it bound to individuality and brains, Die Welt als Wille u. Vorst. II 6 370, but nevertheless interposed between the will and the world of appearance the ideas, which were the eternal forms and exemplars of

things, ib. I 154. And von Hartmann speaks of the Unconscious again as subject and as überbewusst, Philos. des Unbew. II 9 186. The existence of things is determined by the will, but the essence by the intellect, Schelling, Werke, II 3 S. 57-62. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. I 100 f. II 435 f. 446 f. Yet even apart from this acknowledgment, their philosophy is of great significance for theism. It has demonstrated the untenability of rationalistic and idealistic pantheism. God is not to be conceived without will, freedom, and power. Indeed, it has been objected against this that all willing was a desiring and striving and thus a proof of imperfection, of dissatisfaction, of unrest, which cannot occur in God. And mysticism has therefore sung: Wir beten, es geschehe, mein Herr und Gott, dein Wille; Und siehe, Er hat nicht Wille, Er ist eine ewige Stille (Angelus Silesius). But this objection rests on an incorrect conception of the will. Certainly, willing is often a striving after something that is not possessed; but when the will has now obtained that desired thing and rests [206] and enjoys in it, then that resting and enjoying is also an act and activity of the will, indeed the highest and most powerful activity, cf. later the doctrine of the will. Such a will now, which rests and enjoys in what has been obtained, also exists in creatures and is nothing but love, which embraces its object and is blessed in it. If such a resting and enjoying is not reckoned to the will, it is either unattainable for the creature, i.e. then no blessedness is possible for the creature; or if that blessedness will nevertheless once be bestowed on the creature, it cannot exist otherwise than in destruction of the will, in stupefaction of consciousness and in complete suppression of personality. In pantheistic mysticism, therefore, blessedness is conceived as a sinking, a merging, a being swallowed up of the soul in God, i.e. in a nirvana. But Scripture and Christian theology do not teach thus. Blessedness does not kill the will but

brings it to its highest activity; for love is the richest, most powerful energy of the will. Thus now there is also a will in God. His willing is not a striving after a good that He would lack and without which He cannot be blessed. For He is the All-sufficient and the All-blessed in himself. He is himself the highest good, for his creatures and also for himself. He can rest in nothing else than in himself; because He is God, He cannot be blessed except through and in himself. His love is self-love and therefore absolute, Divine love. And that absolute self-love is nothing other than a willing of himself, the highest, absolute, Divine energy of his will. The object of God's will is therefore God himself. Not in that sense, as if He were product of his will, as if He had caused himself and were *causa sui*, cf. above p. 124, for that would again introduce becoming and striving and thus the imperfect into God. But rather thus, that God eternally wills himself with a *voluntas complacentiae*, that He eternally loves himself with Divine love and is perfectly blessed in himself. His will is *sapientissima ejus propensio in se ipsum tanquam summum bonum*; it is also no faculty or power in God, but subject, action and object of that will is one with God's essence; *θελημα θελητικον, θελησις* and *θελημα θελητον*] coincide with his essence, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 1. c. Gent. I 72 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 246. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 19 etc. [207]

Scripture, however, also speaks of a will of God in relation to the created. Just as the knowledge of God is twofold, *scientia necessaria* and *libera*, so also the will of God is to be distinguished as *propensio in se ipsum* and as *propensio in creaturas*. But just as the *scientia libera* does not make God dependent on the creatures but is known to Him from His own being, so also the will of God, which is directed to the creatures, is not to be set dualistically alongside the will which has His own being as its object.

Scripture teaches expressly that God wills alia a se and repeatedly speaks of His will in relation to the creatures, but it adds, as in one breath, that God does not will those creatures out of need, but only for His own sake, for His name's sake, Spr. 16:4. Creation, therefore, is not to be conceived as an object that stands outside and over against Him, which He lacks and after which He strives in order to possess it, or by which He hopes to obtain something which He does not have. For from Him and through Him and also to Him are all things. He does not find His end in the creatures, but these find their end in Him. Quae extra se vult, ea etiam quodam modo sunt in Deo, in quo sunt omnia, Zanchius, II 246. He does not will the creatures for something that they are or that is in them, but He wills them for His own sake. He remains His own end. He never directs Himself to the creatures as such but through these to Himself. Going forth from Himself, He returns to Himself again. It is one propensio in se ipsum tanquam summum finem et in creaturas propter se ut media; His love for Himself takes that for the creatures up into itself and through these returns again to Himself. Therefore His willing, also in relation to the creatures, is never a striving after any good still to be obtained, and thus also no sign of imperfection and unblessedness; but His willing is always, also in and through the creatures, absolute self-enjoyment, perfect blessedness, Divine rest. Rest and labor are one in God; His self-sufficiency is at the same time absolute actusitas, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 2. c. Gent. I 75, 76.

16. Although, however, God by one and the same simple act wills himself and the creatures, nevertheless the will of God must by us be distinguished with a view to the different objects. In pantheism this distinction is impossible, because the [208] world there is the very essence of God himself. But Scripture ascribes to the creatures a being which, though not

independent, is nevertheless proper, distinguished from God's essence; and therefore the creatures cannot in the same sense and in the same way be the object of his will, as he himself is that with his essence. The will of God, whereby God wills himself, is *propensio in se tanquam finem*; the will, which has the creatures as object, is *propensio in creaturas tanquam media*. The former is *necessaria* just as the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*; God cannot do otherwise than love himself; he delights in himself eternally and with divine necessity. This will of God is therefore elevated above all arbitrariness, but yet not unfree and compelled; freedom and necessity here coincide. Quite otherwise, however, is it with the will of God, which has the creatures as object. Scripture speaks of this will as absolutely as possible. God does all that pleases him, Ps. 115:3, Prov. 21:1, Dan. 4:35. He is accountable to no one and justifies none of his deeds, Job 33:13. Men are in his hand as clay in the hand of the potter, Job 10:9, 33:6, Isa. 29:16, 30:14, 64:8, Jer. 8:1v., nations are as a drop, a speck of dust, regarded as nothing, Isa. 40:15v. It is just as foolish for a man to exalt himself against God, as for an axe to boast against him who hews with it, or for a saw to vaunt against him who draws it, Isa. 10:15! There is no right of man with God; no one can ask him: What doest thou? Shall the clay also say to its former: What makest thou, Job 9:2v., 11:10, Isa. 45:9? So let man then be silent and lay the hand upon the mouth, Job 39:37. And the N. T. teaches no otherwise. God can do with his own what he will, Mt. 20:15. Being and thus-being depends solely on God's will, Rev. 4:11. This is the ultimate ground of all. Mercy and hardening have therein their cause, Rom. 9:15-18. In the church the H. Spirit distributes gifts, as he will, 1 Cor. 12:11. And a man has nothing to object against God's free dispositions, Mt. 20:13v., Rom. 9:20, 21. On these grounds, in Christian theology, as the *scientia*

visionis, so also the voluntas Dei, which had the creatures as object, was always called libera. Augustine said that the will of God was the last and deepest ground of all things, de civ. XXI 8. de trin. III 7. 19; a deeper [209] ground there is not. To the question why God created the world, there is but one answer: quia voluit; whoever then still asks further for a cause for that will, majus aliud quaerit, quam est voluntas Dei; nihil autem majus inveniri potest, de gen. c. Man. I 2. de civ. V 9; and thus spoke with him the whole Christian church and theology, e.g. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 5. Calvin, Inst. III 23, 2. All taught, indeed not that God could act plus and melius than he did, for he always acts in a divine, perfect manner; but that he nevertheless could have made the things plura and majora and meliora than he has made them, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 44. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 25 art. 5 and 6. Zanchius, Op. II 184-187. Voetius, Disp. I 426. 564. V 151. Burmannus, Synopsis I 41, § 41. The moral law was by some indeed called eternal and natural, and regarded as expression of God's essence; but there was therein nevertheless again a distinction made between the essential and the accidental, and from many commandments in special circumstances dispensation could be granted, Voetius, Disp. I 347 sq. Moor II 614 sq. The incarnation and satisfaction was according to many not absolutely necessary; God could also, if he had willed, have forgiven without satisfaction and need not necessarily punish sin, Athan. c. Ar. III. Gregorius Naz. Or. 9. Damasc. de fide orth. III 18. Aug., de trin. XIII 10. Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 20. Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 1 art. 2. Petavius, de incarn. II c. 13. Calvin, Inst. II 12, 1. Comm. on John 15:13. Zanchius, VIII 144-146. Martyr, Loci, cl. 2 c. 17. Pareus on Rom. 5. Twissus, Vindic. gr. 1652 I 153 sq. e. a. such as Vossius, Roell, Vogelsang, B. S. Cremer, cf. M. Vitringa I 170. Schultens, Waersch. on the catech. of Comrie, pp. 198-222. Still more

strongly this wisdom of God came out in election and reprobation, for which no single ground is to be given and which rests only in the sovereign good pleasure of God. Of a right of any creature over against God there can be no question; a justitia commutativa there is not, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 21 art. 1. Polanus, Synt. II c. 26. Voetius, Disp. II 358. Since a creature can have no merits with God, there is also no justitia remunerativa in the proper sense, Thomas, I qu. 21 art. 1. Ned. Geloofsbel. art. 24. Conf. Westm. c. 16. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. X 288. Some even maintained that God, although he never makes use of this right, could punish the innocent temporally [210] or eternally, Perkins, Works I 772. Twissus, Vind. I 165. 179. 324 sq. Amyraldus, Synt. thesium I 237. Thus many theologians, proceeding from the absolute freedom of God, came onto the line of medieval nominalism. It was Duns Scotus who consistently applied the Pelagian concept of freedom of the will as absolute indifference to God. In Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 5 he argues against Aristotle and Avicenna, that besides God nothing is necessary. The world in its whole and in its parts is contingent, it is unnecessary for God. To the question why God has now willed this and has willed the one rather than the other, Scotus answers: *indisciplinati est quaerere omnium causas et demonstrationem.... Principii enim demonstrationis non est demonstratio; immediatum autem principium est voluntatem velle hoc ita quod non est aliqua causa media inter ista; sicut immediatum est, calorem esse calefactivum, licet hoc sit naturalitas, ibi autem libertas, et ideo hujus, quare voluntas voluit hoc, nulla est causa, nisi quia voluntas est voluntas. Sicut hujus, quare calor est calefactivus, nulla est causa, nisi quia calor est calor, quia nulla est prior causa, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 5 n. 24. One must stop at this word: Voluntas Dei vult hoc; there is no cause prior ratione voluntatis, ib. To this principle Scotus remains faithful in all that is and happens in time. If*

the whole world is accidental, then this its character can only be preserved thereby, that God, the first cause, causes it accidentally. Now God causes the world through intellect and will. The accidental, however, cannot lie in God's intellect, insofar as it precedes the will, for this intellect intelligit mere naturaliter et necessitate naturali. It must therefore lie in the will, Sent. I dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 14. This divine will nihil aliud respicit necessario pro objecto ab essentia sua; ad quodlibet igitur aliud contingenter se habet, ita quod posset esse oppositi, ib. n. 22. Now Scotus indeed acknowledges that the knowledge of God precedes the will and that the ideas in God, although distinguished from his essentia, are before his decree, Sent. I dist. 35 qu. unic. n. 7 sq. But it is nevertheless the will which out of all those possible ideas chooses and determines which will attain reality. The will is the cause of all actuality. And only as a consequence of this volitional decision does the intellect also know what will become actual, ib. dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 23 sq. God has thus [211] created the world with absolute freedom, even if it is the case that he has taken the decision thereto from eternity, ib. II dist. 1 qu. 2 n. 5. Naturally human freedom of the will was therefore by Scotus also conceived as absolutely as possible; the will is free ad oppositos actus and ad opposita objecta, ib. I dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 15 sq.; it is determined by nothing, it can just as well choose a lower as a higher good, it is itself alone the complete cause of its actions; non autem bonitas aliqua objecti causat necessario assensum voluntatis sed voluntas libere assentit cuilibet bono et ita libere assentit majori bono sicut minori, ib. I dist. 1 qu. 4 n. 16. Nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate, II dist. 25 qu. 1 n. 22. The will even precedes the intellect, for although the intellect offers to the will the object of its striving, the will nevertheless directs the intellect to the object; and blessedness lies formally not in the intellect but in the will,

IV dist. 49 qu. 4. Further, Scotus indeed acknowledges that love to God, prescribed in the first table of the law, is necessary and natural, but the commandments of the second table are positive and could also have been otherwise, III dist. 37 qu. unica. In relation to the incarnation Scotus teaches that the Logos, if he willed, could also assume another nature than the human, e.g. that of a stone, III dist. 2 qu. 1 n. 5 sq. The incarnation would probably also have taken place apart from sin and was also in the state of sin not absolutely necessary; God could also have redeemed in another way, III dist. 7 qu. 3 n. 3. III dist. 20 qu. unica. The merits of Christ were not sufficient in themselves, but were as such accepted by God, III dist. 19 qu. unica. Considered in itself, reckoned according to God's *potentia absoluta*, God could also have granted salvation to the sinner apart from the merits of Christ, and the sinner could also have satisfied for himself, if only God had willed to reckon his works as sufficient, IV dist. 15 qu. 1 n. 4 sq. cf. also IV dist. 1 qu. 6 n. 4 sq. Transubstantiation is possible, *quia una substantia potest totaliter incipere et alia totaliter desinere*, IV dist. II qu. 1 n. 4. God can even cause a person or thing during a *tempus intermedium* to cease in its existence, without thereby identity being lost, IV dist. 43 qu. 1 n. 4. Yet Scotus did not go so far as some Mohammedan [212] theologians, who let all things from moment to moment be created by the will of God without mutual connection, without laws of nature, without substances and qualities, Ritter, *Gesch. der christl. Philos.* III 732 f. He acknowledges ideas in God, which precede the will; deems love to God necessary and natural; believes in a natural knowledge of God, in a world order and natural law, and also says that incarnation and satisfaction according to the *potentia Dei ordinata* were necessary. But nevertheless Scotus elevates freedom and omnipotence so much, that at least the means, which must lead to the end,

become wholly arbitrary, Ritter, *Gesch. d. christl. Philos.* IV 388 f. Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des M. A.* II 832 f. Baur, *Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes* II 642 f. Ritschl, *Jahrb. f. d. Th.* 1865 S. 298 f. Dorner, in *Herzog* 3, 735 f. By others this principle of the freedom and omnipotence of God was developed still further. Entirely in the spirit of Scotus, Occam, e.g., asserted that God according to his *potentia absoluta* can grant salvation without regeneration and can damn the regenerate; that he can forgive without satisfaction and can regard works of sinful man as sufficient; that the Father could have become man in place of the Son, and that the Son could also have assumed the nature of a stone or a donkey; that God can grant dispensation from all commandments of the moral law etc., Stöckl, *Philos. des M. A.* II 1018 f. This nominalistic standpoint was later adopted in the first place by the Jesuits but then further by the Socinians, Fock, *Der Socin.* 416 f., the Remonstrants, *Apol. Conf. c. 24. Episc., Instit. theol. V sect. 5 c. 3*, by Cartesius, *Resp. sextae*, Amst. 1654 p. 160 sq., by Cartesian theologians, such as Burmannus, *Synopsis I c. 20 § 6. c. 21 § 19 sq.*, and in this century among others still by Charles Secrétan, *Philosophie de la liberté* 1849 I 305 S. On this standpoint the will in God is wholly detached from his essence and from all his virtues; it consists in nothing other than formal arbitrariness. Creation, incarnation, satisfaction, good and evil, true and untrue, reward and punishment, everything could just as well have been otherwise than it in fact is. There is nothing natural any more, everything is positive. But precisely this nominalism caused Christian theology to be on its guard. Even if it also said with Augustine that the will of God was the ultimate ground of all things, it nevertheless guarded itself against stripping this will of all nature [213] and letting it dissolve into pure arbitrariness. First of all it took, in the doctrine of God, its point of departure not in the

voluntas but in the *essentia Dei*. The *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* logically preceded the *scientia visionis*, just as the *voluntas necessaria* preceded the *voluntas libera*. Self-knowledge and self-love in God was absolutely necessary; and the knowledge and the will, which have the creatures as object, are not dualistically separated from that, but stand with it in the closest connection. The *scientia visionis* is bound to the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and the *voluntas libera* to the *voluntas necessaria*. According to consistent nominalism not only the existence but also the essence of things is exclusively determined and fixed by the formal will in God; properly speaking there is thus in God no *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, in which all possibilities are comprised, there is only in him a *scientia visionis*, which follows upon the will. But according to Christian theology all possibilities lay enclosed in the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, and from that the *scientia visionis* draws and the will brings them to reality. The existence of things thus does indeed depend on the will of God, but the essence on his intellect. Leibniz built further on this and said that God was indeed free to create or not to create the world, man, the animals, the plants, but if he created them he had to create them according to the idea which his consciousness had formed of them without and before the will. Given the will of God to create, the world must be precisely as it is. It is therefore the best possible and hangs together in all parts so intimately, that *qui unum bene novit, omnia novit*, Theod. I 7. 52 II 169 s. Pichler, Die Theol. des Leibniz I 239 s. cf. also Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 57-62. Hartmann, Philos. des Unb. I 9 100 f. II 435 f. 446 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I § 460 f. Further, Scripture taught everywhere that God created and sustained the world by the word, by the Logos. It thus rested on thoughts of God. God did not act arbitrarily and contingently but with the highest wisdom. Even if therefore

by us the reasons for his acting could not be traced, they were nevertheless present for him. And for those reasons Christian theology then also sought. Creation had its cause in his goodness or love; for the permission of sin all kinds of reasons were given; incarnation and satisfaction were perhaps not absolutely necessary [214] but this way of redemption was nevertheless the most suitable and excellent, Petavius, *de incarn.* II c. 5 sq.; and even if many did not dare to limit the *potestas absoluta*, all nevertheless acknowledged that he made no use of this absolute right and thus in the *potestas ordinata* again wholly agreed with one another. And finally on concrete points nominalism was decisively rejected; the moral law can have no other content than it has, Thomas, *S. Theol.* I 2 qu. 100 art. 8. Becanus, *de lege naturae* III c. 3 qu. 4. Suarez, *de lege* I c. 15. Voetius, *Disp.* I 364-402. Maresius, *Syst. theol.* VII 4. Turretinus, *Theol. El.* III qu. 18 and XI qu. 2. Heidegger, *Corp. Theol.* III 89, 90; the punishment of sin is necessary, Can. Dordr. II 1. Voetius, *Disp.* I 358 sq. II 240 sq. Moor I 683 sq. 996-1034, and likewise the incarnation and satisfaction, Iren. *adv. haer.* III 20. Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo.* Heid. Cat. q. 11. 40. Lord's Supper form of the Ned. Ger. Kerken. Trigland, *Antapol.* c. 4. Voetius, *Disp.* II 238 sq. Turretinus, *de satisf. Christi* II § 16 sq. Owen, *de justitia divina.* Ex. v. h. *Ontw.* v. Tol. V etc.; and the power of God was so defined, that it excluded the doing of contradictory things, see presently at n. 18.

In this way nominalism in Christian theology has, if not been overcome, then at least been pushed back and limited. If the *voluntas libera* was defined as *propensio in creaturas propter se ut media*, then in that there was already enclosed a principled resistance to the will of God as absolute arbitrariness, for the character of the means is determined by the nature of the final end. Hence it is also the case that theology, although placing the

will of God in the foreground and continually returning to it, has nevertheless always again sought motives for that will. Realism strove to understand the world as one harmonious whole, in which nothing was arbitrary and everything had its place, even sin, and which as a whole was serviceable to the glorification of God's name. If the nature of a science consists in the *rerum cognoscere causas*, theology too cannot withdraw itself from such an investigation. Only, for every practitioner of science, and especially for the theologian, humility and modesty are a first duty. He may not be wise above what one ought to be wise. All science is bound to its object; it may not, for the sake of any preconceived theory [215] falsify or deny the phenomena which it observes. Thus theology too is most strictly bound to the facts and testimonies which God makes known to it in nature and Scripture. It must let these stand, unweakened and unmutilated. If it cannot explain them, it has to confess its ignorance. The will of God, which expresses itself in those facts, is for it the end of all reasoning. It finally rests in his sovereignty. In that sense the word of Augustine remains true: *voluntas Dei cujusque creaturae natura est*. It allows itself to be seduced neither by pantheism, which makes the world necessary, for there is a distinction between God and world, between his *voluntas necessaria* and *voluntas libera*; nor also by deism, which makes the world into a product of chance, for that whole world is a revelation of God's wisdom. And it maintains against both, that the world is an act of God's free, sovereign will and that God for this will has had his wise and good reasons. For us something is good solely and only because God wills it; God himself can never will anything, except because it is in itself or for something else good, Voetius, *Disp.* I 387. We almost never see why God has willed the one and not the other, and we must therefore represent it thus, that He could have

willed the one just as well as the other. But in God there actually falls no choice, which after all always presupposes uncertainty, wavering, deliberation. He knows eternally, firmly, unchangeably what He wills. In his will there falls no arbitrariness, no chance, no uncertainty, but only eternal determinateness and unchangeableness. The contingent is proper to the creature, and, said with reverence, it is not even possible for God, to take this character away from the creature. In God alone are existentia and essentia one; every creature as such, by virtue of its own nature, includes the possibility that it did not exist. But God has with eternal and unchangeable will willed all creatures as contingent. Therefore it is not possible for us and is even also not permitted, to climb higher than to the will of God. For every attempt thereto results in this, to seek for the creature a ground in God's being, thus to make it necessary and eternal and divine, and to strip it of its creaturely, i.e. contingent character. In so far the will of God, which has the created as object, is called free. But this freedom does not exclude the other virtues of God, his wisdom, goodness, righteousness etc. [216] For, that is also among creatures not the true freedom of will, which needs a long time of doubt, deliberation and decision; but that is the highest freedom, which at once, uno intuitu, determines both the end and the means and knows of no hesitation. And such a freedom is also in God; a freedom which is not to be thought of as bound by the other virtues of God or as independent of them in nominalistic fashion, but such a freedom, which therefore in an absolute sense is free because it is the freedom of a wise, righteous, holy, merciful and almighty God. When Augustine, Thomas, Calvin etc. therefore said that there was no causa for the will of God, then by that they meant that the will of God, as one with his being, has no causa behind or above itself, on which that will would be dependent. But

by that they by no means wished to say that that will was without ratio, that it in the sense of Schopenhauer was a blind, alogical will. On the contrary, the will of God is one with his being, with his wisdom, goodness and all his virtues, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 5. And therefore heart and head of man can rest in that will, for it is the will, not of a blind fate, of an incalculable chance, of a dark power of nature, but the will of an almighty God and of a gracious Father. His sovereignty is a sovereignty of unbounded power, but also a sovereignty of wisdom and grace. He is King and Father at the same time. Cf. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. I 452-585. Scheeben I 681 f. Dorner I 410 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften 341 f. Müller, Lehre v. d. Sünde II 5 180 f. Ebrard, Dogm. § 71 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 2 283 f. Hodge, I 402.

17. Creation, however, presents still more and still other difficulties for the doctrine of the will of God. Just as God and world are distinct and therefore the will of God for us falls apart into *propensio in se* and *in creaturas*, so there is also in the world among the creatures again all manner of distinction. And that distinction rests on a different relation in which God, with his being, his knowing and willing, places himself toward the creatures. God does not will everything in the same way, in the same sense, with the same energy of his being; for then no diversity among the creatures would be possible, then everything would be a uniform sameness. But while He wills all creatures *propter se ut media*, He wills these more [217] than those, according to the measure as they are more direct and suitable media to his glorification. God is a Father for all his creatures, but He is so in a special sense for his children. His affection for all that He created stands below that for the church, and for this below that for Christ, the Son of his good pleasure. A *providentia generalis*, *specialis* and *specialissima* is distinguished. And so also we make in the will of God, which is directed to

the creatures, again as much distinction as there are creatures. For as rich as that whole world is, so rich is the *voluntas Dei libera*. This therefore is not to be conceived as an indifferent potency, as a blind force, but as rich, full, living, divine *ενεργεια*, artery of all that rich life which creation gives us to behold. But now there is in that world one thing that causes special difficulty for the doctrine of the will of God, and that is evil, both as *malum culpae* and as *malum poenae*, in an ethical and in a physical sense. However much evil may stand under God's government, it nevertheless cannot in the same sense and in the same way be object of his will as the good. With a view to those wholly different and directly opposed objects we must in the will of God itself again make distinction. Scripture leads us in this. There is a great difference between the will of God, which prescribes to us what we have to do, Mt. 7:21, 12:50, Joh. 4:34, 7:17, Rom. 12:2, and the will of God, which says what He does and will do, Ps. 115:3, Dan. 4:17, 25, 32, 35, Rom. 9:18, 19, Ef. 1:5, 9, 11, Op. 4:11. The petition that God's will may be done, Mt. 6:10, has a wholly different sense than the childlike resigned: Thy will be done, Mt. 26:42, Hd. 21:14. And so we see in history time and again that will of God appear in a twofold sense. God commands Abraham to offer his son and yet does not let it happen, Gen. 22. He wills that Pharaoh let Israel go and yet hardens his heart, that he thus does not do it, Ex. 4:21. He has it announced to Hezekiah that he will die and yet adds fifteen years to his life, Jes. 38:1, 5. He forbids condemning the innocent and yet Jesus has been delivered up according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, Hd. 2:23, 3:18, 4:28. God does not will sin, He is far from godlessness, He forbids and punishes it severely, and yet it exists and stands under his government, Ex. 4:21, Joz. 11:20, [218] 1 Sam. 2:25, 2 Sam. 16:10, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, Rom. 1:24, 26, 2 Thess. 2:11 etc. He wills the

salvation of all, Ezech. 18:23, 32, 33:11, 1 Tim. 2:4, 2 Petr. 3:9, and yet has mercy on whom He will, and hardens whom He will, Rom. 9:18. Already soon in theology the distinction arose between this twofold will of God. Tertullian already speaks of a hidden, higher and a lower or lesser will, de exhort. 2 sq. Augustine points out that God many times accomplishes his good will through the evil will of men, Enchir. c. 101. Later this twofold will received the name of voluntas εὐδοκίας, beneplaciti, arcana, decernens, decretiva and voluntas εὐαρεστίας, signi, revelata, praecipiens. The name voluntas signi is derived from the fact that this will significat quid Deo gratum sit et nostri sit officii and is known by us from the five signa: praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, permissio, operatio. Worked out at length by scholasticism, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45. Hugo Victorinus, de Sacram. Lib. 1 Pars 4. Id. Summa Sent. tract. 1 cap. 13. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19 art. 11, 12 etc., it was generally adopted by Roman theology, Petavius, de Deo lib. V c. 4, 6, Theol. Wirceb. III 160. Perrone, II 199. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 156 etc. But with special predilection it was nevertheless treated in Reformed theology, Calv. Inst. I c. 18 § 3, 4. Musculus, Loci Comm. p. 978 sq. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 63 b. sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 237 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 251 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 19 etc. cf. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. I 359-368. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 68 f. Alongside this there came still other distinctions of the will of God, especially that in voluntas antecedens and consequens, which already occurs in Tertullianus, adv. Marc. II 11, Chrysostomus, Ep. ad. Eph. 1:5 and Damascenus, de fide orth. II c. 29, and that in voluntas absoluta and conditionata, efficax and inefficax, which is already found in Augustine, Enchir. c. 102 sq. de civ. XXII c. 1 and 2. These distinctions too can be well understood, in this sense namely that God antecedenter and conditionate wills many things, e.g. the

salvation of all men, which He nevertheless consequenter and absolute does not will and therefore does not let happen. Zanchius t. a. p. therefore also says that all these distinctions come down to the same thing; and Hyperius, Meth. theol. p. 155-159 judges likewise. Walaeus, Op. I 180. Voetius, Disp. V 88. etc. But although Luther in his [219] book de servo arbitrio had made a very sharp distinction between the Deus absconditus and revelatus, the Lutherans rejected this distinction in voluntas beneplaciti and signi, at least in a Calvinistic sense, Gerhard, loc. 2 c. 8 sect. 15. Baier, Comp. theol. pos. I c. 1 § 22. Buddeus, Instit. theol. dogm. II c. 1 § 29. The Arminians followed that example, Episcopius, Instit. theol. IV sect. 2 c. 21. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II c. 9 § 9. And the Roman theologians did indeed retain the distinction in name, but explained it in such a way that the will of God was always voluntas beneplaciti, divided into voluntas antecedens and consequens and that the voluntas signi was nothing but a partial revelation of that will, Theol. Wirceb. III 160. C. Pesch, Prael. II 156. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. I 564 f. Thus it has happened that on the one hand the Romanists etc. have in fact retained only the distinction in voluntas antecedens and consequens (absoluta and conditionata), and the Reformed only that in voluntas beneplaciti and signi (decernens and praecipiens, arcana and revelata) with rejection of that of the voluntas antecedens and consequens, Maccovius, Collegia theol. disp. 1-8. Nic. Gurtler, Instit. theol. 1732 cap. 3 § 105. Moor I 576. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c. 15 § 24 and 27 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 15, 16. The difference comes down to this, that the Romanists, Lutherans, Remonstrants etc. proceed from the voluntas signi; this is the proper will, consisting in this, that God does not will sin but only wills to permit it, that He wills the salvation of all, offers grace to all etc.; and when man has then decided, God accommodates

himself to that, determines what He wills, the salvation of him who believes, the perdition of him who does not believe. The *voluntas consequens* follows upon the decision of man, and is not the proper, essential will of God but the action of God on the occasion of the conduct of man. In contrast, the Reformed proceeded from the *voluntas beneplaciti* and held this to be the proper, essential will of God; that will always goes on, always reaches its goal and is eternal and unchangeable; the *voluntas signi*, on the other hand, is the prescription of God, in law and gospel, which applies as rule for our conduct.

Now it is the continuous doctrine of Scripture, both in O. and N. Test., that the will of God is eternal, unchangeable, independent, efficacious. Not now and then is this expressed, e.g. Ps. 33:11, [220] 115:3, Dan. 7:25, Isa. 46:10, Mt. 11:26, Rom. 9:18, Eph. 1:4, Rev. 4:11 etc., but the whole of Scripture testifies to it; all the virtues of God require this; the whole history of church and world furnishes proof for it. And accordingly Christian theology taught, especially since Augustine, that the will of God is simple, eternal, unchangeable, because it is one with his essence, Aug. Conf. XII 15. The *voluntas antecedens* is properly no will in God, *magis potest dici velleitas quam absoluta voluntas*, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 6. The *voluntas signi* is called *voluntas* in God only in a metaphorical sense, *sicut cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod velit illud fieri*, ib. art. 11. The proper will in God is the *voluntas beneplaciti*, and this is one with God's essence, is unchangeable and is always accomplished, ib. art. 6 and 7. c. Gent. I 72 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45-48 and the comm. Thomas, Bonaventura e.a. Pelagianism has wrongly abandoned this line, and elevated a powerless desire, an unfulfilled wish in God to will. Thereby it has done injustice to the whole being, to all the virtues of God. For if the

velleitas is the proper and essential will of God, then He is deprived of his omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, unchangeableness, independence etc.; the whole government of the world is then withdrawn from his providence; an irreconcilable dualism is created between God's intention and the result of world history; the outcome is then for God an eternal disappointment; the world-plan has failed, and Satan celebrates triumph at the end. Now Pelagianism does indeed assert that it acts thus in the interest of God's holiness, and that it maintains this better than Paul and Augustine, than Thomas and Calvin, because in their system God becomes the author of sin. But this is no more than appearance; sin remains from the standpoint of Pelagius just as inexplicable as from that of Augustine; indeed, holiness comes into its own much better here. For it is more in accordance with Scripture and the whole Christian faith to assume that God, for wise reasons, though unknown to us, has in a certain sense willed sin, than that He, willing it in no respect, nevertheless tolerates and permits it. This latter, after all, does precisely detract from his holiness and omnipotence, cf. later in the doctrine of sin. In addition, Scripture, though theologically placing the voluntas beneplaciti in the foreground, nevertheless [221] at the same time maintains in the voluntas signi how and in what way He does not will sin. In the signa of prohibition, admonition, warning, chastisement, punishment etc. He descends to us, and says what He requires of us. Because man is a rational, moral being, God does not deal with him as with a stick and a block, but speaks and acts with him in accordance with his nature. Just as a father forbids a child the use of a sharp knife, and yet himself handles it without harm, so God forbids to his rational creatures the sin, which He himself nevertheless can use and in fact uses to the glorification of his name. The voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi

therefore also do not conflict with each other, as the common objection runs. For in the first place the voluntas signi is properly not the will of God, but only his command and prescription, which holds as a rule for our conduct. In the voluntas signi He does not say what He will do; it is no law for his acting; it does not prescribe what God must do; but in it He says what we have to do; it is a rule for our conduct, Deut. 29:29. It is therefore called voluntas Dei only in a metaphorical sense. Indeed it is objected against this that the voluntas signi is nevertheless so called because it is a signum voluntatis in Deo, and thus must correspond with his voluntas beneplaciti. Secondly, it should therefore be remarked that this is indeed so; the voluntas signi is an indication of what God wills that we shall do. The voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi do not stand directly opposite each other, so that God according to the former does will sin and according to the latter does not will sin, according to the former does not will the salvation of all and according to the latter does, etc. For even according to the voluntas beneplaciti God takes no pleasure in sin, it is no object of his good pleasure, He does not torment out of lust for tormenting. And conversely He wills just as little according to the voluntas signi as according to the voluntas beneplaciti that all men, head for head, be saved; that cannot, with a view to history, be taught in earnest by anyone; in fact it is by everyone in 1 Tim. 2:4 restricted to a greater or smaller circle. Both stand so little over against each other that the voluntas signi is precisely the way in which the voluntas beneplaciti is accomplished. In the way of admonitions and warnings, prohibitions and threatenings, conditions and demands God carries out his counsel. And the voluntas beneplaciti maintains [222] only that man, transgressing God's command, does not become independent of God for a single moment, but in that same moment

serves the counsel of God and becomes, even if unwillingly, an instrument of his glory. Not the *voluntas signi* alone, but also the *voluntas beneplaciti* is holy and wise and good, and will precisely in the way of the law and of righteousness at the end be revealed as such. Therefore, finally, the distinction of both also ought to be maintained. It is the problem of right and fact, of idea and history, of the moral and the actual, of what ought to happen and of what indeed happens, that here confronts us. Whoever denies the *voluntas signi* does injustice to the holiness of God, to the majesty of the moral law, to the seriousness of sin. Whoever, on the other hand, denies the *voluntas beneplaciti* comes into conflict with the omnipotence, the wisdom, the independence, the sovereignty of God. On both standpoints one runs the danger either with a superficial optimism to close the eyes to reality, and to call all the actual rational, or with a one-sided pessimism to curse existence and to despair of world and lot. Theism, however, seeks no solution in striking out one of both terms of the problem, but acknowledges and maintains them both; it sees the lines of the rational and the actual at every moment in history intersect and cross each other; it traces both back to the sovereignty of God and has of this the lofty thought that it also through the irrational and sinful will bring his holy and wise counsel to execution to the glory of the Lord's name. Herein indeed his divine sovereignty shines forth brilliantly, that He in men's folly glorifies his wisdom, in their weakness his power, in their sin his righteousness and grace.

18. The sovereignty of God finally reveals itself in his omnipotence, which, however, after what has already been said, requires less extensive treatment. In Scripture never and nowhere is a limit set to the power of God. Already in the names El, Elohim, El Schaddai, Adonai the idea of power comes to the foreground. Further, He is called אֵל גָּדוֹל וְנוֹרָא, before

whose face no one can stand, Deut. 7:21v., אֶבִיר יִשְׂרָאֵל, Jes. 1:24, הָאֵל הַגָּדוֹל, הַגִּבּוֹר, whose name is Iahv Zebaoth, Jer. 32:18, אֶמִּיץ כָּח, Job 9:4, כְּבִיר, Job 36:5, עֲזִיז וְגִבּוֹר, Ps. 24:8, אֲדוֹן, κυριος, [223] Mt. 11:25, Op. 1:8, 22:5, i.e. the Lord, the Owner, the Ruler, who possesses authority and supremacy; the King, who reigns in eternity over all things, Ex. 15:18, 29:10, 93-99, 2 K. 29:15, Jer. 10:7, 10 etc., but above all is King over Israel and as such rules it, protects it, and leads it to salvation, Num. 23:21, Deut. 33:5, Richt. 8:23, 1 Sam. 8:7, Ps. 10:16, 24:7, 48:3, 74:12, Jes. 33:22, 41:21, 43:15 etc., and likewise in the N. T. the μεγας βασιλευς, Mt. 5:33, 1 Tim. 1:17, the βασιλευς των βασιλευοντων και κυριος των κυριευοντων, 1 Tim. 6:15, cf. Op. 19:16; παντοκρατωρ, 2 Cor. 6:18, Op. 1:8, 4:8, 11:17; μονος δυναστης, 1 Tim. 6:15; who both possess the ἐξουσια, ἀρχη, potestas, the right, the authority and the competence, Mt. 28:18, Rom. 9:21 and the δυναμις, κρατος, potentia, the fitness and the power to act, Mt. 6:13, Rom. 1:20. But further the omnipotence of God appears from all his works. The creation, the preservation, the redemption of Israel from Egypt, nature with its ordinances, the history of Israel with its miracles proclaim loudly and clearly the omnipotence of God. Psalmists and prophets return to these great deeds time and again and apply them to humiliation for the proud and to comfort for the believer. He is strong in power, Jes. 40:26, creates earth and heaven, Gen. 1, Jes. 42:5, 44:24, 45:12, 18, 48:13, 51:13, Zach. 12:1, maintains their ordinances, Jer. 5:22, 10:10, 14:22, 27:5, 31:35, forms rain and wind, light and darkness, the good and the evil, Am. 3:6, 4:13, 5:8, Jes. 45:5-7, 54:16. He makes mute and speaking, dead and living, saves and destroys, Ex. 4:11, Deut. 32:39, 1 Sam. 2:6, 2 Kon. 5:7, Ex. 15, Deut. 26:8, 29:2, 32:12, 1 Sam. 14:6, Hos. 13:14, Mt. 10:28, Luk. 12:20. He has absolute power over all things, so that nothing can resist Him, Ps. 8, 18, 19,

24, 29, 33, 104 etc. Job 5:9-27, 9:4v., 12:14-21, 34:12-15, 36:37. Nothing is too wondrous for Him, all things are possible for Him, Gen. 18:14, Zach. 8:6, Jer. 32:27, Mt. 19:26, Luk. 1:37, 18:27; He can raise up children for Abraham from stones, Mt. 3:9. He does all his good pleasure, Ps. 115:3, Jes. 14:24, 27, 46:10, 55:10, and no one can summon Him, Jer. 49:19, 50:44. And above all his δύναμις comes forth in the works of redemption, in the raising of Christ, Rom. 1:4. Ef. 1:20, [224] in the working and strengthening of faith, Rom. 16:15, Ef. 1:19, in the distribution of grace above asking and thinking, Ef. 2:20, 2 Cor. 9:8, 2 Petr. 1:3, in the resurrection on the last day, Joh. 5:25v. etc. And this power of God is finally also the source of all power and authority, of all force and strength in the creatures. From Him is the dominion of man, Gen. 1:26, Ps. 8, the authority of government, Spr. 8:15, Rom. 13:1-16, the strength of his people, Deut. 8:17, 18, Ps. 68:36, Jes. 40:26 v. the strength of the horse, Job 39:22, the violence of the thunder, Ps. 29:4, 68:34 etc. In one word, his is the strength. Ps. 62:12, and to Him belong the power and the strength, Ps. 96:7, Op. 4:11, 5:12, 7:12, 19:1.

In complete agreement with their doctrine of the will and the freedom of God, cf. above p. 210f., the nominalists now described the omnipotence of God in such a way that God by it can do everything that He wills, not only, but also can will everything. Distinguishing between the *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata*, they judged that God according to the former could also sin, err, suffer, die, become a stone or an animal, could change bread into the body of Christ, could do contradictory things, could undo what had happened, could make false what was true and true what was false, etc. According to his *potentia absoluta* God is thus sheer arbitrariness, pure potency without any content, which is nothing and can become everything,

cf. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II l. 2 c. 3 § 5. Voetius, Disp. I 411, 427. In principle this is the standpoint of all who uphold the primacy of the will, and therefore this opinion has later repeatedly returned and it occurs not only in Christianity but also among other religions, especially with Islam. On the other side stand those who say that God can only what He wills and that He, what He does not will, also cannot. The possible coincides with the actual. What becomes no actuality is also not possible. God has fully exhausted his power in the world. This was already the opinion of Plato and Plotinus, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 928 V 496 f., and further of some church fathers, Petavius, de Deo V c. 6, but in the Middle Ages was especially taught by Abaelard, Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ea quae facit, Introd. theol. III c. 5. And thus later the Cartesian theologians judged, Burmannus, Synopsis I c. 21 § 24, 26 c. 25 [225] § 10, 11. Braun, Doctr. foed. I 2 c. 3 § 7 sq. Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 199 sq. further Spinoza, Cogit. metaph. II c. 9. Eth. I prop. 16, 17. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 54. Strauss, Gl. I 582 f. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. I 246 f. Nietzsche, Ev. Dogm. 403-406. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godg. II 112 f. etc. Scripture condemns both the one and the other standpoint. It says on the one side expressly that God cannot do many things; He cannot lie, have regret, change, be tempted, Num. 23:19, 1 Sam. 15:29, Hebr. 6:18, Jak. 1:13, 17, ἀρνησασθαι γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὐ δύναται, 2 Tim. 2:13; for his will is after all one with his being, and the potentia absoluta, which detaches the power of God from his other virtues, is nothing but a vain and unlawful abstraction. On the other hand Scripture declares just as decisively that the possible extends much further than the actual, Gen. 18:14, Jer. 32:27, Zach. 8:6, Mt. 3:9, 19:26, Luk. 1:37, 18:27. And to this Christian theology held fast. Augustine says on the one hand that God's will and power are not distinguished from his being. Homo aliud

est quod est, aliud quod potest.... Deus autem cui non est aliud substantia ut sit, et alia potestas ut possit, sed consubstantialia illi est quidquid ejus est et quidquid est, quia Deus est, non alio modo est et alio modo potest; sed esse et posse simul habet, quia velle et facere simul habet, tract. 20 in Ev. Joan. n. 4. Conf. XI 10, XII 15. Indeed God's omnipotence consists in this, that He can what He wills, certe non ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult potest, de civ. XXI 7. But God cannot will everything, He cannot deny himself. Quia non vult non potest, quia et velle non potest. Non enim potest justitia velle facere quod injustum est, aut sapientia velle quod stultum est, aut veritas velle quod falsum est. Unde admonemur Deum omnipotentem non hoc solum, quod ait apostolus: negare se ipsum non potest, sed multa non posse.... Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest mutari, non potest falli, non potest fieri, non potest vinci, Serm. 214. But then further Augustine argues that this is no lack of power, but precisely true, absolute omnipotence. It would precisely be impotence, if He could err, sin, etc. Serm. 213, 214, de civ. V 10. Augustine especially clarifies that in relation to the proposition, which is often brought against the omnipotence of God, that [226] God cannot undo what has been done. This statement can after all have a twofold sense. First, one can mean by it that God nullifies the fact that has happened; but this is no sense, for a fact that has happened is no longer and cannot and need not be nullified. But second, one can mean by it that God would undo the fact that has happened in human consciousness, so that this now comes to think that it has not happened. But this too has no sense, for God who is the truth would then have to make what is true untrue. Other theologians have spoken in a similar sense about God's omnipotence and have only repeated what Augustine had said. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 42-44. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.

25. S. c. Gent. II c. 6-10. Bonaventura, Breviloquium I c. 7. Petavius, de Deo V c. 7. Gerhard, II c. 8 sect. 9. Buddeus, Instit. theol. dogm. II c. 1 § 30. Musculus, Loci Comm. p. 952 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 29. Zanchius, Op. II 159 sq. Voetius, Disp. I 403 sq. V 113 sq. Alsted, Theol. schol. did. p. 93-96. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c. 20. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II 1. 2 c. 1-3. Leydecker, Fax Veritatis p. 163 sq. 233 sq. etc.

Specifically, by the Reformed theologians the distinction in *potentia Dei absoluta* and *ordinata* was only acknowledged up to a certain point. The nominalists had misused this, in order to assert that God according to the first could do everything, also what was in conflict with his nature, and thereby they also especially argued the doctrine of transubstantiation. Against that Calvin rose up and he rejected such a *commentum potentiae absolutae* as profane, Inst. III c. 23 § 1, 5, cf. I 16, 3, II 7, 5, IV 17, 24. Comm. in Jes. 23:9, Luk. 1:18. The Roman Catholics therefore accused Calvin that he limited and thus denied the omnipotence of God, Bellarminus, de gratia et lib. arb. III c. 15. But Calvin did not therefore deny that God could do more than He in fact did, but he only contested such a *potentia absoluta*, which would not be bound to his being and virtues and thus could also do all kinds of contradictory things. Thus conceived, in the sense of Augustine and Thomas, the said distinction was also generally accepted by the Reformed theologians, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 29. Alsted, Theol. schol. did. p. 96. Heidegger, Corpus theol. III 109. Synopsis pur. theol. VI 36. Mastricht, II 20, 13. And thus understood, this distinction is also to be approved. The [227] pantheism does indeed say that God and world are correlata, and that God has no own being and life, no own consciousness and will in distinction from the world. But it thus mixes everything together in a hopeless way, and also brings about a boundless

confusion in thinking. God and world, eternity and time, infinity and finitude, being and becoming, the possible and the actual, the necessary and the contingent, etc., are not words of the same content and the same meaning. The world is of such a nature that our thinking cannot take from it the character of contingency. The thought of its non-existence includes not the least logical contradiction. There can be motives why God has called the world into being; the cosmos can in its whole and in each of its parts be embodiment of divine thoughts; but it is impossible to explain the origin of the world logically, without the will of an almighty God. And therefore alongside the actual there remains a domain for the possible. God is not absorbed in the world, eternity does not pour itself out empty into time, infinity is not identical with the sum of all the finite, omniscience does not coincide with the content of thought of rational creatures. And thus the omnipotence of God is still infinitely exalted above the unbounded power which comes to manifestation in the world. Cf. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. § 499 f. Dorner I 441 f. Ebrard § 179 f. Philippi II 3 59 f. Nietzsche, Ev. Dogm. S. 503-506. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I 2 249 f. Grétilat III 256 s. Hodge I 406 f. Shedd I 358 f.

§ 27. THE PERSONAL NAMES OF GOD.

1 . Higher still than in the essential names does God's revelation rise in the nomina personalia, which make known to us the distinctions that exist in the unity of his being. This revelation already begins in the O. Test. To be sure, it does not yet occur there in full, as the church fathers and later theologians have often taught with disregard of the historical character of revelation; but it is just as incorrect that it would not yet be found there at all, as after the Socinians and the Remonstrants, [228] was taught by Semler, Herder, Doederlein, Bretschneider, Dogm. I4 565 f. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis I2 90 f., and others, cf. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. II 687. The O. T. makes the trinitarian existence of God known only indistinctly; it is the charter of the becoming doctrine of the Trinity, Petavius, de trin. II c. 7. Lange, Dogm. II 124 f. 148 f. But it nevertheless contains, not only in a few texts standing by themselves but especially in the organism of its revelation, moments that are of the highest significance for the doctrine of the Trinity. First of all, the name Elohim comes into consideration. That this in its plural form is no proof for the Trinity was already remarked earlier, p. 104.

But it is nevertheless remarkable that this name, among the advocates of monotheism, has never met with objection on account of its form. This is to be explained only from the fact that it contains no reminiscence of polytheism, but designates the Godhead in its fullness and richness of life. The God of revelation is no abstract unity, but the living, true God, who in the infinite fullness of his life includes the highest diversity. Already immediately at the creation that comes out. Elohim creates by speaking and by sending out his Spirit. The word that God speaks is no sound, but a power, so great that by it he creates and sustains the world; he speaks and it is there, Gen. 1:3, Ps. 33:6, 9, 147:18, 148:8, Joël 2:11. That word spoken by God, proceeding from him and thus distinguished from him, is later hypostatized as wisdom in Job 28:23-27, Spr. 8:22 v. cf. Spr. 3:19, Jer. 10:12, 51:15. That wisdom is from eternity possessed by God, prepared, appointed, searched out, as his nursling and craftswoman, through whom he created and sustains all things. But not only through the word and wisdom, also through the Spirit of God does the work of creation and of preservation come to pass, Gen. 1:2, Ps. 33:6, 104:33, 139:7, Job 26:13, 27:3, 32:8, 33:4. Jes. 40:7, 13, 59:19. While the word is the mediator through which God calls all things into being, it is his Spirit through which he is immanent in all that is created, and makes it all living and adorns it. Thus, already according to the doctrine of the O. T., it comes out in creation that all things owe their origin and continuance to a threefold causa. Elohim and cosmos do not stand dualistically alongside one another, but the world, created by God, has his Word as objective, his Spirit as subjective principle. The world is first thought by God and therefore comes into being through his almighty speaking, and when it has received reality, it does not stand outside and over against him but continues to rest in his Spirit. Still more clearly in the

O. T. this threefold cause comes out on the terrain of special revelation, in the work of re-creation. Then it is no longer Elohim alone, but Jahveh, who reveals himself, who makes himself known as the God of the covenant and of the oath, of revelation and of history. But also as such he does not reveal himself directly and immediately, Ex. 33:20. It is again through his Word that he makes himself known and saves and preserves his people, Ps. 107:20. And bearer of that word of saving revelation is the Malak Ihvh, the Messenger of the Covenant. Not always, where the expression Angel of God or Angel of the Lord occurs in the O. T., is one to think of the angelus increatus, as Hengstenberg thought. In 2 Sam. 24:16v., 1 Kon. 19:5-7, 2 Kon. 19:35, Dan. 3:25, 28, 6:23, 10:13, we have to think of an ordinary angel, just as also in Mt. 1:20, 28, Luk. 1:11, 2:9, Hd. 5:19, 8:26, 10:3, 12:7, 23, 27:23, Jud. 9, Op. 12:7. About other places there can be doubt, such as Num. 22:22v., Jos. 5:13, 14, Richt. 2:1-14, 6:11-24, 13:2-23. But in the places named in part I 250, the subject that speaks and acts in the angel of the Lord rises far above a created angel. The church fathers before Augustine unanimously saw in this Angel of the Lord a theophany of the Logos, cf. the quotations in Trip, Die Theophanien in den Geschichtsbüchern des A. T. Leiden 1858 S. 20-41. Often, however, this view was connected with the opinion that the Father is actually invisible, unapproachable, ineffable, but that the Son can reveal himself and is the principle of all revelation; thus with Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Tertullian. But this separation and opposition between the Father and the Son was rightly contested by the later church fathers, Athanasius, the three Cappadocians, etc. The Son was true God and thus just as invisible as the Father. Thus the view of Augustine was prepared, who also always thought the theophanies of God in the O. T. to be mediated by created angels, de

trin. III 11, de civ. XVI c. 29. The scholastic and Roman theologians usually adopted this exegesis of Augustine, Thomas, S. Theol. [230] I qu. 51 art. 2 and 3 ad 5. I 2 qu. 98 art. 3. Sent. II dist. 8 qu. 1 art. 6. Petavius, de trin. VIII c. 2. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 784 f. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 245 etc. Luther and Calvin thought now of a created, then of the uncreated angel, Trip, 49-58; but the later Protest. interpreters understood those places mostly of the Logos, especially also in opposition to the Socinians, Remonstrants and Rationalists, who saw in them nothing but angelophanies. While Hofmann, Baumgarten, Delitzsch align themselves with the latter view, the old view has again been defended by Stier, Hengstenberg, Keil, Kurtz, Ebrard etc., also Philippi, Kirchl. Glaub. II 3 191-196. The difference between these two interpretations is not so great as it seems. The advocates of the old-church view must, after all, acknowledge that the Logos assumed a human form; and Augustine and his must concede that in that created angel the Logos revealed himself in an altogether special way, Rivetus in Trip 65. And in addition comes the fact that the places where the angel of the Lord is spoken of cannot all be understood in the same sense. So much then also stands firm, that in the Malak Ihvh, who preeminently bears that name, God and then specifically the Logos was present in an altogether unique way. That appears clearly from the fact that he, though distinguished from Jehovah, is nevertheless also one with him in name, in power, in redemption and blessing, in worship and honor, part I 250. Trip, t. a. p. 100 f. This exegesis is moreover recommended by the whole O. and N. T. Scripture, Job 33:23, Ps. 34:8, 35:5, Spr. 8:22v., 30:4, Jes. 9:5, Hos. 12:5, 6, Mich. 5:6, Zach. 1:8-14, 3:1v., 12:8, Mal. 3:1, Joh. 8:56, 58, cf. Joh. 1:1-5, 1 Cor. 10:4, 9; and Hd. 7:30, 35, 38, Gal. 3:19, Hebr. 2:2 are not in conflict with this. And just as Jahveh now in re-creation reveals himself objectively

through his word, in the Malak Ihvh; so he does this subjectively in and through his Spirit. The Spirit of God is the principle of all life and salvation, of all gifts and powers within the terrain of revelation; of courage, Richt. 3:10, 6:34, 11:29, 13:25, 1 Sam. 11:6, of bodily strength, Richt. 14:6, 15:14, of artistic skill, Ex. 28:3, 31:3-5, 35:31-35, 1 Chr. 28:12, of governmental policy, Num. 11:17, 25, 1 Sam. 16:13, of understanding and wisdom, Job 32:8, Jes. 11:2, of holiness and renewal, Ps. 51:13, Jes. 63:10, cf. Gen. 6:3, [231] Neh. 9:20, 1 Sam. 10:6, 9, of prophecy and prediction, Num. 11:25, 29, 24:2, 3, Mich. 3:8 etc. In a special measure he will rest upon the Messiah, Jes. 11:2, 42:1, 61:1, but thereafter also be poured out over all flesh, Joel 3:1, 2, Jes. 32:15, 44:3, Ezech. 36:26, 27, 39:29, Zach. 12:10 and give all a new heart and a new spirit, Ezech. 36:26, 27. On the H. Spirit in the O. T.: Kleinert, zur altt. Lehre vom Geiste Gottes, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1867 S. 3-60. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. 2 178 f. 214 f. Smend, Alt. Religionsgesch. 459 f. Warfield, The Spirit of God in the Old Test., Presb. and Ref. Rev. Oct. 1895 p. 665-687. This threefold divine principle, which underlies creation and re-creation, and bears the whole economy of O. T. revelation, is now a few times also mentioned together. The threefold repetitions in Dan. 9:19, Zach. 1:3, Jes. 6:3, 33:22 do not come into consideration for this; only the high-priestly prayer of blessing, Num. 6:24-26, in the threefold character of its blessing points back to a threefold revelation of God and is thus the O. T. example of the apostolic blessing, 2 Cor. 13:13. The plural forms in Gen. 1:26, 27, 3:22, Jes. 6:8 etc. lack sufficient force, because they are to be explained in the same way as the pluralis Elohim, cf. above p. 104. Of more significance are places such as Gen. 19:24, Ps. 45:8, 110:1, Hos. 1:7, because they point to a self-distinction in the divine being. And most clearly a threefold self-distinction in the divine being is indicated in Ps.

33:6, Jes. 61:1, 63:9-12, Hagg. 2:5, 6. Many formerly also saw in the three men who appeared to Abraham, Gen. 18, a revelation of the Trinity, e.g. Witsius, Oec. foed. IV 3 § 3-8. Others thought that one of the three was the Logos and the other two were ordinary angels, e.g. Calvin, Kantt. Statenvert., Moor I 807. Much more plausible, however, is the exegesis of Augustine, de civ. XVI 29, according to whom the three men were three created angels, in whom Jahveh, however, revealed himself and was present in a special way. Literature on the Trinity in the O. T. in M. Vitranga I 213 sq. 218 sq.

2. These thoughts of the O. T. have been fruitful in many directions. In the first place they were taken over and further elaborated in the apocryphal literature. In the Proverbs of Jesus Sirach [232] wisdom occupies a broad place. She is from God and before all things created by Him, and she remains with Him unto eternity. She is spread out over all God's works, but nevertheless has her resting-place especially in Zion and is to be found in the law, c. 1:1-40 and cap. 24, cf. also Baruch, c. 3:9-4:4. But the book of Wisdom goes further, 6:22-9. Here wisdom is so hypostatized that her Divine attributes and works are ascribed to her. She is clearly distinguished from God, for she is the breath of his power, an effluence of his glory, a radiance of his light, 7:25, 26. But she is also most intimately connected with God, lives together with Him, is initiated into his knowledge and selects those ideas which will be carried out, 8:3, 4. She is the *παρεδρος* on his throne, knows all his works and was present at the creation of the world, 9:4, 9. Yes, she is herself the one who creates and governs and renews all things, 7:27, 8:1, 5. She is identical with God's Word, 9:1, 2, cf. 16:12, 18:15, 16 and with his Spirit, 1:4-7, 9:17, 12:1. Already in this book of Wisdom the influence of Greek philosophy is noticeable, especially 7:22v.,

but much stronger is this the case with Philo. The relation of God to the world had already been investigated by Plato. From the distinction and opposition of *δοξα* and *ἐπιστημη* Plato inferred that, just as the former must have a sensible object in reality, so the latter must have as its object an eternal and unchangeable being, i.e. an idea. These ideas, although actually nothing other than general concepts, were by Plato elevated to metaphysical principia, to proper substances, to a kind of intermediate beings, according to which the *δημιουργος* formed the cosmos and which therefore are the *παραδειγματα* and the *αἰτίαι* of things. Although Aristotle subjected this doctrine of ideas to a sharp criticism, yet the thought that an intelligent, spiritual principle lay at the basis of all things has no longer been lost from Greek philosophy. The Stoa in particular laid emphasis on the fact that a Divine reason was the ground of all phenomena. For that it employed the name *λογος σπερματικός*, because all being and life germinates from that *logos* as from a seed, and it also sometimes spoke in the plural of *λογοι σπερματικοι*, in order thereby, alongside the unity, also to indicate the diversity of the all-creating natural force, Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* IV3 159, 160, cf. 140 note. Even the later so very significant [233] distinction of *λογος ενδιαθετος* and *προφορικός* is borrowed from the Stoa, ib. 67 note. This Greek doctrine of the idea, the *νοῦς* and the *λογος* had now already before Philo been brought into connection with the doctrine of the O. T. concerning the word and wisdom, Zeller, ib. V 266. But nevertheless it was especially Philo who fused all these different elements, Platonic doctrine of ideas, Stoic doctrine of the *logos*, O. T. wisdom-doctrine etc. into one system. In doing so he proceeds from the dualism of God and world. God is *αποιος*, indescribable; we can only say that He is, not what He is. Therefore He also cannot stand in immediate contact with matter. Before God created

the sensible world, He made a plan and in his thinking formed the *κοσμος νοητος*, the ideas, as *παραδειγματα* and *δυναμεις* of all things. These ideas are now represented by Philo as the powers by which God can work in the world, and now more than less figuratively, now more than less personally described as servants, governors, envoys, mediators, as *λογοι* and powers, as bonds and pillars, which by Moses were called angels and by the Greeks *daemonen*, as thoughts which are found in the Divine thinking and are uncreated and infinite as God himself. These ideas are now also many in number, but they find their unity in the *logos*, the idea that is all ideas, the power that is all powers, the book that contains all thoughts within itself, the *κοσμος νοητος* itself. And in the same way as the Divine ideas, so also this *logos* is described, now once more as an attribute of God and one with his wisdom and then more as a being, distinguished from God. He stands, as it were, between God and world and has part in both; he is not uncreated as God and yet also not created as the finite things; he is substitute, envoy, interpreter, governor, angel, instrument, image, shadow of God, indeed his firstborn son, his oldest son in distinction from the world which is his youngest son; Philo even calls him God, but *δευτερος θεος*. Zeller brings clearly to light that the *logos* in Philo, like the Divine ideas, bears and must bear this double character. He is an intermediate and therefore a double being, an attribute of God and yet a person, neither identical with God nor also a creature like the world, an idea in the thinking of God and a power in the world, hovering back and forth between an impersonal attribute [234] and a personal subsistence, but for that very reason deemed suitable as mediator between God and the world, cf. Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* V3 370-386, and litt. on Philo there 338, in addition also Max Heinze, *Die Lehre v. Logos in der gr. Philos.* 1872. Schürer, *Neut. Zeitgesch.* 653 f. Meijer-

Weiss, Ev. Joh. 6e Aufl. S. 52 f. Jean Réville, La doctrine du Logos, Paris 1881. Kuenen, Volksgods. en wereldgods. 163 v. Weiszäcker, Das apost. Zeitalter der chr. Kirche 1890 S. 549 f. Hatch, Griechentum and Christentum 1892 S. 129 f. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 4 S. 552 f. Kaftan, Das Verhältniss des evang. Glaubens zur Logoslehre (Gottschick, Zeits. f. Th. u. K. VII 1897 1es Heft S. 1-27) Anathon Aall, Geschichte der Logosidee in der griech. Philosophie. Leipzig Reisland 1896. Theol. Stud. v. Dr. Danbanton, XI 1893 2e aflev. In Jewish theology this doctrine of intermediate beings has been developed still further. As completely transcendent God cannot enter into immediate connection with the creatures. For that He has need of all kinds of intermediate beings. If He wishes to do nothing other than guide the powers present in nature and humanity, then He makes use of angels. But if He wishes to work creatively or re-creatively in the world, hypostases appear which, although being creatures, nevertheless bear Divine attributes, because they are representatives of God. Such hypostases are Metraton, the μεταθρονος of God; Memra, the word of God; Schechina, the presence of God's glory; Bath Kol, the voice of God, which gives revelations and proclaims oracles; Ruach hakkodesch, the spirit that proceeds from God and communicates higher knowledge, Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, I 265 f. II 393 f. etc. Weber, System der altsyn. paläst. Theol. 172-189. Herzog 2, 230 f., 13, 458 f.

3. Although the Proverbs of Jesus Sirach still fairly closely connect with the canonical literature, in the book of Wisdom, in Philo, and in Jewish theology an influence of philosophy is to be perceived, which causes the thoughts of the O. T. to stray farther and farther away. In the first place there is a difference in principle. The doctrine of intermediate beings in

Philo and the later Jewish theology was born out of the Platonic antithesis of God and world, of which in the O. Test. books not a trace is yet to be observed. The word and the wisdom are in the O. T. [235] not mediating intermediate beings between God and world, but they stand wholly and entirely on the side of God, belong to Him, and are the principia of the created world. In Philo, however, the intermediate beings take an impossible place: are neither God nor creature, neither person nor attribute, neither substance nor power, but partake of both; they erase the boundary line, which in the O. T. always separates the creature from the Creator and prepare the philosophy of Gnosticism and the Kabbalah. In the second place there is a no less great difference in the character, which the doctrine of the word and the wisdom in Scripture and that the doctrine of the intermediate beings in Philo bears. In Philo the logos in its first meaning is equal to reason, thinking, the thought in God and thus as such immanent in God, nothing but an attribute. Only in its second meaning does that logos become word, which proceeds from God and occupies a mediating place between God and world. In the O. Test., however, the word is not first reason and thought of God, much less an ideal world-image, a *κοσμος νοητος*, but the spoken word, by which He creates and sustains all things. And also the wisdom in Job and Proverbs is presented not as an attribute of God, but personally as possessed and ordained by God from eternity and, at the creation of all things, consulted and searched out. Third, the intermediate beings in Philo and the Jewish theologians have no soteriological significance. Indeed they serve for illumination and for communication of knowledge, but of a connection between those intermediate beings and the Messiah there is no mention. They even push the doctrine of the Messiah as revelation of the truth and as acquirer of salvation into the background. And

now it is indeed true, that also in the O. T. the connection between word and wisdom, servant of God and Messiah, Malak Ihvh and Davidide, is not yet clearly effected. The lines still run alongside one another. But they nevertheless approach each other. Elohim and Jahveh is the same God. He, who as Elohim by Word and Spirit creates and sustains the world, is also He who as Jahveh by his Malak has led Israel, by the servant of Jahveh will save his people and by the Messiah from David's house will reign over them eternally and will renew and sanctify them all by his Spirit. And these lines, which in the O. T. more and more approach one another [236] run out upon Him, who is the Logos, the prophet, priest and king, in whom God comes to his people and dwells among them eternally. For Philo an incarnation of the logos would have been an absurd thought. In the N. Test. this is precisely the highest revelation of God. Finally it can still be added here, that the doctrine of intermediate beings in Philo etc. is not worked out and has no boundary. Philo does indeed bring some unity into the Divine ideas by summarizing them in the logos, but the same that he says of this one, he also repeatedly says of all Divine ideas. In Jewish theology the number of intermediate beings increases more and more. It is an emanation, as with the aeons in Gnosticism. The dualism avenges itself to the very end. The intermediate beings bring no communion between God and world into being, because they in fact are neither of the two. The world nevertheless always again remains outside and over against God. The significance of the Spirit of God is not seen. In the O. T. this doctrine of the Spirit occupies a great place. In the apocryphal literature, in Philo and in Jewish theology it is almost wholly neglected. The Spirit is at most only still a Spirit of prediction, bestowed on a few, Zeller, V 384, Weber, 184 f., but no longer the Spirit of the O. Test., who concludes and completes creation and re-

creation. For all these reasons there is a principal distinction between the development, which the trinitarian thoughts of the O. T. have found in the apocryphal literature, in Philo and the Jews, and that which has been given to them in the N. Test. The N. Test. may have some words in common with Philo etc. and also speak of Christ as λογος, εικων, απανγασμα, υιος, θεος etc.; the agreement does not go further. The N. T. is written in Greek, in the κοινή διαλεκτος, in the language that existed and was spoken everywhere. It created no new language. The thoughts of God have assumed the σαρξ of human language. But into those words God has placed a new content. There is agreement in form, the content differs. Philo and John have no more than the name of Logos in common. More and more this is seen and acknowledged, Harnack, Dogmengesch. I2 85, 99. Trip, Die Theophanien des A. T. 126-129. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi I2 30 f. Godet, Comm. sur l'Evang. de Saint Jean I2 p. 212-221. Meijer-Weiss, Komm. über das Ev. [237] des Joh. 6e Aufl. S. 50 f. Weiss, Bibl. Theol. des N. T. 3te Aufl. S. 624. Orr, Christian View of God and the world 510-512. Cremer, Wörterbuch der neut. Gräcität s. v. λογος. Cf. also Max Müller, Theosophie oder Psychol. Religion, Leipzig Engelmann 1895, 12te Vorlesung.

4. The N. Test. contains the pure development of the trinitarian thoughts of the O. T. But now these come to stand in a much clearer light, not through abstract reasonings about the essence of God, but through the self-revelation of God in appearance, word, and deed. Just as strongly as in the O., the unity of God is expressed in the N. Test. There is only one being that can be called God, θεος, Elohim, Joh. 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:4, but this one, true God reveals himself in the economy of the N. T., specifically in the facts of incarnation and outpouring, as Father, Son, and Spirit. In those facts no

absolutely new principia emerge. They are the same ones that were also active in creation and in the economy of the O. T. The Father, who bears this name mostly in relation to the Son and to his children, is the same one who can also be called Father as Creator of all things, Mt. 7:11, Luk. 3:38, Joh. 4:21, Hd. 17:28, 1 Cor. 8:6, Hebr. 12:9; all things are from him, 1 Cor. 8:6. The Son, who is thus named especially in his wholly unique relation to God, is the same one who as Logos with the Father created all things, Joh. 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:15-17, Hebr. 1:3. And the Holy Spirit, who has received his name especially with a view to his work in the church, is the same one who with Father and Spirit in creation adorns and completes all things, Mt. 1:18, 4:1, Mr. 1:12, Luk. 1:35, 4:1, 14, Rom. 1:4. Further, it is the general doctrine of the N. T. writers that these three, Father, Son, and Spirit, are no others than those who also in the economy of the O. T. have revealed themselves to the fathers in word and deed, in prophecy and miracle. The Oldtest. name Jahveh, inadequately rendered by κυριος, unfolds its content fully in the N. T. name πατηρ, above bl. 113. In the incarnate Son of God the fulfillment is seen of all O. T. prophecy and shadow, of prophet and king, of priest and offering, of servant of God and Davidide, of Malak Ihvh and wisdom. And in the outpouring of the H. Spirit there has come to [238] pass what the O. T. had promised, Hand. 2:16v. But the N. T., although connecting itself with the O. T., does not stop there; it goes far above it. Much more clearly than in the O. T. it now comes to light that the God of the Covenant is and must be a triune God, that a threefold principle appears in the work of salvation. Not a few texts, but the whole N. Test. is trinitarian in this sense. All salvation and blessing and blessedness has its threefold cause in God, Father, Son, and Spirit. We see these three immediately appear at the birth of Jesus, Mt. 1:18v., Luk. 1:35

and at his baptism, Mt. 3:16, 17, Mk. 1:10, 11, Luk. 3:21, 22. Jesus' instruction is wholly trinitarian. He declares the Father to us and describes him as Spirit, who has life from himself, Joh. 4:24, 5:26, and in a wholly unique sense is his Father, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 2:16, 5:17. He distinguishes himself from the Father, but is nevertheless his only-begotten, own, beloved Son, Mt. 11:27, 21:37-39, Joh. 3:16 etc., one with him in life, glory, power, Joh. 1:14, 5:26, 10:30. And he speaks of the H. Spirit, who himself leads and equips him, Mk. 1:12, Luk. 4:1, 14, Joh. 3:34, as of another Paraclete, whom he will send from the Father, Joh. 15:26 and who will convict, teach, lead into the truth, comfort, and remain forever, Joh. 14:16. And before he departs, Jesus draws all this together in το ὄνομα του πατρος και του υιου και του ἁγίου πνευματος, i.e. in the one Divine name, το ὄνομα in sing., in which nevertheless three distinct subjects, ὁ πατηρ, ὁ υἱος and το πνευμα, all intentionally named with the article, reveal themselves. This instruction is continued and expanded by the apostles; all know and extol a threefold, Divine cause of salvation. The good pleasure, the foreknowledge, the election, the power, the love, the kingdom is the Father's, Mt. 6:13, 11:26, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 8:29, Ef. 1:9, 1 Petr. 1:2 etc. The mediatorship, the reconciliation, the salvation, the grace, the wisdom, the righteousness is the Son's, Mt. 1:21, 1 Cor. 1:30, Ef. 1:10, 1 Tim. 2:5, 1 Petr. 1:2, 1 Joh. 2:2 etc. And the regeneration, renewal, sanctification, communion is the H. Spirit's, Joh. 3:5, Joh. 14-16, Rom. 5:5, 8:15, 14:17, 2 Cor. 1:21, 22, 1 Petr. 1:2, 1 Joh. 5:6 etc. And just as Jesus finally sums up his instruction in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the H. Spirit, so also the apostles repeatedly place these three alongside [239] one another and on one line, 1 Cor. 8:6, 12:4-6, 2 Cor. 13:13, 1 Petr. 1:2, 1 Joh. 5:4-6, Openb. 1:4-6. Cf. on the Trinity in the N. T. Baur, Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes I 80 f. Hahn, Theol.

des N. T. I 106 f. Philippi, kirchl. Gl. II 200 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 331 f. Sartorius, Christi Person u. Werk I 3 44 f. Beck, Chr. Gl. II 40 f. etc. Also Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. II 37 acknowledges that the trinitarian doctrine of God is rooted in Scripture, cf. Strauss I 409-425. Lipsius, Dogm. § 241, 242. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 426. The text 1 Joh. 5:7 has not been mentioned above because of its doubtful authenticity. It is lacking in all Greek codices, except in a couple from the 16th century; in all Latin codices before the 8th century; in almost all translations. Further, it is never cited by the Greek fathers, not even in the Arian struggle, and likewise not by the Lat. fathers, Hilar. Ambros. Hieron. August, etc. If it is cited or presupposed in Tert., then it existed $\pm$ 190. If in Cyprian, then it was known $\pm$ 220. If it occurred in the Afra, according to an H. S. from the 5th and one from the 7th century, then one can still ascend somewhat higher. The Afra arose $\pm$ 160 in Africa and came $\pm$ 250 to Italy. Certainly the text occurs in Vigilius, end of the 5th century. In the 16th century it was included in the Compl. edition, Erasmus 3rd ed., Stephanus, Beza, textus receptus. In the context it is not required. Explanation of the omission and disappearance is very difficult. The authenticity, however, is still defended by some, e.g. W. Koelling, Die Echtheit von 1 Joh. 5:7. Breslau 1893.

5. Holy Scripture, however, does not stop with these data; it offers still more and also makes us acquainted with something of the relations in which these three distinct subjects, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, stand to one another. For that, the name Father first of all comes into consideration. This name, in the most general sense, denotes God as Creator of all his works, in particular of man, Num. 16:22, Mt. 7:11, Luk. 3:28, Joh. 4:21, Hd. 17:28, 1 Cor. 8:6, Ef. 3:15, Hebr. 12:9. In the O. Test. this name acquires a theocratic significance; God is the Father of Israel, because He

created and preserved it by his wondrous power, Deut. 32:6, Jes. 63:16, 64:8, Mal. 1:6, 2:10, Jer. 3:19, 31:9, Ps. 103:13, Rom. 9:4; in the N. T. this significance [240] passes over into the ethical, in which God is the Father of his children, Mt. 6:4, 8, 9, Rom. 8:15 etc. But in an altogether unique, metaphysical sense God is Father of the Son. Jesus always makes an essential distinction between the relation in which He himself and in which others, the Jews, the disciples, stand to the Father, Mt. 11:25-27, Luk. 22:29, Joh. 2:16, 5:17, 20:17 etc. He called God his own Father, πατέρα ἰδίον, Joh. 5:18. And Scripture clearly indicates that the name Father does not in the first place apply to God in relation to Israel and the believers, but on the contrary originally to the relation of the Father to the Son, Joh. 14:6-13, 17:26. God is, in the proper, original sense, Father of the Son, He loves the Son, Joh. 5:19v., 10:17, 17:24, 26, and this love passes from the Father through the Son over to others, Joh. 16:27, 17:26. This relation of the Father to the Son did not come to be in time but it is from eternity, Joh. 1:14, 8:38, 17:5, 24. And therefore God is by the apostles repeatedly in a special sense called the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Rom. 15:6, 1 Cor. 15:24, 2 Cor. 1:3, Gal. 1:1, Ef. 1:3 etc. The fatherhood of the Son is his special, personal property. He alone is from himself, the first in the order of existence, Joh. 5:26, and therefore also the Father both in creation and re-creation, from whom all things are, 1 Cor. 8:6. Thus in Old as in New Testament it is the Father who occupies the first place. His is the counsel, Hd. 4:28, Ef. 1:11, the good pleasure, Mt. 11:26, Ef. 1:9, the initiative in creation and redemption, Ps. 33:6, Joh. 3:16, the ἐξουσία and the δύναμις, Mt. 6:13, Rom. 1:20, Ef. 1:19, the righteousness, Gen. 18:25, Deut. 32:4, Joh. 17:25, Rom. 3:26, 2 Tim. 4:8, the goodness, the wisdom, the immortality, the inaccessible light, Mt. 19:17, Rom. 16:27, 1 Tim. 6:16. Therefore he also

repeatedly bears the name of God in a special sense. He is Elohim, Jahveh Elohim, El Eljon, El Schaddai, μονος ἀληθινος θεος, Joh. 17:3, εἰς θεος, 1 Cor. 8:6, 1 Tim. 2:5, who is named as God and Father alongside the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:6, 2 Cor. 13:13, 1 Thess.f 1:3, Op. 1:6. Indeed Christ calls Him not only his Father but also his God, Mt. 27:46, Joh. 20:17, Hebr. 1:9, 2:17, 5:1, 10:7, 9, and He himself is called the Christ of God, Luk. 9:20, 1 Cor. 3:23, Op. 12:10. Yet from this it has wrongly been inferred by [241] the Arians of earlier and later time, that only the Father is God, and that Son and Spirit, though related to God, nevertheless stand outside the divine essence. For, in the first place, Scripture, as will appear more fully presently, ascribes to Son and Spirit divine names, attributes, works, and honor just as well as to the Father. And, further, it deserves notice that Scripture nowhere says that the Father alone is the true God, but indeed that the Father is the only true God, something which is fully acknowledged in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity. Next, all those passages make no contrast between the Father on the one hand and the Son and the Spirit on the other, but between the Father, as the only God, and the gods of the heathen. Then from the statements that the Father is the only true God, only wise, only good, only immortal, it by no means follows that the Son and the Spirit are not also of the same divine essence and partake of that same unity, wisdom, goodness, and immortality, any more than from 1 Cor. 8:6 it follows that only Christ and not God is our Lord, through whom all things are and we through Him. And finally the Father can therefore be called only wise, only good, etc., because He possesses everything from himself, is πηγη θεοτητος, whereas Son and Spirit possess the same essence and the same attributes by communication. The name of God, ascribed to the Father in particular, indicates that He is

the first in the divine economy; it is, as it were, an official name, indication of his rank and place, just as among men, who all partake of the same nature, there is nevertheless also distinction of station and of honor, August, de trin. I c. 6. VI c. 9. Petavius, de trin. II c. 4. III c 1. 2. Mastricht, Theol. theor. pract. II c. 25.

6. Further, light is also shed for us on the immanent relations of God by the names which the Son bears in Scripture. These names are very many in number, refer mostly to his historical appearance, and therefore come up later in the locus de Christo. But there are also among them those which belong to Him prior to and abstracted from his incarnation. First of all, the name Logos comes into consideration. Various reasons have been given why Christ bears this name. The word has been translated by ratio, sermo, verbum, and then again understood as verbum [242] interius or exterius, Petavius, de trin. VI c. 1. The point of departure for the designation, however, undoubtedly lies in the continuous doctrine of Scripture, that God reveals himself in creation and re-creation through the word. Through the word God creates, sustains, and governs all things, and through the word He also renews and re-creates the world. The gospel is therefore also called the word of God, λογος του θεου. John calls Christ the Logos, because He is the one in and through whom God reveals himself, both in creation and in re-creation, Joh. 1:3, 14. In the Old Testament, however, the word through which God reveals himself first appears at the creation. The hypostasis and the eternal existence of that word is not expressed. In Proverbs 8 wisdom is indeed presented as personal and eternal, but also brought into close connection with the creation; with a view to this it is prepared, appointed, searched out by God, vs. 22, 23. The Arians inferred from the קִנְיָ of vs. 22, LXX εκτισε με, Syr. Trg. בְּרֵאשִׁי, cf. Sirach 1:4, 9, 24:8, that the Son was not

eternally generated but was created before all things. And the church fathers maintained over against that that קִנְיָ had to be rendered by ἔκτησατο, Aq. Symm., or possedit, Hieron., or that this word did not refer to the essence of the Son but to his office and dignity in creation and re-creation. Without doubt the latter is the case. There is here no question of an eternal generation, but it is only said that God prepared wisdom, קִנְיָ, and appointed it, נִסְכָּתִי, that it was born, הִלָּלְתִּי, before and with a view to the creation, Petavius, de trin. II c. 1. But the N. Testament goes far above this. John says not only that He, in and through whom God reveals himself, is a person, but he declares expressly that this Logos was in the beginning, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λογος. He did not become Logos, He was not first prepared and appointed to it at the creation; He was as person and by nature Logos, Logos from eternity. And further, He himself was θεος, He stood in communion with God, ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ προς τον θεον vs. 2, εἰς τον κολπον του πατρος, vs. 18, object of his eternal love and self-communication, 5:26, 17:24. Therefore He could also reveal the Father perfectly, because He partook of his Divine nature, his Divine life, his Divine love, etc., from eternity and was by nature Logos. God communicated himself to Him, therefore He can communicate God to us. The Logos is the absolute [243] revelation of God, for God has communicated himself with all his fullness to Him eternally.

Another name is that of Son of God. In the O. Test. this name usually has theocratic significance. Israel is so called, because it has been chosen, called, adopted by God, Ex. 4:22, 19:5, Deut. 1:31, 8:5, 14:1, 32:6, 18, Jes. 63:8, Jer. 31:9, 20, Hos. 11:1, Mal. 1:6, 2:10. In the N. Test. the church takes its place, which consists of υἱοι θεου by adoption or τεκνα θεου by birth. Specifically, the title Son of God is also very often an official name, for the judges Ps. 82:6, for the angels, Job 38:7, and especially also for the

king, 2 Sam. 7:11-14, Ps. 89:27, 28. In Psalm 2:7 Jahveh says to the King anointed over Zion: בְּנִי אֶתָּה, אֲנִי הַיּוֹם יִלְדֶּתִיךָ, LXX γεγεννηκα σε, Vulg. genui te; on the day when the Lord anointed Him and appointed Him as king, He generated Him as Son and gave Him the right to world dominion. With respect to David this refers back to the decree of God in 2 Sam. 7, and with respect to the Messiah prefigured by David it is in Hebr. 1:5, 5:5 explained of eternity, cf. vs. 2, 3, in which Christ as the Son has been generated by the Father, i.e. in which He has been brought forth as the radiance of God's glory and the expressed image of his substance. And that He was this has now, according to Hd. 13:33, Rom. 1:3, been powerfully proved in the resurrection. In Micah 5:1 a related thought is expressed. The Ruler over Israel, who will once come forth out of the small Bethlehem, already exists from of old. His goings forth as Ruler, from God, are already from the days of eternity. He was Ruler from eternity, He has shown this in the history of Israel and thus He will once appear visibly out of Bethlehem. The designation Son of God, applied to the Messiah, undoubtedly proceeds from the theocratic significance of this expression in the O. Testament. It is not probable that the demoniacs, Mt. 8:29, cf. 4:3, the Jews, Mt. 27:40, the High Priest, Mt. 26:63, or even the disciples at least in the first period, Joh. 1:50, 11:27, Mt. 16:16, have understood the full content of this designation. But in Christ this name nevertheless receives a much deeper significance. To be sure, He is now and then called, as mediator and king, God's Son in the theocratic sense, Luk. 1:35, although even then the [244] adoptionist conception, that he according to his Divine nature is Son by generation and according to his human nature by adoption, as was asserted by the Socinians, Remonstr. Conf. art. 3. Apol. Conf. art. 3. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 17, 10. B. S. Cremer, cf. Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. v. Ned. VIII 419-

428, Calv. Inst. II 14. 6. Moor, I 755 sq. etc., finds no support in Scripture. But Christ was not first adopted as Son of God as a king under Israel in time. He is not called God's Son on account of his supernatural birth, as the Socinians taught and Hofmann, Schriftbeweis I 116 f. still tries to argue. Nor does He bear that name in an ethical sense, as many think, Weiss, Bibl. Theol. § 17. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 2 97. Scholten, L. H. K. II 206 e. a. Nor did He first become it through his mediatorship and his resurrection, for which one appeals to Joh. 10:34-36, Hand. 13:32, 33, Rom. 1:4. But He is Son of God in the metaphysical sense, by nature and from eternity. He is highly exalted above angels and prophets, Mt. 13:32, 21:27, 22:2, and stands in an entirely unique relation to God, Mt. 11:27. He is the beloved Son, in whom the Father has his good pleasure, Mt. 3:17, 17:5, Mark. 1:11, 9:7, Luk. 3:22, 9:35, the only-begotten Son, Joh. 1:18, 3:16, 1 Joh. 4:9 v., the own Son, Rom. 8:32, the eternal Son, Joh. 17:5, 24, Hebr. 1:5, 5:5, to whom the Father gave ζῶν ἐχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, Joh. 5:26, who is like the Father in knowledge, Mt. 11:27, in honor, Joh. 5:23, in power in creation and re-creation, Joh. 1:3, 5:21, 27, in activity, Joh. 10:30, in dominion, Mt. 11:27, Luk. 10:22, 22:29, Joh. 16:15, 17:10, and precisely on account of this his Sonship has been condemned to death, Joh. 10:33, Mt. 26:63 v.

In the third place, the name Image of God is also discussed here. The human being can indeed be so called by analogy, but Christ is so in the absolute sense. He was, before his incarnation, as Logos, as Son, Rom. 1:3, 4, 8:3, Gal. 4:4, ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ, Phil. 2:6, rich, 2 Cor. 8:9, clothed with glory, Joh. 17:5, and has now returned into that through his resurrection and ascension. Thus He was and is still εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, Col. 1:15, 2 Cor. 4:4, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, Hebr. 1:3, i.e. not the radiance itself, ἀπαύγασμος, but the image effected or

arisen through radiance, [245] reflection, ἀπαύγασμα, of God's glory and the expression, the imprint of the self-subsistence, of the being of the Father. As such He is πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως, Col. 1:15, Op. 1:14, the firstborn in comparison with all creature and thus existing before all creature and not, like the creatures, made or created, πρωτοκτιστος, πρωτοπλαστος, but begotten, πρωτοτοκος, in whom all things were created, ἐκτισθη; and He is at the same time ἀρχη, πρωτοτοκος ἐκ των νεκρων, ἐν πασιν πρωτευων, Col. 1:18, πρωτοτοκος ἐν πολλοις ἀδελφοις, Rom. 8:29, after whose image the believers are renewed, 2 Cor. 3:18, Phil. 3:21. The expression πρωτοτοκος does not include Christ among the creatures but precisely excludes Him from them. He stood, as only- and firstborn, as Son and Logos, as adequate image of God, to the Father from eternity in an entirely unique relation. And indeed Christ is now presented as Mediator as dependent on the Father and standing under the Father, so that He is one sent, a servant, a fulfiller of the work of the Father, obedient unto death and once handing over his kingdom to the Father, but never is his unity of essence thereby impaired. In Joh. 14:28 Jesus says that his going to the Father is for the disciples a cause of joy, ὅτι ὁ πατηρ μείζων μου ἐστίν. Thereby He does not express that the Father is greater in power, which is expressly contradicted by Joh. 10:28-30; but He thinks of the relation in which He now, in his humiliation, stands to the Father. Now this one is greater. But this lesser greatness of Jesus will precisely cease when He goes to the Father, and therefore his disciples can rejoice over his going; He is precisely in essence and nature equal to the Father, although now in office and station less than the Father. He is no creature, but was and is and remains God, above all to be praised unto eternity, Joh. 1:1, 20:28, Rom. 9:5, Hebr. 1:8, 9, 2 Petr. 3:18, 1 Joh. 5:20, Openb. 1:8, 11, cf. also perhaps 2

Thess. 1:12, Tit. 2:13, 2 Petr. 1:1. The attempt, already formerly employed by the Socinians and now by Ritschl, Schultz, Kaftan, Pfleiderer et al., to construe the name θεός, used of Christ, not as a name of essence but as a name of office, requires later, in the doctrine concerning Christ, broader discussion. For the present let it only be remarked that this designation in the case of Christ is untrue if He [246] is not really also partaker of the Divine nature, Lipsius, Theol. Jahresbericht X 378.

7. Finally, Holy Scripture also gives us some insight into the immanent relations of God through the name of the Holy Spirit. In advance it deserves remark, that the doctrine of the H. Spirit is the same through all the Scriptures of Old and New Covenant. Although revealed much more clearly in the N. Test., it is in principle also present in the O. T. The N. T. is conscious of giving no other doctrine of the Spirit than that which was found in the O. T.; it was the same H. Spirit, who formerly spoke through the prophets, Mt. 22:43, Mk. 12:36, Hd. 1:16, 28:25, Hebr. 3:7, 10:15, 1 Petr. 1:11, 2 Petr. 1:21, testified in Noah's days, 1 Petr. 3:19, was resisted by Israel, Hd. 7:51, worked faith, 2 Cor. 4:13, who would descend upon the Messiah and dwell in the church, Mt. 12:18, Luk. 4:18, 19, Hd. 2:16. Although now the Divine being is Spirit, Joh. 4:24, and is holy, Jes. 6:3, yet the Holy Spirit in Scripture is a designation of a particular person in the Divine being, distinct from Father and Son. He bears this name on account of his particular *modus subsistendi*. Spirit properly means wind, breath. The H. Spirit is the breath of the Almighty, Job 33:4, the Spirit of his mouth, Ps. 33:6, who is compared by Jesus with the wind, Joh. 3:8 and is breathed upon his disciples, Joh. 20:22, cf. 2 Thess. 2:18. The Spirit is God as the immanent principle of life in all that is created. And he is called holy, because he himself stands in a particular relation to God and places all

things in a particular relation to God. He is not the spirit of a man, of a creature, but the Spirit of God, the Holy Spirit, Ps. 51:13, Jes. 63:10, 11. As the breath from our mouth, so the Spirit proceeds from God and keeps every creature alive. Therefore he is called the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of the Father, Gen. 1:2, Jes. 11:2, Mt. 10:20, and also the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of the Son, Rom. 8:2, 9, 1 Cor. 2:6, 2 Cor. 3:17, 18, Phil. 1:19, Gal. 3:2, 4:6, 1 Petr. 1:11, standing before the throne of God and of the Lamb, Op. 1:4, 3:1, 4:5, 5:6. This procession of the Spirit is indicated in Scripture by different names. Most often it is expressed thus, that the Spirit is given by God or by Christ, Num. 11:29, [247] Neh. 9:20, Jes. 42:1, Ezech. 36:27, Joh. 3:34, 1 Joh. 3:24, 4:13, sent or sent forth, Ps. 104:30, Joh. 14:26, 15:26, 16:7, Gal. 4:6, Op. 5:6, poured out or poured forth, Jes. 32:15, 44:3, Joel 2:28, Zach. 12:10, Hd. 2:17, 18, descended from God, Mt. 3:16, placed in the midst of Israel, Jes. 63:11, Hagg. 2:6, laid upon someone, Mt. 12:18, breathed upon someone, Joh. 20:22 etc. But it is also said that the Spirit proceeds, ἔκπορευεται παρα τοῦ πατρὸς, Joh. 15:26. This took place specifically on the day of Pentecost. Therefore the personality of the H. Spirit also now first clearly comes forward. In the O. Test. there is indeed a distinction between God and his Spirit. But the nature of that distinction remains obscure. Οἶπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐδέπω ἔδοξασθη, Joh. 7:39. But now he is spoken of as of a person. He is designated as ἐκεῖνος, Joh. 15:26, 16:13, 14, παρακλητος, Joh. 15:26, cf. 1 Joh. 2:1, ἄλλος παρακλητος, Joh. 14:16, who speaks of himself in the first person, Hd. 13:2, to whom all kinds of personal faculties and activities are ascribed, such as searching, 1 Cor. 2:10, 11, judging, Hd. 15:28, hearing, Joh. 16:13, speaking, Hd. 13:2, Op. 2:7 etc. 14:13, 22:17, willing, 1 Cor. 12:11, teaching, Joh. 14:26, praying, Rom. 8:27, testifying, Joh. 15:26, etc.

and who is coordinated with Father and Son and is placed on one line, Mt. 28:19, 1 Cor. 12:4-6, 2 Cor. 13:13, Op. 1:4. This now cannot be, unless he is also true God. As his personality, so also the deity of the H. Spirit first clearly comes to light in the N. T. It appears first of all from this, that in spite of the distinction which exists between God and his Spirit, it is nevertheless completely the same, whether God or his Spirit says something, dwells in us, is despised by us, Jes. 6:9 and Hd. 28:25, Jer. 31:31 and Hebr. 10:15, Ps. 95:7, 8 and Hebr. 3:7-9, Hd. 5:3 and 4, Rom. 8:9 and 10, 1 Cor. 3:16 and 6:19, Ef. 3:22. This then only comes fully into its own, when with the personal distinction the unity of essence goes together. Further, all kinds of Divine attributes are ascribed just as well to God's Spirit as to God himself: e.g. eternity, Hebr. 9:14, omnipresence, Ps. 139:7, omniscience, 1 Cor. 2:10, 11, omnipotence, 1 Cor. 12:4-6, and again this presupposes that the Spirit is one in essence with God himself. The same is the [248] case with the Divine works of creation, Gen. 1:2, Ps. 33:6, Job. 33:4, Ps. 104:30, and of re-creation. Yes, in this his deity especially comes out clearly. He is the one who has qualified Christ for his office by his anointing, Jes. 11:2, 61:1 and Luk. 4:18, Jes. 42:1 and Mt. 12:18, Luk. 1:35, Mt. 3:16, 4:1, Joh. 3:34, Mt. 12:28, Hebr. 9:14, Rom. 1:4, who equips the apostles for their particular task, Mt. 10:20, Luk. 12:12, 21:15, 24:49, Joh. 14:16 v., 15:26, 16:13 v., etc. who distributes to believers all kinds of gifts and powers, 1 Cor. 12:4-11, and who above all causes the fullness of Christ to dwell in the church. The H. Spirit stands to Christ in the same relation as Christ to the Father. As the Son has nothing and does nothing and speaks nothing of himself but receives everything from the Father, Joh. 5:26, 16:15, so the H. Spirit takes everything from Christ, Joh. 16:13, 14. As the Son testifies of the Father and glorifies the Father, Joh. 1:18, 17:4, 6, so in

his turn the H. Spirit the Son, 15:26, 16:14. As no one comes to the Father except through the Son, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 14:6, so no one can say Jesus to be the Lord except through the H. Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:3. There is no fellowship with God except through the Spirit. But that Spirit then also bestows all the benefits which Christ has acquired, regeneration, Joh. 3:3, the conviction of sin, Joh. 16:8-11, adoption, Rom. 8:15, renewal, Tit. 3:5, the love of God, Rom. 5:5, all kinds of spiritual fruits, Gal. 5:22, the sealing, Rom. 8:23, 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5, Ef. 1:13, 4:30, the resurrection, Rom. 8:10. Yes, through the Spirit we have with no one less than with the Son and the Father himself direct, immediate fellowship. The H. Spirit is God himself in us, Joh. 14:23 v., 1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19, 2 Cor. 6:16, Gal. 2:20, Col. 3:11, Ef. 3:17, Phil. 1:8, 21. Who can grant us all that, who can cause God himself to dwell in our hearts, except one who is himself God? Therefore Divine honor is also due to him. He stands alongside Father and Son as cause of all salvation, Mt. 28:19, 1 Cor. 12:4-6, 2 Cor. 13:13, Op. 1:4. In his name we are baptized, Mt. 28:19. From him is all life and power. He is the author of our prayers, Zach. 12:10, Rom. 8:15, 16. And over against that the church is warned not to grieve him, Jes. 63:10, Ef. 4:30; indeed the blasphemy against the [249] H. Spirit is unforgivable, Mt. 12:31, 32. Older literature on the H. Spirit is given by Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. I 75 sq. 241, among which especially Owen, Discourse on the Holy Spirit 1674, holl. 1746, deserves attention, and by Dr. Kuyper, Het werk van den H. Geest, 1888 in the preface; newer literature especially with M. Beversluis, de H. Geest en zijne werkingen volgens de Schriften des N. V. 1896 bl. VII, among which especially come into consideration J. Gloël, Der H. Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des Paulus 1888. H. Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des H. Geistes u.s.w. Gött. 1888. Further still Synopsis der dogm. moraltheol. Lehre von der Wirksamkeit des

H. Geistes zunächst nach dem h. Thomas von Aquin, von Dr. i.e. Pruner, Lycealprogramm für das Jahr 1891 Eichstätt. W. Koelling, Pneumatologie oder die Lehre von der Person des H. Geistes, Gütersloh 1894. Dr. G. Smeaton, The doctrine of the Holy Spirit 1882.

8. In all these moments of revelation, Holy Scripture of course does not yet offer us a fully developed dogma of the Trinity. But it nevertheless teaches that the one name of God unfolds itself fully only in that of Father, Son, and Spirit. It states clearly and distinctly that all God's works outwardly, both in creation and re-creation, have a threefold divine causa. It leaves no doubt that this threefold causa consists of three distinct subjects, who stand in personal relation to one another. And it thereby contains all the data from which theology has constructed the dogma of the Trinity. Philosophy had nothing essential to add to it; even the doctrine of the Logos is New Testament. Only everything awaited the time when the ratio christiana would have developed sufficiently to conceive the holy mystery that lay here. Among the apostolic fathers there is as yet no mention of this. They repeat Holy Scripture, without yet understanding the deep sense and the mutual connection of the truths, and they employ expressions that in a later time would no longer be defensible. Yet they are also of the highest importance for the dogma of the Trinity, insofar as they combat both the Ebionite and the Docetic direction and, in stronger or weaker terms, express the lofty nature of the Christ, exalted above the angels. The dogma of the Trinity, as is already evident at the beginning, was not born from a [250] philosophical reasoning about the being of God, but from reflection on the facts of revelation, on the person and the work of Christ. In the dogma of the Trinity, from the beginning it was a matter of the deity of Christ, of the absolute character of Christianity, of the truth of God's revelation, of the

true reconciliation of sins, of the absolute certainty of salvation. Among the apost. fathers, now, Christ occupies an entirely unique place; predicates are ascribed to Him that belong to no creature. He is called Son, proper, only, only-begotten Son of God, Clemens, 1 Cor. 36. Ignat., Rom. 1. Eph. 20. Smyrn. 1. Diogn. 9. 10. Barn. 7. 12., radiance of God's majesty, scepter of His majesty, Clemens, 1 Cor. 16. 36. Lord of the earth, to whom all is subjected, Creator of all things, Judge of the living and the dead, Barn. 7. 12. Diogn. 7. Did. Apost. 16. Polyc. Phil. 1. 2. 6. 12, holy, incomprehensible Logos, who as a God, ὡς θεός, has been sent to earth, Diogn. 7. and may be called θεός, Clemens, 2 Cor. 1. Ign., Rom. 3. Smyrn. 1. 10. Eph. 1. 18. 19. And Father (God), Son (Christ), and Spirit are mentioned together, Clemens, 1 Cor. 46. Ign. Eph. 9. Magn. 13. Of the Holy Spirit there is little mention among the apost. fathers, but He is nevertheless distinguished from Father and Son and placed alongside them; only with respect to the Pastor of Hermas, Sim. V 5. 6. there is disagreement as to whether he identifies the Holy Spirit with the Son or distinguishes Him from that, Baur, Dreiein. u. Menschw. I 134 and against that Dorner, Entwicklungsgesch. I 191-205. When in the second century the gnosis appears, Christian thinking also awakens. The deity of Christ acquires dogmatic importance and is therefore also expressed much more clearly. Justin Martyr gives Christ repeatedly the name of God, even of ὁ θεός, c. Tryph. 34. 56. 58. 113. 126 etc. and ascribes to Him all kinds of exalted predicates. He is the firstborn of creation, the beginning of another race, equipped not with a single charisma but with all the powers of the Spirit, in possession not of a σπέρμα of the logos, but of the whole logos, λογικου το ὅλον, mighty to deify the human race and therefore Himself God, c. Tr. 87. 138. Apol. II 10. 12. He further clearly teaches the pre-existence of Christ,

not as power only but as person, c. Tr. 128. Because the Father is hidden, inexpressible, exalted above time and space, c. Tr. [251] 127. Apol. II 6., all revelations under the O. T. and also in the heathen world are revelations of the Logos, c. Tr. 127. Apol. I 46. 61. 63. Apol. II 10. 13. He even existed at the creation; the word Gen. 1:26 is spoken to Him, c. Tr. 62. But the immanent relation between Father and Son is not yet clear in Justin. It seems that the Logos, who is indeed another than the Father ἀριθμῶ ἀλλ' οὐ γνῶμη, was first generated by the Father before and for the sake of creation, and indeed did not arise by division, but was nevertheless brought forth δυνάμει καὶ βουλή of the Father, just as one light is kindled from another and just as the word goes forth from our mouth, Apol. II 6. c. Tr. 61. 100. 128. Therefore he is called πρωτογονος, πρωτοτοκος του θεου, Apol. I 46. 58. The generation is called προβαλλειν, but mostly γενναν, c. Tr. 62. 76. 129. Apol. I 23. 2. 6, and the Logos is insofar called a γεννημα or ἔργασια, c. Tr. 62. 114. 129. Justin seeks to maintain the unity of God by the fact that the Son is indeed another than the Father ἀριθμῶ ἀλλ' οὐ γνῶμη, c. Tr. 56 and is subordinate to the Father. The Son is ἡ πρωτη δυναμις μετα τον πατερα, Apol. I 32; He takes the second place, δευτερα χωρα, Apol. I 13; He has received everything from the Father, c. Tr. 86, is God and Lord, because the Father has willed it, c. Tr. 127, and is ὑπο τῳ πατρι καὶ κυριῳ τεταγμενος, c. Tr. 126. Justin thus still has a deficient conception on various points. The hidden being of the Father in contrast with the Son, the generation of the Son by the will of the Father and for the sake of creation, the subordination of the Son to the Father were later rejected by the church. Some have therefore called Justin an Arian, but wrongly. For, first, this question did not yet exist in Justin's time; and, further, there are in him various elements that run directly counter to the

view of Arius; he teaches decisively and clearly the deity of the Son, he says that the Son is not created but generated and elucidates this with the later very common images of word and light; he clearly perceives the importance of the deity of Christ for the whole work of salvation, for the truth of Christianity. Therefore he also repeatedly names the Father, the Son, and the Spirit together as the object of our worship, Apol. I 6. 13. 60. 61. 65. 67; and although it is the case that he assigns to the Son the δευτέρα χωρα and to the Spirit the τρίτη ταξις, Justin expresses clearly in these places the personality of the Holy Spirit and His distinctness from the Son. To be sure, one has appealed against this to Apol. I 33, but this passage teaches nothing other than that Justin understood by το πνευμα in Luk. 1:35 not the person of the H. S. but the Logos, an exegesis that also occurs with others. Further, it is also established that Justin does not count the Spirit among the angels or in general among the creatures. But about the divine nature of the Holy Spirit and about His ontological relation to Father and Son we find in Justin as good as nothing. The religious importance of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was not yet felt. The Spirit is still understood only as Spirit of prophecy, who inspired the prophets and apostles and qualified Christ. But of a continual necessary working of the Holy Spirit in the church Justin has no awareness. The objective revelation of God in the Logos seems sufficient; the subjective illumination is not seen through in its necessity, cf. Semisch, II 305-333. Schwane, Dogmengesch. I2 79 f. Finally, in Justin Martyr it emerges very clearly what kind the influence of Greek philosophy in Christian theology has been. That such an influence has been exercised, and not least in Justin, is denied by no one. But that influence is precisely most noticeable in those elements of Justin's doctrine which were later banished by the church, namely, in his distinction between the λογος

ένδιαθετος and προφορικός, in his conception of the Son as δευτερος θεος, in his doctrine of the hidden God, in his placing of the Son outside the divine being. All other elements, the Logos-nature of Christ, the prae-existence, the generation, the creation of all things through the Logos, the sonship, the deity of Christ, have been derived by Justin with consciousness from Scripture and argued from Scripture, cf. Semisch, Justin der Martyrer II 295 f. The defects that adhere to the doctrine of the Trinity in Justin are not avoided by the following apologists, Theophilus, Tatian, Athenagoras. Tatian, Or. c. Gr. 5, does say that, insofar as all things have their ground in God, they all exist ideally, as Logos, in Him, but this Logos is brought forth by the will of God and is ἔργον πρωτοτοκον του πατρος; κατα μερισμον, [253] οὐ κατα ἀποκοπην. With Theophilus the Logos does indeed exist before the creation as λογος ένδιαθετος, because He is θεου νους και φρονησις, but He is nevertheless generated by the Father as λογος προφορικός for the sake of creation, ad Autol. II 10. 22. Athenagoras, Leg. pro Chr. c. 10, likewise teaches that the Logos did indeed exist eternally, because God is the eternal νους, but He is nevertheless the first γεννημα of the Father, because He went forth from God as the idea and the energy of things. Just as Theophilus was the first to speak of a τριας in God, ad Autol. II 26, so Athenagoras also connects God the Father, God the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who was active in the prophets and is an effluence of God, goes forth from God and returns into Him, like the ray from the sun, and calls them the object of Christian veneration, ib. c. 10. 12. But with the distinction of the three persons their unity is not sufficiently maintained. The Father is the one, unbegotten, eternal, invisible God, and Son and Spirit are one with Him not in essence, but in spirit and power, ib. c. 24.

The next development of the doctrine of the Trinity, consisting chiefly in the banishment of the philosophical elements, is due to three men, each of whom contributed his own share to the construction of Christian dogma. Irenaeus is the powerful opponent of the gnostic concept of God and of the conception of the Logos as world-idea. Now and then he too shows that he has not wholly overcome the old representation; he still calls the Father the invisible, hidden God in contrast with the Son, *adv. haer.* IV 20, 10. But nevertheless he combats as sharply as possible the conception of God as *βυθος* and the emanation of the aeons, and maintains the scriptural distinction of Creator and creature. The Logos is, as it were, stripped of his twofold nature and transferred wholly to the side of God. The Logos is not a creature, but a hypostatic word, III 8, *praeëxistent*, II 6. IV 12, true God, IV 10. 14 etc. Also the distinction of *λογος ἐνδιαθετος* and *προφορικος* is to be rejected II 17. 18. For apart from the fact that this distinction detracts from the personality of the Logos and connects his generation with the creation, the Logos must not be represented as the understanding and the reason of God. For God is simple, wholly spirit, wholly understanding, wholly thought, wholly logos, II 16. 48, so that both the Son and the Father are true God. The unity of Father, Son, and Spirit is [254] very clearly expressed by Irenaeus, their divine nature is expressly maintained, they are repeatedly named together, IV 6. 20, 33. The generation of the Son did not take place in time, the Son had no beginning, He existed eternally with God II 18. III 22. IV 37. But Irenaeus falls short in indicating how, within the unity, the threeness nevertheless exists and how Father, Son, and Spirit, although partaking of one divine nature, are nevertheless distinct. Here he is supplemented and corrected by Tertullian. To be sure, in the overcoming of gnostic dualism he stands behind Irenaeus. He distinguishes between Father

and Son as between a Deus invisibilis et invisus and a Deus visibilis et visus, adv. Prax. 14. 15. In all manner of ways and with all manner of arguments he demonstrates that distinction, with the name Logos, with the incarnation, with the theophanies, etc. Indeed, with Tertullian the Logos first attains full sonship and independent personality through the three moments of the speaking of God, the generation, and the incarnation, adv. Pr. 6. 7, so that there was a time in which the Son was not, adv. Hermog. 3. But even if, against patripassianism, he goes too far in the distinction of the persons, on the other side he therefore strives all the more to hold fast the unity in the threeness and the threeness in the unity. The three persons are unius substantiae, unius status, unius potestatis, unus Deus. They are distinct as regards the ordo and the oeconomia, Oeconomiae sacramentum unitatem in trinitatem disponit. They are three non statu, sed gradu, and yet the one God, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris, Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur. Just as a ray of the sun is also sun, so there are different species, formae, effigies, moduli in the one and undivided substantia. The three persons are therefore unum, not unus. The Son is another than the Father and the Spirit is again another, but the name God and Lord is common to them. They are unus Deus, they are not to be separated. As trunk and branch, spring and stream, sun and ray cannot be separated, so neither can the Father and the Son. The trinitas therefore does not abolish the monarchia. The Son is indeed another than the Father but not divisus, separatus. There is distinctio, distributio, no diversitas and divisio. It is a unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem, adv. Prax. 2 sq. Thus Tertullian kneads the stiff Latin language, in order to maintain equally both the unitas [255] and the trinitas in God; both formally and materially he has been of the greatest significance for the dogma of the Trinity. In spite of the

fact that he does not always rise above subordinatianism and distinguishes too little the ontological, cosmological, and soteriological in the doctrine of the Trinity, he has provided the concepts and the words which the dogma of the Trinity needed in order to express its true meaning. He replaced the Logos-speculation with the filiation and thereby definitively detached the ontological Trinity from cosmological speculation. And he was the first who attempted to derive the Trinity of the persons not from the person of the Father, but from the being of God. While, however, Tertullian does not yet free the ontological Trinity from the cosmological and soteriological process, it is Origen who conceives it wholly and entirely as an eternal process in the being of God himself. The generation is an αἰώνιος γεννησις, de princ. I 2, 4. The light cannot be without shining; so the Father cannot be without the Son, ib. I 2. 2. 4. 7. 10. There was no time in which the Son was not, ib. I 2. 2. 4. c. Cels. VIII 12. The Father is not Father before the Son but per filium, de princ. I 2. 10. There is no separation, ἀχωριστος ἐστι τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ πατήρ, c. Cels. IV 14. 16. All divine attributes are common to Father and Son; the Son is one with the Father; not alongside but in God do we venerate the Son, c. Cels. VIII 12. 13. The Son has the same wisdom, truth, reason as the Father, He is αὐτοσοφία, αὐτοαληθεια, αὐτολογος, c. Cels. V 41. But now, in order to maintain the distinction within this unity and equality, Origen calls subordinatianism to his aid and goes back behind Tertullian in deriving the Trinity not from the being of God but from the person of the Father. And thus Origen came to represent the Father as ὁ θεος, αὐτοθεος, πηγή or ρίζα θεοτητος, μεγιστος ἐπὶ πασι θεος, as κρειττων than the Son, as the one entire Godhead, exalted above all being, invisible, incomprehensible; and the Son as θεος without article, as ἕτερος τοῦ πατρος κατ' οὐσίαν, so much less than the Father as the world is less than

the Son, cf. Dorner, Entw. I 652 f. Compare, concerning the doctrine of the Trinity before Nicaea, besides the dogmengesch. v. Münscher, Harnack, Schwane, Thomasius, also Dr. C. P. Caspari, Der Glaube an die Trinität Gottes in der [256] Kirche der 3 ersten Jahrh. nachgewiesen, Leipzig Faber 1894. Scheeben I 796 f. Petavius, de trinitate, appendix 1. Forbesius a Corse, Instit. hist. theol. 1645 Lib I c. 1-5. G. Bull, Defensio fidei Nicaenae, 1703.

9. The church, however, did not follow Origen. It rejected his subordinationism and at Nicaea pronounced the true, full Godhead of the Son. This confession bore entirely a religious character. It maintained the soteriological principle of Christianity. But from now on the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity changed. Nicaea pronounced the distinction in God, and taught that Father, Son (and Spirit) were God; it now further came down to maintaining the unity in this distinction. Before Nicaea one had difficulty in getting from the unity of God to a threeness; now it is the reverse. From now on the trinitarian dogma acquires a proper, independent value, a theological significance. Athanasius with the three Cappadocians and Augustine are the ones who in this way elaborate and complete the dogma. Athanasius understood better than anyone in his time that with the Godhead of Christ and the Trinity Christianity stood or fell. To the defense of this truth he devoted his whole life and all his powers. He fought for no philosophical problem but for the Christian religion itself, for the revelation of God, the doctrine of the apostles, the faith of the church. The Trinity is the heart of Christianity. Thereby it is in principle distinguished from Judaism, which denies the distinction in God, and from Heathendom, which denies the unity of God, Athan. ad Serap. I 28. With Athanasius, accordingly, the philosophical mixing of ontology and cosmology is wholly

banished. He rejects the gnostic dualism between God and the world, which was taken over by Arius, and every kind of intermediate beings, c. Ar. II 26. The Trinity, he says, has mixed nothing foreign with itself, it does not consist of the Creator and something that has become, but it is wholly and perfectly divine, *ibid.* Therefore the Trinity is also an eternal one. There is in God nothing accidental; He becomes nothing, He is everything eternally. Just as the Trinity always was, so it is and remains, and in it the Father, the Son and the Spirit, *ad Serap.* III 7. c. Ar. I 18. The Father was always Father; it belongs, otherwise than with us, to his nature to be Father, *de decr. nic. syn.* 12. Just as the [257] sun is not to be conceived without light and the spring not without water, so the Father is not to be conceived without Son; God is not ἄγονος; He always speaks, c. Ar. II 2. *ad Serap.* II 2. Whoever denies the Trinity makes God into a lifeless principle or comes to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, c. Ar. I 14. And therefore eternal also is the generation and the existence of the Son. There was neither for the Father nor for the Son a time that He was not, c. Ar. I in its entirety. This Son cannot be a creature and is not brought forth by the will of God but is generated out of his being, c. Ar. I 25. And the same is said, although less often and at less length, of the H. Spirit, *ad Serap.* I 20, 21 etc. These three persons are truly distinct; they are not three parts of one whole, not three names for one thing. The Father is only Father and the Son is only Son and the Spirit is only Spirit, c. Ar. III 4. IV 1. *ad Serap.* IV 4, 6, 7. But at the same time he maintains the unity in such a way that they are all three ὁμοουσιοι and one ὑποστασις (with Athanasius still as much as οὐσια) and have the same properties, c. Ar. III 3, 4, *de decr. nic. syn.* 19-25; that the Father is the ἀρχη and the πηγη θεοτητος, c. Ar. IV 1.; that the three persons exist in one another, *ad Serap.* I 14 III 6, c. Ar. III 6, and are one in their

operation, ad Serap. I 28. Cf. Fr. Lauchert, Die Lehre des h. Athan. d. Gr. Leipzig 1895 S. 10-65. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II 2 83-108. This doctrine of the Trinity of Athanasius we also find in the main, only further elucidated by names, images, comparisons, with Basil in his Libri V against Eunomius, in his writing de Spiritu Sancto and in many of his letters and homilies, with Gregory Nyss. in his Libri XII c. Eunomium and in his oratio catechetica, and with Gregory Naz. in his 5 Orationes theologicae. John Damasc. summarizes the result and aligns himself especially with Greg. Naz., de fide orthod. I c. 8. The whole Greek church has accepted this doctrine at the councils, of which it recognizes the first seven, and differs from the West only in the filioque.

10. In the West, after Tertullian and Cyprian, the doctrine of the Trinity was above all vigorously defended and proved from Scripture by Hilary in his 12 books de trinitate, which, however, contain very little about the H. Spirit and therefore probably earlier bore the title: de fide contra Arianos; and then [258] more speculatively and profoundly by Augustine. His 15 books de trinitate are the profoundest that has been written on this dogma. In them he not only summarizes what earlier patres have said on this subject, but he also treats it independently and introduces important modifications into it. In the first place Augustine proceeds, not from the person of the Father but from the one simple being (essentia) of God, excluding all composition, and therefore expresses the absolute unity of the three persons more strongly than had ever happened before him. Each person is as great as the whole Trinity, de trin. VIII 1. 2. In each person is the whole, same, divine being, so that there are not three Gods, three almighties etc. but only one God, one almighty etc. V 8. The distinction of the persons therefore also cannot lie in attributes or accidents, which the

one person would have and the other not, but only in the relations among themselves. Father is and is called the first person, because He stands in a particular relation to Son and Spirit etc. V 5. just as also the designation Lord, Creator etc. indicates the relation of God to creatures but brings about no change in Him, ib. 16. 17. In the second place Augustine now had to reject every antithesis that had earlier been made between the Father and the Son. The Son, as true God, is no less hidden and invisible than the Father and is completely equal to the Father. Every subordinationism is banished. Augustine goes still further than Athanasius. The latter still allowed some subordination to be valid, c. Ar. I 59, but Augustine has overcome every thought as if the Father were the proper, original God. He proceeds from the *essentia Dei*, which dwells equally in all three. Although he still uses the expression *fons* or *principium deitatis* for the Father, de trin. IV 20, it nevertheless has with him another sense. It does not indicate that the Godhead logically first existed in the Father and was communicated by Him to the Son and the Spirit, but the Father can only be so called because He, not as God but as person, is Father of the Son. And in this sense the formula of Nicaea *Deus de Deo* is also explained by him, de trin. VII 2. 3. Therefore Augustine also arrived at another conception of the theophanies in the O. Test. Formerly one had always and exclusively seen in them revelations of the Logos, because the Father [259] was hidden, but Augustine also ascribes them to the Father and the Spirit, who just as well as the Son can reveal themselves and indeed are not to be separated from that of the Son, de trin. II and III. And finally Augustine, more than any church father before him, sought images, likenesses of the Trinity, *vestigia trinitatis*, and thus brought to light the connection of the doctrine of God with that of the whole cosmos, de trin. IX-XV. Cf. Schwane, II 173-194.

Gangauf, Des h. Augustinus specul. Lehre v. Gott dem Dreieinigen, Augsburg 1883 S. 209 f. Münscher- v. Coelln, Dogmengesch. I 245 f. Harnack, D. G. II 294 f. etc. Thus Augustine completed what Tertullian had begun. There is in the West another conception of the Trinity than in the East and therefore later one could not come to agreement in the filioque. The West aligned itself with Augustine and has adopted his doctrine of the Trinity and on various points, often in a subtle way, worked it out. The symbolum, which wrongly is called after Athanasius, is largely in his spirit and never accepted by the East, Harnack, D. G. II 298 f. Karl Müller, Symbolik, Erl. Deichert 1896 S. 51 f. The doctrine of the Trinity was later in the West. Church especially still treated by Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 2. Erigena, de div. nat. I 62. II 32. 35. Alcuin, de fide sanctae et individuae trinitatis, Migne CI col. 9-64, and further by the scholastics, Anselm, Monol., de incarnatione verbi and de processione Sp. S. Hugo Vict. de Sacramentis, lib. I pars 3. Lombardus, Sent. lib. I and the commentaries on that work, Richard Vict., Libri 6 de trinitate. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 27-43. c. Gent. IV c. 2-26. Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 2-6 etc. And on the same Augustinian foundation rests the doctrine of the Trinity in the Roman, Petavius, de trinitate, libri VIII; in the Lutheran, Gerhard, Loci Loc. III etc., Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 87 f.; and in the Reformed theology, Calv. Inst. I 13. Zanchius, de tribus Elohim, Op. I 1-564. Polanus, Synt. theol. lib. 3. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 80-98. In more recent times the doctrine of the Trinity has indeed mostly been very much simplified but in an ecclesiastical sense taught and defended by Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 117-224. Ebrard, Chr. Dogm. § 95-154, Böhl, Dogm. 113-123. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 462. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 249. Aug. Hopkins Strong, System. Theology, 3 ed. New-York Armstrong 1890 p. 144-170 etc. [260]

11. This dogma, however, has at all times encountered serious opposition. Not only from without, on the part of the Jews, Weber, *System der altsyn. pal. Theol.* 147 f., and of the Mohammedans, e. g. Averroes, Stöckl, *Philos. d. M. A.* II 89, against whom the Christians then acted in defense, litt. in Walch, *Bibl. theol. sel.* I 881 sq. 896 sq. But also within the boundaries of Christendom this dogma, both before and after its establishment, was resisted by many. In the confession of the Trinity the heart of the Christian religion beats; every error is derived from, or upon deeper reflection to be traced back to, a deviation in the doctrine of the Trinity. It is such an essential constituent of the Christian faith, that it still exerts an influence in the confession of the Unitarians. All who are attached to the name of Christians continue to speak of Father, Son, and Spirit, Nitzsch, *Ev. Dogm.* 425. All the more, however, has the doctrine of the Trinity in its ecclesiastical form been contested and repeatedly presented differently. But the history of this dogma clearly shows that the ecclesiastical form, in which this truth is contained, alone is able to maintain unadulterated the matter at issue. Now the great problem with this dogma consists in this, that the unity of the essence should not nullify the threeness of the persons, nor conversely should the threeness of the persons abolish the unity of the essence. And therefore there always threatens danger of straying either to the right or to the left and thus falling into Sabellianism or into Arianism. Arianism was prepared in the 2nd and 3rd century by the Ebionites, the Alogi, Theodotus, Artemon, Paul of Samosata, who indeed saw in Christ a man, born in a supernatural manner and at baptism anointed with the Holy Spirit, made fit for his work and exalted to Lord, but who decisively denied his pre-existence and Godhead. They were adherents of an adoptionist Christology, Harnack *D. G.* I 160. 616 f. In the fourth century this doctrine

is advocated by Lucian and his pupil Arius and then further by Aëtius and Eunomius. Arius taught, as appears from a writing *Θαλεια*, of which Athanasius c. Ar. I has preserved fragments for us, that God, because *ἀγεννητος* and without beginning, is absolutely one. He is inexpressible, incomprehensible, cannot have direct communion with the finite, cannot communicate his essence, which precisely consists in *ἀγεννησια*. Everything outside him is therefore created, come to be by his will. He is not Father from [261] eternity, but Father through and of the creatures. But before God proceeded to the creation of the world, he brought forth for mediation, as a kind of intermediate being, an independent *ὑποστασις* or *οὐσια*, which in Scripture bears the name of wisdom, son, logos, image of God, etc., and through whom God has created all things, and likewise also yet a third, lower *ὑποστασις* namely the Holy Spirit. This Logos is not generated out of the essence of God and does not have the essence in common with the Father, for then there were two Gods, but is created or born *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, is a *κτισμα* or *ποιημα* of God, brought forth *θεληματι και βουλη*. There was therefore a time that he was not, *ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, even though he is also created *προ χρόνων και προ αἰώνων*, i.e. before the world. This Logos was therefore not *ὁμοουσιος* with the Father, but wholly separated from him, changeable, able to choose both evil and good. But he was nevertheless a *κτισμα τελειον*, he chose the good, thereby became unchangeable, and has, as it were, become a God. This Logos also became man, proclaimed the truth, accomplished our redemption and is now our honor, but not worthy of our worship, Harnack, D. G. I 194 f. Arianism was strong and found many adherents, not least among those who after the conversion of emperor Constantine had passed over to Christianity for all kinds of considerations. Moreover, the writings of Athanasius teach us what

formidable weapons they brought with them in the struggle. They appealed first of all to a series of Scripture passages, which express the unity of God, Deut. 6:4, 32:39, Joh. 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, the birth or becoming of the Son, Spr. 8:22, Col. 1:15, his subordination to the Father, Joh. 14:28, 1 Cor. 15:28, Hebr. 3:2, his ignorance, Mark. 13:32, Joh. 11:34, his limited power, Mt. 28:18 and goodness, Luk. 18:19, his increase in wisdom, Luk. 2:52, his suffering, Joh. 12:27, 13:21, Mt. 26:39, 27:46, his exaltation to Lord and Christ, Hd. 2:36, Phil. 2:9, Hebr. 1:4 etc. Further, they argued with many quotations that they had many earlier church fathers on their side. Then they derived various arguments from the Aristotelian, nominalistically conceived, philosophy, and by means of these argued the unity and the ἀγεννησία of God. And finally they pointed out the weaknesses and the contradictions that adhered to the Christology of Nicaea; in which especially this argument occupied a great place [262] that, if the Son was generated, he was thereby essentially distinguished from God as the unbegotten, ἀγεννητος, and thus had arisen in time.

Sabellianism was prepared in the second and third century by Noëtus, Praxeas, Epigonus, Cleomenes, who taught that in Christ the Father himself had been born, had suffered and had died, that Father and Son therefore were names for the same person in different relations, before and in the incarnation, an sich and in his historical appearance, or also that the divine nature in Christ was the Father, and the human nature, the σαρξ, was the Son. This monarchianism, patripassianism or modalism was advocated and further developed in the third century by Sabellius. Father, Son and Spirit are the same God; they are three names for one and the same being, which he called ὑιοπατωρ, yet not simultaneously, but in three successive energies or stages. God existed first in the prosopon, the appearance, the modus of

the Father namely as Creator and Lawgiver; thereafter in the prosopon of the Son as Redeemer from incarnation to ascension into heaven; and finally in the prosopon of the H. Spirit as Life-giver. Sabellius appealed in this especially to Deut. 6:4, Ex. 20:3, Jes. 44:6, Joh. 10:38. Sabellius thus also included the H. Spirit in the being of God, placed Son and Spirit on an equal line with the Father, and furthermore taught a historical succession in the revelations of God, a becoming in God himself, Hippolytus, Philos. IX. Epiphanius, Haeres. 62. Orig. de princ. I 2. Athanas. c. Ar. IV. Harnack D. G. I 674 f.

12. Both directions have continued to exist in the Christian church, to the right and left of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, throughout all centuries. The essence of Arianism lies in the denial of the homousia of Father and Son, in the assertion that the Father alone and in the absolute sense is the only true God. Naturally the Son is then a lesser and lower being, standing outside the nature of God; but about the place that accrues to the Son between God and the world of creatures there can then be difference; Arianism allows all kinds of latitude. The distance between God and world is endless and at every point of that distance a place can be assigned to the Son, from the place next to God on his throne down to that next to the creatures, angels or men. Thus [263] Arianism has also appeared in different forms. First of all in the form of subordinatianism: the Son is then indeed eternal, generated from the essence of the Father, no creature and not brought forth out of nothing, but He is nevertheless less than and subordinate to the Father. The Father alone is ὁ θεός, πηγή θεοτητος, the son is θεός, received his nature by communication from the Father. Thus it was taught by Justin, Tertull., Clement, Origen etc., also by the Semi-Arians, Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, who placed the

Son ἑκτος του πατρος and called Him ὁμοιοσσιος to the Father, later by the Remonstrants, Conf. art. 3. Arminius, Op. theol. 1629 p. 232 sq. Episc. Instit. theol. IV sect. 2 c. 32. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II c. 17 § 25; by the supranaturalists, Bretschneider, Dogm. I 4 612 f. Knapp, Gl. I 260. Muntinghe, Theol. Christ. pars theor. § 134 sq. etc., and by very many theologians in more recent times, Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 207 f. Beck, Chr. Gl. II 123 f. 134 f. Twesten, II 254. Kahnis, I 353, 398. van Oosterzee II § 52. Doedes, Ned. Gel. 71 v. Subsequently it has, in its old guise, which it had with Arius, again appeared among many theologians after the Reformation, especially in England. Milton e.g. taught that Son and Spirit were created by the free will of the Father before the creation, and bore only the name of God on account of their office, just like the judges and authorities in the O. T., de doctr. christ. ed. Summer 1827 lib. I c. 5. 6, and likewise with slight modifications W. Whiston, whose Arianism called forth many counter-writings, Walch Bibl. theol. sel. I 957 f., S. Clarke, The scripture doctrine of the trinity 1712, P. Maty, Lettre d'un théologien à un autre théologien sur le mystère de la Trinité 1729, Dan. Whitby, Harwood, many Remonstrants in this country, and in this time the Groningen theologians, Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 160v. A third form of Arianism arose in Socinianism. The Father is the only, true God. The Son is a holy man created by God immediately, by supernatural conception, who did not exist before his conception and was brought forth by God with this purpose, to preach to men a new law. After fulfilling this charge He was exalted in heaven and became partaker of Divine grace. The Spirit is nothing other than a power of God, Cat. Racov. qu. 94-190, cf. F. Socinus, in Bibl. patr. Polon. I 789 sq., Crell, de uno Deo Patre libri [264] duo, e. a., in Trechsel, Protest. Antitrinitarier II 221 f. 233 f. This Socinianism spread

from Poland to Germany, the Netherlands, England and America, found in these latter two countries spokesmen in John Biddle, Nathanael Lardner, Theoph. Lindsey, Joseph Priestley, founder of the Unitarian Society etc., and passed over into Unitarianism. Socinianism could not in the long run maintain the supernaturalism, which it at first still accepted; Jesus became an ordinary man, even if also an example of piety and morality, Christianity became entirely detached from his person. Thus it was also taught by rationalism, Wegscheider, Instit. theol. § 91. Modern theology stands on the same standpoint. And Ritschl has in substance done nothing other than renew Socinianism. Jesus was a man made capable by God to found the kingdom of heaven on earth and was thereafter exalted to the rank of God and Lord of the congregation. In this whole rationalistic view of the doctrine of the Trinity there is naturally even much less need of Divine grace, and therefore the H. Spirit is herewith scarcely mentioned; his Godhead and for the most part also his personality is denied.

13. Sabellianism, too, can occur in different forms. It has in common with Arianism the denial of the triunity in the Divine being, but now seeks to obtain the unity of God, not by placing Son and Spirit outside God's being, but by taking both up into it in such a way that all distinction between the three persons disappears. The distinction between the persons, according to the church's doctrine of the Trinity, lies in the personal properties, specifically in the eternal generation. If these are denied, then the persons come to stand detached alongside one another, and tritheism arises. Of that, in antiquity, the monophysites John Askusnages and John Philoponus were accused, Baur, II 13 f., and in the Middle Ages Roscellinus, cf. Anselmus, *de fide trinitatis et de incarnatione verbi*. Later a similar accusation arose against Th. Sherlock, because he assumed in the Divine being three infinite

spirits, Walch Bibl. theol. sel. I 972; further against Roell, because he opposed the generation, Examen v. h. Ontw. v. Toler. VIIIe Sam. bl. 10v. Moor, I 735. 761-771; subsequently also against Lampe and Sibelius, because they [265] had objections to the formula per communicationem essentiae, Moor, I 744-755. Ypey and Dermout, Gesch. der N. H. Kerk III 202 en aant. 84v. Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. door Kist en Royaards VIII 419v. If, in addition, the being of God is still conceived in a Platonic-realist sense, then tritheism passes over into tetradism, which was charged against Damianus of Alexandria, Baur, II 29 f. But since such a triad of individual, separated beings, μερικαι ούσαι, ίδικαι φύσεις, cannot be reconciled with the unity of God, this can also be maintained in such a way that Father, Son, and Spirit are the same person and the same being; this patripassianism was taught in the second century by Praxeas. Or one can also, with Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus of Sirmium, regard Son and Spirit as properties in God, which proceeded from God only for the sake of creation and recreation and became independent, personal. The Logos was indeed eternal as λογος ἐνδιαθετος; the Father was never without Logos, he was λογοπατωρ; but this Logos becomes Son, προφορικός, only in time; God extends himself in time into Son and Spirit and then returns again into himself, Schwane, D. G. II 135-150. From that, modalistic monarchianism is then naturally born, which in the three persons sees only three modes of revelation of the one Divine being. This was the actual doctrine of Sabellius, and later this conception of the dogma of the Trinity repeatedly returns. The speculation about the Trinity in Erigena, de div. nat. I 13, and in Abaelard, Introd. ad theol. I 7, is not free of modalism either. But this comes to light more clearly in the pantheistic sects in the Middle Ages, in Joachim of Floris, Amalric of Bena, David of Dinant, who distinguished an

age of the Father, of the Son, and of the Spirit and considered the last to be near, Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufkl. im M. A.* II 183-249. In the century of the Reformation, anabaptism came into opposition against the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity. The true God is the God in us; this is the essential Christ, and the Word, the Spirit in us is the true God, e.g. Camillo in Trechsel II 95 f. David Joris taught that God was one and revealed himself successively as Father, Son, and Spirit in three periods of faith, hope, and love, which had begun with Moses, Christ, and himself, Trechsel I 44 f. Cramer in *Ned. Archief v. Kerk. Gesch.* V 1-145. VI [266] 289-368. But above all Servetus devoted to this dogma all the power of his thinking; in three writings he subjected it in its ecclesiastical form to a sharp criticism and also attempted to build it up positively anew, *de trinitatis erroribus libri septem* 1531, *dialogorum de trinitate libri duo* 1532, and *Christianismi restitutio* 1553. Servetus has no words sharp enough to condemn the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity. In his eyes it is tritheistic, atheistic, a tricipex monstrum, tricipex cerberus, tripartitus Deus. Over against that he proceeds from the proposition that the Divine being cannot be divided, and that therefore, for the maintenance of the deity of Christ and of the H. Spirit, no persons but only dispositions, apparitions, modes of God may be assumed. The Father is the whole being of God, the only God. But he makes use of the Logos, which already existed before Christ, yet not as person but as word, reason, thought, in order to reveal himself in creation and under the O. Test. and to become man in Christ. The Logos did not assume the human nature in Christ but became flesh in him. The man Christ is therefore the true Son of God; God dwells fully in him. And likewise the H. Spirit, who is not really distinguished from the Logos but is included in him, is the mode of God's self-communication. Through him God dwells in

all creatures and communicates his life to all. At the end of the process the Trinity ceases again, Trechsel I 65 f. 103 f. 120 f. The gnostic and theosophical elements that here again came to light in the doctrine of the Trinity soon increased still further in Böhme, Zinzendorf, and Swedenborg. In Böhme the Trinity is the result of a process, of which the dark nature, the light of the idea, and the will in the Godhead are the foundations and the factors, Claassen, Jakob Böhme II 25 f. Zinzendorf did indeed call himself trinitariissimus but nevertheless actually proceeded from a gnostic concept of God. God an sich was unattainable, hidden, unfathomable, but he reveals himself in Christ. This is the actual Creator of all things, the Jehovah of the O. Test., who has become flesh and is the object of our worship. In him the Trinity also becomes manifest, however not with immanent relations of generation, spiration, etc., but as a holy family. The first person is the Father, the H. Spirit is the mother, Christ is the Son, and into that family the [267] individual believer and the congregation are now taken up as the bride of the Son, who, just as Eve from Adam's side, is created in an entirely realistic way from the side and the blood of Christ, Plitt, Zinzendorffs Theol. I 211 f. II 24. 133 f. III 14 f. Swedenborg opposed the doctrine of the Trinity even more strongly. Like Servetus, he saw in it nothing but tritheism. God is one, but he has become manifest in Christ as Father, Son, and Spirit, who relate as soul, body, and the activity proceeding from both, Swedenborg, Die ware christl. Religion, 2te Aufl. Stuttgart 1873 S. 241 f. This theosophy prepared the doctrine of the Trinity of the new philosophy. In the system of Spinoza with his one unchangeable substance there was as yet no place for it. In Kant the three persons are replaced by three qualities; true religion consists in faith in God as holy lawgiver, good ruler, and righteous judge, Rel. innerhalb u. s. w. 168 f. Schleiermacher

exercised a strict criticism on the dogma of the Trinity, and acknowledged in it only this as true, that God is united with humanity, both in the person of Christ and in the Gemeingeist der Kirche, Gl. § 170-172, cf. also Lipsius, Dogm. § 368, Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 103 f. Scholten, L. H. K. II 238. According to Schelling and Hegel the dogma contained a deep philosophical thought, which they interpreted thus: God is spirit, thinking, idea, and it therefore belongs to his nature to represent himself, to think, to objectify himself. The content of that thinking, however, cannot be a thought as in the case of man, but must be reality. God therefore, thinking, brings forth himself, objectifies himself, and indeed in the world, which is the actual Son of God, and then from that Selbstentäußerung, through the consciousness of humanity, returns in the Spirit again to himself, Schelling, Werke I 5 S. 294. I 6 S. 28 f. I 7 S. 56 f. Hegel, Werke XI 120 f. 129 f. XII 181 f. The great difference between this speculation and the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity was indeed recognized by Strauss, Gl. I 492 f. But nevertheless many still take pleasure in such a philosophical construction, Biedermann, § 159. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 122. Others content themselves with distinguishing in the one personality of God three potencies, moments, powers, Schelling in his later period, Rothe, Ethik § 23 f. Nietzsche, Ev. Dogm. 438-446. And finally many do not get beyond [268] an “revelation Trinity” of God in nature (creation), history (Christ), and conscience (congregation), Hase, Hutt. Rediv. § 70. de Wette, Dogm. 3 71. Kaftan, Das Wesen der chr. Rel. 388.

14. The doctrine of the Trinity is in the Christian religion the dogma and thus also the mystery par excellence. As soon as the data which Holy Scripture offers for it became the object of theological thought, the need awoke for all kinds of names and expressions which did not occur in Holy

Scripture, and which nevertheless proved indispensable, in order to represent the truth to some extent, even if imperfectly, and to maintain it against misunderstanding and opposition. The Arians and many tendencies in later times, such as the Socinians, the Anabaptists, the Remonstrants, the Biblical theologians, etc., disapprove the use of such unscriptural names. But Christian theology always defended their right and their value, August., *de trin.* VI 10. Thomas, *S. Th.* I qu. 29 art. 3. Calvin, *Inst.* I 13, 5. Moor I 710-712. M. Vitranga I 191-195. Gerhard, *Loc.* III c. 2. Philippi, *Kirchl. Gl.* II 3 149 f. Scripture, after all, is not given to us in order to be simply repeated, but to be reflected upon and rendered in our own language; Jesus and the apostles used it thus and by reasoning derived further inferences from it; Scripture is not a lawbook and also not a dogmatics but the principium of theology; as the word of God it binds not only in its literal words but also in that which is lawfully derived from it, cf. part I 528. Furthermore, no reflection on the truth of Scripture and thus no single theological activity is possible, without making use of such words which do not occur in Scripture. Not only in the doctrine of the Trinity, but also with every other dogma and in the whole of theology, expressions and terms are employed which are not to be found in Scripture. With these names, therefore, the independence of the Christian, the right of theology, is at stake. And finally these do not serve to introduce new dogmas apart from Scripture or in conflict with it, but precisely to maintain the truth of Scripture against heresy. They have much more negative than positive significance. They indicate the lines within which Christian thinking has to move, in order not to lose the truth of revelation from its hands. Under the appearance [269] of scripturalness, Biblical theology has always strayed further away from Scripture; and with its non-biblical terms, ecclesiastical

orthodoxy has always again been justified in its scriptural character. Thus there also gradually arose in the doctrine of the Trinity all kinds of unusual names, such as ὁμοουσιος, οὐσία, ὑπαρξις, ὑποστασις, προσωπον, γενναν, τριας, unitas, trinitas, substantia, personae, nomina, gradus, species, formae, proprietates etc. The meaning of these terms, however, was at first by no means fixed for a long time. The word οὐσία was indeed usually used of the one being of God, but still served with Origen, Athanasius, Gregorius Nyss. often, to designate the three persons in that one being. Athanasius expressly defended himself against Sabellianism by this, that he calls the Son not μονοουσιος but ὁμοουσιος with the Father, Expos. fid. c. 2. Likewise the word ὑποστασις was used now of the being, then again of the three persons; and one therefore said now that there was only one and then again, that there were three ὑποστασεις in God. But Sabellianism saw in the persons only forms of revelation of the one being. Over against that, the church had to lay emphasis on the fact that those persons were really existing self-subsistences in the divine being. And for that the name ὑποστασις was used. Basilius in his letter περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστασεως brought more uniformity into this, by designating the being of God with οὐσία and the three persons with ὑποστασις or προσωπον; each ὑποστασις thus has its own existence, ἴδια ὑπαρξις, is ὑφεστωσα, and is distinguished from the other by ἰδιότητες, ἰδιώματα, ἰδιαζοντα, σημεια, ἴδια γνωρισματα, χαρακτηρες, μορφαι. And to this the usage of the two Gregories and further of Joh. Damascenus and of Greek theology and church attaches itself. Petavius, de trin. V c. 1 sq. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II 2 99. 151 f. Dorner, Entw. I 2 914 f. Harnack, II 2 252. Hatch, Griech. u. Christ., deutsch von Preuschen 1892 S. 200 f. In the West the confusion was not so great. By Tertullian the term essentia or substantia for the being and the name persona or subsistentia for the persons

had been established. Later church teachers and symbols adopted this usage. Hilarius in his work *de trinitate* speaks constantly of *una essentia*, *substantia*, *natura*, *genus* and of *tres personae*, which are distinguished from one another by *proprietaes*. Augustine disapproved of rendering the Greek [270] ὑποστασις by *substantia*. *Substantia* and *essentia* could not in Latin be distinguished as ὑποστασις and οὐσία in Greek. One could not in Latin speak of *una essentia* and *tres substantiae*. Rather, *substantia* was like the Greek οὐσία, and *essentia* always still sounded strange and unusual to Latin ears. Latin therefore retained the expression *una substantia* and *tres personae*. Yet the word *substantia* was by Augustine preferably avoided altogether, both for the being and for the persons. For *substantia* in Latin, in distinction from *accidens*, indicated the bearer of the properties as existing in itself. Because that opposition cannot apply in God, since being and properties in him are one, Augustine considered it better to designate the divine being as *essentia*, *de trin.* V 8. VII 4. And just as in the East it was necessary, over against Sabellianism, to lay emphasis on the subsistence, the ὑποστασις, of the three persons, so the Latins, over against Arianism, held fast that the three persons were not three *substantiae*, but three *personae*. Scholasticism further expanded this terminology and gave a fixed schema, which later was generally adopted, also in the theology of the Reformation. In God there is one being, *una essentia*, *unitas naturae*, and three persons, *tres personae*, *trinitas personarum*. These three persons are one in that being, ὁμοουσιοι, *coessentiales*, and mutually exist in one another, ἐμπεριχωρησις, *circumincessio personarum*. But they are distinct. For there are in God *duae emanationes*: *per modum naturae* and *per modum voluntatis*; *tres hypostases*: *Pater*, *Filius*, *Spiritus S.*; *quatuor relationes*: *paternitas*, *filiatio*, *spiratio activa* and *passiva*; *quinque notiones*:

innascibilitas, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa and passiva; tres proprietates personales: Pater, qui est ingenuitus, Filius, qui est genitus, Spiritus Sanctus, qui est spiratus, Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 3. 4 cf. Anselmus, Monol. c. 29 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 22 sq. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 27-32 etc.

15. In order to understand the doctrine of the Trinity well, three questions must be answered: what does the word essence signify? what is indicated by the word person? And what is the relation between essence and person and between the persons mutually? As far as the concept essence is concerned, Aristotle defined [271] οἴσια as a substance, ἡ μητε καθ' ὑποκειμενον τινος λεγεται μητε ἐν ὑποκειμενω τινι ἐστιν, οἶον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος και ὁ τις ἵππος. And thus the word was at first also used in theology and applied to the three persons as well as to the one essence. But gradually οὐσια was employed in another sense and it became the designation of the essence, the nature, the essentia of a thing, what Aristotle had called το τι ἦν εἶναι. Thus it became synonymous with φυσικς. Some considered this word, because derived from φοναι, just as natura from nasci, less suitable to designate the essence of God, Greg. Naz. ad Evagr., Dionys. de div. nom. c. 2. But this word nevertheless became established in theology just like the word nature, and found support in 2 Petr. 1:4. Οὐσια, φυσικς, substantia, essentia, natura became the constant name for the one essence of God, the Godhead in general, abstracted from its ὑπαρξις, subsistentia and from its τροποι ὑπαρξεως, modi subsistendi, thus for the divine nature, as it is common to all three persons. This essence of God is one and simple, essentially distinct from all creatures and in possession of all those attributes which have been treated earlier. The distinction between this essence and the three persons in God finds its analogy in the creatures.

In these we distinguish between the essence and the individuals. Paul, John, Peter all partake of the same human nature but as persons are distinct from the essence and from one another, Basilus, Epist. 43. But here at once a double danger threatens. Nominalism conceives the essence, the universal, only as a name, a concept and thus in the doctrine of the Trinity arrives at tritheism; excessive realism thinks, with respect to the essence, of a self-subsistence standing behind and above the persons and thus arrives at tetradism or sabellianism. Even Gregory of Nyssa did not wholly overcome this exaggerated realism. In order to prove that the Godhead is one and that one ought not to speak of three Gods, he denied the applicability of number also to finite creatures. It was according to him an abuse, to speak in the plural of those who partake of one nature and thus to speak of many men, ad Ablabium, cf. Petavius, de trin. IV c. 9. Schwane II 156 f. Dorner, Entw. I 916 f. Thus, however, the distinction between the essence in God and in the creatures is overlooked. There is without doubt analogy, and because of that [272] analogy we may also speak of his essence with respect to God. But that analogy nevertheless at the same time presupposes a very important difference. The concept of the essence of man is a species-concept; human nature indeed has real existence and is no *flatus vocis*, it is present not indeed outside and above men, but yet in each man. But it exists in each man in its own, finite manner; men, like the gods in polytheism, are indeed ὁμοι-] but not ὁμο-] or μονοουσιολ. Human nature is in the different men not *tota* and not *numero eadem*; and men are therefore not only *distincti* but also *divisi*. In God all that is different. The divine nature is not to be conceived as an abstract species-concept and just as little as a *substantia* outside, above, behind the persons; it exists in the persons and in each of these *tota* and *numero eadem*. The persons are therefore indeed

distincti but not divisi. They are ὁμο-, μονο-, ταυτοουσιτοι. They are separated by no place or time or anything else. All of them partake of the same divine nature and perfections. It is one and the same Godhead, which exists in the three persons, in all and in each in particular, so that in God there is only one Eternal, one Almighty, one Omniscient, one God with one understanding, one will, one power, Symb. Athan. n. 9-18. The word essence thus maintains the truth which in Scripture is always placed in the foreground, is enclosed in monotheism and is also defended by unitarianism. Whatever distinctions may exist in the divine essence, they may and can not detract from the unity of the nature. For in God the unity is not defective and limited but perfect and absolute. Among creatures all diversity by its nature also includes more or less separation and division. Everything that is creature necessarily exists in the forms of space and time and thus alongside and after one another. But eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, goodness, etc. by virtue of their nature exclude all separation and division. God is absolute unity and simplicity, without composition or division, and that unity is itself not ethical, not contractual in nature, as among men, but absolute, and thus no accidents to the essence, but one with the essence of God itself. [273]

16. But now the glory of the confession of the Trinity lies precisely in this, that this unity, however absolute, does not exclude but includes diversity. The being of God is no abstract unity, no abstract concept, but a fullness of being, an infinite richness of life, which in the diversity unfolds precisely the highest unity. Those self-distinctions, which Holy Scripture now makes known to us in the Divine being under the name of Father, Son, and Spirit, are designated in theology with the word person. In the East one first used for that προσωπον, corresponding to the Hebrew פָּנִים, face,

outward appearance, role. But this word was susceptible to misunderstanding; Sabellius said that the one Divine οὐσία or ὑπόστασις assumed different πρόσωπα. Over against this the church fathers maintained that the three πρόσωπα in the Divine being were not merely appearances, forms of revelation, but that they were πρόσωπα ἐνυπόστατα, that they existed ἐν ὑπόστασει. Thus the word πρόσωπον was replaced by ὑπόστασις, which word first means foundation, substructure, firmness, and then denotes that which really exists and not merely in appearance, or also that which exists in itself in distinction from accidentia, which inhaere in something else, cf. also 2 Cor. 9:4, 11:17, Hebr. 1:3, 3:14, 11:1 and Cremer s. v. In Latin one used the word persona, which first denoted the mask, then the role of an actor, thereafter the conditio, qualitas, status, in which someone appears and thus in legal language made known the jus standi in judicio. This concept was thus also freely floating, and in Tertullian it still alternates with all kinds of other words, nomen, species, forma, gradus, res. Yet this word was retained in Latin, even when in the East πρόσωπον had already been replaced by ὑπόστασις; for the word ὑπόστασις could not be rendered in Latin by any suitable word; substantia one could not use, because this was already in use for the essence. But this difference in expression repeatedly gave occasion for misunderstanding between the East and the West. The Greeks thought, with the Latin persona, of their word πρόσωπον, and the Latins understood the Greek ὑπόστασις in the sense of their substantia. Back and forth one reproached one another with the poverty of language. Yet in substance one taught entirely the same, namely that the three persons were not modi but self-subsistences. Thus the word πρόσωπον, [274] persona in ecclesiastical language received as essential characteristic the self-subsistence, ὑπόστασις, subsistentia, subsistens,

suppositum. This sense the word ὑποστασις still has in Athanasius and the Cappadocians. But later the word persona acquired yet another trait. For if persona indicated nothing other than ὑποστασις, that which exists in itself, over against accidens, then it could also well be used of things. In the christological struggle one was driven, over against Nestorianism and Monophysitism, to an even sharper determination of nature and person; and thus there then arose, in the work ascribed to Boethius *de duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, the definition of persona as *naturae rationabilis individua substantia*. The word now expressed a twofold thing: self-subsistence and rationality or self-consciousness. This meaning it has in scholasticism, Lombardus, *Sent. I dist. 23 cf. 25, 26*. Thomas, *S. Th. I qu. 29*. Bonaventura, *Sent. I dist. 23 qu. 1 and dist. 25*, and furthermore also in the older Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed dogmatics, Petavius, *de trin. IV c. 9*. Schmid, *Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 90 f*. Beza, *Tract. theol. I 646*. Zanchius, *Op. I 13*. Maresius, *Syst. theol. III 7*. Synopsis pur. theol. VII 8 etc. Only since the previous century did the determination arise that the essence of personality lies, not in existing in itself, but in self-consciousness and self-determination. This definition may now be correct for human personality, although even then it is still open to objection, but in any case it is no correct description of the word person in the doctrine of the Trinity. Applied here, it would lead to tritheism, i.e. to three personalities, each with a separate self-consciousness and self-determination. Even the definition of Boethius fits much more in the doctrine of Christ than in that of the Trinity. And that has also been felt time and again. Richard of St. Victor opposed it, because it spoke of *individua substantia* and therefore described person as *divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia*, *de trin. IV 21*. Calvin spoke only of *subsistentia in Dei essentia*, *Inst. I 13, 6*, cf. Alting,

Theol. probl. nova III qu. 31. And all acknowledged the truth of the word of Augustine: we speak of persons, *non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur*, de trin. V 9. VI 10, cf. Anselmus, Monol. c. 37, 38. Calvin, Inst. I 13, 2-4, and furthermore Braun, Der Begriff Person in seiner Anwendung auf Trinität und Incarnation, Mainz 1896. Person [275] in the dogma of the Trinity denotes nothing other than that the three persons in the Divine being are not *modi* but each exists in its own way. Even on the rational and self-conscious in this concept the emphasis does not fall at all; for this follows of itself from the fact that they partake of the same essence and all virtues, thus also of knowledge and wisdom. What, however, is expressed in the word person is that the unity of the Divine essence unfolds in a threefold existence. It is a *unitas, ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem*. The persons are not three modes of revelation of the one Divine personality, but the Divine essence exists in no other way than as three-personal, precisely because it is absolute, Divine personality. In man we have of that only a weak analogy. Personality in human beings comes into being only in that there is a subject that sets itself over against itself as object and again comprehends itself with itself; three moments constitute the essence of human personality, but with us these are only moments; in God they are, because in Him there is no time or space, no extension and no division, three ὑποστάσεις, three modes of existence of the one and the same essence. This analogy of human personality must, however, still be supplemented in another way. Human nature is too rich to be embodied in one single human being or person; it therefore extends itself in many human beings and comes only in humanity to its full unfolding. So also the Divine essence unfolds its fullness in three persons; but these are not three individuals alongside and separated from one another, but in and within the Divine essence the threefold self-distinction, which takes up the

unfolding of the essence in personality and thus makes it three-personal. The unfolding of human nature is of a twofold kind: in the individual human being to personality and in humanity to many individuals, who together also again form a unity, a personality, as Christ with the church is one perfect man, 1 Cor. 12:12, Ef. 4:13. This double unfolding, which in humanity can be no other, is in God one; the unfolding of his essence to personality coincides with that of his essence to persons. The three persons are the one Divine personality brought to perfect self-unfolding in and out of and through and within the essence. [276]

17. From this it can be inferred in what sense the third above-mentioned question concerning the relation of essence and person and of the persons among themselves must be answered. With Tertullian the three persons are *unius substantiae, unius status, unius potestatis sed unus Deus*; they are three *non statu sed gradu, unum, not unus*; they are *unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris, Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur*. There is *distinctio, distributio, no diversitas and divisio*. Athanasius and the Cappadocians defined the ὑποστασεις as τροποι ὑπαρξεως, and thereby indicated that they, one in essence, nevertheless each had their own existentia and differed in mode of existence. The distinction between essence and person and the persons among themselves thus lay in the mutual relation, ἡ προς ἀλληλα σχεσις, in being Father, Son, and Spirit, in the properties of πατροτης (ἀγεννησια), υἱοτης (γεννησις) and ἁγιασμος (ἐκπορευσις). This was worked out more broadly by Augustine. He does not derive the trinitas from the Father but from the unity, from the deitas, and regards it not as accidental but as essentially proper to God. It belongs to his essence to be triune. Insofar, being-person is identical with the essence itself. *Non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse sed*

omnino idem, de trin. VII 6. For if being belonged to God in an absolute sense and being-person in a relative sense, then the three persons could not be one essence. Each person is therefore equal to the whole essence and as much as the two others or as all three together. With creatures this is not so. One man is not as much as three men. At in Deo non ita est; non enim major essentia est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus simul quam solus Pater aut solus Filius, sed tres simul illae substantiae sive personae, si ita dicendae sunt, aequales sunt singulis, de trin. VII 6. In summa trinitate tantum est una quantum tres simul sunt nec plus aliquid sunt duae quam una, et in se infinita sunt. Ita et singula sunt in singulis et omnia in singulis et singula in omnibus et omnia in omnibus et unum omnia, ib. VI 10. Ipsa trinitas tam magnum est, quam unaquaeque ibi persona, ib. VIII 1. Therefore the distinction between essence and person and persons among themselves cannot lie in any substance, but only in the mutual relations. Quidquid ergo ad seipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis singulariter dicitur, id est, de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, et simul de ipsa trinitate non pluraliter sed [277] singulariter dicitur, de trin. V 8. Quidquid autem proprie singula in eadem trinitate dicuntur, nullo modo ad seipsa sed ad invicem, aut ad creaturam dicuntur et ideo relative, non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est, ib. c. 11. And accordingly the later theology said that essence and person differed not re but ratione, yet not ratione ratiocinante, i.e. rationaliter, nominaliter, as Sabellius thought, but ratione ratiocinata. The distinction consisted not in any substance but only in relation, but this distinction was nevertheless real, objective, grounded in God's revelation. Essence and person differ not re but yet realiter; the difference consists in a modus subsistendi but is nevertheless a real difference. The person is a mode of existence of the essence; and the persons among themselves

therefore differ, as the one mode of existence differs from the other, or according to the common example, as the open differs from the closed hand, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 28 sq. Petavius, de trin. IV c. 10. 11. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. I2 350 f. Calvin, Inst. I 13, 6. 16-20. Zanchius, Op. I 21 sq. Moor I 713 sq. Turretinus, Th. El. III qu. 27 etc. If this distinction of essence and person and of persons among themselves must be indicated in a single word, there is indeed not much more to be said about it. But this distinction nevertheless becomes clearer if we conceive the relations themselves through which it comes about in the divine essence. Although Holy Scripture is strictly monotheistic, it nevertheless ascribes divine nature and perfections to Son and Spirit and places them on one line with the Father. Father, Son, and Spirit are thus distinct subjects in the one and the same divine essence. And as such they also bear different names, have special personal properties, and always appear in a certain fixed order, both ad intra and ad extra. The distinction of the persons thus lies wholly and entirely in the so-called ἰδιώματα, ἰδιότητες, proprietates, personal properties, namely paternitas (ἀγεννησία, innascibilitas), generatio activa, spiratio activa, filiatio (generatio passiva and spiratio activa), processio (spiratio passiva). These now by their nature add nothing new, no new substance, to the essence. A man who becomes a father does not change in essence but only enters into a relation hitherto foreign to him. The essence of God is distinguished from being-Father, being-Son, and being-Spirit not in a thing-like, substantial way but only ratione, relatione. The one [278] and the same essence is and is called Father when it is conceived in its relation to that same essence in the relation of the Son. And the persons among themselves therefore differ only in this, that the one is Father, the other Son, and the third Spirit. Among men we find only a weak likeness of

this, but one that can nevertheless serve for clarification. Among men fatherhood and sonship are indeed nothing but a relation, but that relation presupposes a personal, individual subject that is the bearer of that relation, but otherwise still exists in all sorts of ways outside that fatherhood and sonship. Fatherhood is only an accidental property of being-human; some men never become fathers; whoever becomes one has not been one for a long time and gradually ceases again to be one, etc. Being-human therefore by no means is exhausted in fatherhood or sonship. But it is not so in the divine essence. Being-God coincides completely with being-person. *Quemadmodum hoc illi est esse, quod Deum esse, quod magnum, quod bonum esse, ita hoc illi est esse, quod personam esse*, Aug. de trin. VII 6. The divine essence therefore, so to speak, is completely exhausted in each of the three persons in being-Father, being-Son, and being-Spirit. The paternitas, filiatio, and processio are not additional properties alongside the essence, but the eternal forms of existence of, the eternal, immanent relations in the essence. With men the unfolding of the one human nature falls apart; it takes place partly in the individual man, in that he becomes personality; it further takes place in humanity, whose members all represent human nature in a special way; it finally also comes about in the relations of sex and kinship, which also each time make a side of human nature known to us. In men this threefold unfolding of nature falls apart in space and time; it is essentially extension. In God, however, there is no separation or division. The unfolding of his essence into personality includes at once, immediately, absolutely, completely within itself that of his essence into persons and at the same time that of his essence into the immanent relations which are expressed by the names Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus God is the archetype of man; what in humanity falls apart, lies alongside one another,

is spread out in the forms of space and time, that is eternally and simply present in God. The processiones in his essence simultaneously bring about in [279] God his absolute personality, his triunity, and his immanent relations. They are the absolute archetypes of all those processiones through which in the individual man, in the family, and in humanity human nature comes to its full unfolding. Therefore the three persons are indeed each another, *alius*, but not *aliud*; the threeness is from and in and unto the unity; the unfolding of the essence takes place within the essence and therefore does not detract from the unity and simplicity of the essence. Furthermore, the three persons, though not *aliud*, are nevertheless *alii*, distinct subjects, ὑποστάσεις, *subsistentiae*, who precisely thereby bring the essence of God to absolute unfolding within the essence itself. And finally those three persons are mutually related to one another in an absolute way through generation and spiration; their distinctness as subjects coincides completely with their immanent kinship relations. The Father is solely and eternally Father, the Son is solely and eternally Son, the Spirit is solely and eternally Spirit. And because each of them is himself in a simple, eternal, absolute way, therefore the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God. The Father is so as Father, the Son as Son, the Holy Spirit as Holy Spirit. And because all three are God, they partake of one divine nature, and there is therefore one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who is to be praised unto eternity.

18. After the doctrine of the Trinity in general has thus been set forth, the three persons must now be discussed separately. The first person is the Father and his personal property is the *paternitas* or also the ἀγεννησία. In the Arian struggle this word played a great role. It was taken over from common Greek. Plato called the ideas ἀγεννητους; Aristotle so called

matter; the Gnostics spoke of God as βυθος ἀγεννητος, ingenitum, Iren. adv. haer. I 1. From them Paul of Samosata and the Arians, Aëtius and Eunomius, took over this usage, in order thereby to combat the homoousia of the Son and the Spirit with the Father. The ἀγεννησια expressed, in contrast with every creature, God's proper essence. The Son, however, is not ἀγεννητος; He is called in Scripture μονογενης and orthodoxy also calls Him generated; thus He cannot be God, but must be a creature; we may not assume δυο [280] ἀγεννητα, i.e. δυο θεους, Athanasius, c. Ar. I 31 sq. de decr. nic. syn. 28 sq. Basilus, adv. Eunom. II 25 sq. etc. Now, however, there exist in Greek two words: γεννητος from γενναν, gignere, generare and γενητος from γιγνεσθαι, fieri; the latter is much broader than the former and denotes everything that is produced and has a beginning of existence, whether by creation, generation, or propagation. These two words at first were not always clearly distinguished; one only pointed out that the word ἀγεννητος or ἀγενητος could be used in different senses and in the one sense could not and in the other sense could be applied to the Son. But gradually the practice arose of making a distinction between the two words. All three persons could then, in contrast with every creature, be called ἀγενητος; none of them was produced in the manner of creatures; none of them had a beginning of existence. The agenesia was a property of the divine essence and common to all three persons. But from that the ἀγεννησια had to be distinguished. This was a property of the Father alone. The Son could be called γεννητος, not because He, as a creature, was produced in time, but because He from eternity was generated out of the essence of the Father, cf. Athan., Basil. Gregor. t. a. p. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I c. 8. Augustinus, de trin. V c. 3. Petavius, de trin. V c. 1-3. Suicerus, s. v. But the church fathers at the same time remarked that this

property, viz. the ἀγεννησία, belonged specifically to the person and not to the essence. The essence is in the three persons one and the same, but the agennesia is a relation in the essence. Just as Adam and Eve and Abel partake of the same essence, although they received it in different ways, so also in God the essence is one, although this exists in the three persons in different ways, Athan. de decr. nic. Syn. 8. Gregor. Naz. Orat. theol. V. In addition, there is also the fact that the name ἀγεννησία is negative and only says that the Father is exalted above generation, but it says nothing positive concerning God's nature; properly speaking, therefore, it is also no designation of the person of the Father, for the ἀγεννητον esse and being-Father is absolutely not the same, Basilius, adv. Eun. I 9. 15. Greg. Naz. Orat. theol. III. August. de trin. V 5. Therefore the name Father is to be preferred above that of ἀγεννητος, Basilius, adv. Eun. I 5. The scriptural name of Father indicates much [281] better than that of ἀγεννητος the personal property of the first person. In the paternitas a positive relation to the second person is enclosed. The name Father is even more proper to God than the name God, for the latter is a general name, a nomen dignitatis, but the Father-name in the N. T. is, just like that of Iah in the O. T., a nomen proprium, designation of a personal property of God. He who denies God the Father-name does Him an even greater dishonor than he who denies his creation. This Father-name is then also not a figurative manner of speaking transferred from men to God. Rather the relation is reversed. Fatherhood on earth is a far, weak likeness of the Fatherhood of God, Ef. 3:15. God is Father in a true and perfect sense. Among men a father is again son of another and a son in his turn again father; among men a father alone is not able to bring forth a son; among men fatherhood is temporal and in a certain sense accidental, not essentially connected with being human; it begins only

late and it soon, in any case at death, ceases again. But in God that is wholly different. He is simple and pure and wholly Father; He is only Father, He is Father by nature; He is Father eternally, without beginning and end, and therefore the generation must also be an eternal one and the Son as eternal as the Father, for if the Son were not eternal, the Father also could not be eternal. The eternity of the Fatherhood brings with it the eternity of the Sonship; he who names the Father, thereby of himself also names the Son, Athanasius, c. Ar. I 23. 28. Greg. Naz. Orat. theol. III 5. 17. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 8. Hilarius, de trin. XII 24. For this relation of the Father to the Son and at the same time to the H. Spirit, the Father was often called αὐτογενής, αὐτογενήτος, αὐτοφύης, ἀποίητος, ἀναρχος, principii expers, sui ipse origo, suae causa substantiae, sui principium; and further ἀρχή, αἷτια, ρίζα, πηγή, principium, causa, radix, fons, origo, caput etc. of the Son and the Spirit or of the whole Godhead, Petavius, de trin. V 5. Suicerus, s. v.

19. The special property of the second person in the Trinity is the filiation. In Scripture He bears various names, which indicate His relation to the Father, such as [282] word, wisdom, logos, son, firstborn, only-begotten, only son, image of God, εἰκὼν, ὑποστάσις, χαρακτήρ. On these names and on some texts cited above, the doctrine of the eternal generation, first so named by Origen, αἰώνιος γεννησις, was built. Naturally we speak of this in a human and therefore imperfect and defective way; and the thought of it admonishes to modesty, Iren. adv. haer. II 28, 6, Athan., c. Ar. II 36. Basilus, adv. Eun. II 22, 24. Greg. Naz. Orat. XX etc. But nevertheless we may speak thus. For just as by way of comparison mouth and ear and eye are ascribed to God, so human generation is an analogy and image of that divine act, by which the Father gives to the Son the life in Himself. But then all the imperfect and sensible elements of it must also be thought away. The

generation of a human being is imperfect and defective; a man needs a woman in order to bring forth a son; a man can never communicate his full image, his whole being, in one child and not even in many children; a father becomes a father only in the course of time and also ceases to be so, and the child soon becomes wholly independent of and autonomous over against the father. But it is not so with God. There is generation also in the divine being. It is a beautiful thought, repeatedly recurring among the church fathers, that God is fruitful. He is not an abstract, rigid unity, not μοναδικος, solitarius. He is a fullness of life; his nature is a γεννητικη, καρπογονος ούσια; it is capable of extension, unfolding, communication. Whoever denies this and denies all production in the divine being, does not take seriously that God is infinite, supremely blessed life. He retains nothing but an abstract, deistic concept of God, or by way of compensation takes up, in a pantheistic manner, the life of the world into the divine being. Without the Trinity, creation also is not to be understood; if God cannot communicate Himself, then He is a dark light, a dry spring, and how would He be able to communicate Himself ad extra, to creatures? Athan., c. Ar. II 2. Damasc. de fide orth. I 8. But nevertheless that generation is to be conceived in a divine manner. Therefore it is in the first place spiritual. The Arians raised against it especially the objection that all generation necessarily brings with it separation, division, τομη, διαιρεσις and also παθος, ἀπορροια. That would be so if it were [283] bodily, sensible, creaturely. But it is spiritual and divine, and therefore simple, without division or separation; it takes place ἀρρευστως και ἀδιαιρετως, Athan., Expos. fidei 2. It brings distinctio and distributio, but no diversitas and divisio into the divine being. Ὁ δε θεος ἀμερης ὦν ἀμεριστος ἐστι και ἀπαθης του υἱου πατηρ, οὔτε γαρ ἀπορροη του ἄσωματου ἐστιν, οὔτ' ἐπιρροη τις εἰς αὐτον γινεται, ὡς ἐπ'

ἀνθρώπων, Athan. de decr. nic. syn. 11. c. Ar. I 16. 28 sq. The generation in God therefore has its most striking analogy in thinking and speaking; and Scripture itself points to that, when it calls the Son the Logos. Just as the spirit of man objectifies itself in the word, so God communicates His whole being in the Logos. But here too there is again a difference. Man needs many words in order to express his thought; those words are sounds and thus sensible and material; they are non-self-subsistent and have no subsistence in themselves. But when God speaks, then in the one Logos He speaks out His whole being and gives Him life in Himself. In the second place, therefore, generation implies that the Father generates the Son ἐκ της ούσιας του πατρος, θεον ἐκ θεου, φως ἐκ φωτος, θεον ἀληθινον ἐκ θεου ἀληθινου, γεννηθεντα οί ποιηθεντα, ὁμοουσιον τῷ πατρι, as was established at Nicaea. The Arians taught that the Son had been brought forth by the will of the Father out of nothing. But this was not generation but creation. To create is το ἐξωθεν και οὐκ ἐκ της ούσιας του κτιζοντος και ποιουντος γινεσθαι το κτιζομενον και ποιουμενον ἀνομοιον παντελως κατ' ούσιαν; but generation is το ἐκ της ούσιας του γεννωντος προαγεσθαι το γεννωμενον ὁμοιον κατ' ούσιαν, Damasc. de fide orthodox. I 8, cf. Athan., de decr. nic. syn. 13. 26. c. Ar. I 5. 6. The Son is not a creature, but God to be praised unto all eternity, Rom. 9:5. And therefore He was not brought forth by the will of the Father, out of nothing and in time. But He is generated out of the being of the Father, in eternity. Generation is therefore not a proper work, no ἐνεργεια of the Father, but to the Father there belongs a φυσικη γεννητικη. That of course does not mean that generation is an unconscious, unwilled emanation, that it proceeds outside the will and the power of the Father. It is not an act of a preceding, deciding will, of a βουλησις προηγουμενη, like creation; but it is so naturally proper to the Father that

His [284] will, as voluntas concomitans, has in it His whole good pleasure. It is revelation of *zījne φυσεως γνησιοτης και ούσιας ίδιοτης* and thus also of His knowledge, will and power and of all His virtues, Athan. c. Ar. III 59-67. Greg. Naz. Or. III 6 sq. Cyrillus Alex. de trin. II. Hilarius, de trin. III 4. Augustinus, de trin. XV 20. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 6. 7. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 41 art. 2. In the third place, therefore, generation is also confessed by the Christian church as an eternal one. The Arians said that the Son at first was not, *ήν ποτε ότε ούκ ήν*, appealed especially to the *έκτισε*, creavit of Spr. 8:22, cf. above p. 242. and pointed to the antinomy that exists between the concepts *αίωνιος* and *γεννησις*. But if Father and Son bear these their name in a metaphysical sense, as Scripture indisputably teaches, then thereby generation is also proved as an eternal one. If the Son is not eternal, then God too is surely not eternal Father; He was then God before He was Father and only later in time became Father. The denial of eternal generation therefore not only does injustice to the deity of the Son but also to that of the Father; it makes Him changeable, deprives Him of His divine nature, takes from Him the eternity of the Fatherhood, and leaves it unexplained how God can truly and with right be called Father in time, if the foundation for that does not lie eternally in His nature, Athan., de decr. nic. syn. 26 sq. de sent. Dionysii 14 sq. c. Ar. I 12 sq. Basilius, adv. Eun. II 14 sq. de Spir. S. 14 sq. Greg. Naz. Or. theol. III 3 sq. But that generation is then also to be understood in the true sense as an eternal one. It is not once in eternity completed and accomplished, but it is an eternal, unchangeable, and thus at the same time eternally completed and eternally continuing act of God. Just as the sun radiates light, and the spring lets water flow out, so generation is proper to the nature of the Father. The Father never was and is never without generation. He always generates. *Ούχι έγεννησεν ό πατηρ*

τον υἱον και ἀπέλυσεν αὐτον ὁ πατηρ ἀπο της γενεσεως αὐτου, ἀλλ' ἀει
γεννᾷ αὐτον, Orig. in Jerem. hom. IX 4, de princ. I 2, 2. God's generating is
speaking and His speaking is eternal, Θεου αιδιον το γεννημα. Athan. c. Ar.
I 14. 20. IV 12. de sent. Dion. 15. 16. Damascenus, de fide orth. I 8. Aug. de
trin. VI 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 42 art. 2. Polanus, Synt. theol. III c. 4.
Voetius, Disp. V 632. Synopsis pur. theol. VIII 11. Scholten, L. H. K. II
207. [285]

20. The third person in the Trinity bears the name of the H. Spirit, and his
personal property is the ἐκπορευσις, πνοη, processio, spiratio. The doctrine
of the H. Spirit has in Christian theology always been treated only as a
consequence of the doctrine of the Son. With the second person the struggle
ran almost exclusively over his Godhead; his personality was generally
established. But with the H. Spirit the struggle was conducted chiefly over
his personality; if this was acknowledged, his Godhead followed of itself;
with the Godhead of the Son that of the H. Spirit also had to be assumed.
The Pneumatomachi of earlier and later times, however, raised all kinds of
objections against the personality and Godhead of the H. Spirit. They
appealed to the fact that the name God is never ascribed to the H. Spirit in
Scripture, that nowhere is there any mention of his worship, and that he is
repeatedly represented as a power and a gift of God; the few passages that
speak of him as a person had to be understood as personifications. Now
Gregory of Nazianzus explained the great difference of opinion that in his
time existed concerning the H. Spirit from the fact that the O. Test. had
clearly revealed the Father but less clearly the Son, and that the N. Test. had
indeed set the divine nature of the Son in clear light, but had still only
darkly indicated the Godhead of the H. Spirit. But now the H. Spirit dwells
among us and makes himself clearly known to us, Orat. V. In this lies an

unmistakable truth. The personality and the Godhead of the H. Spirit do not stand so objectively outside of us and over against us as those of the Father and the Son. The name that he bears does not express that personality, as that of Father and Son does. The economy of the H. Spirit, namely sanctification, does not stand out so clearly to our consciousness as that of creation, incarnation, and satisfaction. We ourselves live in that economy, the H. Spirit dwells in us and among us, and therefore prayer is directed less to him than to the Father and to the Mediator. He is much more the author than the object of prayer. Therefore the personality or at least the Godhead of the H. Spirit was for a long time in dispute in the church. The religious interest of this doctrine was not felt in the first period. The Spirit was usually indeed acknowledged in his personality but was only regarded as Spirit who in the past had performed his work, had illuminated the prophets and apostles [286] and had equipped and qualified Christ for his office. The necessity of the *gratia interna* was not yet seen; there was as yet no conscious, living need for an almighty, divine operation of grace in the heart; the *unio mystica*, the communion between God and man, was not yet sounded in its depth; the objective revelation of God in Christ seemed sufficient, and a subjective illumination was not yet deemed necessary, cf. above 251v. As soon as the congregation more deeply reflected upon its own life and sought to give account not only of the objective but also of the subjective principia of salvation, it confessed with joy the personality and the Godhead of the H. Spirit. And so it has gone on through all centuries. The denial of the personal existence and the divine nature of the H. Spirit always proceeds consciously or unconsciously from a rationalistic, Pelagian, deistic principle; it belongs in the circle of the Arians, Socinians, Remonstrants, etc. From this it also immediately appears that the confession

of the personality and Godhead of the H. Spirit has not arisen from philosophy but from the heart of the Christian religion itself, from the faith of the congregation. There is, with it as with the Godhead of the Son, a deep religious interest; with it the Christian religion itself is at stake. For this stands indubitably firm on the ground of Scripture, that the H. Spirit is the subjective principle of all salvation, of regeneration, faith, conversion, sanctification, etc., that, in other words, there is no communion with Father and Son except in and through the H. Spirit. And now one of the two: the H. Spirit is a creature, whether then a power, a gift, a person, or true God. If he is a creature, then he cannot indeed and in truth make us partakers of God himself, the Father and the Son with all their benefits; then he cannot be the principium of the new life in the Christian and in the whole congregation; then there is no true communion of God and man, then God remains above and outside us, and he does not dwell in humanity as in his temple. But the H. Spirit is not a creature and cannot be. For he stands in the same relation to the Son as this one to the Father, and makes us partakers of the Son and the Father, cf. above 248. He is as closely bound to the Son as this one to the Father. He is in the Son, and this one is in him. He is ἴδιον κατ' οἴσιαν τοῦ υἱοῦ. [287] He is the Spirit of wisdom and of truth, of power and of glory, the Spirit through whom Christ sanctifies the congregation and in whom he makes her partaker of himself and of all his benefits, the θεία φύσις, the υἱοθεσία, the unio mystica with God. He who gives us God himself must himself be true God. To this soteriological interest there is then added the theological significance of the personality and Godhead of the H. Spirit. Without this it does not come to a true unity of Father and Son; whoever denies the Godhead of the H. Spirit cannot maintain that of the Son; only in the divine person of the H. Spirit does the Trinity close,

does the unity of the essence in the threeness of the persons and the threeness of the persons in the unity of the essence come to pass. With the Godhead of the H. Spirit the whole dogma of the Trinity stands and falls, the mystery of Christianity, the heart of religion, the true, essential communion of our souls with God. This was understood by the church fathers and therefore they defended with the Godhead of the Son also that of the Spirit, cf. Athanasius in his letters to Serapion, Gregory Naz. in his oratio theol. de Spiritu Sancto, Basil in his third book against Eunomius and in his Liber de Spiritu Sancto, Gregory of Nyssa, especially in his writing to Ablabius, Hilary, de trinitate libri XII etc. The Symbolum Constant. I expressed the faith εἰς το πνευμα το ἅγιον, το κυριον, το ζωοποιον, το ἐκ του πατρος ἐκπορευομενον, το συν πατρι και υἱῳ συμπροσκυνουμενον και συνδοξαμενον, το λαλησαν δια των προφητων. And since then all Christendom confesses its faith εἰς τριαδα ὁμοουσιον, Basil in Hahn, Bibl. der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche³ 1897 S. 270.

21. The relation in which the Holy Spirit stands to Father and Son is made known to some extent by his name το πνευμα ἅγιον and also by many verba: given, sent, poured out, breathed, proceeding, descending, etc., p. 246. Christian theology designated it as προβολη, ἐκπορευσις, ἐκφοιτησις, πνοη, προιεναι, προκυπτειν, προχεισθαι, processio, spiratio, etc. Preferably it was conceived as a πνοη, spiratio. Scripture provided grounds for that, when it called the Holy Spirit πῆρ, πνευμα and repeatedly compared him with breath and wind, Ps. 33:6, Job 33:4, [288] John 3:8, 20:22, Acts 2:2, etc. But otherwise theology observed modesty here in the description of the spiratio. Like generation, it had to be conceived as eternal communication of the same essence; it also had to be distinguished from generation, because generation gave to the Son and spiratio to the Holy Spirit life in

himself, Athan. ad Serap. I 15 sq. Greg. Naz. Or. theol. V 7 sq. Basilus, de Spir. S. 46 sq. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 8; but one felt the difficulty of more precise determinations. Augustine said: quid autem inter nasci et procedere intersit de illa excellentissima natura loquens, explicare quis potest? Non omne quod procedit, nascitur; quamvis omne procedat quod nascitur. Sicut non omne quod bipes est homo est, quamvis bipes sit omnis qui homo est. Haec scio. Distinguere autem inter illam generationem et hanc processionem nescio, non valeo, non sufficio, c. Maxim. III 14. de trin. XV 17. 20. Tract. 99 in Joann. etc. Yet some distinction was indeed sought. And this was then found in this, that the Son proceeded from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit from both, August, de trin. XV 26, or in this, that he proceeded from Father and Son ut datus, non ut natus, August. de trin. V 14 Petavius, de trin. VIII c. 13. Above all, however, it was pointed out that the Holy Spirit therefore could not be the Son of the Son, because then the trias would become a $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ and there would be no end to the movement of life in the being of God, Basilus, adv. Eunom. V. The Holy Spirit is δι' ἑαυτου συμπληρουν την πολυμνητον και μακαριαν τριαδα, Basilus, de Sp. S. 45. The Trinity is susceptible neither of increase nor of decrease; it is τελεια, Athan. c. Ar. I 18. To be sure, Augustine once answers the objection of the Arians, that the Father was more powerful than the Son, if only the former could generate a Son through whom all things were created: absit autem ut, quomodo putas, ideo sit Pater potentior Filio, quia creatorem genuit Pater, Filius autem non genuit creatorem. Neque enim non potuit sed non oportuit. But how this is to be understood is clarified in what immediately follows. Immoderata enim esset divina generatio, si genitus Filius nepotem gigneret Patri.... nec impleretur generationis series, si semper alter ex altero nasceretur, nec eam perficeret

ullus, si non sufficeret unus, c. Maxim. Arian. III 12. In illa vero essentia trinitatis nullo modo alia [289] quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest exsistere, de trin. VII 6. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 27 art. 5. Finally, especially through Thomas and his followers, the distinction between generation and spiratio was indicated in such a way that generation took place per modum intellectus, spiratio per modum voluntatis. This distinction had long been prepared by the fact that generation was compared with thinking and speaking, and the Holy Spirit was represented as the love that binds Father and Son to one another. In medieval and Roman theology this distinction became almost general, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 27. c. Gent. IV 13. 15 sq. Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 3. Thomas, Bonav. et al. in Sent. I dist. 13. Petavius, de trin. VII c. 13 etc. The Protestant theologians all did assume a certain distinction between generation and spiratio, as also between Son and Spirit; they also partly acknowledged the correctness of the above-mentioned distinctions, Melanchton, Loci Comm., de Filio. Alsted, Theol. schol. p. 137. 145. Maresius, Syst. Theol. III 28; but many nevertheless did not dare to speak so confidently here and considered this distinction not scriptural and not modest enough, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. I 387 sq. Hollaz, Examen theol. p. 341. Zanchius, Op. I 255. Voetius, Disp. V 139. Synopsis pur. theol. IX 14. Moor I 791.

22. Yet gradually a considerable difference developed in the doctrine of the Trinity between the East and the West. The ontological procession of the Son from the Father was conceived in the second century as an eternal generation; and thus for the Holy Spirit also, who nevertheless could not remain standing separately alongside Father and Son, a similar procession had to be assumed. The relation of the Spirit to Father and Son had to be determined. Athanasius taught in that regard, that the Holy Spirit is called

both Spirit of the Father and of the Son or of Christ, that He possesses that same ἰδιότης, ταξίς, φύσις, in relation to the Son as the Son to the Father, Ep. ad Serap. I 21. III 1. He is said to proceed from the Father, ἐκπορευεσθαι, because He is sent and given by the Logos, παρα του λογου, who is from the Father, ib. I 20. As ἐκπορευμα of the Father, the Holy Spirit is always in the hands of the Father, who sends Him, and of the Son who bears Him, and cannot be separated from Them, Expos. fidei 4. de sent. Dionys. 17. He is not the brother or son of the Son, but is [290] the Spirit of the Father, just as the Son is Son of the Father, Ep. ad Serap. I 16. IV 3. But although He is not called Son, He is nevertheless not ἔκτος του υἱου, for He is called the Spirit of wisdom and of sonship; if we have the Spirit, we have the Son and conversely. Why, however, the one is called Son and the other Spirit, is incomprehensible, but thus Scripture teaches, ib. IV 4. 5. He is εἰκὼν του υἱου, ib. I 24. 26. IV 3, united with the Son, ἡνωμενον, just as the Son with the Father, ib. I 31. Athanasius thus teaches very clearly a dependence of the Spirit on the Son but nevertheless does not state that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. The three Cappadocians speak in the same spirit; they teach clearly that the Holy Spirit stands to the Son as the Son to the Father, that He follows the Son in order, that the Spirit grants us the Son and the Father, that He proceeds from the Father and is thought after and with the Son, that He is from the Father through the Son, δια υἱου, and that only ἡ προς ἀλληλα σχεσις grants each of the three persons a proper name, Greg. Naz. Or. theol. V 9. Basilus, adv. Eun. III 1. sq. de Sp. S. V. etc.; but the procession of the Spirit from the Son is expressed by none of them. Nor can one say that this was denied or contested by them, for this question had not yet come onto the agenda then. Hence, in Greg. Nyss., Epiphanius, Dydimus, Cyrillus and others, expressions also occur that seem

to teach the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son. They use the prepositions *παρὰ* and *ἐκ*; say that the Holy Spirit takes everything from Christ, and that Christ is the source of the Holy Spirit, Joh. 7:38; they state that He is from the essence of the Father and of the Son and that He is *ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας υἱοῦ*, the image, the mouth, the breath of the Son; they acknowledge that He is the third person, existing after the Son and receiving everything from the Father through the Son, etc., Petavius, *de trin.* VII c. 3-7. But the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the East nevertheless took a different direction than in the West. Cyrillus taught against Nestorius, who made Christ dependent on the Holy Spirit and thus reversed the order of the persons, entirely in agreement with the Greek fathers, that the Spirit proceeded from the Father through the Son, *διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ*, in Schwane, D. G. II 204. Damascenus likewise says that the Spirit is also Spirit of the Son, because He has been revealed and communicated through Him; that He proceeds from, *ἐκ*, [291] the Father *διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ*; but he expressly rejects that He is from the Son and has His existence from Him; Son and Spirit are referred back to one cause, *εἰς μίαν αἰτίαν ἀναφέρονται*, *de fide orthod.* I 8. 12. And this has remained the doctrine of the Greek church, *Conf. orthod.* qu. 9. 71. Schaff, *Creeds of Christ.* II 282. 350. The East remained with the theology of the fathers. The West, however, went further. Tertullian had already begun to derive the Trinity not from the Father but from the essence of God, and he already said: *spiritum non aliunde puto quam a Patre per filium*, *adv. Prax.* c. 4. 25. Hilarius places the Spirit in the same relation to the Son as the Son to the Father, and says that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and is sent and distributed by the Son, indeed has the Son as auctor, *de trin.* II 4. VIII 20. But above all Augustine went beyond the Greek fathers. He conceives the three persons

as relations in the one, simple Godhead and therefore had to place the Spirit in relation not only to the Father but also to the Son. Clearly Augustine therefore teaches that the Holy Spirit stands in relation, *refertur*, to Father and to Son, that He is *ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio*. In the names Father and Son, to be sure, only the mutual relation is expressed and not that to the Spirit; our language is too poor for it. But the Spirit is nevertheless called a gift of the Father and of the Son. He has both as principium; *fatendum est patrem et filium principium esse spiritus sancti*. But these then are not two principia, any more than Father, Son, and Spirit are three principia of creation. No, Father and Son are *unum principium* of the Spirit. The Son also has this, that He causes the Spirit to proceed also from Himself, received from the Father; for the Son can in nothing be distinguished from the Father except by the fact that He is Son, *de trin.* V 11-15. XV 17. 26. *de Symb.* II 9. This doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit is then found after Augustine in the symbol of the synod of Toledo ± 400, in the letter of Leo I to Turribius, in the *Athanasianum* n. 22, and in the symbol of the third synod of Toledo 589, which inserted the *filioque* into the text of the *Constantinopolitanum*, *Denzinger* n. 98. 113. 136. The church and theology in the West followed Augustine, and repeatedly defended the *filioque* against the East, *Denzinger*, n. 224. 242. 294. 355. 382. 385. 586. 598. 868. 873. *Alcuinus*, *de processione Sp. S.* [292] *Anselmus*, *de processione Sp. S.* *Lombardus*, *Sent.* I dist. 11. *Thomas*, *S. Theol.* I qu. 36. *Petavius*, *de trin.* VII; and the Reformation joined in with this. But the East, in spite of all attempts at agreement, remained at the old standpoint, even up to the conference of the Old Catholics at Bonn in 1875, *Harnack*, *D. G.* II 275 f. 285 f. *Schwane*, *Dogm.* II 198 f. III 146 f. *Schaff*, *Creeds of Christ.* II 545 sq. The fruitlessness of all these attempts is the

more remarkable because the difference seems to be so slight. The Greeks do not teach subordinatianly and acknowledge the full homoousie of the three persons; they also indeed place the Holy Spirit in a certain relation to Christ, who sends and distributes Him; they also have no objection to saying that He proceeds from the Father through the Son, *δια τοῦ υἱοῦ*, per filium. Conversely, the Western church has stated that the procession from Father and Son was not to be understood as proceeding from two principia and consisting in two spirationes but as ex uno principio and unica spiratione, Denzinger n. 382. 586. Pope Leo acknowledged that the inclusion of the expression filioque in the old symbol was formally incorrect, Schwane II 209; even the formula ex patre per filium as such found no objection in the West, Denzinger, 586. 868. Schaff, Creeds II 552. And yet no agreement has been obtained. The Greeks always retained the one great objection, that, if the Holy Spirit also proceeded from the Son, there would come in the Godhead two principia, two αἰτία. That points back to a different doctrine of God and to a different practice of piety. The combating of the filioque in the Greek church is still the last remnant of subordinatianism. However much the three persons are also thought perfectly one and equal, that unity and equality accrue to Son and Spirit only from the Father. This one is πηγή και ἀρχή της θεοτητος. If the Holy Spirit therefore also proceeds from the Son, this one comes to stand alongside the Father, and the principle of unity is broken and a kind of ditheism is professed. For the Greeks the unity of the essence and the root of the Trinity lie not in the divine nature as such but in the person of the Father. He is the only αἰτία. The three persons are not three relations in the essence, no self-unfolding of the Godhead, but it is the Father who communicates His essence to Son and Spirit. But from that it follows that

Son and [293] Spirit now also come to stand alongside one another and both in equal manner have their αἰτία, their principium in the Father. In both the Father reveals Himself. The Son makes Him known, the Spirit makes Him enjoyed. The Son does not reveal the Father in and through the Spirit, the Spirit does not lead to the Father through the Son. But both are to a certain extent independent; both open a way to the Father. Orthodoxy and mysticism, understanding and will stand dualistically alongside each other. And this peculiar relation of orthodoxy and mysticism is the characteristic of Greek piety. The doctrine stands outside, above life; it serves only for the head; it is a suitable object for theological speculation. Alongside that there is another source for life in the mysticism of the Spirit; this does not well up from knowledge but has its own origin, and nourishes the mind. Head and heart do not stand in the right relation; representation and emotion are totally separated; the ethical connection is lacking. Cf. deel I 70. Harnack D. G. II 285 f. Kattenbusch, Vergl. Confessionskunde I 318 f. Schmid, Symbolik S. 30 f. K. Müller, Symbolik 220.

23. These immanent relations of the three persons in the Divine being also come forth outwardly in their revelations and works. Indeed, all opera ad extra are common to the three persons. Opera Deitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, servato ordine et discrimine personarum. It is always the one and the same God who appears in creation and re-creation. But in that unity the order of the three persons is preserved. The ontological Trinity is also reflected in the economic. And therefore particular properties and works are ascribed to each of the three persons, not with exclusion of the other two persons, as Abaelard thought, Introd. ad theol. I c. 7-14, but in such a way that therein the order comes to expression which also exists between the persons in the ontological Trinity. These properties are therefore not

propriae but appropriatae to them, and Holy Scripture takes the lead in this, above pp. 238. 240. With appeal to Mt. 28:19 and 1 Cor. 8:6 Hilary says that the Father is the auctor, from whom all things are; the Son, the Only-begotten, through whom all things are; and that the Holy Spirit is a gift in all. There is therefore one power, one son, one gift. Nothing is lacking to this perfection. In the Father is the aeternitas, in the Son is the species in imagine, in the [294] Spirit is the usus in munere, de trin. II 1. Hilary ascribes these properties to the three persons, because the Father is the ἀρχή and without principium; the Son the image of the Father, who reveals Him in his glory; the Holy Spirit a gift of Father and Son, who makes us partake of communion with God. Augustine raised some objection to this, de trin. VI 10 and indicated the distinction differently: in Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu Sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia; et tria haec unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, connexa omnia propter Spiritum Sanctum, de doctr. christ. I 5. In his work de trinitate he developed this distinction still more broadly. Here he ascribes to the Father power, to the Son wisdom, to the Holy Spirit goodness or love. This, however, must not be understood in such a way that the Father first became wise and good through the wisdom of the Son and the goodness of the Holy Spirit. For Father, Son, and Spirit all partake of the same Divine nature and the same Divine attributes. But nevertheless it is permitted, in an economic sense, to ascribe the named properties to the three persons, de trin. VII 1 sq. XV 7. Later theologians adopted this distinction, Erigena, de div. nat. I 13. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 39 art. 7. 8. Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 6. Sent. I dist. 31 art. 1 qu. 3 and art. 2 qu. 3. Hugo Vict. de Sacr. I pars 3 c. 27.

To this also corresponds an economic distinction in the opera ad extra. These are indeed all works of essence, but each of the three persons

nevertheless therein takes that place which corresponds to the order of his existence in the Divine being. The Father works from himself through the Son in the Spirit. Holy Scripture clearly indicates this distinction in the so-called *praepositiones distinctionales* ἐκ, δια and ἐν, 1 Cor. 8:6, Joh. 1:3, 14; the text often adduced for this, Rom. 11:36, is not to be divided trinitarianly, and Col. 1:16 is only apparently in conflict with this use of the *praepositions*. This distinction, which Scripture makes between the three persons, was already perceived early and was emphatically pointed out, Iren. adv. haer. V 18. Athanasius appeals repeatedly to Ef. 4:6 and says that God as Father is above all, and as Son through all and as Spirit in all, and that the Father creates and recreates all things through the Son in the Spirit, Ep. ad Serap. I 14. 28. II 6. 7. Basil was accused, [295] because in his prayer he now once thanked the Father μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ σὺν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ and then again δια τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. He defends in his writing de Spiritu Sancto the first expression, because Son and Spirit are of one essence with the Father and therefore must receive the same honour, and speaks at length about the distinction of the *praepositions*, de Sp. S. 3 sq. Against the Arians he argues that the unequal *praepositions* do not prove the inequality of the persons, but indicate a definite order in their existence and activity. The Father is the αἰτία προκαταρκτική, the Son the αἰτία δημιουργική, the Spirit the αἰτία τελειωτική, de Spir. S. n. 21. 22. 38. This same distinction recurs with all later theologians, cf. also Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 341 f. All works of God outwardly have one principium, viz. God, but they come about through the cooperation of the three persons, who both in the works of creation and in those of redemption and of sanctification occupy a proper place and fulfil a proper task. Everything proceeds from the Father, is accomplished by the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit.

Yes, to a certain extent the works outwardly are also distributed among the three persons. Gregory of Nazianzus explained, as has already been said above, the great difference of opinion about the Holy Spirit in his time from the fact that this one first made himself clearly known through his indwelling in the church, *Orat. theol.* V 26. Much misuse has been made, by pantheism in its various forms, of the truth expressed by Gregory. Time and again, from Montanus down to Hegel, the opinion has arisen that the three persons represented three successive periods in the history of the church. Thereby the economic trinity was detached from its metaphysical foundation, the being of God was dragged down into the stream of becoming, and the cosmogony was transformed into a theogony. It has precisely been the struggle of the patres, to banish this paganistic, pantheistic element from Christian theology, to detach God as the Being from the evolution of becoming, and thus to conceive the trinity as an eternal movement of life in the Divine being itself. Gregory of Nazianzus also does not teach in the above-mentioned words that the Godhead of the Son and of the Holy Spirit only later came to be; he seeks to prove both as decisively as possible from Scripture. But God has indeed, in his self-revelation, taken counsel with the [296] receptivity of men. It was dangerous, so says Gregory t. a. p., so long as the Godhead of the Father was not yet acknowledged, to teach that of the Son, and to impose upon us, as it were, the Godhead of the Holy Spirit, so long as that of the Son was not yet confessed. He did not wish to overload us with food and not at once to blind our eyes by the full light of the sun. All works outwardly, creation, preservation, government, incarnation, satisfaction, renewal, sanctification etc. are works of the whole trinity. But nevertheless, in an economic sense, creation is more particularly ascribed to the Father, redemption to the Son,

sanctification to the Holy Spirit. As in the ontological trinity the Father is in order the first, and the Son the second and the Holy Spirit the third; so also in the history of revelation the Father has gone before the Son and this one again before the Holy Spirit. The economy of the Father was in particular that of the O. Testament, Hebr. 1:1; the economy of the Son began with the incarnation; and the economy of the Holy Spirit entered in with the day of Pentecost, Joh. 7:39, 14:15. The Father comes from himself, but the Son does not come except sent by the Father, Mt. 10:40, Mk. 9:37, Luk. 9:48, Joh. 3:16, 5:23, 30, 37, 6:38v. etc., and again the Holy Spirit does not come, except sent by both, Joh. 14:26, 16:7, August. tract. VI in Joann., de trin. II 5. IV 20. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 14-17. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 43. Petavius, de trin. VIII c. 1. But this sending in time is a reflection of the immanent relation of the three persons in the being of God, and has its foundation in generation and spiration. The incarnation of the Word has its eternal archetype in the generation of the Son, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is a weak analogy of the procession from Father and Son. Therefore the church fathers concluded from the relations which, between the three persons in time, presented themselves before the eyes of men, to their eternal immanent relations. And this entirely rightly. For, says Augustine, the Son cannot be called sent for that reason because he became flesh, but He is and is called sent, in order that He might become flesh. There was not in time a word spoken by the Father, that the eternal Son would be sent. Sed utique in ipso Dei verbo quod erat in principio apud Deum et Deus erat, in ipsa scilicet sapientia Dei sine tempore erat, [297] quo tempore illam in carne apparere oporteret. Itaque cum sine ullo initio temporis in principio esset verbum, et verbum esset apud Deum et Deus esset verbum; sine ullo tempore in ipso verbo erat, quo tempore verbum

caro fieret et habitaret in nobis. Quae plenitudo temporis cum venisset, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, id est, factum in tempore, ut incarnatum verbum hominibus appareret, quod in ipso verbo sine tempore erat, in quo tempore fieret. Ordo quippe temporum in aeterna Dei sapientia sine tempore est. Cum itaque hoc a patre et filio factum esset, ut in carne filius appareret, congruenter dictus est missus ille qui in ea carne apparuit, misisse autem ille qui in ea non apparuit. Quoniam illa quae coram corporeis oculis foris geruntur, ab interiore apparatu naturae spiritalis existunt; propterea convenienter missa dicuntur. And this same holds for the sending of the Holy Spirit. Facta est enim quaedam creaturae species ex tempore in qua visibiliter ostenderetur spiritus sanctus.... Haec operatio visibiliter expressa et oculis oblata mortalibus missio Spiritus Sancti dicta est, non ut ita appareret ejus ipsa substantia, qua et ipse invisibilis et incommutabilis est sicut pater et filius, sed ut exterioribus visis hominum corda commota a temporali manifestatione venientis ad occultam aeternitatem semper praesentis converterentur, de trin. II c. 5 cf. Petavius, de trin. VIII c. 1 § 7-12. The Holy Spirit was already gift, before he was bestowed on anyone. Quia sic procedebat ut esset donabile, jam donum erat et antequam esset cui daretur. Aliter enim intelligitur cum dicitur donum, aliter cum dicitur donatum. Nam donum potest esse et antequam detur, donatum autem nisi datum fuerit, nullo modo dici potest, ib. V c. 15. The sending in time thus stands in the closest connection with the eternal procession in the Divine being. And while now Son and Spirit in incarnation and outpouring have appeared under visible form, this their sending is completed in their invisible coming into the hearts of all believers, in the church of the Son, in the temple of the Holy Spirit. The Son and the Spirit have eternally proceeded from the Father, in order that He

himself through and in Them would come to his people and God at last would be all in all.

24. The doctrine of the Trinity so far surpasses the understanding of man, that from the beginning one applied oneself to elucidating it by images or proving it by reasoning. In the first place it was already remarkable that the number three in Scripture had such a rich and deep significance. There is mention there of three parts of creation, heaven, earth and what is under the earth; three groups of peoples according to the three sons of Noah; three dispensations of the covenant of grace, before, under and after the law; three patriarchs; three parts of the tabernacle; three principal feasts; three parts of the O. Testament; three years of Jesus' public activity; three offices; three days of Jesus' burial until the resurrection; three crosses on Golgotha; three languages in the inscription above Jesus' cross; three beloved disciples; three witnesses, 1 Joh. 5:8; three Christian principal virtues; three kinds of lust, 1 Joh. 2:16; three woes, Op. 8:13 etc., a threefold blessing; a threefold act in bowing, blessing; a three-day fast, three times of prayer per day etc., Zöckler. Theol. Nat. 682 f. 696 f. Bähr, Symb. des mos. Cultus, 2e Aufl. 1874. Herzog² 17, 410 f. Yet not only in Scripture does the number three occupy such a broad place, but outside it too this number is of great significance. For the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, analogy was sought not only in the intermediate beings, which gradually arose in Jewish theology, Weber, Syst. der altsyn. pal. Theol. 172 f., and the three Sephiroth, כתר, חכמה and בינה, of which the Kabbalah spoke, Ad. Franck, La Kabbale 1843. Agrippa of Nettesheim in Stöckl, Gesch. d. Philos. des M. A. III 413 cf. II 236. But traces and indications of the Trinity were also found in the Trimurti of the Indians, Brahma, Vishnu and Ciwa; in the three forms of the Chinese Tao; in the three Germanic principal gods, Odin, Thor and Loki;

and in other Chaldean, Egyptian and Greek representations of the gods. In particular one pointed with a certain predilection to a saying of Hermes Trismegistus and to the three principia which Plato assumed for the explanation of the world, the highest *νοῦς* (being, the good), the world of ideas and the *ὕλη*, Pfanner, *Syst. theol. gentilis purioris*, Basil. 1679 cap. 3. Moor, *Comm. in Marck* I 885-890. Tholuck, *Die specul. Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* 1826. Lange, *Chr. Dogmatik* II 143 f. Kahnis, *Luth. Dogm.* I2 352. Baur, *Chr. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit* I 10 f. 18 f. 33 f. Delitzsch, *Apol.* 286. Zöckler, *Theol. Nat.* 689, cf. also Schelling, *Werke* II 2 S. 78. II 3 S. 312 f. But all these analogies are polytheistic and [299] therefore can hardly be compared with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Of more value still are the physical analogies which have been sought in nature. Justin Martyr, following Philo, made use of the image of fire, which, kindling another, nevertheless remains the same. Tertullian said that God brought forth the Logos, *sicut radix fruticem et fons fluvium et sol radium*, and spoke of source, flood and stream, of root, trunk and crown etc. These images repeatedly returned among the later church fathers and theologians and were expanded and multiplied. The more one thought everything through, the more it appeared that all things consisted in threes. Space with its three dimensions; time with its three moments; nature with its three kingdoms; the world of matter, of spirit and of the connection of both in man; bodies in their solid, liquid and gaseous state; the forces of attraction, of repulsion, and of the equilibrium of both; the three functions of the human soul, *το λογικον*, *το θυμικον* and *το ἐπιθυμητικον* or the three faculties, head, heart and hand; the three factors of the family, man, woman and child, cf. however Augustine, *de trin.* XII 5 sq.; the three estates in society, *Lehr-*, *Wehr-* and *Nährstand*; the three ideal goods of the true, good

and beautiful; the triad in music, consisting of the fundamental tone with its third and fifth; the rainbow and its many colors; the sun with its vigor, splendor, calor, its life-giving, illuminating and warming power; the three primary colors, yellow, red and blue etc. have in earlier and later times been used as analogies of the Christian Trinity, Delitzsch, Syst. d. christl. Apol. 1870 S. 282 f. Zöckler, Theol. Naturalis 1860 S. 672 f. Higher stand the logical analogies which have been traced. Augustine repeatedly points out that everything must in the first place have a being, a unity, a measure, *esse, unitas, mensura, modus*; in the second place a certain form, species, in order to be something determinate and distinct from other things; and finally between that general and this particular it must possess a certain relation and agreement, *ordo*. Matter, form or beauty and harmony between both or love are the basic forms and the moments of all being, *de trin. VI 10. de vera relig. c. 7. de vita beata 34. cf. Gangauf, Des h. Augustinus specul. Lehre v. Gott d. Dreieinigen 1883 S. 209 f. Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit, 83 quaest. qu. [300] 18.* Medieval theology worked this out in all kinds of ways and sought to trace a trias everywhere. It found analogy of the Trinity in the trivium of *grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica*; in the three philosophical disciplines, *logica, physica, ethica*; in the three persons of grammar; in the *activum, passivum* and *medium*; in the *singularis, dualis* and *pluralis*; in the three basic vowels and in the *radices trilitterales* of the Hebr. language; in the *dispositio, elocutio* and *actio* of rhetoric; in the *definitio, divisio* and *argumentatio* of dialectic; in the three forms of poetry, epic, lyric and drama; in the three stages of mysticism, *cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio* or *fides, ratio, contemplatio*, or *via purgativa, illuminativa, unitiva* etc. Dionysius Areopagita divided his heavenly hierarchy, and Dante his divina

Comoedia, according to the triad. In more recent philosophy, threeness has come to formal dominion. Kant, according to Hegel, Werke II 37, found triplicity again as if by instinct and then schematized accordingly the organs of knowledge, the faculties of the soul, the categories, the ideas of reason etc. But only in the idealistic philosophy derived from Kant, of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, did this triplicity become a dialectical method. Idealism wants to understand things as a product of consciousness, as an unfolding of the idea. That idea must therefore be thought as living, moving and producing. That is possible only if it is always in a contradiction between what it is and what it does, and then resolves and reconciles this contradiction in a third. The law of contradiction is the essence of spirit. Thus the idea advances in all its unfoldings and developments through the moments of position, negation, limitation; thesis, antithesis, synthesis; an-sich, für-sich, an-und-für-sich. The whole world develops in the "Schema der Dreieinigkeiten." Logic with its doctrine of being, essence and concept, considers den Geist an sich; philosophy of nature in the three forms of mechanics, physics and organics has to do with den Geist für sich, spirit in its other-being, in its self-alienation; philosophy of spirit with its subjective, objective and absolute spirit treats den Geist an und für sich, spirit in its return to itself, in its becoming conscious of itself, Windelband, Gesch. der Philos. 1892 S. 464 f. 481 f. Rümelin, Reden und Aufsätze 1888 S. 47 f. Through the influence of this philosophy, triplicity was laid as a foundation under numerous philosophical and [301] theological systems. Not enough, however, that in all kinds of ways analogies for the Trinity were traced; attempts were also made to prove it itself positively, and then either to derive it as necessary from the essence of thinking or from that of love. The doctrine of the Logos both in Scripture and in Greek philosophy

involuntarily and of itself caused one to see in human thinking and speaking an image of the trinitarian process in the divine being. Justin Martyr, c. Tr. c. 61, Tatian, Or. c. Gr. c. 5, Tertullian, c. Prax. c. 5 sq., Lactantius, Inst. IV 29 etc. already make use of this comparison. Athanasius and the Cappadocians have repeatedly represented generation as a knowing of God of himself in his image, as an eternal speaking of a word; Father and Son related as *νοῦς* and *λόγος*, e.g. Athan. c. Ar. II 35 sq. Greg. Naz. Or. theol. IV 20, and especially Gregory of Nyssa, Or. catech. c. 1-3. But in particular Augustine found in the inner, rational man clear traces of the Trinity. And he found them in different ways and in different direction. First he found them in the triad of *esse*, *nosse* and *velle*; *essentia*, *scientia*, *amor*; *mens*, *notitia*, *amor*, Conf. XIII 11, de civ. XI 26-28, de trin. IX 4. 5. Next he discovered traces of it in the faculties of the soul, specifically in sense perception, which comes about through an object, *ipsa res*, through an image of it in the eye, *visio*, and the *intentio animi*, which directs the sense to the object, de trin. XI c. 1. 2; and this trinitas remains, even when the object disappears, for then an image of it is preserved in the *memoria*, the external viewing gives way to the *interna visio*, and it remains the will that binds both, ib. c. 4 sq. Augustine, however, finds the greatest likeness of the Trinity in the self-knowledge of the human spirit, de trin. IX 4 sq. X 9 sq. XIV 6 sq. XV 6 sq. He usually names the trinitas which he finds here with the names *mens*, *notitia*, *amor* (*dilectio*), or *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas*. First the spirit is *memoria*, i.e. consciousness both of other things and of itself; for there is a consciousness, a *scientia* that is not yet actual knowledge; in the spirit as *memoria* many *notitiae* lie hidden, also of itself; someone can know something even if at the moment he is not thinking of it, de trin. XIV c. 6. 7. But from that spirit as *memoria*, from the *scientia* which

is preserved in the memoria, there is now produced by the cogitatio, by thinking, knowing, the intelligentia. In that intelligentia the spirit forms an adequate image of itself, understands and knows and beholds itself. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intelligit se et recognoscit. And this self-knowledge and self-beholding is a producing: gignit ergo intellectum hunc et cognitionem suam. And these two now are united by the will or love. Haec autem duo gignens et genitum dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens, de trin. XIV 6. Thus Augustine is deeply convinced that all creatures, as works of God Triune, also display in greater or lesser degree vestigia or indicia trinitatis, de trin. VI 10. XV 2. Above all he seeks an imago trinitatis in man, who was created after the image of God Triune, ib. de civ. XI 26. The whole creation was for Augustine a mirror of God. In all kinds of ways he therefore also tries to show the correspondence between the trinitas which he discovers in creatures, especially in man, and the trinitas in the divine being. The trias consists in both in this, that all three are one and equal, that each of the three is in the other two and these again in the one and thus omnia in omnibus are, de trin. IX 5. X 11. But in doing so he does not conceal from himself that all these comparisons are only analogies and images, and that alongside the correspondence there is also very great difference. Thus the trinitas in man is not man himself but something in or about man, whereas in God the Trinity is himself and the three persons are the one God. The memoria, intelligentia and amor are in man only powers, but the three persons are in the divine being three subjects. In man those three powers are often unequal and serve to supplement one another, but in the divine being there is complete unity and equality of the persons, de trin. XV 7. 17. 20 sq. Augustine also did not intend, with these analogies and

images, to prove the Trinity a priori; he proceeded from faith, he accepted it on the ground of God's word; only he attempted to point it out a posteriori in the whole of nature and to elucidate it by thinking, *de vera relig.* 7. *de trin.* I 1. V 1. IX 1. The first seven books of his work *de trinitate* are therefore chiefly devoted to proofs from Scripture; and only in the last eight books does he seek to [303] confirm it from nature and man. And finally he added that this trinitas in the human spirit could indeed be noticed by everyone but nevertheless could be recognized as an image of the threefold being of God only by the believer. It is indeed essentially proper to the spirit of man and has not been eradicated by sin; but it is nevertheless darkened and is renewed by faith, when man again learns to *meminisse, intelligere et amare* God. And we become his image completely only when we shall see him face to face, *de trin.* XIV 12 sq. *Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem*, *de civ.* XI 28. This proof for the Trinity from thinking has been adopted by many, e.g. Erigena, *de div. nat.* II 32. Anselm, *Monol.* c. 29-67. Lombardus, *Sent.* I dist. 3, 6-23. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 45 art. 7. S. c. Gent. IV 26. *Sent.* I dist. 3 qu. 2 art. 3. Bonaventura, *Brevil.* II c. 12. *Itiner. mentis* c. 2-4. *Sent.* I dist. 3 art. 1 and 2. Duns Scotus, *Sent.* I dist. 3 qu. 9. Hugo Vict. *de Sacr.* I pars 3 c. 21 sq. Luther, in Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.* I 2 99 f. Melanchthon, *Loci Comm.* loc. 3. *Enarratio symb. Nic.*, *Corpus Ref.* XXIII col. 235, *Explicatio Symb. Nic.* ib. col. 359 sq. *Examen Ordinandorum*, ib. col. 3. Jak. Schegk, *Contra Antitrinitarios* in Trechsel, *Die protest. Antitrin.* II 380 f. Polanus, *Synt. Theol.* p. 202. Zanchius, *Op.* I col. 356 sq. Keckermann, *Syst. Theol.* 1603 p. 20 sq. Poiret, *Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima et malo libri quatuor* 1677, in Baur, *Chr. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkei* III 315 f. Mornaeus, *de verit. relig. christ.* c. 5. Leibniz,

Syst. Theol. Mainz, 1825 p. 30. Lessing, Erziehung des Mensch. § 73. Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 315. Twisten, Dogm. II 194-216. Lange, Dogm. II 141. Bilderdijk, Opst. v. godg. en zedek. inhoud I 24v. Kuyper, De Schrift, het woord Gods 1870. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 183 etc. But in connection with this proof for the Trinity from thinking Augustine also makes use of another, namely from love. He proceeds from the statement of Scripture: God is love, and shows that in love there is always a triad, *amans et quod amatur et amor*. In love there is always a subject and an object and a bond between both. *Immo vero vides trinitatem, si caritatem vides, de trin. VIII 8. IX 1. 2.* This speculation too has been followed by many, especially by Richard Vict. de [304] trinitate III c. 2 sq. The fullness of divine love, as also that of divine goodness, blessedness and glory, will require a plurality of persons in the divine being, for love demands an object, and indeed one that is equal to the lover. But this love is then perfect only when both, he who loves and he who is loved, take up a third into their mutual love and are reciprocally loved by him. And likewise we find this reasoning in Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 2 art. 1. qu. 2., and in more recent times in J. Müller, Die christl. Lehre v. d. Sünde II 5 181 f. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. heiligen Liebe I 3 S. 11 f. Liebner, Christ, Dogm. I 69 f. Schöberlein, Grundlehren des Heils 1848 S. 22 f. Peip, art. Trinität, Herzog 2 16, 465 f. Dorner, Chr. Glaub. I 415 f. Ges. Schriften 345 f. etc. Alongside these more general speculations from the understanding and the will of God, other constructions of the Trinity have also been attempted. The most remarkable is that of theosophy, which under the influence of Neoplatonism, Gnosticism and the Kabbalah again shortly before the Reformation appeared in Pico of Mirandola, Reuchlin, Nettesheim, Paracelsus; then found its actual philosopher in Jakob Böhme and in this century was again

advocated by Schelling and Baader. Schelling proceeds from the fact that real being cannot be explained from a pure thinking. The what of things may be derived from reason; the that of things is impossible to explain from it. The essence and the existence of things point back to different principia, *Philos. der Offenb., Werke*, II 3 S. 57 f. Therefore both deism and pantheism are to be rejected, II 2 S. 68 f. God must not be conceived eleatically as an abstract unity. He is an All-einheit, a plurality, which connects the unity of deism and the allness of pantheism with one another, *ib.* 73. Already in the concept of God three moments are to be distinguished; first that of being-able, the subject, the will, next that of pure-being, the object, the idea, and finally the identity of both, the subject-object, II 2 S. 24 f. II 3 S. 205 f. In these three the concept of the absolute is completed; it is thereby spirit, perfect spirit, II 3 S. 238 f., personal and self-conscious, II 2 S. 73 f., an Einzelwesen, II 3 S. 174. But even if it is the case that we, thinking, first come through these three to the perfect Spirit, he has therefore not come forth from these. On the contrary, the Spirit [305] is the first and bears these three moments as immanent Bestimmungen in himself, II 3 S. 240 f. The perfect, absolute Spirit is thus the an sich, für sich and bei sich seiende Geist, *ib.* 251 f. But in that Spirit there also lies hidden what shall be. He is free Spirit and can reveal himself outside himself, *ib.* 261. The three Bestimmungen which the Spirit has in himself become the Potenzen of an extra-divine being, *ib.* 272. Schelling derives the whole creation, mythology and revelation from the separation and union of the three Potenzen; they are the forms of all possibilities, the principia, the ἀρχαί, of all being, II 2 S. 61, 112, II 3 S. 267 f. This cosmogony in Schelling is, however, at the same time a theogony. In the development of the world the Potenzen in God raise themselves to ever higher level; in the

revelation of God to his creatures he at the same time reveals himself to himself. The three Bestimmungen in the absolute spirit, the three Potenzen in the creation of the world and mythology, pave the way to understand the one and the same Godhead as three persons, II 3 S. 316. The absolute Spirit becomes Father, Son and Spirit in the historical course of revelation. God, namely not a particular form but the whole God, the absolute personality, can be called Father, not only as Urheber of all things, but also insofar as he by the first Potenz of his being compels the second to realize itself, II 3 S. 311, 322, but he is not actually Father at the beginning and the progress of the process, but only at the end, ib. 335 f. 339. The second form is the Son, whose generation is not eternal but relates to the being of the Son outside the Father and therefore begins in the moment of creation; the Son is therefore only fully Son at the end of the process, ib. 312, 318, 321 f. 330 f. And the same holds for the third Potenz, 333 f. At the end the whole Godhead is realized in three persons distinct from one another, who are neither three distinct Gods nor also merely three distinct names, 335, 337. Through this speculation, more recent philosophy again brought the trinitarian dogma into honor. There was no lack of attempts to construct the Trinity by thinking, especially from the essence of spirit, of self-consciousness, of personality, Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 444 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 405 f. J. H. Fichte, Deutinger, Rosenkrantz and others, cf. Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. seit Kant I 285-531. Günther even went so far that he, like Raymundus de Sabunde, Raymundus Lullus and some other rationalists, rejected the distinction between articuli puri and mixti, also counted the Trinity among the truths of reason and considered it provable from the nature of self-consciousness, Drews I 447 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I2 399-451.

25. Church and theology generally adopted a very reserved attitude toward these philosophical constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity. At most they want to know something a posteriori only of proofs for the Trinity, in order to elucidate the dogma; but even then many still warned against the attempt to seek support for this doctrine in reason. More than any other, the dogma of the Trinity was a mystery that far transcended nature and reason and could be known only from the special revelation. Like Augustine, Thomas did indeed assume *vestigia trinitatis* in creation and also attempted to elucidate them a posteriori by reasoning. But he expressly declared that the Trinity was not knowable by reason, for creation is a work of the whole Trinity and thus indeed shows the unity of the essence but not the distinction of the persons. *Qui autem probare nititur trinitatem personarum naturali ratione, fidei dupliciter derogat; first, by falling short with respect to the dignity of faith, which has only invisible things as its object, and second, by keeping others away from the faith, when they come to think that our faith rests on such weak grounds, S. Theol. I qu. 32 art. 1, cf. also Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 3 n. 6 and the commentaries on that place. Calvin saw little use in the analogies and proofs that were adduced from nature and man for the Trinity, Inst. I 13, 18. I 15, 4. Comm. in Gen. 1:26. And many Reformed and Lutheran theologians judged in the same way, Hyperius, Meth. theol. p. 111. Zanchius, Op. I 356 sq. Walaeus, Op. I 236. Synopsis pur. theol. VII 14. Mastricht, Theol. theor. pract. II 24, 21. Gerhard, Loci theol. III § 23-32. Quenstedt, Theol. I p. 265 sq. Hollaz, Examen theol. p. 344 etc., cf. in more recent times Böhl, Dogm. 80. Beck, Glaub. II 129.*

Without doubt it is now, over against all who wish to make the doctrine of the Trinity rest on rational grounds, to be maintained that the knowledge

[307] of this doctrine is due only to God's special revelation. Scripture is the only and final ground for the doctrine of the Trinity; reason can at most a posteriori elucidate this doctrine to some extent by thinking. But nevertheless the reasonings adduced in elucidation of the Trinitarian dogma are not devoid of all value. In the first place Scripture itself grants us freedom for it, when it says that the whole creation and especially man is a work of the triune God. Very certainly all works of God outwardly are undivided and proper to all three persons: in these works, therefore, much more the unity of God than the distinction of the persons stands in the foreground. But in that unity the diversity nevertheless cannot be lacking. And Scripture itself indicates thereby that all creatures will display vestigia, and man the *imago trinitatis*. However much, then, sin has objectively veiled God's revelation in his works and subjectively darkened our eye, it cannot be denied a priori that the understanding illumined by revelation can discover in nature traces of that God whom it learned to know in Scripture as triune in his mode of existence and working. To that is added that all these reasonings undoubtedly are not able to prove the dogma of the Trinity. None of them can or may be the ground of our faith. We would give the truth over to the mockery of our opponents if we accepted it on such weak grounds as our reason is able to adduce, Thomas S. Theol. I qu. 32 art. 1, qu. 46 art. 2. S. c. Gent. I c. 9. But these reasonings are nevertheless indeed able to refute various objections that are raised against the dogma, ib. c. Gent. I c. 9; they indeed have the power to show that it is neither impossible nor absurd what revelation teaches us, ib. S. Theol. II 2 qu 1 art. 5 ad 2; and they are capable of demonstrating that the faith of the opponents is insufficient and in conflict with reason itself, ib. S. Theol. I qu. 1 art. 8. Voetius, Disp. I p. 1 sq. So absurd is the doctrine of the Trinity nevertheless

not, as it appeared to a superficial rationalism of earlier and later time. With a calculation that one cannot be three and three cannot be one, it is not overthrown. Rather philosophy time and again, and again also in this century, has returned to the doctrine of the Trinity and has at least to some extent seen its rich sense and its deep significance. [308] To that finally is added still that these reasonings trace out and preserve the coherence between nature and grace, between creation and re-creation. It is one and the same God who creates and sustains us and who re-creates us according to his image. Grace indeed rises above nature, but is not in conflict with it. Restoring what has been corrupted in it by sin, it also clarifies and perfects what of God's revelation has still remained in it. The thinking understanding places the doctrine of the Trinity in the midst of the rich life of nature and humanity. The confession of the Christian is no island in the ocean, but a high mountain peak, from which the whole creation is surveyed. And it is the task of the Christian theologian, to set God's revelation clearly in the light in its connection with and significance for the whole of life. Christian thinking remains unsatisfied, so long as not all being is led back to God triune and the confession of the Trinity of God is not placed in the midst of the center of our thinking and life. The analogies and proofs, adduced for the Trinity, therefore do not serve to demonstrate the dogma, but they serve especially to show the manifold usefulness and the rich significance that is enclosed in this confession for the life and the knowing of the creatures. They are in the end born not out of a desire for idle speculation and inappropriate curiosity, but out of a deep religious interest. If God is triune, then that must be of the highest significance, for it is only out of and through and unto God that all things are.

To begin with, the Trinity makes God known to us as the true Living One. Already by the Church Fathers it was observed that the error of deism and pantheism, of monism and polytheism, is avoided by the Trinity, and that the truth which lay hidden in all those ideas about God was taken up in the Trinity. Deism digs a chasm between God and his creature, abolishes the kinship of both, and leaves for God nothing but an abstract unity, a pure being, a monotonous and uniform existence; it satisfies neither the head nor the heart; it is the death of religion. Pantheism indeed brings God nearer to us but makes Him like the creature, wipes out the boundary line between creator and creatura, robs Him of a being and life of His own, and undermines religion. But the Christian doctrine of the Trinity makes God known as essentially distinct from the world and [309] yet as partaking of a proper, blessed life. God is a fullness of being, *πελαγος ούσιας*. He is not unfruitful, *άγονος*. He is the absolute being, the Eternal, who is and was and is to come, but in that being the eternally living, the eternally bringing forth. People have attempted to derive the Trinity from the thinking and willing of God, from his love, goodness, perfection, etc. Intended as philosophical constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity, they all leave much to be desired. The construction from thinking arrives at no distinction of persons, does not make clear the procession of the third person, and with a view to this one must pass over to and supplement itself with the construction from the will of God. The derivation of the Trinity from love runs up against the same objections and does not know how to set the procession of the H. Spirit in the light. But yet it is true that these and all other attributes first obtain life and reality through the Trinity. Outside of and without it they are names, sounds, empty concepts. As attributes of a triune God they begin to live for head and for heart. Only through it do we understand that God in

himself, even abstracted from the world, is the independent One, the eternal, the all-knowing, the all-good, the love, the holiness, and the glory. The Trinity makes God known to us as the fullness of being, the true life, the eternal beauty. Also in God there is unity in diversity, diversity in unity. Indeed this order and harmony is present in Him in an absolute way. In creatures there is only a weak analogy of this. Either the unity or the diversity does not come into its own. Creatures exist in space and time, stand next to one another and do not penetrate one another. There is unity only through attraction, through will and affection, a moral unity, which is breakable and unstable. And where more deep-going, physical unity exists, e.g. between the powers of the one substance, there is lack of independence, and the unity takes the distinction back into itself. But in God both is present: absolute unity and absolute diversity. It is one and the same essence that is borne by three supposita. Here there is the highest communion, communion of the same essence, and at the same time the highest diversity, diversity of persons. Therefore, if God is triune, the three persons cannot be thought otherwise than as ὁμοουσιοί. Arianism in its manifold forms does not think through the essence of God and therefore [310] does not satisfy thought. If there are distinctions, not outside but in and within the divine essence, then these distinctions, i.e. these persons, must all be of the same essence. In God nothing can exist that would be something other or something less than God. There is no transition between Creator and creature. Father, Son, and Spirit all partake of the same essence and are true God, or they sink down to the creature. There is, from a Christian standpoint, no third possibility. But likewise Sabellianism in its different modi is hereby condemned. For the homoousia of the three persons then has meaning and significance only if these are truly and realiter distinguished

from one another, as distinct bearers of one and the same substance. The diversity of the subjects, which in the revelation of God, in creation and re-creation, appear alongside one another, arises from the diversity which in the essence of God itself exists between the three persons. There could be no distinction in the unity outwardly, if it did not exist inwardly, *ad intra*.

In the second place, the Trinity is of the highest importance for creation. This can be maintained only with the confession of a triune God. By that alone is it possible, on the one hand against deism to maintain the connection and on the other hand against pantheism to maintain the distinction of God and world. Creation is not to be conceived as a pure accident and just as little as a self-development of the Divine being. It must have its foundation in God and yet form no moment in his inner life-process. How would it be possible to maintain both otherwise than through the triunity of God? The life of God is divinely rich; it is fruitful; there is action, production in it. And the doctrine of the Trinity therefore also speaks of the generation of the Son and the procession of the H. Spirit. Both these acts are essentially distinct from creation; the former are immanent relations, the latter is an *opus ad extra*; the former are sufficient in themselves, God does not need creation, He is life, blessedness, glory in himself. But nevertheless creation stands in the closest connection with this fruitfulness of God. For, in the first place, Athanasius rightly remarked that if the Divine being is unfruitful and cannot communicate itself, then there can also be no question of any revelation of God outwardly, i.e. of any communication of God in and to his creature. The doctrine of the incommunicability [311] of the Divine being through generation and procession to Son and Spirit entails that the world stands detached alongside, outside, over against God. God is then absolutely hidden, *βυθός*,

συνη, the unconscious, Ungrund; the world does not reveal Him; no knowledge of God is possible. In contrast, the dogma of the Trinity teaches that God can communicate himself, absolutely to Son and Spirit, relatively therefore also to the world. For the communication that takes place in the Divine being is, according to the thought of Augustine, the example, the archetype of the work of God in creation. Scripture repeatedly points to the close connection that exists between Son and Spirit on the one hand, and creation on the other. The designations Father, Son (word, wisdom), Spirit certainly indicate immanent relations, but nevertheless are also reflected in the relations that are present in the works of God outwardly between the three persons. From the Father are all things; in the Son lie the ideas of all being; in the Spirit are the principia of all life. The generation and procession in the Divine being are the immanent acts of God, which make a creation and revelation of God outwardly possible. From that, finally, it is to be explained that all works of God outwardly are then first sufficiently known when their trinitarian existence is seen. The examples, mentioned above, are in part very far-fetched and in any case nothing more than analogies. But philosophy from Plato down to von Hartmann has always again, consciously or unconsciously, returned to a triad of principia or ἀρχαί, from which creation in its whole and in its parts could be explained. There lies a great truth in it, that creation everywhere shows us vestigia trinitatis. And because these vestigia show themselves most clearly in man and he may even be called imago trinitatis, therefore he, as it were, traces out everywhere these vestigia by an immanent impulse. In the triad there first comes forth the perfection of the creature, the completeness of the system, the harmony of beauty. The higher something stands in the realm of creatures, the more it strives toward the triad. And even in the aberrations of

man in the religious sphere there is still something of this working to be perceived. Schelling's attempt to interpret mythology also trinitarianly has nevertheless been something more than a genial fantasy.

In the third place, the Trinity is of the highest importance for [312] the Christian religion. With the confession of God's triunity the whole of Christianity stands or falls, the entire special revelation. It is the core of the Christian faith, the root of all dogmas, the substance of the new covenant. From this religious, Christian interest the development of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity has therefore also taken its beginning. In it, it truly was not a matter of a metaphysical doctrine or philosophical speculation, but of the heart and the essence of the Christian religion itself. This is felt to such an extent that all who still set store by the name of Christian acknowledge and honor a certain Trinity. In every Christian confession and dogmatics the deepest question is this, how God can be one and yet again threefold. And according as this question is answered, in all parts of doctrine the Christian truth comes to its right more or less. In the doctrine of the Trinity the heart of the whole revelation of God for the redemption of humanity beats. Prepared in the Old Covenant, it therefore first comes clearly to light in Christ. Religion can make do with nothing less than God himself. Now in Christ God himself comes to us, and in the H. Spirit he communicates himself to us. The work of re-creation is through and through trinitarian. Out of and through and in God are all things. It is one divine work from the beginning to the end, and yet threefold distinguished; it is concluded by the love of the Father, the grace of the Son, and the communion of the H. Spirit. And correspondingly the life of faith of the Christian refers back to three principia, as the Ned. Gel. art. 9 says, that we know the doctrine of the Trinity as well from the testimonies of Holy

Scripture as from the workings of the three persons, especially from those which we feel in ourselves. We know ourselves to be children of the Father, redeemed by the Son and in communion with both through the H. Spirit. All salvation and blessing comes to us from God triune. In that name we are baptized; that name is the sum of our confession; from that name all blessing descends upon us; to that name we bring eternal thanks and honor; in that name we find rest for the heart, peace for our conscience. The Christian has a God above and before and in himself. To the doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, salvation in this and the life to come is bound, even though it is also the case that we cannot determine the measure of knowledge that is required also of this mystery for a sincere faith. [313]

§ 28. THE COUNSEL OF GOD.

1 . Up to this point we have dealt with the divine being, as it is and exists in itself. Not in the sense as though we thought and spoke about God apart from his revelation in nature and Scripture. For we cannot speak of God except on the basis of his revelation; if we ventured to take his names upon our lips, we spoke of him as Christians, instructed by his Word. But nevertheless we dealt with God, as he, according to his revelation, exists in himself. And we came to know him as the eternal being, which at the same time is the highest being and the highest life, as *summum esse*, mere *essentia* and at the same time as *ipsissima ἐνεργεια*, *actus purissimus*, *totus actuosus*; he always works. Now we descend to his works. Those works are the creatures, *opera ad extra*. But before we can contemplate these, the question arises: What is the connection between God, as he exists in himself, and these his works? And that connection is indicated in the Counsel of God, which comprises the *opera essentialia ad intra*, i.e. the decrees. These are not described to us in Scripture in the abstract, but are set before our eyes in history itself. God is Lord of the whole earth and shows

that from day to day in the creation, preservation, and government of all things. And so it is also with election and reprobation. These are not portrayed in the O. T. as eternal decrees, but they confront us on every page as facts in history. From the beginning the human race divides into two, into the holy line of Seth, Gen. 4:25, 26, 5:1-32 and that of Cain, increasingly alienating itself from God, Gen. 4:17-24. When both races mingle and increase in unrighteousness, Noah alone finds grace in the eyes of the Lord, Gen. 6. After the flood the blessing is pronounced over Shem and Japheth, the curse, on the other hand, over Canaan, Gen. 9:25-27. From the line of Shem Abraham is chosen, Gen. 12. Of his sons it is not Ishmael but Isaac who is the son of the promise, Gen. 17:19-21, 21:12, 13. Among Isaac's sons Esau is hated and Jacob loved, Gen. 25:23, Mal. 1:2, Rom. 9:11, 12. Of the sons of Jacob each receives a rank and task of his own, and Judah [314] receives the primacy, Gen. 49. While all other peoples are temporarily passed by and walk in their own ways, Israel alone is chosen by the Lord to be a people of possession. This election, ידע, בחר, Hos. 13:5, Am. 3:2, did not take place because of Israel's worthiness but only according to God's merciful love, Deut. 4:37, 7:6-8, 8:17, 9:4-6, 10:15, Ezech. 16:1v. Am. 9:7 and this love is from days of old, Jer. 31:3. It had as its object Israel as people and nation, although thousands broke the covenant and there is a distinction between Israel according to the flesh and according to the promise, Rom. 2:28, 29, Rom. 9-11. And it had as its goal that Israel would belong to the Lord, would be his people and possession, and would walk in holiness before his face, Ex. 19:5, Deut. 7:6, 14:2, 26:18, Ps. 135:4, Mal. 3:17. Within the circle of Israel there is then repeatedly mention of a special election to a dignity or service, as e. g. of Jerusalem and Zion to be a dwelling of the Lord, Deut. 12:5, 14:23, 1 Kon. 11:30, 2 K. 21:7, Ps. 78:68,

70, of Moses to be mediator of the O. Covenant, Ex. 3, of Levi to the priesthood, Deut. 18:5, 21:5, of Saul and David to be king, 1 Sam. 10:24, 2 Sam. 6:21, of the prophets to their office, 1 Sam. 3, Jes. 6, Jer. 1, Ezech. 1-3, Am. 3:7, 8, 7:15, above all of the Messiah to be Redeemer of his people, who is the Israel, the servant of the Lord par excellence, Jes. 41:8, 42:1, 44:1, 45:4 etc. Yet although this election in the O. T. appears mostly as fact in history and thus coincides with the calling itself, yet it rests on a foreknowledge and predestination of God. In general the O. Testament teaches that God creates, preserves, and governs all things by the word and with wisdom, Ps. 33:6, 104:24, Job 38, Spr. 8 etc., so that everything rests on God's thought. But it is also expressly said that God knows the future and proclaims it beforehand, Jes. 41:22, 23, 42:9, 43:9-12, 44:7, 46:10, 48:3v., Amos 3:7. In prophecy he makes known beforehand the things which and as they shall happen, Gen. 3:14v. 6:13, 9:25v. 12:2v. 15:13v. 25:23, 49:8v. etc. The days of a man's life are all already determined beforehand and written in God's book, before even one has come into view, Ps. 139:16, 31:16, 39:6, Job 14:5. The righteous are written in the book of life, as the citizens of a [315] city or a kingdom are recorded, and have therein the assurance that they will have a share in the life in communion with God in the theocracy of Israel, Ex. 32:32, Ps. 87:6, Ezech. 13:9, Jer. 17:13, Ps. 69:29; in Jes. 4:3 and Dan. 12:1 this is further developed in such a way that those who are written down unto life will have a share in the theocratic salvation in the future. Here the New Test. thought is prepared, that the book of life contains the names of the heirs of eternal life. And all things happen according to the counsel of God. With him are wisdom and power, counsel, חָכְמָה and understanding, Job 12:13, Spr. 8:14, Jes. 9:5, 11:2, 28:29, Jer. 32:19. By that he always chooses the best ways to attain his goal,

needs no one's counsel, and is terrible, far exalted, above the counsel of the holy ones and of all who are around him, Jes. 40:13, Jer. 23:18, 22, Ps. 89:8. God's counsel is his definite thought, his fixed decision concerning all things, Jes. 14:24-27, Dan. 4:24. That counsel is indeed hidden, Job 15:8 but comes to reality in history itself. For according to that counsel everything happens, it exists forever, no one can resist it, Jes. 24 vs. 24-27, 46:10, Ps. 33:11, Spr. 19:21; and over against it the counsel of the enemies is destroyed, Neh. 4:15, Ps. 33:10, Spr. 21:30, Jer. 19:7.

2. The N. Test. sets this counsel of God in a much clearer light. Not only are all His works known to God from eternity, Hd. 15:18 (cf. however the *variae lectiones*), but everything happens according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. The N. T. word βουλη denotes the will of God as resting on counsel and deliberation, and is therein distinguished from θελημα, the will as will, cf. Ef. 1:11 βουλη του θεληματος. Such a counsel of God precedes all things. It encompasses everything, Ef. 1:11, also the sinful deeds of men, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, cf. Luk. 22:22. God has determined beforehand the dwelling-place of the peoples both in time and in extent, ὀρισας, Hd. 17:26. God's will becomes manifest also in the perdition of Judas, Joh. 17:12, in the giving over of the Gentiles, Rom. 1:24, in the rejection of Esau, Rom. 9:13, in the hardening of the ungodly, Rom. 9:18, in the raising up of Pharaoh, Rom. 9:17, in the enduring of the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, Rom. 9:22, in the being set [316] (κειμαι) of Christ not only for a rising again but also εἰς πτωσιν, Luk. 2:34, for a κρισις, Joh. 3:19-21, for a λιθος προσκομματος και πετρα σκανδαλου, 1 Petr. 2:7, 8, cf. 1 Thess. 5:9, Judas vs. 4. But above all the βουλη του θεου nevertheless has reference to the work of redemption, Luk. 7:30, Hd. 13:36, 20:27, Hebr. 6:17. And the N. T. is rich in words, to describe this counsel of

God more closely. It speaks of εὐδοκία, good pleasure, good will, Mt. 11:26, Luk. 2:14, 10:21, Ef. 1:5, 9, Phil. 2:13, 2 Thess. 1:11; προθεσις, purpose, Rom. 8 vs. 28, 9:11, Ef. 1:11, 3:11, 2 Tim. 1:9; προγνωσις, foreknowledge, Rom. 8:29, 11:2, 1 Petr. 1:2; ἐκλογή, election, Mk. 13:20, Hd. 9:15, 13:17, 15:7, Rom. 9:11, 11:5, 28, 1 Cor. 1:27, 28, Ef. 1:4, 1 Thess. 1:4, 2 Petr. 1:10, Jak. 2:5; προορισμος, Rom. 8:29, Cor. 2:7, Ef. 1:5, 11; cf. also Hd. 13 vs. 48 where it is said that as many believed, ὅσοι ἦσαν τεταγμενοι εἰς ζωνν αἰώνιον, i.e. not as if they had made themselves fit or had been subjectively predisposed but as having been ordained, appointed to eternal life; and also still Ef. 2:10, where of the good works of the believers it is said that God προητοιμασεν them. The words are thus distinguished: προθεσις indicates that God in the work of salvation does not proceed according to arbitrariness or chance but according to a fixed plan, according to an unchangeable purpose; ἐκλογή modifies this thus, that that purpose does not encompass all, but that it is a προθεσις κατ' ἐκλογην, Rom. 9:11, an electing purpose, so that not all but many come to salvation; προγνωσις attends to the persons, who in this electing purpose of God are the object not of His nuda praescientia but of His dilectio practica; while finally προορισμος looks more to the means, which God disposes, in order to bring these known ones to the destination determined for them. Προθεσις certitudinem eventus indicat, προγνωσις personarum singularitatem, προορισμος mediorum ordinem. The election is certa per προθεσιν, determinata per προγνωσιν, ordinata per προορισμον, Turretinus, Theol. El. IV qu. 7. The eternity of this purpose does not of itself already lie enclosed in the preposition προ, with which the words are compounded, but is nevertheless clearly expressed in Ef. 3:11, 2 Tim. 1:9, cf. Mt. 25:34, 1 Cor. 2:7, Ef. 1:4. It has indeed been asserted that Paul in Rom. 9 does not deal

with the absolute sovereignty and the eternal decree [317] of God, but only with a Verhalten Gottes, das in der Zeit, in der Geschichte seine Ursachen wie seine Wirkungen hat, W. Beyschlag, Die paulin. Theodicee Röm. IX-XI, 2te Aufl. Halle 1895. Dr. van Dijk, The doctrine of election according to the N. T., Studiën ond. red. van de la Saussaye, Valetton en Van Dijk IV 3e stuk. Buhl, Der Gedankengang von Röm. 9-11, Stud. u. Kr. 1887 S. 295-322. Kübel, Herzog² 12, 158. But this assertion is refuted by Rom. 9. For the προθεσις κατ' ἐκλογην clearly precedes the facts of history; the history thus serves to cause that purpose, which already existed, to remain firm, Rom. 9:11. To Sarah a seed of promise is promised long beforehand, v. 9. Before the children of Isaac were born, God had already said that the greater would serve the lesser, vs. 11. Verses 15-18 teach that election does not have its causes in works but solely and only in the will of the One calling. Very certainly Rom. 9 speaks of an acting of God in time, but the cause of that acting falls outside time, lies only in God's will and good pleasure. To that is added that the causa electionis elsewhere also is clearly ascribed only and exclusively to God's grace, love, good pleasure, Mt. 11:25, Luk. 12:32, Ef. 1:5, 9, 11, 2 Tim. 1:9, 10. It is even not correct, with Rom. 9:21, either exclusively with supralapsarianism to think of the massa incorrupta or with Augustine and infralapsarianism only of the massa corrupta. Paul here does not at all think of this distinction. What he wishes to say is only this, that God has the absolute right, to give to His creatures that destination which seems good to Him, cf. Jes. 10:15, Jer. 18, Mt. 20:15. From the standpoint of absolute right a creature has nothing to say against his Creator. Paul refutes all objections against election not by this, that it is righteous and equitable, but with an appeal to the sovereignty and the absolute right of God. Just as the N. T. expresses the eternity of election

more clearly than the O. T., so it also conceives that election more individually and personally. While in the O. T. the people of Israel appears as the object of election, here they are particular persons, who are chosen in Christ, together form His body and bear the name of *εκλεκτοι*, Mt. 24:31, Luk. 18:7, Hd. 13:48, Rom. 8:33, Ef. 1:4, Tit. 1:1, 2 Tim. 2:10, 1 Petr. 1 [318] vs. 1, 2, 9 etc. Above all this also appears from the book of life, in which the names are written of the heirs of eternal life, Luk. 10:20, Hebr. 12:23, Phil. 4:3, Op. 3:5, 13:8, 20:12, 21:27, 22:19. Finally it is the clear doctrine of the N. Test. that election has its goal, not in an earthly life in Canaan, nor also in an eminent place in the kingdom of God, but specifically in the heavenly salvation. To be sure, within the congregation there is again an election to one or another office or service, e.g. of the apostles, Luk. 6:13, Joh. 6 vs. 70 etc., but the proper election has as its goal holiness, Ef. 1:4, sonship, Ef. 1:5, salvation, 2 Thess. 2 vs. 13, eternal life, Hd. 13:48, conformity to Christ, Rom. 8:29, Joh. 17:24, the glorification of God, Ef. 1 vs. 6, 12. Also in Rom. 9 Paul does not deal with a higher or lower place in the kingdom of God, but he makes a distinction in Israel itself between children of the flesh and children of the promise. He speaks specifically of vessels for honor and of vessels for dishonor, *κατηρτισμενα εις απωλειαν*. He sets mercy and hardening over against one another, and in vs. 14 and 19 he lets objections come to speech, whose seriousness precisely presupposes the doctrine of such a sovereign election.

3. Also outside the Christian religion, manifold conflict has been waged over predestination and freedom of the will. Philosophy has alternately arrived at a pantheistic determinism or at a deistic doctrine of freedom. The Jews also ascribe to man, even in the state of sin, freedom of the will, Weber, System 223. In Mohammedanism a conflict has been waged over

predestination and freedom of the will, which in many respects is analogous to that in the Christian church. In Islam God is the absolute omnipotence, the absolute arbitrariness, over against which man is completely passive. Against that, in the second century of the Hedjra, resistance arose on the part of the Motazelites, who defended the free will, contested predestination, and regarded not omnipotence but justice as the essence of God, Houtsma, *De strijd over het dogma tot op El-Ash'ari*, Leiden 1875. Kuenen, *Volksgodsd. en wereldgodsd.* 1882 blz. 40 v.; cf. also the conflict in the school of Ramanuja in India, which has often been compared with that of Gomarists and Arminians, Saussaye, *Rel. gesch.* I [319] 448. In the Christian church, in the first period, over against the pagan fate and the gnostic naturalism, all emphasis was laid on the moral nature, the freedom, and the responsibility of man, and therefore the doctrine of Scripture concerning the counsel of God could not come into its own. Man was indeed corrupted by sin in greater or lesser degree, but nevertheless remained free and could accept the offered grace of God. An absolute predestination and an irresistible grace was not taught; the counsel of God consisted in the praescientia and the determination of reward or punishment dependent thereon. God gives over to unbelief those of whom he foreknows that they will not believe, and He elects those whose merits He has foreseen, Justinus, *c. Tryph.* § 141. Iren. *adv. haer.* IV 29. Tertull. *adv. Marc.* II 23 etc., cf. Münscher—v. Coelln I 356 f. Hagenbach, § 48 and 57. Calvijn, *Inst.* II 2, 4, 9. This has essentially remained the standpoint of the Greek church. Man has been weakened and made mortal by sin. Yet he can still will the natural good and also accept or reject the offered grace (*gratia praeveniens*). If he accepts it, then he is supported by that grace (*gratia cooperans*), and must persevere to the end, for he can still always fall away.

Those who accept the grace and persevere, God has foreknown and destined for salvation. The others, although He voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, He leaves lying in their fall and destines them to destruction, Damascenus, *de fide orthod.* II 29, 30. *Conf. orthod.* qu. 26-30. In the manner of expression Pelagius joined himself to the older writers, but he nevertheless taught, by failure to recognize the doctrine of redemption always simultaneously maintained by the church fathers, something essentially new, Harnack, *D. G.* III 183. Sin with him was no habitus or state, but only an act, which leaves human nature with its free will completely uninjured. Grace consists in this, that God by creation bestows on man the posse in natura and further in the law and the teaching and the example of Christ offers him an auxilium divinum; this gratia per Christum, however, is bestowed secundum merita upon such as use their free will well. Predestination finally was nothing but a foreseeing by God of the free acts and merits of men and the corresponding [320] fore-determination of reward and punishment. Properly speaking, therefore, there is no predestination on God's side, neither to grace nor to salvation; it depends entirely on the praevisio of the good deeds of man. Only, Pelagius came into a great difficulty with infant baptism, for this was bestowed without any merits; and he could not rescue himself from that except by all manner of evasions and inconsistencies. The doctrine of Pelagius was somewhat softened in what in the Middle Ages was so called semipelagianism of John Cassian, abbot in Marseille, pupil of Chrysostom and well acquainted with the Greek patres. This one did indeed teach that sin had corrupted human nature. But man was not dead, but sick. He was like a sick person who cannot heal himself but nevertheless can take the medicine to himself and can desire healing; like someone who, having fallen into a pit, cannot save

himself but nevertheless can grasp the rope thrown to him. The sinful man therefore cannot merit grace, but can indeed accept it, and, supported by it, persevere. And God bestows that grace upon those of whom He has foreseen that they would accept it and would persevere in it; so also with children and peoples. He withholds it, on the other hand, from those of whom he foresees the opposite. And herein consists predestination and reprobation; it depends on the *praescientia Dei* concerning the attitude of man toward the offered grace. *Nostrum est velle, Dei perficere*. Cf. G. J. Vossius, *Historia Pelagianismi* 1618, better edition 1655. Wiggers, *Pragm. Darstellung des Aug. u. Pelag.* 1831-33. Wörter, *Der Pelag. nach seinem Ursprunge und seiner Lehre*, Freiburg 1866. Munscher-v. Coelln I 371 f. Harnack, *D. G.* III 151 f. Schwane, *Dogm.* II 2 512 f. Möller, art. Pelagius in *Herzog2*. Long before the Pelagian conflict Augustine taught predestination. He came to it through his study of the epistle to the Romans, Reuter, *Augustin. Studien* 1887 S. 5 f., and in this wished to give nothing other than the doctrine of Scripture, *de dono pers.* c. 19. He already gave it in his *quaestiones ad Simplicianum* of the year 397 and then developed it more broadly in his writings *de correptione et gratia* 427, *de praedestinatione sanctorum* and *de dono perseverantiae* 428 or 429. Augustine makes a distinction between *praescientia* and *praedestinatio*. The former is broader than the latter. *Praedestinasse est hoc praescisse, quod [321] (Deus) fuerat ipse facturus*, *de dono persev.* 18. *de praed. sanct.* 10. 19. Predestination is nothing other than *praescientia scilicet et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei*, *quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur*, *de dono pers.* 14. This predestination takes place not according to merit or worthiness but out of sheer grace; not only to faith, *non eliguntur quia crediderunt sed eliguntur ut credant*, *de praed. sanct.* 17. For all men were

alike, a massa damnata, de civ. XIV 26. de praed. sanct. 8. de nat. et gr. 4. 8 etc. Above all this comes out in the predestination of young children, of whom some perish without baptism and others are preserved through baptism, de praed. sanct. 12. Enchir. 98. Predestination has its sole cause in the sovereign will of God, in his absolute freedom of power. He owes no one anything, and can justly damn all, but according to his good pleasure He makes the one vessel unto honor and the other unto dishonor, de praed. sanct. 8. Alongside predestination, therefore, reprobation comes to stand. Augustine more than once reckons this to predestination. He speaks of a praedestinare ad aeternam mortem, de an. et ejus orig. IV 10. de civ. XXII 24, of praedestinati ad sempiternum interitum, in Joh. Ev. tract. 48, of mundus damnationi praedestinatus, ib. 111, of Judas as perditioni praedestinatus, ib. 107 etc. The text 1 Tim. 2:4 was therefore explained by Augustine in a limited sense and in different ways, Enchir. 103. de corr. et gr. 14. Most often, however, predestination is taken as foreordination unto salvation. With the good, predestination is necessary; with the evil, praescientia is sufficient, although this too is again not conceived as purely passive, but as active. For God does not ordain in the same way unto destruction and unto the means leading thereto, namely the sins, as He ordains unto salvation and unto the means that serve thereto. Predestination, namely, with Augustine is always a praedestinatio adaequata, i.e. unto salvation and therefore also unto grace. To the praedestinati belong also those who now do not yet believe or are even not yet born. But their number is fixed and unchangeable. In time they come to Christ, receive baptism, faith, and above all also the donum perseverantiae. For this is bestowed only upon the praedestinati. Whether someone is predestined, he can know only from this, that he perseveres to the end [322] . For God has

received into the church some who are not elect and do not persevere, so that the *praedestinati* would not exalt themselves and would not seek false rest, *de corr. et gr.* 13. Why God now preserves only some and lets others perish, is a mystery. Unjust it is not, for He owes no one anything. Reprobation is an act of justice, just as predestination was an act of grace. In both God makes his virtues manifest, *de civ.* XIV 26, cf. Wiggers, I 290 f. Schwane II2 557 f. Baltzer, *Des h. Aug. Lehre über Prädest. und Reprob.* Wien 1871. Rottmanner, *Der Augustinismus.* München 1892.

4. Pelagianism was condemned at the same time as Nestorianism at the council of Ephesus 431. The struggle between the followers of Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, the anonymous writer of the *vocatione omnium gentium*, Lucidus, Fulgentius and others, and the Semipelagians, Cassian, Faustus of Reji, the unnamed writer of the much-discussed book *Praedestinatus*, which arose in the fifth century and was published by the Jesuit Sirmond in 1643, Gennadius, Vincentius of Lerinum and others, first came to a decision at the Synod of Orange 529. Here, on the one hand, it was clearly taught that the whole man has been corrupted by the sin of Adam, can. 1. 2, has of himself nothing but *mendacium et peccatum*, can. 22, and that both *initium* and *augmentum fidei* is to be ascribed not to ourselves, to our natural powers, to our free will, but to grace, to the *infusio*, *operatio*, *inspiratio*, *illuminatio* of the H. Spirit in us, who bends (*corrigen*s) our will from unbelief to faith, can. 3-8. But on the other hand, of free will it is only said that it has been weakened by sin, *infirmatum*, *attenuatum*, can. 8. 13. 25, that all the baptized by the grace received in baptism, *Christo auxiliante et cooperante*, can and must fulfill, *si fideliter laborare voluerint*, what belongs to salvation, can. 13. 25; and furthermore there is complete silence about absolute *praedestinatio*, *gratia irresistibilis*, the particularity of grace. This

indecisiveness worked harmfully. This came out clearly in the Gottschalk controversy. Many already then stood on a semipelagian or pelagian standpoint, Hinkmar, Rhabanus, Erigena, and achieved victory at the [323] synod of Quierzy 853. But there were also numerous learned men who absolutely could not reconcile themselves to the condemnation of Gottschalk and the pronouncements of Quierzy. To these belonged Prudentius, Remigius, Ratramnus, Lupus and others; they defended a *gemina praedestinatio*; the *praedestinatio ad gloriam* is without any merit, does not take place on account of *praevisa fides*, *merita*, but is the cause of the *praedestinatio ad gratiam*, *fidem*, *merita* etc.; the *praedestinatio ad damnationem*, however, does not in that way include the *praedestinatio ad peccata*, but is, at least as *reprobatio positiva*, dependent on the *praescientia* and *permissio* of sins. Hence 1 Tim. 2:4 was still understood in a restricted sense, not of all men head for head but was taken of many or of all kinds of men, and it was considered absurd that Christ would have made satisfaction for all men, thus also for the Heathen, who never hear of Him, and even also for the man of sin, the antichrist. On this standpoint stood also still the synod of Valence 855. Cf. H. Schrörs, *Der Streit über die Prädest.* in IX Jahrh. Freiburg 1884. Niemeijer, *De strijd over de leer der praedest.* in de 9de eeuw, Gron. 1889. Schwane, D. G. III 428 f. Denzinger, n. 283 sq. And this is in the main also still the standpoint of scholasticism. The *praedestinatio ad mortem* is preferably not named by this name, because then it so easily gets the appearance that it, as a means, brings with it the *praedestinatio ad peccata*, but it is usually treated under the name of *reprobatio*; sometimes this is then distinguished into negative and positive; the former is *ante praevisa merita* and an act of sovereignty, but the latter is dependent on and follows upon the *praescientia* and the decree to permit

sins. Hence 1 Tim. 2:4 is still taken in a restricted sense, and a benevolentia Dei universalis, and a general satisfaction of Christ is not yet taught, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40 and 41 with the comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19 and 23. c. Gent. III 163. But nominalism, the rejection of the Reformation and Jesuitism have removed the Roman church and theology more and more from Augustine and Paul. Rome did not heed the call to reform with impunity and at Trent established the following dogma: 1o through sin the liberum arbitrium is indeed viribus attenuatum et inclinatum, [324] but not amissum et extinctum, Trid. sess. 6 cap. 1 and can. 5; man can before the justificatio still do many natural things, which are absolutely not sin but truly good, ib. can. 7. 2o. To the good in a supernatural sense, to faith, hope, love, to the justificatio, to the acquiring of eternal life, the natural man, deprived by original sin of the dona superaddita, is not able. For that he needs more than the vires naturae and legis doctrina, namely the divina gratia, the praeveniens Spiritus Sancti inspiratio, ib. can. 1-3. 3o. This gratia divina is bestowed upon the children of believers in baptism, and in adults consists in this, that God calls them objectively through the gospel and subjectively touches their heart per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem. This grace is unmerited, praeveniens, gratia gratis data, ib. cap. 5. 4o. This grace, however, is not irresistible. It indeed rouses man, helps and moves him, and makes him fit to turn to his justificatio, and to free consent to grace; but he can both recipere and abjicere the inspiration of the H. Spirit, ib. cap. 5. If he accepts this grace, and, aroused and moved by it, cooperates with God and by the seven praeparationes makes himself fit and prepares himself, se disponat ac praeparet, for the justificatio, then he receives this in baptism by grace and only according to a meritum ex congruo so called by

scholasticism, *ib.* cap. 6 and 8 and can. 4. 5o. The *gratia infusa* of the *justificatio* remains resistible and losable, but accepted and preserved, it enables one to do good works and according to a *meritum ex condigno* to merit eternal life, *ib.* c. 9-16. 6o. In accordance with this Rome has decisively rejected Augustine's doctrine of absolute *praedestinatio*. Yet in doing so it has always avoided the name of Augustine, made a caricature of his doctrine among his adherents and condemned this. The above-mentioned book *Praedestinatus* represents it as if in the fifth century in Gaul a sect of ultra-*praedestinatio*nists had existed, and reproduces Augustinism in paradoxical propositions, which no follower of Augustine has ever taught, Harnack III 225 f. And likewise in Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wiclif, Hus, Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel under a false name genuine Augustinism has been condemned, Denzinger *Enchir.* § 477 sq. 881 sq. 966 sq. 1216 sq. Harnack III 628-640. [325] The Tridentinum expresses itself very cautiously about *praedestinatio*. On the one hand it seems to teach an election, for it says that no one in this life may determine *se omnino esse in numero praedestinatorum*, for only from special revelation can one know *quos Deus sibi elegerit*, VI cap. 12 and can. 15. 16. But on the other hand it expressly teaches that Christ was sent, so that *omnes adoptionem filiorum* reciperent, that He has made satisfaction for all, VI cap. 2 and 3, that man can accept or reject grace, keep or lose it, and condemns the doctrine: *justificationis gratiam non nisi praedestinitis ad vitam contingere*; *reliquos vere omnes qui vocantur vocari quidem sed gratiam non accipere utpote divina potestate praedestinitos ad malum*, *ib.* can. 17, as if this latter were taught by anyone and in that way! The church leaves these two series of pronouncements unreconciled alongside one another; but theology has always and in all kinds of ways attempted an agreement. First, almost all

Roman theologians teach that God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all and therefore also has let Christ make satisfaction for all; this voluntas antecedens even extends to children dying unbaptized and to the Heathen. But according to his voluntas consequens, which takes account of the good or bad use that men make of their freedom and of grace, God does not will the salvation of all. Praedestinatio is here from the beginning already made dependent on praescientia. Next, there has gradually arisen among them and been generally accepted the distinction between the praedestinatio complete and incomplete sumpta, adaequata and inadaequata. By the former is understood praedestination both ad gratiam et ad gloriam; by the latter that which has reference to one of the two. The intention of this distinction is that the praedestinatio ad gratiam and that ad gloriam are not inseparably connected; one can partake of the praedestinatio ad gratiam and have received the grace of faith and of justification and yet lose this again and thus be deprived of the praedestinatio ad gloriam. This separation was unknown to the medieval theologians, Anselmus, Lombardus, Thomas etc., is still contested by some but penetrates further and further. Now as to the praedestinatio ad primam gratiam, this is called by all, in [326] opposition to Pelagianism, unmerited, Rom. 9:16, Joh. 6 vs. 44; it does not take place ob praevisa merita; also it is, in opposition to Semipelagianism, preceding the will of man, gratia praeveniens, praecedens. Because now the praedestinatio ad primam gratiam is the beginning of the praedestinatio completa or adaequata, it can be said that the whole praedestinatio is grace and unmerited, because it is gratuita in causa, while among the Thomists it is gratuita in se. But this does not exclude that this praedestinatio ad primam gratiam and to every following grace would not follow a certain order; according to Molina God has by the scientia media foreseen that

some men would make good use of the grace offered each time and has accordingly decided the distribution of grace. He has also foreseen that the saints by their prayers or by *merita de congruo* would acquire grace for others, and accordingly decided to grant it to these. Someone cannot merit for himself the *praedestinatio ad primam gratiam*, but the saints can for others, and above all Christ is *causa nostrae praedestinationis*. The *praedestinatio ad gloriam* is according to the Augustinians and Thomists such as Sylvius, Thoma, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, Alvarez, Lemos, Goudin etc., and also according to Bellarminus and Suarez indeed absolute; God has first decided to grant salvation to some before and apart from all merits and then decided to work them by grace in such a way that they could merit that salvation by their works. But the Molinists, Molina, Valentia, Vasquez, Tanner, Lessius, Becanus, Petavius, Lapide etc. defend the *praedestinatio ad gloriam post praevisa merita*. Finally, as to *reprobatio*, the Augustinians and Thomists are divided; some attach themselves entirely to Augustine, are *infralapsarian* and let the decree of rejection follow upon original sin and upon this alone, so that reprobation is a *justa derelictio in eadem massa* (Gonet, Gotti, Gazzaniga); others distinguish between a negative but absolute decree, not to grant salvation to some, and another decree, to withhold grace, to permit sin, and to punish (Alvarez, Estius, Sylvius, Salmanticenses); still others understand by the decree of rejection nothing but the will of God to permit that some [327] through their own fault perish (Billuart, Goudin), cf. C. Pesch, *Praelect.* II 217 sq. Jansen, *Prael.* III 171 sq. But over against them stand the Molinists, who wholly reject the so-called *reprobatio negativa*, i.e. an absolute, sovereign decree preceding sin, and teach that God *voluntate antecedente* wills the salvation of all, and further accept only a *reprobatio positiva*, i.e. a decree of God to

punish eternally those whose sin and unbelief He has foreseen. Reprobatio is thus in every respect post praevisa merita, and then according to some such as Hinkmar still only a praedestinatio of the punishment for the ungodly, but not of the ungodly for the punishment. Cf. Bellarminus, de gr. et lib. arb. II c. 9-15. Becanus, Theol. schol. I tract. 1 c. 14-16. Petavius, de Deo, 1. X. Theol. Wirceb. ed. 3 Paris. 1880 III 181-285. Billuart, Summa S. Thomae, the whole Tom. II. Daelman, Theologia I p. 199-316. Schwetz, Theol. dogm. II § 121. C. Pesch, Prael. II 165-226. Jansen, Prael. theol. II 135-177. Simar, Dogm. p. 556-576 etc.

5. The Reformation went back to Paul and Augustine and found in the confession of God's sovereign election the power to oppose the Pelagianism of the Roman church. All Reformers were unanimous in this. Luther taught and defended predestination in the early period just as strongly as Zwingli and Calvin. Nor did he ever retract it, even though it is also the case that later, against the Anabaptists, he laid more and more emphasis on the revelation of God in word and sacrament, J. Müller, Lutheri de praedest. et lib. arb. doctrina 1852. Schweizer, Die protest. Centraldogmen I 57-94. Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I 165 f. 286 f. II 32 f. Weber, Luthers Streitschrift de servo arbitrio, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1878 S. 229-249. Max Staub, Das Verhältniss der menschl. Willensfreiheit zur Gotteslehre bei Luther u. Zwingli, Zurich 1894. Melanchthon at first taught completely the same, Loci Comm. 1521, cap. de hominis viribus adeoque de libero arbitrio, and also in his comm. on Rom. 9, but from 1527 onward and in the later editions of the Loci from 1535 on and in the Conf. Aug. variata of 1540, came to an ever further deviation from predestination and to an open confession of synergism, Schweizer I 381 f. This synergism, like the universalism of Sam. Huber, was decisively rejected by the genuine

Lutherans, such as Flacius, Wigand, [328] Amsdorf, Hesshusius et al., Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel IV 152. Art. Synerg. in Herzog2. And the Formula concordiae expressed as strongly as possible that man by nature is incapable of any spiritual good and that faith in the absolute sense is a gift of God. This ought to have led to also accepting absolute predestination. But in Luther from the beginning there nevertheless dwelt a somewhat different spirit than in Zwingli and Calvin. With him the confession of predestination rested only on anthropological grounds, on the deep corruption of sin and the impotence of man. If only man had no merit and depended solely on grace, enough seemed to have been done. Luther therefore avoided more and more the speculative doctrine of predestination, the voluntas beneplaciti, the hidden God, held to the administration of word and sacrament, to which grace is bound, and placed the universal saving will of God, voluntas signi, increasingly in the foreground. He silently looked on at Melanchthon's change with respect to this doctrine, and remained with the doctrine of justification by faith. Predestination had no independent theological significance; it was of secondary importance. The synthetic method in this doctrine was opposed; one followed the analytic, from below upward; one did not derive it from the idea of God but only from the condition of man, Schweizer, I 398. 445. 466. Hence the synergism of Melanchthon was indeed still opposed, but gradually predestination itself was also set aside. Hesshusius already brought in against Calvin and Beza, that their doctrine introduced a fatum and made God the author of sin 1560-61. Marbach in 1561 at Strassburg opposed Zanchius. Andreae did indeed still teach an election whose cause lay only in God's grace, but otherwise held to the preaching of the gospel and remained with the second causes, faith and unbelief, Schweizer, I 477 f. The Formula

concordiae teaches as decisively as possible the *servum arbitrium* but leaves absolute and particular predestination alone and holds to the universal and earnest will of God in the gospel. It does not deny election, it also does not call *praescientia* to its aid, it still agrees with the *ubi et quando visum est Deo* of the *conf. Aug.*; election is unconditional and has its cause only in God's will. But it identifies election and [329] predestination, it makes reprobation depend on *praescientia*; and after it has taught election, it immediately adds, out of fear of all kinds of danger or misuse, that one must not attempt to speculate about that hidden decree, but that one must contemplate the counsel of God in Christ, in the gospel, whose preaching is universal and earnest, and that the cause of perdition is only man's unbelief. God wills that all be saved; He wills no one's sin and no one's death. After the *Formula concordiae*, especially also in the struggle against Huber's universalism, there arose among the Lutherans, such as Gerlach, Hunnius, Lyser, the conception that God *voluntate antecedente* wills the salvation of all, but *voluntate consequente* only the salvation of those whose faith and salvation he had foreseen. Toward the end of the century an ever more decisive distinction is made between *praescientia* and *praedestinatio*, predestination is equal to election, and is dependent on Christ's merit, the cause of rejection lies in man's sin. The Saxon visitation articles of 1592, drawn up by Hunnius, and the writings of Hunnius *de providentia dei et aeterna praedestinatione* 1597 and *de libero arbitrio* 1598 teach this clearly. Mediation is sought in the earnestness with which the natural man can make use of the means of grace, Schweizer I 526-585. Heppe, *Dogm. d. d. Pr.* II 1-79. But with this doctrine the Lutherans could not remain standing. When at the Synod of Dordrecht the Remonstrants had been condemned, they felt themselves more and more drawn to these. Although the Reformed always

distinguished between Lutherans and Remonstrants, the former judged more and more that in the Remonstrants their own doctrine was condemned, Schweizer, Centr. II 206 f. The Lutheran theologians of the 17th century approached the Remonstrant confession. They first teach a *voluntas Dei antecedens*, which caused Christ to die for all, wills the salvation of all and then offers the gospel to all, and thereafter a *voluntas consequens*, which actually resolves to grant salvation to those, *quos in Christum finaliter credituros esse praevidit*, and prepares perdition for those who finaliter resist grace, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 1-74. Hollaz, Examen theol. p. 585-649. Gerhard, Loci theol. loc. VII Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 196 f. In 1724 Mosheim declared, [330] that the 5 articles of the Remonstrants contained the pure Lutheran doctrine, Schweizer, II 210. Pietism, rationalism, supranaturalism and the whole intellectual tendency of the eighteenth century was not favorably disposed toward the doctrine of predestination; the *voluntas antecedens* entirely displaced the *voluntas consequens*; and under predestination nothing else was understood than the general decree of God, to save men through faith in Christ, Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 147. Bretschneider, Dogm. III 127 f. Reinhard, Dogm. 439 f. Herder considered it a good fortune that the struggle over grace was buried in the stream of oblivion and exclaimed: *Verdorren müsse die Hand, die ihn je daraus hervorhebt*, Vom Geist des Christ. 154. Leibniz still exerted himself to unite freedom of the will with predestination, Tichler, Theol. des Leibniz I 357 f. But Kant openly stated that man still had a *moralische Anlage* and thus could do what he must, Religion, ed. Rosenkranz 50 f.

6. While the Lutherans more and more abandoned the original standpoint of Luther and of the whole Reformation, the Reformed have remained faithful to it; the cause of the schism is therefore not to be sought with

them. Zwingli taught predestination as decisively as possible, not only on anthropological grounds but also especially on theological grounds, derived from the being of God, *Anamnema de Providentia*, Opera IV 79 sq. Calvin still spoke very softly and modestly in the first edition of his Institutes, but through his study of the Epistle to the Romans, April 1538-1541 in Strasbourg, came to an ever more decisive confession, both with respect to man's unfreedom, II c. 2, and with respect to election, III c. 21 sq. Although guarding himself against the paradoxes of Luther and Zwingli and sometimes presupposing predestination more than teaching it, e.g. in the Catech. Ecclesiae Genev. with preface to the coetus of East Frisia, in Niemeyer Conf. Ref. 123 sq., he nevertheless advocated it with force where it was denied and contested. He defended it against Alb. Pighius of Kampen in his writing: *Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de servitute et liberatione humani arbitrii* 1543. Against Bolsec he wrote *de aeterna Dei praedestinatione* 1552. Against Rome he directed his *Acta Synodi Tridentinae cum antidoto* 1547. And he did not rest, [331] before his doctrine had found acceptance in all Reformation Switzerland, particularly in Zurich, where Bullinger advocated a moderate, infralapsarian conception, Schweizer, Centr. I 255-292. Through Calvin the doctrine of predestination has been incorporated into the confession of all Reformed churches. Yet from the beginning there has been great difference in the manner of presentation, both in the confessions and among the theologians. Apart from the *Repetitio Anhaltina* of 1579 in Niemeyer, p. 638, the *confessio Sigismundi* of 1613, ib. 650, the *colloquium Lipsiense* of 1631, ib. 661 sq. 664 sq., which reproduce the Reformed doctrine only impurely, there is among the confessional writings an unmistakable difference. The *Catechismus Genevensis* of Calvin does not speak at all about

predestination; the Heidelb. Catechismus makes only brief mention of election, q. 52, 54; the Anglican confession speaks only of *praedestinatio ad vitam* and gives as its object *eos quos (Deus) in Christo elegit* art. 7; the *Confessio Helv. II* of Bullinger art. 10 and the *Conf. Scotic. I* art. 8 speak approximately in the same spirit; the *Confessio Gallic. art. 12* and *Belgica art. 18* and the *Formula cons. Helv. 4-6* are decisive but sober and *infralapsarian*; the strictest and most Calvinistic are the *consensus Genevensis*, the canones of Dordrecht, the Lambeth articles drawn up by Dr. Whitaker 1595, in Schaff, *Creeds of Christ. III* 523, the Irish articles of 1615, *ib.* 526, the Westminster Confession c. 3. And likewise there is great distinction among the theologians. There were always those who, out of fear of misuse, treated the doctrine of predestination “a posteriori, from below upward,” Trigland, Kerck. *Gesch.* 79, 84, 85 v. 92 v. 99. They preferred the method of ascending from the effect to the cause, from the fruit to the root, and of concluding from faith and conversion to election and then applying this to comfort and assurance, rather than deriving predestination and election a priori from the idea of God. To these belonged especially Bullinger, Ursinus, Olevianus, Boquinus, Hyperius, Sohnius et al., Heppe *Dogm. des d. Protest. II* 1-79, Gooszen, in his two works on the Heidelb. Catech. 1890 and 1893. Dr. van ’t Hooft, *De Theol. van H. Bullinger* 1888, cf. my art. *Calv. en Geref., Vrije Kerk*, Febr. 1893. But this is no difference in kind and in principle. All the theologians mentioned have repeatedly clearly [332] and unequivocally testified their agreement with the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, Trigland, Kerck. *Gesch.* 59-79. Schweizer, *Centr. I* passim, cf. II 110. Conversely, the Calvinists also at all times desired sobriety and caution in the treatment of this doctrine. Calvin did not bring it up in the catech. Genev. Dordt, canones I 12, 14 and

Westminster, conf. c. 4 § 8 warn against vain and curious investigations. Many theologians in the first period treated the doctrine of election not in the locus de Deo but in the locus de salute, Calvin himself, Inst. III c. 21-24. Martyr, Loci Comm. 1580 p. 229. Sohnius, Op. I 256. II 42. Musculus, Loci Comm. cap. 24. Heid. Catech. q. 54. Conf. Belg. art. 16. Gall. art. 12 etc. They thus first follow the order of the apostle Paul, who from the doctrine of sin and of grace in Rom. 9-11 ascends to election and also in Eph. 1:3 proceeds from the blessings of Christ. But just as Paul, having arrived there, then also a priori derives all benefits of salvation from election, Rom. 8:29 v. Eph. 1:4 v., so among the Reformed the analytical method gradually gives way to the synthetic. The life of faith was indeed the condition under which the confession of election arose, but the fact of election was nevertheless the source of all salvation, fundamentum ac prima causa bonorum omnium. This was the conviction not only of Calvin, but also of Melancthon, Hemming, Bucer, Olevianus etc., in Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. II 12. 20. 27. 70. Musculus says expressly: we treat election after faith, not as though it would only then follow upon it, but in order that from there, as from the stream, we might look up ad ipsum fontem, Loci p. 534. The systematic order and the theological interest required that predestination be treated in the locus de Deo. Thus it had already been done by scholasticism, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 23; thus it was done in part also still by the Lutherans, Gerhard loc. VII; and thus it became the usual order among all the Reformed, Hyperius, Meth. Theol. p. 182. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 171 III 402. Polanus, Synt. IV c. 6-10. Zanchius Op. II 476. Junius, Maccovius, Maresius, Maastricht etc., whether it was then treated with the doctrine of the attributes of God or also in a separate locus after the Trinity. This difference in order is in itself not

principal and need not be so. [333] But nevertheless it is not accidental that the a priori order has mostly been followed by the Reformed, and, on the other hand, the a posteriori order, which treats predestination at the entrance or in the middle of the locus de salute, has gradually come into use among the Lutherans, the Remonstrants, the Roman Catholics, and most newer dogmaticians. Even then, however, the difference does not consist in this, that the Reformed derive predestination in a speculative manner from an a priori, philosophical, deterministic concept of God and the others adhere to the revelation of God in Christ. For even the strictest Calvinists wish to give in the locus de Deo and in that de decretis nothing other than the doctrine of Scripture, the content of God's revelation. But among the Reformed predestination has not only an anthropological and soteriological, but especially also a theological interest. In it the matter is not first of all the salvation of man but the honor of God. With the synthetic, a priori order too a deep religious interest is involved. The assertion that this order would presuppose a nominalistic concept of God and would offer a dry, lifeless dogma, as some think, e.g. Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1868 S. 107-110. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 55. Doedes, Ned. Geloofsbel. 185, 203 v. de Cock, Is de leer der absolute praedest. uitgangspunt of resultaat van de leer der Geref. Kerk. 1868, is therefore devoid of all ground. Dry and abstract the doctrine of predestination can be treated just as well in the middle as at the beginning of dogmatics. Truly, saving faith is needed, not only to confess election, but also all other dogmas, also those about God, the Trinity, man, etc. If this consideration were decisive, then all dogmas would have to be moved to after the locus de salute. Dogmatics, however, does not describe the truth as it subjectively comes to the consciousness of believers, but as God has objectively presented it in his word, cf. deel I 49,

50. The synthetic method alone sufficiently maintains the religious interest of the honor of God, cf. Kübel, Herzog2 12, 145 f.

7. Among the Reformed there soon arose yet another difference, that of supra- and infralapsarianism. It is rooted in principle already in the struggle of Augustine against the Pelagians. With these. [334] the order of the decrees was as follows: 1o. the decree to create man, 2o. to send Christ on the basis of the foreseen but not previously determined fall, to have Him make satisfaction for all, to have Him preached to all, and to grant to them all a *gratia sufficiens*, and 3o. on the basis of foreseen faith and perseverance on the one hand and of foreseen unbelief on the other side to elect some to eternal life and to destine others for eternal punishment. With Augustine the order was quite different. Sometimes he also brings reprobation under the *praedestinatio*, above 321, but even when he does not do that, he conceives the *praescientia* not negatively and passively but actively. The will of God is after all *rerum necessitas*, the *Gen. ad litt.* VI 15; what happens *contra Dei voluntatem* still does not happen *praeter ejus voluntatem*; permission is to be thought positively, *nec utique nolens sinisset volens*, *Enchir.* 95. 100. The supralapsarian representation, that reprobation is an act of God's sovereignty, is already contained here. Most of the time, however, Augustine speaks, with respect to the fall, of God's *praescientia* and *permissio*, *de civ.* XIV 11. *de trin.* XIII 12 etc. The decree of creation and of permission of the fall is then the first; and upon that then follows the second decree of election and rejection. These both presuppose the fallen human race, the *massa corrupta*, *Enchir.* c. 98 sq. *de corr. et. gr.* 7 sq. Augustine is therefore in his representation usually infralapsarian; he does not go back behind the fall; he sees in rejection an act of God's justice. *Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus. Potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare,*

quia bonus est; non potest quemquam sine meritis damnare, quia justus est, c. Jul. III c. 18. But Augustine also does not place the decree of election and rejection further forward. Only original sin precedes it. This is sufficient for rejection. Actual sins remain, in the decree of rejection, out of account, although they are taken into consideration in the determination of the degree of punishment. Augustine came to this order through what Paul says of Jacob and Esau, Rom. 9:11 and through the lot of unbaptized children dying very early, Enchir. c. 92-99. de civ. XVI 35, de dono pers. c. 8 sq. c. Julianum IV c. 8. Yet, although original sin is a sufficient reason for rejection, it is also with Augustine not the last and deepest cause. To the question why God [335] rejected some, elected others; and also, why He has definitely rejected these and elected those, there is no answer but the will and good pleasure of God. He has mercy on whom He will and He hardens whom He will, Enchir. 95. de praed. sanct. 8. 9. de corr. et gr. 8. Finally there then follows a third decree concerning the means that lead to the end. With rejection Augustine does not draw the line through. Indeed he teaches that God also acts positively and actively in sin; God is peccatorum ordinator, Conf. I 10; He judged it good that sin should exist, Enchir. 27. 96. de civ. XXII 1; He punishes sin with sin, c. Jul. V 3. de gr. et lib. arb. 21; but he represents rejection mostly negatively as a praeterire et derelinquere, and usually does not reckon it to the praedestinatio, but identifies this with election and then subsumes both, election and rejection, under the providentia. By contrast, there is indeed a praedestinatio to the means unto salvation. The praedestinatio or election is namely with Augustine always a praedestinatio ad gloriam, and this now of itself brings with it the praedestinatio ad gratiam. The election therefore did not take place because of foreseen faith or foreseen good works; it also did not take place because

of Christ. But it is election to the final end and thus to the means i.e. Christ, who Himself also is predestined, and thus to the calling, baptism, faith, the gift of perseverance; the *praedestinatio* is a preparation of grace. Those therefore who are elected come, along the way of grace in Christ, infallibly to heavenly salvation, *de corr. et gr.* 7. 9. 13. *de praed. sanct.* 10. 19. *de dono pers.* 18. Many followers of Augustine therefore later came to the doctrine of the *gemina praedestinatio*, above 323. Alongside the *praedestinatio ad gloriam* there came to stand, coordinated, a *praedestinatio ad mortem*. This, however, could nevertheless not be conceived in the same sense as that; and therefore it was distinguished into *reprobatio negativa* and *positiva*. The *reprobatio negativa* then precedes the fall and is an act of sovereignty; it no more took place because of merits than election did, Lombardus, *Sent. I dist. 41. 1*; it includes the *voluntas permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam* and is *causa derelictionis*, Thomas, *S. Theol. I qu. 23 art. 3*, cf. however Daelman, *Theol. I 296-303*, Billuart, *Summa S. Thomae II 459 sq.* And thus many Thomists taught, Alvarez, Salmanticenses, Estius, Sylvius etc., that negative [336] reprobation preceded the fall and was purely an act of God's free power and good pleasure, Pesch, *Prael. dogm. II 217 sq.* Only, this supralapsarian reprobation was conceived wholly negatively, as the decree of God, not to elect some men, to let them fall and thereafter to destine them to eternal punishment (*reprobatio positiva*). In substance now Luther, Zwingli, Calvin and all supralapsarian Reformed have taught nothing else. The Roman Catholics do represent it differently, and lay to the charge of the Praedestinatians in the fifth century, of Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wiclif, and especially of the Reformers, that they taught a *praedestinatio ad peccata* and made God the author of sin, Bellarminus, *de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. II c. 2 sq.* Petavius, *de Deo X c. 6*

sq. Möhler, Symbolik § 12. But this happens only in order to maintain their own semipelagian standpoint and to bring it into agreement with Augustine and Thomas. The modifications that the Reformers have introduced into the doctrine of Augustine and Thomas are, apart from the doctrine of the assurance of salvation, subordinate and do not touch the essence of the matter. With them they taught that election did not take place *ob praevisa merita*, but was the source of faith and good works; that the *praedestinatio ad gloriam* infallibly brought with it that *ad gratiam*; that the *reprobatio negativa* was not to be explained as an act of justice but had to be conceived as an act of sovereignty, preceding sin; that this *reprobatio negativa* brought with it the decree to permit sin, and to leave some lying in their fall; and that the *reprobatio positiva* took that sin into account. But to that they now often added, that the concepts of *praescientia* and *permissio*, though in themselves not wrong, could not or might not be conceived purely passively and, if this happened, in any case offered not the least solution, and that the distinction of *reprobatio negativa* and *positiva* had little value. Thereby all three Reformers came to the so-called *supralapsarian* representation of the doctrine of *praedestination*, according to which the two decrees of election and rejection are to be regarded as acts of God's sovereignty, preceding those concerning the fall, sin, and redemption in Christ. Calvin in particular often intentionally remains with the proximate causes of salvation and perdition and then reasons in an *infralapsarian* way. A reprobate [337] should not seek the cause of his punishment in God's decree but in the corruption of his nature, which is his own fault, *Inst.* III 23, 9. Elect and reprobate were both equally guilty, but God is merciful toward the former, righteous toward the latter, *ib.* III 23, 11. Under the clay, *Rom.* 9:21, are to be understood the fallen men, of whom God elects some and leaves others

over exitio suo, cui natura obnoxii sunt omnes, comm. on Rom. 9:21, de aet. praedest. C. R. XXXVI 287. The fall in Adam is propinqua reprobationis causa, comm. on Rom. 9:11. God hates in us nothing but sin, C. R. ib. 295. 315. And of this representation, quod ex damnata Adae sobole Deus quos visum est eligit, quos vult reprobat, Calvin says, sicuti ad fidem exercendam longe aptior est, ita maiore fructu tractatur.... sicuti non solum ad pietatem potius conducit, sed magis videtur mihi theologica, plus convenable à la chrestienté et aussi pour plus édifier, C. R. XXXVI 317. But this nevertheless does not satisfy Calvin. Sin may be the proximate cause of rejection, it is not the last, C. R. ib. For it cannot be represented thus, that God decided to create man without a prior plan, then looked on and waited what man would do and thereafter only, knowing this beforehand, proceeded to election and rejection. The praescientia and the permissio give no solution, for God, knowing the fall beforehand, could have prevented it; He has therefore voluntarily permitted it because He judged this good, Inst. I 18, 1. II 4, 3. III 23, 6-8. C. R. ib. 359. XXXVII 291. 294. Therefore Adam's fall, sin in general and all evil is not only foreseen by God but also in a certain sense willed and determined by Him, ib. There must therefore, though hidden for us, be a reason why God has willed the fall; there is yet an altius Dei consilium, which precedes the fall, C. R. XXXVI 288. When Pighius then also objects to Calvin, that on his standpoint discretionem inter electos ac reprobos priorem fuisse hominis lapsu in mente divina, then Calvin does indeed answer, that Pighius confuses the causae proximae et remotae, that every reprobate must seek the causa proxima in his own sin and that also on the other standpoint equal objections remain in existence, but he does not reject Pighius' inference; there is an arcanum Dei consilium, which precedes the fall, C. R. XXXVI

296 sq. Rejection as well as [338] election has its last and deepest cause in God's will, Inst. I 18, 2. III 22, 11. III 23, 1, 2, 7, 8. C. R. XXXVI 278, 317. etc. With Calvin therefore the supralapsarian representation alternates with the infralapsarian, Rivetus, de praed. et elect. nomine et objecto, Op. II. Twissus, Vind. gr. 1652 I 105 sq. Petavius, de Deo X c. 6 sq. Kreyher, Die Erwählungslehre Zw. u. Calv. Stud. u. Krit. 1870, 3tes Heft. Later supralapsarianism was taught by Beza, Tract. theol. I 171-205. 360 sq. III 402-407. Piscator, de gratia Christi. Polanus, Synt. IV c. 7-10. Ferrius, Specimen schol. orthod. c. 26. Withaker, Op. I 692. Perkins, Works I 761-806. Twissus, Op. I 35, sq. Gomarus, Op. 1664 I 428 sq. II 24 sq. Maccovius, Loci C. c. 25. Voetius, Disp. I 354 sq. Heydanus, Corpus theol. I loc. 3. Burman, Synopsis I c. 38 § 13 sq. Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 255 sq. Comrie, Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI and VII, especially p. 376 ff. Kuyper, Heraut 584.

According to the supralapsarian conception, a knowledge of God of all possibilities precedes all decrees, *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. According to the rule *quod ultimum est in executione, primum est in intentione*, God in his first decree established the end, for which He would create and govern all things, namely, in the eternal blessedness and in the eternal punishment of certain possible men, *creandi et labiles*, to reveal His virtues, specifically His mercy and His justice. In order that these virtues might be revealed, a second decree had to determine that there would exist a humanity in so pitiable and miserable a condition that it could be the object of that mercy and justice. In order that such men might come to be, it had to be determined in a third decree that a man would be created, adorned with God's image and head of humanity, and that that man *permissione efficaci* would fall and would drag all his descendants along in his fall. And

finally God had to indicate in a fourth decree how His mercy would be shown to the elect in the appointment of a Mediator, in the gift of faith and in preservation unto the end, and how, on the other hand, His justice would be revealed in the reprobate in the free withholding of the saving grace of God and in the handing over to sins. Election and reprobation in this order of the [339] decrees preceded not only faith and unbelief, renewal and hardening, but also the fall and creation. However, one objection at once presented itself here. It was established Reformed doctrine that the election of Christ and of the church took place in one decree, in connection with each other, and thus had as its object the *Christus mysticus*. But in the supralapsarian order the election of the church is detached from that of Christ and separated from it by the decree of creation and fall. Comrie attempted to meet that objection, *Ex v. 't Ontw. v. Tol. VII 346v.*, and he therefore taught that the elect are elected before the decree of creation and fall to union with the Christ. This union is so intimate and indissoluble that, when those elect will fall, as is afterwards determined in the decree, Christ who was elected as Head, will now also be elected as Mediator of reconciliation. Thus Comrie perceived that the election of the church as the body of Christ could not be separated from that of Christ as Head of the church. And so he placed the election of both before the decree of creation and of the fall. Election thus now, with the possible men, also received a possible Christ as its object. The churches, however, had always had objections to this supralapsarian conception. It has been included in no single confession. At the synod at Dordrecht there were indeed a few adherents of this view, especially Gomarus and Maccovius, *Acta syn. Dordr. Sess. 107, v. d. Tuuk, Joh. Bogerman, bl. 224 v., Kist en Royaards, Archief v. Kerkgesch. III 1831 bl. 505 v.* The delegates of South Holland

and Friesland also preferred no decision in this question. But all the judgments of domestic and foreign theologians, even those of Geneva, were infralapsarian. And the synod defined the electio as that decree of God, quo.... e universo genere humano, ex primaeva integritate in peccatum et exitium sua culpa prolapso.... elegit, Can. I 7. It did not condemn supralapsarianism, it left the private opinion of Gomarus as it was but did not accept it, van der Tuuk bl. 227 v. Only the synod at Westminster in cap. 3 of its confession deliberately left this question undecided and chose no party between infra- and supralapsarianism. And furthermore infralapsarianism found support among the theologians in Martyr, Loci C. 232 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 485 sq., who are wrongly counted among the supralapsarians by Vitringa [340] II 41, Bogerman in van der Tuuk bl. 226, 349, Polyander, Rivetus, Walaeus, H. Alting, Molinaeus, Wendelinus, Spanheim, Fr. Turretinus, Heidegger etc., especially also Maresius, who in various writings defended infralapsarianism against Voetius, and others, cf. also Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. II 1024 sq.

8. Yet this milder form of the doctrine of predestination also soon found opposition. In the century of the Reformation it was already contested by Erasmus, Bibliander, Pighius, Bolsec, Trollet, Castellio, Ochinus e. a. The Socinians wholly denied predestination, taught only a decree of God to grant eternal life to those who keep his commandments and to punish the others, and sacrificed even God's omniscience to the freedom of the human will, Socinus, Praelect c. XIII. Crell, de Deo et ejus attrib. c. 32. Fock, Der Socin. 653 f. In this country it met with objections from many, such as Coolhaes, Duifhuis, Coornhert, Sybrants, Herberts, Wiggerts and then especially from Arminius. He understood by predestination the eternal decree of God, to save in and for and through Christ those of whom He

foresaw that they would believe by virtue of the gratia praeveniens and would persevere by virtue of the gratia subsequens, and to punish the others, who would not believe or persevere, Arminii Opera 1629 p. 119, 283, 389 etc. Arminius still intended to maintain the necessity of grace and faith as a gift; and his followers attempted the same in their remonstrance of the year 1610 art. 3 and 4, in Scholten L. H. K. II 458. But this grace was nevertheless always resistible, art. 4, 5, and the general will of God to save all men, the general satisfaction of Christ, the general offer of the sufficient means of grace, and the objection of the then nevertheless always fixed and certain praescientia Dei with respect to who would and would not believe, necessitated laying the decision more and more in the hands of man, Scholten II 472 v. In the later remonstrant writings this comes out clearly, in the letter of Episcopius to the Reformed abroad, in the second remonstrance of the year 1617, in Schweizer, Centr. II 89 f. 106 f., in the confession and apology of the confession in Episcopius, Opera II 69 f. [341] 95 f., in the dogmatic works of Uytenbogaert, Instruction in the christ. doctrine, 2nd ed. 1640, Episcopius, Opera I 410 sq. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II c. 18 sq. and IV. Remonstrantism prepared rationalism. It was indeed condemned at the synod of Dordt, but as a spiritual tendency it found entrance more and more in all churches and countries in the 17th and 18th century. It even received support from the Reformed side in the school at Saumur. Here Amyraldus taught a double decree. God first decreed in general that all without distinction who believed in Christ would be saved; but by his praescientia knowing that no one could believe of himself, He added to the first, general and conditional decree a second, particular and absolute decretum, to grant to some the grace of faith and to save them, Traité de la prédestination 1634. Synt. thesium in acad. Saumur. 1665 pars II p. 107 sq. cf. Rivetus,

Opera III 828-852. Spanhemius, de gratia univers. 18. 40. Examen v. h. Ontwerp v. Toler. VI 195 v. VII 314 v. 450 v. Schweizer, Centr. II 225 f. Scholten L. H. K. II 612 v. Walch, Bibl. II 1028. The first, general decree, if it meant anything, entirely pushed the second aside. In spite of the condemnation in the Formula consensus of 1675 can. 4-6 it broke through and led in Pajon to denial of the gratia efficax. In all Reformed churches an Arminian direction gained ground. All the directions and sects that arose in the 17th and 18th century, neonomianism, deism, quakerism, methodism etc. showed weaker or stronger affinity with Arminius. Only a few theologians held out here and there, such as Comrie, Holtius and Brahe in this country, Boston and the Erskine's in Scotland, and especially also Jonathan Edwards 1703-1758 in America.

Deeper study of nature, history, and man has, in this century, demonstrated the untenability of deistic Pelagianism. And in its place there has arisen a pantheistic or materialistic determinism, more ethically or more physically tinged. Naturally, despite an appearance of agreement between this determinism and the doctrine of predestination, there is a principled distinction. In pantheism and materialism there is no place at all for a counsel of God; there remains only room for an unconscious fate, a blind nature, an alogical [342] will. Yet many have understood and explained the ecclesiastical doctrine of predestination in such a deterministic sense, Biedermann, § 847 f. Strauss II 362 f. 462 f. Scholten, L. H. K. passim, especially II4 453-605, De vrije wil, 1859 bl. 385 v. Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie II 174 f. 216 f. 271 f. From this standpoint it is said: so gewiss jeder Mensch zum Bösen nicht bloss prädisponirt sondern auch präterminirt ist, so gewiss ist auch jeder zum Guten nicht bloss prädisponirt sondern präterminirt.... so gewiss es keinen schlechthin

Verworfenen giebt, so gewiss keinen schlechthin Erwählten, denn auch der Verworfenste trägt die Gnade in gewissem Grade in sich und auch der Begnadeste ist nicht vom aktuellen Bösen eximirt, Hartmann, ib. 217. In substance Schleiermacher also agrees with this, Chr. Gl. II § 117-120; for although he proceeds from the church doctrine and holds fast to the revelation in Christ, yet he distinguishes election and reprobation only with respect to time; there are no reprobates in the strict sense, everyone would, under other circumstances, already have been converted here, or comes later to conversion. All thoughts of earlier and later times return in more recent theology. First, many try to evade the whole doctrine of predestination by the remark that eternity is not a time before time, that the decrees of God therefore cannot be conceived as ready and finished many centuries beforehand, but that the whole predestination with election and reprobation is nothing other than the eternal immanent acting and ruling of God revealing itself in time; the decrees are nothing other than the facts of history itself, Schweizer, Christl. Glaub. II 254 f. Lipsius Dogm. § 540. In this way, however, the whole distinction between eternity and time, between God and world, is erased and theism is exchanged for pantheism. Therefore others do indeed assume an eternal decree of God, but one that consists in nothing other than the voluntas antecedens, whereby God sincerely wishes and wills the salvation of all. In history, however, this general decree becomes, at least temporally, particular. For God proceeds historically in carrying it out. The object of election is not individual persons, but the congregation. God calls peoples, and He does so successively, according as, in the course of the ages, under His guidance they have become receptive and ripe for the higher religion of [343] Christianity. And among those peoples He also calls the particular persons again successively and in

connection with their people, their disposition, their upbringing. The election of the one people and of the one man is therefore not at the expense but for the benefit of others. Not all can be the first. The peoples and persons now temporarily passed over, i.e. reprobated, come later in this life or probably after this life to true conversion. In any case there is no decree of reprobation on God's side that would exclude certain persons from salvation; at most, on man's side a lasting resistance and a positive hardening is possible, which causes him to be eternally lost, Martensen § 206 f. Lipsius § 541-548. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III² 112 f. Luthardt, Komp. der Dogm. § 32 f. Nitzsch, Evang. Dogm. 607. Still others go a step further and teach that to that general decree there is added yet another particular decree, in which God determined to save those whose faith and perseverance He has foreseen and known in advance, and, on the other hand, to punish the others eternally. But all agree in this, that they ascribe the decision for eternity to the power of man. Yet again in different ways. The power to accept or reject grace belongs, according to the one, to man already from creation or from the pedagogical guidance of God's general providence, J. Müller, Dogm. Abhandl. 243 f. Id. Lehre v. d. Sünde II 313 f. Nitzsch, Syst. d. Chr. Lehre § 144. Kübel in Herzog² 12, 161, cf. 15, 112. Ebrard, Dogm. § 325. 344, also Ch. de la Saussaye in mijne Theol. van ch. d. l. S. 64v.; according to the other, from the *gratia praeparans* and *antecedens*, which is bestowed upon man in baptism or in the preaching of law and gospel, Kliefoth, Acht Bücher von der Kirche 1854 cf. Müller, Dogm. Abhandl. 247 f. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe I³ 174 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk II³ 278. 286. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. § 40. 41. Dorner, Glaub. III 703-724. Lipsius § 541; or else the reconciliation is sought in this, that grace is bestowed upon those who make good use of the

natural powers of the will and with earnestness investigate God's word, etc., Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 1, S. 72 f., cf. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 511. Finally, predestination in the Augustinian sense is still taught by some, such as Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 535 s. Shedd, [344] Dogm. Theol. I 393 s. Strong, Syst. Theol. New-York 1890 p. 171 s. Böhl, Dogm. 124 f. 527 f. etc. It is noteworthy that in America the Lutheran churches, united in the Missouri synod, have approached Calvinism, Dieckhoff, Der missour. Prädestinatismus u. die Concordienformel, Rostock 1884, whereas the Cumberland Presbyterian Church has modified the Westminster confession in an Arminian spirit, Schaff, Creeds III 771. In the revision of the Westminster confession, which was brought up for consideration some years ago in Scotland and America, many also raised objections against the doctrine of election and reprobation, the perdition of children dying in earliest infancy and of heathens, and in general against the one-sided proceeding of the confession from the sovereignty of God with disregard of His universal love.

9. By the counsel of God is to be understood his eternal decree concerning all that in time shall be or shall happen. Scripture proceeds everywhere from the fact that all that is and happens is the realization of God's thought and will, and finds its model and foundation in God's eternal counsel, Gen. 1, Job 28:27, Spr. 8:22, Ps. 104:24, Spr. 3:19, Jer. 10:12, 51:15, Hebr. 11:3, Ps. 33:11, Jes. 24:24-27, 46:10, Spr. 19:21, Hd. 2 vs. 23, 4:28, Ef. 1:11 etc. It is already the privilege of man, to act after deliberation and counsel. With a rational being, thought, the intention, precedes the deed. Much more is this the case with the Lord our God, without whose knowledge and will nothing can come into existence. Among Christians, therefore, there can also be no difference about the existence of such a counsel of the Lord.

Only pantheism, which acknowledges no life and consciousness in God of his own, distinct from the world, can raise objection against that. But for that reason this is placed before the choice, either to deny the logos in the world and to derive it from a blind will, or to acknowledge the logos in the world but then also to assume in God a consciousness which contains the ideas of all things. The logos in the world presupposes the logos in God. There could be no thought in the creation, if it had not been created with understanding and with wisdom. This thought of the Lord which is embodied in the creation is further not to be conceived as an uncertain notion, of which the realization remains doubtful [345]; it is no *nuda praescientia*, which receives its content from the creatures; no plan, design, intention, of which the execution can be frustrated. But it is both at the same time, an act of God's understanding and of his will. Therefore Scripture speaks of counsel, of the thoughts of his heart, Ps. 33:11, of counsel of his will, Ef. 1:11, of predestination and preordination, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, Rom. 8:29; God speaks and it is, He commands and it stands. The counsel of God is of such a nature, that in its time it necessarily brings about the execution. It is efficacious, Jes. 14:27, Ps. 115:3, 135:6, unchangeable, Jes. 46:10, Ps. 33:11, Hebr. 6:17, Jak. 1:17, independent, Mt. 11:26, Ef. 1:9, Rom. 9:11, 20, 21. Yet there is between the decree and the execution a distinction just as between God's being and his works outward. The decree of God is an *opus ad intra*, immanent in the Divine being, eternal and standing outside time. Indeed it has been objected against this, that eternity cannot and may not be thought of as a time before time, and that the counsel of God and his election therefore also may not be understood as a decree that was taken ages beforehand. This remark is also correct in itself. Eternity is essentially distinct from time. The counsel of

God is no more than generation an act of God in the past; it is an eternal act of God, eternally completed and eternally continuing, outside and above time, Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 230b. It is no fruit of all kinds of reasoning and consideration, so that God would first for a time have been without decree, undecided, without will, as Scaliger rightly remarked, Moor, Comm. in Marck. I 900. Vitringa II 13. Heppe, S. 101-102. And it is just as little to be conceived as a plan that lies ready somewhere and now waits for execution. But the counsel of God is the eternally active will of God, the willing, decreeing God himself, not something accidental in God but one with his being. God cannot be thought of as not willing, as undecided, Maccovius, Loci Comm. 129. Mastricht III 1, 28. Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 1, 7. Examen v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. 6e Sam. 164-166. But thereby the counsel of God nevertheless remains maintained as an *opus ad intra*, determined by nothing but by God himself, distinct from the works of God in time, Hd. 15:18, Ef. 1:4.

The content and object of this counsel of God are all things, [346] which are and will happen in time, in one word the world-idea, the *κοσμος νοητος*. This world-idea stands in close connection with the being of God, but may nevertheless not be identified with the being of God and thus also not with the Son, the Logos. It stands to the being of God in the same relation as the *Weltbewusstsein* to the self-consciousness of God. The self-knowledge of God does not exhaust itself in the world, any more than his power or any of his virtues. But the world is indeed a suitable instrument, to bring all God's virtues to revelation in a creaturely manner. The world-idea is so conceived by God, that it can radiate his glory and can bring his perfections to contemplation according to the measure of the creature. It is a mirror, in which God displays his image. It is the creaturely reflex of his adorable

being; finite, limited, inadequate but nevertheless true and faithful imprint of his self-knowledge. In relation to the world itself this counsel of God is therefore both *causa efficiens* and *causa exemplaris*. *Causa efficiens*, for all creaturely being can of course come into existence only through and as a consequence of the decree and the will of God. The decree is the womb of all things, Zef. 2:2. All that is, finds its last, deepest ground in the good pleasure of God, in the εὐδοκία τοῦ θεοῦ. Higher we cannot climb. Why all things are and are thus, finds for us its last answer in the *Deus voluit*, in his absolute sovereignty. But the counsel of God is also *causa exemplaris* of all that is and happens. We think the things, after and as they are. For God the things are, after and as they have been thought by Him. Just as Moses had to make the tabernacle according to the pattern, shown to him on the mountain, Hebr. 8:5, just as every πατρία in heaven and on earth is named from the Father, Ef. 3:15, so all that is temporal is an image of the eternal, all that is being a shadowing of the thought, and in the deepest ground all that is and happens a reflection of the Divine being. Although objection has been made to it, because the world-idea does not coincide with God's being, yet the word of Thomas can be understood in a good sense, *Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum*, S. Theol. I qu. 15 art. 1. qu. 44 art. 3, cf. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 36. Polanus, Synt. p. 268. Gomarus, Theses Theol. IX § 28-30. Amesius, Medulla Theol. I 7. 13 sq. Heidegger, Corpus [347] Theol. V 12. Turret. Th. El. IV 1, 7. Mastricht III 1, 28. Moor I 903 sq. Therefore this counsel of God is not to be thought otherwise than as a single, simple decree. At the Westminster synod there was discussion about whether one would speak of decree in sing. or in plur. The confession uses the word only in the singular. And indeed the world-idea in the Divine consciousness is one simple conception. Just as Minerva comes forth

wholly grown from Jupiter's head, just as genius suddenly and at once grasps the idea of a work of art, so in the self-consciousness of God the world-idea is eternally completed. But just as an artist can carry out his conception only gradually, so God spreads the one thought of his counsel piece by piece in time before the eyes of his creatures. The world-idea is one; but, realizing itself, it unfolds itself in all its richness in the forms of space and time. In creatures and in a creaturely manner, that is outside himself, God can reveal his love and thus all his virtues in no other way than in the forms of length and breadth, of depth and height, Ef. 3:18, 19. Thus alone do we learn to know something of God's manifold wisdom and of his unsearchable riches. But thus the one, simple and eternal decree of God also unfolds itself in time before our eyes into a multiplicity of things and events, each of which in turn points back at a moment to the one decree of God and makes us, in a human manner, speak of many decrees of God. This manner of speaking is not to be disapproved, provided only that the unity of the decree in God and the unbreakable connection of all particular decrees is maintained and acknowledged.

10. In the counsel of God, first of all that decree is to be distinguished which formerly was generally designated by the name of providentia. The word *προνοια*, providentia, providence, originally means nothing else than foreseeing, providing beforehand, deliberating beforehand. Thus the word was also at first understood in theology. The providence of God was therefore reckoned among the decrees and discussed under the will of God. It was then defined as *ratio ordinis rerum in finem*, i.e. as that act of God's intellect and will whereby He from eternity has ordered all things to an end established by Him. As such a *ratio ordinis* it is indeed to be [348] distinguished from the execution in time, i.e. from the *exsecutio ordinis*,

which more particularly bore the name of gubernatio, Boethius, de consol. phil. IV pr. 6. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 35 n. 1. Thomas. S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 1. c. Gent. III 77. And thus the providentia is conceived as a decree of God, besides by many Roman theologians, Petavius, de Deo VIII. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 175 sq. Perrone, Prael. II 233 c. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 158, also in the first period by many Reformed theologians, Ursinus, Explic. Catech. qu. 27. Zanchius Op. II 324, 436. Maresius, Syst. theol. IV § 19. Conf. Helv. II art. 6, cf. later on the government of God. In this sense the providentia is a consilium or decretum, according to which, as according to the exemplar, God in time preserves and governs all things. But later the name providentia has come most into use for the act of preservation and government itself, as Zwingli, Calvin, Polanus, the Synopsis etc., already treat it in that sense after the creation. The name matters less, but it is of importance that the decree of God includes all things, not only the determination of the eternal state of rational creatures (praedestinatio), but the ordering and arrangement of all things without distinction. And this was formerly indicated by the name providentia. Predestination therefore did not come to stand by itself separately, but was connected with the decree of God concerning all things and was only a particular application thereof. As Zwingli expressed it: est autem providentia praedestinationis veluti parens; predestination is providence itself, insofar as it is related to the eternal lot of men and angels. The Reformed expressed this, in closer adherence to Scripture, which does not speak of *πρνοια*, by the counsel of God. This includes all things and thus in the first place has reference to the world in its entirety. Everything, also in unconscious nature, is and happens according to the counsel of God. Underlying all things are his ordinances. Heaven and earth, light and darkness, day and night, summer and winter, sowing and

harvest etc. are both in their unity and in their diversity ordered by Him who is wonderful in counsel and great in deed, Gen. 1:14, 26, 28, 8:22, Ps. 104:5, 9, 119:90, 91, 148:6, Job 38:10 v., Jes. 28:29, Jer. 5:24, 31:25 v., 33:20, 25. Insofar now as the counsel of God has irrational nature as its object, it is, except by the Manicheans etc., almost unanimously acknowledged. And also [349] there is still great unanimity when such a counsel and ordering of God is assumed in a more special sense for rational creatures. The creation of the human race, Gen. 1:26, the division of the peoples, Gen. 11, the determination of their times and their dwelling, Hd. 17:26, the difference between peoples and men in gift, disposition, rank, station, wealth, condition etc., Deut. 32:8, Spr. 22:2, Mt. 25:15; even the inequality within the congregation in all kinds of gifts, 1 Cor. 4:7, 12:7-11, Rom. 12:4 v. find their deepest cause in the will of God. All being and all diversity of being is only to be explained from his good pleasure. The ground of the existence and of the thus-existence of all things rests only in God. That something is and that it is precisely this and not something else; that there is manifold being and life; that there is endless diversity among creatures in species, kind, duration, rank, station, possession etc. is only God's good pleasure. And this good pleasure does not presuppose but creates its object. If the animals could speak and contended with their Creator because they are not, as we are, men, everyone would consider that absurd, says Augustine, *de verbis apost. sermo* 11, cf. *Calv. Inst.* III 22, 1. And indeed nothing befits any creature other than to acquiesce in the good pleasure of God. There is in fact only a choice between these two, that the creature either be its own maker and thus cease to be creature, or that the creature remain creature from the beginning to the end and thus have to thank God alone for its existence and thus-existence. As soon, however, as

that counsel of God was also extended to the moral world, opposition has arisen from all sides. Here the counsel of God had its end, this was the special domain of man, here man appeared as the creator of his own lot. In order to maintain freedom, responsibility, guilt etc., Pelagius distinguished between the natural and the moral world, between the posse and the velle and withdrew the latter from the counsel and providence of God. And all Pelagianism aims to make the moral world for a part or in its entirety independent over against God. This attempt, however, deserves to be rejected in itself and wholly in general already. First, it is in conflict with Scripture. For although Scripture maintains the moral nature of man at all times as strongly as possible, it never seeks to do so by making a dualistic separation [350] between natural and moral world and withdrawing the latter from God. God's counsel extends over all things, also over the moral, over evil as well as over good. Next, such a separation is in fact impossible. The world-idea is one organic whole. Physis and ethos stand in the closest connection and at every moment interpenetrate each other. Distinction there is very certainly; but separation there is nowhere; there is no point in creation to be indicated where the counsel and government of God ends and the independent will and act of the creature begins. Above all in this century the historical and organic view has driven out and condemned this Pelagian separation at every point. But further, this dualism would withdraw the greatest and most important part of the world from God's counsel and deliver it into the hands of chance and arbitrariness. Yes, not only from God's counsel and will, but even from his knowledge the world is then for a great part withdrawn. If God and his creature can be thought of only as competitors and the one can preserve his freedom and independence only at the expense of the other, then God must be more and more limited in his

knowing and willing; Pelagianism banishes God from the world, it leads to deism and atheism, and sets the arbitrariness, the folly of man upon the throne. Therefore the solution of the problem must be sought in another direction, namely, in such a way that God, because He is God and the world is his creature, by his infinitely great knowing and willing does not destroy but precisely creates and maintains the independence and freedom of the creatures.

11. With the *providentia generalis* and *specialis*, however, Pelagianism does not yet raise itself in its full strength; it acknowledges this to a certain extent. But then it acts in a combative manner especially when the eternal state of rational creatures, the particular decree of *praedestinatio*, comes under discussion. Now *praedestinatio* is only a further application of the counsel, the *providentia* of God. Just as no separation can be made between the natural and the moral world, so no boundary can be indicated between what relates to the temporal and what relates to the eternal state of rational creatures. Yet Pelagianism has here exchanged *praedestinatio* for *praescientia* and [351] defined predestination as that decree of God whereby He has determined eternal salvation or punishment for those whose persevering faith or unbelief he had foreseen beforehand. However generally this conception has now been accepted in the Christian church—it is, after all, shared by the Greek, Roman, Luth., Remonstr., Anabapt., Methodist. church etc.—it is nevertheless decisively contradicted both by Scripture, and by religious experience, and by theological thinking. First, Scripture teaches clearly and plainly that faith and unbelief, salvation and perdition are not merely an object of the *nuda praescientia Dei*, but are determined by his will and decree. The *προγνωσις* in Rom. 8:29, 11:2, 1 Petr. 1:2, cf. Hd. 2:23 is not passive foreknowing, not a state of

consciousness but, like the hebr. *נָתַן* Hos. 13:5, Am. 3:2 etc., a self-determination of God preceding the realization in history, to enter into a definite relation to the objects of his foreknowledge; it stands in the closest connection with the *προθεσις*, *προορισμος* and *ἐκλογή* and is an act of his *εὐδοκία*. Second, it is the teaching of Scripture that faith cannot arise from the natural man, 1 Cor. 2:14, that it is a gift of God, Ef. 2:8, Phil. 1:29, 1 Cor. 4:7, and that it therefore does not precede election but presupposes it and is its fruit and operation, Rom. 8:29, Ef. 1:4, 5, Hd. 13:48. Third, it is the unanimous testimony of all religious, Christian experience, that salvation both in an objective and in a subjective sense is solely and only God's work. In doctrine someone may be Pelagian, in the practice of the Christian life, in prayer above all, every Christian is Augustinian. Then he excludes all boasting and gives God alone the honor. Augustine therefore rightly said that the faith of the ancient church in God's grace had expressed itself not so much in the opuscula as in the prayers, *de dono pers.* 23, cf. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* I 16. Fourth, the *praescientia Dei* is nevertheless of such a nature that its object is foreknown as indubitably certain, and then it is equal to *praedestinatio*; if, however, the object is totally contingent and arbitrary, *praescientia* also cannot be maintained. According to the Greek, Roman and Lutheran churches, and even according to the Remonstrants in their remonstrance, who all seek to evade *praedestinatio* by *praescientia*, the number of those who believe and [352] will be saved is just as fixed and certain as according to Augustine and the Reformed. Augustine said: *certus est praedestinatorum numerus qui neque augeri potest neque minui*, *de corr. et gr.* 13. And thus it is taught by Lombardus, *Sent.* I dist. 40. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 23 art. 6. 7, cf. qu. 24 and all Roman theologians, even though they differ in this, that some derive that certainty of the outcome more from

the will, and others, such as Molina e. a., more from the knowing of God, Perrone, Prael. theol. II 249. Pesch, Prael. theol. II 205. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. III 143. The Lutheran theologians later did indeed make praedestinatio depend on praescientia but nevertheless never called the certainty and unchangeableness of the outcome into doubt, Gerhard, Loci Theol. loc. VII § 212 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 20. Hollaz, Examen theol. p. 641. Scripture spoke in many places, Dan. 12:1, Mt. 24:24, 25:34, Joh. 10:28, Rom. 8:29-30, 1 Petr. 1:2-4 too clearly and too strongly for this unchangeableness to be able to be denied. Both formaliter and materialiter, both as to quantity and quality, the number of those who are saved stands immovably fixed according to the confession of all Christian churches. But if this is acknowledged and conceived, praescientia is one and the same with providentia and praedestinatio. God has foreknown who would believe, and knows that eternally and unchangeably. Thus these in time also will certainly and infallibly come to faith and to salvation. For freedom in the sense of chance and arbitrariness, on this standpoint there remains nowhere any room. Praescientia includes praedestinatio. If one says, like Castellio, in Schweizer, Centrald. II 278, that God has foreknown the contingent precisely as contingent, then one falls back into the line of thought of Augustine and can thereby just as well bring freedom into agreement with praedestinatio. The question is precisely whether the free, contingent as such can be known eternally as certain and infallible. If yes, then Augustine is right and the whole doctrine of praescientia is unnecessary. If no, then one must go further and also deny praescientia; then the outcome of world history must remain absolutely contingent and as such incalculable and unknowable. Cicero already saw this and therefore also denied praescientia, cf. above 208v. Later the

Socinians, the Remonstrants, Episc. Inst. [353] theol. IV sect. 2 c. 18. Vorstius in Scholten II 492 and many theologians in more recent times followed him, who, for the maintenance of creaturely freedom, have assumed a self-limitation of God in his knowing, willing, and being able, Weisse, Philos. Dogm. § 509. Martensen § 115. 116. Rothe, Ethik § 42. Dorner, Gl. I 319 f. Hofstede de Groot, Inst. theol. nat. ed. 3 p. 183 e. a., cf. Scholten, L. H. K. II 490. Yet the Christian churches have not dared this consequence. All confess the providentia and the praescientia Dei. Everything happens in time as it is eternally known by God. The end result and the ways and means leading to it are fixed in God's praescientia. Thus considered, the doctrine of praedestinatio is not a confession of the Reformed church alone, not a private opinion of Augustine and Calvin, but a dogma of the whole of Christendom. There is difference in the name by which it is called; in the manner in which it is presented; but in substance there is agreement, i.e. all Christian churches and theologians confess that everything is and happens and turns out as God eternally knows it. In that sense Augustine could rightly say: praedestinationis hujus fidem, quae contra novos haereticos nova sollicitudine defenditur, nunquam ecclesia Christi non habuit, de dono pers. c. 23; and Prosper: praedestinationem Dei nullus catholicus negat, in Perrone II 249. All Christian churches have brought it up in the confession to a greater or lesser degree. Yes, it can be said, whether one thinks Pelagian or Augustinian, the matter about which one thinks nevertheless remains the same. History does not change. The facts and the connection of the facts in world history exist as they are, independently of the false or true conception that we form of them, Schweizer, Ref. Dogm. I 73. The distinction lies only herein, that the Reformed, with Scripture in hand and with Augustine as an example, did

not remain standing with the second causes, but dared to ascend to the first cause, i.e. the will of God, and therein alone have been able to find rest for their thinking and life. The doctrine of praedestinatio has its invincible power and strictness in the facts of world history, as they are explained by God's word as the execution of his eternal counsel. It is itself not hard and strict, but terrifyingly serious are the facts on which it is built, Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 349. And Pelagianism therefore does not satisfy, [354] because at every point of life and of the history of humanity it collides with the tremendous reality. It is a superficial varnish that indeed deceives man but does not change reality.

12. Yet Pelagianism, although in general it has already proved untenable, resumes its attack at every particular point in the doctrine of predestination. In the first place it assumes a voluntas or decretum Dei antecedens and conditionatum, in order to offer a sufficient grace to all fallen human beings. For this it appeals to various texts of Holy Scripture, Jes. 5:3, Jer. 51:9, Ezech. 18:23, 32, 33:11, Mt. 23:37, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 11:32 and especially 1 Tim. 2:4 and 2 Petr. 3:19. Pelagians, Semipelagians, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Remonstrants, among the Reformed the Amyraldists and all universalists of earlier and later times assume such a first general decree. This decree, however, immediately comes into conflict with reality. Through all centuries only a small portion of humanity has been acquainted with the gospel. In fact, grace in the history of humanity is not universal but particular. To be sure, various attempts have been tried, to bring this fact into agreement with the general decree. The Pelagians have erased the boundary between nature and grace and have also found in the lex naturae a way to salvation. Many Roman Catholic theologians judge that grace is bestowed or will be bestowed upon all who make a good use of the light

and the power of nature. The old Lutherans said that grace in the time of Adam, Noah and the apostles, Rom. 10:18 had been universal but had again been limited only by the sin of human beings. And more recent theologians have come to the doctrine that the gospel of grace will still after death be preached to all infideles negativi. But all these hypotheses go outside Scripture and cannot nullify the fact of the particularity of grace. If this fact, however, stands firm, the question arises, why the gospel is preached to one and not to another? Why is one born in a Christian, and another in a heathen land? The Pelagians and Semipelagians also attempted to justify this with the consideration that God also with this [355] *praedestinatio ad primam gratiam* had taken account of the natural merits of the human being and the use that he had made of his natural powers. But Augustine refuted this *praedestinatio ad primam gratiam ob praevisa merita ex voluntate naturali* sufficiently, by pointing to the children, who had no such merit and of whom some died baptized and others unbaptized. The Roman Catholic church has therefore also always combated this point in Pelagianism, held fast to the *gratia praeveniens* and called the first grace unmerited, cf. in Denzinger, n. 171. 679. In actual fact Pelagianism encounters in the case of children an insurmountable objection. The *praedestinatio ad primam gratiam*, i.e. being born in a Christian land or later becoming acquainted with the gospel is wholly unmerited and unconditional. Here at the beginning, at the first decree, predestination cannot be conceived otherwise than as absolute and unconditional. Why one becomes acquainted with the gospel and another remains deprived of it, one thus is placed in the possibility of becoming eternally blessed and the other not, cannot be answered from the human being. Everyone must here, whether he will or not, acquiesce in the will and the good pleasure of God.

Secondly, Pelagianism seeks to maintain itself with the *praedestinatio ad gratiam efficacem*. Reality teaches that not all who hear the gospel accept it with a true faith. Whence this distinction? Pelagianism says that the *gratia*, which is bestowed upon all, is in itself *sufficiens*, and that now the will of man decides whether that *gratia* will be and remain *efficax* or not; with Pelagianism there is thus in fact no decree any longer after that of the universal offering of grace. From now on everything is left to the decision of man. God has done his part; He gave the *posse*; man possesses the *velle*. But no single Christian confession has dared to adopt this Pelagian standpoint. All have, in a weaker or stronger sense, taught a *gratia efficax*, a *donum fidei*, and thus have also distinguished a second decree in predestination. Only then did the question arise, to whom this *gratia efficax*, this *gratia habitualis*, *infusa*, i.e. the true faith, was bestowed. On this point all manner of confusion prevails. But yet in Rome, among the Lutherans, among the Remonstrants, etc., the doctrine has gradually arisen that the grace of faith is bestowed [356] upon those who make good use of the *gratia prima*, i.e. the preaching of the gospel, the illumination of the H. Spirit, etc., and do what is in their power, *quod in se est*. To be sure, this is no *meritum ex condigno*, but still a *meritum ex congruo*. God binds himself in the distribution of the gift of faith to the earnestness of human striving. The *praedestinatio ad ultiores gratias* is a decree, not of God's sovereignty, but of his justice or equity. It is equitable that God should bestow faith and forgiveness upon whoever has done his best. Yet this conception too is in conflict both with Scripture and with reality. Indeed man is obligated to faith and conversion and is also admonished thereto by the preaching of the gospel. But from the obligation no conclusion can be drawn to the power; from the *du sollst* there by no means follows the *du*

kannst. How would sinful and corrupt man also possess the power to accept or not accept the gospel and to make or not make good use of the *gratia prima*? From where would he derive that power, from himself, from the operation of the Logos, from the grace of baptism? The advocates of the *gratia sufficiens* offered to all are themselves at a loss about it. And Scripture teaches as clearly as possible that man is wholly unwilling and powerless, that faith is an unmerited gift of grace, that salvation also subjectively is God's work. Nature and grace may stand in relation; there is between the two an essential distinction and no gradual transition; of a *meritum ex congruo* there is mention neither in Scripture nor in reality. Little children enter, the wise and the intelligent go away, and tax collectors and sinners go before the Pharisees into the kingdom of heaven.

Thirdly and lastly, Pelagianism still seeks to maintain its position with the *praedestinatio ad gloriam*. Even if someone truly believes and has thereby received forgiveness and the right to life, it is absolutely not certain that he will preserve that faith and thus obtain salvation. Therefore, with God a third decree is still necessary, namely, to grant salvation to those whose perseverance in the faith to the end He has eternally foreseen. But in an intensified sense all the above-mentioned objections herewith return. The decree of God becomes wholly conditional and loses the character [357] of a will and a decree; it is nothing but a wish, the fulfilment of which is wholly uncertain; God looks on passively and assumes a waiting attitude; man decides, arbitrariness and chance sit upon the throne; even with believers the final outcome is still wholly uncertain; at every moment a falling away of the saints is possible. The separation of the *praedestinatio ad gratiam* from that *ad gloriam* is furthermore wholly in conflict with Scripture; it makes it so that the chain of salvation, Rom. 8:29, can be

broken at every point; it dissolves the one work of re-creation into a series of human deeds and actions, which stand loose, without coherence, alongside one another and lack all continuity. And finally, with this doctrine the whole work of God in the salvation of sinners is misunderstood and denied; Scripture always and everywhere lays the strongest emphasis on the faithfulness and unchangeableness of God, on the eternity of his covenant, on the firmness of his promises; but of all this there is, with Pelagianism, no longer any mention. The Lord does not know those who are his; his covenant and his lovingkindness do indeed totter from moment to moment; sheep are indeed snatched out of Jesus' hand; it is not true that God glorifies all whom He has known, called, and justified. Pure, consistent Pelagianism is the complete overthrow of all Christianity and religion. Therefore it has also been accepted by no single Christian church. However much the doctrine of predestination, through semi-Pelagian intermixtures, has become impure in the Roman and the Lutheran church, it is nevertheless confessed by all. Predestination is essentially a dogma of the whole of Christendom.

13. The word predestination, προορισμος, has, however, been used in Christian theology in very different senses; at one time it had a broader, at another a narrower meaning. From a Pelagian standpoint it is nothing other than the decree to grant eternal salvation to those whose faith and perseverance God has foreseen, and to destine others, whose sins and unbelief He foresaw, to eternal punishment. Creation, fall, Christ, the preaching of the gospel and the offering of grace to all, persevering faith and unbelief precede predestination, are not included in it but fall outside it; it itself is nothing other than the destining to eternal life or to eternal [358] punishment. Here predestination has the narrowest sense, but it also

depends entirely on the *nuda praescientia Dei*, is uncertain and not worthy of the name of predestination; not God but man makes history and determines its result. This opinion has been refuted more than sufficiently and need not be discussed further, cf. also Perkins, Works I 788 v. Twissus, Op. I 669 sq. But the important difference between infra- and supralapsarianism deserves broader treatment. This in fact consists in nothing other than a narrower or broader definition of the concept of predestination. Augustine, namely, restricted the word in a twofold sense. First, he let the decree of predestination follow upon that of creation and the fall; and second, he usually took the word in *bonam partem*, identified preordination with election and preferred to designate the decree of reprobation by the name of *praescientia*. Predestination says what God does, namely the good, but *praescientia* looks to what man does, namely the evil, *de dono pers.* c. 17-19. *de praed. sanct.* c. 10. With this usage scholasticism in general aligned itself, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 23, the Roman, Denzinger, Enchir. 279. 285. 296. Trid. VI can. 6, and Lutheran theology, Müller, Symb. Bücher S. 554. The infralapsarians among the Reformed in the same way let the decree of creation and fall precede that of election and reprobation; but while most here after the fall had no objection to also including reprobation under the *praedestinatio* and thus speaking of a *gemina praedestinatio*, Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 9. 6, others judged it better to restrict the word predestination to election, and to treat reprobation separately alongside it under its own name, Hyperius, Methodus Theol. 183 sq. Martyr, Loci C. 231-233. Zanchius, Op. II 479. Keckermann, Syst. theol. 1603 p. 296. Pareus on Rom. 8:29, 30, ed. 1609 p. 562. If now the word *praescientia* is not taken in a Pelagian sense and reprobation is not withdrawn from the will of God, as

with the later Roman Catholics and Lutherans, then this is a difference in name but not in the matter itself, Mastricht, Theol. III 2, 24. Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 7, 4. Stapfer, Wederl. Godg. V 466 v. But characteristic of the infralapsarian view is that creation [359] and fall in the decree precede election and reprobation. By contrast, by supralapsarianism predestination is so expanded that it also includes creation and the fall within itself as means that lead to the final end, the eternal state of rational creatures.

Both representations of predestination, both the supra- and the infralapsarian, have in the Reformed church and theology always been acknowledged alongside one another. The Dutch confessional writings are infralapsarian, but no ecclesiastical assembly, not even that of Dordrecht, has ever made things difficult for a supralapsarian. The Lambeth Articles of 1595, incorporated in the Irish confession of 1615 cap. 3, and the confession of Westminster intentionally leave the question undecided. The Reformed theologians have always granted civil rights to both representations, Voetius, Disp. V 602-607. Twissus, Op. I 50. Spanheim, disp. de praedest. § 8. 9. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VII 296. 383 v. Spanheim used to say that he was supra- on the chair, in the instruction of the congregation infralapsarian, Ex. v. h. Ont. v. Tol. VII 296. And indeed both stand on Reformed foundations. On the one side the supralapsarii teach just as decidedly as the infralapsarii, that God is no author of sin, but that this has its cause in the will of man. God as the Almighty may have determined the fall and also exercise his regiment in and through sin; He remains holy and righteous, man falls and sins voluntarily, through his own fault. *Cadit homo, providentia Dei sic ordinante, sed suo vitio cadit*, Calv. Inst. III 23, 8. And also the supralapsarii have not arrived at their representation through philosophical thinking, but they gave it, because they considered it more in

agreement with Holy Scripture. Just as Augustine came to his doctrine of *praedestinatio* through the study of Paul, so the doctrine of Scripture concerning sin led Calvin to his supralapsarianism. In that, according to his own declaration, he gave no philosophy but the truth according to the Word of God, Inst. I 18. III 21-23. And on the other side the infralapsarian Reformed fully acknowledge that God did not foresee the fall and sin and the eternal punishment of many by a *nuda praescientia* but included and determined it in his decree, Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 9, 6. Over the decrees themselves and their content there is thus no difference at all. Both deny [360] free will, reject faith as cause of election and sin as cause of reprobation, and thus combat Pelagianism; both ultimately rest in the sovereign good pleasure of God. There is only a difference concerning the order of the decrees. The infralapsarian adheres to the historical, causal; the supralapsarian prefers the ideal, teleological order. The former takes the concept *praedestinatio* in a narrower sense and lets creation, fall, *providentia* precede it; the latter includes under predestination all other decrees. There the emphasis falls on the multiplicity, here on the unity of the decrees; there all decrees have to a certain extent a proper, independent significance, here the preceding ones are all subordinated to the final decree.

14. The appeal to Scripture does not bring this dispute to a solution. For while infralapsarianism is supported by all those passages where election and reprobation relate to the fallen world and are presented as acts of mercy and justice, Deut. 7:6-8, Mt. 12:25, 26, Joh. 15:19, Rom. 9:15, 16, Ef. 1:4-12, 2 Tim. 1:9, supralapsarianism seeks its strength in all those texts which express God's absolute sovereignty, especially also in relation to sin, Ps. 115:3, Spr. 16:4, Jes. 10:15, 45:9, Jer. 18:6, Mt. 20:15, Rom. 9:17, 19-21.

The fact that each of the two representations rests on a certain group of texts and in doing so does not sufficiently allow another to come into its own, already proves the one-sidedness of both. Infralapsarianism deserves praise for its modesty; it offers no solution but remains with the historical, causal order; it seems less harsh and takes more account of the demands of practice. It does not satisfy, however, because reprobation no more than election is to be understood as an act of God's justice. Faith and good works are not the cause of election, and so sin is not the cause of reprobation either; this lies only in God's free good pleasure; the decree of reprobation therefore always in a certain sense precedes the decree to permit sin. Moreover, if God took the decree of reprobation only after that of the permission of sin, the question always arises again: but why then did He permit that sin? Did that permission consist in a *nuda praescientia*, and is the fall in fact a frustration of God's [361] plan? But that a Reformed person, even if he is an infralapsarian, can and may never say. He must nevertheless also in a certain sense include the fall in God's decree and have it determined beforehand. But why then did God decree the fall *permissione efficaci*? Infralapsarianism has no answer to this except only God's good pleasure, but then says the same as supralapsarianism. Reprobation is not to be explained as an act of God's justice, for the first sin is in any case permitted by God's sovereignty. Infralapsarianism, going back, nevertheless ends up again with supralapsarianism; if it would not want this, it would have to take refuge in the *praescientia*. And then finally there is added still, that it places the decree of reprobation after the fall, but where somewhere? Did God decide to reprobate many only after original sin; does this come into consideration with the decree of reprobation only, and does God not at all, with this dreadful decree, take account of the *peccata actualia*? If

reprobation must be reduced to God's justice, why then is it not rather placed, not after the entrance of original sin only but after the completion of the peccata actualia by each human being to be reprobated in particular? That indeed Arminius did teach, who also included under it the sin of foreseen unbelief. But that of course did not do for a Reformed theologian. Reprobation then depended on the nuda praescientia, i.e. on man; the sinful acts of man then became the last and deepest cause of reprobation, and therefore one remained quite arbitrarily with the decree of reprobation immediately after the fall. But in fact it therefore taught, in relation to all peccata actualia, exactly the same as supralapsarianism; reprobation does indeed not precede original sin but nevertheless precedes all other sins. Infralapsarianism seems to be gentler and fairer, but upon deeper reflection this proves not to be much more than appearance.

Supralapsarianism therefore undoubtedly has this in its favor, that it refrains from all vain attempts to justify God, and in both reprobation and election rests in God's sovereign, incomprehensible but nevertheless always wise and holy good pleasure. And yet it is, if not more, then at least equally unsatisfactory as infralapsarianism. It assumes the appearance of a solution, but in fact provides it at no single point and in no respect. [362] First of all, the revelation of all God's virtues is without doubt the final goal of all God's ways, but it will not do, with supralapsarianism, immediately to include in this final goal the manner in which hereafter this gloria Dei will come to revelation in the eternal state of his rational creatures. For that eternal state, both of blessedness and of perdition, is not the final goal itself, but a means, to bring all God's virtues to revelation in a creaturely manner. For it cannot be said that God could not have revealed his honor in the salvation of all, if this had pleased Him. It is also not correct that God in the

eternal state of the lost reveals exclusively his justice, and in that of the elect exclusively his mercy. Also in the church, which was purchased by the blood of the Son, his justice becomes manifest; and also in the place of perdition there are still sparks of his mercy. The final goal of all God's works is and must be his glory; but the manner in which this glory will shine is not thereby given of itself; this has been determined by his will, and although God also for that has had wise and holy reasons, we cannot say why He has willed precisely this means, why He has determined the perdition of many and not the preservation of all. Moreover, supralapsarianism in this runs up against the objection that it gives to the decree of election and reprobation only possible men and, as Comrie added to it, a possible Christ as object. Indeed this latter element has been removed from the supralapsarian representation by others, Kuyper, De vleeschwording des Woords bl. 202v. But thereby the principle has not been removed, from which this error arose. If election has only possible men as object, it logically brings with it that of a possible Christ, since the election of the church and her Head cannot be separated. But apart from this, the election and reprobation, which has only *homines creandi et labiles* as object, is not yet the actual, but only a preliminary decree. Supralapsarianism must presently nevertheless proceed again to the infralapsarian order. For after first possible men have been elected and reprobated, there follows thereafter the decree, to create these possible men in reality and to let them fall, and then there must nevertheless again follow the decree now to elect in part and to reprobate in part those men who are no longer thought merely in the [363] idea as possible but now also thought in the decree as actually existing. The logical order in supralapsarianism thus leaves everything to be desired. Properly it is distinguished from

infralapsarianism only in this, that it, in the manner of Amyraldism, lets a decree concerning possibilities precede the infralapsarian series of decrees. But what is such a decree concerning possible men, of whom it is absolutely not yet established whether they will actually be? *Homines possibiles* are infinitely many in the consciousness of God, who will never be. The decree of election and of reprobation thus has *non-entia* as object, and not definite persons known to God by name. Finally, there is still this difficulty connected with supralapsarianism, that it makes eternal punishment in the same way and in the same sense an object of God's will as the eternal life of the blessed, and that it makes sin, which leads to that eternal punishment, in the same way and in the same sense a means as redemption in Christ is a means to eternal blessedness. On this there is among the Reformed no difference, that sin and punishment are willed and determined by God. It is also completely true that words such as *permissio* and *praescientia* in fact provide nothing toward a solution of the difficulties. The questions nevertheless remain precisely the same: why has God, foreknowing everything, created man so that he could fall and did not prevent the fall? Why did He let all fall in one? Why does He not have the gospel preached to all and does He not grant faith to all? In one word, if God foresees and permits, He does that *volens* or *nolens*. The latter is impossible. Thus the *permissio* is a *permissio efficax*, an act of his will. Nor is the concept of *permissio* without any value or force over against the accusation that God is the author of sin, for he who lets someone sin and go lost, while He could have prevented it, is just as guilty as he who incites him to sin. But on the other hand there is also on this no difference, that sin, although not being *praeter Dei voluntatem*, nevertheless is and remains *contra ejus voluntatem*; that it is not only a means to come to the final goal,

but that it is a disturbance of God's creation, and that the fall of Adam therefore was no progress but most certainly a fall. And this too is indeed [364] established, that thinking may disapprove the words *permissio*, *praescientia*, *praeteritio*, *derelictio*, but that no one can provide other, better words. Even the strictest supralapsarian cannot do without those words, neither in the pulpit nor in the lectern, Frank, *Theol. der Concordienformel* IV, 148. 272. For even if one may assume that there is a *praedestinatio ad mortem*; of a *praedestinatio ad peccatum* no one among the Reformed has dared to speak. All without distinction, Zwingli, Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Gomarus, Comrie etc. have maintained that God is not the author of sin, that man was not created unto damnation, that in reprobation also the strictness of his justice came out, that reprobation is not the *causa*, the *principium*, but only the *causa per accidens*, the *remotio principii* is of sin, that sin is not the *causa efficiens* but indeed the *causa sufficiens* of reprobation etc. Therefore supralapsarianism is, and fortunately so, always inconsistent; it begins with a bold run-up, but soon recoils backward and falls back into the infralapsarianism first rejected. Among the proponents of supralapsarianism this comes out clearly. Almost all hesitate to let the reprobatio in its entirety and without any restriction precede sin. The Thomists distinguished between reprobatio negativa and positiva; the first preceded creation and fall, the second followed upon it, cf. above 326. This distinction also repeatedly returns among the Reformed theologians, be it also in a more or less modified form. Not only is it acknowledged by all that the decree of reprobation is to be distinguished from the *condamnatio*, which is the execution of that decree, takes place in time and has sin as cause, Beza, *Tract. theol.* I 176. Polanus, *Syst. theol.* p. 251. 254. But in the decree of reprobation itself many make a distinction between a preceding,

more general decree of God, to reveal in some homines creabiles et labiles his virtues, specifically his mercy and justice, and a following, definite decree, to create those homines possibiles also in reality, to let them fall and sin and to punish their sins, Beza, I 173. 176. 177, cf. III 403. Piscator bij Twissus, I 51-52, Perkins, Werken I 763. Twissus, I 71. Maccovius, Loci Comm. p. 222. 237. Voetius, Disp. V 602 sq. Maastricht, Theol. theor. pract. III 2, 12. Ex. v. h. ontw. v. Tol. VII 375v. Moor II 66. 67. [365]

15. Thus neither supralapsarianism nor infralapsarianism has succeeded, with this problem, in giving the solution and in allowing the all-sidedness of Scripture to come into its own. In part this can be explained from the one-sidedness of which they both are guilty. First of all it is not correct, as was already said just now, to define the *finis supremus* of all things as the revelation of God's mercy in the elect and of his justice in the lost. Certainly the glory of God and the manifestation of his perfections is the final end of all; but the double state of blessedness and misery is not included in that final end and relates to it as means. It is absolutely not to be proved that with this final end of God's glory that double state had to be given. If he brings *opera ad extra* into being, he can thereby never mean anything else than the honour of his name. But that he seeks that honour in this way and in no other way depends only on his free sovereignty. Apart from this, however, it is also not true that God's justice would come to revelation only in the miserable state of the lost and his mercy only in the blessedness of the elect, for also in heaven his justice and holiness shine forth, and also in hell there is still something of his mercy and lovingkindness. In the second place it is incorrect to represent the misery of the lost as the goal of *praedestinatio*. Indeed sin is not to be reduced to a *nuda praescientia* and *permissio Dei*. Fall and sins and eternal punishment

are included in the decree of God, and in a certain sense willed by God. But then yet always only in a certain sense and not in that same way as grace and salvation. In these he has a good pleasure, but sin and punishment are not his delight, his joy. When he makes sin subservient to his honour, he does that by his omnipotence, but it is against its nature. And when he punishes the ungodly, he does not rejoice in their suffering in itself, but he celebrates therein the triumph of his virtues, Deut. 28:63, Ps. 2:4, Spr. 1:26, Klaagl. 3:33. If therefore on the one hand, with a view to the all-embracing and unchangeable character of God's counsel, there is no objection to speaking of a *gemina praedestinatio*, yet the *praedestinatio* in the one case is not of the same nature as in the other. *Praedestinatio est constitutio finis et ordinatio mediorum ad finem; cum aeterna [366] damnatio non sit finis hominis, sed tantum extremum, ideo reprobationis genus non proprie praedestinatio constitui potest. Pugnant enim haec inter sese, ordinare ad finem et ordinare ad damnationem. Omnis enim finis sua natura est optimum quid et perfectio rei; damnatio autem est extremum malum et summa imperfectio, ita ut impropria sit locutio, qua dicitur, Deum nonnullos homines praedestinasse ad damnationem, Keckermann, Syst. theol. 1603 p. 296, cf. Twissus I 53 A.* However strongly and however frequently Scripture then also says that sin and punishment are determined by God; the words *προθεσις, προγνωσις, προορισμος* it nevertheless uses almost exclusively of the *praedestinatio ad gloriam*. In the third place it is also for another reason less correct to coordinate the *praedestinatio ad mortem aeternam* with, and to set it equally as final end as, the *praedestinatio ad vitam aeternam*. The object of election is not merely some human beings, just as of rejection, but in election the human race under a new Head, namely Christ, is object, and thus by the *gratia* not only some

individuals but the human race itself with the whole cosmos is saved. And in this salvation of the human race and of the world not merely some virtues of God come to revelation, so that alongside that an eternal perdition would still be necessary in order to reveal his justice, but in the completed kingdom of God all virtues and perfections of God come to unfolding, his justice and his grace, his holiness and his love, his sovereignty and his mercy. And this status gloriae is thus the proper direct, though also to his honour subordinate, goal which God aims at with his creation. In the fourth place supra- and infralapsarianism erred in that they placed everything that preceded the final end as means among themselves in a subordinated relation. Now the means are of themselves subordinate to the final end but therefore not yet to one another. Creation is not merely a means for the fall, and this not merely a means for grace and hardening, and these again not merely a means for blessedness and misery. It must indeed be considered that the decrees are as rich in content as the whole world history, for this is the unfolding of those. Who would now be in a position to summarize this world history in a logical schema of a few concepts? Creation, [367] fall, sin, Christ, faith, unbelief etc. do not at all stand only in a relation of means to one another, so that the preceding can as it were fall away when the following has been reached. They are not subordinated to one another but also coordinated, as Twissus I 71 already remarked. Creation has truly not taken place only for this, that the fall could enter, but it gave to a world the appearance that will remain also in the state of glory. The fall did not occur only for this, that there would be a creatura miserabilis, but it maintains as fact its significance with all the consequences that have proceeded from it. Christ has not merely become a Mediator, which would have been sufficient for the reconciliation of sin; but God has also ordained him as Head of the

church. The whole world history is not a means that falls away when the end is reached, but works through and leaves fruits behind in eternity. And election and reprobation themselves do not run here on earth as two straight lines alongside one another, but in the unbelievers there is much that does not flow from rejection and in the believers there is much that is not to be credited to election. On the one hand both presuppose sin and are acts of mercy and justice, Rom. 9:15, Ef. 1:4, and they are both nevertheless also acts of divine free sovereignty and sovereignty, Rom. 9:11, 17, 21. Likewise Adam is also before the fall already a type of Christ, 1 Cor. 15:47 v. and yet the incarnation is always in Scripture built on the fall of the human race, Hebr. 2:14 v. Sometimes Scripture speaks so strongly that rejection is completely coordinated with election and eternal punishment is by God equally aimed at as goal as eternal blessedness. Luk. 2:34, Joh. 3:19-21, 1 Petr. 2:7, 8, Rom. 9:17, 18, 22 etc., but sometimes the mors aeterna falls away entirely in the description of the future; the end will be the triumph of the kingdom of God, the new heaven and earth, the new Jerusalem, where God will be all in all, 1 Cor. 15, Op. 21, 22; everything is subordinate to the church as this is to Christ, 1 Cor. 3 vs. 21-23; rejection is wholly subordinated to election. Therefore finally neither the supra- nor the infralapsarian representation of praedestinatio is able to take up into itself the full rich truth of Scripture and to satisfy our theological thinking. What is true in supralapsarianism is that [368] all decrees together form a unity; that there is a final end to which everything is subordinate and subservient; that sin did not come into the world unthought-of and unexpected for God but in a certain sense is willed and determined by him; that creation was already immediately designed for re-creation and with Adam before the fall already reckoned on the Christ. But what is true in infralapsarianism is that

the decrees, though one, are nevertheless also distinguished with a view to their objects; that in those decrees not only a teleological but also a causal order is to be noticed; that creation and fall do not merge into this, that they are only means for the final end; that sin above all and in the first place has been a disturbance of creation and in and for itself can never have been willed by God. In general the formulation of the final end of all things, namely that God reveals his justice in the reprobate and his mercy in the elect, is yet all too simple and too sober. The status gloriae will be so indescribably rich and glorious. We expect a new heaven, a new earth, a new humanity, a restored creation, an ever continuing development never again disturbed by any sin. And toward that creation and fall, Adam and Christ, nature and grace, faith and unbelief, election and reprobation, all together, each in its way, cooperate, not only after but also alongside and with one another. Yes, the present world with its history is also in itself already a continuing revelation of God's virtues. It is not only a means for the higher and richer revelation that comes, but also in itself of value. It therefore remains and continues to work also in the future dispensation and will give to the new humanity continual material for the worship and glorification of God. Therefore among the decrees, just as among the facts of world history, there is not only a causal and a teleological, but also an organic order. We can in our limitation only place ourselves at the one or at the other standpoint; and therefore the proponents of a causal and those of a teleological world- and life-view come into conflict with one another at every moment. But for God that is wholly different. He surveys the whole. All things are eternally present in his consciousness. His counsel is one single simple conception. And in that [369] counsel all particular decrees stand in that same connection in which the facts of history a posteriori now

partly appear to us and once will appear to us fully to stand. That connection is so rich and complicated that it is not to be rendered in a single word of *infra-* or *supralapsarian*. It is both causal and teleological; the preceding works into the following but the future also already determines the past and the present. There is rich, all-sided *Wechselwirkung*. As in an organism all members cohere and mutually determine one another, so the world is a work of art of God, of which all parts are organically connected among themselves. And of that world both in its length and breadth the counsel of God is the eternal idea.

16. From this it becomes clear, in what sense reprobation is to be reckoned as belonging to predestination. If one attends only to the fact that the counsel of God comprehends all things, then there is every right to speak of a *gemina praedestinatio*. Sin also, unbelief, death, and eternal punishment stand under the government of God. Not only does it in fact avail nothing, whether one here prefers to speak of *praescientia* and *permissio* rather than of *praedestinatio*. But Scripture also testifies in this matter as decisively and firmly as possible. It is true that it makes little mention of rejection as an eternal decree. All the more, however, does it let it appear as an act of God in history. He rejects Cain, Gen. 4:5, curses Canaan, Gen. 9:25, drives Ishmael out, Gen. 21:12, Rom. 9:7, Gal. 4:30, hates Esau, Gen. 25:26, Mal. 1:2, 3, Rom. 9:13, Hebr. 12:17, lets the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16; even within the circle of revelation there is often mention of a rejection by the Lord of his people and of particular persons, Deut. 29:28, 1 Sam. 15:23, 26, 16:1, 2 Kon. 17:20, 2 Kon. 23:27, Ps. 53:6, 78:67, 89:39, Jer. 6:30, 14:19, 31:37, Hos. 4:6, 9:17. But in that negative rejection there also appears many a time a positive action of God, consisting in hatred, Mal. 1:2, 3, Rom. 9:13,

cursing, Gen. 9:25, hardening and obduracy, Ex. 7:3, 4:21, 9:12, 10:20, 10:27, 11:10, 14:4, Deut. 2:30, Jos. 11:20, Ps. 105:25, 1 Sam. 2:25, Joh. 12:40, Rom. 9:18, in bewilderment, 1 Kon. 12:15, 2 Sam. 17:14, Ps. 107:40, Job 12:24, Jes. 44:25, 1 Cor. 1:19, in blinding and stupefaction, Jes. 6:9, Matth. 13:13, [370] Mk. 4:12, Luk. 8:10, Joh. 12:40, Hd. 28:26, Rom. 11:8. God's government extends over all things and also in the sins of men he has his hand. He sends a lying spirit, 1 Kon. 22:23, 2 Chr. 18:22, incites David through Satan, 2 Sam. 24:1, 1 Chr. 21:1 and tests Job, cap. 1, calls Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus his servants, 2 Chr. 36:22, Ezra 1:1, Jes. 44:28, 45:1, Jer. 27:6, 28:14 etc., and Assyria the rod of his anger, Jes. 10:5v. He delivers Christ over to his enemies, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, appoints him for a fall and rising, for an odor of death and of life, for a judgment and for a stone of stumbling, Luk. 2:34, Joh. 3:19, 9:39, 2 Cor. 2:16, 1 Petr. 2:8. He gives men over to their sins, Rom. 1:24, sends a power of delusion, 2 Thess. 2:11, raises up Shimei to curse David, 2 Sam. 16:10, cf. Ps. 39:10, a Pharaoh to show his power, Rom. 9:17 and the man born blind, to reveal his glory, Joh. 9:3. Certainly in all these works of God man's own sin may not be overlooked. In God's hardening man hardens himself, Ex. 7:13, 22, 8:15, 9:35, 13:15, 2 Chron. 36:13, Job 9:4, Ps. 95:8, Spr. 28:14, Hebr. 3:8, 4:7. Jesus speaks in parables, not only in order that but also because the unbelievers neither see nor hear, Mt. 13:13. God gives men over to sin and the lie, because they have made themselves worthy of this, Rom. 1:24, 2 Thess. 2:11. And it is a posteriori that believers see in the iniquities of the enemies the government and the hand of the Lord, 2 Sam. 16:10, Ps. 39:10. But nevertheless in all this the will and the power of God also become manifest. In all this he displays his free sovereign sovereignty. He creates the good and the evil, the light and the darkness, Jes. 45:7, Am. 3:6, the

ungodly for the day of evil, Spr. 16:4, does all that pleases him, Ps. 115:3, deals with the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan. 4:35, inclines every heart as he wills, Spr. 16:9, 21:1, directs everyone's course, Spr. 20:24, Jer. 10:23, makes from the same clay vessels for honor and for dishonor, Jer. 18, Rom. 9:20, has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills, Rom. 9:18, appoints to disobedience, 1 Petr. 2:8, writes down for judgment, Jud. 4, and has not written many names in the book of life, Op. 13:8, 17:8. These manifold, strong [371] statements of Scripture are confirmed every day in the history of mankind. The defenders of reprobation have therefore always appealed to those dreadful facts, in which history is so rich, Calvijn, C. R. XXXVII 289 sq. There is so much that is unreasonable in nature, so much undeserved suffering, so many disasters without cause, so unequal, incomprehensible distribution of lot, so crying a contrast of joy and sorrow, that for everyone who reflects only the choice remains, either with pessimism to explain this world from the blind will of an accursed God, or on the ground of Holy Scripture in faith to acquiesce in the sovereign and free, but always nevertheless, however incomprehensible, wise and holy will of him, who once will cause the full light to rise over these riddles of life. The acceptance or non-acceptance of a decree of rejection therefore does not have its cause in a smaller or greater measure of love and compassion. The difference between Augustine and Pelagius, Calvijn and Castellio, Gomarus and Arminius does not lie in this, that the latter were so much gentler and dearer, more genial and more compassionate people. But it lies herein, that the former accepted Scripture in its entirety, also in this its doctrine; that they were theistic and always wanted to be, and also in these moving facts of life recognized the will and the hand of the Lord; that they dared to look reality in all its dreadfulness in

the face. Pelagianism strews flowers on the graves, makes of death an angel, sees in sin a weakness, holds discourses on the usefulness of adversities, and deems this world the best that is possible. Calvinism is not served by such superficial babbling and trifling. It tears the blindfold from its eyes, it does not want to live in an imagined delusion, it accepts the seriousness of life in its full depth, it stands up for the rights of the Lord of lords, and bows down in humility and adoration before the uncomprehended, sovereign will of God almighty. And thereby it appears in the ground to be much more merciful than pelagianism. How deeply Calvijn felt the seriousness of what he said, appears from his decretum horribile, Inst. III 23, 7. Entirely unjustly has this word been made into a reproach to him. It does not plead against Calvijn, it pleads for him. The decretum as doctrine of Calvijn, is not horribile; [372] but reality is dreadful, which is the revelation of that decree of God, which is thus taught by Scripture and history, which for every thinking man, whether he follow Pelagius or Augustine, remains completely the same, and which by no delusional representations can be annulled even in the least. And in the midst of that dreadful reality Calvinism now brings not this solution but indeed this consolation, that in all that happens it recognizes the will and the hand of an almighty God, who at the same time is a merciful Father. Calvinism gives no solution but causes man to rest in him, who dwells in an inaccessible light, whose judgments are unsearchable, whose ways are untraceable. In that Calvijn rested. *Testis enim mihi erit Dominus, cui conscientia mea subscribet, sic me stupenda haec ipsius judicia quotidie meditari, ut nulla me plus aliquid sciendi curiositas sollicitet, nulla mihi de incomparabili ejus justitia obrepat sinistra suspicio, nulla me obmurmurandi libido prorsus titillet, de aet. praed. C. R. XXXVI 316.* And in that rest of

mind he awaited the day, in which he would see face to face and would receive the solution of these riddles, Inst. III 23, 2. C. R. XXXVI 366.

17. However much rejection, on the one hand, may with full right be reckoned to predestination, it nevertheless is not, in the same sense and in the same manner, content of God's decree as election. The advocates of the *gemina praedestinatio* have also at all times acknowledged this. When it concerned the sovereignty of God, the definite and unambiguous testimonies of his word, the facts of history that cannot be erased, then they were as unyielding as the apostle Paul and wanted to know nothing of yielding or mediating. Then they sometimes came to harsh statements, which can hinder the Pelagian-minded heart of man. Thus Augustine once said that God could not be accused even if He had wanted to damn some who were innocent. *Si humanum genus, quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo, non cum debita mortis et peccati origine nasceretur et tamen ex eis creator omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum; quis omnipotenti creatori diceret: quare fecisti sic?* de praed. et gratia 16. And some theologians, [373] also among the Reformed, have spoken in the same spirit. Whoever has some sense of the incomparable greatness of God and the nothingness of the creature; and whoever in addition considers how we can many a time look upon the heaviest suffering of man and animal with the most indifferent mind, above all when it is serviceable to our own interest, to art, or to science; he loses the courage to attack Augustine or others harshly for such a statement, let alone to call God to account. If it is a matter of right, solely and only of right, what right can we assert over against Him who called us forth out of nothing and bestowed everything that we have and are? But nevertheless, although for a moment one can speak thus over against someone who thinks he may accuse God of

injustice, almost all the Reformed, with Calvin at their head, have in the end decisively and with indignation rejected such a *dominium absolutum*, above p. 212 v. The cause why God has willed the one or the other, has elected this one and rejected that one, may be wholly unknown to us. His will is always wise and holy and good and has had for all things his righteous reasons. His power is not to be separated from his righteousness, Calvin, C. R. XXXVI 310. 361. Provided only that the right and the honor of God were first acknowledged, all the Reformed advised the most cautious and tender handling of the doctrine of predestination, and warned against vain and curious investigations. *Nos ergo nimis acutos esse non convenit; modo ne interea, quod Scriptura clare docet ac experientia confirmat, vel negemus verum esse vel tanquam Deo minus consentaneum carpere audeamus*, Calvin, *ibid.* 366. Zwingli, *Op.* VIII 21. Beza, *Tract. theol.* I 197. Martyr, *Loci C.* III c. 1. Westm. conf. bij Schaff, *Creeds* III 610. Can. Dordr. I 12. 14 enz. Although God knows those who are his and the number of the elect is called small, *bene sperandum est tamen de omnibus, neque temere reprobis quisquam est annumerandus*, Conf. Helv. II bij Niemeyer, *Coll. Conf.* 482. Piscator, *Aphorismi* 1614 p. 223. Zanchius, *Op.* II 497 sq. Furthermore, all maintained that sin, though not *praeter*, was nevertheless very much *contra Dei voluntatem*. Indeed it could not be the cause, the *causa efficiens* and *impulsiva*, of the decree of rejection, for it itself after all followed in time upon the eternal [374] decree and would, if it were itself the cause, have had to cause all men to be rejected. But it was nevertheless *causa sufficiens*, and of the eternal punishment determined the *causa meritoria*. For there is a distinction between the decree of rejection and rejection itself. The former has its final and deepest cause only in God's will; but rejection itself takes account of sin. The decree of rejection

realizes itself through man's own guilt, Polanus, Synt. 251. Twissus, Vind. gr. I 273 sq. Perkins, Werken I 769. Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 14. Synopsis pur. theol. XXIV 50. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VII 445. Heppe, Dogm. 132. Therefore this decree is also no fatum, which drives man forward against his will; no sword of Damocles, which hangs threateningly above his head. It is nothing other than the divine idea of reality itself. In the decree lie causes and effects, condition and fulfillment, lies the whole connection of things chained together precisely as we behold that in reality. Sin, guilt, misery, punishment have in the decree that same nature and that same mutual relation as in the world of things itself. We see that decree, which has not been revealed to us beforehand, gradually unfold in its whole fullness in history; with us it is and must be the pure reflex in our consciousness of reality. We think the things after they are. But with God the decree is the eternal idea of reality, as that gradually unfolds in time. His thoughts of things precede their being. And now the decree of rejection says only that that whole, sinful reality, that whole world-history in the mutual connection of its events, has its final cause, not in itself—how could this also be?—but outside itself in the thought and in the will of God. The decree changes nothing in reality; this is and remains completely the same, whether one follows Augustine or Pelagius; but it makes the believer confess that also that dreadful world, for which the Manicheans introduce an ἀντιθεός, pessimism a blind accursed will, and many a fate or chance, is there according to the will of Him who now makes us walk in faith but once in the day of all days will justify himself before all creature. Completely incorrect, therefore, is the representation as if the counsel of God in general and the decree of rejection in particular were a single, bare, [375] volitional determination concerning someone's eternal lot. It must not be represented

thus, as if for a man only the end were determined and he now, whatever he may do, were driven there by force. The decree is as unsearchably rich as reality. It is the main artery of all being. It comprehends in a single conception the end with the ways, the goal with the means. It is no transcendent power which from above at will, now and then, intervenes in reality and drives it on toward the end. It is the divine, immanent, eternal idea, which displays its fullness in the forms of space and time, and what with God is one unfolds successively in length and breadth for our limited gaze. The decree of rejection therefore also does not lie loose alongside all other decrees, nor alongside that of election. Sin and grace, punishment and blessing, righteousness and mercy do not lie dualistically alongside each other in reality, as if the rejected one were visited only with sin and punishment, the elect exclusively with grace and blessing. For believers still sin daily and stumble in many things. Are these sins of believers now an outflow of election? No one will assert it. Indeed those sins are again made by God serviceable to their salvation and all things work together for good to the one called, Rom. 8:28. Yet to that end those sins are not in themselves and by nature suited, but only because God as the Almighty can still cause the good to proceed out of the evil. The sins therefore are no means unto salvation, such as regeneration, faith. They are no *praeparatio gratiae* but, considered in themselves, *negatio gratiae*, Becanus, Theol. schol. I tr. 1 c. 14 qu. 3 n. 12-20. Therefore the law also still has significance for believers; therefore they are admonished to make their election sure with fear and trembling; therefore there is also among believers sometimes mention of temporal hardening and rejection. But also conversely the *reprobati* share in many blessings, which do not as such flow to them from the decree of rejection but from the goodness and grace of God. They receive many

natural gifts, life, health, strength, food, drink, cheerfulness etc., Mt. 5:45, Hd. 14:17, 17:27, Rom. 1:19, Jak. 1:17 etc., God does not leave himself without witness to them. He endures them with much longsuffering, Rom. 9:22. He has the gospel of his grace proclaimed to them and has [376] no pleasure in their death, Ezech. 18:23, 33:11, Mt. 23:27, Luk. 19:41, 24:47, Joh. 3:16, Hd. 17:30, Rom. 11:32, 1 Thess. 5:9, 1 Tim. 2:4, 2 Petr. 3:19. The Pelagians infer from these places that it is God's proper, essential will that all men head for head be saved, and that therefore there is no preceding decree of rejection. These texts do not teach that. But they do acknowledge this as the will of God, that also with the reprobati all means of grace are employed toward their salvation. These media gratiae now do not as such flow forth from the decree of rejection. They can be misused for that; they can serve to render man inexcusable, to harden him and to aggravate his judgment, just as the sun can warm but also scorch. But in themselves, by nature, they are no media reprobationis but media gratiae ad salutem, Synopsis XXIV 54 sq. Heppe p. 134. 135. Election and rejection may therefore issue in a final and total separation; here on this earth they cross each other, as it were, time and again. That points to the fact that both, in and for themselves, are no end-goal and have been no causa finalis for God. Both are means for the gloria Dei, which is the final goal and thus the deepest ground of all things. Beginning and end, reason and goal of all being is therefore something good. Sin and punishment can never have been willed by God in themselves and for themselves. They conflict with his nature. He is far from godlessness, and He has no pleasure in afflicting. He does not do it from the heart. They therefore can only have been willed by God as means for another, better, greater good. Indeed there is great difference between election and rejection. All that God does, He does for

his own sake. Election too has its cause and goal only in God. But in the work that He brings to pass through election, He delights. Therein his own virtues shine back to Him. The new creation is a mirror of his perfections. But that which He carries out according to the decree of rejection is not directly and in itself the object of his good pleasure. Sin is not itself a good. It becomes a good only because it, and insofar as it, contrary to its nature and despite itself, is compelled by divine omnipotence to the exaltation of God's honor. It is indirectly a good, because it is subjected, subdued, overcome and thus shows God's greatness, power, righteousness. For [377] herein his sovereignty finally comes out most brilliantly, that He knows how to lead the evil still to the good, Gen. 15:20 and makes it serviceable to the salvation of the church, Rom. 8:28. 1 Cor. 3:21-23, to the glory of Christ, 1 Cor. 15:24v., Ef. 1:21, 22, Phil. 2:9, Col. 1:16, to the glory of his name, Spr. 16:4, Ps. 51:6, Job 1:21, Joh. 9:3, Rom. 9:17, 22, 23, 11:36, 1 Cor. 15:28.

18. Thus predestination finally issues in election; in this it reaches its end and comes to its full reality. In its highest form it is the decree of God concerning the revelation of his virtues in the eternal, glorious state of his rational creatures, and the ordering of the means leading thereto. Even so, reprobation must not be forgotten. Only over against this dark reverse side does election itself come forth in the most glorious light. It is of gripping seriousness that even on this highest terrain, where it concerns the eternal weal and the eternal woe of rational creatures, the day rises out of the dark night, the light is born out of the darkness. It seems that the law holds everywhere, that many are called and few chosen. There lies a deep truth in the proverb, that the death of the one is the bread of the other. Darwin's doctrine of the survival of the fittest has a general validity and is in force

through the whole creation. Thousands of blossoms fall off, in order that a few might ripen into fruit. Millions of living beings are born and only a few remain in life. Thousands of people labour in the sweat of their face, in order that a few might be able to bathe in luxury. Wealth, luxury, art, science, all that is high and noble is built on the foundation of poverty, privation, ignorance. Never and nowhere does it proceed in the world toward the uniform distribution of the socialists. There is no equality on any terrain. Everywhere there is election alongside and on the foundation of reprobation. The world is not arranged according to the Pharisaic law of work and wage; merit and wealth have nothing to do with one another. And also on the highest terrain it is only divine grace that makes a distinction. Like all decrees, so also election has its deepest cause in the good pleasure of God. The Pelagians of every sort have [378] always wanted to conceive these decrees as acts of God's justice, in which he proceeded according to the merit of man. God allows himself in his decrees to be determined by the foreseen behaviours of the creature. He offers salvation to all. He grants faith to him who makes good use of this offer by his natural or also by granted supernatural power. He saves him who perseveres in faith unto the end. Now there is indeed among the decrees a certain order; they encompass both the end and the means. To the prayer of his children God has in his decree bound the hearing. If he has decreed to give rain in the drought, he has at the same time determined that his people will pray to him for it and that he will give the rain as an answer to their prayer. In his decree he has laid a connection between sunshine and warmth, sowing and harvest, laziness and poverty, knowledge and power etc., and so also between sin and punishment, unbelief and perdition, faith and salvation. The harmony between the phenomena and events in the real world is a perfect imprint of

the harmony in the world of the thoughts and decrees of God, Edwards, Works II 514. Scripture often remains with these *causae secundae*, and the Reformed too have fully acknowledged their significance. But these second causes are therefore not yet the last and deepest cause. And one cannot evade the investigation into that. From all sides the questions press themselves upon us. Why is there such a connection between the phenomena and events among themselves, as we repeatedly observe in the world? An appeal to the nature of things is no sufficient answer, for that nature too is from God and determined by him. Science can ascertain that, but it presupposes what is and does not know why it is and must be so. Why there is causality among the creatures among themselves, why each creature is what it is, why there is such endless diversity among the creatures, in character, nature, genus, species, power, intellect, wealth, honour etc.; within the circle of the created there is no cause to be found for it. And so also among the rational creatures; why some angels are destined for eternal glory and of the others the fall and perdition is foreseen and determined; why precisely that human nature which Christ assumed was deemed worthy of this honour; why the [379] one human being is born within, the other outside Christianity; why the one has so much advantage over the other in character, disposition, inclination, upbringing; why the one child dies early and is taken up into heaven as a child of the covenant and the other outside the covenant enters death without grace; why the one comes to faith and the other not; they are all questions to which no creature can answer. The decrees of God are not to be understood as acts of a justice that acts according to work and merit. Above all it appears clearly with the angels that the last cause of their election and reprobation must lie in the will of God. For even if one calls in the *praescientia*, saying that God has foreseen

the perseverance of some and the fall of other angels, then this praescientia nevertheless precedes their creation. Why then did God create those angels whose fall he foresaw? Why did he not give them sufficient grace to remain standing, as with the others? There is here a reprobation that rests solely and exclusively on God's sovereignty, Bellarminus, *de gr. et lib. arb.* II c. 17. Twissus, *Vind. gr.* I 76. On the other side election is not in itself always an act of mercy or to be explained as such. In the election of Christ and of the good angels there is no question of sin and thus of mercy. And the election of human beings is indeed an act of mercy, but yet not to be explained from mercy alone. For then God would have had to be merciful to all, since all were miserable. And thus reprobation was indeed an act of justice but not to be explained from justice alone, for then all would have been reprobated, Twissus, *Vindic. gr.* IV 111 sq. Mutually the decrees may thus stand in connection, but they themselves as acts of God are not conditional, but absolute, acts of God's absolute sovereignty. There has been laid by God a causal connection between sin and punishment, and he maintains that in everyone's conscience; but the decree of reprobation finds its deepest cause not in sin and unbelief, but in the will of God, Spr. 16:4, Mt. 11:25, 26, Rom. 9:11-22, 1 Petr. 2:8, Op. 13:8. So also there is a causal connection between faith and salvation, but the decree of election is not caused by foreseen faith; rather election is the cause of faith, [380] Hd. 13:48, 1 Cor. 4:7, Ef. 1:4, 5, 2:8, Phil. 1:29. Even Christ cannot be regarded as *causa electionis*. Indeed this expression is susceptible of a good interpretation. Thomas rightly says that Christ is the cause of our *praedestinatio*, not considered as act or decree, but with a view to its end and goal. *Sic enim Deus praeordinavit nostram salutem, ab aeterno praedestinando, ut per Jesum Christum compleretur*, S. Theol. I qu. 24 art. 4. And thus also by

some Reformed there was spoken of Christ as *causa* or *fundamentum electionis*, or of our election *per en propter Christum*, Hyperius, *Meth. Theol.* p. 193. *Conf. Belg.* art. 16. *Conf. Helv.* II art. 10. Martinus at the Synod of Dordrecht 1618/19, sess. 65. 67. Maresius, *Syst. Theol.* IV § 41. Christ is indeed *causa* or *fundamentum electionis*, insofar as election is realized in and through him; he is also the *causa meritoria* of salvation, which is the goal of election; he is also the mediator and the head of the elect. The decree of election is also taken with a view to the Son, out of love to him, Heidegger, *Corpus Theol.* V 31. The church and Christ are together, in one and the same decree, in communion with and for one another, chosen, *Ef.* 1:4. But therefore Christ as mediator is not yet the *causa impulsiva*, *movens*, *meritoria* of the decree of election. In that sense Christ has indeed been called the cause of election by many Romanists, by the Remonstrants, in their *declaratio circa art. 1 de praedest.*, bij M. Vitringa II 55, by the Lutherans, *Form. Conc.* bij Müller S. 705. 720. 723, Quenstedt III 17. 31 sq. and by many more recent theologians, Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I 229, Meyer on *Ef.* 1:5, Kübel in *Herzog* 12, 156 etc. But the Reformed have rightly contested this, Martyr, *Loci C.* 236. Polanus, *Synt.* VI 27. Voetius, *Disp.* II 267. Twissus, *Vindic. gr.* I 139 sq. Turretinus, *El.* IV qu. 10. Moor II 18 sq. For Christ is himself object of *praedestinatio* and therefore cannot be its cause. He is a gift of the love of the Father and this therefore precedes the sending of the Son, *Joh.* 3:16, *Rom.* 5:8, 8:29, 2 *Tim.* 1:9, 1 *Joh.* 4:9. The Son has not moved the Father to love, but the electing love has arisen from the Father himself. And thus Scripture teaches everywhere that the cause of all decrees does not lie in any creature but only in God [381] himself, in his will and good pleasure, *Mt.* 11:26, *Rom.* 9:11v. *Ef.* 1:4v. And precisely therefore the doctrine of election, both for the

unbeliever and for the believer, is such an unspeakably rich comfort. If it went according to right and merit, then all were lost. But now that it goes according to grace, there is also hope for the most miserable. If work and wage were the standard in the kingdom of heaven, then it would be opened for no one. Or also if according to the doctrine of Pelagius the virtuous man were chosen for his virtue and the Pharisee for his righteousness, then the poor tax collector would be excluded. Pelagianism is so mercilessly hard. But to confess election, that is, to recognize in the most unworthy of human beings, in the most deeply sunken, still a creature of God and an object of his eternal love. Election does not serve, as it is so often preached, to repel many but to invite all to the riches of God's grace in Christ. No one may believe that he is a reprobate, for each is seriously and urgently called and is obliged to believe in Christ unto salvation. No one can believe it, for his life itself and all that he enjoys is a proof that God has no pleasure in his death. Nor does anyone actually believe it, for then he would already have hell on earth. But election is a source of comfort and strength, of humility and meekness, of confidence and decisiveness. The salvation of man lies unshakably fixed in the gracious and almighty good pleasure of God.

19. And this glory of election appears even more beautifully when we finally pay attention to its object and goal. In earlier dogmatics that object was usually specified. Angels, human beings, and Christ were treated as its object. Concerning human beings there is no difference; whether before or after faith, whether before or after the fall, all assume that human beings are the proper object of predestination and of election. This is not to be understood in the sense that human beings, peoples, generations, or also the church in general, without further determination and in contrast with the individuals and particular persons, would be the object of election, as

Schleiermacher, Gl. § 119. Lipsius § 525 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. [382] III2 112-130 et al. assert. For this representation is a mere abstraction, since humanity, people, generation, church exists only in particular persons; it is also contradicted by Scripture, for this teaches a personal election, Mal. 1:2, Rom. 9:10-12 Jacob, Acts 13:48 ὅσοι, Rom. 8:29 ὅς, Eph. 1:4 ἡμᾶς, Gal. 1:15 Paul; the names of the elect are written in the book of life, Isa. 4:3, Dan. 12:1, Luke 10:20, Phil. 4:3, Rev. 3:5 etc. But yet it is true that those elect in Scripture are not considered separately and atomistically, but as one organism. They are the people of God, the body of Christ, the temple of the H. Spirit. They are therefore chosen in Christ, Eph. 1:4, to be members of his body. Both, Christ and the church, are thus included in the decree of predestination. Therefore Augustine already said: sicut ergo praedestinatus est ille unus, ut caput nostrum esset, ita multi praedestinati sumus, ut membra ejus essemus, de praed. sanct. c. 15, cf. de corr. et gr. c. 11. de dono pers. c. 14. The synod of Toledo 675 spoke in the same spirit, in Denzinger n. 232, and scholasticism treated at length the predestination of Christ, especially in connection with Rom. 1:5, Thomas, Sent. I dist. 40 qu. 11. III qu. 10. S. Theol. III qu. 24. S. c. Gent. IV c. 9. Petavius, de incarn. verbi lib. XI c. 13. 14. The Lutherans, however, denied this, because they conceived predestination as election out of sin to salvation by the mercy of God, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 18. 43. But all the more did the Reformed bring out that Christ also had been ordained by God and together with the church was the object of God's election. There was even still a difference over whether Christ was object of predestination only or also of election. Some, such as Calvin, C. Ref. XXXVII 714. Gomarus, Op. I 430. Marck. VII 5. Moor, II 55. Kuyper, Heraut 286. 287 said that Christ was destined to be mediator, in order to bring salvation for his own to pass; the

election of human beings thus logically preceded the preordination of Christ to be mediator. But others, such as Zanchius, Op. II 535 sq. Polanus, Synt. IV 8. Synopsis 24, 24. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Thol. VII 344-353. Heppe, Dogm. der. w. ref. K. S. 125 f. Kuyper, Uit het Woord II 314 also regard Christ as object of election, [383] since he was destined not only to be mediator but also to be head of the church; the election of Christ then logically preceded that of the church. Now it is undoubtedly true that Christ is ordained to be mediator, in order to do all that was necessary for the salvation of man; and it is equally certain that Christ is not chosen by the compassion of God out of sin and misery to glory and salvation. But Scripture nevertheless speaks many times also with respect to the Messiah of God's election, Isa. 42:1, 43:10, Ps. 89:4, 20, Mt. 12:18, Luke 23:35, 24:26, Acts 2:23, 4:28, 1 Pet. 1:20, 2:4. This election rightly bears that name, because the Son from eternity has been designated by the Father to be mediator, and above all because the human nature of Christ out of sheer grace and without any merit has been destined for union with the Logos and for the office of mediator. But by this Christ is only object of predestination, since this, in distinction from election, precisely includes the ordering of the means to the end. Scripture, however, on the other hand says just as strongly that the church is chosen in and unto Christ, to bear his image and to behold his glory, John 17:22-24, Rom. 8:29; Christ is not only destined to be mediator but also to be head of the church; all things are created through him but also unto him, 1 Cor. 3:23, Eph. 1:22, Col. 1:16 v. Not as though thereby Christ became the ground and the foundation of our election. But the election of the church is the very first benefit to the church; and this benefit too already takes place in communion with Christ, and has not as ground but precisely as goal that all other benefits, regeneration, faith, etc. are communicated by

Christ to the church. In this sense the election of Christ logically precedes ours. But however one might also think this logical order, all the Reformed said that Christ and his church together, that the *Christus mysticus*, was the proper object of election. *Uno et indiviso decreto omnes, Christus et nos, electi sumus*, Mastricht, *Theol. theor. pract.* III 3, 8. Heidegger, *Corpus Theol.* V 30. Yet even here they did not stop. In agreement with Augustine, *Enchir.* 100, the Scholastici, Thomas S. *Theol.* I qu. 23 art. 1 ad 3 and in contrast with the Lutherans, Quenstedt III p. 18, 43, they also included the angels in the decree of predestination [384]. Scripture gave occasion for that, 1 Tim. 5:21, 2 Pet. 2:4, Jude 6, Mt. 25:41, and this example of Christ taught that election does not always presuppose a state of sin and misery. However much then the *ἐκλογή* in Scripture is as a separation out of the peoples, Gen. 12:1, Deut. 7:6, 30:3, Jer. 29:14, 51:45, Ezek. 11:17, Hos. 11:1, Acts 2:40, Phil. 2:15, 1 Pet. 2:9 etc. and the number of the elect is often regarded as very small, Mt. 7:14, 22:14, Luke 12:32, 13:23, 24; in that *ἐκκλησία* the world is nevertheless saved. Not some human beings out of the world, but the world itself is the object of God's love, John 3:16, 17, 4:14, 6:33, 12:47, 2 Cor. 5:19. In Christ all things in heaven and on earth are reconciled with God; under him they are all gathered together into one, Eph. 1:10, Col. 1:20. The world, created by the Son, is also destined for the Son as its heir, Col. 1:16, 2 Pet. 3:13, Rev. 11:15. And thus it is not an accidental and arbitrary aggregate, but an organic whole, which in election has been known by God and in redemption has been preserved by Christ. *Reconciliatus mundus ex inimico liberabitur mundo. Ecclesia sine macula et ruga ex omnibus gentibus congregata atque in aeternum regnatura cum Christo, ipsa est terra beatorum, terra viventium*, Aug. *de doctr. chr.* III 34, cf. Perkins, *Werken* I 770. Twissus, *Vind. gr.* I 312. And precisely because

the object of election is a perfect organism, therefore it itself is not to be thought otherwise than as a firm and definite decree of God. In an aggregate the number of parts is wholly indifferent. But all that exists organically rests on measure and number. Christ is chosen by God to be Head, the church to be his body; and together they must grow up to a perfect man, in whom each member occupies its own place and fulfills its own task. Election is the divine thought, the eternal plan of that temple which he builds in the course of the centuries and of which he himself is the Artist and the Builder. To the building of the temple everything is subordinated and serviceable. Just as all decrees of God run out into that of election, so the whole history of world and humanity cooperates toward the coming of the kingdom of God. Even those who are not citizens in that kingdom, says Calvin, in salutem nascuntur electorum, C. R. XXXVI 360. Polanus, Synt. 252. [385] Creation and fall, preservation and government, sin and grace, Adam and Christ, each in its own way contributes to the bringing about of this building of God. And this building itself is erected to the honor and to the glorification of God. Πάντα γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐστίν, ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, Χριστὸς δὲ θεοῦ, 1 Cor. 3:21-23.

CHAPTER V. ON THE WORLD IN ITS ORIGINAL STATE.

MONERGISM BOOKS

§ 29. THE CREATION.

1 . The execution of the counsel of God begins with creation. This is the beginning and foundation of all revelation of God and therefore also the foundation of all religious and ethical life. The Old Test. creation narrative is so sublimely beautiful, that it nowhere finds its equal and by all, also by naturalists such as Cuvier and von Humboldt, has been praised in competition. Das erste Blatt der mosaischen Urkunde hat mehr Gewicht als alle Folianten der Naturforscher und Philosophen (Jean Paul). And thereafter that creation in the history of revelation again and again comes to the foreground. True religion distinguishes itself from the first moment onward thereby from all other religions, that it conceives the relation of God to world and man as that of the Creator to his creature. The thought of a being outside of and independent of God occurs nowhere in Scripture. God is the only and absolute cause of all that is. He has created all things by his Word and Spirit, Gen. 1 vs. 2, 3, Ps. 33:6, 104:29, 148:5, Job 27:3, 33:4, Jes. 40 vs. 13, 48:13, Zach. 12:1, Joh. 1:3, Col. 1:16, Hebr. 1:2 etc. Nothing stood over against Him; no matter that binds Him, no power that limits

Him. He speaks and it is, Gen. 1:3, Ps. 33:9, Rom. 4:17. He is the unlimited possessor of heaven and earth, Gen. 14:19, 22, Ps. 24:2, 89:12, 95:4, 5. There is no boundary to his power; He does all that pleases Him, Jes. 14 vs. 24, 27, 46:10, 55:10, Ps. 115:3, 135:6. All things [387] are from and through and unto Him, Rom. 11:36, 1 Cor. 8:6, Hebr. 11 vs. 3. The world is the product of his will, Ps. 33:6, Op. 4 vs. 11; it is the revelation of his virtues, Spr. 8:22v., Job 28 vs. 23v., Ps. 104:1, 136:5v., Jer. 16:12 and has its goal in his honour, Jes. 43:17, Spr. 16:4, Rom. 11:36, 1 Cor. 8:6. This doctrine of creation, which in Scripture occupies such an all-governing place, is not presented as a philosophical explanation of the world-problem. It very certainly also gives an answer to the question concerning the origin of all things; but it nevertheless has above all a religious-ethical significance. No right relation to God is conceivable except on its foundation. It places us in that relation to God in which we ought to stand. And therefore it is of excellent practical value. It serves to bring out the greatness, the omnipotence, the majesty and at the same time the goodness, the wisdom, the love of God, Ps. 19, Job 37, Jes. 40; and it therefore strengthens faith, confirms trust in God, comforts in suffering, Ps. 33:6 v., 65:6v., 89:12, 121:2, 134:5, Jes. 37:16, 40:28v., 42:5 etc.; it arouses to praise and thanks, Ps. 136:3v., 148:5, Op. 14 vs. 7; disposes to humility and meekness and makes man feel his smallness and nothingness over against God, Job 38 vs. 4v., Jes. 29:16, 45:9, Jer. 18:6, Rom. 9:20.

2. The doctrine of creation is known only from revelation; it is understood by faith, Hebr. 11:3. The Roman Catholics do indeed teach that it can also be traced from nature by reason, Thomas, Sent. II dist. 1 qu. 1 art. 2. S. c. Gent. II 15. 16. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. II 2 795 f. Scheeben, Dogm. II 5. 6, and the Vatican even elevated this to a dogma, de fide c. 2 can. 2. But the

history of religions and of philosophy does not plead for this. Mohammedanism does indeed teach creation out of nothing but has borrowed this from Judaism and Christianity, Zöckler, *Gesch. der Beziehungen zw. Theol. und Naturw.* 1877 I 426 f. The pagan cosmogonies are all polytheistic and at the same time theogony; they all assume a primal matter, whether this is conceived as a chaos, as a personal principle, as an egg or the like; and finally they are either more emanationistic, so that the world is an efflux of God, or more evolutionistic, so that the world more and more [388] deifies itself, or more dualistic, so that the world is a product of two hostile principles, Wuttke, *Die Kosmogonien der heidn. Völker vor der Zeit Jesu und der Apostel*, Haag 1850. Lenormant, *Les origines de l'histoire d'après la Bible et les traditions des peuples orientaux*, Paris 1880. Zöckler in *Herzog* 13, 631 f. Nor does the Chaldean Genesis, which moreover offers remarkable parallels with that of the O. Test., form an exception to this. It is at the same time theogony and has Bel form the world out of the tiamat, which chaotically conceals everything within itself, Saussaye, *Lehrb. der Rel.* I 341 f. Greek philosophy seeks either materialistically the origin of things in a material element (Ionian School, Atomists), or pantheistically in the one, eternal, unchangeable being (Elea) or in the eternal becoming (Heraclitus, Stoa). Even Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle did not get beyond a dualism of spirit and matter; God is not a creator, but at most a former of the world (*δημιουργος*). The scholastics did indeed assert that Plato and Aristotle taught a creation out of nothing, but this was rightly contested by others, e.g. by Bonaventura, *Sent.* II dist. 1 p. 1 art. 1 qu. 1. The Greeks knew a *φύσις* (natura) and *κόσμος* (mundus) but no *κτίσις* (creatura). Christianity won the victory over this pagan theogony and cosmogony in the struggle against Gnosticism, which, in order to

explain sin, assumed alongside the highest God a lower God or an eternal ὕλη. But nevertheless the paganistic explanations of the origin of things repeatedly also resurfaced in the Christian centuries. Already in the book of Wisdom 11:17 it is said that God's almighty hand created the world out of ἀμορφος ὕλη; and the same expression also occurs in Justin Martyr, Apol. I 10. 59. But Justin has in view there the later so-called creatio secunda and elsewhere also expressly teaches the creation of matter, Dial. c. Tr. 5. Coh. ad. Gr. 23, cf. Semisch, Justin der M. II 336. Just as in the second century Gnosticism, so after Nicaea especially Manichaeism arose, which likewise, in order to explain sin, assumed alongside the good God an originally evil being, Augustine in many writings, c. epist. Manich., c. Faustum, c. Fortunatum etc. Flügel, Mani, seine Lehre und seine Schriften, Leipzig 1862. Kessler in Herzog² 9, 233 f. This dualism found wide dissemination in Christendom, even as far as [389] among the Priscillianists in Spain, and reappeared anew in the Middle Ages in many sects, such as the Bogomils and Cathars. But besides dualism, pantheism also received its spokesmen. Under the influence of Neoplatonism Pseudo-Dionysius taught that the ideas and exemplars of all things existed from eternity in God and that his overflowing goodness moved Him to give these ideas reality and to communicate himself to his creatures, de div. nom. c. 4 § 10. God has, as it were, come forth in the creatures out of his unity, has multiplied and poured himself out in them, de div. nom. c. 2, 11, so that God is the universal being, de div. nom. c. 5, 4, the being of the things themselves, de coel. hier. c. 4, 1. But yet he adds that God nevertheless maintains himself in his unity, de div. nom. c. 2, 11 and that God therefore is all in all, because He is the cause of all, de coel. hier. c. 5, 8. The same thoughts recur in Erigena. More than once he expressly teaches a creation out of nothing, de div. nat. III 15 V 24.

33, but the relation in which he places the four natures to one another makes his system into pantheism. The first nature, which creates and is not created, i.e. God, brings forth, thinking, out of nothing, that is out of himself, the ideas and forms of all things in the divine word, ib. III 14. 17. This is the second nature, which is created and creates. This second nature is *natura creata*, insofar as it has been brought forth by God; it is *creatrix*, insofar as it itself is the cause and potency of the actual world. For this second nature is not essentially and substantially distinct from the third nature, i.e. the world of appearances, which is created and does not create; the former is the cause, the latter the effect; it is the same world, now considered in *aeternitate verbi Dei*, then in *temporalitate mundi*, III 8. It is God himself, who first in the ideas creates himself, then descends in the creatures and becomes all in all, in order then finally in the fourth nature, which does not create and is not created, to return to himself, III 4. 20. And the cause of this process of God is the goodness of God, III 2. 4. 9, his striving to become all, *appetitus quo vult omnia fieri*, I 12. Outside the Christian world pantheism was taught by the philosophers Avicenna 1036 and Averroës 1198, by Sufism, which saw in the universe an emanation of God; and among the Jews by the Kabbalah, Stöckl, *Philos. des M. A.* II 28. 92. 181. 237. [390] And toward the end of the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern period all these pantheistic, dualistic, emanationistic ideas crossed among the mystics, theosophists and Anabaptists, such as Floris, Amalrik of Bena, the brethren of the free spirit, the Libertines, Eckhardt, Tauler, Servetus, Frank, Schwenkfeld, Bruno, Paracelsus, Fludd, Weigel, Böhme, in confusion; even Socinianism taught only a creation out of an *ἀμορφος ὕλη*, *materia informis*, in Fock, *Der Socin.* S. 482; the finite and infinite were set too abstractly alongside and over against each other for the

former to be able to have its cause in the latter. But nevertheless pantheism as a philosophical system was first brought into honor again by Spinoza. He saw in the one substance the eternal and necessary *causa efficiens* and immanens of the world; the world is the explication of the divine essence, and the particular things are the *modi*, by which the divine attributes of thought and extension are determined in a particular way, *Eth.* I. This philosophy found toward the end of the previous century more and more assent and was elevated by Schelling and Hegel to the system of the nineteenth century. The biblical doctrine of creation was wholly rejected. Fichte said: *die Annahme einer Schöpfung ist der Grundirrhum aller falschen Metaphysik und Religionslehre und insbesondere das Urprinzip des Juden- und Heidenthums*, *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* 1806 S. 160. Schelling called creation out of nothing *das Kreuz des Verstandes*, and opposed it decisively, *Werke* I 2 S. 44 f. 8 S. 62 f. In his first period he taught the absolute identity of God and world; both relate to each other as essence and form; they are the same, considered under different points of view; God is not the cause of the all, but the all itself, and the all is therefore not becoming but an eternal being, *ἐν και παν*, *Werke* I 4 S. 117 f. 5 S. 24 f. 365 f. 373 f. 6 S. 174 f. But in his later period, through Baader, he came under the influence of Böhme and thus of the Kabbalah and Neoplatonism and now seeks the ground of the world in the dark nature of God. Theogony and cosmogony are most closely related. Just as God out of his indifference, through the opposition of the *principia*, nature (*Urgrund*, *Ungrund*, darkness) and understanding (word, light), raises himself to Spirit, love, personality, so these three are at the same time the Potencies of the world. The dark nature in God is the blind, [391] disorderly principle, the matter and ground of the created world, insofar as it is chaos and bears a

chaotic character. But in that world the Potency of the divine understanding also works, and brings into it light, order, rule. While finally in the spirit of man God himself as Spirit reveals himself and becomes full personality, Werke I 7 S. 359 f. II 2 S. 108 f. 3 S. 262 f., cf. above p. 305. And likewise Hegel openly professed himself to pantheism, indeed not to that which holds the finite things themselves for God but yet to that pantheism which in the finite and contingent sees the appearance of the absolute, the petrified idea, the frozen intelligence, Werke VII 23 f. From philosophy this pantheism passed over into theology. Schleiermacher rejected the separation of creation and preservation and held the question of the temporality or eternity of the world to be indifferent, provided only that the absolute dependence of all things on God remained maintained, Glaub. § 36. 41. Bovon, Dogm. Chrét. I 289. And likewise God is only the eternal immanent cause and ground of the world in Strauss, Glaub. I 656 f. Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 649 f. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 71. Pfleiderer, Grundriss der chr. Gl. u. Sittenlehre § 84. Scholten, Dogm. christ. initia, ed. 2 p. 111. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. II 174v. Alongside this pantheism materialism has also arisen, which seeks the ultimate elements of all being in eternal, ungenerated and indestructible material atoms, and from their mechanical and chemical separation and combination taking place according to fixed laws attempts to explain all phenomena, the whole world. It already had its preparation in Greek philosophy, was reintroduced into the modern period by Gassendi and Descartes; it was promoted by the English and French philosophy of the previous century; and it appeared in this century not as a fruit of scientific research but as a product of philosophical reflection in Feuerbach, who can be called the father of materialism in Germany, and then especially after 1850 found acceptance among practitioners of natural

science through all kinds of incidental causes, such as Vogt, Büchner, Moleschott, Czolbe, Haeckel, Strauss etc., Lange, *Gesch. des Materialismus*, 4e Aufl. 1882.

3. Now, first of all, it deserves remark that both pantheism [392] and materialism are not results of exact investigation but philosophy, worldview, systems of belief, not of knowing in the strict sense. Materialism does indeed like to present itself as exact natural science, but it can easily be shown that it is, both historically and logically, a fruit of human thinking, and is a matter as much of the heart as of the head of man. The origin and the end of things, after all, lie outside the limits of observation and investigation; science presupposes being, and rests on the foundation of the created. Insofar pantheism and materialism are in the same condition as theism, which confesses a mystery in the origin of things. The only question therefore is this, whether pantheism and materialism are able to replace this mystery with an intelligible explanation. That demand may be made of both, because they precisely reject the doctrine of creation on account of its incomprehensibility and see in it a cross of the understanding. Is it indeed so, that pantheism and materialism satisfy thinking better than theism and therefore deserve preference? But both systems have in the history of humanity so time and again arisen and again been abandoned; they have so often been subjected to serious, conclusive criticism, that they cannot be accepted by anyone solely on account of their satisfaction for thinking. Other motives are decisive in that. If the world did not arise by creation, it must nevertheless be explained in some other way. And then, not to speak of dualism, only two paths present themselves, namely, either to explain matter from spirit or spirit from matter. Pantheism and materialism are not pure opposites; they are rather two sides of the

same thing; they repeatedly pass over into one another; they grasp the same problem only from another side; they both run up against equal objections. Pantheism stands for the transition from thinking to being, from the idea to reality, from the substance to the modes and has delivered nothing that resembles a solution. It has indeed assumed various forms and indicated that transition under various names. It conceives the relation of God to the world as that of ἓν καὶ πᾶν, natura naturans and naturata, of substance and modes, of essence and appearance, of the general and the particular, of species and [393] specimens, of whole and parts, of idea and objectification, of ocean and waves etc., but with all these words it says nothing by way of explanation of that relation. From a pantheistic standpoint it is not to be understood how being has proceeded from thinking, multiplicity from unity, matter from spirit. Especially that has come out clearly in the systems of Schelling and Hegel. Here there was no lack of words. The idea assumes a form, a body, it objectifies itself, passes over into its other-being, it *dirimeert* and *differencieert* itself, it freely resolves, to *sich zu entlassen*, *zu entäussern*, to turn over into its opposite etc. Schelling, Werke I 2 62 f. 4 223 f. 257 f. Hegel, Werke VI 413 f. VII 23 f. But both nevertheless found in this so little satisfying a solution, that they more than once spoke of a falling-away from the absolute, through which the world had arisen, Schelling, *ib.* 6 38 f. Hegel, *ib.* XII 177. No wonder that therefore Schelling in his second period and likewise Schopenhauer, von Hartmann et al. assigned the primacy to the will and conceived the absolute first of all as nature, as will, as impulse, cf. above p. 203 f. The pantheistic identity of thinking and being has proved to be an error; all the more because the substance, the idea, the one, the all or however pantheism may call the absolute, is not a fullness of being, but a pure potency, a

contentless abstraction, a mere nothing. And from that the richness of the world, the multiplicity of what is, could be explained! Let him believe that who can! Very rightly therefore Kleutgen says: Darin aber besteht die Verschiedenheit der pantheistischen Speculation von der theistischen, dass jene, von ebenso dunkeln als unerweislichen Annahmen über das göttliche Sein beginnend, in offenen Widersprüchen endet, diese aber von sicheren Erkenntnissen der endlichen Dinge ausgehend, immer höhere Aufschlüsse gewinnt, bis sie vor dem Unbegreiflichen steht, nicht irre werdend, dass Der, welchen sie als den ewigen und unwandelbaren Urheber aller Dinge erkennt, in seinem Sein und Wirken über unser Denken erhaben sei, Phil. der Vorz. II2 884. Cf. on pantheism, art. by Ulrici in Herzog2. Doedes, Introd. to the Doctrine of God p. 68f. 268 with the literature cited there. Opzoomer, Law and Philosophy 1857 cap. 1. Pierson, Reflection, authority and experience 1855 cap. 1. Rauwenhoff, Philosophy of religion 205f. Hoekstra, Philosophical Religion II 73f. Kuyper, [394] Fading of the boundaries 1892. Is. van Dijk, Aesthetic and ethical religion 1895. Hartmann, Collected Studies and Essays 1876 S. 549-729. R. Flint, Antitheistic theories 1885 p. 334. 536. Hettinger, Apology of Christianity I7 S. 243 f. Ebrard, Apol. I2 435 f. etc., cf. also vol. I 148-151.

For the time being the origin of things remains unexplained in materialism. While pantheism has the universe proceed from one ultimate principle, which coincides with the world, materialism assumes a multiplicity of principia. But these ultimate principia of all things are, according to materialism, nothing other than indivisible particles of matter. If the advocates of this worldview were now to remain faithful to this their fundamental proposition, they would not be permitted to ascribe to those atoms a single metaphysical, transcendent praedicate. From the standpoint

of materialism, properly considered, it is impermissible to speak of the eternity, the uncreatedness, the indestructibility of the atoms, or also of matter and force. If one says that the world has arisen from material atoms, one must also remain faithful to that. Atoms, indeed, since they are elements of the empirical world, can bear only empirical but no metaphysical properties. The concept atom absolutely does not include that it is by nature and per se eternal and indestructible. Whoever holds the atoms to be the ultimate principia of all being, cuts off for himself the way to speculation and metaphysics and must then also explain the world only from those empirical atoms by an empirical way. The materialist can only say that experience teaches that the atoms do not arise and do not perish; but of a metaphysical nature and of metaphysical properties of the atoms he may not speak. Natural science, upon which the materialist always appeals, as such has to do with the finite, the relative, with nature and its phenomena; it always proceeds from nature, assumes it as given, and cannot penetrate to what lies behind it. As soon as it does that, it ceases to be physics and becomes metaphysics. But materialism does not remain faithful to itself and immediately ascribes to the atoms all sorts of properties that are not enclosed in the concept itself and are not learned by experience. Therefore materialism is not an exact science, not a fruit of strict scientific investigation, but a [395] philosophy that is built upon the denial of all philosophy; it suffers from an inner contradiction; it denies all the absolute and makes the atoms absolute; it denies God's existence and deifies matter. Indeed, one can speak still more strongly: if materialism wants to explain all things from matter, it lacks all right to speak of atoms. Atoms have never been observed; no one has ever seen them; empirical investigation has not brought them to light. They bear from the outset a metaphysical nature and

therefore ought already to be contraband for materialism. And as metaphysical substances they are in an antinomy that has as yet been solved by no one. They are material and yet they are at the same time supposed to be indivisible, unchangeable, infinite in number, eternal and indestructible. And if, with all that, matter itself, which is assumed as the explanatory principle of the universe, were only known and comprehensible! But precisely the essence and the nature of matter is the most mysterious of all and withdraws itself entirely from our knowledge. We can still better conceive and represent to ourselves what spirit is than what matter is. Matter is a name, a word, but we do not know what is to be understood by it. We stand here before a mystery, in its kind just as great as the existence of spirit, which, because of its incomprehensibility, is rejected by materialism. But granted that there are atoms and that they are eternal and unchangeable, then thereby nothing has yet been achieved toward an explanation of the world. How has the world arisen from those atoms? If the presently existing world, or also a preceding one, has had a beginning, there must be a cause by which the atoms have been set in motion, and indeed in such a motion that had the present world as result. But motion cannot be explained from matter, for all matter is by nature inert and comes into motion only through an impulse from without. A primum movens outside matter, however, cannot be assumed by materialism. And thus nothing else remains than, just as the atoms, so also to make motion, change, time, or with Czolbe even this existing world absolute and eternal. Materialism entangles itself in ever greater contradictions; it confuses the physical and the metaphysical, becoming and being, change and unchangeableness, time and eternity, and speaks of infinite space, infinite time, infinite world, [396] as if it were nothing and there did not lie in it the

most absurd contradiction. Finally, it has repeatedly and from various sides been shown that materialism remains deficient in order to explain, out of the mechanical combination of purely material and thus unconscious, lifeless, unfree, purposeless atoms, that whole spiritual world of life, consciousness, purpose, religion, morality, etc., which nevertheless presses itself upon our inner awareness with no less force than the physical world upon our senses. And it seems that this critique is gradually beginning to make some impression upon the materialists themselves. Materialism in this century, having arisen out of pantheism, returns more and more to pantheism and even takes up all sorts of mystical elements into itself, Wetensch. Bladen, Mei 1896. The long-rejected vital force now again finds defenders. The atoms are represented as living, ensouled. Haeckel again speaks of a "Geist in allen Dingen", of a "göttliche Kraft", a "bewegenden Geist", a "Weltseele", which dwells in all things and in this pantheistic monism seeks the bond between religion and science. But thereby materialism has also itself openly confessed its impotence to explain the world; in its poverty the mechanism of the atoms called the dynamic principle to help again. Cf. Ulrici, Gott und die Natur 1866. Fabri, Briefe gegen den Mater. 1864. Hartmann, Ges. Stud. u. Aufsätze 1876 S. 421 f. Nathusius, Natur u. Philos. Heilbronn 1883. T. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel I 2 11 f. 143 f. 504 f. II 118-171. Hettinger, Apol. des Christ. I 7 167 f. Pfaff, Schöpfungsgesch. 1881 S. 729 f. Reusch, Bibel u. Natur 1876 S. 43 f. P. Janet, Le maté, contemporain en Allemagne 1864. Pressensé, Les origines 1883 p. 129 S. Especially also the just appeared work of Raoul Pictet, Etude crit. du materialisme et du spiritualisme par la physique expérimentale. Genève 1897.

4. Over against all these directions the Christian church unanimously held fast the confession: *credo in Deum patrem, omnipotentem, creatorem coeli et terrae*; and it understood by creation that act of God whereby, according to his sovereign will, He brings the whole world out of non-being into a being that is distinct from his own essence. And this is indeed the doctrine of Holy Scripture. The word **ברא** originally means: to split, divide, cut [397] (Josh. 17:15, 18 in piel of the felling of forests), and hence to form, bring forth, create. It does not in itself yet express that something is brought forth out of nothing, for it is many times also used of the works of preservation, Isa. 40:28, 45:7, Jer. 31:22, Am. 4:13. It is synonymous with and alternates with **עשה**, **יצר**, **הִקְדִּישׁ**, Ps. 104:30. But it nevertheless differs from these in that it is always used of the divine making and never of man's doing; that it never has with it an accusativus of the material from which something is made; and that it therefore precisely everywhere expresses the greatness and power of the divine working, Delitzsch, *Neuer Comm. zur Gen.* S. 48. And the same is the case with the N. T. words **κτιζειν**, Mk. 13:19, **ποιειν**, Mt. 19:4, **θεμελιουν**, Hebr. 1:10, **καταρτιζειν**, Rom. 9:12, **κατασκευαζειν**, Hebr. 3:4, **πλασσειν**, Rom. 9:20, which also do not of themselves express a creating out of nothing. The term creating out of nothing is therefore also not literally borrowed from Scripture but occurs for the first time in 2 Macc. 7:28, where it is said that God made heaven and earth and man **ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν**, Vulg. *fecit ex nihilo*. It has been contested that this expression might be taken in the strict sense, and a Platonic interpretation has been given to it. Yet it deserves attention that the writer speaks not of **μη ὄντα**, i.e. a *nihilum privativum*, a quality- and formless matter, but of **οὐκ ὄντα** i.e. a *nihilum negativum*. Further, it is not even yet certain that the author of the book of Wisdom in cap. 11:18 taught the eternity of a formless

matter; the passage can very well be understood of the creatio secunda, just as later this is the case with Justinus Martyr. But however this may be, Scripture leaves no doubt in this respect. It does not use the term, but teaches the matter clearly. To be sure, it has been thought that Gen. 1:1-3 actually proceeded from an original, uncreated chaos. Because בְּרֵאשִׁית in form is a status constr., verses 1-3 would thus have to be translated: in the beginning when God created heaven and earth—the earth now was waste and empty etc.—, then God said: let there be light. In verse 2 the waste and empty earth would then be presupposed with God's creating; thus Ewald, Bunsen, Schrader et al., cf. Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 S. 570 f. But this translation is not acceptable. In the first place, the sense then acquires a [398] periodic length that occurs little in Hebrew, here immediately at the beginning and according to the style of Gen. 1 is not at all to be expected and also lays far too strong an emphasis on the creation of the light; secondly, the status constr. of בְּרֵאשִׁית does not require this translation, because in the same form without suffix or genitive it also occurs in Isa. 46:10, cf. Lev. 2:12, Deut. 33:21; and thirdly, it would be strange that while the protasis would say that God still had to create heaven and earth, the parenthesis already designated the chaos with the name of earth and made no mention at all of the original state of heaven. And in addition there then comes still that this translation, even if it were correct, would by no means teach the eternity of the waste earth but at most would leave this in the middle. That, however, conflicts with the whole spirit of the creation narrative. Elohim is not presented in Gen. 1 as a world-former who in human fashion makes a work of art out of material at hand, but as One who, merely speaking, by a sheer word of power, calls all things into view. And with that the whole of Scripture agrees. God is the Almighty, who stands

infinitely far above all creature, and deals with all creatures according to his sovereign good pleasure; the absolute possessor, כֹּלֵה of heaven and earth, Gen. 14:19, 22, who does all that pleases Him, to whose power nowhere a boundary is set. He speaks and it is, He commands and it stands, Gen. 1:3, Ps. 33:9, Isa. 48:13, Rom. 4:17. Further, all things in Scripture are time and again described as made by God and absolutely dependent on Him. He has made everything, heaven, earth, sea with all that is on it and in it, Ex. 20:11, Neh. 9:6 etc. Everything is created by Him, Col. 1:16, 17, exists only by his will, Rev. 4:11, and is from and through and unto God, Rom. 11:36. Further, never and nowhere is there even the slightest mention of an eternal unformed matter. God alone is the Eternal, the Incorruptible; He alone is exalted above becoming and change. By contrast, things have a beginning and an end, and are subject to variation. In an anthropomorphic way this is expressed. God existed before the mountains were born and his years do not cease, Ps. 90:2, Prov. 8:25, 26; He has chosen and loved προ καταβολης κοσμου, Eph. 1:4, John 17:24, cf. Mt. 13:35, 25:34, Luke 11:50, John 17:5, Hebr. [399] 4:3, 9:26, 1 Petr. 1:20, Rev. 13:8, 17:8. And finally Rom. 4:17, even though there is not specifically mention there of creation, teaches that God calls and commands τα μη ὄντα, that which possibly is not yet, ὡς ὄντα, as though it were; being or non-being makes for Him no difference. Hebr. 11:3 expresses it still more clearly, that the world has thus been made by God, that what is seen has not come to be ἐκ φαινομενων, out of what appears before the eyes. A formless matter is thereby wholly excluded; the visible world has not proceeded from the visible but rests in God, who by his word called everything into view.

5. This doctrine of Scripture finds its sharpest expression in the words out of nothing, and has thus from the beginning been understood and

reproduced by Christian theology, Hermas, Pastor I 1. Theophilus, ad Autol. II 4. Tertull. de praescr. 13. Iren. adv. haer. II 10 etc. But among Gnostics and Manichaeans, theosophists and naturalists, pantheists and materialists, this doctrine has at all times met with contradiction. Especially the Aristotelian dictum: *ex nihilo nihil fit*, has been brought forward against it. Yet this refutation is wholly without ground. In the first place, this rule of Aristotle is by no means so simple as it seems; at every moment we stand before phenomena that cannot be reduced to present factors; history is no sum; life is no product of chemical combinations; genius is still something other and something more than the child of its time, and every personality is something original. But apart from this and taken *cum grano salis*, this rule of Aristotle finds no contradiction. Theology has never taught that non-being was the father, the source, the principium of being. Moreover, it has repeatedly added that the expression *ex nihilo* was no indication of a previously existing matter, out of which the world was formed; but it only made known that what is once was not, and that it has been called into existence only by God's almighty power; the expression *ex nihilo* thus is equivalent to *post nihilum*; *particula ex non designat sed excludit materiam*; the world has its cause not in itself but only in God, Iren. adv. haer. II 14. August. Conf. XI 5. XII 7. De Gen. ad litt. I 1. Anselmus, Monol. c. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 45 art. 1 etc. The expression was retained so gladly in [400] Christian theology only for this reason, because it was particularly suited to cut off all kinds of error at the root. In the first place it served against the paganistic doctrine of an *ἀμορφος ὕλη*, above which even a Plato and Aristotle had not been able to rise. In paganism man is bound to matter, subjected to sensuality and nature-worship; he cannot grasp the thought that spirit stands free over against and above matter, and still much

less that God is absolutely sovereign, determined by nothing other than by his own being. And over against that, creation out of nothing now teaches the absolute sovereignty of God, his complete independence; if even a single particle of matter had not been created out of nothing, God would not be God. In the second place this expression excludes all emanation, all identity of being of God and world. To be sure, the scholastics spoke more than once of an *emanatio* or *processio totius entis a causa universali*, and also indeed of a participation of the creature in the being and the life of God. But by that they did not mean emanation in the proper sense, as if the divine being flowed out into the creatures and unfolded itself in them, as the genus in its species. But by that they only wished to say that God is *ens per essentiam*, but the creature *ens per participationem*; the creatures do indeed have a being of their own, but this has in the divine being its *causa efficiens* and *exemplaris*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 45 art. 1. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. II 828 f. 899 f. Creation out of nothing maintains that there is an essential distinction between God and world. Creation does not consist in a transition of the world from a being in God to a being outside God, nor also from a being without God to a being through God, but from non-being to being. The world is certainly no *ἀντιθεός*, it does not exist independently, it is and remains in God as its continuing *causa immanens*, as later in the doctrine of preservation against Manichaeism and deism must be shown. But it is according to the doctrine of Scripture no part, no efflux of the being of God. It has a being of its own, another, a being and existence distinct from the *essentia Dei*. And that is expressed by the *ex nihilo*. Yet philosophy has also misused this term. Just as Plato understood by the *μη ὄν* an eternal unformed matter, so Erigena even designated God as *nihilum*, insofar as he is exalted above all [401] categories and determinations, above

all being and essence; *dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam nihilum non immerito vocitatur*, de div. nat. III 19. And when he brings everything forth out of nothing into appearance, then that means that he *de sua videlicet superessentialitate producit essentias, de supervitalitate vitas*, etc. de div. nat. III 20. Hegel dealt with this concept still more strangely in his *Logik*, when he understood by nothing a *Nicht-seyn, das zugleich Seyn, und ein Seyn, das zugleich Nicht-seyn ist*; a nothing that is at the same time everything, namely in *potentia* and nothing determinate in *concreto*, Werke III 64. 73 f. Over against this philosophical confusion of concepts, Christian theology stands in direct opposition; it understands by nothing a pure *nihil negativum* and rejects all emanation. Yet there also lies in emanation a true thought, which precisely by the biblical doctrine of creation, without violation of the being of God, is maintained much better than in philosophy. The doctrine of creation out of nothing namely in the end gives to Christian theology a place between Gnosticism and Arianism, i.e. between pantheism and deism. Gnosticism knows no creation but only emanation and therefore makes the world into the Son, the wisdom, the image of God in an adequate sense; Arianism knows no emanation but only creation, and therefore makes the Son into a creature; there the world is deified, here God is made worldly. But Scripture and correspondingly Christian theology knows both, emanation and creation; a twofold communication of God, one within, one outside the divine being; one to the Son, who in the beginning was with God and himself was God, and one to the creatures, which have come into being in time; one from eternity and one in time; one out of the essence and one through the will of God. The first is called generation, the second creation. Through generation the adequate image of God is communicated eternally

to the Son; through creation only a weak, faint likeness of God is communicated to the creature. But yet both are connected. Without generation creation would not be possible. If God could not communicate himself absolutely to the Son, he could much less in a relative sense communicate himself to his creature. If God did not exist trinitarianly, creation would not be possible, Athan. c. Ar. I 12. II 56. 78. [402]

6. Correspondingly, Holy Scripture also teaches that God, Triune, is the author of creation. Scripture knows no intermediate beings. The Jews, in connection with the plural in Gen. 1:26, thought of the angels, Weber, Syst. 170. The Gnostics let a series of aeons proceed from God, which acted creatively. The Arians made of the Son an intermediate being between Creator and creature, which, though created, nevertheless itself in turn created. In the Middle Ages many were not disinclined to assume the possibility of a cooperation of the creature in creation. They came to this because in the church the forgiveness of sins and distribution of grace was inherent in the office, and a priest in the mass could change the bread into the body of Christ and thus became a creator *sui creatoris* (Biel). Hence Lombard, in the doctrine of the sacraments, says that God also indeed *posset per aliquem creare aliqua, non per eum tanquam auctorem sed ministrum cum quo et in quo operaretur*, Sent. IV dist. 5 n. 3. By some, such as Durandus, followed by Suarez, Bellarminus, he was nevertheless contradicted by others such as Thomas, Scotus, Bonaventura, Richard, Victor etc., Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 45 art. 5. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit II 2 849 f. And with this the Reformed also agreed, who, even more than Roman Catholics and Lutherans, resisted all mixing of Creator and creature, Voetius, Disp. I 556 sq. Synopsis, X 14. Turret. Th. El. V qu. 2. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. VI 14. Mastricht III 5, 20. M. Vitringa II 81-82. Scripture

ascribes creation exclusively to God, Gen. 1:1, Jes. 40:12v., 44:24, 45:12, Job 9:5-10, 38:2v. Thereby He is distinguished from the idols, Ps. 96:5, Jes. 37:16, Jer. 10:11, 12. Creating is a divine work, an act of infinite power, and therefore communicable to no creature, whatever it may be, neither in nature nor in grace. But all the more unanimously Christian theology ascribed the work of creation to all three persons in the Trinity. Scripture also left no doubt about this. God has created all things through the Son, Ps. 33:6, Prov. 8:22, John 1:3, 5:17, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:15-17, Heb. 1:3, and through the Spirit, Gen. 1:2, Ps. 33:6, Job 26:13, 33:4, Ps. 104:30, Jes. 40:13, Luke 1:35. And in that connection Son and Spirit are not conceived as original forces but as self-subsisting principia, [403] as auctores, who, with the Father, bring the work of creation to completion, just as with Him they are also the one, true God. In the Christian church this doctrine of Scripture did not at once come into its own; the Logos was at first too much conceived as an intermediate being, which effected the transition between God and world; and the person and the work of the Holy Spirit still came entirely into the background, above p. 251v. But Irenaeus already said that God had no need of foreign instruments in creation and also did not use the angels therein, but that He has His own hands, the Logos and the Holy Spirit, through whom and in whom He has created all things, adv. haer. IV 20. Clearly the doctrine of creation as the work of the whole Trinity was developed by Athanasius and the three Cappadocians in the East and by Augustine in the West. No creature, says Athanasius, can be ποιητικον αίτιον of creation; if the Son therefore creates the world with the Father, He cannot be an extra-divine, created demiurge, as Arius thinks, but must be the proper Son of the Father, ίδιον γεννημα της ούσιας αύτου, c. Ar. II 21 sq. But where the Logos is, there also is the Spirit, and thus ὁ πατηρ δια του

λογου ἐν τῷ πνεύματι κτίζει τα πάντα, ad Serap. III 5. And Augustine speaks still more strongly: ab hac summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona trinitate creata sunt omnia, Enchir. 10, so that the whole creation is a vestigium trinitatis, de trin. VI 10. de civ. XI 24. Conf. XIII 11. And thus this doctrine has become the common property of the whole of Christian theology, Joh. Damasc. de fide orthod. I 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 45 art. 6. Luther, art. Smalc. I 1. Calv. Inst. I 14, 20, and also of the various confessions, Denzinger, Enchir. Symb. n. 202. 227. 231. 232. 355. 367. 598. Müller, Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K. 5e Aufl. S. 38. 299. Niemeyer, Coll. conf. eccl. Ref. p. 87. 331. 341 etc. This doctrine found contradiction only among those who also reject the ecclesiastical dogma of the Trinity and at most want to know only of a creation of the Father through the Son but in no case recognize in creation a common work of the three divine persons, such as the Arians, Socinians, Remonstrants, Rationalists, and in more recent times Martensen, Dogm. § 61. Oosterzee, Dogm. § 56, 5 and especially Doedes, Ned. Gel. 121v. Both dogmas also stand and fall with each other. The confession of the unity of essence of the three persons of itself entails [404] that all opera ad extra are communia and indivisa; and conversely the combating of the trinitarian work of creation is proof of deviation in the doctrine of the Trinity. What matters here is only to make, with Scripture and with the church fathers, such as Athanasius, the strictest distinction between Creator and creature, and to guard oneself against all gnostic mixing. If Son and Spirit in Scripture appear as self-subsisting principia, as auctores of creation, then they also partake of the divine essence; and if they are true God, they also have part in the work of creation. In contrast, the Arian doctrine involves insoluble difficulties. It cannot be denied that Scripture teaches creation as a work of the Father

through the Son. If the Son is now regarded as a person outside the divine essence, there is justification for the question: to the creating of the Father through the Son no sense can be attached; Scripture says it, but what can it mean? the Father has commissioned the Son with creating? then the Son would be the actual Creator. Father and Son have together created all things? but then it is not creating through the Son, Doedes t. a. p. 128. The doctrine of the Trinity here causes the true light to dawn. Just as God is one in essence and distinct in persons, so also the work of creation is one and undivided and yet in that unity rich in diversity. It is one God who creates all things, and therefore the world is a unity, just as conversely the unity of the world proves the unity of God. But in that one divine essence there are three persons, each of whom in the one work of creation fulfills a proper task. Not in the sense that creation belongs principaliter to the Father and minus principaliter to the Son and the Spirit, or that the three persons work independently alongside one another, supplement each other's labor, and are three separate *causae efficientes* of creation; the expression of *tres causae sociae* among some theologians therefore met with objection among many, Zöckler, *Gesch. der Bezieh.* I 621 f. 679 f. There is indeed cooperation, but no division of labor. All things are at the same time from the Father through the Son in the Spirit. The Father is the first cause; from Him the initiative proceeds; creation is therefore in the economic sense specifically ascribed to Him. The Son is not the instrument but the personal wisdom, the Logos, through whom all things are created; all things [405] rest and have system in Him, Col. 1:17 and are created unto Him, Col. 1:16, not as final end but as Head and Lord of all creatures, Eph. 1:10. And the Holy Spirit is the personal immanent cause, through whom all things live, move, and are in God, receive their form and shape, and are led onward to their destination.

Cf. above 417v. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 328 f. Kuyper, Het werk van den H. Geest I 20v.

7. Yet, although creation is a work of the whole Trinity, it cannot be denied that in Scripture it still stands in a peculiar relation to the Son, which deserves separate discussion. The O. Test. says many times that God has created all things through the word, Gen. 1:3, Ps. 33:6, Ps. 148:5, Isa. 48:13, has founded the earth by wisdom and has prepared the heavens by understanding, Ps. 104:24, Prov. 3:19, Jer. 10:12, 51:15. But that wisdom is also presented personally as counsellor and mistress-craftswoman of creation. God acquired and possessed it, arranged it, searched it out, in order that He through it, as firstling of his way, as beginning of his works, would create and order the world. And thus it was already with Him before creation, and during creation it worked along and rejoiced in the works of God's hands, above all in the children of men, Prov. 8:22-31, Job 28:23-27. In the N. Test. this doctrine is further developed. We read there not only that God has created all things through the Son, John 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:15-17, Heb. 1:3, but Christ is there also called *πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως*, Col. 1:15, *αρχη της κτισεως του θεου*, Rev. 3:14, the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end of all things, Rev. 1:17, 21:6, 22:6, to whom all things are created, Col. 1:17, in order to be gathered together again under Him as the Head, Eph. 1:10. Christ in all these passages has not only a soteriological but also a cosmological significance. He is mediator of the re-creation not only but also of creation. The Apologists did not yet know what to do with these thoughts of Scripture. Standing under Platonic influence, they often saw in the Logos not much more than the *κοσμος νοητος*; they brought Him into the closest connection with the world, held his generation motivated by the creation and made as yet no sufficient distinction between

the birth of the Son and the creation [406] of the world; they still struggle with the gnostic thought that the Father is actually the hidden, invisible Godhead and is first made manifest through the Logos, cf. above p. 251v. Although this gnostic element has now been banished from theology by the church fathers, especially Athanasius and Augustine; it has nevertheless returned in it time and again. The root from which this thought springs is always a certain dualism, a more or less sharp antithesis between spirit and matter, between God and world. God is invisible, inaccessible, hidden; the world is, if not anti-, then yet ungodly, God-less, athée. To reconcile this principal antithesis a being-in-between is needed, and that is the Logos. He is in relation to God the world-idea, the world-image, the *κοσμος νοητος*, and in relation to the world He is the actual Creator, the principle of the possibility that there comes to be a world. Among the Herrnhutters this even led to the fact that the Father wholly recedes, and Christ is the actual Creator; the re-creation devours the creation, grace destroys nature. Various *Vermittelungstheologen* teach that the Logos is the world according to its idea, and that it thus gehört zum Wesen des Sohnes, sein Leben nicht mehr im Vater sondern auch in der Welt zu haben; als das Herz des Vaters ist er zugleich das ewige Weltherz, der ewige Weltlogos, Martensen, *Dogm.* § 125. Meyer on Col. 1:16. This representation then naturally leads to the doctrine of the incarnation apart from sin. The world is in itself profane, creation actually no essentially Divine work. If God will be able to create, if the world, if humanity will be able to be pleasing to Him, then He must see it in Christ. This is He in whom and for whom the world alone can be willed by God; in whom as the head and the Centralindivium humanity alone can be well-pleasing to God; the incarnation is necessary for the revelation and the communication of God, and the God-man is the highest

goal of creation, cf. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre van der Person Christi III 1227-1262, Nitzsch, Syst. der chr. Lehre S. 204, Lange, Chr. Dogm. II 215 and especially also Keerl, Der Mensch, das Ebenbild Gottes II 1 f. Finally this series of thoughts is completed in the doctrine that creation is necessary for God himself; God an sich is indeed nature, Urgrund, βυθος, σιγη, but in order himself to become personality, [407] spirit, He has need of creation. Creation is the history of God, cosmogony is theogony, Schelling, Werke II 2 S. 109.

This Gnosticism can be overcome in principle only when all dualism between God and world is cut off at the root. Creating is no lower and less divine work than re-creating; nature does not stand beneath grace; the world is not profane in itself. And thus there was also no need of a lower divine being, in order to enable the Father to create the world. The Christian church believes in the Father, the Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth. Creation is absolutely no more the work of the Son than of the Father. All things are from God. And the Christian church confesses of the Son, that He is no less than the Father and does not stand closer to the creatures, but that He is of one essence with the Father and with the Spirit, and that they together are the one, eternal, true God, Creator of heaven and of earth. But indeed the Son takes an own place in the work of creation. Augustine especially set this in the light. Although he did not identify the ideas of things with the Logos, as the Apologists had done, he nevertheless had to bring these into connection with the Logos. The world was indeed not eternal, but its idea was nevertheless eternal in the consciousness of God. The Father speaks out all his thoughts, his whole being, in the one, personal Word, and therefore the world-idea is also contained in the Logos; the Logos can therefore be called *forma quaedam, forma non formata sed*

forma omnium formatorum, Serm. 117, cf. de lib. art. III 16 en 17. de trin. XI 10. XV 14, cf. Anselmus, Monol. 34. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 34 art. 3, cf. 44 art. 3. Thereby the significance of the Son for creation can be established. In the first place it is the Father, from whom the initiative of creation proceeds, who thinks the world-idea, but all that the Father is and has and thinks, He communicates to and speaks out in the Son. In Him the Father beholds the idea of the world itself, not as though this were identical with the Son, but in such a way that it, in the Son, in whom his whole fullness dwells, stands before His eyes and confronts Him. In the divine wisdom there also lies enclosed, as part, as epitome, that wisdom which will be realized in the creatures [408]. He is the Logos, through whom the Father creates all things; the whole world is a realized thought of God; a book with great and small letters, from which his wisdom is to be known. But not only *causa exemplaris* is He, also *ἀρχὴ δημιουργικῇ*. The word that God speaks is no sound without content; it is powerful and living. The word, the world-idea, which the Father speaks out in the Son, is a *ratio seminalis*, *forma principalis*, of the world itself; therefore the Son is called the *ἀρχὴ, πρωτοτοκος, ἀρχὴ τῆς κτισεως*, the firstborn, who bears creation, in whom it rests, from whom it arises as its cause and example; and therefore that word, which the Father speaks at creation and by which He calls the things out of nothing into being, is also powerful, for it is spoken in and through the Son. And finally the Son is also in a certain sense the *causa finalis* of the world. Because it has in Him its foundation and example, it is also created unto Him, indeed not as final ultimate end, but yet as Head, Lord and Heir of all things, Col. 1:16. Summed up in the Son, gathered under Him as Head, all creatures come again to the Father, from whom all things are. And thus the world has its eternal idea, its *ἀρχὴ* and its

τελος in the triune being of God. The word, which the Father speaks out in the Son, is the full expression of the divine being and thus also of all that which will also exist outside the divine being as creature through that word. And the spiration, by which Father and Son are principium of the Spirit, also contains in itself the willing of that world, whose idea is comprised in the divine Wisdom, Kleutgen, Philos. II 870. Therefore creation proceeds from the Father through the Son in the Spirit, in order that it in the Spirit through the Son may return again to the Father.

8. In this way some light also falls on the difficult problem of creation and time. Scripture says simply and humanly, that things have had a beginning. It speaks of a time before the birth of the mountains, before the foundation of the world, before the times of the ages, Gen. 1:1, Ps. 90:2, Prov. 8:22, John 1:1, Eph. 1:4, 2 Tim. 1:9. And we too can never rid ourselves in our thinking and speaking of that form of time. Properly speaking, from this human limitation all the objections are born, which repeatedly [409] arise again against a creation in time. Going back with our thoughts, we finally come to the first moment, in which all things take a beginning. Before that there is nothing but the deep silence of eternity. But at once the questions multiply in our heart. With what shall we fill that eternity and what activity can there be, if all work of creation and preservation is thought away? The doctrine of the Trinity and of the decrees gives us some answer here; but detached from the world, they no longer offer any content to our thinking. What then did God do before the creation, He, who cannot be thought as a Deus otiosus, but who always ἐργάζεται, John 5:17. Has He then changed, passed over from idleness to activity, from rest to labor? How is the creation, the transition to the act of creating, to be reconciled with the immutability of God? And why did He pass over to that creation only when

already an eternity had sped by? How is there in that eternity exalted above all time a moment to be found, in which God passed over from not-creating to creating? And why did He choose precisely that moment, why did creation not begin ages before? All these questions have elicited various answers. Pantheism attempted to give a solution by teaching that in God being and working were one, that God has not become a Creator but that creation itself is an eternal one; the world has had no beginning, it is the eternal self-revelation of God; and God does not precede the world in duration but only in a logical sense, insofar as He is the cause of all things; the *natura naturans* is not to be thought without *natura naturata*, the substance not without *attributa* and *modi*, the idea not without appearance, Erigena, *de div. nat.* I 73. 74. III 8. 9. 17 etc. Spinoza, *Cogit. metaph.* II c. 10. Hegel, *Werke* VII 25 f. Related to that is the solution which Origen gave; he did indeed reject the eternity of matter, and did indeed teach that everything was created out of nothing by the Logos, *de princ.* II 1; but God is not to be thought idle, his omnipotence is eternal as He himself, and therefore He has also begun to create from eternity. Indeed the present world is not eternal, *de princ.* III 5, but to this world innumerable worlds preceded, just as many will also follow, *de princ.* I 2. III 5. This opinion, which actually originates from the Stoa, Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* IV3 [410] 153 f., was condemned by the church at the council of Nicaea, but has nevertheless repeatedly been renewed, in this century still by Rothe, *Theol. Ethik* § 50 f. Ulrici, *Gott u. die Natur* 1866 S. 671 f. Martensen, *Chr. Dogm.* § 65, 66. Dorner, *Gl.* I 466 f. G. Wetzel, *Die Zeit der Weltschöpfung.* *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1875 S. 582-588 etc. In this connection there also deserves mention the question much treated in scholasticism, whether the world could not have been eternal. In defense of Aristotle, who taught the

eternity of the world, Zeller, III 3 357 f., this question was answered affirmatively by some, e.g. by Thomas, S. Th. I. qu. 46 art. 1, 2. S. c. G. II 31-37, Durandus, Occam, Biel, Cajetanus, cf. Esser, Die Lehre des h. Th. v. Aq. über die Möglichkeit eener anfangslosen Schöpfung, Münster 1895. Rolfes, Philos. Jahrb. X 1897 Heft 1. By others, however, it was decisively denied, as by Bonaventura, Sent. I. dist. 44 art. 1 qu. 4. Albertus Magnus, Henricus of Ghent, Richard, Valentia, Toletus, cf. Petavius, de Deo III c. 5. 6, and likewise by the Lutherans, Quenstedt I 421. Hollaz p. 358, and the Reformed, Zanchius, Op. III 22 sq. Voetius, Disp. I 568. Leydecker, Fax Verit. 140. Coccejus, S. Theol. c. 15. Moor II 179 M. Vitringa II 83. Turret. Th. El. V qu. 3; only a single one considered an eternal creation possible, Burmannus, Synopsis I 41, 24. All these answers, however, grant no satisfaction to thought. Naturally there is no difference about this, that the world at this moment, instead of thousands of years, could also already have existed for millions of ages. No one who denies this in the abstract. But something entirely different is whether the world could have been eternal in the same sense as God is eternal. This now is impossible, for eternity and time differ essentially. Kant saw in it an insoluble antinomy, that the world on the one hand must have had a beginning, because an infinite elapsed time was unthinkable, and that yet on the other hand it could have no beginning, because an empty time is unthinkable, Kr. d. r. Vern. ed. Kirschmann, 5e Aufl. 360 f. Only the last member of this antinomy has no right of existence; with the world time also of itself falls away; there then remains no time and thus also no empty time any longer, Iren. adv. haer. III 8. Athan. c. Ar. I 29. 58. Tert. adv. Marc. II 3. adv. Hermog. 4. August. de civ. XI 6. That we [411] cannot conceive that and always have need of such an auxiliary representation of a time before time,

is of no relevance here and comes only from the fact that our thinking consists in the form of time; in order to think away time, thinking would have to think away itself, which is impossible. Thus there remains only the first member of Kant's antinomy, namely that the world must have had a beginning. However endlessly prolonged, time remains time and never becomes eternity. There is between the two an essential difference, above p. 131. The world is not to be thought without time; time is a mode of existence of all that is finite and created; never can the predicate of eternity in the strict sense belong to what exists in the form of time. Likewise the question, whether God then could not have created from eternity, rests on the identification of eternity and time. There is in eternity no earlier or later. God has eternally created the world, i.e. also in the moment when the world received existence, God was and remained the Eternal and He created as the Eternal. The world, even if it had existed an endless series of ages and even if millions of worlds had preceded this one, it remains temporal, finite, limited and thus has had a beginning. The hypothesis of Origen gives not the least solution; the issue remains completely the same; it is only shifted some millions of years. Still more unfounded is the question, what God then did before the creation. It has been answered by Augustine, Conf. XI 12. Luther, Calvin, Inst. I 14, 1 in accordance with Prov. 26:5. It proceeds from the supposition that God exists in time and that creation and preservation is his daily strenuous labor. But God dwells in eternity, He is *actus purissimus*, an infinite fullness of life, blessed in himself, without the creation not idle and by it not wearied. *Non itaque in ejus vacatione cogitetur ignavia, desidia, inertia, sicut nec in ejus opere labor, conatus, industria. Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere*, August. de civ. XII 17. And likewise it is with pantheism; it is not so superficial as Socinianism and materialism,

which simply changes eternity into a time endlessly prolonged forward and backward and does not know the distinction between endless and infinite; it does not say that God is all things and all things are God; it makes distinction between being and becoming, *natura naturans* and *naturata*, substance and [412] *modi*, the all and all things, the idea and the appearance, i.e. between eternity and time. But to the question: wherein then does that distinction consist? what connection is there between the two? how does eternity pass over into time? pantheism remains owing the answer. It gives words and images enough, but nothing can be thought with them. Theism, however, holds eternity and time to be two incommensurable magnitudes. They can and may neither of them be neglected by us; they both press themselves upon our consciousness and thinking. But we are not able to see through their connection; living and thinking in time, we stand in admiration before the mystery of the eternal, uncreated being. On the one hand it is certain, that God is the Eternal; in Him there is no past or future, no becoming or change; and whatever He is, is eternal, his thought, his will, his decree. Eternal in Him is also the world-idea, which He thinks and utters in the Son; eternal in Him is the decree to create the world; eternal in Him is the will, which has created the world in time; eternal is also the act of creating, as act of God, as *actio interna et immanens*, August. *de civ.* XII 17. Lombardus, *Sent.* II dist. 1 n. 2. Bonav. *Sent.* II dist. 1 art. 1 qu. 2. Thomas, *c. Gent.* I 82. Petavius, *de Deo* V 9, 9 and 13, 5. Voetius, *Disp.* I 565. Turret. *Th. El.* V qu. 3, 16, for He has not become a Creator, so that He would first for a time not and thereafter would have created; He is the eternal Creator, as Creator He was the Eternal and as the Eternal He has created. Creation therefore brought no change in Him; it has not emanated from Him; it is no part of his being; He is unchangeably the same eternal God. And on the

other hand it is certain, also for thinking, that the world has had a beginning and has been created in time. Augustine has rightly said: *mundus non est factus in tempore sed cum tempore*, Conf. XI 10-13, de civ. VII 30. XI 4-6. XII 15-17, just as Plato and Philo and Tertullian, adv. Marc. II 3 had already said this before him and all theologians have later repeated it. An empty time is unthinkable. A time before the world has not existed. Time is a necessary mode of existence of the finite. It has not been created separately but is given of itself with the world, co-created just as space. In a certain sense the world has thus always been, i.e. as long as there was time. All change therefore does not fall in God but in it. It is subject to time i.e. to change. It is the continual becoming over against God as the eternal and unchangeable being. And these two now, God and world, eternity and time, stand in this relation; that the world in all its parts is borne by God's omnipresent power and time in all its moments is permeated by the eternal being of our God. Eternity and time are not two lines, of which the shorter for a time runs parallel with the endlessly prolonged; but eternity is the unchangeable center, which sends forth its rays to the whole circumference of time. For the limited eye of the creature it successively unfolds its infinite content in the breadth of space and the length of time, in order that it might understand something of the unsearchable greatness of God. But therefore eternity and time nevertheless remain distinct. This alone we confess, that the eternal willing of God, without ceasing to be eternal, can bring forth and does bring forth operations in time, just as his eternal thinking also can have temporal things as content. Thomas with Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. II 871. The power of God's will, which is eternally one, caused to arise what was not, without any change taking place in Him. God wills eternally what will take place only after ages or has taken place before

ages. And at the time, when it happens, there is change in the things but not in his being. *Una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt*, Aug. de civ. XII 17.

9. If now this world, which has arisen and exists in time, is essentially distinct from the eternal and immutable being of God, then with all the more force the question presses itself upon us, what moved God to call this world into existence. Scripture repeatedly traces all being and such-being of the creatures back to the will of God, Ps. 33:6, 115:3, 135:6, Isa. 46:10, Mt. 11:25, Rom. 9:15v. Eph. 1:4, Rev. 4:11 etc. That is for us the final ground, the end of all contradiction. The will of God [*Dei voluntas*] is the supreme law. The will of the Creator is the nature of each thing, Aug. de civ. XXI 8. To the question why things exist and are as they are, there is no other and deeper answer than because God has willed it. Whoever then asks further: why has [414] God willed it? seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found, de Gen. c. Manich. I 2, cf. above 208v. And this has been the standpoint of the whole Christian church and theology. But pantheism is not satisfied with this and seeks a deeper ground. In particular, in two ways it then attempts to explain the world from the being of God. Either it represents that being as so overflowing rich that the world flows forth from it of itself, and, the more it removes itself from Him, approaches the *μη ὄν* and congeals into sensible matter. This is the doctrine of emanation, which arose in the East, found dissemination especially in India and Persia, and then in the systems of Gnosticism and Neoplatonism also penetrated to the West. Or it attempts to explain the world not from the *πλουτος* but from the *πενια του θεου*. God is so poor, so wretched, that He needs the world for his own development; He is in

himself mere potentia, which is nothing but can become everything; He must objectify himself, and through the opposition with the world become spirit, become personality in man. In itself God is not yet the absolute; He becomes this only through the world-process; first Deus implicitus, He gradually becomes Deus explicitus. The world is thus necessary for God; it is a necessary moment of development in his being; Ohne Welt ist Gott kein Gott. Over against this pantheism, which destroys the personality of God and deifies the world, theism maintains the doctrine that creation is an act of God's will. But yet no arbitrariness is meant by that. Thus the will of God is indeed conceived in Mohammedan theology and also among the Nominalists, the Socinians, the Cartesians. The world is a product of mere arbitrariness; it exists, but could just as well not have existed or also have been entirely different. Christian theology, however, has mostly guarded itself against this extreme, and has taught that, although the will of God in creation was also in the highest degree free and all compulsion and necessity are excluded, nevertheless that will had its motives and God with his works outward had his high and holy intentions, above pp. 208-216. And thus it has then been asked what moved God to create this world, i.e. what end He set before himself with creation. The answers to that have been different. Many have seen in the goodness and the love of God a sufficient motive for [415] explanation of the world. Scripture also spoke of it many times, that God is good, that his goodness appears in all his works, and that He loves all his creatures and wills their blessedness. God also could not be thought of as needing something; He could not have created the world in order to receive something, but only in order to give himself and to communicate. His goodness was therefore the reason for creation. Already Plato, Timaeus p. 29 D, Philo in Herzog2 11, 643 and Seneca, Epist. 95

spoke in that spirit; and Christian theologians also said many times that God created the world not out of need but out of goodness, not for himself but for men. God made the world not for himself but for man, Tert. adv. Marc. I 43. adv. Prax. 5. If He could not do good, there would be no power; but if He could and did not do it, there would be great envy, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 16. Ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπερκαλὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ, διὸ καὶ φιланθρωπὸς ἐστίν. Ἀγαθὸν γὰρ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἂν γενοίτο φθονος, ὅθεν οὐδε το εἶναι τινὶ φθονεῖ ἄλλα παντὸς εἶναι βούλεται, ἵνα καὶ φιλανθρωπευεσθαι δυνήται, Athan., Or. c. gentes 41, cf. also Damascenus, de fide orth. II 2. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 2. Voetius, Disp. I 558 etc. These statements, however, alternated repeatedly with others, in which God himself and his honor was called the cause and the end of creation. But humanism placed man in the foreground; Socinianism sought his essence not in communion with God but in dominion over the earth; the doctrine of natural law, of natural morality and of natural religion made man autonomous and independent of God; Leibniz taught that God by his goodness, wisdom and power was morally bound to choose from many possible worlds the best and to bring this into existence; Kant, through practical Vernunft, called God to help only in order to grant man in the hereafter the blessedness to which he, according to his virtue, had a claim. And thus in the rationalism of the previous century man became the most interesting creature; everything existed for him and was serviceable to his perfection; man was Selbstzweck and everything else, God himself included, was means, Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 442 f. Id. Dogm. I 669. Wegscheider, Dogm. § 95. And even now many still teach that God must give reality to the world-idea, which He necessarily thinks, because otherwise [416] He would be selfish and not the highest love. Because He is good, He wills not only to be

blessed, but He establishes a kingdom of love and seeks the blessedness of his creatures; this is for Him the final end, Rothe, Theol. Ethik. § 40. 41. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 448-459. Martensen, Dogm. § 59. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I2 205 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 428. Müller, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde II5 187 f. Schoeberlein, Prinzip u. Syst. der Dogm. 628. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 144. James Orr, Christ. view of God 155. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 259 f., and also Hermes and Günther in Kleutgen, Theol. I2 642 f. This doctrine of man as Selbstzweck, however, is unacceptable from a Christian standpoint. Naturally, in creation God's goodness also becomes manifest; Scripture repeatedly expresses this. But yet it is not correct to say that his goodness demands creation, because otherwise He would be selfish. For God is the All-good, the perfect love, the complete blessedness in himself and thus also does not need the world in order to bring his goodness or love to development, any more than He needs it in order to come to self-consciousness and personality. Next, it lies in the nature of the case that God is not there for man but man can be there only for God. For although man in a certain sense may be called Selbstzweck, insofar as he as a rational, moral being never can or may be reduced to a will-less instrument; yet he is dependent on God in the deepest sense and has nothing that he has not received. God alone is Creator, man is creature; and for that reason alone he cannot be the end of creation. Because he has his origin only in God, he can also have his end only in Him. And finally the doctrine that creation has its motive in God's goodness and its final end in man's blessedness is also in conflict with reality. The universe truly does not exhaust itself in the service of man and must yet have another end than to be useful to him. The flat utilitarianism and the selfish teleology of the previous century have been sufficiently refuted. The suffering and the pain

which is poured out over humanity cannot be explained from the goodness of God alone. And the outcome of world history, which speaks not only of the blessedness of the elect but also of an eternal triumph over the godless, brings to manifestation still wholly [417] other virtues of God than his goodness and love alone.

10. Scripture therefore also adopts a different standpoint and assigns a higher goal. It says that the whole of nature is a revelation of God's virtues and a proclaimer of his praise, Ps. 19:1, Rom. 1:19. God created man after his image and to his honor, Gen. 1:26, Jes. 43:7. He glorifies himself in Pharaoh, Ex. 14:17 and in the man born blind, Joh. 9:3. He creates the ungodly for the day of evil, Spr. 16:4, Rom. 9:22. Christ has come to glorify Him, Joh. 17:4. All benefits of grace he bestows for his name's sake, redemption, forgiveness, sanctification etc., Ps. 105:8, 78:9, Jes. 43:25, 48:11, 60:21, 61:3, Rom. 9:23, Ef. 1:6 v. He gives his honor to no other, Jes. 42:8. The final goal is that all kingdoms be subjected to Him and every creature bow before Him, Dan. 7:27, Jes. 2:3-13, Mal. 1:11, 1 Cor. 15 vs. 24 v. Already here honor is brought to Him by all his people, Ps. 115:1, Mt. 6:13. Once God alone will be great, Jes. 2 vs. 3-13, and receive glory from all his creatures, Op. 4:11, 19:6. He is the First and the Last, the Alpha and the Omega, Jes. 44:6, 48:12, Op. 1:8, 22:13. From and through and to Him are all things, Rom. 11:36. Resting on this, Christian theology taught almost unanimously that the gloria Dei was the final goal of all God's works. Although in the earliest period the goodness of God is chiefly mentioned as the motive of creation, yet the honor of God as the final goal of all things is not lacking. Thus Athenagoras says that God propter se ipsum et elucentem in omnibus ipsius operibus bonitatem et sapientiam adductum fuisse, ut hominem faceret, de resurr. mort. 12. Tertullian says that God created the

whole world in ornamentum majestatis suae, Apolog. 17. Especially in medieval theology this gloria Dei came more into its own, with Anselm, who makes the honor of God the principle of his doctrine of incarnation and satisfaction, Cur Deus homo c. 11, but then further also with Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 44 art. 4. qu. 66 art. 2. qu. 103 art. 2. S. c. Gent. III 17. 18. Sent. II dist. 1 qu. 2 art. 2. Bonaventura II dist. 1 p. 2 etc. And this same doctrine we find with the later Roman Catholics, Scheeben, [418] Dogm. II 31 f. Simar, Dogm. S. 234 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. I2 640-692. Schwetz, Theol. dogm. I 396 sq. Jansen, Pract. dogm. II 319 sq.; then with the Lutherans, Gerhard, Loci theol. loc. V c. 5. Quenstedt, Theol. I 418. Hollaz, Examen p. 360 etc.; and finally and in particular also with the Reformed, cf. especially Edwards, The end in creation, Works II 193-257. The difference between them and the Lutherans and Roman Catholics does not consist in this, that they set the honor of God and these latter man as the final goal, but lies herein, that they have made this honor of God the principle of all doctrine and life, of dogmatics and morals, of family, society and state, of science and art. Nowhere has this gloria Dei been applied so universalistically as among the confessors of the Reformed religion. Now, however, against this final goal of all creatures a twofold objection has been raised. First, that God thereby becomes selfish, seeks himself and degrades the creatures, specifically men, to means. Already earlier, p. 178, this was brought up and it was shown that God as the perfectly good may rest in nothing but himself and may be satisfied with nothing less than himself. He cannot do otherwise than seek his own honor. Just as a father in his family and a prince in his realm must demand and seek the honor that as such belongs to them, so it is also with the Lord our God. Now man can ask for this honor due to him only in the name of God

and for the office entrusted to him by God; but God asks and seeks that honor in his own name and for his own being. Because he is the highest and the only good, perfection itself, therefore it is the highest righteousness that he seeks his own honor in all creatures. And so little does this seeking of one's own honor have anything in common with our selfishness, that God rather demands that honor, where it is wrongfully withheld from him, in the way of right and righteousness. Willingly or unwillingly every creature will one day bow the knee before him. Obedience in love or forced submission is the final destiny of all creatures. The other objection runs, that God then nevertheless, thus seeking his honor, has need of the creature. The world serves for his glorification; something is therefore lacking in his perfection and blessedness; creation provides for a need of God and contributes to his perfection, [419] Strauss, Gl. I 633. This objection seems irrefutable; and yet in various kinds of human labor an analogy is also to be noticed, which can clarify God's creating for us. On a lower level man labors because he must; need or compulsion drives him onward. But the nobler the labor becomes, the less room there is for need or compulsion. An artist does not create his work of art out of need or compulsion, but according to the free impulse of his genius. I pour out my bosom like 't vinkjen in the abeelen; I sing and know no other goal (Bilderdijk). The pious person serves God not out of compulsion nor through hope of reward, but out of free love. So there is also in God a good pleasure, which is infinitely exalted above both need and compulsion, above *πενία* and *πλουτος*, which embodies God's artist-thoughts in creation and finds delight therein. Yes, what in men is only a weak analogy is present in God in absolute originality. The creature has no independence outside of and over against God, like the creation of an artist. God therefore never seeks the creature as though it could give him

something that he lacks, or take away something that he possesses. He does not seek the creature, but through the creature he seeks himself. He is and remains always his own goal, cf. above p. 207. His willing is always, also in and through the creatures, absolute self-enjoyment, complete blessedness. Therefore the world has not proceeded from a need of God, from his poverty and unblessedness, for in the creature it is not a matter for him of that creature but of himself. And just as little is its origin to be ascribed to an ungovernable pleroma in God, for he uses every creature for his own glorification and makes it serviceable to the proclamation of his virtues.

12. From this there also flows a wholly particular worldview. The word creation can mean both, the act and the product of creating. According as the former is conceived, the view of the latter also changes. Pantheism attempts to explain the world dynamically, materialism mechanically. But both strive to derive everything from one all-governing principle. There the world may be a ζῶον, of which God is the soul, here a mechanism, which comes into being through the combination and separation of atoms; in [420] both the unconscious, blind fate is exalted to the throne: both fail to recognize the richness and diversity of the world, erase the boundaries between heaven and earth, matter and spirit, soul and body, man and animal, understanding and will, eternity and time, Creator and creature, being and non-being, and dissolve everything into a dead uniformity; both deny an end and can point to neither a cause nor a destination for the existence of the world and for its history. Entirely different, however, is the view of Scripture. Heaven and earth are distinguished from the beginning. Everything is created with its own nature and rests on its own ordinances set for it by God. Sun and moon and stars have their own task; and plant and animal and man have a distinct nature. There is the richest diversity.

But in that diversity there is also the highest unity. For both the ground lies in God. He is the one who created all things according to his unsearchable wisdom, who continually preserves them in their distinct nature, who leads and governs them according to the powers and laws implanted in them, and who, as the highest good and as the final end of all things, is sought and desired by all things in their measure and in their way. Here is a unity that does not destroy but maintains diversity, and a diversity that does not detract from unity, but unfolds it in its richness. By virtue of that unity the world can, in a figurative sense, be called an organism, in which all members are connected with one another and act upon one another reciprocally. Heaven and earth, man and animal, soul and body, truth and life, art and science, religion and morality, state and church, family and society, etc., they are indeed distinct but they are not separated. There exist between them all kinds of relations; an organic, or if one will, an ethical bond holds them all together. Scripture expresses this clearly, when it not only comprehends the universe under the name of heaven and earth, but also designates it as עולם, i.e. the hidden, the invisible, the unsurveyable, time in past or future, the age, eternity, the world, Pred. 1:4, 3:11; and in the N. T. as κόσμος, Joh. 1:10, τα παντα, 1 Cor. 8:6, 15:25 v., κτισις, Mk. 10:16, αἰῶνες, Hebr. 1:2, duration, lifespan, Zeitalter, world, cf. seculum a. v. sexus, human lifespan, world, and our [421] world from waeralti, werolt, men's or human lifespan. The names עולם and αἰῶνες proceed from the thought that the world has a duration, a lifespan, and that a history takes place which runs out toward a definite goal. The Greek κόσμος and the Latin mundus, however, place the beauty and harmony of the world in the foreground. And the world is indeed both. Just as Paul at the same time compares the church to a body and a building and speaks of a growing

temple, Ef. 2:21, and Peter calls the believers living stones, 1 Petr. 2:5; so the world is a history and a work of art together. It is a body that grows and a building that is erected. It spreads out in the breadth of space and continues in the length of time. Neither the mechanical principle of materialism nor the dynamic principle of pantheism is sufficient for its explanation; but whatever truth is in both is acknowledged in the doctrine of the world according to the Scriptures. It is at the same time to be viewed horizontally and vertically; it strives from the lowest creatures upward, toward above, toward the light and the life of God, and it also moves forward toward a God-glorifying end. Thus it displays God's virtues and perfections, in principle already at its beginning, in its continuing development in ever higher measure, and once completely at the end of times. Augustine has been the church father who also understood these thoughts most deeply and worked them out most broadly. In his work *de civitate Dei* he delivers a Christian philosophy of history; he shows how the Christian worldview finds its truth and its proof in history; he sketches the *civitas coelestis* in its origin and essence, in its development and relation to the *civitas terrena*, in its end and goal, Biegler, *Die Civitas Dei des h. Aug.* Paderborn 1894. But at the same time he includes in it the description of the universe as a wonderfully beautiful harmony. The world is with Augustine a unity, *universum ab unitate nomen accepit*, *de Gen. c. Manich.* I 21. Yet that unity is not uniformity but endlessly rich diversity, *de civ.* XI 10. God namely is *summum esse*, *summum verum*, *summum bonum*, *summum pulchrum*. And therefore He created many creatures, which in different measure partake of his being, of his truth, goodness, and beauty. *Aliis dedit esse amplius et [422] aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit*, *de civ.* XII 2. With appeal to the word from the book of Wisdom

11:21: πάντα μετρώ και ἀριθμῶ και σταθμῶ διατάξας, Augustine says that all things are distinguished by *modus*, *species*, *numerus*, *gradus*, *ordo*. And thereby they precisely bring about that world, that *universitas*, in which God according to his good pleasure distributes his *bona* and which thus is a revelation of his virtues, *de div. qu.* 83 *qu.* 41. *de ord.* I 19. *de Gen. ad litt.* I 9 II 13. *Conf.* XII 9. *de civ.* XI 33. For all that diversity is to be ascribed only to God, not to the merit of the creature. *Non est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non ille constituit, sine quibus nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest*, *de civ.* XI 15, cf. Scipio, *des Aur. Aug. Metaphysik*, Leipzig 1886 S. 31-80. And this worldview has been that of the whole of Christian theology. The world is one body with many members, *Athan. c. Ar.* II 28. 48. The unity, order, and harmony in the world was with the church fathers a powerful proof for the existence and unity of God, *Athan. Or. c. gentes c.* 39. God is the center and all creatures group themselves around Him in concentric circles and in a hierarchical order, *Pseudodion. de coel. en de eccl. hierarchia*. Thomas compares the world to a purely tuned stringed performance, whose harmonies interpret to us the glory and blessedness of the Divine life, *S. Th. I qu.* 25 *art.* 6. *Hare deelen inveniuntur ad invicem ordinatae esse quasi partes animalis in toto, quae sibi invicem deserviunt*, Thomas, *Sent. II dist.* I *qu.* I *art.* 1. *Nulla est mundi particula*, says Calvin, *in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae ejus emicare cernantur*, *Inst.* I 5, 1. *Nihil in toto mundo praestantius, nobilius, pulchrius, utilius, divinius ista rerum multarum diversitate, distinctione, ordine, quo una altera nobilior est, et una pendet ab altera, una subest alteri, una obsequium accipit ab altera. Hinc enim totius mundi est ornatus, pulchritudo, praestantia; hinc multiplex usus, utilitas, fructus nobis exoritur. Hinc ipsa Dei bonitas, gloria, sapientia, potentia clarius elucet,*

illustratur, Zanchius, Op. III 45. And with all of them the world is a theatrum, a speculum lucidissimum gloriae divinae. Through this worldview Christianity has overcome both contempt for nature and deification of nature. In paganism man does not stand in the right [423] relation to God and therefore also not to the world. And likewise in pantheism and materialism the relation of man to nature is in principle falsified. Alternately he deems himself infinitely exalted above nature and thinks that it has no secrets left for him; and then again he feels that nature as an incomprehended, dark, mysterious power, whose riddles he cannot solve, from whose power he cannot uproot himself. Intellectualism and mysticism alternate; unbelief makes room for superstition; and materialism turns into occultism. But the Christian looks upward and confesses God as the Creator of heaven and earth. He sees in nature and history the unsearchableness of God's ways and the inscrutableness of his judgments, but he does not despair, for all things stand under the governance of an almighty God and a gracious Father, and will therefore work together for good to those who love God. Here there is thus room for love and admiration of nature, but all deification is also excluded. Here man is placed in the right relation to the world, for he is placed in the right relation to God. Therefore creation is also the fundamental dogma; it stands in the foreground throughout the whole of Scripture; it is the cornerstone on which Old and New Covenant rest. And this doctrine therefore finally also excludes an egoistic theology and a false optimism. Certainly, there is truth in it that all things are there for man, or rather for humanity, for the church of Christ, 1 Cor. 3:21-23, Rom. 8:28. But that humanity finds its final end with all creatures in the glorification of God. To that everything is subordinate. To that everything works, also sin and suffering. And with a

view to that the world is arranged purposively. In scholasticism the question was also treated, an Deus possit aliquid facere melius quam fecit. Abaelard said no, because God's goodness must always will the best and otherwise would be selfish, *Introd. ad theol.* III c. 5, and Leibniz later reasoned entirely in the same spirit. But in God no uncertainty, no choice is to be thought. He has not chosen the best out of many possible worlds. His will is eternally determined. A creature can in itself always be thought better, greater, more beautiful than it actually is, because a creature is contingent and susceptible to development and perfection [424] . And even the universe as contingent can also be thought otherwise and better for us humans. Indeed Thomas said: *universum non potest esse melius propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, in quo bonum universi consistit; quorum si unum aliquod esset melius, corrumpetur proportio ordinis, sicut si una chorda plus debito intenderet, corrumpetur citharae melodia.* But he added: *Posset tamen Deus alias res facere vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et esset aliud universum melius, S. Theol. I qu. 25 art. 6 ad 3, cf. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 44. Bonaventura, Sent. I qu. 44 art. 1 qu. 1-3. Hugo Vict. de Sacr. II c. 22. Voetius, Disp. I 553 sq. Maastricht III 6, 11. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. VI 21.* The nature of the creature entails that it can be thought, both in its being and in its being-so, only as contingent. But for God this question does not exist. This world is good, because it answers to the goal determined by Him. It is neither the best nor the worst, but it is good, because God has called it so. It is good, because it is serviceable, not to the individual man but to the revelation of God's virtues. And for whoever thus regards it, it is also good, because it makes him know God, whom to know is eternal life. Therefore Lactantius said truthfully: *idcirco mundus factus est ut nascamur; ideo nascimur ut agnoscamus factorem*

mundi ac nostri, Deum; ideo agnoscimus ut colamus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboribus cultus Dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis afficimur, ut similes Angelis effecti, summo Patri ac Domino in perpetuum serviamus et simus aeternum Dei regnum. Haec summa rerum est; hoc arcanum Dei; hoc mysterium mundi, Inst. div. VII 6.

§ 30. THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.

1 . According to Holy Scripture, creation falls apart into a spiritual and a material world, into heaven and earth, τα ἐν τοις οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ τὰ ὄρατα, Col. 1:16. The existence of such a spiritual world is acknowledged in all religions [425]. Besides the proper gods, all kinds of demigods or heroes, daemons, genii, spirits, souls etc. are also objects of religious veneration. Especially in Parseeism this doctrine of the angels was strongly developed. A whole host of good angels, Jazada, is there gathered around Ahuramazda, the God of light, just as the God of darkness Ahriman is surrounded by a number of evil angels, Dewa's. According to Kuenen, G. v. I. II 254 v. and many others, the Jews borrowed their doctrine of the angels chiefly from the Persians since the Babylonian Captivity. But in this there is very great exaggeration. For, in the first place, Kuenen also acknowledges that belief in the existence and activity of higher beings is Old-Israelitish. Secondly, there is a great difference between the angelology in the canonical writings and in Jewish popular belief. And finally, there is still so much uncertainty in the reciprocal relationship of

Judaism and Parseeism, that James Darmesteter in his work on the Zendavesta in 1893 derives the Persian doctrine of angels precisely conversely from Judaism, cf. Dr. Geesink in the *Heraut* 830, and against Darmesteter, *Tiele, Versl. en Meded. v. d. Kon. Ak. van Wet. Letterk.* 1895 bl. 364 v. The existence of the angels was, however, according to Hd. 23:8 denied by the Sadducees, who therefore probably regarded the angel appearances in the Pentateuch as momentary theophanies. Josephus leaves various angel appearances unmentioned and attempts to explain some naturally, e.g. *Ant.* VIII 13, 7. According to Justin, *Dial. c. Tr.* 128, the angels were by some held to be temporary emanations from the Divine being, which after completion of their task returned again into God. In later time the existence of the angels was denied by the followers of David Joris, cf. *Hoornbeek, Summa Controv.* 1653, p. 413, by the Libertines, cf. *Calvin, Opera ed. Schippers* VIII 383, by Spinoza, *Tract. Theol. pol.* II 56 and *Hobbes, Leviathan* III c. 34, who simply saw in them revelations and workings of God. Balthazar Bekker did not go so far in his *Betoverde Werelt* II c. 6-15, but nevertheless limited the activity of the angels, held them many times to be human beings, and taught, like Spinoza, that Christ and his apostles in the doctrine of the angels had repeatedly accommodated themselves to the belief of their contemporaries. Leibniz, Wolff, Bonnet, Euler and the supranaturalists attempted to maintain their existence chiefly on moral [426] grounds; from man upward as well as downward there could exist no vacuum formarum in the ascending series of creatures, Reinhard, *Dogm.* 184. Bretschneider, *Dogm.* I 746 f. Even Kant considered the existence of other thinking beings than human beings not impossible, *Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. zw. Theol. u. Naturw.* II 69. 249. The eighteenth century erased the distinction between angels and human beings, just as the

nineteenth did that between human beings and animals. Swedenborg for example had heard from the angels themselves that they were actually human beings; the inner being of man is an angel and man is destined to become an angel, *Die wahre christl. Religion*, 2e Aufl. Stuttgart 1873 S. 42. 178. In more recent theology, however, little has remained of the angels. Rationalists such as Wegscheider do not indeed deny the existence of the angels but nevertheless deny their appearance, *Inst. theol.* § 102. Marheineke in the second edition of his dogmatics omitted the paragraph on the angels. Strauss thought that the modern worldview had taken away their dwelling from the angels; they owe their origin only to folk legends, to the urge to counterbalance the mass of matter in the world with somewhat more spirit, *Gl.* I 671 f. With Lipsius they are but bildliche Veranschaulichung des lebendigen Wirkens der göttlichen Vorsehung and belong only in religious symbolism, *Dogm.* § 518 f., cf. Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II 2 510 f. And Schleiermacher too did indeed consider their existence not impossible, but nevertheless judged that Christ and the apostles taught nothing positive about them, because they had accommodated themselves to the people and had spoken of angels as we do of fairies and elves, and that they had no dogmatic and religious significance for us, *Chr. Gl.* § 42. 43, cf. Bovon, *Dogm. Chrét.* Lausanne 1895 I 297. Even those who still maintain their existence often change their nature. Schelling held the good angels to be Potenzen, Möglichkeiten, which because of the fall had not entered into actuality and now are nothing other than the idea or potency of an individual or people, *Werke*, II 4 S. 284 f., cf. Martensen, *Dogm.* § 68. 69. Others have changed the angels into inhabitants of the planets. Already early we find the opinion that the planets were inhabited. It already occurs with Xenophanes and some Stoics. After modern astronomy had given

some idea [427] of the tremendous space of the universe, that thought again found acceptance with Descartes, Wittichius, Allinga, Wilkins, Harvey, Leibniz, Wolff, Bonnet, Kant, Reinhard, Bretschneider, Swedenborg and others, cf. Zöckler, *Gesch. der Bez.* II 55 f. Lange, *Gesch. des Mater.* 431. Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff* 55. Strauss, *Alte u. neue Gl.* 165. C. du Prel, *Die Planetenbewohner*, Leipzig 1879. C. Flammarion, *Les terres du ciel.* 7 ed. Paris 1881. Id., *Are the heavenly bodies inhabited?* Dutch trans. by Dr. H. Blink, 1891. And some theologians have thus come to think of angels with those inhabitants, Kurtz, *Bibel und Astronomie*, 3te Aufl. S. 173 f. 346 f. Keerl, *Der Mensch das Ebenbild Gottes I* 278 f. Splittgerber, *Tod, Fortleben und Auferstehung* 5te Aufl. 1879 S. 150. Lange, *Dogm.* II 362 f. K. Keerl, *Die Fixsterne und die Engel*, *Bew. d. Gl.* Juni 1896 S. 230 f. etc. And finally, over against materialism a reaction has arisen in spiritism, which not only acknowledges the existence of departed spirits but also considers a communion between them and human beings possible and thereby has again paved the way for belief in a spiritual world among thousands. Special literature on the angels: Suarez, *de angelis*, Lugd. 1620. Jac. Ode, *Comment. de angelis*, Traj. 1739. Voetius, *Disp.* V 241-268. Kuyper, *Heraut* no 858-915. Oswald, *Angelologie*, Paderborn 1883.

2. The existence of the angels cannot be proved philosophically. The reasoning of Leibniz, that from man downward likewise as upward all kinds of sorts of creatures must exist, so that there may be no vacuum formarum and no saltus naturae, is not plausible, because it would by consequence erase the distinction between Creator and creature and would lead to a gnostic pantheism. Yet philosophy can still much less adduce any argument against the possibility of such an existence. So long as we ourselves are psychic beings and cannot explain the life of the soul from metabolism, but

for that have to assume a spiritual substance, so long is also the existence of a spiritual world in conflict with no single argument of reason or with any fact of experience. Not only Leibniz and Wolff, but also Schleiermacher and Kant have fully acknowledged the possibility. The universality of [428] the belief in such a spiritual world moreover proves that in this acknowledgment something other and something more than arbitrariness and chance is hidden. The explanation of Strauss, that the world of angels is a compensation over against the quantity of matter in the creation, is not worth a refutation. And likewise the reasoning of Daub has no value, that man, because placed between good and evil, created types toward both sides and thus came to the ideas of angel and devil, in Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 536. The belief in a spiritual world is not philosophical but religious in nature. It is most closely connected with revelation and miracle. Religion is not conceivable without revelation, and revelation cannot exist, without there being above and behind this visible world a spiritual world, which stands in communion with this. In all religions the angels are not factors of the religious-ethical life itself, but of the revelation on which this life is built. With religion the belief itself is given, that its deepest causes do not lie within the circle of visible things. The good and the evil, both in religious and in ethical sense, are rooted in another world than that which appears before our eyes. The belief in angels gives expression to that. It does not constitute the essence and the center of religion, but nevertheless stands in connection with it. The transcendence of God, the belief in revelation and miracle, the essence of religion of itself brings with it the belief in spiritual beings. The Diesseits does not satisfy man. He thirsts again and again for another world, which is no less rich than this. Materialism by reaction calls forth spiritualism. But while now in all

religions and spiritistic theories the doctrine of the angels appears falsified and corrupted, erases the boundary line between God and creature and fails to recognize the distinction between revelation and religion, this doctrine in Scripture again occurs in such a way that it robs nothing from God's honor and leaves religion in its purity untouched. The revelation in Scripture is for the Christian the firm ground also for his belief in the angels. In earlier time one attempted to prove the existence of the good and especially also of the evil angels historically, from oracles, apparitions, ghosts, demoniacs, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 50 art. 1. Zanchius, Op. II 2. Vossius, de orig. et progr. idololatriae I c. 6. Voetius, Disp. I 985-1017. [429] V 241 etc. But these proofs were just as little convincing as those from reason. On the other hand, the existence of the angels is taught very clearly in Scripture. To be sure, Spinoza and Schleiermacher have objected against that, that Christ and the apostles spoke about angels by accommodation to popular belief and themselves taught nothing positive about them. But Jesus and the apostles themselves express their belief in the angels unequivocally and repeatedly, e.g. Mt. 11:10, 13:39, 16:27, 18:10, 24:36, 26:53, Luk. 20:36, 1 Cor. 6:3, Hebr. 12:22, 1 Petr. 1:12 etc. When we speak of elves and fairies, everyone knows that this is meant in a figurative sense. But in Jesus' time the belief in the angels was general; if they spoke of angels, everyone had to think that they themselves also believed in them. The ultimate ground for our belief in the angels therefore also lies in revelation. Christian experience as such teaches nothing of it. The object of true faith is the grace of God in Christ. Angels are no factors of the religious life, no object of our trust, no object of our worship. They are that nowhere in Scripture and therefore also may not be that for us. In the Protestant confessions therefore there is very little mention of the angels, Ned. Gel. art. 12. Heid. Cat. vr.

112. 117. Niemeijer, Coll. Conf. p. 315. 316. 476. The Reformed in particular sinned rather in defectu than in excessu. At Rome angelology occupies a much greater place, but there it also falsifies religion and falls short of God's honor. However much the angels are nevertheless no factor and object of our religion, they are nevertheless of great significance in the history of revelation and derive from that especially their value for the religious life.

3. The name angel, under which we usually comprehend the whole class of the higher, spiritual beings, is in Scripture not a *nomen naturae* but a *nomen officii*. The Hebr. מַלְאָךְ simply means messenger, envoy and can also denote a man, whether sent by men, Job 1:14, 1 Sam. 11:3 etc., or sent by God, Hagg. 1:13, Mal. 2:7, 3:1; and likewise it is the case with ἄγγελος, which is more than once used of men, Mt. 11:10, Mk. 1:2, Luk. 7:24, 27, 9:52, Gal. 4:4, Jak. 2:15; it is then wrongly rendered in our Statenoverzetting by angel instead of by envoy, e. g. Mal. 3:1, [430] Op. 1:20 etc. A common, distinctive name for all spiritual beings together is not found in Scripture, even though they are also often called sons of God, spirits, saints, watchers. There are different kinds and classes of angels, all of which bear a name of their own. The world of angels is as rich as the material world; just as in this there are all kinds of creatures, which together nevertheless form one whole, so it is also with the world of spirits. The class of the cherubim is mentioned first in Scripture. They appear in Gen. 3:24 as guardians of the garden. In tabernacle and temple they are depicted above the ark with faces turned toward the mercy seat, and with wings that cover the mercy seat, Ex. 25:18v., 37:8, 1 Chr. 28:18, 2 Chr. 3:14, Hebr. 9:5 and between which the Lord dwells, Ps. 80:2, 99:1, Jes. 37:16. When God descends to the earth, He is represented as sailing, riding upon the

cherubim, 2 Sam. 22:11, Ps. 18:11, cf. Ps. 104:3, Jes. 66:15, Hebr. 1:7. In Ezekiel 1 and 10 they occur under the name of חַיִּיּוֹת, four in number, in human form, each with four wings and with four faces, namely of a man, lion, ox and eagle; while finally in Op. 4:6v. as the four ζῶα, each with one face and each with six wings, they surround the throne of God and sing the thrice-holy day and night. The name כְּרוּבִים is derived in various ways, now from כָּ and רֹב, as many (Hengstenberg), then from רֶלֶב chariot, or also from כָּרַב ar. to terrify, thus as it were horrible beings, but mostly from a stem that means to seize, to hold fast, cf. קָטַץ, Delitzsch on Gen. 3:24 and Ps. 18:11. An equally great difference exists concerning the nature of the cherubs. Some regard them as mythical beings, others as symbolic figures, still others as powers of God in creation, or also as an original designation of thunderclouds or storms, Smend, Altt. Rel. 21 f. But in Gen. 3:24, Ezek. 1, Op. 4 they are nevertheless clearly represented as living and personal beings; indeed the human form is predominant in them, Ezek. 1:5. Because, however, they are beings of extraordinary, human strength and glory, Scripture calls symbolic representation to its aid, in order to give us some idea of their spiritual nature. They are portrayed as ζῶα, in whom the power and the strength of God comes to expression much better than in weak man. They [431] have the strength of an ox, the majesty of the lion, the swiftness of the eagle and with that the reason of man. The wings which they bear, and the sword with which they guard the garden, point to those same properties. From this representation, which is not an image but a symbol, it appears that they are also among the angels highly placed beings, who more than any other creatures reveal the power, the majesty, the glory of God and who therefore are also charged with the task, to watch over His holiness at the garden of Eden, in the tabernacle and temple and also at God's descent

to the earth, Dr. Joh. Nikel, Die Lehre des A. T. über die Cherubim und Seraphim, Breslau 1890. Further, in Jes. 6 the שֶׁרָפִים are mentioned, probably from the arab. stem sarufa, nobilis fuit, who there also are symbolically represented in human form but with six wings, of which two serve for covering the face, two for covering the feet and two for the swift execution of God's commands. In distinction from the cherubim, they stand as servants around the King, who sits on His throne, sing His honour and wait for His commands. Seraphim are the nobles, cherubim are the strong ones among the angels. Finally, with Daniel there still occur two angels with proper names, namely Gabriel, cap. 8:16, 9:21 and Michael c. 10:13, 21, 12:1, who both, in deviation from many earlier and later interpreters, such as the van den Honerts, Burman, Witsius, Hengstenberg, Zahn e. a., are to be regarded as created angels and may not be identified with the Son of God. Also according to the N. T. there are different classes of angels. The angel Gabriel appears in Luk. 1:19, 26. Michael occurs in Judas 9, Op. 12:7, 1 Thess. 4:16. And further among the angels there is mention of ἀρχαι, ἐξουσιαι, Ef. 3:10, Col. 2:10, κυριοτητας, Ef. 1:21, Col. 1:16, θρόνοι, Col. 1:16, δυνάμεις, Ef. 1:21, 1 Petr. 3:22, all of which point to a distinction in rank and dignity among the angels, while finally in the Apocalypse of John seven angels very clearly repeatedly come to the foreground, c. 8:2, 6, 15:1 etc. In addition, the number of the angels is very great. The name Tzebaoth, cf. above p. 111v., Mahanaim, Gen. 32:1, 2, legions, Mt. 26:53 and host, Luk. 2:13, and the numbers of thousand times thousands indicate this, Deut. 33:2, Ps. 68:18, Dan. 7:10, Hebr. 12:12, Judas 14, Op. 5:11, 19:14. Such [432] a great number of itself already requires distinction of order and rank, and all the more, because the angels do not, like men, stand in family relations to one another and thus in so far are much more like one another.

Scripture then also clearly teaches that among the angels there is all manner of distinction, of rank and station, of dignity and service, of office and honour, even of class and kind. This beautiful, rich thought of diversity in unity must not be surrendered, even though it has been worked out in a fantastic manner by the Jews and by the Roman Catholics. The Jews made all manner of distinctions among the angels, Weber, System 161 f. In the Christian church one at first remained with the data of Scripture, Iren. adv. haer. II 54. Orig. de princ. I 5. Augustine still said not to know how the *societas* of the angels was ordered, Enchir. 58. But Pseudodionysius in his writings the *coelesti* and the *ecclesiastica hierarchia* gave a schematic division. Proceeding from the thought that God in creation as it were stepped out from His unity into multiplicity, the div. nom. II 11, he teaches that all things proceed from God in an ever descending series and thus again successively return to Him. God is the centre, the creatures gather peripherally around Him. There is a hierarchy of things, the *coel. hier.* III 1. Such a hierarchy is of two kinds, a heavenly and an ecclesiastical. The heavenly is formed by three classes of angels. The first and highest class serves God exclusively; it comprises the seraphim, who unceasingly contemplate the Divine being; the cherubim, who ponder His counsels; and the thrones, who worship His visions. The second class serves the whole visible and invisible creation; it comprises the dominions, who order what must happen according to God's will; the powers, who carry out what has been decided, and the virtues, who bring it to completion. The third class serves the earth, the individual men and peoples; it comprises the principalities, who promote the general welfare of men, the archangels, who lead the particular peoples and the angels, who watch over the individual men, the *coel. hier.* VI sq. Of that heavenly hierarchy the ecclesiastical is an

image, in its mysteries (baptism, eucharist, ordination), organs (bishop, priest, deacon) and laity (catechumens, Christians, monks), the eccl. hier. 2 sq. And this whole hierarchy has its origin and head in Christ, the [433] incarnate Son of God, the eccl. hier. I 1, and its goal in deification, ib. I 3. This division of Pseudodionysius, which makes the hierarchy in heaven and on earth known as the intimate thought of the Roman system, found a fertile soil. Damascenus, *de fide orthod.* II c. 3. Lombardus, *Sent.* II dist. 9. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 108. Petavius, *de angelis* tib. II. Oswald, *Angelologie*. Paderborn 1883 S. 57 f. etc. Now in Scripture also a distinction and order of rank of the angels is indeed clearly taught. Some wrongly think that by the different names the same angels are always meant, only viewed from a different point of view, Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis* I 301. It must even be acknowledged that this order of rank in Protestant theology has not come sufficiently into its own. There is rank and order among those thousands of beings. God is a God of order in all the congregations, 1 Cor. 14:33, 40. The world of spirits is no less rich and beautiful than the world of material beings. But the hierarchy of Roman doctrine goes far beyond the revelation of God in His word. It was therefore unanimously rejected by the Protestants, Calv. on Ef. 1:21. Voetius, *Disp.* I 882 sq. Rivetus, *Op.* III 248 sq. Quenstedt, *Theol.* I 443. 450. Gerhard, *Loc.* V cap. 4 Sect. 9. And likewise all calculations of the number of the angels were regarded as vain and unfruitful; thus e.g. that of Augustine, who after the fall of some had the number of the angels supplemented by the *praedestinati homines*, *Enchir.* 29. *de civ.* XXII c. 1. Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo* I 18; or of Gregory, who thought that as many men were saved as there were angels who had remained standing, cf. Lombardus, *Sent.* II 9; or of William of Paris, who called the number of the angels infinite; or of

Hilary and many others, who on the ground of Mt. 18:12 thought that the number of men stood to that of the angels as one to ninety-nine, cf. Petavius, *de angelis* I c. 14; or of G. Schott, who set the number of the angels at a thousand times a thousand millions, in *Busken Huet, Het Land van Rembrand* II 2, 37. And likewise one concerned oneself little with the question whether the angels among themselves also differed in essence and kind, *essentia* and *specie*; Thomas taught this decisively, *S. Theol.* I qu. 50 art. 4, but the church fathers are mostly of another opinion, *Damasc. de fide orthod.* II 3. Petavius, *de angelis* I c. 14. Voetius, *Disp.* V 261. However manifold distinction may exist among the angels, [434] Scripture does not enter into this and offers only a few data. With respect to us, unity comes much more to the foreground than diversity; they all have a spiritual nature, are all called ministering spirits, and all find their principal activity in the glorification of God.

4. The unity is expressed first of all in this, that they are all created beings. Schelling does indeed say that the good angels, as pure Potencies, are not created, *Werke* II 4 S. 284. But the creation of the angels is clearly expressed in Col. 1:16, and is implied in the creation of all things, Gen. 1:1, Ps. 33:6, Joh. 1:3, Rom. 11:36, Ef. 3:9, Hebr. 1:2. Concerning the time of their creation, however, little can be said with certainty. Many church fathers, appealing to Job 38:7, thought that the angels were created before all things, *Orig. on Gen.* 1, *Basilus, Hexaem. hom.* 1. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* 38 and 42. *Damascenus, de fide orthod.* II c. 3. *Dionysius, de div. nom.* c. 5 etc., and later the Socinians judged thus, *Crell, de Deo et attrib.* I c. 18, and the Remonstrants, *Episcopius, Inst. Theol.* IV 3, 1. *Limborch, II* 20, 4, who in this way weakened the distinction between the Logos and the angels. But this thought finds no support in Scripture. Nothing precedes the creation of

heaven and earth, of which Gen. 1:1 speaks. Job 38:7 does indeed teach that they were present at the creation, just as the stars were, but not that they already existed before the beginning of creation. On the other hand, it is certain that the angels were created before the seventh day, when heaven and earth and all their host were completed and God rested from his work, Gen. 1:31, 2:1, 2. But for the rest we are in uncertainty. Only it may be regarded as probable that, just as the earth in Gen. 1:1 is indeed already created as earth but nevertheless still must be prepared and adorned, so also heaven was not completed in a single moment. The word heaven is proleptic in verse 1. Only later in the history of revelation does it become apparent what is implied in it. Scripture now speaks of heaven as the cloud-heaven, Gen. 1:8, 20, 7:11, Mt. 6:26, then as the starry heaven, Deut. 4:19, Ps. 8:4, Mt. 24:29, and finally as the dwelling of God and of the angels, Ps. 115:16, 2:4, 1 Kon. 8:27, 2 Chr. 6:18, Mt. 6:19-21, Hebr. 4:14, 7:26, [435] 8:1, 2, 9:2v. etc. Just as heaven as cloud- and starry heaven was prepared only in the course of the six days, so it is possible and even probable that the third heaven with its inhabitants was also formed only gradually. The more that spiritual world is conceived as richer and fuller, in diversity still far surpassing the material world, the more acceptable it is also to posit for that preparation of the heavens a certain lapse of time, even though the creation narrative is entirely silent about this.

5. Next, the unity of the angels appears from the fact that they are all spiritual beings. Concerning this, however, there has at all times been great difference of opinion. The Jews ascribed to them airy or fiery bodies, Weber, System 161 f. And likewise it was judged by most of the church fathers, such as Justinus, c. Tryph. 57. Orig. de princ. I 6. Basilius, de Sp. S. c. 16. Tertull., de carne Chr. 6. Augustinus, de trin. II 7 etc. At the second

synod at Nicaea 787, a dialogue was read aloud by the patriarch Tarasius, by a certain John of Thessalonica, in which he argued that the angels had subtle bodies and therefore might also be depicted. Tarasius added to that, that they were limited in space and had appeared in human form, and therefore were depictable. And with this the synod testified its agreement, Schwane, D. G. II 2 235. But gradually the boundary between matter and spirit was drawn more sharply, and many ascribed to the angels a purely spiritual nature, such as Pseudodion., de coel. hier., Damascenus, de fide orth. II c. 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 50 art. 1. qu. 51 art. 1. The fourth Lateran council in 1215 called the nature of the angels spiritualis, Denzinger, Enchir. n. 355 and most Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians agreed with that. Nevertheless, a certain corporeality of the angels was also later repeatedly taught, by Roman Catholics such as Cajetan, Eugubinus, Bannez, by some Reformed such as Zanchius, Op. III col. 69. Vossius, de idol. I 2, 6, further by Episcopius, Inst. Theol. V c. 2 p. 347, Vorstius, Poiret, Böhme, Leibniz, Wolff, Bonnet, Reinhard etc., and in more recent times e.g. by Kurtz, Bibel und Astronomie, 3e Aufl. S. 152. Beck, Lehrwiss. I 176. Lange, Dogm. II 578. Kahn, Dogm. I 443 f. Vilmar, Dogm. I 306. [436] Keerl in Bew. d. Gl. Juni 1896 S. 235-247 etc., cf. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 265 f. The principal ground for this opinion is that the concept of a purely spiritual, bodiless nature is metaphysically unthinkable and also incompatible with the concept of creature. God is pure Spirit, but He is also simple, omnipresent, eternal. The angels, however, are limited, also with respect to time and place; if they really move from one place to another, then they must in their way be bodily. And likewise the angels are not simple as God but are composed of materia and forma, and for that reason too a certain, indeed not coarse, material, but still subtle,

etheric corporeality must be ascribed to them. To this consideration there was added the exegesis, which in the sons of God in Gen. 6 thought of angels. This interpretation of Philo, Josephus, the Jews, the LXX, was taken over by many church fathers, Justinus, Apol. I 1. Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV 16, 2 V 29. 2. Clemens, Tertull., Lactantius, Cyprianus, Ambrosius etc., also found acceptance with Luther and in more recent times was again defended by Ewald, Baumgarten, Hofmann, Kurtz, Delitzsch, Hengstenberg, Köhler, Kübel and others. Further, for the corporeality of the angels one also appeals to their appearances, to some particular texts in Holy Scripture, such as Ps. 104:4, Mt. 22:30, Luk. 20:35, 1 Cor. 11:10, and sometimes also to the fact that as inhabitants of the stars they must be bodily. Over against all these arguments, however, stands the clear statement of Holy Scripture that the angels are πνεύματα, Mt. 8:16, 12:45, Luk. 7:21, 8:2, 11:26, Hd. 19:12, Ef. 6:12, Hebr. 1:4, who do not marry, Mt. 22:30, are immortal, Luk. 20:35, 36, and are invisible, Col. 1:16, can be a legion in one limited space, Luk. 8:30, and as spirits have no flesh and bones, Luk. 24:39. Further, the view of the בְּנֵי־הָאֱלֹהִים in Gen. 6:2 as angels and not as men is untenable, for although this designation is often customary for angels, Job 1:6, 2:1, 38:7, yet it can also very well denote men, Deut. 32:5, Hos. 2:1, Ps. 80:16, 73:15; and in any case it is not applicable to the evil angels, who here must have committed the sin; further, the expression לָקַח אִשָּׁה in Gen. 6:2 is always customary of a lawful marriage and never of fornication; next, the punishment for the sin is executed only upon men [437] , for they are the guilty ones and of angels there is no mention, Gen. 6:3, 5-7. The other Scripture passages also do not prove the corporeality of the angels; Ps. 104:4, cf. Hebr. 1:7 only says that God uses his angels as servants, just as wind and fire also serve to carry out his commands, but by no means

indicates that the angels are changed into wind or fire; Mt. 22:30 implies that the believers after the resurrection will be like the angels, in that they no longer marry, but contains nothing about the corporeality of the angels; and 1 Cor. 11:10 says that the women, as a sign of their subjection to the man, must also be covered in the congregation, in order not to displease the good angels who are present in the congregation; of evil angels, who otherwise would be seduced by the women, there is here no thought at all. As for the angelic appearances, it is indeed certain that they have always taken place in bodily, visible form, just as symbolism also always represents the angels in all kinds of visible forms. But from this nothing follows for their corporeality. For God is Spirit and yet is beheld by Isaiah in cap. 6 as a King, sitting on his throne. Christ appeared in the flesh and yet is true God. The angels appear, both in the appearance and in the symbolism, repeatedly in other forms; the representation of the cherubs in Gen. 3:24, above the ark of the covenant, in Ezekiel and in the Apocalypse, differs very strongly among itself; and the forms in which they appear are by no means alike, Gen. 18, Judg. 6, 13:6, Dan. 10:11, Mt. 28 vs. 3, Luk. 2:9, Rev. 22:8. How these bodies are to be conceived is another question. Whether they were essential bodies or apparent bodies cannot be said, Damascenus, *de fide orthod.* II 3. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I qu. 51 art. 1-3. Turret., *Theol. El.* VII 6, 5. etc. The strongest proof for the corporeality of the angels, however, is, as said above, borrowed from philosophy. But in that there is all sorts of misunderstanding at play. If corporeality only means that the angels are limited, both in time and in space, and also are not simple as God, in whom all attributes are his being itself, then certainly corporeality would have to be ascribed to the angels. But usually corporeality nevertheless includes a kind of materiality, be it then also of a finer nature than in man and animal.

And in this sense there can and may be no talk of a body in the case of the angels. Matter and spirit exclude each other, Luk. 24:39. It is pantheistic identity-philosophy to mix the two and to erase the distinction. Scripture, however, always maintains the distinction between heaven and earth, angels and men, spiritual and material, invisible and visible things, Col. 1:16. If therefore the angels are to be conceived as spirits, they stand in another, freer relation to time and space than men. On the one hand they are not exalted above all time and place like God, for they are creatures and thus finite and limited. There does not belong to them an *ubi repletivum*, omnipresence and eternity. On the other hand they also have no *ubi circumscriptivum*, like our bodies, for the angels are spirits and therefore have no dimensions of length and breadth, and thus no extension, no diffusion through space. Therefore it was commonly said that there belonged to the angels an *ubi definitivum*; that is, as finite and limited beings they are always somewhere; they cannot be in two places at the same time; their presence is not extensive but punctual; and they are so free from place that they can move with the greatest speed and cannot be held back by any material objects; their change of place is momentary. Indeed such a speed of movement and such a *Zeit- und Raumfreiheit*, which nevertheless is no *Zeit- und Raumlosigkeit*, is for us inconceivable. But Scripture indicates it clearly, and in the speed of thought and imagination, of light and electricity, we have an analogy not to be despised, August. de civ. XI 9. Damascenus, de fide orthod. II 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 52 and 53. Voetius, Disp. V 252 sq. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 302. Oswald, Angelologie S. 23-43.

6. The unity of the angels is further manifested in this, that they all are rational beings, endowed with understanding and will. Both these faculties

are repeatedly ascribed in Scripture to the angels, both evil and good, Job 1:6v., Zach. 3:1v., Mt. 24:36, Mt. 8:29, 18:10, 2 Cor. 11:3, Ef. 6:11 etc.; all kinds of personal characteristics and activities occur in them such as self-consciousness, Luk. 1:19, [439] speaking, ib., desiring, 1 Petr. 1:12, rejoicing, Luk. 15:10, praying, Hebr. 1:6, believing, Jak. 2:19, lying, Joh. 8:44, sinning, Joh. 3:8 etc. In addition, great power is also attributed to them; the angels are not timid beings, but an army, a host of mighty heroes, Ps. 103:20, Luk. 11:21, Col. 1:16, Ef. 1:21, 3:10, 2 Thess. 1:7, Hd. 5:19, Hebr. 1:14. On this ground it is incorrect, with Schelling and others, to regard the angels as properties or forces. But nevertheless, in the description of the personality of the angels one should remain with the simplicity of Holy Scripture. Augustine distinguished a twofold knowledge of the angels; one, which they as it were in the morning of creation, a priori, obtained through the contemplation of God, *cognitio matutina*, and another, which they as it were in the evening of creation, a posteriori, became partakers of from the creatures, *de Gen. ad litt. V 18. de civ. XI 29*. The scholastics not only adopted this distinction, Thomas, *S. Theol. I qu. 54*, but also attempted to determine more precisely the nature and degree of the knowledge of the angels. Their knowledge is not, as in God, identical with their being and essence. But they do not know by sensory perception; the distinction between *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* is not present in them; the *intellectus* in them is never mere capacity and never at rest, but always active; they cannot be without knowing; they know themselves, their own being, through themselves, perfectly and unchangeably; they know created things not from their appearance but through innate ideas, not by abstraction and discursively, but intuitively and intellectually; and indeed the angels with their natural powers know not immediately but *per speciem*

impressam, through and at the same time with their own being; yet in the supernatural order, to which the good angels have been elevated, they nevertheless know God by immediate contemplation, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 54-58. S. c. Gent. II c. 96-101. III c. 49. Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 3 art. 4 and dist. 4 art. 3. Petavius, de angelis I c. 6-9. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit I2 196 f. Oswald, Angelologie 43-51. It was even taught by some, in order to defend prayer to the angels and also to the saints, that they, seeing God who sees all things, saw all things in Him and thus knew all our needs and necessities, Gregorius, Moral. lib. 12 c. 13. Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 83 art. 4. III qu. 10 [440] art. 2. Bellarminus, de sanct. beat. I c. 26. The Protestants were more cautious; they admonished to modesty. In the manner in which we come to knowledge, there is so much that is mysterious; how much more in that of the angels, Zanchius, Op. III 108 sq. Voetius, Disp. V 267. Gerhard, Loci theol. V c. 4 sect. 5. This alone can be said, that they are richer in knowledge than we here on earth, Mt. 18:10, 24:36, that they obtain their knowledge from their own nature, Joh. 8:44, from the contemplation of God's works, Ef. 3:10, 1 Tim. 3:16, 1 Petr. 1:12 and from revelations which God communicates to them, Dan. 8, 9, Op. 1:1. But they are nevertheless bound to the objects, Ef. 3:10, 1 Petr. 1:12. They do not know our, nor one another's hidden thoughts of the heart, 1 Kon. 8:39, Ps. 139:2, 4, Hd. 1:24, so that they also among themselves have need of a language, in order to communicate their thoughts, 1 Cor. 13:2, and in general in their way and according to the nature of their nature can also, speaking and singing, glorify God, Petavius, de angelis I c. 12. They do not know the future, nor the futura contingentia, except only per conjecturam, Jes. 41:22, 23. They do not know the day of judgment, Mk. 13:12. And their knowledge is capable of increase, Ef. 3:10. In addition, it may certainly also

be added that knowledge and power among the angels are very different. Also in this respect there is diversity and order. Indeed, from the mere names that occur in Scripture it may be inferred that the angels are distinguished not only in classes but also as persons and that they each bear a particular individuality, even though the opinion of some scholastics is to be rejected, that each angel forms a particular species, Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 3 art. 2. Thomas, S. c. Gent. II 52.

7. Finally, the angels are also one in this, that they are all moral beings. This appears both from the good angels, who serve God night and day, and from the evil, who did not remain standing in the truth. Concerning the status originalis of the angels, Scripture says very little. It only testifies that God at the end of the work of creation saw and sees all things, they were very good, Gen. 1:31. Moreover, in Joh. 8:44, Judas 6, 2 Petr. 2:4 a good condition of all angels is presupposed. And this same is required by the theism of the [441] Scripture, which entirely excludes Manichaeism. Precisely, however, because Scripture reveals so little, imagination and reasoning found ample play here. Augustine thought that the angels at the very moment of their creation had partly fallen and partly remained standing; to the latter God thus at the same time with their nature gave the grace of perseverance, *simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam*, de civ. XII 9, cf. de corr. et gr. c. 11 n. 32. To this the scholasticism later appealed for its doctrine of the *dona superaddita* also with the angels. According to Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 4 art. 1 qu. 2, Halesius, Lombardus, Scotus e. a., the angels first existed for a time in *puris naturalibus* and later received the *auxilium gratiae actualis*. Thomas, however, thought with others that the distinction of nature and grace was only to be understood logically, and that grace, in order to be able to remain

standing, had also been bestowed upon the different angels in different measure, S. Theol. I qu. 62 art. 3. and 6. Equipped with that grace, the angels could merit the highest, inalienable blessedness, which consists in the vision of God, Petavius, de angelis I 16. Becanus, Theol. Schol., de ang. c. 2. 3. Theol. Wirceb. 1880 III 466 sq. Pesch, Prael. III 204 sq. Oswald, Angelologie 81 f. Jansen, Prael. II. 361 sq. In the locus de homine the doctrine of the dona superaddita will demand our special attention. Here let it only be pointed out that in any case it finds not the least ground in Scripture with the angels. Protestant theology therefore also rejected it unanimously. It contented itself with the fact that the angels who remained standing were confirmed in the good. And this it maintained with Augustine and scholasticism over against Origen, de princ. I 5. 3. 4, and the Remonstrants, who still held the will of the good angels to be changeable. Indeed, the good angels in Holy Scripture are also always presented to us as a faithful host, which unchangeably does the will of the Lord. They are called angels of the Lord, Ps. 103:20, 104:4, ἐκλεκτοί, 1 Tim. 5:21, ἅγιοι, Deut. 33:3, Mt. 25:31, angels of light, Luk. 9:26, Hd. 10:22, 2 Cor. 11:14, Op. 14:10. They daily see God's face, Mt. 18:10, are set before us as an example, Mt. 6:10; and the believers will one day become like them, Luk. 20:36. [442]

8. In all these properties of createdness, spirituality, rationality, and morality the angels agree with human beings. Precisely because in Scripture the unity of the angels comes to the foreground and their mutual diversity recedes, there is danger of overlooking the difference between angel and human being. Their agreement seems far to surpass the distinction. Both, human being and angel, are personal, rational, moral beings; both were originally created in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness; both received

dominion, immortality, and blessedness; both are called in Scripture sons of God, Job 1:6, Luk. 3:38. And yet their distinction is most strictly maintained in Scripture by the fact that the human being, but never the angel, is said to have been created in God's image. In theology this distinction has in many respects been neglected. According to Origen the angels and the souls of human beings are of the same species; the union of the soul with the body is a punishment for sin and thus actually accidental. Origen came to this because he taught that all inequality was from the creature. God created all things in the beginning equal, that is, He created only rational beings and all of them equal, angels and souls. Inequality came among them through free will; some remained standing and received reward, others fell and received punishment; the souls were determined to be bound to bodies. The whole material world and all the diversity that is present in it is thus due to sin and to the different degree of sin; it is not there in order to reveal God's goodness but in order to punish sin. This doctrine of Origen has indeed been rejected by the church, and theology has maintained the specific difference of human being and angel, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 75 art. 7. But nevertheless the thought has not been wholly overcome that the angels, because only spiritual, stand higher than human beings, and therefore have still more or at least as much right to the name of bearers of God's image, Damasc., de fide orth. II 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 93 art. 3. Commentatores op Sent. II dist. 16. Oswald, Angelologie 25 enz. In the hierarchy of creatures the angels, as purely spiritual beings, stand closest to God. Tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti coelum et terram, duo quaedam unum prope te, alterum prope nihil; unum quo superior tu esses, alterum quo inferius nihil esset, [443] Aug. Conf. XII 7. Non tantum substantiam a se longinquam, scil. naturam corpoream, producere debuit

(Deus), verum etiam propinquam et haec est substantia intellectualis et incorporea, Bonav. Brevil. II 6. But Lutherans and Reformed too have lost sight of this distinction between human being and angel too much and have called the angels bearers of God's image, Calvin, Inst. I 15, 3. Polanus, Synt. theol. V c. 10. Synopsis pur. theol. XII 7. XIII 17. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. IX 187. Moor, II 335. Gerhard, Loc. V c. 4 sect. 5. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 63. Only a few such as Theodoretus, Macarius, Methodius, Tertull. adv. Marc. II 8 and others opposed this, Petavius, de sex. dierum opif. II c. 3 § 4-8. Augustine says expressly, Deus nulli alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam nisi homini, in Thomas, I qu. 93 art. 3, cf. also Maresius, Syst. Theol. V 37. However much agreement there may be between human being and angel, there is no less great difference. There are indeed all kinds of traits of the image of God in the angels, but the human being alone is the image of God. That image of God lies not only in that which human being and angel have in common, but equally in that which distinguishes them. The principal points of difference are these: first, the angel is spirit and as spirit complete; the human being, on the other hand, is soul and body together; the soul without the body is incomplete. The human being is thus a rational but equally a sensible being; through the body he is bound to the earth, he belongs with the earth and the earth with him. And of that earth he is head and lord. After the angels had already been created, God says that He wills to create the human being and wills to give him dominion over the earth, Gen. 1:26. Dominion over the earth is essentially proper to the human being, a part of the image of God, and is therefore also given back by Christ to His own, whom He makes not only prophets and priests but also kings. The angel, however, however strong and mighty, is a servant in God's creation; no lord of the earth, Hebr. 1:14. Second, the angels as purely

spiritual beings are also not mutually bound by bonds of blood. There is among them no father and son, no physical connection, no community of blood, no consanguinitas; they stand, however intimately ethically connected, nevertheless loose alongside one another, so that many could fall and others nevertheless remain standing. In the human being there is therefore a shadowing forth of the Divine being, in which there are also persons who are one not only by will and affection but also by essence and nature. Third, therefore there is indeed a humanity, but in this sense no “Angelhood”. In one human being all fell, but also in one the human race is preserved. In humanity there is an Adam and therefore also a Christ possible. The angels are witnesses, human beings are objects of God’s most glorious deeds, of the works of His grace. The earth is the stage of God’s wonders; here the battle is fought, here the triumph of the kingdom of God is achieved, and the angels turn their eye toward the earth and desire to look into the mysteries of salvation, Ef. 3:10, 1 Petr. 1:12. Fourth, even if the angel may be the more powerful spirit, the human being is nevertheless the richer spirit. In understanding and power the angel far surpasses the human being. But through the wonderfully rich relations in which the human being stands to God, the world, and humanity, he is deeper of soul and richer of heart. The relations which the life of sex and family, life in household, state, and society, life for labor, art, and science brings with it, make every human being into a world in miniature, which in many-sidedness, in depth, in richness far surpasses the personality of the angels. Therefore also the richest and most glorious virtues of God are knowable and enjoyable only for the human being. Angels experience His power, wisdom, goodness, holiness, majesty; but the depths of God’s eternal mercies disclose themselves only for the human being. In the human being, or better still in

humanity, therefore only in a creaturely way is the full image of God unfolded. Finally, let it be added here that the angels thus also stand in a wholly different relation to Christ than human beings. That a relation exists between Christ and the angels is indubitable. First, various passages of Scripture teach that all things, Ps. 33:6, Spr. 8:22v., Joh. 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Ef. 3:9, Hebr. 1:2 and in particular also the angels, Col. 1:16 have been created through the Son, and thus He is the Mediator unionis of all that is created. But in the second place Ef. 1:10 and Col. 1:19, 20 contain the deep thought that all things also stand in relation to Christ as Mediator of reconciliation. God has namely reconciled all things to Himself through Christ and gathers them all under Him as the Head. The relation now does indeed not consist [445] in this, as many have thought, that Christ for the good angels has acquired the gratia and the gloria, cf. Voetius, Disp. II 262 sq. Gerhard, Loci Theol. XXXI c. 4 § 42 and later in the doctrine of satisfaction; nor also, as others judged, in this, that the angels could be called membra ecclesiae, cf. Gerhard, Loci Theol. XXII c. 6 sect. 9. But it is nevertheless situated herein, that all things which through sin have been disturbed and shattered are again in Christ mutually reconciled, restored to their original relation, and gathered together under Him as the Head. Christ is thus indeed Lord and Head, not Reconciler and Savior of the angels. All things have been created through Him, and therefore they have also been created unto Him, in order that He, reconciled and restored, may give them back to the Father. But human beings alone form the church of Christ; it alone is His bride, the temple of the H. Spirit, the dwelling of God.

9. With this nature of the angels their service and activity correspond. Scripture clearly makes a distinction in this respect between an extraordinary and an ordinary service of the angels. The extraordinary

service first begins after the fall, and has become necessary through sin. It is an important element in special revelation. We see the angels appear for the first time to guard the garden, Gen. 3:24, but then they appear and convey revelations, act in blessing or in punishment in the history of the patriarchs and of the prophets, and throughout the whole O. Test. They appear to Abraham, Gen. 18, Lot, Gen. 19, Jacob, Gen. 28:12, 32:1; they serve at the giving of the law, Hebr. 2:2, Gal. 3:19, Hd. 7:53; they take part in the battle of Israel, 2 Kon. 19:35, Dan. 10 vs. 13, 20; they proclaim God's counsel to Elijah and Elisha, to Ezekiel, Daniel and Zechariah. As if to refute that they are no remnants from polytheism and do not belong to a prehistoric period, their extraordinary service increases still further in the days of the N. T. They occur at the birth of Jesus, Luk. 1:13, 30, 2:10, at his temptation, Mt. 4:11, accompany him throughout his entire earthly life, Joh. 1:52, and appear especially at his suffering, Luk. 22:43, resurrection, Mt. 28 and ascension, Hd. 1:10. After that they still appear a few times in the history of the apostles, Hd. 5:19, 12:7, 13, [446] 8:26, 27:23, Op. 1:1, then to cease the extraordinary service and to appear again only at the return of Christ, Mt. 16:27, 25:31, Mk. 8:38, Luk. 9:26, 2 Thess. 1:7, Judas 14, Openb. 5:2 etc., in which they wage battle against God's enemies, Op. 12:7, 1 Thess. 4:16, Judas 9, gather the elect, Mt. 24:31, and cast the ungodly into the fire, Mt. 13:41, 49. The extraordinary service of the angels thus consists in this, that they accompany the history of salvation at its turning points. They do not themselves bring that salvation to pass, but they nevertheless take part in the history of that salvation. They convey revelations, protect God's people, fight his enemies, and perform all manner of service in the kingdom of God. Always they are thereby active on the terrain of the church; even where they receive power over the forces of nature, Op. 14:18, 16:5, or

intervene in the destinies of the peoples, this takes place in the interest of the church. In doing so they never displace the sovereignty of God, nor are they mediators of the communion of God with man. But they are ministering spirits in the interest of those who shall inherit salvation. They serve God in the kingdom of grace, not in that of nature. This extraordinary service has therefore of itself also ceased with the completion of revelation. While formerly they repeatedly had special revelations to convey and descended to the earth, they are now rather an example to us and we ascend to them. As long as special revelation was not yet completed, heaven drew near to the earth and God's Son descended to us. Now Christ has appeared, and the word of God has been spoken to us completely. Thus the angels look toward the earth, in order to learn from the church the manifold wisdom of God. What could angels still be able to give us, now that God himself bestowed his own Son upon us?

But Scripture also speaks of an ordinary service of the angels. First of all, it belongs thereto that they praise God day and night, Job 38:7, Isa. 6, Ps. 103:20, 148:2, Rev. 5:11; and Scripture gives the impression that they do that in audible sounds, although it is also the case that we can form no conception of the speaking and singing of the angels. But to that ordinary service also belongs that they rejoice over the conversion of the sinner, Luke 15:10, watch over the believers, Ps. 34:8, 91:11, protect the little ones, Mt. 18:10, are present in the congregation [447], 1 Cor. 11:10, 1 Tim. 5:21, follow it in its course through history, Eph. 3:10, allow themselves to be instructed by it, Eph. 3:10, 1 Petr. 1:12 and carry the believers in Abraham's bosom, Luke 16:22. They are thus active *coram Deo consistendo*, *hominibus piis assistendo*, *atque diabolis et hominibus malis resistendo*, Hollaz, p. 390. Scripture generally remains with this general description of

the ordinary service of the angels and does not descend into particulars. But theology has not been satisfied with that; it has specialized it in all manner of ways. This happened especially in the doctrine of guardian angels. The Greeks and Romans had something similar in their δαίμονες and genii; not only did one ascribe to every human being a good and an evil genius, but one also had genii of houses, families, associations, cities, countries, peoples, of earth, sea, world etc. The Jews assumed seventy national angels with appeal to Deut. 32:8 and Dan. 10:13, and further gave to each Israelite an angel for guidance, Weber, System 161 f. Christian theology soon adopted this. The Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. VI 2 assigns to every human being two angels, εἰς τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ εἰς τῆς πονηρίας and further also placed the whole creation and the entire structure of the church under the guardianship of the angels, Vis. III 4. With predilection this doctrine of guardian angels was developed by Origen. Sometimes every human being with him has a good and an evil angel; sometimes he adds to it that only the good angels of the baptized Christians see the face of God; or he also says that only the Christians and the virtuous have a guardian angel, and that they receive, according to their merit, a lower or higher angel as guide. But further he also assumes special angels for churches, countries, peoples, for arts and sciences, for plants and animals; thus Raphael is the angel of healing, Gabriel of war, Michael of prayer etc., cf. de princ. I 8. III 3. c. Cels. V 29. VIII 31 etc. And thus essentially all church fathers taught, although there was difference over whether all human beings or only the Christians had a guardian angel; whether every human being had only a good or also an evil angel; when the guardian angel was bestowed on the human being, at birth or at baptism, and when he was taken from him, upon the attainment of perfection [448] or only at death. With all it was also

established that there are not only guardian angels of human beings but also of countries, peoples, churches, dioceses, provinces etc., Schwane, D. G. II 244. Later this protection of the angels was in part limited and in part further extended. Limited, insofar as some, in the footsteps of Pseudodionysius, de coel. hier. c. 13, taught that the three principal classes of the angels, cherubim, seraphim and thrones, served God alone in heaven, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 112. Extended, insofar as scholasticism thought the whole providence of God in nature and history, in particular in the movement of the stars, to be mediated by angels, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 70 art. 3. qu. 110 art. 1. S. c. Gent. III 78 sq. Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 14 p. 1 art. 3 qu. 2. Guardian angels of human beings are generally assumed by the Roman theologians and are also acknowledged in the Catech. Rom. IV c. 9 qu. 4 and 5. But otherwise there is among them great difference of opinion over all the above-mentioned points, cf. Petavius, de ang. II c. 6-8. Becanus, Theol. schol. tract. III de angelis c. 6. Theol. Wirceb. Paris. 1880 III 480. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. III 210. Oswald, Angelologie 120 f. etc. The same doctrine we find with Luther, cf. Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 345; but the Lutheran theologians were mostly more cautious, Gerhard, Loci theol. V cap. 4 sect. 15. Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. I 450. Hollaz, Syst. theol. p. 390. Calvin rejected the angeli tutelares, Inst. I 14, 7. Comm. on Ps. 91, Mt. 18:10 and most Reformed followed him, see especially Voetius, Disp. I 897 sq.; only a few assumed guardian angels of human beings, Zanchius, Op. III 142 sq. Bucanus, Inst. theol. VI 28. Maccovius, Loci Comm. p. 394. Rivetus, Alsted, Vossius, also Hugo Grotius on Mt. 18:10, cf. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 155. M. Vitranga II 117. In more recent times the doctrine of guardian angels has again found support with Hahn, Weiss, Bibl. Theol. des N. T. 594. Ebrard, Dogm. § 239. Vilmar, Dogm. I 310.

Martensen, Dogm. § 69 e. a. Furthermore, the ordinary service of the angels was also further defined in this, that with their intercession for the believers on earth they were beneficially active in heaven. This too was already taught by the Jews, and also by Philo, and then taken over by Origen, c. Cels VIII 64 and the church fathers and established in the Roman symbols, Catech. Rom. III c. 2 qu. 5 n. 2. The Lutheran confessional writings also still speak [449] of this intercession, Apol. Conf. art. 21. Art. Smalc. II 2, and likewise the Luth. dogmatici, Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 324. On the other hand, it was unanimously rejected by the Reformed.

For this special service of protection and intercession appeal is made to some passages of Scripture, especially Deut. 32:8, Dan. 10:13, 20, Mt. 18:10, Rev. 1:20, 2:1 etc., Job 33:23, Zech. 1:12, Luke 15:7, Rev. 18:3, and especially also to Tobit 12:12-15. In itself this doctrine of the protection and of the intercession of the angels is not objectionable. That God, as in the special, so also in the general revelation, often or even regularly makes use of angels, is in itself not impossible; and likewise it is not absurd that the angels send up their prayers for men to God, since they nevertheless take an interest in their lot and follow the course of the kingdom of God in the history of mankind. But, however little there is in itself to object to it, Scripture, with respect to protection and intercession of the angels, observes a sobriety which must be a rule for us. In Deut. 32:8 we read that God, at the separation of the peoples, already thought of his people Israel and determined their dwelling לְמִסְפַּר בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל, according to the number of the children of Israel, i.e. in such a way that Israel, according to its number, received a sufficient inheritance. The LXX, however, translated these words by κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων and thereby gave occasion to the doctrine of the angels of the nations. The original text, however, teaches nothing of this

here and thus falls away entirely as a proof-text. It is otherwise with Daniel 10:13, 20. There it is said that the figure appearing to Daniel in v. 5 stood over against the prince of Persia and, helped by Michael, who is called one of the first princes v. 13, the great prince for the children of Israel 12:1, 10:21, drove away that prince of Persia and took his place with the kings of Persia. Calvin and the Reformed usually thought, with that prince of Persia, of the Persian kings. But it seems that under that prince something else, namely the protecting spirit of Persia, must be understood. For, in the first place, there is no doubt that Israel has such a protecting angel in Michael, who is called its prince, 10:13, 21, 12:1; in the second place, the kings of Persia in 10:13 are clearly distinguished from that prince; and in the third place, the analogy requires that the spiritual power on the one side wages war against a [450] spiritual power on the other side. The book of Daniel thus really gives us the representation that the struggle between the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the world is fought not only here on earth but also in the realm of spirits among the angels. More may and can not be inferred from it. It does not at all lie in it that each land and people has its own angel. But in the mighty conflict that is fought between Israel and Persia, that is here essentially between the kingdom of God and that of Satan, there appear on both sides angels who take part in the conflict and support the peoples. Still much less can it be inferred from Rev. 1:20 etc. that each congregation has its angel, for under the ἄγγελοι of the seven congregations nothing else is to be understood than their teachers; they are, after all, wholly regarded as representatives of the congregations; it is their works that are praised or blamed; to them the letters are written. The doctrine of the protecting angels finds the most support in Mt. 18:10, which text undoubtedly contains that a certain class of the angels is charged with

the protection of the little ones, but where yet it is not stated in the least that to each elect person an angel is assigned. This is found only in the apocryphal book Tobit. But thereby this doctrine of the protecting angels also betrays its origin. It is essentially of pagan origin. It moreover leads to all kinds of subtle questions and idle issues. It does not know whether to every man, e.g. even to the antichrist, as Thomas thought, I qu. 113 art. 4, or only to the elect an angel is assigned, or only a good or also an evil angel accompanies all, when he is given to someone and taken from him, what his service is, etc. Therefore we may not go further than that to certain classes of the angels also the care of certain interests on earth has been entrusted. And likewise it is with the intercession of the angels; it is taught in Tobit 12:16, but does not occur in Scripture. In Job 33:23 there is mention of the Angelus increatus. Luke 15:7 does indeed teach that the angels rejoice over the conversion of a sinner and thus does indeed presuppose that they desire it, but nevertheless speaks of no intercession in the proper sense. And in Rev. 8:3 an angel does indeed receive a censer with incense, in order to make the in themselves sinful prayers of the saints sweet and acceptable to the Lord; [451] but of intercession also here not a word is made mention. The angel is simply a servant; he does not set up the altar, he does not prepare the incense itself but receives it, and only lets the prayers with that incense ascend to God. He performs such a service as the seraphim in Isa. 6:6, 7.

10. This doctrine of the guardian angels and of their intercession has finally also had this disadvantage, that in practice it soon led to a veneration and worship of the angels. Col. 2 vs. 18 teaches that such a *θρησκεία των ἁγγέλων* already occurred in the apostolic time. Theodoretus remarks in his commentary on that passage, that such a service of the angels still existed in

Phrygia in his time and that the synod at Laodicea had forbidden the veneration of the angels, lest God be abandoned, Schwane, D. G. II 245. Many church fathers warn against veneration and worship of the angels, Iren. adv. haer. II 32. Orig. c. Cels. V 4, 5. VIII 13. Athanasius, c. Ar. II 23. Augustinus, de vera relig. 55. Conf. X 42. de civ. VIII 25 etc. The conviction is still general, that God alone may be worshiped, and that to the angels only a civil honor is due. Honoramus eos caritate, non servitute, Aug. de vera relig. 55. They are potius imitandi quam invocandi, de civ. X 26. And even Gregory the Great says in his exposition on the Song of Songs cap. 8, that, since Christ has come to earth, ab ipsis etiam angelis ecclesia honoratur; under the O. T. Joshua did indeed worship the angel, Jos. 5:19, but in the N. T. the angel rejects the worship of John, Op. 22:9. But yet these warnings prove precisely that in practice the boundaries between the worship of God and the reverence for the angels were being erased. Clearly the invocation of the angels is first expressed by Ambrosius, de viduis, cap. 9 § 55, where he, among other things, says: obsecrandi sunt angeli, qui nobis ad praesidium dati sunt. Already Eusebius made the distinction between the τιμᾶν, which is fitting for us toward the angels, and the σεβειν, which belongs to God alone, Praep. Ev. VII 15, and in substance we find this also already in Orig. c. Cels. VIII 13. 57. Augustinus adopted it, precisely in order to prevent the religious veneration of the angels, de civ. V 15. VII 32. X 1. But soon that distinction was employed in order to legitimate the invocation of the angels. Thus already at the council of Nicaea 787 [452] and then further among the scholastics, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 9. Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 103 art. 3. Trent called the invocation good and useful, sess. 25; the Catech. Rom. III cap. 2 qu. 4 n. 3 grounded it on the fact that the angels always see God's face and have taken upon

themselves the *patrocinium salutis nostrae*; the *Breviarium Romanum* also included prayers in *festis angelorum* and the Roman dogmaticians defend it unanimously, Bellarminus, *de sanct. beatit.* I c. 11-20. Petavius, *de angelis* II c. 9 and 10, although they usually treat it later under the *cultus sanctorum*. Lutherans and Reformed and almost all Protestants, however, stood firm when they rejected this religious veneration of the angels, as also that of the saints, Luther, in Köstlin, *L. Theol.* II 23 f. Zwingli, *Op.* I 268 sq. 280 sq. III 135 sq. etc. Calvin, *Inst.* I 14, 10-12, cf. III 20, 20-24. Gerhard, *Loci theol.* XXVI § 370-480, on the angels especially § 427. Quenstedt I 486 sq. Turretinus, *Th. El.* VII qu. 9. Id. *De necessaria secessione nostra ab ecclesia Romana*, Genevae 1692, disp. 2-4 de idololatria Romana p. 33-109. For in the first place there is not a single example of it in Scripture; indeed the Roman Catholics appeal to some passages of the O. Test. such as Gen. 18:2, 32:24, 48:16, Ex. 23:20, Num. 22:31, Jos. 5 vs. 14, Judg. 13:17, but here everywhere it is not a created angel but the *Malak Ihvh* that is spoken of, and in the N. T. there is not even the appearance of any proof to be found. But not only that; the veneration of angels is not only without precept and without example in Scripture, so that Rome with some appearance of ground could assert that the veneration of angels and saints is not forbidden in Scripture and thus permitted, and therefore also in fact does not impose and command it, but only allows it and deems it useful, Jansen *Prael. theol.* III 1008; it is also positively forbidden in it, Deut. 6:13, 10:20, Mt. 4:10, Col. 2:18, 19, Op. 19:10, 22:9. Religious honor may according to Scripture be rendered only to God and belongs to no creature. The Roman Catholics have not dared to deny this entirely, but have nevertheless sought with the distinction of *latria* and *dulia* to justify the veneration of the angels. Now in Rome this is not a distinction between

religious and civil honor, which would be defensible; no, the veneration of angels and saints at Rome indeed bears a religious [453] character, even if this is relative. The *dulia* is a *cultus religiosus*. But thus understood, it is condemned both by Scripture and by practice. Scripture knows no twofold religious veneration, a lower and a higher. The Roman Catholics also concede that *latria* and *dulia* are absolutely not distinguished in Scripture as they do, and that they also etymologically give no ground for it. The Hebr. עבד is now translated by δουλεια, then by λατρεία, cf. Deut 6:13 and 1 Sam. 7:3, 1 Sam. 12:20 and Deut. 10:12; to Israel both the δουλευειν and the λατρευειν of other gods is forbidden, Ex. 20:5, Jer. 22:9. Likewise the Hebr. שרת is rendered by both Greek words, Ez. 20:32, Isa. 56:6. More than once δουλευειν is used of God, Mt. 6:24, Rom. 7:6, 14:18, 16:18, Gal. 4:9, Eph. 6:7, Col. 3:24, 1 Thess. 1:9 and λατρευειν is also sometimes employed of service toward men. Neither etymologically nor scripturally are the two words distinguished as Rome teaches this. The whole distinction is arbitrary. Besides, monotheism entails that there is and can be only one religious veneration; all veneration of creatures is either only civil or it falls short of monotheism and ascribes to creatures a divine character. Practice teaches this all too clearly. Even if one says repeatedly that angels and saints are only mediators, that they are not themselves directly but God in them who is invoked, that God's honor is not diminished but increased by their invocation; it all in fact makes no difference, experience shows all too clearly that the Roman Christian places his trust in creatures. Moreover, even if the distinction were in itself correct, it would nevertheless not be able to justify the religious veneration of the angels. For if this reasoning were sufficient for defense, no idolatry and no image-worship would any longer be condemnable. The Heathens, worshiping animals and images,

knew very well that these were not the gods themselves, Rom. 1:23. The Jews did not hold the golden calf to be Jahveh himself, Ex. 32:4, 1 Kings 12:28. Satan, tempting Christ, absolutely did not demand that he should hold him for God, Mt. 4:9. And John by no means thought that the angel who appeared to him was God, Op. 19:10. And yet Jesus answers: the Lord your God you shall worship and Him alone [454] serve. This alone is exclusive, just as the one Mediator Christ Jesus excludes all other angels or men as mediators. But this is precisely what is denied by Rome. Just as Mt. 19:17, 23:8, John 9:5, 1 Tim. 2:5, 6:16 etc. do not exclude that men too can be called good, master, light, mediator, immortal, so also according to Rome Mt. 4 vs. 10 does not prove that God alone may be worshiped. The angels and saints are namely according to Rome partakers of the divine nature itself; the *dona supernaturalia* are indeed bestowed, derived, but are of the same nature as the divine being itself. And therein lies with Rome the deepest ground of the worship of the saints and angels. God in the *justitia supernaturalis* communicates himself, his own being, to creatures; and therefore these too may be venerated in a religious way. And the proper thought of Rome is this: *tot esse species adorationis, quot sunt species excellentiae*, Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 103 art. 3. Bellarminus, de sanct. beatit. I c. 12. Petavius, de angelis II c. 10. Jansen, Praet. Theol. III 1017. Möhler Symb. § 52. 53.

By the rejection of the religious veneration of the angels, Protestantism has acknowledged that the angels are not an indispensable element in the religious life of Christians. They are not the agents of our salvation, not the ground of our trust, not the object of our veneration; not with them, but with God do we stand in communion; indeed, they no longer appear to us now, and all special revelation through angels has ceased. The angels cannot and

may not take that place in the Prot. churches and confessions which is assigned to them in the Roman. But yet not all significance of the world of angels for religion has thereby been denied. This lies, in the first place, in the fact that God, in His works on the terrain of grace, wills to make use of the service of angels. The angels are of extraordinary significance for the kingdom of God and its history; at all turning points we meet them; they are mediators of the resurrection, witnesses of God's great deeds. Their significance is much more of an objective than of a subjective nature. Of communion with the world of angels we know nothing in our religious experience. Neither upon our religious nor upon our moral life do the angels have an influence that can be brought under clear words. Their value lies in the [455] history of revelation, as Scripture makes that known to us. In the second place, therefore, the angels also cannot be an object of our reverent homage, as we render that to human beings. Very certainly there is a civil honor, which we have to show to them. But this, too, is again different than toward human beings whom we personally know and meet. The Roman Catholics also chiefly defend the veneration of the angels with the reasoning that, as envoys of the Most High, they nevertheless have a claim to our homage, just as in the ambassadors of princes those princes themselves are honored. And this is also, in itself, entirely correct. If an angel appeared to us, he would have to be greeted by us with reverent homage. And so it also happened, when angels in the days of revelation appeared to human beings. Only, such appearances are no more. Of a homage such as the patriarchs, prophets, apostles rendered to the angels appearing to them, there can be no question with us. It is not possible to render such a reverence and homage to them. In the third place, therefore, there is indeed still an honor that the angels must receive from us. But this

honor is in no respect religious, but only civil in nature, in the essence of the matter like that which we ascribe to human beings, to creatures. And this honor civilis consists in this, that we think of them and speak of them with reverence, that we do not despise them in the small, Mt. 18 vs. 10, that we are mindful of their presence, 1 Cor. 11 vs. 10, that we proclaim to them the manifold wisdom of God, Ef. 3:10, that we make them see into the mysteries of salvation, 1 Tim. 5:21, that we by our conversion prepare joy for them, Luk. 15:10, imitate them in the practice of God's will, Mt. 6:10, that we feel and live one with them in the expectation of going to them, Hebr. 12:22, that we with them and all creatures form one choir for the magnifying of the Name of the Lord, Ps. 103:20, 21. Herein consists the true veneration of the angels. And if this is well understood, then finally, in the fourth place, the doctrine of the angels can also be for us unto comfort and encouragement. God has also revealed this doctrine to us, in order that He might strengthen us in our weakness, raise us up in our despondency. We do not stand alone in the spiritual struggle. We stand in connection with an entire cloud of [456] witnesses around us. There is yet another, better world than this, where God is served in a perfect manner. It is to us for an example, for a spur and incitement, and at the same time for longing and final goal. As the world of angels in revelation has descended to us, so the congregation in Christ ascends to it. We shall be like the angels and daily see the face of our Father, who is in the heavens, Mastricht, Theol. theor. pr. III 7, 25. Love, Theol. practica p. 205. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 320 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. I 353. v. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. § 57, 10.

§ 31. THE MATERIAL WORLD.

1 . Besides the spiritual there also exists a material world. But while the angels in their existence and essence are known only from revelation and are hidden from reason and science, the material world is beheld by all and is discussed both in philosophy and in theology, both in religion and in science. Here therefore difference and collision are possible at every moment. To be sure, both, philosophy and theology, speak about the material world in a different sense. The former investigates the origin and the nature of all things, but the latter proceeds from God, and leads everything back to Him; it has to do with the creatures only insofar as they are works of God and reveal something of His virtues; thus, even where it treats of the creatures, it is and remains always theology, Thomas, S. c. Gent II c. 2 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. V c. 7. But even though there is so important a distinction, theology and philosophy nevertheless deal with the same world. In order to avoid collision between the two, a separation of property has often been proposed: science would investigate the visible things and leave to religion and theology nothing but the religious-ethical world; or

still more strictly, all that is would belong to science and only in value-judgments would religion be allowed to speak. But such a separation is both theoretically and practically impossible. Just as every scientific system in the end always is rooted in religious convictions, so there is no single religion that does not bring with it [457] a definite view of the created. All religions have their cosmogonies, which have not arisen from philosophical reasoning but rest on tradition. Genesis 1 too is by no means a philosophical worldview, but a tradition, which in many respects agrees with the cosmogonies of the other religions and yet also in a remarkable way deviates from them. The agreement consists in this, that in all cosmogonies the formation of the world is ascribed to God, that the first state was an undeveloped and chaotic one, that the formation of the world proceeds in some periods of time, ascends from lower to higher and ends in man, who is akin to God, cf. above p. 386. But the points of difference are much greater still. The pagan cosmogonies are all at the same time also theogonies, all assume a primal matter and teach a chaos in the proper sense. The narrative in Genesis, on the other hand, is strictly monotheistic, it teaches a creation out of nothing, and knows no chaos in the proper sense. Therefore it is also unbelievable that the Jews would have taken over this narrative from the Babylonians in the exile. For, in the first place, creation was already known to the Israelites even before the exile. Next, this was also already the case with the seven-day week, which is grounded on the days of creation. Then it is improbable that the Jews would have taken over so important a part of their doctrine from their conquerors. And finally, the pagan cosmogonies were so thoroughly polytheistic, that they had rather to repel than to attract the monotheistic people of Israel and also could not be reworked just like that into a fair, monotheistic narrative such as Gen. 1. Rather, everything

pleads for the fact that in Genesis we possess a tradition that originates from the oldest times, has gradually been corrupted among the other peoples, and has been preserved by Israel in its purity, Delitzsch, Neuer Comm. z. Genesis S. 41. 42.

2. In the narrative of Gen. 1 the first verse must be understood as the description of a distinct fact. In verse 2 the earth already exists, though in a desolate and empty condition. And verse 1 relates the origin of that earth; it was created by God at once as earth. After in verse 1 heaven was only briefly mentioned alongside the earth, verse 2 immediately turns to the earth, [458] the cosmogony becomes geogony. And that earth is from the first moment onward earth; no ὕλη in the Aristotelian sense, no materia prima, no chaos either in the sense of the pagan cosmogonies. Ein geschaffenes Chaos ist ein Unding (Dillmann). The earth is indeed now described to us as תְּהוֹם וָבְהוֹ, as a תְּהוֹם, over which the darkness spread. But this expresses something wholly different from what is usually understood under chaos. The word תְּהוֹם occurs several times, especially in Isaiah, and everywhere calls to mind a space that is empty; a place where there is no way and everything is untracked and unformed. The word בְּהוֹ is still found in Isa. 34:10 and Jer. 4:23, both times in connection with תְּהוֹם, and expresses the same thought. The condition of the earth in Gen. 1:2 is not that of a positive devastation but of a not-yet-formed being. There is no light, no life, no organic being, no form and shape of things. Still more closely it is explained by the fact that it was a תְּהוֹם, a roaring mass of water, shrouded in darkness. The earth is ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ δι' ὕδατος, 2 Petr. 3:5, Ps. 104:5, 6. This unformed, undeveloped condition has, according to the intention of Genesis, certainly lasted some time, however short it may have been. No mere logical supposition is described in it, but a factual condition. Only

then the question arises, how long this condition lasted. This now again depends entirely on whether the creation of heaven and earth, of which Gen. 1:1 speaks, falls before or within the first day. Genesis gives no other impression than that the creation of heaven and earth in verse 1 and the unformed condition of the earth in verse 2 precedes the first day. For, in verse 2 there is still darkness and no light; now the day is not and does not begin with darkness but with light; only through the creation of the light verse 3 does the day become possible; God therefore also did not call the darkness but the light day and the darkness He called night, verse 5; the alternation of light and dark, of day and night could only with the creation of the light make a beginning; only after the light had been, could it become evening and thereafter again morning, and with this morning the first day ended, for Gen. 1 counts the day from morning to morning. The work of the first day thus consisted not in the creation of heaven and earth, not in the letting-continue of the unformed condition, but in the creation of the light [459] and the separation of light and darkness. Against this exegesis there would now also be absolutely no objection, if it were not written elsewhere that God created heaven and earth in six days, Ex. 20:11, 31:17. This, however, cannot be understood otherwise than of the *creatio secunda*. For, in these two texts the emphasis does not fall on the fact that God has brought forth everything out of nothing, but that He has been active with the forming of heaven and earth for six days, and this is set before us as an example. Clearly there is a distinction between what God, Gen. 1:1 “in the beginning”, cf. Joh. 1:1 and what He, Gen. 1:3v. speaking, does in the six days; the unformed condition of Gen. 1:2 separates both from one another. The *creatio prima* is immediate, *immediata*, it is a bringing forth of heaven and earth out of nothing, it presupposes absolutely no material at hand, it

has taken place *cum tempore*. But the *creatio secunda*, which begins with verse 3, is not direct and immediate, it presupposes the material created in verse 1 and attaches itself thereto, and it takes place specifically in *tempore* and indeed in six days. Hence this *creatio secunda* already anticipates the works of preservation and government; it is already in part preservation and no longer a mere creation. Moreover, in the same moment as heaven and earth in verse 1 are created by God, they are also preserved by Him. The *creatio* passes at once and immediately over into the *conservatio* and *gubernatio*. But nevertheless the work of the six days, Gen. 1:3v., must still be reckoned as belonging to creation. For all the creatures which have been brought forth in those six days, light, firmament, sun, moon, stars, plant, animal, man, have according to Genesis not proceeded from the existing material by immanent forces according to fixed laws in the way of evolution. That material was powerless to bring forth all that by itself along a natural way, by immanent development. It did not have in itself the suitability, the *potentia* for it; it had only a *potentia obedientialis*. God brought forth, from the primal material of Gen. 1:1, speaking, creating, the whole cosmos. With each new formation He did indeed attach Himself to what already existed, but the higher nevertheless did not proceed from the lower solely by immanent power. Each time a creative word of God's omnipotence was needed in addition. [460]

3. The work of creation has been divided by Herder et al. into two ternaries, in such a way that the works of the second ternary correspond to those of the first. There is indeed correspondence between the work of the first and of the fourth day; but the second and fifth, and likewise the third and sixth, do not stand in such parallelism. On the fifth day, after all, not only the birds in the firmament, but also the fish and water-animals are

created, which corresponds much more with the work of the third day. Yet in the works of creation there is clearly a progress perceptible from the lower to the higher, from the general presuppositions for organic life to this organic life itself in its different forms. Better therefore is the old division of the whole work of creation into three parts: creatio Gen. 1:1, 2, distinctio on the first three days, between light and darkness, heaven and earth, land and sea, and ornatus on the fourth to the sixth day, population of the prepared earth with all kinds of living beings. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 74. Yet this division too is not meant as a strict separation, for the plants, created on the third day, also serve for adornment etc. The distinctio and ornatus put an end to the *tohoe wabohoe* of the earth. The unformed and undeveloped condition of the earth, of which verse 2 speaks, must, however, not for a moment be thought of as passive. However long or short it may have existed, there lay forces and operations in it. For we read that God's Spirit hovered over the waters. The verb *רחף* means: to hover with the wings over something, Deut. 32:11, and the use of this word proves that with *רוח אֱלֹהִים* one must think not of the wind but specifically of the Spirit of God, to whom also elsewhere the work of creation is ascribed, Ps. 33:6, 104 vs. 30. The Spirit of God, as the principle of creaturely being and life, works formatively, life-awakeningly upon the water-mass of the earth and thus meets the creative word of God, which on the six days, in connection with what exists, calls the different formations of the creatures into being. The work of the first day now consists in the creation of the light, in the separation of light and darkness, in the alternation of day and night, thus also in movement, change, becoming. Light is namely, according to the now most accepted hypothesis of Huygens, not a substance, but an enormously rapid undulation [461] or vibration of the ether-atoms, and thus nothing but

movement. It is therefore to be well distinguished from the light-givers, sun, moon and stars, and according to Genesis precedes them. Light is also the most general presupposition for all life and development. While the alternation of day and night is only still necessary for animal and man, the light is already also a need for the plant world; it moreover gives form, shape, colour to all things. On the second day distinction is made between the firmament, the air- and cloud-heaven, which according to optical appearance is often called a curtain, Ps. 104:2, a veil, Isa. 40:22, a sapphire, Ex. 24:10, Ezek. 1:22, a mirror, Job 37:18, a roof and vault over the earth, Gen. 7:11, Deut. 11:17, 28:12, Ps. 78:23 etc., and the earth with its waters, Ps. 24:2, 136:6. The work of separation and distinction, begun on the first day, is continued on the second; the distinction of light and darkness, of day and night, is now made serviceable to the separation of heaven and earth; of air and clouds above, of earth and water below. At the end of the second day the words are lacking: God saw that it was good. From this one has inferred that the number two was an ominous number or also that on that day hell was created; but the reason is probably this, that the work of the second day is most closely connected with that of the third day, and is completed only in the separation of the waters; thereafter then the divine approval follows. On the third day, after all, the separation is carried through between earth and water, land and sea; thereby the earth has become a cosmos, with continents and seas, mountains and valleys, lands and streams. Without doubt all these formations have not taken place except under the most tremendous operations of the mechanical and chemical forces lying in nature. These have been awakened by the mighty word of God and by the animation of the Spirit and have given to the earth its cosmic form. From now on other, namely organic, forces also appear. The earth is still naked

and bare. Therefore this day does not end before also in general the green is created, which then especially splits into two kinds, namely into herbs and trees, which each have their own seed and thus propagate themselves. This plant world could now do without the light, but not without the sun. But it is not so with the animal and human world; before these are created, therefore, on the fourth day sun, moon and stars must first be prepared. It is not implied here that the material mass for these planets was only then created, but only that all those thousands of planets now first on this day became what they henceforth would be for the earth; that together they fulfil the place of the light and are for the earth for signs of wind and weather, of events and judgments; for regulation of fixed times for agriculture, navigation, feasts, the life of man and animal; and finally for calculation of days and months and years. The fourth day thus relates the appearance of the starry heaven for the earth; day and night etc. are henceforth regulated by the sun; the earth becomes a member, a part of the universe; it is set in harmony with all other planets. Now the earth as dwelling-place of the ensouled, living beings, of animals and men, is ready. On the fifth day the waters themselves by the mighty word of God bring forth all water-animals, and the air is filled with all kinds of birds. Of both kinds of animals a great multitude is created, in all kinds and number. And then on the sixth day follows the creation of the land-animals, which at God's command come forth from the earth, specifically in three kinds, wild animals, cattle and creeping animals; and finally also the creation of man, who after a definite counsel of God is formed as to his body out of the earth and as to his soul is created directly by God. Thus the whole creation was completed. God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good. He had a good pleasure in his own work. Therefore He rested on the seventh day. His rest is a

consequence of his satisfaction and good pleasure in his works, which now as works of creation are completed, but is at the same time positively a blessing and sanctifying of the seventh day, in order that the creation, continuing in that seventh day, blessed by God with all kinds of powers, sanctified by God to his service and honour, may henceforth itself develop under the providence of the Lord and correspond to its destination.

4. This hexaemeron has been treated by Christian theology with [463] particular predilection. The literature is astonishingly rich, but has been almost completely processed in the important book by Dr. Zöckler, *Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft mit besondrer Rücksicht auf die Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 2 Theile, Gütersloh 1877/79. The oldest Christian exposition of the hexaemeron has been preserved in the second book of Theophilus' writing ad Autolycum c. 9-38. It is also discussed more or less extensively by Tertullianus, *adv. Hermog.* c. 19 sq., by Origenes in his homily on the hexaemeron as the beginning of his 17 homilies of Genesis, then especially by Basilus, in *Hexaemeron homiliae IX*, Gregorius of Nyssa, *Apolog. in Hexaemeron*, Damascenus, *de fide orthod. lib. II*; in the West especially by Lactantius, *Inst. div.* II c. 8-12, Ambrosius, in *Hex. libri VI*, Augustinus, especially the *Genesi ad lit. I. XII*, *de civ. XI 4 sq. Conf. XI-XIII* etc. These works were exploited by Isidorus, Beda, Alcuinus and others and then remain the foundation of the treatment of the hexaemeron in scholasticism, Lombardus, *Sent. II dist. 12-18*, Thomas, *S. Theol. I qu. 44-102*, Bonaventura, *Sent. II dist. 12-18. Brevil. II c. 1-5* etc. Also after the Reformation the same worldview and the same conception of the hexaemeron continue to prevail both in Roman Catholic and in Protestant theology. On the Roman Catholic side the principal treatments are those of Cajetanus, in his commentary on Genesis,

Eugubinus in his *Cosmopoeia* 1535, Catharinus in his elucidations on the first 5 chapters of Genesis, Pererius in his four-volume work on the first book of Moses, Lapide in his well-known commentary, Molina in his *tractatus de opere sex dierum*, Suarez in his commentary on the first part of the *Summa*, Petavius in his *theol. dogm., tract. de sex primorum mundi dierum opificio*, Becanus, *Theol. schol. tr. IV de operibus sex dierum etc.* Of the Lutherans the principal ones are: Luther's commentary on Genesis, Melancthon's annotations on Gen. 1-6, Chemniz, *Loci Theol.* 1610 pag. 109-123, Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* I 431 sq. Hollaz, *Syst. Theol.* p. 361-373. The literature among the Reformed is even richer. Not only in commentaries on Genesis, by Calvin, Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Musculus, Martyr, Piscator, de Dieu, Coccejus etc., is this material treated. And also not only in dogmatic works such as those of Polanus, Gomarus, [464] Heidegger, Mastricht, Maresius, Moor etc. does it come up; but also many separate treatises were devoted to it, such as by Capito, *Hexaemeron Dei opus explicatum* 1539, Danaeus, *Physice christiana, seu christ. de rerum creaturarum origine et usu disputatio* 1575, Zanchius, *de operibus Dei intra spatium sex dierum creatis*, *Op.* III 217-480. Voetius, *Disp.* I 552-881. V 148-241, Rivetus, *Exerc. theol. et schol. in 1 libr. Mosis*, *Op.* 1651 I p. 1 sq. Hottinger, *Κτισις ἑξαήμερος*, i.e. *Historiae creationis examen theol.-philol.* Heid. 1659, cf. further, Walch, *Bibl. theol. sel.* I 242, Mart. Vitranga II 93.

All these works take the standpoint of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic worldview. The earth rests immovably in the center of the universe; all the stars and the whole heaven move around it. That those stars moved freely in the air-space could not be conceived; one represented it to oneself thus, that each star was fastened in a sphere. One therefore had to assume as many heavenly spheres as one observed stars of unequal motion and period of

revolution. And now it was not the stars but the spheres which moved and carried along the stars fastened therein. The vault of heaven thus consists of a system of eight or more concentric spheres, which are slid into one another without empty intermediate spaces; the highest, outermost sphere is that of the fixed stars, the "first heaven", as Aristotle called it. The earth was conceived as a globe or as a disk, surrounded by water. Only a few assumed that antipodes could exist and that there was also still land on the other side of the ocean; as a rule both of these were rejected. This Ptolemaic worldview now naturally also had influence on the exegesis of the hexaemeron. In it two directions are clearly to be distinguished. The one rejects the temporal character of the six days, ascribes to them at most visionary significance, lets everything be created at once and simultaneously, and often arrives at all kinds of allegorical explanations. It is represented already by Philo and later in the Christian church by Clemens, Origenes, Athanasius, Augustinus, Erigena, Abaelard, Cajetan, Canus, Gonzalez etc., also by Mozes Maimonides, More Nebuchim II c. 30. The other direction holds fast to the literal sense of the creation narrative, specifically also of the six days; it was followed by Tertullianus, Basilus, Gregorius [465] Nyss., Ephraem, Damascenus, and thereafter in scholasticism, in Roman Catholic and Protest. theology almost to exclusive dominion, although the other exegesis of Augustinus was always discussed with respect and never anathematized, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 15, 5. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 74 art. 2. In spite of this important difference in the exegesis of Gen. 1, there was nevertheless in the worldview complete agreement. The Ptolemaic system still held its ground in more recent times, long after Copernicus had come forward with his explanation of the motion of the heavenly bodies. It was absolutely not the church and orthodoxy as

such, which resisted the more recent worldview, as one so gladly represents it, e.g. Draper in his *Gesch. van de worsteling tusschen godsd. en wet.* Haarlem 1887. But it was Aristotelianism, which on every terrain, both on that of science and of religion, of art as of church, sought to maintain itself against the more recent time. Hence it is that the Christian church and theology, although they have now generally exchanged the Ptolemaic for the Copernican hypothesis, have nevertheless remained in existence up to the present day and toward the end of this century by no means yet appear to be written off for death. It is a proof that church and theology are not so bound to these worldviews, that they would stand and fall with these. Indeed it is not to be seen why the Copernican hypothesis, if it otherwise sufficiently explains the astronomical phenomena, should have to be rejected by Christian theology as such. For indeed Scripture always speaks geocentrically and also relates the origin of things from the standpoint of the earth, but in doing so it employs that same language of daily experience in which we still always speak, even though we have a wholly different conception of the motion of the heavenly bodies than that which generally prevailed in the time when the books of the Bible were written. One can even without hesitation acknowledge that the biblical writers also had no other worldview than that which was then generally accepted; for there is after all a distinction between *auctoritas historiae* and *auctoritas normae*, cf. deel I 371-373. From this language of Holy Scripture it is to be explained that the miracle which is related in Jos. 10:12, 13 and 2 Kon. 20:9, Jes. 38:8, is indicated by the standing still and returning of the sun. [466] Thereby it is by no means decided that the miracle itself consisted in an objective standing still and returning of the sun. Without its being exegeted away rationalistically, it can be and has also been explained in very many

ways, cf. Dilloo, *Das Wunder an den Stufen des Achaz*. Amst. 1885. We too would now express the same phenomena in the same way; Scripture relates the miracle as fact, it does not say in what way it came about. But even stronger; even if in an astronomical sense the earth is for us no longer the center, it is nevertheless indeed so in a religious and ethical sense, and it remains so for all human beings without distinction; science can change nothing about this. Man is in a certain sense the weakest of all creatures; the strength of many an animal, the power of nature far surpasses his; and yet he is the king of the earth, the crown of creation; he is weak as a reed, but he is a *roseau pensant*. And thus may the earth be thousands of times smaller than many planets; it is and remains in an ethical sense the center of the universe, it is the only planet suitable as a dwelling place for higher beings; here the kingdom of God is established, here the struggle between light and darkness is fought, here God prepares for himself in the congregation an eternal dwelling. We therefore continue from this earth to look upward to above, whence both in a physical and ethical sense the rain and the sunshine and the growth must come, without our thereby determining in an astronomical sense the place of heaven or knowing its position in the universe. It is, however, certainly said rather superficially, that scientific investigation would have deprived God and the angels of their dwelling. For even if Lalande presumed to say that he had searched the whole universe and nowhere had found God; the universe with its immeasurable spaces is for our limited gaze still one riddle, and whoever does not find God in his immediate proximity, in conscience and heart, in word and congregation, will also not find Him in the universe, even if he arms his eye also with the best telescope, Ebrard, *Het geloof aan de H. Schrift en de uitkomsten van het onderzoek der natuur*, Vert. door Dr. A. v.

d. Linde, Amst. 1862. Paul Wigand, Die Erde der Mittelpunkt der Welt. Heft 144 van de Zeitfr. des chr. Volkslebens. [467]

5. The Copernican worldview therefore encounters no objection on the part of Christian theology. Quite different, however, is the case with the hypotheses which nowadays are accepted by science for the formation of our planetary system and of the earth. With respect to the former, Kant and Laplace proposed the hypothesis that our planetary system and actually even the entire universe had originally been one gaseous chaos, of very high temperature and rotating from the West to the East around its own axis. This rotation had as a consequence that pieces flew off, which, because they continued to move in the same direction, gradually assumed the form of spheres, Haeckel, Natürl. Schöpfungsgesch., 5te Aufl. 1874 S. 285 f. Fr. Pfaff, Schöpfungsgesch. mit bes. Berücksichtigung des bibl. Schöpfungsberichts, 3te Ausg. 1881 8. 190 f. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff, 16e Aufl. 1888 S. 130 f. Now it deserves first of all remark, that this hypothesis, however deistically conceived, was by Kant absolutely not advanced in order to set God aside, but he judged that this chaotic condition of all materials was the simplest that could follow upon nothing, and that those materials themselves were all so formed by God as the first cause, that they could by immanent forces, according to fixed laws, bring forth the present world-system without any miraculous intervention of God. This hypothesis, however, is further insufficient for explanation of the origin of the universe, of motion, of organic beings. In general it must be remarked, that however primitive and chaotic that first condition of all matter may be conceived and however many millions of years it may be set back, it nevertheless affords no rest for thought. One will then either with Kant have to acknowledge that this very first condition of the creature in its entirety depends

immediately on God and follows upon nothing, or one will in that chaotic condition have to see not only the beginning of the present world-system, but also the end and the destruction of a preceding world, and so in infinitum, and thus have to eternalize matter and motion, Lange, *Gesch. des Mater.* II 522. Strauss, *Der alte u. d. neue Glaube* 225. Büchner, *ib.* 133. Haeckel *ib.* 288. But further this hypothesis is burdened by many objections and it does not explain the phenomena. All of them need not be discussed here, e.g. not the fact [468] that there are also heavenly bodies which have a retrograde motion and rotate not from the West to the East, but from the East to the West. They are, however, so weighty that they are also acknowledged by Haeckel. Only let it be recalled that, given the gaseous nebular mass and given also the mechanical motion, this is still by no means sufficient to explain this world-system. For motion and matter is not enough. There must also be direction in that motion and besides matter there must also have existed something else in order to explain the world of spiritual phenomena. Why did this world-system arise out of that nebular mass, which everywhere betrays order and harmony and which would collapse at the slightest deviation? How could the universe come into being through an unconscious, purposeless motion of atoms? The chance of such a world-whole out of such a chaotic condition is in the highest degree improbable, and actually wholly impossible. And in addition there then comes still, that this hypothesis, even if it explained the phenomena, would nevertheless remain a hypothesis. For what conclusion is there to draw from possibility to actuality? *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. What proof can be adduced that the world-system now could not have arisen in that way, but has in fact arisen? There is a great difference between a logical supposition and an actual condition that would once have existed. When

natural science investigates the phenomena, it attempts to reduce them to their simplest form. It therefore in the end assumes very primitive and very simplest data, atoms, aether, chaos etc. But these are logical suppositions to which it arrives. That such atoms once purely as atoms, in a most primitive condition, have existed, in a condition that followed upon nothing, that is thereby absolutely not proved. Just as the original elements of things (atoms, dynamids, monads), so also the primitive conditions which one lets precede the formation are nothing but auxiliary representations, no reality. It is with them as with that religionless condition which nowadays in the investigation into the origin of religion is assumed, cf. deel I 208, or as with the state of nature of Rousseau, out of which by contrat social the state has arisen. Perhaps all such hypotheses as auxiliary representations in thought, like the auxiliary lines in the [469] mathesis, can render some service, but they are therefore still no real explanations, no factual principia of what exists. Finally, what no science can teach, revelation teaches, which is moreover confirmed by the tradition of all peoples, namely that it has pleased God in the formation of the world to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, from the simple to the composite, from the lower to the higher. There lies a truth in the theory of evolution, which is also acknowledged by Scripture. Gen. 1:2 expresses that clearly. But the condition of creation there is a real condition; no chaos in the proper sense, no ὕλη in the Aristotelian sense, no prima materia without forma, no unthinkable mass of pure atoms, but a condition of formlessness of earth and heaven, which existed for a time, in which the Spirit of God was active, hovering and brooding. It therefore will not do, with many Christian apologists, to adopt the hypothesis of Kant-Laplace without any form of criticism and then to be grateful that one has been able to insert it so well into Gen. 1:2. Rather,

Scripture relates to us a real condition and science speaks of suppositions which are scientifically not tenable, Pfaff, Schöpfungsgesch. S. 731 f. Ulrici, Gott und die Natur, 2e Aufl. 1866 S. 334-353. Reusch, Bibel u. Natur, 4te Aufl. 1876 S. 179 f. T. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel, 2te Aufl. 1892 II 327-352. Braun, Die Kant-Laplace'sche Weltbildungstheorie, in Neue Kirchl. Zeitschr. III 9tes Heft. Steudel, Christenthum und Naturwissenschaft, Gütersloh 1895 S. 142 f. Schanz, Ueber neue Versuche der Apol. Regensburg 1897 S. 211 f.

6. The same difference as in the formation of our world-system also presents itself in the developmental history of the earth. Geology, on the basis of the strata of the earth and of the fossils of plants, animals, and humans found therein, has built a hypothesis concerning the developmental periods of the earth. According to it, the oldest period is the azoic, or that of the Urformation, in which especially the eruptive kinds of rock have been formed and as yet no trace of organic life is found. Thereupon followed the palaeozoic period, or that of the primary formation, in which, besides all kinds of kinds of rock, especially also the coal is formed, and also already plants of the lowest kind and all classes of animals [470] except birds and mammals are encountered. In the third, mesozoic period, or that of the secondary formation, there falls, inter alia, the chalk formation, and all kinds of plants and animals, also the first egg-laying and mammals, are found. The tertiary or kainozoic formation following upon that runs from the chalk formation up to the ice age and, besides plants and land- and freshwater animals, especially also brings forth the predatory animals and many of the extinct mammals. According to a single one, e.g. Burmeister, Gesch. der Schöpfung 7te Aufl. 1872 S. 612, the human being likewise already lived contemporaneously with these in the tertiary period; but

according to most, the human being first appeared at the end of this period, after the ice age, in the quaternary period, Pfaff, Schöpfungsgesch. S. 485 f. Ulrici, Gott u. die Natur S. 353 f. Reusch, Bibel u Natur 184 f. Zittel, Aus der Urzeit, 2e Aufl. 1875 S. 537. This doctrine of the geological periods undoubtedly stands on a much firmer ground than Kant's hypothesis; it rests on data which the investigation of the strata of the earth provides. Here the struggle between revelation and science therefore also bears a much more serious character. On many points there is difference and contradiction. First, in the time, and second, in the order, in which the different creatures have arisen. As regards the time, the difference is very great. The chronology of the LXX deviates considerably from that of the hebr. text. The church fathers often adhered to the Greek translation and then calculated the time from the creation of the world to the taking of Rome by the Goths at 5611 years, Eusebius, Augustinus de civ. XII 10. In later time, especially since the Reformation, one generally gave preference to the chronology of the hebr. text and then calculated that the creation of the world had taken place in 3950 B. C. (Scaliger), or 3984 (Kepler, Petavius), 3943 (Bengel), 4004 (Usher); the Jews now count the year 5658, cf. Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen 1879 S. 289 f. Schanz, Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts, Freiburg 1896 S, 1 f. But one attempted an even more exact calculation. There was serious dispute over whether the creation had taken place in the spring or in the autumn; the former was the opinion of Cyrillus, Basilius, Beda, Cajetanus, Molina, Lapide, Luther, Melancton, Gerhard, Alsted, Polanus, G. J. Vossius etc.; the latter was defended by Petavius, Calvisius, Calov, [471] Danaeus, Zanchius, Voetius, Maresius, Heidegger, Turretinus et al. Sometimes the date was determined still more closely, on 25 March or on 26 October, Voetius Disp. I 587.

Hagenbach, D. G. 630 note. Over against that the geologists and natural scientists of this time place their calculations, which are built on the rotation of the earth in connection with its flattening at the poles, the heat of the earth steadily decreasing toward the surface, the formation of the deltas on Nile and Mississippi, the formation of the strata of the earth, of the different kinds of rock, especially of the coal, etc. They are fabulous numbers, just as among some heathen peoples, which are thus assumed for the age of the earth. Cotta speaks of an unbounded span of time, Lyell of 560 million, Klein of 2000 million, Helmholtz of 80 million, and even Pfaff of at least 20 million years, Pfaff, Schöpf. 640-666, Id. Das Alter der Erde, in de Zeitfr. des chr. Volkslebens VII. Peschel, Völkerkunde, 5te Aufl. S. 42-52. Haeckel, Nat. Schöpf. S. 340 f. But in the second place there is also very great difference between the creation narrative in Genesis and the opinions of many scholars with respect to the order in which the created beings have arisen. To mention only a few points: according to Scripture, the light is indeed already created on the first day, but our solar system is first formed on the fourth day, after on the second and third day the earth was already prepared and covered with a luxuriant plant growth; according to the geologists the order is precisely the reverse. According to Genesis, the plant kingdom is indeed created on the third day, but animals are first created on the fifth day; geology, however, teaches that in the primary or palaeozoic period animals of a lower kind and fishes also already occur. Genesis relates that all water animals and all birds were created on the fifth, and all land animals with the human being on the sixth day, but according to geology some mammals also already belong to the secondary or mesozoic period. Thus it appears, therefore, that on many weighty points difference exists.

7. Naturally, various attempts at reconciliation have been tried. First let the ideal theory be mentioned, so called, because it adheres only to the idea, not to the letter of the creation narrative. It sees in Gen. 1 no historical narrative [472] but a poetic description of the creative act of God. The six days are not chronologically ordered periods of longer or shorter duration, but only different points of view, from which the one created world is each time considered, in order thus to give to the limited gaze of man a better overview of the whole. To palaeontology, therefore, it is left entirely to determine the time, the manner, and the order of the origin of the different periods. One can say that this theory has been prepared by the allegorical exegesis, which from ancient times in the Christian church with respect to Gen. 1 was customary. Following Philo and with appeal to Sir. 18:1, *Deus omnia simul creavit*, Origen, Augustine, and many others taught that God had created all things at once and simultaneously; the six days are not really successive periods but they indicate only the causal connection, the logical order of the creatures, and describe how the angels successively have obtained knowledge of the whole of creation. And also with those who held fast to the literal sense of the creation narrative, the allegory nevertheless each time still played a great role; the chaos, the light, the term one day instead of first day; the absence of the divine approval at the end of the second day, paradise, the creation of Eve, etc. gave occasion to ingenious spiritualizations. Such allegorizing, mythologizing, and rationalizing explanations of the creation narrative came especially into favor after the awakening of natural science and were applied by Hobbes, Spinoza, Beverland, Burnet, Bekker, Tindal, Edelmann, J. L. Schmidt, Reimarus e. a. Herder, *Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts*, saw in Gen. 1 a beautiful poem of the oldest humanity, which, proceeding from the dawning

day, sang of the seven-day week. Modern philosophy and theology has advanced still further, has rejected along with the creation narrative even the concept of creation, and sees in Gen. 1 a myth, which at most still contains a religious core. Christian theologians have not gone so far but have nevertheless often, in order to reconcile religion and science, returned to the allegorical conception of Augustine and give up the literal and historical conception of Genesis I. To that belong very many Roman Catholic theologians, Michelis, Entw. der beiden ersten Kapitel der Genesis 1845 and various [473] articles in his journal *Natur u. Offenbarung* 1855 f. Reusch, *Bibel u. Natur* S. 251 f. Schanz, *Apol. des Christ.* I 293 f. Scheeben, *Dogm.* II 105 f. H. Lüken, *Die Stiftungsurkunde des Menschengeschl.* 1876. Güttler, *Naturforschung u. Bibel* 1877. Hummelauer, B. Schäfer e. a. cf. Hettinger, *Apol.* III 7 S. 206 etc.; but also numerous Protestant theologians such as Zollmann, *Bibel u. Natur in der Harmonie ihrer Offenbarungen* 1869 S. 52 f. Dillmann, *Comm. op Genesis.* Riehm, *Christ. und Naturwiss.* Leipzig, Hinrich 1896. Steudel, *Christ. u. Naturw.* Gütersloh 1895. Vuilleumier, *La première page de la Bible*, *Revue de théol. et de philos.* Juillet 1896 p. 362-377. Sept. p. 393-418.

A second attempt at reconciliation is the restitution theory. This seeks agreement between revelation and science by separating Gen. 1:2 and 3, ascribing to the chaos a long duration of existence and placing in it all those phenomena which geology provides. The hexaemeron, which begins with verse 3, relates only the restoration and preparation of the earth for man. Such a rather long span of time between Gen. 1:1 and 2 was already assumed by Episcopus, *Instit. theol.* IV sect. 3 c. 3, Limborch, *Theol. Christ.* II c. 19-21 e. a., in order thus to obtain room for the fall of the angels. It was taken over in the previous century by the rationalists J. G.

Rosenmüller, J. D. Michaelis, Reinhard; found entrance especially in this century among the theosophists Oetinger, Hahn, St. Martin, Baader, Schelling, Fr. v. Meyer, Steffens, Schubert, Keerl, who placed in it the fall of the angels and the devastation of creation caused thereby; and has also been taught by Chalmers, kardinaal Wisemann, Zusammenhang zw. Wiss. u. Offenb., deutsch von Haneberg, 3te Aufl. 1866 S. 263 f. Vigouroux, *het livres saints* III 442. Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.* I 474 enz.

A third theory, the concordistic, seeks to obtain harmony of Scripture and science by conceiving the days of creation as periods of longer duration. The exegesis of the six days already early yielded objection. Sun, moon, and stars were first created on the fourth day; the three days preceding that therefore had in any case to be of a different nature than the last three. Basil explained it thus, that God effected the first three days by an emission and contraction [474] of the light created on the first day, Strauss, I 621. But this explanation did not satisfy all, e.g. not Augustine, who sometimes deviates from his own Simultan-theory, *de Gen. ad lit.* I 16. Moreover, there was still difference over whether the work of creation on each day was completed in one moment, or whether it first came into being successively in the course of each day. Descartes had namely said that out of the chaos, without any act of creation of God, the *res pure naturales* could have come forth. The idea of development was thereby given a handle. Some Cartesian theologians, such as Wittichius, Allinga, Braun, therefore taught that each work of creation took up a day, cf. M. Vitringa II 95. Moor II 212. And Whiston already said that the days must be conceived as years, and was followed in that by others. But father of the concordistic theory has been the abbot Jerusalem. It was taken over by natural scientists such as de Luc, Cuvier, Hugh Miller, Pfaff etc., by theologians such as Lange, Delitzsch,

Rougemont, Godet, Ebrard, Der Glaube an die H. Schrift und die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung 1861. Luthardt, Apol. Vorträge, 8 Aufl. 1878. Zöckler among others in Herzog 13, 647, Brandt in Bew. d. Gl. 1867 S. 339 f., Hengstenberg, cf. Bew. d. Gl. 1867 S. 400 f., also Roman Catholics such as Heinrich, Palmieri, Simar, Dogm. 249, Pesch, Prael. III 40 etc. Quite often many have connected this theory with the restitution-theory, and then still have contented themselves with an agreement in main points. Hugh Miller e.g. let the azoic period coincide with Gen. 1:3, the palaeozoic with Gen. 1:6-13, the mesozoic with Gen. 1:14-23, the cainozoic with Gen. 1:24, Zöckler, Gesch. II 544.

The fourth theory, finally, which has indeed been called the anti-geological one, holds fast to the literal and historical view of Genesis I, and seeks to place the results of geology partly in the six days of creation, partly also thereafter in the time from Adam to Noah, especially also in the flood. From ancient times the flood was regarded as of great significance. People reasoned about the total or partial character, which has always been in dispute, about the construction of the ark, about the height of the flood, etc. Zöckler II 122 f. But the flood first acquired geological significance after Newton; Thomas Burnet in 1682 published his *Theoria sacra telluris* and in it assumed a very great distinction [475] between the time before and after the flood; with him this becomes the destruction of an old and the birth of an entirely new world. It was a tremendous catastrophe, which changed the whole surface of the earth, gave oceans and mountains their appearance, put an end to the mild spring climate, to the luxuriant fertility, to the extraordinary lifespan of human beings before that time, and above all brought it about that the earth's axis, which previously stood parallel to the axis of the sun, came to stand obliquely to the earth's orbit. This entirely

new theory was fiercely contested, inter alia by Spanheim and Leydecker, but was nevertheless further developed by Whiston, Clüver and many others, Zöckler II 143-192. Toward the end of the previous century this diluvialistic theory was more and more abandoned, but it nevertheless still remained in honor among many orthodox, both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, cf. Keil, on Genesis, and furthermore others in Zöckler, II 470-482, 788 f. The proponents of this attempt at reconciliation continue to identify the flood of the Bible with the diluvium or the ice age of geology and judge in connection therewith that the flood was universal and extended over the whole earth. Most geologists and theologians, such as Sedgwick, Greenough, Buckland, Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, Barry, Dawson, Diestel, Dillmann, Pfaff, Kurtz, Michelis, Reusch, Guttler, also Kuyper, Heraut 929. 930. 962, are now in recent times indeed of the opinion that the flood of the Bible was a wholly different one than the diluvium of geology and therefore must also be understood as partial; universal it can only be called insofar as the whole human race perished by it, although even this latter is still denied by some, such as Cuvier. But the debate over this important and difficult question has by no means yet been decided in favor of this latter opinion; the most recent study on the flood, by Martin Gander, is a powerful plea for the diluvialistic view. Cf. Zöckler, *Gesch. der Bez.* II 784-791. Id. in *Herzog* 13, 645 f. Diestel, *Die Sintflut*, *Deutsche Zeit- u. Streitfragen*, n. 137. Kusters, *The Bibl. Flood narratives compared with the Babyl.*, *Theol. Tijdschr.* 1885 p. 161v. 321v. Reusch, *Bibel u. Natur* 289 f. Schanz, *Apol.* I 341 f. Vigouroux, *Les livres saints* IV 239. Suess, *Die Sintfluth*, Leipzig 1883. Jürgens, *War die Sintflut eine Erdbebenwelle?* St. aus Maria Laach 1884. Howorth, *Das Mammut und die Fluth*, [476] 1893. Girard, *Etudes de géologie biblique. Le déluge devant la critique*

histor. I Freiburg 1893. Schwarz, Sintflut und Völkerwanderungen, Stuttgart 1894. C. Schmidt, Das Naturereigniss der Sintfluth, Basel 1895. Zöckler, Neue Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1895, Heft 3 en 4. Martin Gander, Die Sündflut in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erdgeschichte, Münster 1896.

8. These four attempts to bring Scripture and science into agreement are not in every respect opposed to one another. Even in the first-mentioned ideal theory there still lies some truth. For by all it is conceded that Scripture does not speak the language of science but that of daily experience, that it also, in the narrative of creation, stands on a geo- or anthropocentric standpoint, and that it thereby does not wish to give a lesson in geology or any other science, but that also, in the narrative of the origin and the becoming of all creatures, it remains the book of religion, of revelation, of the knowledge of God. *Non legitur in Evangelio dominum dixisse: mitto vobis paracletum qui vos doceat de cursu solis et lunae; christianos enim facere volebat, non mathematicos*, August. de actis c. Felice Man. I 10. *Moses rudi populo condescendens secutus est, quae sensibilibus apparent*, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 70 art. 4. *S. Scriptura ex professo non tractat eas res, quas in philosophia cognoscimus*, Alsted, Praecognita 181, cf. Voetius, Disp. V 131. Hettinger, Apol. III 196. But if Scripture then nevertheless, from its standpoint, precisely as book of religion, comes into contact with other sciences and also lets its light shine upon them, then it does not suddenly cease to be God's word but remains that. Also when it speaks about the formation of heaven and earth, it gives no saga or myth or poetic fantasy, but then too it gives, according to its clear intention, history, which deserves faith and trust. And therefore Christian theology also, with only a few exceptions, held fast to the literal, historical conception of the creation narrative. Yet it is remarkable that no

single confession determined anything about the hexaemeron and that also in theology all kinds of explanations alongside one another were tolerated. Augustine already admonished, on this terrain, not to deem something too quickly to be in conflict with Scripture, not to speak about these difficult subjects except after serious study, and not through ignorance to make oneself ridiculous in the eyes of unbelieving science, *de Gen. ad lit.* I 18. 19. 20. 21, cf. also Thomas, *S. Th.* I qu. 68 art. 1. The warning has not always been faithfully taken to heart by the theologians. And yet geology can render us excellent service in the explanation of the creation narrative. Just as the Ptolemaic world-view has pressed theology to another and better explanation of the standing still of the sun in *Jos.* 10; just as Assyriology and Egyptology are precious contributions for the interpretation of Scripture; just as history many times first makes prophecy known in its true meaning; so also the geological and palaeontological investigations in this century serve for better understanding of the creation narrative. Let one indeed well consider that the creation and preparation of heaven and earth is a divine work par excellence, a miracle in the absolute sense, full of hidden things and mysteries. And yet in Genesis this work is narrated in so simple and sober a manner, that there almost seems to exist a disharmony between the fact itself and the description of it. Behind every feature in the creation narrative lies a world of wonders and mighty deeds of God, which by geology are displayed before our eyes in an immeasurable series of phenomena. Of the facts brought to light by geology and palaeontology, Scripture and theology therefore have nothing to fear. Also the world is a book of which all the pages have been written by God's almighty hand. The conflict arises only because both the text of the book of Scripture and that of nature are often so badly read and understood. The theologians are not

free from blame here, and have often, in the name not of Scripture but of their own incorrect conception, condemned science. And the natural investigators have repeatedly interpreted the facts and phenomena which they discovered in a manner and placed them in the service of a world-view which was justified neither by Scripture nor by science. For the present it would deserve recommendation that geology, which relatively is still such a young science and indeed has already investigated much but nevertheless still has so endlessly much to investigate, should limit itself to the collecting of material and should refrain from building conclusions and from setting up hypotheses. It is absolutely not yet in a position to do that and must still exercise patience for a long time, before it is authorized and competent to do so.

9. When these preliminary remarks are now taken to heart, then in the first place it is probable that the creation of heaven and earth in Gen. 1:1 preceded the work of the six days in verse 3 ff. by a shorter or longer time. The restitution theory has certainly gone astray, if it placed in Gen. 1:2 the fall of the angels and the devastation of the earth. For of this there is not a word; it also does not say that the earth became waste and empty, but that it was that and that it was created thus; and the waste and emptiness by no means implies that the earth was devastated but that it, although already earth, was nevertheless still unformed, without form or shape. But otherwise it is correct that the creation of heaven and earth and the waste and empty condition of the earth cannot be placed within the first day; this began only and by the nature of the case could only begin with the light. The first day is not formed by the original darkness and by the light created thereafter, but it is formed by the first alternation of evening and morning, which entered after the creation of the light. The darkness of which Gen.

1:2 speaks was not the first evening; but only after the light had been created did it become evening and thereafter morning. And with that morning the first day was finished, which had begun with the creation of the light; the day in Genesis begins and ends with the morning, cf. Keil, Delitzsch e. a. on Genesis. Also Augustine, Conf. XII 8, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 12, 1. 2, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 74 art. 2, Petavius, de sex dier. opif. I c. 9 n. 2 e. a. therefore judged rightly, that the creation of heaven and earth and the waste condition of the earth took place ante omnem diem. Thus also only does it come into its own, that the creation in Gen. 1:1 is simply narrated as a fact without any further description, but that the preparation of the earth, Gen. 1:3 ff. is narrated at length. Gen. 1:1 says only that God is the Creator of all things, but makes no mention of the fact that God created them through his Word and Spirit. Naturally this is not denied; but it nevertheless is not there; and likewise it is not there, in how much [479] time and in what manner God created heaven and earth, and how long the unformed condition of the earth lasted. Only when the six-day work begins is it said that also that unformed earth was maintained and made fruitful by God's Spirit, Gen. 1:2, and that all things on and in that earth have been brought into being by the Word of God, Gen. 1:3ff.; in the distinctio and ornatus of the earth during the six days God's wisdom comes forth, Calvin on Gen. 1:3. But even if one, with a view to Ex. 20:11, 31:17, wanted to bring what is narrated in Gen. 1:1 and 2 within the first day, then thereby only would be obtained that the first day would have been a wholly unusual one. It would then have begun in the moment of creation, and would first for a time have been dark, Gen. 1:2. In any case this exegesis does recognize as true that there is enclosed in it the concordistic theory mentioned above in the second place. Let it be fully conceded that the

conception of the creation days as periods of time has arisen on the occasion of geology. Thereby, however, it is absolutely not judged; the question is only whether Scripture, without violence being done to its sense, allows this conception. Formerly one considered Jos. 10:12 incompatible with the Ptolemaic world-view, now on that ground it is no longer rejected by anyone; everyone acknowledges that the words of Scripture allow another conception than that which formerly was held to be the only true one. The prophetic expectations prove in reality to extend over much longer spans of time than the words in which they are clothed, at the first reading, lead one to suppose. The day of *Ihvh* comprises a much longer period of time than the word itself contains. The apostles spoke of a little time, the end, the last time, the last hour, etc., and yet since their word eighteen centuries have sped by. With a view to this wholly peculiar standard, which Holy Scripture repeatedly applies in time determinations, it is a priori not impossible that also the days in Gen. 1 are to be understood as periods of time. But there are also positive data, which make this exegesis not necessary but nevertheless possible. On the expressions occurring repeatedly in Scripture: in the days of, at the end of days (= after many years), all the day (= always), in the day that (= when) etc., too much emphasis is often laid in this connection; the figurative meaning of [480] the word day in Old and New Test. e.g. Isa. 2:2, 11, 13:6 etc., Mt. 24:22, Luk. 10:12, Joh. 9:4, Acts 2:20, 17:31, Rom. 2:16, 1 Cor. 3:13, 1 Thess. 5:2, 4, likewise has insufficient probative force; and the appeal to Ps. 90:4 and 2 Petr. 3:8 also has little bearing on the matter. But the following is indeed of importance. First, as was shown above, it is in conflict with Gen. 1 to bring the *creatio prima* in the unformed condition of the earth into the first day. If, however, one nevertheless does that, this first day in any case becomes a

wholly unusual one, which begins with the darkness and whose duration cannot be calculated. Second, the first three days of the creatio secunda also according to the intention of Genesis are calculated by a wholly different standard than the following three. The essence of day and night does not consist in a shorter or longer duration but in the alternation of light and darkness. This alternation for the first three days was not effected by the sun, which was created only on the fourth day, but has in another way been brought about by the light created in verse 3. If, however, this is the case, the length of those first three days is also not to be determined. Third, it follows from that that also the following three days in the same way and in agreement with the first three days can be understood as periods of time. For indeed on the fourth day sun, moon, and stars were created and it is in itself thus possible that the second set of three days was determined by the rotation of the earth. But the creation narrative does say that sun, moon, and stars were then made and obtained their destination for the earth, but it does not say a word that that destination on that same day at once was fully attained. The creation period itself was in wholly different circumstances than those which entered after the completion of the work of creation. Only then was everything finished and determined. Fourth, it is very difficult to place on the sixth day all that Gen. 1 and 2 let happen on it. On that day must then fall the creation of the animals, Gen. 1:24, 25, the forming of Adam, Gen. 1:26, 2:7, the planting of the garden, Gen. 1:8-14, the proclamation of the probationary command, Gen. 2:16, 17, the leading of the animals to and their naming by Adam, Gen. 2:18-20, the sleep of Adam and the creation of Eve, Gen. 2:21-23. This may now not be impossible, [481] yet it is not probable. Yes, if Scripture in Gen. 1:26-31 mentions the creation of Adam and Eve in one breath and of all that the second creation

narrative inserts between them makes not the least mention and then nevertheless places all that on the sixth day, Gen. 1:31, thereby the possibility that the days are periods of time is sufficiently proven. Fifth, it is not the intention of Genesis to show that the creation of all things took place precisely in 6×24 hours, not a minute shorter or longer. But day in the creation narrative denotes the time in which God was active creating. With each morning he gives a new world its appearance; the evening enters when he has brought this into being. The creation days are God's workdays. Through a sixfold renewed labor he has prepared the whole earth and changed the chaos into a cosmos. This is set before us as an example in the sabbath commandment. As for God, so also for man after six-day labor rest enters. With Israel that creation time was also the foundation for the division of the ecclesiastical year. And for the whole world it remains a type of the aeons of this dispensation, which once ends in the world-sabbath, in the eternal rest, Hebr. 4. Sixth finally, on each creation day much more has happened than the sober words of Genesis lead us to suppose. As in the decalogue one single sin comprehends many others under itself, so also in the creation narrative of each day only the principal thing is named, that which for man is the best known and the most important. Scripture itself proves that, for the first creation narrative contains nothing of paradise, the naming of the animals, Adam's sleep, etc., which are mentioned only in the second creation narrative. And further natural investigation teaches us to know all manner of creatures, of which the writer of Genesis did not think for a moment; all manner of chemical elements, many minerals and plants, and various kinds of animals, insects, infusoria, bacteria, are not named in Genesis. Yet they must nevertheless have been created, and thus find a place in the hexaemeron. On each day the work of creation has certainly been

much greater and richer than Genesis reports to us in its simply sublime narrative.

10. With this view of the creation narrative the [482] results of geological research can very well be brought into agreement. But one must then certainly know what those results are. As soon as, however, one undertakes a somewhat more precise investigation into that, one runs up against all kinds of objections and everything becomes all the more uncertain, the more deeply one investigates and the further one penetrates. Naturally no one has, and can have, any objection to the facts which geology brings to light. Those facts are just as much words of God as the content of Holy Scripture, and thus to be accepted by every believer. But from those facts the exegesis which the geologists present of them must be very strictly distinguished. The phenomena which the earth displays are one thing; the combinations, hypotheses, conclusions which are connected with them by the investigators of the earth are another. Apart now from the absolutely not imaginary possibility that the observation, ascertainment, and description of the geological facts and phenomena also sometimes indeed stands under the influence of an a priori worldview, geology today teaches unanimously that the earth's surface is composed of different layers, which all clearly bear the marks of having been deposited in water; that these earth layers, where and insofar as they are present anywhere, always occur in a certain order, so that, e.g., a lower formation never lies in between higher ones; and finally that these earth layers contain a great mass of fossils, which again are not scattered motley and mixed through all layers, but are of a lower kind the lower they occur in lower sediments. Those are the facts; and upon them all those long geological periods have then been built by the geologists, which were already enumerated earlier. But precisely against these geological

periods there exist very serious objections. 1o. First of all it deserves consideration that geology is still a young science. It is not yet a hundred years old. In the first half of its existence it was, with men such as von Buch, de Saussure etc., absolutely not hostile to Scripture; only when Lyell et al. placed it in the service of the theory of evolution did it become a weapon for combating the biblical creation narrative. This consideration already admonishes to caution; if geological science becomes older and richer, it will on this point probably revise itself. 2o. Geology one may call the archaeology of the earth. It teaches us [483] to know conditions in which the earth formerly was. But it naturally tells us about the cause, the origin, the duration etc. of those conditions as good as nothing. To want to construct a history of the earth from the phenomena of the earth seems a priori an undertaking just as hazardous as to want to make up the history of a people from the archaeological remains of a people. As an aid archaeology may be very useful; it cannot replace history. Geology offers important data, but it can of course never deliver a Schöpfungsgeschichte. Whoever attempts that must at every moment take refuge in conjectures. All birth, said Schelling, is from darkness to light. All origins lie in the dark. If one does not tell us who our parents and forefathers were, then we do not know it. If there is no creation narrative, the history of the earth is and remains unknown to us. 3o. Geology can therefore also never reach as far as the creation narrative; it stands of itself on the foundation of the created and does not approach Gen. 1; it can ascertain what it observes, but the origins of it only suspect. Very rightly and beautifully the geologist Ritter von Holger says: Wir haben das Unangenehme, dass wir erst ins Theater gekommen sind, nachdem bereits der Vorhang gefallen ist. Wir müssen das Schauspiel das gegeben wurde, aus dem auf der Bühne zurückgebliebenen

Dekorationen, Versatzstücken, Waffen u. s. w. (das sind namentlich die paläontologischen Entdeckungen oder die Versteinerungen) zu erraten suchen, daher ist es sehr verzeihlich, wenn wir uns irren, bij Trissl, Das bibl. Sechstageswerk 1894 S. 73. 4o. Although the earth layers, where and insofar as they occur anywhere, lie in a certain order, yet it is equally a fact that they nowhere occur all together and complete, but some are found here, others elsewhere. Wir haben nirgends ein vollständiges Exemplar des Buches der Erde, sondern verstreut über dieselbe eine grosse Menge von defecten Exemplaren von dem verschiedensten Formate und auf sehr verschiedenem Materiale, Pfaff, Schöpf. 5. 5o. The series and the order of the earth layers and thus also of the geological periods built upon them is therefore not immediately given by the facts, but rests on a combination of facts, which is exposed to all kinds of conjecture and error. There belongs, according to the acknowledgment of the geologists themselves, much patience and effort to it, [484] in order to establish the correct order of the earth layers, Geikie, Geologie, deutsch von O. Schmidt, Strassburg 1886 S. 55. Pfaff, Schöpf. 5. 5o. Of the surface of the earth only a very small portion has yet been investigated, especially England, Germany, and France. Of the other parts of Europe still little, of the greatest part of Asia, Africa, New Holland etc. still as good as nothing is known. Even Hæckel concedes that scarcely the thousandth part of the earth's surface has been palaeontologically investigated, Nat. Schöpf. 1874 S. 355. And this calculation is certainly not estimated too low. Later investigations can therefore still bring all kinds of other facts to light. The hypotheses and conclusions of geology are thus in any case built on an insufficient number of data. 6o. It is a fact, which finds more and more recognition from the side of geology, that the time of the formation of the earth layers absolutely

cannot be determined from the nature and the quality of those layers. Die Beschaffenheit der Schichten, says Pfaff, t. a. p. 5, giebt durchaus keinen Anhaltspunkt an die Hand, um über die Zeit ihrer Bildung einen Aufschluss zu erhalten. Under the influence of Darwinism, which wanted to explain everything by infinitely small changes in infinitely great spans of time, one has indeed spoken of millions of years. But those are simply mythological numbers, for which all ground is lacking, Schelling, Werke, II 1 S. 229. The geologists still absolutely do not know whether formerly the same or rather other circumstances prevailed. And even under equal circumstances everything grows in youth much faster and stronger than in later years. Moreover, all the grounds on which the geologists up to now built their numbers have proved untenable. The delta formations, the uplifts and subsidences of the mainland, the coal formations etc. have all again been abandoned as a basis of calculation. Sober natural investigators today therefore also speak entirely differently. Es fehlet uns jeder exacte Massstab zur Berechnung vorhistorischer Ereignisse, Zittel, Aus der Urzeit, 2e Aufl. 1875 S. 556. 7o. Also the order in which the earth layers occur can be no standard for calculating the time and the duration of their formation. Naturally in a particular place the lowest layer is older than the uppermost, but all right is lacking to join together the different earth layers of different places and thus to form a series of formations and periods [485] . Wie jetzt in unseren Meeren an einer Stelle sich Kalkniederschläge bilden, während zu derselben Zeit an anderen Orten sich Lagen von Sand oder Lehm übereinander absetzen, so haben sich auch in früheren Zeiten an verschiedenen Orten gleichzeitig verschiedenartige Schichten gebildet, und wieder gleichartige zu verschiedenen Zeiten, Pfaff, ib. The layers from so-called different periods are not constantly different, and those which are

held to be equally old are not always qualitatively equal, Trissl 61. In the same time in different parts of the earth equal formations can have taken place, just as that still today often happens. 80. The time of the formation of the earth layers and the order of their position is therefore today almost exclusively determined according to the petrifications which are found in them, cf. art. Geognosie bij Brockhaus. Geology has become dependent on palaeontology, and this today stands almost entirely in the service of the theory of evolution. In advance it is assumed as proven that the organic beings have developed from the lower to the higher; and upon that the order and the duration of the sediment formations is then built. Conversely one then used the order of the sediments again as a proof for the theory of evolution and thus made oneself guilty of a *circulus vitiosus*. Now, however, the theory of evolution is much more refuted than favored by palaeontology. For in the different layers different fossils of plants and animals do not occur in some few specimens and kinds. But with every layer geology at once and suddenly stands before an immeasurably rich world of organic life, distinguished in kinds and supplemented by no transitional forms. Even petrifications of plants and animals are found which have since become extinct, surpass all later formations in size and strength, and as it were make nature known to us in her first creative power, in her luxuriant fertility, Pfaff, Schöpf. 667-709. 90. Now it is indeed true that the fossils are not scattered motley and mixed through all layers, but that in certain layers as a rule certain plants and animals also occur. Yet also from this neither for the theory of evolution nor for the geological periods is anything to be inferred with certainty. For the different kinds of plants and animals were and are distributed over the surface of the earth in accordance with their nature and conditions of life [486] ; they lived in different places

and zones, and they thus also had to petrify in the different sediments which were formed in different places. The petrifications are therefore not representatives of the time of origin of the organic beings, but of the higher or deeper zones in which they lived. Suppose, after all, that the plants and animals now living over the whole earth were suddenly buried in earth layers and petrified, then neither from the distinct kinds of fossils nor from the different layers in which they occurred would any conclusion be drawn with respect to the time of their origin. And besides that there then still come all kinds of other circumstances which make the division and calculation of the geological periods almost impossible, such as, e.g., that the distinct kinds of plants and animals in the first time were not so spread over the whole earth as later; that of many plants and animals in the different layers no petrifications have been preserved; that manifold causes can have brought some plants and animals into places and zones in which they did not live by nature; that the same earth layers indeed usually but by no means always contain the same kinds of fossils, and that therefore earth layers which are qualitatively equal and were first placed in the same time were later again assigned elsewhere, because one found new and other petrifications in them, etc. 10o. The geologists themselves often acknowledge that the geological periods are not strictly to be separated. Especially with the tertiary and quaternary period this comes out. Here almost everything is uncertain. Uncertain is the boundary, the beginning, the end, the duration of those two epochs. Uncertain is the cause, the extent, the duration of the so-called ice period; there is difference over whether one or more ice times must be assumed; and even the whole existence of an ice time is still subjected to serious doubt. Uncertain is the cause, the time and the manner in which the great prehistoric animals perished, whose fossils

are sometimes still preserved wholly uninjured. Uncertain is the appearance of man, before or after the ice time, in the tertiary or quaternary period, at the same time with or after the mammoth, mastodon and rhinoceros. Uncertain is the cause of the diluvial formations and of their extension over the whole earth. Uncertain is the cause and the time of the mountain and [487] glacier formations, in which only the fact that the displacements of the glaciers from the North to the middle of Europe would require for the Scandinavian mountains a height of 44000 meters offers an almost insurmountable objection etc. 11o. Besides that there finally comes still that Scripture and the unanimous tradition of almost all peoples relates an awe-inspiring flood, which has brought a tremendous reversal in the whole condition of the earth. According to Scripture after the flood an entirely different condition enters in for man and earth. Humanity before the flood distinguished itself by great intellect, vigorous spirit of enterprise, titanic courage, long lifespan, strong bodily development, dreadful godlessness. And without doubt nature, the plant and animal kingdom, was in accordance with that. But in the flood almost all people perish, many kinds of plants and animals die out, nature is put under restraint, a gentler dispensation enters in, the dispensation in which we live. These testimonies of Scripture are confirmed on all sides by geology. Man from the tertiary period has not yet been found, and it is not probable that he will ever be found; humanity then before the flood probably was not yet spread over the earth; the flood explains that of the people before that time no fossils remain; the skulls and bones which have been found of people here and there were all from the quaternary time and not different from ours. Further, geology teaches clearly that man has still lived simultaneously with the mammoth, the hebr. behemoth, Job 40 vs. 10, and that the mammoth thus

still belongs in the historical time. The universality of the diluvial formations proves that the flood must have extended over the whole earth. The mountains for a great part arose in the historical time. The causes of the ice period, if it has existed at all, are completely unknown and thus can very well have lain in the flood and in the lowering of the temperature which thereafter entered everywhere. Only through and after the diluvium has the earth received its present form. Against the identification of diluvium and flood there is actually only one serious objection, and that is the time. Geology usually places the ice time and the diluvium some thousands of years before Christ. [488] But on the one hand it is to be remarked against that that the chronology of Scripture also is by no means yet fixed. One need not go so far as de Sacy, who said: *il n'y a pas de chronologie biblique*, in order nevertheless to agree with Voetius, when he declared: *ex S. Scriptura exacta supputatio haberi non potest*, Disp. V 153. It is not impossible that sometimes generations have been skipped and personal names have been meant as tribal names. And on the other hand the geological calculations, as was said above, are far too uncertain for an objection against the above view to be derived from them. 12o. When we summarize all this and take it into account, then Scripture from the moment of creation onward in Gen. 1:1 up to the flood offers a more than sufficient span of time for the placing of all those facts and phenomena which geology and palaeontology in this century have brought to light. It is not to be seen why these all could not find a place in that time. More theology now also has not to do; it has not to concern itself with the causes of those phenomena; the explanation of the facts remain to geology! But perhaps Scripture can thereby nevertheless render better service than natural science usually suspects. For it points out to us that creation is a Divine work par

excellence. In the origin and the formation of things forces have worked, up to the flood conditions have existed, and in that flood a catastrophe has taken place such as after this time have no longer occurred. Becoming is always governed by other laws than development. The laws of the creature are not the rule of creation and much less those of the Creator. Further, theology should hold only to the indisputable facts which geology makes known, but should beware of the hypotheses and conclusions which the geologists add to them. Therefore it refrains from every attempt to identify the so-called geological periods with the six days of creation. For it is nothing other than an unprovable opinion that those periods have followed one another successively and in that order. Thereby it is not denied that, e.g., the azoic formations already began from the moment of creation. Rather everything points to it that they then under the working of all kinds of mechanical and chemical forces already [489] made a beginning. But geology knows nothing of it that they did not also later take place simultaneously with the palaeozoic etc., and it conjectures both as to the causes and as to the manner of their origin. And so it is with all other periods. It is very probable that the so-called tertiary epoch reaches still up to the flood, and that diluvium and ice time coincide with this catastrophe. Next, by the simultaneous occurrence of plant and animal fossils in the so-called palaeozoic period nothing is decided for the order of their origin. For geology knows nothing of the origin of those organic beings; it only finds them but does not penetrate to their origin. And it too must assume that the plant kingdom arose before the animal kingdom, for the simple reason that the animals live from the plants. Insofar as geology can say anything about the order of origin of things, it agrees completely with Scripture. First the inorganic creation; then the organic, beginning with the plant kingdom;

thereafter the animal kingdom and this again in the same order, first the water, then the land animals, and among them especially the mammals, Pfaff, Schöpf. 742. Thus we as Christians and as theologians await the certain results of natural science with some confidence. For thorough and all-sided investigation theology need not be afraid. It should only beware of attaching too great value to an investigation which is still entirely new, inaccurate, and incomplete and therefore is repeatedly supplemented by conjectures and suppositions. Let it be on its guard against making too hasty concessions to and seeking agreement with so-called scientific results which can be overthrown every day and by deeper investigation can be shown in their untenability. And let it as a science of the Divine and eternal things have patience until the science which combats it has investigated more deeply and more broadly and, as it goes and has gone in most cases, corrects itself. Thus theology better maintains its dignity and honor than by continually bending to the opinions of the day. Cf. Howorth, *The mammoth and the flood* 1887. Bosizio, *Das Hexaemeron und die Geologie*, Mainz 1865. Trissl, *Das bibl. Sechstageswerk vom Standp. der kath. Exegese u. v. Standp. der Naturw.* 2e Aufl. Regensburg 1894. Id. *Sündfluth oder Gletscher* 1894. Hahn, *Die Entstehung der Weltkörper*, Regensburg 1895. [490]

§ 32. THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

1 . Creation culminates in man. In him the spiritual and the material world unite. According to the first creation narrative, man, male and female together, was created on the sixth day, Gen. 1:26v., after the creation of the land animals had preceded. Scripture also teaches therein a close kinship of man and animal. Both were created on the same day, both were also formed from the dust of the earth. But alongside that kinship there is also a great distinction. The animals are brought forth by the earth at God's command, Gen. 1:24; man, however, is created after a deliberation of God, after his image, as a lord over all things. These brief indications are elucidated and expanded in the second creation narrative. The first creation narrative gives a general history of creation, which finds its goal and its end in man; the second deals in particular with the creation of man and with the relation in which the other creatures stand to him. In the first account man is the end of nature, in the second the beginning of history. The first narrative shows how all other creatures prepare man; the second introduces the history of the temptation and of the fall of man and for that purpose

describes especially his original state. In the first account, therefore, the creation of all other things, of heaven, earth, firmament, etc., is narrated at length and in regular order, and the creation of man is not discussed in detail; the second presupposes the creation of heaven and earth, gives no chronological but a material order, and does not say when plants and animals were created but describes only in what relation they, according to their nature, stand to man. Gen. 2:4b-9 does not imply that the plants, but only that the garden in Eden, was formed after man; the creation of the plants is without doubt thought by the writer between verses 6 and 7. Likewise, in Gen. 2:18v. the creation of the animals is indeed placed only after that of man, but not in order thereby to describe the objective course of creation, but only to indicate that the help for the man is to be found not among the animals but only in a [491] being like him. The description, finally, of the creation of the woman is in no respect in conflict with that in Gen. 1 but is only a further explanation thereof. Cf. Hengstenberg, *Authentie des Pentateuchs* I 306 f. Oehler, *Altt. Theol.* § 18. Köhler, *Lehrb. der bibl. Gesch. des A. T.* I 24. Baumstark, *Christl. Apologetik* II 458 f. H. van Eyck van Heslinga, *De eenheid van het scheppingsverhaal*, Leiden, Daamen 1896.

2. This Divine origin of man has never been doubted in the Christian church and theology. But outside revelation all kinds of conjectures about the origin of man have been ventured. Many legends of the Heathens still ascribe the creation of man to the gods or demigods, as e.g. in Hesiodus, *Op. et Dier. Lib.* I 23-25. Ovidius, *Metam.* I 82 sq. 363 sq. And philosophy too, especially that of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, usually recognized in man, formed from the dust of the earth, a higher, rational principle, which was derived from the gods. But more than once, both in religion and in

philosophy, wholly different ideas have nevertheless been cherished about the origin of man. Now man comes forth autochthonously from the earth, then he has developed from some animal or other, or he is also held to be the fruit of some tree or other etc., cf. Andrew Lang, *Research into the development of religion, cult, and mythology*, Translated from the Eng. by Dr. L. Knappert I 1893 p. 143. 275. With materialism in the previous century in France this view of the origin of man again came into honour; man was explained wholly and entirely, also as to his psychical side, from matter. Since that time the idea of evolution gained ground more and more. Linnaeus 1778 and Blumenbach 1840 still maintained the specific distinction between man and animal. But Kant already regarded the transition of man from an earlier animal to a later human condition as something that spoke for itself, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* § 77-80, *Ueber die verschiedenen Racen der Menschen* 1775. Lamarck 1744-1829, Saint-Hilaire 1772-1844, Oken 1779-1851, von Baer 1836, H. Spencer 1852, Schaaffhausen 1853, Huxley 1859, Nägeli 1859 were all already advocates of the animal descent of man. Philosophy taught this already long before natural science. And Charles Darwin [492] 1809-1882 was therefore by no means the first who propounded the doctrine connected with his name. His fame has only been that he made a very great multitude of observations, which related to the life of man and animal and brought to light the kinship of both; that he knew how to combine these in a peculiar way and to place them in the service of the hypothesis already prevailing; and that he pointed out a way in which this descent of man from the animal, as it seemed, was made possible, *The origin of species by means of natural selection* 1859, Dutch transl. *Het ontstaan der soorten*, by Dr. T. C. Winkler, 2nd ed. 1883. *The descent of man* 1871, Dutch transl. *De afstamming van den mensch en*

de seksueele teeltkeus, edited by Dr. H. Hartogh Heys van Zouteveen, 3rd pr. 1884. A whole host of scholars, Lyell, Owen, Lubbock, Tylor, Hooker, Tyndall, Huxley, Moleschott, Haeckel, Hellwald, Büchner, Vogt etc. thereby considered the earlier hypothesis as good as proven and presented it as an incontrovertible result of natural science. Under Darwinism is now to be understood the doctrine that the species into which the organic beings were formerly classified do not bear constant properties but are variable; that the higher organic beings have arisen from the lower and in particular man has gradually in the course of the centuries developed from an extinct ape lineage; that the organic in its turn has arisen from the inorganic, and that thus evolution is the way in which under the dominion of purely mechanical and chemical laws all that exists has come into being. That is the thesis or rather the hypothesis. This evolution Darwin attempts to explain and to make possible by the following considerations: first, nature teaches us everywhere to know a struggle for life, in which every being participates and by which it is compelled to develop and to perfect itself or otherwise to perish; second, nature selects from many plants, animals, men such for continued life and propagation (natural selection) as are most favourably organized, and this natural selection is supported by sexual selection, by which every female gives preference to the best organized male; third, the favourable properties thus acquired, in the way of struggle and selection, pass from parents to children or also to [493] grandchildren (atavism), and perfect the organisms more and more. Naturally these are not proofs, but only suppositions and explanations, how in Darwin's opinion evolution could be possible. Proofs for the hypothesis are actually derived only from the kinship that is to be observed among the organic beings and that also exists in physical and psychical respect between animal and man; from the

change and inheritance of properties, which we observe time and again in the world of men and animals; from the rudimentary organs, which have remained to man from his earlier animal condition; from embryology, according to which the higher organisms as embryos pass through the developmental stages of the lower, Romanes, *De bewijzen voor de theorie van Darwin*, from the Eng. by Spaink, Amst. 1884.

3. However much authority this Darwinism may at once have appeared with, it has nevertheless from the beginning encountered serious opposition, not only among theologians and philosophers, but also among all kinds of natural scientists, such as Agassiz, *Essay on the classification* 1865, Dawson, *Die Natur und die Bibel*, aus dem Engl. Gütersloh 1877, Nägeli, *Entstehung u. Begriff der naturhist. Art*, 2e Aufl. 1865. Mech. phys. *Theorie der Abstammungslehre* 1883. Wigand, *Der Darwinismus u. s. w.* 3 Bde 1874-77, and further Dana, Flourens, de Beaumont, Jordan, Blanchard, Quatrefages, Oswald Heer, Oscar Fraas, Ad. Bastian, R. Wagner, Pfaff, Kölliker etc. Virchow repeats almost every year at the meeting of naturalists his protest against those who present Darwinism as a dogma. Dubois Reymond spoke of sieben Welträthsel, which could not be solved by natural science, and wrote not long before his death that we perhaps had to return again to supranaturalism. The life-force earlier rejected with mockery is again taken under protection by Gustave Bunge; in Max Verworn, Wilhelm Ostwald, Ed. *Rindfleisch* a tendency toward pantheism and mysticism is to be perceived; even Haeckel commended monism as unity of religion and science. Romanes, who was decidedly a Darwinist, died in 1895 reconciled with the faith of the Anglican church. There is undoubtedly a reaction against materialism and Darwinism approaching. And in addition there comes still the [494] criticism, to which Darwinism has been subjected by

theologians and philosophers. They too have in this question the right to speak and have raised weighty objections, cf. Ulrici, Gott u. die Natur 1866. Gott u. der Mensch I 1874. Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. II 579 f. Id. Die Lehre v. Urstand des Menschen 1879 S. 113 f. Hartmann, Wahrheit u. Irrthum im Darw. 1875. Carneri, Sittlichkeit u. Darw. Wien 1877. Weygoldt, Darw. Relig. Sittl. Leiden 1878. Hamann, Entwicklungslehre u. Darwinismus, Jena 1892. Dutoit-Haller, Schöpfung u. Entw. nach Bibel u. Naturw. Basel 1892. Joh. Ranke, Der Mensch, Leipzig 2e Aufl. 1894. Ebrard, Apol. I 352 f. Steude, Christ. u. Naturwiss. 1895 S. 148 f. Bettex, Naturstudium u. Christ. 2e Aufl. 1896. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II 147. 171 f. Reusch, Bibel u. Natur 330 f. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung u. seine Entw. Paderborn 1896. Hettinger, Apol. I 167 f. Kuenen, Theol. Tijdschr. X 408v. Lamers, Nieuwe Bijdr. III 185v. Serrurier, Gids Mei 1895. Tijdspiegel April 1896 bl. 455. Wet. Bladen Mei 1896. Salisbury in his opening address of The british association of science in Oxford Aug. 1894 etc.

With a view to this turning point, theology has often been far too premature and has accommodated itself far too hastily to the theory of evolution, e.g. Powell, Evidences of Christianity 1860. Temple, Christ. and Natural Science, trans. by Dr. J. W. Gunning, Haarlem 1887. Drummond, The ascent of man, 1895. Carrière, The moral world order p. 365ff. etc. Yet there exist against Darwinism far too serious and weighty objections for it to be accepted as a scientific explanation of the phenomena. In the first place, it is wholly powerless to make the origin of life even in any degree intelligible. At first one took refuge in the *generatio aequivoca*, i.e. in the arising of organic beings through accidental combination of inorganic substances. When the investigations of Pasteur proved its untenability, one seized upon the supposition that the protoplasms or germs of life had been

brought to the earth by meteor-stones from other heavenly bodies (Helmholtz, Thomson). When this hypothesis too proved to be little more than a notion, the doctrine was proclaimed that the cells and germs of life had always existed alongside the inorganic and thus, like matter, force, motion etc., were eternal. But thereby the insufficiency of the [495] theory of evolution was pronounced by the proponents themselves; whoever makes matter, motion, life eternal, does not solve the riddle but despairs of the solution. In the second place, Darwinism is also not able to explain the further development of organic beings. Scripture on the one hand acknowledges the truth that lies in evolution, when it has plants and animals come forth from the earth at God's command, Gen. 1:11, 20, 24; but on the other hand it says that the earth could bring forth these organic beings only by a word of God's omnipotence, and that those organic beings from the beginning existed alongside one another as specifically distinct; they all have their own kind, Gen. 1 vv. 11, 21. Thereby it is not excluded that within the kinds all sorts of changes can take place, and neither is the right of science curtailed, to indicate the boundaries of the kinds more precisely. Indeed it is absolutely not necessary to see in all the kinds which botany and zoology now enumerate original creations; the concept of kind has still by no means been sharply and clearly determined. But it is equally certain that the essential diversity and inequality of creatures rests on God's creative omnipotence. He is the one who makes a distinction between light and darkness, day and night, heaven and earth, plant and animal, angel and man, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 47. And this diversity and inequality of creatures, specifically of organic beings, remains in Darwinism a riddle. If man had descended from the animal, precisely the great difference that exists between the two and comes to expression in the whole organism

would remain an insoluble riddle. It is now indeed generally acknowledged that the many kinds of plants and animals cannot be derived from one, or even from four or five original organisms; those kinds diverge morphologically and physiologically far too strongly. Natural and sexual selection are insufficient to make such kind-changes possible, and have therefore already been importantly limited and modified by Darwin himself. Moreover, such transitions from the one kind into the other have never been observed either in the past or in the present time. The same kinds of plants and animals that we now know also existed thousands of years ago and appeared all at once in great numbers. The transitional forms which would bring the kinds now existing closer to one another [496] have been found nowhere. Palaeontology does not prove a slow and straight-line ascent of organic beings from the lower to the higher, but shows that all sorts of kinds existed alongside one another from the beginning. Such transitional forms, however, would have to be found in great numbers, because the morphological changes took place so slowly, only in thousands of years, and were each time of so slight significance. It cannot be imagined that all these would by chance have perished through catastrophes; all the less, because all the lower organisms have, down to the present day, in spite of their imperfection and unfitness for the struggle for life, continued to exist alongside the higher. To this is added that from various sides, especially by Aug. Weismann, on good grounds the thesis has been defended that precisely acquired characteristics are not inherited, Koster, Wet. Bladen, March 1897 p. 321-344. Entirely in contradiction with Darwin's theory, the morphological characteristics are the least and the physiological the most variable. If those morphological changes also proceeded so slowly and were each time so slight in significance, they could also be of no use in the

struggle for life; in the time of transition they were rather a defect than a perfection. So long as breathing through gills passed over into breathing through lungs, it was rather a hindrance than an advantage in the struggle for existence. For all these reasons the natural scientist, whose science must rest on facts, would do better, in this matter to refrain from a judgment. Materialism and Darwinism are both historically and logically not a result of experimental science but of philosophy. Besides, Darwin himself says that many of the considerations that he advanced are in a high degree speculative, *Afst. des menschen* II 365. According to Haeckel he discovered no new facts, but did combine and utilize them in a peculiar way, *Nat. Schöpf.* 1874 S. 25. The great kinship of man and animal has always been acknowledged and expressed in the animal rationale. But in earlier times one did not yet connect with that the monistic philosophy, that a pure potency, which is nothing, such as atoms, chaos, cells etc., can nevertheless become everything. That has first been discovered by pantheism, materialism and Darwinism! Third, with Darwinism the origin of man is an [497] insoluble problem. Positive proofs for man's animal descent are actually not there. Haeckel's ontogeny can after the refutation by Bischoff and others no longer count as proof. The arguments that one derived from all sorts of human bones and human skulls found in caves, most recently in Ned. Indië, cf. Prof. Hubrecht in *Gids* June 1896, have in turn been abandoned one after the other. The investigation on the one hand of the anthropoid ape species and on the other hand of all sorts of bones, skulls, abnormal humans, microcephalics, dwarfs etc., has ended with establishing that the distinction between animal and man is essential and has always existed, Pfaff, *Schöpf.* 721. It is then also generally acknowledged that no ape species, as it now exists or has existed, can be the stock of the human

race. The strongest defenders of Darwinism concede that a transitional species must be assumed, of which, however, the slightest trace has thus far not been found. Virchow said at the meeting of naturalists in 1894: Bis jetzt is noch kein Affe entdeckt worden, der als der eigentliche Urvater des Menschen betrachtet werden konnte, auch kein Halbaffe. Diese Frage steht nicht mehr im Vordergrund der Forschung, bij Hettinger, Apol. III 297. Above all, however, Darwinism in the fourth place remains in default of the explanation of man as to his psychical side. Darwin began with the attempt to derive all spiritual phenomena in man, consciousness, language, religion, morality etc. from phenomena that occurred in animals, Afst. des menschen, chapters 3 and 4. The expression of emotions in man and animals 1872, and many others have followed him in that. But these attempts too have thus far not succeeded. Just as the essence of force and matter, the origin of motion, the arising of life, teleology, so too consciousness, language, freedom of the will, religion, morality still belong to the Welträthsel, which await solution. The thought, which is purely spiritual, stands to the brain in a wholly different relation than bile to the liver and urine to the kidneys. Language is and remains, according to the word of Max Müller, the Rubicon between us and the animal. The psychological explanation of religion is untenable, part I 208. And the derivation of rationality from the social instincts does not do justice to the authority of the [498] moral law, to the categorical character of the moral imperative, to the "Sollen" of the good, to conscience, responsibility, consciousness of guilt, repentance, remorse, punishment. Yes, although Darwinism in itself is not yet identical with materialism, it nevertheless moves in that line, finds there its principal support, but thus also prepares the perversion of religion and morality and kills the human in man. It makes no difference whether one says that it is better to be a highly

developed animal than a fallen man; the doctrine of the animal descent of man assails in man the image of God and degrades him to the image of orang-utan and chimpanzee. And that image of God is not to be maintained from the standpoint of evolution. It compels us to go back to creation, as Scripture teaches it to us.

4. In connection with this doctrine concerning the origin of man, evolution also comes into conflict with Scripture with respect to the age, the unity, and the original dwelling-place of man. A great age was ascribed to the human race by many peoples, such as the Japanese, the Indians, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, who spoke of different world-times and of 10 and 100 thousands of years. Modern anthropology has repeatedly returned to these fabulous numbers, but remains just as little in agreement as pagan mythology; it varies between 10 and 250 thousand years and more. Concerning the existence of man in the tertiary period there prevails great difference of opinion; it is denied by most, also by many who otherwise are Darwinists, such as Virchow, Mor, Wagner, Oskar Schmidt, Häckel, Zittel e. a. The question is therefore also so difficult to answer, because the boundaries between tertiary and quaternary period cannot be indicated. But even if man has lived in the tertiary period and even if he is a contemporary of the mammoth, then this does not prove that man is so old, but that that period is much younger than one originally thought. Much more uncertain are the calculations which are built on the pile-dwellings which one found in Switzerland and elsewhere, on the bones and skulls which were discovered in caves near Liège, Amiens, Dusseldorf etc., on the delta formations of Nile [499] and Mississippi and on the stone-, bronze- and iron-period, which according to some followed one another chronologically. All the calculations built on

this have therefore time and again been contradicted and refuted by sober natural investigators, such as Fraas, Quenstedt, Pfaff, Dawson, Tylor, Virchow, Schaaffhausen, Kjerulf, even Hellwald, *Culturgesch.* I 10. Here even more than with the age of the earth it holds that one can indeed name numbers, but that one has no material for a history in so long a time. Of much more value for the determination of the age of the human race are the chronological data which are provided by the history and the monuments of various peoples. The history of India and China yields no firm basis for chronology and ascends only a few centuries before Christ. But with the history of Egypt and Babylonia it is somewhat otherwise. Here there is undoubtedly an ancient civilization; it exists already as far as we can go back in history. Scripture itself teaches that also clearly. But nevertheless the chronology is still so uncertain that nothing can be built upon it. This appears sufficiently from the fact that the reign of the Egyptian king Menes according to Boeckh begins in 5702, according to Brugsch in 4455, according to Lepsius in 3893, according to Bunsen in 3623, according to Wilkinson in 2691 etc.; and that Bunsen lets the historical time for Babylon begin in 3784, v. Gutschmid in 2447, Brandis in 2458, Oppert in 3540 etc., Hettinger, *Apol.* III 258 f. Every practitioner of ancient history has his own chronology; it is a labyrinth in which the thread is lacking; only with the people of Israel is there in the proper sense talk of a history and of a reckoning of time. Fritz Hommel therefore rightly says that the chronology for the first thousand years before Christ stands fairly firm, sometimes down to particulars; that in the second thousand years before Christ only a few fixed points seem to be given, and that in the third thousand years, i.e. before 2000 B.C., everything is uncertain, *Gesch. des alten Morgenlandes*, Stuttgart 1895 S. 38. Moreover, the human race also for other reasons

cannot have existed many thousands of years before Christ. The population of the earth would then at the time of Christ have been much greater and would have been spread much more widely. And yet a thousand years B.C. the greatest part of the [500] earth was still uninhabited, North Asia, Central and Northern Europe, Africa south of the Sahara, Australia, the South Sea islands, America. Even at the time of Christ, except in Asia, humanity was chiefly still dwelling around the Mediterranean Sea. If humanity were so old, there would also have been found many more ruins of cities and remains of men, which now are only scanty in number and limited to a part of the earth. The most reliable numbers therefore do not go higher than to five to seven thousand years B.C., Pfaff, Schöpf. 710-728. Gander, Die Sündflut 1896 S. 78-90. Upham in an article on Die Zeitdauer der geolog. Epochen in the journal Gaea XXX 1894 S. 621 f. cites various scholars who place the ice age about seven or eight thousand years before Christ. If we therewith consider that also concerning the chronology of the bible there is still anything but agreement, then there is also at this point no important difference between Scripture and science. But even if according to the usual calculation the flood took place in 2348 B.C., there was up to the calling of Abraham in 1900 a period of 450 years, which is sufficient to cause fairly powerful kingdoms to arise on Euphrates and Nile. Noah and his three sons could, each marriage reckoned at six children, in fourteen generations of 33 years, that is in 462 years, have more than twelve million descendants. Compare further concerning the age of the human race: Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. II 755 f. Id. Lehre vom Urstand 87 f. Id. Herzog2 9, 583. Vigouroux, Les livres saints etc. III 452 s. Schanz, Apol. des Christ. I 333 f. Dessailly, L'antiquité de la race humaine d'après les sciences contemporaines, Paris

1893. P. Schanz, *Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts*, Freiburg 1896. Reusch, *Bibel u. Natur* 518 f. Hettinger, *Apol. der Christ.* 17 281-310.

5. The unity of the human race stands firm for Holy Scripture, Gen. 1:26, 6:3, 7:21, 10:32, Mt. 19:4, Hd. 17:26, Rom. 5:12v., 1 Cor. 15:21v. 45v. but has been almost never acknowledged by the peoples who lived outside the revelation. The Greeks regarded themselves as autochthones and looked down from on high upon the barbarians. And this contrast is found among almost all peoples. In India, too, in the course of time a sharp [501] division was made between the four classes of the people, and for each a separate origin was assumed. Only the Stoa declared that all men formed one *συστημα πολιτικον*, one body, of which each was a member, and therefore also preached universal justice and philanthropy, Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* IV 287 f. After the Renaissance, here and there the idea arose again of a different origin of the human race. This idea appeared now in the form of properly polygenism in Caesalpinus, in Blount and other deists; partly as coadamitism, i.e. descent of the different races from different progenitors, in Paracelsus e. a., partly as praeadamitism, i.e. descent of the wild and dark-coloured peoples from a progenitor before Adam, while he then was only the progenitor of the Jews or also of white humanity, in Zanini and especially in Isaac de la Peyrère. The latter in 1655 published, without name of author, printer, or place, a little work entitled: *Praeadamitae*; and behind it a *Systema theologiae ex praeadamitarum hypothesi*. In it it was asserted that long before Adam men had existed, with appeal to Gen. 4:14, 16, 17, 6:2-4. These men descended from that first pair, whose creation is reported in Gen. 1. In Gen. 2, however, the creation is narrated of Adam and Eve, who were the progenitors of the Jews. These transgressed the law that had been given to them in paradise, and fell into still greater sins than the

peoples descended from the first man, for these did not sin, as Paul, Rom. 5:12-14 expresses it, in likeness of the sin of Adam; they transgressed no positive law; they committed peccata naturalia but no peccata contra legem. This theory for a time made great headway and called forth opponents from all sides, Spanheim, Op. III 1249 sq. Turret. Theol. El. V qu. 8. Marck, Historia Paradisi II 2 § 3 sq. Moor, Comm. II 1001-5. M. Vitringa II 127, cf. Studien en Bijdragen van de Moll en Scheffer IV 238 f. Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. I 545 f. II 768 f. Urstand 231 f. But it nevertheless soon fell into oblivion. Only a few, such as Bayle, Arnold, Swedenborg, did not consider it wholly rejectable. Especially when in the previous century knowledge of the peoples was expanded and the great difference in colour, hair, stature, custom etc. between the peoples was perceived, then many returned to the idea of different [502] progenitors, Sullivan 1795, Crüger 1784, Ballenstedt 1818, Stanhope Smith 1790, Cordonnière 1814, Gobineau 1853-55 e. a. By some this was made serviceable to the defence of slavery, as by Dobbs in Ireland against Wilberforce, by Morton, Nott, Gliddon, Knox, Agassiz e. a. Another kind of polygenism was taught by Schelling, Werke, II 1 S. 500-515. He also assumed many races of men before Adam, but these had so raised and developed themselves from a low, animal standpoint that they finally produced him, in whom the human first came to revelation and who therefore rightly could bear the name of man, haadam. And likewise a certain praeadamitism was taught by Oken, Carus, Baumgärtner, Perty, Bunsen, cf. also Bilderdijk, Opstellen v. godg. en zedek. inh. II 75. Strauss, Dogm. I 680 etc. To that was now added after 1860 Darwinism, which on account of its doctrine of variability could very well be monogenistic but nevertheless with many of its adherents became polygenistic. The development from animal to man has taken place at different times and

places and has given different races their appearance, Häckel, Schaaffhausen, Caspari, Vogt, Büchner etc. On Darwinian standpoint, however, the question as to the age of man is not to be answered. The transition from animal to man has taken place so slowly that there has properly been no first man. Over against this polygenism, monogenism has still been defended by von Humboldt, Blumenbach, St. Hilaire, v. Baer, v. Meyer, Wagner, Quatrefages, Darwin, Peschel, Ranke; Virchow too considers it not impossible, Hettinger, Apol. III 224.

Now the existence of peoples and races in humanity is certainly a very important problem, the solution of which has not yet been found for a long time. The difference in colour, hair, skull, language, representations, religion, morals, customs, habits etc. is so great, and the spread of the one humanity over the whole earth e.g. to the South Sea islands, to America etc. is so unknown, that the thought of a different origin of the peoples can hardly be surprising. Scripture therefore derives the origin of the languages and of the peoples from an act of God, by which He intervened in the development of humanity, Gen. 11, cf. Schelling, Werke II 1 S. 94-118. Lüken, Die Tradit. des Mensch. 278 f. Auberlen, De goddel. openbaring I. Kaulen, Die Sprachenverwirrung zu Babel, Mainz [503] 1861. Strodl, Die Entstehung der Völker, Schaffh. 1868. The origin of the peoples has a deep, religious-ethical significance and testifies to spiritual decline. The wilder and rougher humanity becomes, the more the languages, the representations etc. diverge. In proportion as one lives more secluded, the difference of language increases. Confusion of speech is the consequence of confusion in the thoughts, in the consciousness, in life. And yet in that division and rupture the unity is still preserved. Linguistics has discovered relationship and unity of origin, where formerly it was not suspected in the remotest

distance. The existence of races and peoples is a fact, and yet the indication of their boundaries is so difficult, that there is the greatest difference of opinion about it. Kant assumed 4, Blumenbach 5, Buffon 6, Peschel 7, Agassiz 8, Haeckel 12, Morton even 22 different races, Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, 316 f. Among all races there are again transitions, which seem to make a mockery of every classification. Genesis 10 therefore also maintains the unity of humanity amid all diversity, and Joh. von Müller said not without reason: von diesem Kapitel muss alle Historie anfangen. Against this unity Darwinism in fact can raise no objection. The distinction between man and animal is after all always much greater than between men among themselves. If man could develop from an animal, it is not to be seen why the common origin of humanity in itself should meet with objection. Darwinism indeed offers the means at hand to make all kinds of changes within the same species under all kinds of influences of climate, way of life etc. possible and intelligible. In so far it renders excellent service to the defence of the truth. For, however great the difference between the races may be, the unity and the kinship of all men nevertheless come to the fore all the more strongly through deeper investigation. It appears in this, that parents of the different races can mate and can produce fertile children; that every class of men can inhabit every zone of the earth and can live there; that peoples who have never come into contact with one another nevertheless have various characteristics and customs in common with one another, such as gestures, decimal system, skin colouring, tattooing, circumcision, couvade etc.; that numerous physiological phenomena are the same in all races, such as the upright posture, the [504] form of the skull, the average weight of the brain, number and length of the teeth, the duration of pregnancy, the average number of pulse beats, the

internal structure of the organism, of hand, foot etc., the average age, the temperature of the body, the periodicity of the catamenia, susceptibility to diseases etc.; and that they finally in intellectual, religious, moral, social, political respect have all kinds of things in common, language, understanding, reason, memory, knowledge of God, conscience, consciousness of sin, repentance, sacrifices, fasting, prayer, traditions about a golden age, about the flood etc. The unity of the human race, taught by Scripture, is most strongly confirmed by all this. It is in the end no indifferent matter, as has sometimes been asserted. It is on the contrary of the highest importance; it is the presupposition of religion and morality. The solidarity of the human race, original sin, the reconciliation in Christ, the universality of the kingdom of God, the catholicity of the church, love of neighbour, are built upon it. Verg. Zöckler, Die einheitl. Abstammung des Menschengeschlechts, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1863 S. 51-90, Id. Gesch. der Bez. II 768 f. Id. Lehre vom Urstand 231 f. Rauch, Die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts, Augsburg 1873. Th. Waitz, Ueber die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts und den Naturzustand des Menschen, Leipzig 1859. H. Ulrici, Gott und der Mensch, I 2 S. 146 f. Lotze, Mikrokosmos II 3 S. 101 f. Peschel, Völkerkunde S. 14 f. Reusch, Bibel und Natur S. 459 f. Schanz, Apol. des Christ I 318-333. Vigouroux, Les livres saints IV 1-120. Delitzsch, Neuer Comm. zu Genesis S. 199. Hettinger, Apol. des Christ. I 7 S. 223-280.

6. Finally, there is also disagreement about the original dwelling-place of man. Genesis relates that God, after He had created Adam, planted a garden in Eden. Eden, עֵדֶן, joy, land of joy, is therefore not the same as paradise but is a region, in which the court or garden, גֶּן, LXX παραδεισος, according to Spiegel from the Zend pairidaêze = enclosure, was planted. This paradise is

then further called garden of Eden, Gen. 2:15, 3:23, garden of God, Ez. 31:8, 9, garden of Iahveh, Jes. 51:3, and is sometimes identified with Eden, Jes. 51:3, Ezech. 28:13, 31:9. Further, God planted that garden in Eden מִקְדָּם, from the east, eastward, toward the east, namely from the standpoint of the writer [505] out. From the region Eden a stream went out to water the garden; and from there, i.e. from that garden, at its flowing out from the garden it divided itself into four heads or branches, which bear the names of Pison, Gihon, Hiddekel and Phrath. The latter two rivers are the Tigris and the Euphrates; but about the former two there has always been disagreement. The church fathers, just like Josephus, usually thought of the Ganges in the case of the Pison and of the Nile in the case of the Gihon. But a careful investigation into the location of paradise was not undertaken by them. The earthly paradise for them often merged with the heavenly and was then explained allegorically. Augustine, de Gen. ad litt. VIII, 1 says that there were three opinions about paradise. Some conceived it as an earthly, others as a heavenly paradise, and still others unite both opinions. Those who held it to be an earthly paradise then thought that it had been situated very high between heaven and earth, that it even reached to the moon, or that the whole earth had once been paradise, or that it had been situated on the other side of the ocean. According to some, paradise after the fall was wholly and entirely destroyed, especially by the flood; according to others it still existed, but had become inaccessible through mountains and seas; and still others supposed that it had been taken up into heaven. The first who tried to indicate the location of paradise geographically was Augustinus Steuchus from Gubbio, hence Eugubinus, † 1550. In his work Kosmopoia, published in 1535 at Lyon, he developed the so-called Pasitigris hypothesis, according to which the four rivers are the mouths of one great stream, the

united Tigris-Euphrates, and paradise thus had been situated in the vicinity of the present city of Korna. This hypothesis found much approval among Roman Catholics such as Pererius, Jansen, Lapide, Petavius, Mersenna, among Reformed such as Calvin on Gen. 2:10, Marck, *Histor. Paradisi* 1705 lib. I, among Lutherans and others, and was adopted in modified form by Pressel, *art. Paradies* in *Herzog1*. Around the middle of the 17th century there arose alongside it the so-called Armenia hypothesis, which had already been prepared by Rupert of Deutz, Pellicanus, Fournier and then was developed especially by Reland, Prof. at Utrecht † 1706. This takes Pison to be the Phasis, Gihon to be the Araxes, Havilah to be Colchis, Cush to be the land of the Κοσσαῖοι between Media and Susiana, and thus sought paradise [506] much farther north, namely high in Armenia, approximately between Erzerum and Tiflis. It gained even more ground than the Pasitigris hypothesis and in the present time was still defended by von Raumer, Kurtz, Baumgarten, Keil, Lange, Delitzsch, Rougemont etc. By contrast, Friedrich Delitzsch in his work: *Wo lag das Paradies*, Leipzig 1881 sought the location of paradise again farther south, namely in the region near Babylon, which on account of its beauty was called by the Babylonians and Assyrians “garden of the God Dunias”; the stream out of Eden was thus the Euphrates in its upper course, Pison and Gihon were two canal rivers. Others, however, have gone much further and see in the paradise narrative a legend, which gradually has wandered from the east to the west and in which Pison and Gihon originally designate the Indus and the Oxus, J. D. Michaelis, Knobel, Bunsen, Ewald etc. Others see in it a myth, in which Havilah represents the gold-land of the legend and the Gihon is the Ganges or the Nile, Paulus, Eichhorn, Gesenius, Tuch, Bertheau, Schrader and others. Most anthropologists and linguists no longer take Gen. 2 into account at all

and name entirely different lands as the original dwelling-place of man. But they are far from unanimous and have bestowed this honor upon approximately all lands. Romanes, Klaproth, de Gobineau, George Browne named America, Spiller thought of Greenland, because the polar regions after the cooling of the earth were the first to be habitable, Wagner held Europe to be the land where the ape first developed into man. Unger named specifically Styria, L. Geiger Germany, Cuno and Spiegel South Russia, Poesche the region between Dnieper and Niemen, Benfey and Whitney Central Europe, Warren the North Pole. Others such as Darwin, Huxley, Peschel and others gave preference to Africa, because there in gorilla and chimpanzee the nearest relatives of man were found. And Link, Häckel, Hellwald, Schmidt devised a certain land Lemuria, where the apes first became men and which had been situated between Africa and Australia but by chance at the end of the tertiary period had disappeared into the depths of the sea. Many in addition assume not only one original dwelling-place of man, but are of the opinion that the evolution from animal to man has taken place in different parts of the earth, and thus unite [507] Darwinism with polygenism; thus e.g. Häckel, Vogt, Schaaffhausen, Caspari, Fr. Müller etc. Already this great difference among the anthropologists shows that science up to now can establish nothing here with any certainty. It loses itself in conjectures but knows nothing concerning origin and dwelling-place of the first man. There is then also not a single fact that compels us to give up the determination of Holy Scripture concerning Eden. Rather, ethnology, linguistics, history and natural science provide us with data that make Asia probable as the original dwelling-place of man. Neither Africa, nor Europe, nor America and still much less a land such as Lemuria can lay as much claim to that as Asia. Here we find the oldest peoples, the oldest

civilization, the oldest languages; the whole of ancient history points us to this continent. From this part of the earth Europe and Africa, Australia and also America have been populated. To be sure, many questions present themselves here, to which no answer can yet be given. And especially it is uncertain how and when America has become populated, Zöckler, *Gesch. der Bez.* I 542 f. Peschel, *Völkerkunde* 402 f. Vigouroux, *Les livres saints* IV 98 s. Dr. E. Schmidt, *Die aeltesten Spuren des Menschen in N. Amerika*, No 38 and 39 of the *Deutsche Zeit- und Streitfragen*, *Wetenschappelijke Bladen* 1895. But these objections in no way overthrow the doctrine of Scripture that Asia is the cradle of humanity. Concerning the location of paradise and of Eden there may be difference of opinion, so that it has been placed in turn in the middle, east, south of Asia; even the geography may no longer be able to be established; Scripture and science both testify that in Asia the original dwelling-place of man is to be sought, Peschel, *Völkerkunde* S. 35-41. Zöckler, *Gesch. der Bez.* passim, especially I 128 f. 170 f. 395 f. 654 f. II 779 f. Id. *Lehre vom Urstand* 216 f. Herzog art. *Paradies* of Pressel, Herzog² art. *Eden* of Rütschi. Reusch, *Bibel und Natur*, 498 f. Zöckler, *Bibl. u. Kirchenhist. Studien*, München 1893 V 1-38. Delitzsch, *Neuer Comm. zu Genesis* S. 81 f. [508]

§ 33. THE ESSENCE OF MAN.

1 . The essence of man lies in this, that he is God's image. The whole world is a revelation of God, a mirror of his virtues and perfections; each creature is in its own way and in its own measure an embodiment of a divine thought. But among all creatures only man is the image of God, the highest and richest revelation of God and at the same time thereby the head and the crown of the whole creation, *imago Dei* and *compendium naturae*, *μικροθεος* and *μικροκοσμος* together. Even Heathens have acknowledged this truth and called man God's image. Pythagoras in Cicero, *de senect.* c. 21. Plato, *de Leg.* IV 713 C. *de Rep.* III 415 A. X 517. Ovid, *Met.* I. Cicero, *de Leg.* I 8. Seneca, *de cons. ad Helv.* 6 and others express it clearly and distinctly, that man or at least his soul is created after God's image, that he is akin to God and is his offspring, cf. Pfanner, *Syst. theol. gent.* 1679 p. 189 sq. And not only that, but almost all peoples have traditions of a golden age, an *aurea aetas*. Among Chinese, Indians, Iranians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans etc. one encounters accounts of an earlier time, in which man lived in innocence and blessedness and stood in

communion with the gods. They were sung by the poets, Hesiod, *Op. et dies* 109 sq. Ovid, *Met.* I 89 sq. Verg. *Georg.* I 125 sq. *Aen.* VIII 315 sq. and by the philosophers acknowledged in their truth, Plato, *Pol.* 272 A. cf. J. G. Friderici, *diss. de aurea aetate quam poetae finxerunt*, Lips. 1736. Lüken, *Traditionen des Menschengeschl.* 1869. Zöckler, *Lehre v. Urstand des Menschen* 1879 S. 84 f. Oswald, *Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit* 1887 S. 37 f. E. L. Fischer, *Heidenthum und Offenbarung*, Mainz 1878. Zöckler, *Bibl. u. Kirchenhist. Studien*, 1893 V 1 f. Yet Holy Scripture first sets this doctrine of man's being the image of God in the true, full light. The first creation narrative reports that God after deliberate consultation created man בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כְּדְמוּתֵנוּ, κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν και καθ' ὁμοιωσιν, ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Gen. 1:26, 27. Further, in Gen. 5:1 and 9:6 it is repeated again that God created man בְּהִמּוֹת אֱלֹהִים, and בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים; Psalm 8 sings of man as lord of what is created, [509] and Eccl. 7:29 recalls that God made man יִשָּׁר. Otherwise the O. Test. speaks little of the status integritatis; Israel was more than any other people a people of hope; its eye was directed not to the past but to the future. Even the N. Test. speaks relatively seldom about the image of God, after which man was originally created. Directly we find mention of it only in 1 Cor. 11:7, where the man is called εἰκὼν και δοξα θεου, and Jas 3:9, where it is said of men that they are καθ' ὁμοιωσιν θεου γεγονотας; while Luke 3:38 calls Adam the son of God and Paul with a heathen poet says: του γαρ και γενοσ ἐσμεν, Acts 17:28. Indirectly, however, Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10 are also of great significance here; there is there mention of the καινος or νεος ἄνθρωπος, which believers must put on; and of this it is said that he was created in accordance with God, κατα θεον, κτισθεντα, in righteousness and holiness of the truth, and is renewed unto knowledge κατ' εἰκόνα του κτισαντος

αὐτόν. There lies here in 1o that the new man, which believers put on, was created by God; 2o that this new man is made in accordance with God and after his image, and 3o that that accordance comes to expression specifically in the righteousness and holiness as fruit of the known truth. This, however, refers back to the original creation in so far as the words of which Paul makes use are clearly borrowed from it; and as the second creation according to the whole doctrine of Scripture is no creatio ex nihilo but a renewal of what existed; and as the ἀνακαινουςθαι of the believer clearly describes this creation as a renewal. Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10 therefore have as their underlying thought, that man was originally created after God's image and is now in the re-creation renewed after it. But Scripture does not only relate to us the fact of the creation of man after God's image, it also explains to us its meaning. The two words צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת, εἰκὼν and ὁμοιωσις, are certainly not identical, but an essential, material distinction is nevertheless not to be indicated between them. They are used promiscuously and alternate with one another without definite reason. In Gen. 1:26, cf. 5:3 they both stand; in Gen. 1:27 and 9:6, cf. Col. 3:10 only image stands; in Gen. [510] 5:1, Jas. 3:9 only likeness. The distinction that exists between the two comes down to this: צֶלֶם means image, both Urbild and Abbild, דְּמוּת means likeness, both Vorbild and Nachbild. Der Begriff von צֶלֶם ist starrer, der von דְּמוּת flüssiger und so zu sagen geistiger; in jenem überwiegt die Vorstellung des Urbilds, in diesem die Vorstellung des Ideals, Delitzsch, op Gen. 1:26. The likeness is a further determination, a strengthening and completion of the image. Likeness is in itself weaker and broader than image; an animal does have some traits of likeness and correspondence with, but is nevertheless no image of man. Image expresses that God is archetype and man is ectype; likeness adds to it

that that image corresponds in every part with the original, Augustine, quaest. 83 qu. 74. Thomas, S. Theol. I. qu. 93 art. 9. Gerhard, Loci theol. VIII § 18. Polanus, Synt. Theol. V 10 etc. Just as little as between these two concepts, is there an essential distinction between the prepositions כ and כּ, which are used herewith. These too alternate with each other; in Gen. 5:1 כ stands with דְּמוּת, in verse 3 likewise and at the same time כּ with צֶלֶם; in the N. T. κατα stands with εἰκὼν, Col. 3:10, but also with ὁμοιωσις, Jas. 3:9. Nothing can therefore be built on this; only it can be said with Delitzsch: bei כ denkt man sich die Urform gleichsam als Gussform, bei כּ als vorgehaltenes Muster. There therefore exists no ground, with Böhl, Dogm. 154 f. to derive from that preposition כ that the image of God is a sphere and element in which man was created, cf. against that Kuyper, De Vleeschwording des Woords, 1887 bl. VIII v. Daubanton, Theol. Stud. 1887 bl. 429-444. Besides these words, Scripture offers for the content of the image of God the following data. First, it is clear that the words image and likeness do not express something in God but in man, do not indicate the imago increata but the imago creata. The intention is not that man is created after something in God that bears the name of image and likeness, so that e.g. thereby the Son would be indicated; but man is so created after God that he is his image and likeness. Next, this creation after God's image is in no respect limited, neither on the side of the archetype nor on that of the ectype. It is not said that man is created only after some virtues or also after one person [511] in the divine being, nor also that man only for a part, after the soul or after the understanding or after holiness alone, bears God's image and likeness. Rather the whole man is image of the whole Godhead. Third, the meaning of the image of God is further explained to us by the Son, who in an entirely unique sense is called λογος, υἱος, εἰκὼν, χαρακτηρ

του θεου, John 1:1, 14, 2 Cor. 4:4, Col. 1:15, Heb. 1:3, and to whom we must again be made like, Rom. 1:29, 1 Cor. 15:49, Phil. 3:21, Eph. 4:23 v., 1 John 3:2. The Son now bears all these names, because he is God from God and light from light, partaking of the same essence and the same virtues with the Father. He is thus called not on account of a part or piece of his being, but because he corresponds absolutely with the Father. This in its turn also holds for man. Like the Son, so man as such, wholly and entirely, is God's image. He does not merely bear, he is the image of God. Yet of course with this difference, that what the Son is in an absolute sense, man is in a relative sense. The former is the eternal, only-begotten Son; the latter is the created son of God. The former is the image of God within, the latter outside the divine being. The former is the image of God in a divine, the latter in a creaturely way. But thus man is then also in his measure image and likeness of God. Finally, fourth, it is also indicated here and there in what that image manifests itself and comes forth outwardly. Nowhere is the full content of that image of God unfolded. But Gen. 1:26 clearly indicates that that image of God comes to expression in his dominion over all that is created, cf. Ps. 8, 1 Cor. 11:7. The portrayal of the paradisal state in Gen. 1 and 2 shows that that image of God also includes the accordance with the will of God, cf. Eccl. 7:29. And the re-creation after the image of God or Christ is chiefly placed in the putting on of the new man, who inter alia consists in righteousness and holiness of the truth.

2. Concerning the content of the image of God, at first all sorts of differences of opinion prevailed in the Christian church. It was now located in man's body, then in his rational nature, or in his freedom of will, then again in his dominion or also in other moral virtues such as love, righteousness, etc., cf. passages in Suicerus s. v. εἰκὼν. Petavius, de sex

dier. opif. [512] II c. 2. Münscher-v. Coelln I 339 f. Hagenbach § 56. But gradually two conceptions nevertheless come to stand clearly alongside and over against one another, both of which appeal to the distinction of צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת. Some, namely, such as Clemens Alex., Strom. II c. 22. Origenes, de princ. III 6 e. a. observed that Gen. 1:26 does indeed say that God wills to create man according to his image and likeness, but that according to verse 27 He in fact creates him only according to his image, i.e. with a rational nature, in order that man might now acquire the likeness with God himself in the way of obedience and at the end receive it as a reward from God's hand. Others, on the contrary, were of the opinion that man, together with the image, i.e. the rational nature, also immediately received the likeness as a gift, and that he, having lost this through sin, regains it through Christ, Irenaeus, adv. haer. V 16, 2. Athan. c. Ar. II 59 c. Gent. 2. de incarn. 3. The first conception, which one could call the naturalistic, found support in the doctrine of freedom of will, by which one could not conceive holiness as a gift of God bestowed upon man immediately, but only as a good to be acquired by man himself in the way of moral effort, Harnack II 134 f. Many therefore also taught that the first man was created in a state, not of positive holiness but of childlike innocence, Tertull., de an. 38. Theoph., ad Autol. II 24. 27. Iren. adv. haer. IV 38. To such statements Pelagius later appealed, when he located the essence and the original state of man in moral indifference, in nothing but formal freedom of choice. The image of God consists only in the naturalis possibilitas perfectionis bestowed by God, which is inalienable and therefore is still now the portion of every human being. God bestows the posse, but ours is the velle, August. de gratia Christi I 3 sq. Later this conception found acceptance among the Socinians, who considered the image of God to be located only in dominion, Fock, Der

Socin. 484; among the Anabaptists, who said that the first man, as a finite, earthly creature, was not yet the image of God but could first become it through regeneration, Menno Simons, *Werken* 125. 126. 180, cf. Erbkam, *Gesch. der prot. Sekten* 461. Cloppenburg, *Op.* II 144 sq.; among the Remonstrants, *Conf.* V 5. *Apol. conf.* ib. Episcopius, *Inst. theol.* IV 3, 7. Limborch, *Theol. Chr.* II 24, 5; among the Rationalists and Supranaturalists, [513] Wegscheider, *Inst. theol.* § 99. Bretschneider, *Dogm.* § 115. 116. Reinhard, *Dogm.* § 70; and among many more recent theologians, Dorner, *Gl.* I 515. Lange, *Dogm.* II 298 f. Müller, *Sünde* II 457 f. Beck, *Lehrw.* I 186 f. *Chr. Gl.* II 328 f. Martensen, *Dogm.* 139. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I 432. Zöckler, *Lehre v. Urstand des Menschen* 1879 S. 40 f. 333. Grétilat, *Theol. syst.* III 464 S. Hofstede de Groot, *Gron. Godg.* 89v. Doedes, *Leer der Zaligheid* § 24. *Ned. Geloofsbel.* 145. Heid. *Catech.* 69 enz., who all let the status integritatis consist in a state of childlike innocence. Usually all these theologians do still hold fast to the historical truth of such an original state. But in substance, in the conception of the image of God in the first man they agree entirely with those who, separating the idea from the fact, deny the reality of the status integritatis and locate the image of God only in free personality, in the rational or moral nature, in the religious-ethical disposition, in the destination of man to communion with God, Kant, *Relig. ed.* Rosenkranz 27 f. Fichte, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* 1800. Hegel, *Werke* XI 183 f. Schleiermacher, *Gl.* § 59-61. Strauss, *Gl.* II 72. Biedermann, *Dogm.* II 562 f. Lipsius, *Dogm.* § 420. 440. Ritschl, *Rechtf. u. Vers.* III 314. Nietzsche, *Ev. Dogm.* 306 f. Bovon, *Dogm. Chrét.* I 132. 139. Scholten, *L. H. K.* I 304v. II 67v. Imperceptibly this conception then leads on to the doctrine of evolution, according to which the essence of man is located not in what he was or is but in that which he can become in endless

development through his own exertion of power. Paradise lies not behind but before us. A developed ape deserves preference over a fallen man. Originally bearing the image of orang-utan and chimpanzee, man gradually raised himself from a state of crude brutality to that of noble humanity, cf. litt. deel I 236.

3. It needs no demonstration that Holy Scripture stands in direct opposition to this doctrine of evolution. The Christian churches have therefore almost unanimously rejected the naturalistic, Pelagian conception of the image of God and of man's original state. Apart from the arguments for the Darwinian hypothesis already refuted earlier, there are in fact also no direct, historical proofs for the animal [514] state of man, as evolution imagines it. The bones and skulls of men that have been found have, upon closer investigation, all proved to be derived from beings completely like us in nature. As far back as we can go in history, we discover a condition of fairly high civilization, in China, India, Babylonia, Egypt; and every proof is lacking that the peoples there have developed out of an animal state. The appeal to the so-called primitive peoples, who moreover are also not stripped of all civilization, is of no force. For it is unprovable that they stand closer than the cultured peoples to the original state of man. Rather, there is ground to believe that they, separated from humanity, have gradually declined into a state of barbarism. For none of those peoples has been able, by its own means alone, to raise itself out of that condition. They all bear the character of degenerates, who, like branches torn off from the tree, without new vital force from without, wither away and disappear, Waitz, Ueber die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts und den Naturzustand des Menschen 1859 S. 334 f. Peschel, Völkerkunde, 5te Aufl. 135 f. Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. II 744 f. Vigouroux, Les livres saints IV 171 s.

The question concerning the primitive state of man is therefore actually not a historical but a philosophical question; for that state precedes all historical testimonies. The answer that one gives to that question is determined by the thought that one forms of man. The more this being is now conceived, the more it becomes impossible to let the history of man begin with an animal, barbarous state. Life, consciousness, language, religion, morality, etc. are not to be explained from evolution, but presuppose a distinct origin, a creation out of nothing. Even in the theology of the moderns this still comes out. To be sure, they deny the creation according to God's image and the status integritatis; but when it comes to the most critical point, the idea of creation suddenly emerges again. Consciousness is something specifically human; or at least religion has its own, original principle in man; or, if evolution is accepted here as well, then one nevertheless stops at the ethical and maintains its independence; the moral life or the moral disposition is *sui generis* and *sui originis*, [515] Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. I 1v. 14. 213v. etc. But this position between creation and evolution is an untenable standpoint. It has repeatedly been adopted by all kinds of Pelagian directions in the Christian church, because one had objections both to creation and to evolution and thus sought a mediation. The first man was not an animal, but also not a perfect, holy man; he was an innocent child. He was neither positively good nor positively evil, but he stood between both, was morally indifferent, could do the one and the other. Actually he was nothing, potentially he was everything, pious and godless, holy and unholy, good and evil. The disposition, the *posse*, has arisen by creation, but everything that is now built upon that potential foundation is man's own will and work. Now there lies in this representation, as we shall see in the following paragraph, indeed something true, insofar as the first man did not

yet have the highest and thus indeed had to develop. But apart from this, it is nevertheless for many reasons wholly unacceptable. In the first place, Scripture clearly teaches that man, both psychically and physically, was created adult, in virili aetate, August. de Gen. ad lit. VI c. 13, 14. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 17. The narrative in Genesis about the first humans is very simple, but the condition of those first humans is not that of simple, innocent children but of adult, well-conscious and freely acting beings. The creation according to the image of God, Gen. 1:27, Pred. 7:29, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, the blessing of multiplication, Gen. 1:28, the divine approval, Gen. 1:31, the probationary commandment, Gen. 2:17, the naming of the animals, Gen. 2:19, the utterance concerning Eve, Gen. 2:23, 24, the manner of the temptation, Gen. 3:1v., and the attitude of Adam and Eve after the fall, Gen. 3:7 v. prove abundantly that the first humans were created not indifferent but positively good. The only counter-proof could be derived from the fact that shame was lacking in the first humans. And this has therefore always been brought forward by the opposing party as a very powerful argument. This, however, cannot be valid for that reason, because the sexual life before the fall was very well known to the first man, Gen. 1:27, 28, 2:23, 24, and shame is derived not from the awakening of sexual life, but specifically from the fall. Secondly, this representation suffers from [516] half-heartedness and makes the problem that lies here still more complicated. Half-hearted it is, insofar as it on the one hand embraces evolution and yet, having arrived at a certain point, again embraces creation. It wants to know nothing of a creation of actus, but nevertheless assumes creation of potentiae. It speaks of Fähigkeit ohne Fertigkeit; and considers the creation of a child, both in the physical and in the psychological sense, simpler and more reasonable than that of an adult. This

is now in itself already absurd, for whoever lets the *potentiae* arise by creation and not by evolution can in principle no longer have any objection against the doctrine of the *justitia originalis* and the *status integritatis*. But it also makes the matter more difficult to conceive besides. A potency does not develop of itself, without more, into actuality. Max Müller rightly said: wenn wir es versuchen wollten, uns den ersten Menschen als Kind geschaffen und allmählich seine physischen und geistigen Kräfte entfaltend zu denken, so könnten wir nicht begreifen, wie er nur einen Tag ohne übernatürliche Hülfe zu leben vermochte, Vorles. über die Wiss. der Sprache I3 Leipzig 1875 S. 410. In the same spirit Schelling expressed himself: Ich halte den Zustand der Cultur durchaus für den ersten des Menschengeschlechts u. s. w., Werke I 5 S. 286 f. 6 S. 57 f. II 1 S. 238 f. And J. G. Fichte also said: Es drängt sich die Frage auf, wenn es nothwendig sein sollte, einen Ursprung des ganzen Menschengeschlechts anzunehmen, wer erzog denn das erste Menschenpaar? Erzogen mussten sie werden—ein Mensch konnte sie nicht erziehen. Also ist es nothwendig, dass sie ein anderes vernünftiges Wesen erzogen, das kein Mensch war, es versteht sich bestimmt nur so weit, bis sie sich selbst untereinander erziehen konnten. Ein Geist nahm sich ihrer an, ganz so wie es eine alte ehrwürdige Urkunde vorstellt, welche überhaupt die tiefsinnigste, erhabenste Weisheit enthält und Resultate aufstellt, zu denen alle Philosophie am Ende doch wieder zurück kommen muss, Grundlage des Naturrechts 1796. In order to avoid one miracle, many miracles must be assumed. Thirdly, this representation rests on the error that there can be no innate holiness. Holiness, so one says, is always the fruit of struggle and effort. If Adam was created positively holy, he was necessarily good and his freedom was lost, e.g. Rothe, Theol. Ethik [517] § 480 f. Thus one comes to the point of

feigning a condition between good and evil, holy and unholy, an indifferent state, which precedes the moral in bonam or malam partem, and out of which man must then develop by free decision of the will in the one or the other direction. Man is then deprived of all intellectual and ethical content, and the image of God is placed in the pure, naked, merely formal personality, Nitzsch, Syst. der chr. Lehre S. 211. Müller, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 154 f. 493 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 432. Thomasius, Dogm. I 110 f. Beck, Glaub. II 333. Doedes, Leer der Zaligheid bl. 55v. Such a concept of personality, however, is a mere abstraction, to which nothing corresponds in reality. No man is conceivable without definite qualities of understanding and will. A complete indifference of the will, without character, without inclination to one side or the other, is simply an impossibility. Just as in nature only a good tree can bear good fruits, so also in ethical life the good nature precedes the good works. Operari sequitur esse. Scripture therefore also teaches that holiness both in creation and re-creation is a gift of God. Whoever has it can further unfold it in word and deed; but whoever lacks it can never acquire it. And finally this representation falls short with respect to the righteousness of God, who has allowed his creature to be tempted beyond ability; with respect to the seriousness of the temptation, which then becomes a cunning deception; with respect to the character of the fall, which ceases to be a dreadful guilt and changes into a non-imputable misfortune and an almost unavoidable fate. It wipes out the boundaries that exist between the status integritatis and the status corruptionis and lets man retain undisturbed even after the fall the image of God, which consists in something purely formal. It conceives the relation between the formal (the personality, the freedom of the will) and the material (the religious and ethical life) just as loosely and dualistically as Rome represents this

between *pura naturalia* and *donum superadditum*, only with this difference, that holiness in Rome is a fruit of the *gratia* and in Pelagius and his own a product of arbitrariness.

4. Alongside and over against this naturalistic conception of the image of God there came to stand another representation, which we can call the [518] supranaturalistic one, above p. 512. It did not arise from the distinction between *צלם* and *דמות*, although this was later also brought into connection with it. Nor is it built on the interpretation of Gen. 1 and 2, for many acknowledge that it does not occur there, or at least not literally. But it is derived from the idea of the *status gloriae* that gradually arose in the Christian church, to which believers are elevated by Christ and his Spirit, Joh. 1:12, Rom. 8:14-17, 1 Cor. 2:7v., Ef. 1:15v., 2 Petr. 1:2v., 1 Joh. 3:1, 2 etc. cf. Scheeben, Dogm. II 272-281. Gradually this *status gloriae*, under Neoplatonic influence, was conceived as a condition that far surpassed the state of nature not only in an ethical but also in a physical sense. Since the fourth century, in the Christological controversies, this thought came so much to the foreground that the deity of the Son and of the Spirit was proved especially by the fact that they were for human beings the authors of their deification. The essence of the *status gloriae* comes to lie more and more in the *visio Dei per essentiam*, in the *deiformitas*, *deificatio*, in the not merely moral but *physica participatio divinae naturae*, in the *Verschmelzung mit Gott*, cf. above 152v. And to this doctrine of the *status gloriae* there now came still that of the meritoriousness of good works. The *gratia infusa*, which was bestowed in baptism, was decidedly necessary but also put the human being in a position to do such good works as could merit *ex condigno* eternal salvation, the *visio Dei per essentiam*. From these two thoughts, the mystical conception of man's final destiny and the

meritoriousness of good works, the Roman doctrine of the *donum superadditum* was born. Alexander Halesius was the first who brought it into a definite formula. The heavenly blessedness and the beholding of God, which is man's final destiny and was this also for Adam, cannot be merited *ex condigno* except by such good works as are in accordance with that final destiny, i.e. as, like it, bear a supernatural character and thus proceed from a supernatural principle, the *gratia infusa*. The *justitia*, which Adam now of himself as a human being, as an earthly being, possessed by creation, was by the nature of the case not sufficient for that. And thus also to Adam, in order to reach his final destiny, a [519] supernatural grace had to be bestowed, namely the *gratia gratum faciens*, the image of God. *Haec autem sublimatio creaturae rationalis est supranaturale complementum; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptio nec assumptio huiusmodi fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae sed per donum superadditum naturae, consecrans naturam, ut sit templum, assimilans Deo, ut sit filius sive filia, confoederans Deo sive uniens per conformitatem voluntatis, ut sit sponsa; hoc autem fit a Deo mediante gratia gratum faciente*, Halesius, *S. Theol.* II qu. 91 membr. 1 art. 3. This doctrine found general acceptance among the scholastics, Thomas, *S. Th.* I qu. 95. Bonaventura, *Brevil.* II c. 11. 12. V c. 1, and the comm. of Thomas, Bonav. Duns Scotus on *Sent.* II dist. 29; was taken up in the *Catechismus Romanus*, I 2 qu. 18, 3, later against the Reformers, Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel defended and maintained, Bellarminus, *de gratia primi hominis*, Denzinger, *Enchir.* n. 881 sq., and forms one of the most important and most characteristic loci in Roman theology, cf. e.g. Becanus, *Theol. Schol.* I tract. 5. Casini, *Controv. de statu purae naturae*, printed as appendix ad librum II de opif. sex dierum of Petavius, *Theol. dogm.* ed. 1868 IV p. 587-653. *Theol. Wirceb.* VII p. 145 sq. Perrone, *Prael. theol.* III 166-182.

Kleutgen, Theol. II2 6-151. 507-615. Scheeben, Dogm. II 239-514. Id. Natur u. Gnade 1861. Schüzler, Natur u. Gnade. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit 1887 S. 1-61. Simar, Dogm.3 S. 326 f. C. Pesch, Prael. III 76-111. Möhler, Symb. § 1 etc. Although, however, there is agreement in the main matter, there is nevertheless all manner of difference on subordinate points. Some, such as Halesius, S. Theol. II qu. 96 m. 1. Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 2. Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, Biel and others, asserted that the supernatural gift of the *gratia gratum faciens* was distinct from the *justitia originalis*, which the human being immediately possessed by nature through creation, and was also bestowed temporally later than this. According to them the human being was first created with the *justitia originalis*; by this he was put in a position to merit the *gratia gratum faciens ex congruo*; and when he had received this, he could thereby acquire heavenly blessedness *ex condigno*. But Thomas objected to that, because the *gratia gratum faciens* would then also rest on merits, as a personal gift to Adam could not have been lost or acquired by him for all his [520] descendants, and then also could not be bestowed in baptism on small children without merit; therefore Thomas taught that Adam at the moment of creation simultaneously with the *justitia originalis* also received the *gratia*, S. Theol. I qu. 100 art. 1. Sent. II dist. 20 qu. 2 art. 3. dist. 29 qu. 1 art. 1. Trent avoided a decision in this point of dispute between Franciscans and Dominicans and only declared that Adam had lost the *justitia* and *sanctitas*, in qua constitutus fuerat, sess. V 1. Although later theologians mostly followed Thomas and in fact and temporally let the *justitia originalis* coincide with the *gratia gratum faciens*; ideally and logically the conception nevertheless remained the same. Roman theology has a twofold conception of the human being: the human being in *puris*

naturalibus, without supernatural grace, is indeed sinless, but has only a natural religion and virtue, and has his destination on earth; the human being, endowed with the donum superadditum of the image of God, has a supernatural religion and virtue and has his destination in heaven. But with this twofold idea of the human being one was not yet finished. For as soon as one considered what belonged to the one and what to the other idea of the human being, one became embarrassed with various gifts bestowed on the first human being. The immortalitas and the impassibilitas could not in the strict sense be called natural, for they were not properties of Adam's earthly body as such and could be lost. On the other hand, they also could not be a consequence of the gratia gratum faciens, for then the human being in puris naturalibus, without the donum superadditum, would have been susceptible to death and suffering, and death would then not be a punishment for sin. The same is the case with the concupiscentia. The struggle between flesh and spirit is according to Rome natural; the subjection of the flesh to the spirit is thus something supernatural, not already given with creation itself; but it nevertheless also cannot first be due to the gratia gratum faciens, for then a sinless human being without donum superadditum would not be possible. Therefore between the two ideas which Rome forms of the human being, a third had still to be inserted. And thus, according to Rome, a human being is conceivable and possible with dona naturalia, [521] praeternaturalia and supernaturalia. There is a threefold righteousness, a justitia naturalis, praeternaturalis and supernaturalis. No wonder that some, such as Berti, Norisius and others, could not conceive of such a human being who was endowed only with dona naturalia and praeternaturalia; according to God's potentia absoluta such a human being would indeed be possible, but according to his potentia

ordinata not; the visio beatifica is in fact proper to the human being by nature, saltem quoad inclinationem et appetitum, Perrone, III 167. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. 52 f. Pesch, Prael. III 109. But even if the conceivability and possibility of a human being in puris naturalibus is maintained, there is still all manner of difference in the doctrine of the image of God. Some distinguish image and likeness in such a way that the first comprises the dona naturalia, the second the supernaturalia; others, such as the Catech. Rom., let both refer to the dona supernaturalia. Halesius, Bonaventura, Thomas etc. thought with the justitia originalis of the justitia naturalis and indicated the justitia supernaturalis as gratia gratum faciens; but the Catech. Rom. and most later theologians speak precisely of the dona superaddita as justitia originalis. The immortalitas, impassibilitas, the liberum arbitrium, the temperatio concupiscentiae are now derived from a divinum beneficium, then again from the imago or from the similitudo, and are also reckoned to the justitia originalis, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 95 art. 1. Sent. II dist. 19 qu. 1 art. 4. Pesch, Prael. III 89 sq. The Catech. Rom. places everything alongside each other and brings it to no unity: Adam was susceptible to no death and suffering divino beneficio; his soul was created according to God's image and likeness; moreover, concupiscence was restrained and subjected to reason; and finally God added to that still the justitia originalis and the dominion, I 2 qu. 18, 3. And with all that there then still comes the difference over the nature of the gratia gratum faciens, over its relation to the Spirit of God, to the soul and its faculties, to the theological virtues, to good works etc., cf. later the locus de gratia. Enough, to show that the Roman doctrine concerning the image of God is also in itself not yet worked out and for that reason too cannot satisfy theological thinking.

5. In the first place, however, this doctrine is built on an incorrect [522] conception of man's final destiny. The status gratiae and gloriae, in which the church of Christ shares here and hereafter, is described in Holy Scripture in the most beautiful way, as a sonship of God, as communion in the divine nature, as the beholding of God, as eternal life, as heavenly blessedness, etc. On this there is no difference between Rome and us; no eye has seen, no ear has heard, it has not ascended into the heart of man, what God in the N. Test. dispensation of the covenant of grace has prepared for those who love Him, 1 Cor. 2:9. But Rome conceives this final destiny of man, which has been realized by Christ, as a Neoplatonic beholding of and a mystical fusion of the soul with God, cf. above 152v. and 518. And this is not the doctrine of Holy Scripture. For all those benefits which Christ has acquired for His own are not first bestowed upon them in the state of glory but are in principle their portion already here on earth, 1 Cor. 2:9 and yet also, according to Rome, do not include the beholding of God per essentiam. The sonship of God is a fruit of faith, Joh. 1:12, Rom. 8:14v. Gal. 4:6, 1 Joh. 3:1, 2. Eternal life is already enjoyed here and consists in a knowing of God in the face of Christ, Joh. 3:16, 36, 17:3. Christ is and remains the way to the Father, to the knowledge and the beholding of God, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 1:18, 14:6, 1 Joh. 3:2b. The visio Dei is only to be obtained in an ethical sense, Mt. 5:8, 1 Joh. 3:6. Even participation in the *θεία φύσις* is not something future only, but is an end which the bestowal of God's promises already here on earth intends, 2 Petr. 1:4, and again ethically vermittelt, Hebr. 12:10. Secondly, nowhere in Holy Scripture is it taught that this status gloriae, which already takes its beginning on earth in the status gratiae, is supranaturalis and superadditus in the Roman sense. Certainly this state of grace and glory goes very far beyond all thought and

imagination of man, 1 Cor. 2:9, 13:12, 1 Joh. 3:2. But one should consider that according to 1 Cor. 2 it is the wisdom of the world, the spirit of the world, the psychical man, vs. 6, 8, 12, 14, for whom these benefits of God are a mystery; and this psychical man is the man who lets himself be guided only by the animal life, deprived of the πνεῦμα ἐκ θεοῦ, and therefore [523] is darkened in his understanding. Added to this is that what God bestows and will bestow upon believers also for them themselves remains an undeserved gift of grace, which again and again disposes them to admiration and worship. And then it must also not be forgotten that Christ not only acquired what Adam lost but also what Adam would have acquired in the way of obedience. Therefore the treasure of salvation of the covenant of grace goes very far beyond all our thoughts; but there is not a word about its being a superadditum, which originally did not belong with our human nature. Thirdly, the conclusion is incorrect which Rome derives from these benefits of grace in Christ for the state of Adam before the fall. Rome reasons thus: if the status gloriae for restored man consists in conformity to God, then it must also have consisted in that for the first man. And if that status gloriae is now not attained by believers except through the status gratiae, then this also holds for Adam before the fall. The connection between the status gratiae and gloriae consists according to Rome in this, that man in justification receives the gratia infusa and by virtue of that does good works, which merit eternal life ex condigno. All this Rome transfers to the first man. He too had as final destiny the status gloriae; he could not attain this except through the status gratiae; to Adam therefore a gratia was bestowed, by which he could merit eternal life ex condigno. Just as that status gloriae is, so also that gratia by virtue of its nature is supernatural, elevated above the psychical man, and thus a donum superadditum. This

reasoning of Rome is correct, insofar as it concludes from the image of God in restored man to that in the first man. There is indeed no more than one image of God. It is also correct, insofar as it assumes that the final destiny for Adam was no other than what the believer now receives through Christ, namely eternal life. There is really only one ideal for man. But it is incorrect, because it posits between *gratia* and *gloria* a connection of meritoriousness and further also applies this to Adam. The meritorious value of the *bona opera* can only be treated later. Here it is only pointed out that even if the Roman conception of man's final destiny were correct, it still gives no right to conceive the [524] *gratia* in an adequate, supernatural sense. For such a connection is also possible, that God binds to certain works certain promises and gifts, without these therefore in the strict sense, *ex condigno*, being merited by them. Of such a nature was the promise of eternal life to Adam in case of obedience, as the Reformed taught in their doctrine concerning the *foedus operum*, cf. § 32. There was a merit *ex pacto*, not *ex condigno*. The good works of man are never worth the heavenly glory, they never weigh against it. Rome, however, introduces the meritoriousness of good works, both in the believer and in Adam, and therefore falls short with respect to grace. Grace with Rome changes entirely in character. It stands not in ethical but in physical opposition to nature. It presupposes not sin and guilt, but only a lower nature. It makes on the one hand everything into grace and thereby precisely makes it so that there is no grace at all. For the *gratia* is with Adam and with the believer indeed grace, but in no other sense than that in which life, understanding, wisdom, power, etc. are grace. There is no reason to call only the *donum superadditum* grace; that Adam was created and received understanding and will was then equally grace, even if there is also a quantitative difference in

the gifts of grace. And thus actually everything becomes grace, which in the first moment is bestowed by God upon man in creation or re-creation. But also only in that first moment. For as soon as he has received those first gifts, man himself according to Rome goes to work by that gratia; and everything that he now further receives, he receives as wages for his merits. Even eternal life is no longer a gift of grace of God but a worthy, fitting, adequate wage for the work of man. Only it can still be called a gift of grace, because the power which made man capable of meriting was grace. Just as formerly the Pelagians said: the posse is from God, the velle is from man. Fourthly, above 520-521 it has been indicated that the Roman doctrine of the donum superadditum has led and must lead to a threefold conception of man. For Rome there is not one idea and one moral law and one destiny for man; but as in the other creatures, so also in the world of men the hierarchy and the ordering of ranks continues. There [525] is in the abstract a homo with justitia naturalis, another with justitia praeternaturalis, a third with justitia supernaturalis conceivable. The first of these three men is actually still little elevated above the animal; he is subject to the concupiscentia, to the natural opposition between flesh and spirit, to the susceptibility to bodily suffering and temporal death. But he still has in his will the power to do the good, to not let the concupiscentia pass over into sinful deeds, and thus to lead a well natural but yet sinless life. To this image man after the fall is fairly similar. Although original sin is still often conceived not only negatively but also positively, it is nevertheless weakened more and more, in proportion as the physical opposition of nature and grace replaced the ethical antithesis of sin and grace. According to many it consists only negatively in a loss of that donum superadditum, which was bestowed upon the first man by the good pleasure of God, e.g.

Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. 59, 137 f. Man without that *donum superadditum* thus remains complete in his kind, perfect, and however difficult it may be, especially in the long run, yet if he wills even a sinless man. And hence with Rome the mild judgment concerning the children dying unbaptized and concerning the heathen, who have made a good use of the light and the power of nature. They have no guilt and thus no punishment, receive a *poena damni*, no *poena sensus*. As such a *homo naturalis*, however, God did not create the first man. He at once gave him a *justitia praeternaturalis* in addition, and therefore Adam also, abstracted from the actual *donum superadditum* i.e. the *gratia gratum faciens*, was elevated above the *concupiscentia*, suffering and death, also as regards the body. This is a second idea of man, which is possible and capable of existing; such a man would then have been able to keep God's commandments without struggle from the side of the flesh (*donum integritatis*), but his righteousness would nevertheless have remained natural and would not have merited the *visio Dei per essentiam*. This second conception of man is now once more raised a step higher by the addition of the *donum superadditum*, by which a man arises with *justitia supernaturalis*. As through the whole Roman system, so we also encounter here in the doctrine of the image [526] of God the opposition between the natural and the supernatural, between the human and the divine, between the earthly and the heavenly and within both domains then again all kinds of gradations. There is all manner of rank and class and estate in the ethical and religious. Not all stand and elevate themselves equally high. If God is the center, the creatures group themselves in ever wider circles around Him. The *homo naturalis* is farthest removed from Him, then the *homo praeternaturalis*, thereafter the *homo supernaturalis*. And in the last class there is again all manner of distinction

and degree. There are clerici and laymen, monks and ordinary people, praecepta and consilia, lower and higher morality. Highest stands the mysticus, who already here on earth by meditation and asceticism and oratio brings it to contemplatio. And above men stand again the angels, arrayed in all kinds of orderings of rank. Everything rises upward, toward God; it approaches Him ever more. The fusion of the soul with God is the highest blessedness. Therefore in Rome there is a place for all; it reckons with each one's capacity and suitability; it has a different ideal for the different men; it does not set the same moral and religious demands upon everyone. Pierson has rightly laid emphasis on this; only he regarded as principle and essence what was only consequence and phenomenon, *Gesch. van het R. Kath. I 24v*. Against this in the ground Neoplatonic, Areopagitic philosophy it is that the Reformation, resting on Scripture, has proceeded. Scripture does not know such a physical opposition of the natural and the supernatural. It knows only one idea of man, one moral law, one final destiny, one priesthood, which is the portion of all believers. Fifthly, it appears clearly from this that the reason why Rome teaches the *justitia praeter- and supernaturalis* does not lie in this, that otherwise the lossability of the *justitia originalis* cannot be explained. Roman theologians indeed constantly bring this objection against the doctrine of the Reformation; the *justitia originalis* belongs to the essence of man or not; if the former, then it is unlosable or, if it nevertheless is lost, then man loses in it a part of his essence and he ceases to be a complete man. But however much this objection is repeatedly made; not in order to evade it has Rome come to the doctrine of the *donum superadditum*. Rome retains [527] exactly the same difficulty. For Adam also had a *justitia naturalis*. And this *justitia naturalis* is indeed natural, flowing forth from the principia and powers of the natural

man, without supernatural help (even if not, without the general help of God's preservation), and it is nevertheless losable and is by many in fact lost. And nevertheless even the most deeply fallen sinner, deprived of all *justitia naturalis*, still remains man. The losability and the factual loss of the *justitia originalis* therefore can absolutely render no service as an argument against its natural character. If that were the case, then the *justitia naturalis*, which Rome teaches, would also have to bear the name of *supernaturalis*. The question between Rome and us is a wholly different one. Lovable is the *justitia originalis*, because it is an *accidens*, not a *substantia*. But among the *accidentia*, which all as such are losable, Rome again makes a distinction between what is *naturaliter accidens* and what is *supernaturaliter accidens*, e.g. Benschop in *De Katholiek CX* p. 56. According to us the whole *justitia originalis* is an *accidens naturale*; according to Rome the *gratia gratum faciens* is an *accidens supernaturale*. Why? Not, to make the losability possible and clear. But because man without it remained a defective creature. Rome teaches expressly that it was for God, given once that He wished to create a being consisting of soul and body, of spirit and matter, impossible to create these two, soul and body, without supernatural help in complete harmony, just as little as He can make a square circle. Flesh and spirit strive *per se* with one another, and God cannot prevent strife between those two elements without supernatural grace. Bellarminus says it clearly, that man consists of flesh and spirit, and thus partly has *propensio ad bonum corporale*, partly *ad bonum spirituale*, and that *ex his diversis vel contrariis propensionibus existere in uno eodemque homine pugnam quandam*. Further he now teaches, *divinam providentiam initio creationis ut remedium adhiberet huic morbo seu languori naturae humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, addidisse homini quoddam donum insigne*,

justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam freno pars inferior superiori et pars superior Deo facile subjecta contineretur, de gr. pr. hom. c. 5, cf. c. 7. Here it is clearly expressed that the flesh by its nature stands over against [528] the spirit. Matter is a power over against God, which indeed is not per se sinful as in Manichaeism, but nevertheless is of very low order, moves in an entirely own direction and of itself entices man to struggle and to sin. Indeed that power is so great that the ratio alone cannot, or at least cannot except with great difficulty, control the motus animi. For that a special, supernatural grace is needed. As in the philosophy of Plotinus, matter is a creature that stands very far from God, is by nature hostile to all that is spiritual and therefore must be powerfully restrained. Sixthly finally, Rome's doctrine of the donum superadditum brings with it a peculiar conception of Christianity. The Christian religion with Rome indeed also serves to deliver from sin; but in the first and principal place it nevertheless extends to bestow back upon man that gratia which was bestowed upon Adam as a donum superadditum but was lost by him. This gratia was as necessary to man before the fall as it is now to us, and was then just as supernatural as now after the fall. According to Rome grace is thus a donum supernaturale per se and not per accidens, not only on account of sin, Bellarm. de gr. pr. hom. c. 5. Sin has brought no change in the nature of the gratia. Perhaps it has been increased by sin. But it was before and after the fall completely the same, namely an elevatio supra naturam. That is its character and essence. Christianity therefore may also still be Erlösungsreligion; in the very first place it is no reparatio but elevatio naturae; it serves to raise nature above itself, to deify man. For that purpose with Adam the gratia gratum faciens served, for that purpose now Christianity serves. This grace is therefore then and now the same; that is,

what is proper, what is essential in Christianity has absolutely not become necessary through the fall; it was already necessary before the fall. Christianity as *elevatio naturae* was also already with Adam before the fall. The reception of the *gratia infusa* is now bound besides to *praeparationes*, specifically also to faith in two dogmata, the Trinity and the incarnation, cf. part I 518v. Well then, so it was also with Adam. He already knew both before the fall, Becanus, *Theol. schol.* I tr. 5 c. 2 qu. 2. Simar, *Dogm.* 332. Pesch, *Prael. dogm.* II 89 etc. Thomas, *S. Theol.* II 2 qu. 2 art. 7, qu. 5 art. 1. The incarnation is therefore [529] also *per consequentiam* before the fall and without sin necessary. In other words, in order that man become like God, God must become man. This law held as well before as after the fall. Now the incarnation brings with it reconciliation only as something subordinate. But the center of gravity with Rome lies not in satisfaction and forgiveness of guilt, but in the incarnation of God and in the deification of man, cf. part I 220v. 276v.

6. By the Reformers this doctrine was unanimously rejected, but chiefly for this reason, because it led to a weakening of original sin. The opposition was directed especially against the thesis of scholasticism: *supernaturalia amissa, naturalia adhuc esse integra*. And from that one concluded back to the image of God. If man through sin, through loss of the image of God, was wholly and entirely corrupted, then it must also have belonged to his nature. And thus Luther said, *justitiam non esse quoddam donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatumque a natura hominis sed fuisse vere naturalem, ut naturae Adae esset diligere Deum, credere Deo etc.*, in *Genes.* III. But the Reformers also had to continue to make a distinction between what of the image of God had remained and what of it had been lost. For that they used the names of *substantia*, *essentia* and *dotes*, *dona*, even *supernaturalia dona*.

The Apol. Conf. calls the knowledge, the fear of God in Adam *dona*, and the Form. Conc. speaks of *dotes in paradiso naturae concreatae*, Müller, Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K5 S. 80. 81. 580. The Lutheran dogmaticians did call the image of God natural, insofar as human nature without that image could not be pure and it was created at once together with it. But they denied that the image of God was natural in that sense, that it would proceed of itself as such from human nature and thus would constitute an inalienable, essential constituent part of it; and some, such as Gerhard, Quenstedt e. a. also expressly called the *supernaturalis Dei favor*, the *gratiosa s. trinitatis inhabitatio* and the *suavitas et delectatio* flowing from it expressly by the name of *dona supernaturalia*, Gerhard, Loci theol. VIII c. 1-3. Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. II 1-48. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 461-488. Likewise Calvin distinguishes between the *substantia animae* and its *dotes*, Inst. I 15, 2 and says with [530] Augustine, *naturalia dona fuisse corrupta in homine per peccatum, supernaturalibus autem exinanitum fuisse*; indeed he even calls these latter *adventitia, praeter naturam*, II 2, 12. And many Reformed theologians in the same sense distinguish between *qualitates naturales* and *dona supernaturalia*, Maccovius, Loci Comm. 405 sq.; the *immortalitas* is by many derived not from Adam's nature but from the *gratia Dei*, Zanchius, Op. III 497. Polanus V 29. Junius, Op. I 211. Bucanus, Theol. XI 12. Maccovius p. 409. Even the old distinction of image and likeness was adopted by many and also applied in this sense, Zanchius, Op. III 486. Martyr op Gen. 1:26. Alsted, Theol. schol. 281. Yet it soon became clear that the Protestants, even where they still retained the expression *dona supernaturalia*, nevertheless understood these in another sense than the Roman Catholics. With the latter the intention is this, that a man is very well conceivable and possible without these *dona supernaturalia*; indeed

that man then, as a rational moral being, also has some knowledge of God, of the moral law, of righteousness. But there is an essential difference between the knowledge, the love, the righteousness in a natural and in a supernatural sense, between the *homo naturalis* and *supernaturalis*, between the man and the Christian, between the world and the church, between nature and grace. Grace is not merely a restoration but an elevation, supplementation of nature, an *elevatio*, *sublimatio naturae*. This now was in principle contested by the Reformation. And therefore it had to come and it also in fact came to the doctrine that the image of God was by nature proper to man and that he, without that image, could exist only in *natura impura*, as a sinner. But now among the Reformers there was also still difference in the conception of the image of God. In the first period some Lutherans also still placed the image of God in the being of man and in the substance of the soul, Luther in Köstlin, I 121, Melanchthon, Hemming, Selnecker in Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. I 338 f. But Lutheran theology nevertheless proceeded from another thought. Its subjective, soteriological character had to lead to seeking the image of God only in the moral qualities which the first man received and whose loss made man into a stick and a block in religious and moral respect. Luther often laid all the emphasis on the [531] gifts and let the image of God be absorbed in them, Köstlin II 358 f. Heppe I 345. The confessional writings speak in the same spirit, Müller S. 80. 576, and likewise the theologians, Heerbrand, Hunnius, Gerhard VIII c. 1. Quenstedt II 3-10, 17-23. Hollaz, p. 464 sq. etc. Indeed the Lutherans do not deny that also the essence of man expresses *quaedam θεία* sive *divina*; but the proper image of God is located only in the *justitia originalis* with the *immortalitas*, *impassibilitas*, *dominium* and *conditio felicissima* connected with it. For only the Son is essentially and substantially the image of God, Hebr. 1:3; in

man it is a *perfectio accidentalis*, losable and lost, Rom. 3:23, and only in the believer renewed and restored, Rom. 8:29, 2 Cor. 3:18, 5:17, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10. The Reformed, however, from the beginning also included the essence of man in the image of God. Heppe, *Dogm.* 169. 170 asserts wrongly, that Calvin and Zanchius did not teach thus. Calvin indeed makes a distinction between the *substantia animae* and its dotes, but says expressly that the image of God consisted in that *tota praestantia, qua eminet hominis natura inter omnes animantium species*, and that it further, *proinde*, also consists in the *integritas*, *Inst.* I 15, 2. II 12, 6, cf. in Gen. 1:26, 9:6, Jak. 3:9. And with this all the Reformed agree, Zanchius, *Op.* III 486. 677 sq. Ursinus, *Catech.* qu. 7. Martyr, *Loci C.* 46 sq. Polanus, *Synt. Theol.* V 34. Synopsis XIII 36. Leydecker, *Fax Verit.* p. 395 etc. Only Coccejus, *S. Theol.* XVII § 12-24 again proposed another opinion and taught that the soul and its properties were indeed presupposition, but not content of the image of God; they were, as it were, the canvas on which the image was painted by God, but this itself consisted only in the gifts according to 2 Cor. 3:18, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, cf. also Heidegger, *Corp. Theol.* VI 119. Braun, *Doctr. foed.* I 2, 15, 5 v. Others expressed it thus, that the image of God consisted *antecedenter in natura spirituali, formaliter in sanctitate, consequenter in dominio*, Turretinus, *Theol. El.* V qu. 10 § 6. Ryssenius, *Theol.* 178. Witsius, *Oec. foed.* I 2, 11. Brakel, *Red. Godsd.* X 25. Most, however, one continued to speak of the image of God in a broader and in a narrower sense. Thereby in Reformed theology the bond was held fast between the physical and the ethical nature of man, and thus further [532] between nature and grace. In addition, there soon came in Reformed theology yet another distinction, which was worked out especially in the doctrine of the *foedus operum*. This gave answer to the question, not what

Adam was, but what Adam had to become. Only in these three points, the image of God in a broader sense, the image of God in a narrower sense, and the unfolding or destination of the image of God, i.e. in the doctrine of the covenant of works, is the locus de imagine Dei to be treated fully.

7. Between Rome's doctrine and that of the Reformation concerning the image of God there is a deep difference, which extends over the whole of theology. This difference does not lie in the expression *justitia originalis*. For although this term is used by the Roman theologians in different senses, yet the latter also sometimes designate thereby the *justitia supernaturalis*, above p. 519. *Originalis* can be called the *justitia* in the first man, because his positive conformity with the law of God is proper to him from his origin onward, because as such it is to be distinguished from the *justitia habitualis* and *actualis*, and because in Adam it was the principle and the root of his actual righteousness. Indeed, since Thomas there was also no difference about this, that the *justitia originalis* also for the whole of humanity, if Adam had remained standing, would have been the source of its actual righteousness, for Adam received it not as *persona privata* but as *persona publica*. The whole dispute turned on whether that *justitia originalis* was now *naturalis* or, at least in part, *supernaturalis*. The Reformers asserted the former. By that they did not mean to say that that original righteousness flowed of itself from human nature, taken in the sense of the connection of spirit and matter, nor either that it might not be called a gift, even of God's grace in a broad sense; but they only maintained with that expression that the image of God, the original righteousness, was inseparable from the idea of man; that it was the normal state, the harmony, the health of man; that without it man cannot be a true, perfect, normal man. If man loses that image of God, then he loses no substance and he indeed remains man, but

he becomes an abnormal, sick, spiritually dead man, a sinner; then something is lacking to him which belonged to his kind and nature, like [533] sight to the blind man, hearing to the deaf man, health to the sick man. With Rome man can lack the *justitia supernaturalis* and yet be a good, true, perfect sinless man, with a *justitia naturalis*, which in its kind is without any defect. But according to the Protestants that cannot be. There is no status medius between man as image of God and man as sinner. He is son of God, his offspring, his image, or he is child of wrath, dead in sins and trespasses. When man receives that image of God, this perfect righteousness, again through faith in Christ, then that is indeed a *donum supernaturale* but *supernaturale per accidens*; he receives back what belongs to his being, like the blind man who becomes seeing again. This doctrine now is grounded on Holy Scripture, which nowhere at the creation of man speaks of *dona supernaturalia*; Rome therefore also does not appeal to Gen. 1:26, 31, Eccl. 7:29 etc., but to the representation of the N. T. of the status *gratiae* and *gloriae*, which however can in no way serve as proof. Scripture everywhere proceeds from the fact that man is akin to God and is his offspring; service of, love to, communion with God is no *donum superadditum* but originally, by nature, proper to man. God claims man wholly, with understanding, heart, soul, body and all powers for his service and for his love. The moral law is one for all men, in all times, and holds the moral ideal equally high for all. There is no lower and higher righteousness, no twofold morality, no double kind of duties. The original righteousness is so natural that it also, according to most Roman theologians, would have been inherited by Adam's descendants in case of his obedience, and that the Heathen even now by nature do the things that are of the law, Rom. 2:15. If then also against this reformational doctrine it

is objected that it is in an antinomy, because it on the one hand calls the *justitia originalis naturalis* and yet on the other hand *amissibilis* and *accidentalis*, Benschop in *de Katholiek CX* p. 43, also Strauss, *Glaub. I* 708. Lipsius, *Dogm. § 434*, then this objection flows only from misunderstanding, Philippi, *Kirchl. Gl. III* 408. Natural the original righteousness is called, not because it consists in a certain substance or essence, but because it is a natural property or quality. Just as health belongs to the nature of [534] man but for that reason is nevertheless losable, so it is also with the image of God. Both, Rome and the Reformation, agree in this, that the original righteousness is no matter, no spiritual substance, as the Manicheans teach, but an *accidens*, a *qualitas*. And the difference is only whether it is naturally accidental or, at least for a part, supernaturally accidental, *de Katholiek, ib.* pp. 56-60. Rome teaches only of the *justitia naturalis* that it is naturally accidental; the Reformation teaches it of the whole *justitia originalis*. But therefore also, as was already said above, Rome's objection against the doctrine that the image of God is natural entirely falls away; for it itself acknowledges that the *justitia naturalis* is natural and yet losable and thus can no longer bring this objection against the doctrine of the Protestants. Rome's doctrine has therefore also not arisen from the objection that the naturalness of the original righteousness is not to be reconciled with its losability, but it owes its origin to a wholly different series of thoughts, namely to the Neoplatonic conception of the Christian ideal of life. It is that Neoplatonism that has been rejected by the Reformation on the ground of Scripture. And in doing so it has guarded itself against all Manichaeism. Through sin man has lost no substance. In this sense man is still man even after the fall. But through the loss of the original righteousness he has lost the harmony, the health of

his nature, has become wholly and entirely a sinner; his nature in the sense of substance, essence has remained, but the moral qualities naturally proper to him have been lost, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. I 309v. This beautiful conception of the image of God and of the original righteousness has now come into its own still better in the Reformed church and theology than in the Lutheran. Here the image of God is restricted to the original righteousness, and thus has been wholly lost together with it. The separation between the spiritual and the worldly, between the heavenly and the earthly is here drawn through so sharply and divided into two hemisphaeria, that the connection of nature and grace, of creation and re-creation is wholly misunderstood, cf. part I 222v. The supranaturalistic representation of the image of God is here not yet wholly overcome; it stands loose alongside and above nature, and the loss of it has indeed as a consequence that man [535] in spiritual things is wholly deaf and blind, but in earthly things he is still capable of much good and to a certain extent independent of the grace of God in Christ. The Reformed, however, by their distinction of the image of God in a broader and narrower sense have most purely maintained the connection of substance and quality, of nature and grace, of creation and re-creation. Indeed this distinction too has often been conceived still all too mechanically, and it ought to be developed further organically. But here it has nevertheless been expressed most clearly that the image of God in the narrower sense was most closely connected with that in the broader sense; that both components made up the full image of God; that not something in man but man himself, the whole man, was image of God; that sin, which caused the image of God in the narrower sense to be lost and that in the broader sense to be corrupted and destroyed, has affected the whole man, and that accordingly grace in Christ also restores the whole man and is of

the greatest significance for his whole life and labor, also in family, society, state, art, science etc.

8. In the treatment of the doctrine of the image of God, therefore, in accordance with Scripture and the Reformed confession, this thought ought to stand in the foreground, that man does not bear or have the image of God, but that he is the image of God; as man he is son, likeness, offspring of God, Gen. 1:26, 9:6, Luk. 3:38, Hd. 17:28, 1 Cor. 11:7, Jak. 3:9. Two things are enclosed herein; first, that not something in God, some virtue and perfection with the exclusion of others, nor also one person, e.g. the Son with the exclusion of Father and Spirit, but that God himself, that the whole Godhead is the archetype of man. Indeed it has often been taught, that man has been made specifically after the Son or after the Christus incarnandus, Clemens Alex. Strom. V 14. Tertull. de resurr. carnis c. 6. Osiander, in Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 2. II 12, 6. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 290. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I 3 126. Beck, Gl. II 329. Schoeberlein in Herzog 2 4, 7. Martensen, Dogm. § 72. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 70 etc. But Scripture says that nowhere. It repeatedly expresses, that man has been made after God's image, that we have not been created after Christ but that He has become like us, Rom. 8:3, Phil. 2:7, 8, Hebr. 2:14, [536] and that we now, recreated after the image of Christ, again become like God, Rom. 8:29, 1 Cor. 15:49, 2 Cor. 3:18, Phil. 3:21, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, 1 Joh. 3:2, cf. above 511. Much better, therefore, is it to say, that the threefold being of God is the archetype of man, August. de trin. XII 6. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 16. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 5, cf. above p. 311, although in the psychological tracing of the trinitarian moments in the human being all caution is also to be observed, Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 4. Comm. in Gen. 1:26. Synopsis pur. theol. XIII 7. Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. II 4. Hollaz, Ex.

theol. 466. On the other side, from the doctrine that man has been created after God's image, it follows that that image extends over the whole man. There is nothing in man excluded from the image of God. All creatures display vestigia Dei, man is imago Dei. And he is that wholly and entirely, in soul and body, in all faculties and powers, in all states and relations. Man is the image of God, because he is and insofar as he is truly man, and he is man, truly, essentially man, because and in that same measure as he is the image of God. But naturally, just as the cosmos is an organism and thus in some creatures more and in others less clearly reveals God's virtues, so also in man as organism the image of God comes out more clearly here than elsewhere, in the soul more than in the body, in the ethical virtues more than in the physical powers. Yet this detracts nothing from the truth, that the whole man is God's image. Scripture would not be able and permitted to speak of God in a human way and to transfer all human properties to God, cf. above p. 66, if God had not first made man wholly and entirely after his image. And it is the task of Christian theology, to point out this image of God in the whole being of man. Compare herewith my *Beginnellen der Psychologie*, 1897, which treat some subjects from the doctrine of man more broadly than the space here permits.

First of all, the image of God is demonstrable in the soul of man. According to Gen. 2:7 man was formed from the dust of the earth by the inbreathing of the *נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים*, and thus he became a *נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה*, ψυχὴ ζῶσα. The breath of life is the principle of life, the living soul is the essence of man. [537] By both, Scripture assigns to man a distinct, independent place and avoids both pantheism and materialism. The names *רוּחַ* and *נֶפֶשׁ*, πνεῦμα and ψυχή, which in Scripture designate the invisible constituent of man, set this clearly in the light. Trichotomism, which in principle is rooted in the

dualism of Plato and in the Christian church repeatedly found entrance with gnostic and theosophical tendencies, sees in this two particular substances. But wrongly. Hebr. 4 vs. 12 and 1 Thess. 5:23 no more give an enumeration of the essentially different constituents of man than e.g. Luk. 10:27 and thus prove nothing. Soul and spirit in Scripture repeatedly stand in parallelism and alternate with one another. Now body and soul, then body and spirit, constitute the essence of man, Mt. 10:28, 1 Cor. 7:34, Jak. 2:26. The psychical activities are alternately ascribed to the spirit and to the soul, Ps. 139:14, Spr. 19:2 and Spr. 17 vs. 27, Ps. 77:7, 1 Cor. 2:11, Num. 21:4 and Job. 21:4, 1 Sam. 1:10 and Jes. 54:6, Luk. 1:46 and 47 etc. Dying is called both the surrender of the soul, Gen. 35:18, 1 Kon. 17:21, Mt. 20:28, Hd. 15:26, 20:10, and of the spirit, Ps. 31:6, Mt. 27:50, Luk. 8:55, 23:46, Hd. 7:59. Sometimes the spirit and sometimes the soul is immortal, Pred. 12:7, Mt. 10:28; and the dead are called souls, Op. 6:9, 20:4, and spirits, Hebr. 12 vs. 13, 1 Petr. 3:19. But although not essentially distinct, they are nevertheless by no means identical. Spirit is man, because he did not, like the animals, come forth from the earth, but the breath of life was breathed into him by God, Gen. 2:7; because he has his principle of life from above, from God, Pred. 12:7; because he has a spirit of his own, distinct from the Spirit of God, Gen. 41:8, 45:27, Ex. 35:21, Deut. 2:30, Richt. 15 vs. 19, Ezech. 3:14, Zach. 12:1, Mt. 26:41, Mk. 2:8, Luk. 1 vs. 47, 23:46, Joh. 11:33, Hd. 7:59, 17:16, Rom. 8:16, 1 Cor. 2:11, 5:3-5, 1 Thess. 5:23, Hebr. 4:12, 12:23 etc.; because as such he is akin to the angels, can also think spiritual, heavenly things, and if need be can also exist without a body. But soul is man, because the spiritual constituent in him from the first moment onward, in distinction from the angels, is oriented to a body, is organized for a body; because through that body he is bound to [538] the earth and

also for his higher life to the sensible and external; because he can ascend to the higher only from out of the lower; because he thus is a sensible, material being and as such akin to the animals. Man is an animal rationale, un roseau pensant; standing between angels and animals, akin to both and distinct from both, in himself uniting and reconciling heaven and earth, the invisible and the visible things, with one another. And precisely as such he is image and likeness of God. God is most certainly spirit, and in so far the angels too are akin to Him. But sometimes there is also mention of his soul, and throughout the whole of Scripture all those peculiarly psychical affections and activities are also ascribed to God, which are essentially proper to man. In Christ God assumed not the nature of angels but that of men. And therefore it is precisely man, in distinction from the angels, who is image, son, offspring of God. The spiritualitas, invisibilitas, unitas, simplicitas, immortalitas of the human soul are traits of the image of God. This image itself is expressed in this, that he has a πνευμα, which from the outset has been organized into ψυχη.

Secondly, the faculties of man also belong to the image of God. While the spirit is the principle and the soul the subject of life in man, according to Holy Scripture the heart is the organ for his life. It is first the centre of bodily life, but then further, in a figurative sense, the foundation and source of all psychic life, of affections and passions, of desire and will, even of thinking and knowing. From the heart are all תוֹצְאוֹת הַיָּיִם, Spr. 4:23. This life, which has its origin in the heart, then divides into two streams. On the one hand, that life is to be distinguished which comprises all impressions, perceptions, sensations, observations, deliberations, thoughts, knowledge, wisdom, has, particularly in its higher form, the νοῦς as organ, and embodies itself in the word, the language. And on the other hand, from the

heart all the affections, passions, impulses, inclinations, attachments, desires, and decisions of the will take their origin, which must be guided by the *vouç* and express themselves in the deed. Also in all these psychic faculties and activities of man, traits are to be seen of the image of God. Already the diversity and richness of those powers points back to God. [539] The lower a creature stands, the less richly organized it is, and thus also the less akin to and susceptible to the highest good, which God is. Even the angel stands, in this respect, below man. Precisely because man is so wonderfully richly organized, he can, in the richest way, as it were from all sides, in all His virtues and perfections, become conformed to God as the highest good and enjoy Him. Augustine even saw in heart, understanding, and will (*memoria*, *intellectus*, *voluntas*) an analogy of the trinitarian being of God. Just as the Father gives life to the Son and the Spirit and the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, so it is also in man that the heart, the *memoria*, the deep, hidden life of the soul, grants existence to *intellectus* and *voluntas* and, in particular, also causes the will to follow in order upon the understanding. Rationalism and Pelagianism detach understanding and will from the heart, and seek in both together the whole, full being of man; mysticism, despising the conscious, willing life, withdraws into the depth of the mind; the Greek church and theology places both, head and heart, unvermittelt alongside each other; but the theology of the West, under the guidance of Augustine, has avoided all these errors; it has seen that the doctrine of God and of man stood in the closest connection; in the Trinity it therefore held fast to the unity of essence, the distinctness of the three persons, the *filioque*, and correspondingly it also taught in psychology that the deep, hidden life of the soul came to revelation only through the

cognitive and the appetitive faculty, and that, under these two, the latter was guided and governed by the former.

9. Thirdly, the image of God reveals itself in the virtues of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, with which man was created at once. For a regulated treatment, above one ought first to have spoken separately about the nature and the faculties of the soul, but this is intended only as a logical distinction. Man was not created as a neutral being with merely indifferent *potentiae*, but he was created at once physically and ethically mature, with knowledge in the understanding, righteousness in the will, holiness in the heart. For man, goodness consists in moral perfection, in complete [540] conformity with the law of God, in a holy and perfect being as God himself, Lev. 19:2, Deut. 6:5, Mt. 5:48, 22:37, Ef. 5:1, 1 Petr. 1:15, 16. That law is one and the same for all men; Scripture knows no twofold mankind, no twofold moral law, no twofold moral perfection and destiny. If man is created good, then he must be created with the *justitia originalis*. This, on the one hand, is not to be conceived as childish innocence, but it also may not be exaggerated, as if the *status integritatis* were already equal to the *status gloriae*. Adam's knowledge was a pure but nevertheless a limited one and susceptible of increase; he did not walk in sight but in faith; he knew not only intuitively but also discursively; he did not know the future except through special revelation, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 94 art. 1-3. And likewise it was with his righteousness and holiness; they were his property from the beginning, for otherwise he would never have been able to do any good work. Good fruits presuppose a good tree; *operari sequitur esse*. But that inborn righteousness and holiness nevertheless had to be preserved by man, unfolded, and converted into deeds. Not as if Adam, equipped with the necessary gifts, now had to set to work himself in his own power, without

and outside God. The *justitia originalis* was a free gift of God and it was also maintained in him from moment to moment by the providence of God. It is not conceivable for a moment without communion with God. Just as the Son already before the fall was *Mediator unionis*, so also the H. Spirit already then was the craftsman of all knowledge, righteousness, and holiness in man. Some church fathers argued this with Gen. 2:7 and then said that man was first formed by the Logos and that thereafter the breath of life, i.e. the H. Spirit, was breathed into him, cf. Kleutgen, *Theol.* II 541 f. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk* I3 155. This exegesis was incorrect, but it is perfectly true that man also in *statu integritatis* possessed the virtues of knowledge and righteousness only through and in the H. Spirit. To be sure, there is a great difference between the indwelling of the H. Spirit in man before sin and in the state of sin. Now that indwelling is indeed *supra naturam*, because the H. Spirit, as it were, must come to man from outside and stands in direct [541] opposition to his whole sinful nature. With Adam, however, that whole opposition did not exist; his nature was holy and therefore did not need, as with believers, to be made holy; it was from the outset suited for the indwelling of the H. Spirit. Therefore this was also natural with Adam. No truly good, perfect man is conceivable without the communion of the H. Spirit. There is no *homo naturalis* in the Roman sense, standing between fallen, sinful man and perfect man, created according to God's image. Whoever is man, man in the full, true sense, he is and must be the image of God, son of God, offspring of God, living in communion with Him through the H. Spirit. And thus man also before the fall was *totius sacrosanctae trinitatis domicilium, pulcherrimum Spiritus Sancti templum*.

Fourthly, the body of man also belongs to the image of God. Philosophy, which does not know revelation or rejects it, always falls back again into

empiricism or rationalism, into materialism or spiritualism. But Scripture reconciles both. Man has a πνευμα, but that πνευμα is psychically organized, and must by virtue of its nature dwell in a body. It is man's essence, to be bodily, sensuous. Therefore, if not temporally then yet logically, first his body is formed from the dust of the earth and thereafter the breath of life is breathed into him. He is called Adam after the earth, out of which he has been formed. He is and is called dust, Gen. 2:7, Ps. 103:14, Job 10:9, 33:6, Jes. 2:22, 29:16, 45:9, 64:8, ἐκ γης χοικος, 1 Cor. 15:47. The body is no prison, but a wondrous work of art of God almighty and, just as much as the soul, constituting the essence of man, Job 10:8-12, Ps. 8, 139:13-17, Pred. 12:2-7, Jes. 64:8; it is our ἐπιγειος οἰκια, 2 Cor. 5:1, our σκευος, i.e. our serving organ, our instrument, 1 Cor. 12:18-26, 2 Cor. 4:7, 1 Thess. 4:4, and the members of the body are the ὅπλα with which we fight in the service of righteousness or of unrighteousness, Rom. 6:13; it belongs so essentially to man, that it, although by sin violently torn loose from the soul, is nevertheless in the resurrection united with it again. The nature of the union of soul and body is incomprehensible, but it is much closer than occasionalism or the harmonia praestabilita or the systema influxus imagines it; it is not ethical but [542] physical; it is so intimate, that one nature, one person, one I is the subject of both and of all their activities. It is always the same soul, which sees through the eye, thinks through the brains, grasps with the hand, walks with the foot. Although not present in every part of the body secundum totalitatem virtutis, it is nevertheless present in all members secundum totalitatem essentiae. It is one and the same life, that flows through the whole body, but in each member works and manifests itself in its own corresponding manner. Now this body too, which is so intimately connected with the soul, belongs to the image of God. Indeed,

this is not to be thought in such a way that God himself has a material body, as the Audians supposed; nor also, that God, creating man, had assumed a body, as Eugubinus taught; nor also, that God had created man after the Christus incarnandus, as Osiander judged. God, after all, is πνεῦμα, Joh. 4:24 and has no body. The human body does not, in its material substance, as σαρξ, but indeed in its organization as instrument of the soul, in its perfectio formalis, form part of the image of God, Augustinus, de Gen. ad litt. VI 12. Greg. Nyss., de hom. opif. c. 8. Thomas, S. Th. I qu 93 art. 6. S. c. Gent IV 26. Petavius, de sex dier. opif. II 4, 7 sq. Gerhard, Loci VIII 3. Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 3. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 328. Zanchius, Op. III 677 sq. Bucanus, Inst. theol. VIII 13. Synopsis pur. theol. XIII 13. Mastricht, III 9, 30. Just as God, although being πνεῦμα, is nevertheless Creator of a material world, which may be called his revelation and appearance, and this revelation attains its climax in the incarnation, so also the spirit of man as soul is disposed toward the body as its appearance. The incarnation of God is the proof that not the angel but man has been created after God's image and that his body forms an essential constituent of it. Creation has from the beginning been so arranged and human nature has at once been so created, that it was capable and suited for the highest conformity to and for the most intimate indwelling of God. God could not have become man, if he had not first made man after his image. And precisely because the body as organ of the soul also belongs to the essence of man and to the image of God, therefore it originally also shared in immortality. [543] God is not a God of the dead but of the living, Mt. 22:32. Death is a consequence of sin, Gen. 2:7, 3:19, Rom. 5:12, 6:23. This immortality, however, did not yet consist in Adam in the non posse mori, in the eternal, incorruptible life, but only in the posse non mori, in the not dying in case of obedience. It was not

absolute but conditional, it depended on an ethical condition. It is therefore not correct, to say with the Pelagians, Socinians, Remonstrants etc., that man was created mortal and that death is given of itself with the material organism and thus is the normal, natural condition. But yet on the other hand there is an essential difference between the not dying of Adam, so long as he remained obedient, and the not being able to die, which he would have received as reward for his obedience. Just as the knowledge, righteousness and holiness in Adam was still devoid of the *donum perseverantiae*, so immortality was not yet one with the eternal, inalienable life. The human nature of Adam was so created, that it, in case of transgression of God's commandment, could die and had to die. Adam was still earthly out of the earth, only Christ is the Lord out of heaven; the natural is first, thereafter the spiritual. Through this body man was now bound to the earth but could he also exercise his dominion over the earth. Dominion over the earth is, just like immortality, a part of the image of God. Indeed the Socinians went much too far, when they placed in dominion the whole essence of man and the entire content of the image of God; but nevertheless Gen. 1:26 clearly teaches, that that dominion is most closely connected with the creation after God's image and is directly given. It is no external addition, it does not rest on an additional, special disposition; but man, who is image of God, is thereby at the same time exalted above all other creatures and appointed as lord and king over them all. And finally, to the image of God also belongs the dwelling in paradise, Gen. 2:8-15. Holiness and blessedness belong together; the conscience of us all testifies, that there ought to exist a connection between virtue and happiness; the ethical and the physical, the moral and the natural order in the world, essence and appearance, spirit and matter may form no

antithesis. For fallen man therefore there is fitting an earth, [544] which lies under the curse; the ungodly is awaited hereafter by a place of darkness, the righteous shall one day walk in the light of God's countenance; the not yet fallen and yet still earthly man dwells in a paradise.

10. Thus the whole human being is the image and likeness of God. He is it as to soul and body, as to all faculties, powers, and gifts. Nothing in the human being is excluded from the image of God; it extends as far as the human extends; it is the human in the human being. The human is not the Divine itself, but it is nevertheless the finite, creaturely imprint of it. All that is in God, his spiritual being, his virtues and perfections, his immanent self-distinctions, his communication and revelation in creation; it all finds its, be it then also finite and limited, analogy and likeness in the human being. There lies a deep truth in the representation of the kabbalah, that God, who is the Infinite in himself, reveals himself in the ten sefirot or attributes and that these together constitute the Adam Kadmon, Franck, *La Kabbale* 1843 p. 179; human nature is among the creatures the highest and most perfect revelation of God. And that it is absolutely not according to its pneumatic side alone, but equally according to its somatic side; it is it precisely as human, i.e. as psychic nature. God and world, spirit and matter are according to the teaching of Scripture no oppositions. There is in matter nothing contemptible and nothing sinful. The visible world is just as much a beautiful, rich revelation of God as the spiritual. In the former he displays his virtues just as much as in the latter. All creatures are embodiment of his Divine thoughts and all display *vestigia Dei*. But all these *vestigia*, in the spiritual and in the material world spread alongside one another, are comprehended together in the human being and thus mutually connected and raised higher, that they clearly form the image and the likeness of God.

The whole world rises upward, closes itself off, completes itself, receives its unity, its goal, its crown in the human being. In order to be the image of God, the human being therefore had to be a summary of the whole of nature. The Jews said that the material for the human body had been gathered together by God from the different lands of the earth, Weber, System 202 f., cf. a Frisian [545] myth in Dr. J. te Winkel, Gesch. der Ned. Lett. I 28. In this strange form a true, beautiful thought was expressed. The human being is as spirit akin to the angels and ascends to the invisible things; but he is also citizen of the visible world and connected to all bodily creatures. There is in the human body not a single substance which does not occur in the nature around him. Thus the human being is the unity of the material and the spiritual world, the mirror of the universe, vinculum, compendium, epitome totius naturae, μικροκοσμος, and precisely thereby also image and likeness of God, his son and heir, μικροθεος. He is the prophet, who declares God and proclaims his virtues; he is the priest, who with all that is created dedicates himself as a holy offering to God; he is the king, who in righteousness leads and governs all things. And in all this he points to One, who in an even higher and richer sense is the revelation and the image of God, to Him, who is the only-begotten of the Father and the firstborn of all creatures. Adam, the son of God, was a type of Christ.

§ 34. THE DESTINY OF MAN.

1 . Although Adam was created in God's image, he nevertheless was not so at once in the fullest sense, and he was not so only in himself. Only then does the image of God stand before us in its entire richness, when we also include in it the destiny of man, both for this and for the future life. In 1 Cor. 15:45-49 Paul sets the two covenant heads, Adam and Christ, over against one another and compares them, not so much, as in Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:22, with respect to what they brought about, as rather with respect to their nature and person. The comparison here descends to the deepest level and penetrates to the root of the difference between the two. The whole Adam, both before and after the fall, is set over against the whole Christ, both after and before the resurrection. The first man is by virtue of creation ψυχη ζωσα, ψυχικος, ἐκ γης χοικος; but the second man is through his resurrection πνευμα [546] ζωοποιουν, πνευματικος, ἐξ οὐρανου, cf. W. Lütgert, *Der Mensch aus dem Himmel*, Greifswalder Studien, H. Cremer zum 25 j. Prof. dargebracht u. s. w. Gütersloh 1895 S. 207-228. Although Adam was created in God's image, he was, because

earthly from the earth, dependent on the earth; he had, after all, need of food and drink, light and air, day and night, and thus did not yet have a pneumatic, glorified body, raised above all those needs; his psychical body had not yet fully become an organ of the spirit. As such Adam stands below Christ: Adam is the first, Christ is the second and last, who presupposes Adam and follows upon Adam; Adam is the lesser and lower, Christ is the greater and higher; Adam therefore pointed to Christ, he was already before the fall a type of Christ; in the creation of Adam Christ was already reckoned with; the whole creation, also that of man, was infralapsarian; the natural is first, thereafter the spiritual. What Paul here sets forth broadly and deeply is grounded in Gen. 1-2 itself. Man, though πνεῦμα and bearing in himself a breath of life, became, like the animals, a living soul. He received fruit of herb and tree for food, Gen. 1:29, a paradise for a dwelling-place, Gen. 2:8v., a woman for a help, Gen. 2:18v., a commandment for a guideline, Gen. 2:16, 17, a threat of punishment in case of transgression, Gen. 2:17. From everything it appears that the first man, however highly placed, did not yet have the highest. There is a very great difference between the psychical and the pneumatic, between the status integritatis and the status gloriae. After the resurrection belly and food will be done away, 1 Cor. 6:13, but with Adam both were present; in heaven the children of God will no longer marry but will be like the angels, Mt. 22:30, yet Adam had need of the help of a woman. Adam therefore stood not at the end but at the beginning of the way; his condition was a preliminary and temporal one, which could not remain so, and had to pass over either to higher glory or to a fall into sin and death. For upon the transgression of the commandment stood death, but thus, by contrast, upon the keeping of it stood life, and indeed eternal life. For not only does the conscience of us all testify that in

keeping God's commandments there is great reward and that the transgression of them brings punishment, but Holy Scripture also repeatedly expresses this; it comprehends all [547] salvation, bound to the doing of God's commandments, under the name of life, of eternal life, and in both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace it acknowledges for man only one highest ideal, and that is eternal life, Lev. 18:5, Ezech. 20:11, Ps. 19 vs. 12, Mt. 19:17, Luk. 10:28, Gal. 3:12. Thus Adam still stood at the entrance; he did not yet have this reward, eternal life, but had to acquire it; he could still err, sin, fall, die. His relation to God was such that he could increase more and more in his communion, but could also still fall away from it. This peculiar relation is in Scripture perhaps in one place compared with a covenant. In Hos. 6:7 the Lord says of Israel and Judah that they, in spite of all the labor expended upon them כְּאָדָם עָבְרוּ בְרִית, LXX ὡς ἄνθρωπος, Vulg., sicut Adam. The translation: like a man, is pressed by the objection that precisely of men in general it is said that they transgressed the covenant; and the rendering: like a man's (covenant), would in any case require that the word כְּאָדָם was placed not after the subject הָעָם, but after the word to be determined בְּרִית. And thus only the translation: like Adam, remains. There is then enclosed in it that the commandment given to Adam was in the essence of the matter a covenant, because it, like that of God with Israel, intended to grant Adam eternal life in the way of obedience. This is now further strengthened by the parallel that Paul draws in Rom. 5:12-21 between Adam and Christ. Just as the obedience of one man, namely Christ, and the grace bestowed in him brought for humanity acquittal, righteousness, and life, so also the one transgression and offense of the one man is for humanity the cause of condemnation, sin, and death. It is with Adam as with Christ. We stand in fact to him in the same relation.

He is a type of Christ, our head, from whom, on account of his transgression, guilt and death come to us. He is the cause of the death of us all; we all die in Adam, 1 Cor. 15:22. Here too the relation of Adam to God is a covenant relation, but now not so much described from the side of God, as rather from the side of those who under Adam as head are included in that covenant. [548]

2. In Christian theology this rich thought of Scripture has not always come sufficiently into its own. The naturalistic view located the image of God only in the disposition, the *nuda potentia*, the freedom of the will, the formal personality, and even regarded death as natural. The image of God, or at least the likeness, consisted much more in that which man had to acquire by his own exertion of strength than in that which was bestowed upon him immediately at creation. Over against this, the supranaturalistic view swung to another extreme and ascribed to the *status integritatis* an entirely supernatural character. Not only was the *justitia originalis* held to be a *donum supernaturale*, immortality regarded as a special *beneficium conditoris*, and all susceptibility to suffering and pain denied to Adam, Aug. de civ. XIV 26. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 97 art. 2; but some, such as Greg. Nyss., Joh. Damasc., Böhme e. a. judged that man before the fall, because immortal, had no need of food, Petavius, de sex dier. opif. c. 7; excretion would in any case have taken place without any *indecentia*, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 97 art. 3; man's food, according to most church fathers, scholastics, Roman, Lutheran, Remonstrant, and also according to some Reformed theologians such as Zwingli, Musculus, Martyr, Zanchius, Junius, Piscator etc., would have consisted only of plants and not of meat; generation would have occurred without any sensual lust, and the children would not have been born speechless and in need of help and would have grown up very

quickly, Aug. de pecc. mer. et rem. I 37. 38. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 20. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 98 art. 1; many went still further and thought that procreation would not have occurred at all per coitum, Aug. Retract. I 10. Greg. Nyss. de hom. opif. 16. 17. Damasc, de fide orthod. II 30; man was first created androgynous, the creation of the woman is already a proof of the fall, the Jews in Weber, Syst. 202 f. Erigena, de div. nat. II 6. 10. 23. IV 12. Böhme, Oetinger, Baader, Schelling, Lange, Dogm. II 324 f. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 102 f. Hofmann, Weiss. u. Erf. I 65 f. Schriftbew. I 2 403 f. etc.; the woman therefore was actually not the image of God and partook of human nature, cf. in Aug. de trin. XII 7. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 93 art. 4. qu. 99 art. 2. Bonav. Sent. II dist. 16 art. 2 qu. 2. dist. 20 art. 1 qu. 6. Gerhard, VIII [549] c. 6. Quenstedt, II p. 15. Jansen, Gesch. des deutschen Volkes VI 1888 S. 395-397. Even by Origenes, c. Cels. I 32. 33. de princ. II 9, corporeality and all inequality among men were derived from a fall of the praeeistente souls, or else a wholly different body than ours was ascribed to man before the fall, cf. the Ophites in Hagenbach, D. G. § 62, Böhme, Ant. Bourignon, Baader etc. And in connection with all this paradise was often conceived very idealistically or even allegorically; the animals would not have died, wild and unclean animals would not have been there, the rose had bloomed without thorns, the air was much purer, the water much softer, the light much brighter, e.g. Luther on Gen. 3, cf. Strauss, gl. I 700 f.

Yet it was acknowledged by all that Adam did not yet possess the highest. In the probationary commandment, the freedom of choice, the possibility of sin and death, this was naturally implied. Augustine in particular made a clear distinction between the posse non peccare and posse non mori, which Adam possessed, and the non posse peccare and the non posse mori, which with glorification would have been bestowed upon the first man in case of

obedience and is now granted by grace to the elect, de civ. XXII 30. de corr. et grat. 11. Enchir. 104-107. de Gen. ad litt. III 2. VI 25. Op. imp. c. Jul. V 58. VI 5 etc. Augustine even spoke of that relation in which Adam originally stood as of a covenant, testamentum, pactum, de civ. XVI 27; and the translation of the words כְּאָדָם by: as Adam, led many to a similar view, Marck, Histor. Parad. II 6, 7. In substance, therefore, the doctrine of the later so-called covenant of works is already found among the church fathers. In the state of Adam, as it was conceived by scholasticism, the Roman, the Lutheran theologians, all the elements are enclosed which were later specifically summarized by the Reformed in the doctrine concerning the foedus operum, cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 19. 20. Of the relation in which believers through Christ come to stand to God, the name covenant is often used in Scripture. Already Zwingli and Bullinger seized upon these thoughts of Scripture in order to defend the unity of Old and New Testament against the Anabaptists, cf. later with the doctrine of the foedus gratiae. When now, after the example of Scripture, the Christian religion was presented as a covenant, Paul with his parallel between Adam and Christ gave occasion to think also of the status integritatis as a covenant. In distinction from the foedus gratiae this was then called the foedus naturae or operum. Covenant of nature it was called, not as though it would flow forth of itself and naturally from the nature of God or that of man. But it was called so, because the foundation on which the covenant rested, i.e. the moral law, was known to man by nature, and because it was established with man in his original state and could be kept by man with the powers bestowed upon him in creation, without supernatural grace. When later the name gave rise to misunderstanding, it was preferably replaced by that of foedus operum, covenant of works; and it bore this name because eternal

life in this covenant was obtainable only in the way of works, i.e. of the keeping of God's commandments. This covenant was now, as a parallel of the *foedus gratiae*, taught and developed by the Reformed with particular predilection. It already occurs with Ursinus, *Catech. major* qu. 9. Olevianus, *de subst. foed. grat.* 1585 I § 8. 9. II § 5. Polanus, *Synt. Theol.* VI 33. Junius, *Theses theol.* c. 25. Wollebius, *Theol. Christ.* I c. 8, etc., in this country for the first time with Trelcatius, *Loci Comm.* 1587 p. 276. Gomarus, *Oratio de foedere Dei* 1594. Trelcatius Jr. *Instit. Theol.* 1604 p. 131. Cloppenburg, *Disp. de foedere Dei* 1643. Coccejus, *Summa doct. de foedere* 1648 and further with all theologians, e.g. Mastricht, *Theol.* III c. 12. Marck, *Historia Parad.* 1705 II c. 6 sq. Moor, III 52-108, M. Vitranga, c. 8. Comrie, *Verhandeling over het verbond der werken* before his edition of Boston, *Beschouwing van het verbond der genade* 1741. Brahe, *Aanm. over de Walch. artikelen*, 1758 bl. 123v. Examen van het Ontw. v. Toler. 10e Sam. J. van den Honert, *Voorrede voor Ursinus' Schatboek* bl. 112-144 etc. The confessional writings do not mention it in so many words; but in substance it is nevertheless already contained in art. 14 and 15 of the Ned. Gel., where it is taught that through Adam's transgression of the commandment of life the whole human nature has been corrupted, in Lord's Day 3 and 4 of the Heid. Cat., where man is said to have been created after God's image, in order that he would live with God in eternal blessedness, but is also called wholly corrupted through Adam's fall, and in cap. 3, 2 of the Canones Dordr., where it is said that the corruption of Adam passes over to us "according to God's righteous judgment"; formally the covenant of works was included in the Irish Articles, in the Westm. Confessie and in the Walcheren Articles 1693. Furthermore, the doctrine of the *foedus operum* later also found entrance among some Roman Catholics, Scheeben II 500.

Pesch, Prael. III 136 and Lutherans, such as Pufendorf, Jaeger, Buddeus, Instit p. 527 e. a., cf. Vitringa II 242; on the other hand it was opposed by Episcopius, Instit. theol. II c. 2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 2. J. Alting on Hebr. 8:6 and Op. V 392. Venema, Korte verdediging van zijn eer en leer 1735. N. Schiere, Doctrina test. et foed. div. omnium 1718 p. 491 sq. and others. Rationalism wanted to know nothing of it, and even van Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. § 75 saw in it only a juridical artifice. Nevertheless it was taken up again by Dr. Kuyper, Heraut 161 v. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 117-122. Dr. Vos, De Verbondsleer inde Geref. Theologie 1891.

3. Against the doctrine of the covenant, as it has been developed in Reformed theology, it can certainly be objected that it has descended far too much into details and has been treated far too scholastically. The later theologians did indeed still defend the doctrine, but they no longer felt its meaning and its theological and religious importance; the soul was out of it, and the attack was therefore easy. But the doctrine of the covenant of works rests on a Scriptural foundation and is of outstanding value. All higher life among rational and moral creatures bears the form of a covenant. Covenant is, in general, an agreement of persons, whereby they voluntarily, for the warding off of some evil or for the obtaining of some good, obligate and bind themselves toward one another on definite conditions. Such an agreement, whether entered into tacitly or expressly stipulated, is the ordinary form for the living together and working together of human beings among themselves. Love, friendship, marriage, and all social cooperation in commerce, industry, science, art, etc. ultimately rests on the foundation of a covenant, i.e. on mutual fidelity and all kinds of moral, generally recognized, obligations. It can therefore not surprise, that also the highest, richest life of man, i.e. religion, bears this character. In Scripture the

covenant [552] is the fixed form in which the relation of God to his people is represented. And also where the name does not occur, we nevertheless always see both, as it were, in conversation with one another, negotiating with each other, God inviting man to repentance, reminding him of his obligations and binding himself to the granting of all good. Later, with the doctrine of the covenant of grace, the biblical concept of בְּרִית will be set in the light. Here let it be enough to recall this general notion. Even if the name covenant for the religious relation of Adam to God should never occur in Scripture, not even in Hos. 6:7; yet the religious life of man before the fall bears the character of a covenant. The Reformed were never so narrow as to insist on the name, if only the matter stood firm; the vocabulo dubitetur, re salva. But behind the combating of the name was mostly that of the matter hidden. And this can neither nor may be surrendered, because covenant is the essence of true religion. For, in the first place, God is Creator, man creature; and thereby an infinite distance is posited between the two; there seems between the two no communion, no religion, to be possible; there is only distinction, distance, removal endless. If God remains standing above man in his sovereign loftiness and majesty, then no religion is possible, at least no religion as communion with God; then the relation between the two is completely expressed in the names lord and servant; then the image of the potter and the clay is still far too weak to indicate that relation, for the clay still has a being and thus rights independent of and over against the potter, but man has nothing that he is or has outside of and over against God. If therefore there shall truly be religion, if there shall be communion between God and man, if the relation of both, though indeed also but yet not only, shall be that of a lord to his servant, of a potter to his clay, but also that of a king to his people, of a father to his son, of a mother

to her child, of an eagle to his young, of a hen to her chicks, etc.; i.e. if not one single relation, but all and various relations of dependence, subjection, obedience, friendship, love, etc. among men in religion have their example and attain their fulfillment [553] there, then religion must bear the character of covenant. For then God must descend from his loftiness, bow himself down to his creature, communicate himself to man, reveal, bestow; then He, who dwells in the high and exalted and eternal, must also dwell with him who is of a humble spirit, Isa. 57:15. This now is nothing other than a covenant. If religion is called a covenant, then it is thereby indicated as the true, genuine religion. No single religion has ever understood that; all peoples either draw God down pantheistically into the creaturely or raise Him deistically endlessly above it; in neither case does it come to true communion, to covenant, to genuine religion. But Scripture maintains both; God is endlessly great and condescendingly good; He is Sovereign but also Father; He is Creator but also archetype; He is in one word the God of the covenant. In the second place it is clear that a creature over against God can bring along and possess no single right. That is by the nature of the case impossible. A creature as such has everything that it is and what it has to thank its Creator for; it has no claim over against God; it can boast of nothing; it has absolutely no rights or demands; there is never any talk of merit in the creature over against God and there can be no talk of it; the relation of Creator and creature cuts off all merit of the latter in principle and entirely. This holds not only after but just as well before the fall. Also then man was creature, without claim, without rights, without merit. When we have done all that which is commanded us, then we are still δούλοι ἄχρηστοι, Luke 17:10. Now, however, the religion of Holy Scripture is of such a nature that man therein, as it were, can nevertheless assert rights over

against God. He has, after all, freedom to come to Him with prayer and thanksgiving, to address Him as his Father, to trust in Him in all need and death, to desire all good from Him, to expect even salvation and eternal life from Him. This is now possible solely and only thereby, that God in condescending goodness gives rights to his creature. All right of creatures is a bestowed good, a gift of grace, undeserved and unowed; all reward is on God's side out of grace; there is no *meritum de condigno* nor also *de congruo* possible. [554] True religion can therefore be nothing other than a covenant; it has its origin in condescending goodness, in the grace of God. This character religion bears both before and after the fall. Religion is one, just as the moral law and the destination of man. Covenant of works and covenant of grace differ not in the final goal but only in the way that leads to that final goal. In both there is one Mediator, then of union, now of reconciliation; in both there is one faith, then in God now in God through Christ; in both there is one hope, one love, etc. Religion is always essentially the same; it differs only in forma. In the third place: man is a rational and moral being. Thus God has created him, and thus He therefore also treats him; He maintains what He created. God therefore does not compel man, for compulsion is in conflict with the nature of a rational creature. He does not treat him as an irrational creature, as a plant or an animal, as a stick and a block, but He proceeds with him as with a rational, moral, self-determining being. He wills that man be free and in freedom, willingly, in love serve Him, Ps. 110:3. Religion is freedom, is love, which does not allow itself to be compelled. And therefore it must from the outset also bear the form of a covenant, in which God appears not compelling but counseling, admonishing, warning, inviting, entreating, and in which man serves God not by compulsion or violence, but willingly, with his own, free

consent, moved by love to reciprocal love. Religion is in the ground of the matter not a duty but a privilege. It is not a work by which we are advantageous to God and bring Him something, and have claim to reward. But it is grace, to be allowed to serve Him. God is never obligated in us, we are always obligated in Him for the good works that we do, art. 24 Ned. Gel. On his side always the gift, on our side always and only the thanks. And therefore religion is not thinkable otherwise than in the form of a covenant; therein it first comes to its full realization. Such a covenant God then also concluded with the first man. The splintery elaboration of this doctrine be set wholly aside. But the matter itself stands firm; after man had been created after God's image, God pointed out to him his destination and the way in which he alone could reach it. For, the moral law man could know without extraordinary revelation, it was written in his heart. But the probationary command is positive, it is not given with the nature of man itself, it could only become known to him because God communicated it to him. Neither did it speak for itself that the keeping of that command bestowed eternal life. In that sense the *foedus operum* is no *foedus naturae*. At first this was not yet so clearly seen, cf. Gomarus, *de foedere*. But gradually it was clearly taught, that God in no single respect was obligated, to grant to man, who kept his law and thereby did nothing other than what he was bound to do, the heavenly blessedness and eternal life; there is here no natural connection between work and reward, Coccejus, *de foedere* II 23 sq. Burman, *Synops. Theol.* II 8, 2, 4. Marck, *Hist. Parad.* p. 479. Cloppenburg, *Exerc. theol.* VI disp. 5. *de foed.* I 8 sq. Witsius, *Oec. foed.* I 4 § 10-23. Leydecker, *Fax Verit.* p. 399 sq. Ex. v. h. *Ontw. v. Tol.* IX 227 v. 261 v. X 288 v. 318 v. Brahe, *Aanm. over de vijf Walch.* art. bl. 125 v. And that is the truth that lies in Rome's doctrine of the *donum superadditum*.

Eternal life is and remains an undeserved gift of God's grace. But because Rome does not know the doctrine of the covenant of works, it infers from this gift of grace of eternal life, that also the image of God in man must be supernatural, and now by that supernatural power bestowed in the image of God it nevertheless again earns eternal life *ex condigno*. Under the appearance of honoring grace, it thus again introduces the meritoriousness of good works. The Reformed, however, maintained on the one hand, that the image of God in man was natural, and that man, who was the image of God, could know the moral law without supernatural revelation, and could keep it without supernatural power. And on the other hand they held, that a higher state of blessedness than that in paradise on earth, by the nature of the case could never be merited but only could be bestowed by God's free disposition. And these two thoughts they united in the *foedus operum*. This rests on a free, special, gracious disposition of God; it proceeds from Him; He establishes all parts of it, condition and fulfillment, keeping and reward, transgression and punishment; it is *monopleuric* in origin; it is added to the creation after God's image. Man on his part, because created after God's image, rests therein and sees in this [556] covenant a way to higher blessedness opened to him. The *foedus operum* thus does justice to both: the sovereignty of God, which includes the dependence of the creature, the unmeritoriousness of all his works, and the grace and lovingkindness of God, which nevertheless wills to grant to the creature a higher blessedness than the earthly. As the probationary command stands to the moral law, so the covenant of works relates to the creation after God's image. With the probationary command the whole moral law stands or falls; with the covenant of works the whole image of God in man stands or falls. The

covenant of works is the way for man created after God's image and not yet fallen to the heavenly blessedness.

4. The covenant of works therefore includes yet another beautiful thought. It not only realizes the true, full idea of religion; it also expresses that man before the fall, though created after God's image, did not yet possess the highest. On this point there is chiefly a difference with the Lutherans. With them, creation after the image of God is the realization of the highest idea of man; the ideal is fully attained in Adam; a higher state is not possible. Adam had nothing to become, but only to remain what he was; he partook of the full *gratiosa inhabitatio S. Trinitatis*. He therefore also did not stand under a law that commanded him to do something positive; the law that applied to him had only a negative content; only sin first brought him under the dominion of the law. Hence it is that among the Lutherans the original state, as also among the church fathers, is often depicted very exaggeratedly; and that the state to which believers are raised in Christ is, in the essence of the matter, thought to be equal to that of Adam before the fall. With the believer, for the Lutheran everything concentrates around justification; if someone partakes of this, then he has enough, he is completely satisfied and blessed. Salvation coincides entirely with forgiveness; there is no need to connect this backward with eternal election and forward with the whole Christian life, the good works, and eternal life; neither predestination nor perseverance are necessary here; the Lutheran believer enjoys in the present and has enough in that, Luther bij Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.* II 361. [557] Schneckenburger, *Vergl. Darst. des luth. u. ref. Lehrbegriffs*, I 90 f. 120 f. II 185 f. Vilmar, *Dogm.* I 340, Frank. *Syst. d. chr. Wahrh.* I 375.

Different, however, are the Reformed, who walked in the footsteps of Augustine. According to them Adam did not have the highest. The highest is namely material freedom, and consists in no longer being able to err, sin, die; in being raised absolutely above all fear and anxiety, above all possibility of falling. This highest the believers receive immediately out of grace through Christ. They can no longer sin, 1 Joh. 3:9, they can no longer die, Joh. 3:16; they immediately have through faith eternal, inalienable life; theirs is the *perseverantia sanctorum*, they can no longer be lost. Christ therefore does not bring his own back into the state of Adam before the fall; He acquired and bestows much more, namely also that which Adam would have received if he had remained standing. He places us not at the beginning but at the end of the way which Adam had to traverse; He fulfilled not only passive, but also active obedience, delivers not only from guilt and punishment but also at once out of grace bestows the right to eternal life. Adam, however, did not yet have this highest; he did not yet have eternal life; he did receive the *posse stare*, but not the *velle stare*; indeed the *posse si vellet* but not the *velle, quod posset*; he had the *posse non errare, peccare, mori*, but not yet the *non posse errare, peccare, mori*. He still was in the possibility of sin and death, and thus also still in some fear and anxiety; his was not yet the perfect, unchangeable love that excludes all fear. And rightly therefore the Reformed said that this possibility, this being a changeable good, this still being able to sin and die was no part, no piece, no content of the image of God, but its boundary, its limitation, its circumference, Heppe, *Dogm. der ev. ref.* K. 181. Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.* II 104. 150. Therefore it was necessary that the image of God be unfolded, completely overcame and annihilated this possibility of sin and death, and shone in imperishable glory. As a consequence of this conception

of the status integritatis, the Reformed, in distinction from others, observed a praiseworthy sobriety in the description of the paradisal state. Adam was not Christ, the natural was not the spiritual, the [558] paradise was not heaven. However much, then, naturalism is to be resisted, which fails to recognize the power of sin and deems death natural; on the other side supranaturalism is no less to be avoided, which lets the image of God consist in a supernatural addition to nature. Sin, according to the Reformed, has corrupted and destroyed everything, but, because it is no substance, it has not been able to change the essence, the substance of creation. Man as a sinner has still remained man; and so also all other creatures, earth, heaven, nature, plant, animal, in spite of the curse of sin and the dominion of corruption, have remained essentially and substantially the same. As we saw above with religion, so it is also with everything else: sin has taken away no substance, grace gives back no substance. The materia of all things is and remains the same, but the forma, bestowed in creation, was deformed by sin, in order in grace to be reformed again wholly and entirely, Voetius, Disp. I 776. This serious and yet so healthy conception of the paradisal state by the Reformed comes out on numerous points. Against the Lutherans and Remonstrants they defended that Adam, besides the probationary command, was indeed also bound to the moral law. He was not exlex, even though he also fulfilled it without any compulsion, willingly and out of love. That moral law was known to Adam by nature and therefore did not need, like the probationary command, to be revealed in a special way. In essence it is like the ten commandments, but nevertheless bore another form, for the law given on Sinai presupposes sins and therefore speaks almost always negatively: thou shalt not, and the moral law before the fall was much more positive. But precisely because the moral law with Adam by the nature of

the case was wholly positive, it did not make the possibility of sin clear to Adam's consciousness. With the commandments there therefore had to come a prohibition, with the moral laws a definite law; with the commandments, whose naturalness and reasonableness Adam saw, a command that in a certain sense was arbitrary and accidental. In the probationary command the whole moral law was for Adam set on one throw; it embodied for him the dilemma: God or man, his authority or one's own insight, unconditional obedience or independent investigation, faith or doubt. It was a dreadful test, which opened the way to an eternal salvation or to an [559] eternal perdition. Against the Cocceians the Reformed maintained that to that moral law the sabbath command also belonged; man before the fall did not yet enjoy the eternal, heavenly sabbath; just as to the alternation of day and night, so he was also subject to that of six-day labor and rest on the seventh day; day of rest and working days were therefore also distinguished before the fall; the religious life also then required its own form and service and day alongside the life of culture. The magical, theosophical opinion that the two trees in the garden possessed in themselves the power to kill or to make alive, whether then by nature, Thomas, Suarez, Pererius, Reinhard, Dogm. 279. 289, or in a supernatural way, Augustinus, Bonaventura; whether already with the one-time, Bellarminus, the gr. pr. hom. c. 14 or with repeated use, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 97 art. 4, cf. also Heraut 941; was by the Reformed, even though some such as Pareus, Rivetus, Zanchius, Op. III 501 at first still assumed an effect of eating the fruit also on bodily life, with ever greater unanimity and decisiveness rejected, Calvijn, on Gen. 2:9, 3:22. Inst. IV 14, 12. 18. Marck, Hist. Parad. I c. 17. Litt. bij M. Vitringa II 220 sq. This conception, to be sure, is in agreement with the Roman doctrine of the sacraments but

therefore also has for the Reformed great objection; it makes life and death independent of the ethical condition, i.e. of whether or not one obeys God's command; it presupposes that man after the fall would nevertheless have remained alive, if he but *ex opere operato* had eaten of the tree of life; it implies that eternal life, at once or more slowly, could be effected in man by eating a physical fruit, and thus fails to recognize the distinction between the natural and the spiritual. Therefore the Reformed saw in the tree of life rather a sign and seal of the covenant of works, which in a sacramental way bestowed life. Likewise, by the Reformed all theosophical speculations about a male virgin, about the absence of sexual desire, about a magical generation as in conflict with Scripture were unanimously rejected, Marck, *Hist. Parad.* p. 279 sq. And just as the creation of the woman does not already presuppose a certain fall of Adam, so after the entrance of sin no nova species has been added in the plant or animal kingdom; wild and creeping animals, according to Voetius, were not first created after the fall but already on the sixth day, *Disp.* V 191. And finally Calvin, on Gen. 1:29, 9:3 and most Reformed, cf. Heidegger, *de libertate christianorum a recibaria* 1662. Voetius, *Disp.* IV 387. V 194. Coccejus, *S. Theol.* XX 17. Marck, *Hist. Parad.* p. 341. Moor, III 35-38 etc., judged that the eating of flesh had also been permitted to man before the flood and before the fall. That Gen. 1:29 does not speak of that intentionally cannot, as *argumentum e silentio*, be of service; in Gen. 1:30 only the plant world is divided between man and animal; but of man's dominion and right over the animal world there is no mention there; these are already bestowed on man in Gen. 1:28 and certainly, especially also with a view to the fishes, include the right to kill and use animals. Immediately after the fall God himself makes animal skins and Abel brings an offering, which certainly also was accompanied by

a sacrificial meal. Kreophagy moreover has certainly been in use before the flood, and would, if God had first given the right thereto in Gen. 9:3, before that time have been unlawful and sinful. Gen. 9:1-5 gives no new command but renews the blessing of creation; the new is only the prohibition to eat the flesh with its soul, i.e. with its blood. The ground for the prohibition, Gen. 9:5-7, to kill a man, is not present with the animals; they are, after all, not made after God's image. And finally it is not to be seen why precisely after the fall and after the flood the use of flesh would have been permitted by God to man; conversely one would expect that the right and the dominion of man after the fall would have been limited; that the use of flesh, in order to counteract becoming wild, would have been abolished; that vegetarianism would much more have been deemed in agreement with the condition of man entering after fall and flood than kreophagy, cf. Zöckler, *Lehre vom Urstand* 273 f. Köhler, *Bibl. Gesch.* I 33 f. Reformed theology could in all these questions judge so soundly, because it was deeply penetrated by the thought that Adam did not yet have the highest. Sin without doubt has a cosmic significance; it works, as is evident from death, also into the physical, and has brought the whole earth under the curse. Without it the development of humanity and [561] the history of the earth would have been wholly different, even though it is also the case that we can form no conception of that. But yet on the other hand the status integritatis is not to be identified with the status gloriae; from the latter one may not conclude to the former; Jes. 11:6, 65:25 are just as little applicable to the condition before the fall as Mk. 12:25, Luk. 20:36, 1 Cor. 6:13 etc. The forma has been changed, but the materia of man, plant, animal, nature, earth is the same before and after the fall. All essential constituent parts that are now present also existed before the fall. The distinction and inequality

of man and woman, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters, of relatives and friends; the manifold institutions and relations in social life such as marriage, household, upbringing etc.; the alternation of day and night, working days and day of rest, labor and relaxation, months and years; the dominion of man over the earth through science and art etc.; they have undoubtedly been modified by sin and changed in form, but nevertheless they have their principle and foundation not in sin but in creation, in the ordinances of God. Socialism and communism, also of many Christian sects, rightly fights against the dreadful consequences of sin, especially also in the social sphere; but it does not stop there, it also comes into conflict with the nature of things, with the ordinances of creation, and thereby always bears not a reformational but a revolutionary character.

5. Finally, in the doctrine of the *foedus operum* there is still a third thought enclosed, which is of the richest religious and ethical significance. Adam was not only created; as man he was in himself incomplete; something was lacking to him, which no lower creature could make good to him, Gen. 2:20. As man alone he was thus also not yet the fully unfolded image of God. The creation of man after God's image is on the sixth day only then completed, when God creates both, man and woman, in union with each other, cf. *אִתּוֹ* Gen. 1:27, after his image. Yet this creation of man and woman together after God's image is also not the end but the beginning of God's way with man. It is not good that the man; it is also not good that man and woman are alone. Over them both God [562] immediately pronounces the blessing of multiplication, Gen. 1:28. Not the single human being, and not man and woman together, but the whole of humanity is only then the fully unfolded image of God, his son, his race. The image of God is far too rich for it to be able to be realized wholly in one single human child,

however richly gifted. Only in a humanity with millions of members can it be unfolded in some measure in its depth and richness. Just as the vestigia Dei are spread over many, many works, both in space and time; so the imago Dei is only to be drawn life-size in a humanity whose members exist both after and alongside one another. But just as the cosmos is a unity and in man receives its head and lord; just as the vestigia Dei scattered through the whole world are gathered together in and raised up to the imago Dei of man; so also that humanity in its turn is to be thought of as an organism, which precisely as such is only then the fully unfolded image of God. Not as a heap of souls on a piece of ground, not as an incoherent aggregate of individuals, but as created out of one blood, as one household, as one family, humanity is the image and likeness of God. To that humanity there also belongs its development, its history, its ever expanding dominion over the earth, its progress in knowledge and art, its subjection of all creatures. This too is all unfolding of the image and the likeness of God, after which man was created. Just as God has not revealed himself once at creation but continues and increases that revelation from day to day and from century to century; so also the image of God is not an unchangeable magnitude, but it explains itself and unfolds itself in the forms of space and time. It is a Gabe and Aufgabe at the same time; it is an unmerited gift of grace, which was already immediately granted in creation to the first man, but it is at the same time principle and seed of an altogether rich, glorious development. Only humanity in its entirety, as one perfect organism, gathered together under one head, spread over the whole earth, as prophetess proclaiming the truth of God, as priestess dedicating itself to God, as queen ruling the earth and the whole creation, only it is the fully finished image, the most speaking and most striking likeness of God. Scripture teaches all this clearly, [563]

when it says that the church is the bride of Christ, the temple of the H. Spirit, the dwelling of God, the new Jerusalem, where all the glory of the nations is brought together. For indeed thereby the status gloriae is depicted, which now will be reached through sin; but religion, moral law, final destiny is essentially the same in covenant of works and covenant of grace. In both it is about a kingdom of God, about a holy humanity, in which God can be all in all. Only one point in this representation still requires some further discussion. Humanity is not to be thought of as a perfect organism, unless it is connected and gathered together in a head. In the foedus gratiae Christ occupies that rank, He is the head of the church; in the foedus operum that place was taken by Adam. Already Eve was therefore created out of Adam, in order that he would be principium totius speciei and the unity of the human race would be rooted in the unity of its origin. The woman is thus very certainly indeed partaker of human nature and of the image of God and she represents both in her own way and according to her own nature; but she is partaker of both not over against but alongside others and in connection with the man; she is ἐκ ἀνδρός, δια τον ἀνδρα, δοξα ἀνδρός, she is not without the man; and also the man, though head of the woman and εἰκὼν καὶ δοξα θεου because he in the first place is bearer of dominion, is nevertheless also not complete without the woman, he too is not without the woman, for she is the mother of all living, 1 Cor. 11:7-12, Ef. 5:22 v. Above all, however, Paul points out to us this unity of humanity, when he sets Adam over against Christ, Rom. 5:12-21, 1 Cor. 15:22, 45-49. Humanity is not only physically out of one blood, Hd. 17:26; that would not be enough for humanity, for it also holds true of all those animal species which in the beginning were created. Moreover, Christ, the antitype of Adam, is not our progenitor; we have not physically proceeded from Him,

but He himself is out of Adam, as far as the flesh is concerned. In this respect Adam and Christ are not alike. But the agreement lies in this, that humanity in an ethical sense stands to Adam in the same relation as to Christ. In the same way as Christ is cause of our righteousness and our life, Adam is that of our sin and our death. God reckons and judges in one man the whole human [564] race. This now the Reformed have expressed in their doctrine of the foedus operum. Therein first, not merely the physical, but the ethical unity of humanity comes into its own. And this is necessary for humanity as organism. In general the architectonic law everywhere demands the monarchical system. A work of art must be governed by one thought; a sermon must have one theme; a church is completed in the tower; the man is the head of the family; in a kingdom the king is bearer of authority; the human race as one organic whole, as an ethical Gemeinschaft, is not conceivable without a head. In the foedus operum Adam occupied that place. The probationary command proves that he occupied an altogether exceptional position; he was progenitor not only, but also head, representative of the whole human race; his act was decisive for all. Just as the fate of the whole body rests with the head, which for all members thinks and judges and decides; just as the well-being of a family depends on the man and father; just as a prince can be for blessing or for curse for thousands and millions of subjects; so the fate of humanity has been laid in the hands of Adam. His transgression has become the fall of his whole race; but his obedience would also have been life for all his descendants, as the antitype Christ proves. If we could not without our knowing in Adam be subjected to condemnation, we also could not apart from our doing in Christ be adopted unto grace. Covenant of works and covenant of grace stand and fall with each other. One and the same law holds for both. On the basis of

physical descent an ethical unity is built, which makes humanity, corresponding to its nature, appear as one organism and binds its members most closely together not only by bonds of blood but also by participation in blessing and curse, in sin and righteousness, in death and life.

6. From this a new light falls upon the question of the propagation of the human race. At all times opinions about this were divided. The praeexistentianism of Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Philo and the later Jews found among the Christians entrance only with a few, Orig., *de princ.* I 6, 2. 8, 3. II 9, 2. c. Cels. I 32. 33. Henry More, *Mysterium* [565] *pietatis* 1660. Kant, *Relig.* ed. Rosenkranz 44 f. Schelling, *Werke* I 7 S. 385 f. Müller, *Sünde* II 5 99 f. 504 f. Scripture also offered not the least ground for it; our soul is absolutely not conscious of such a pre-existence and sees in the body so little a prison and place of punishment, that it shudders at death; it is rooted moreover in a pagan dualism of spirit and matter, destroys the unity of the human race and effaces the distinction between man and angel. In contrast, between traducianism and creationism in Christian theology the dispute remained undecided. The former had in ancient times many advocates, such as Tertullianus, *de an.* 19. 27, Rufinus, Makarius, Eunomius, Apollinaris, Gregorius Nyss., and according to Hieronymus even *maxima pars occidentalium*, but later it was, with a few exceptions, embraced only by the Lutherans, by Luther himself, who however was first a creationist, Köstlin, *Luthers Theol.* II 365, and then by Melanchton, Gerhard, *Loc.* VIII c. 8. Quenstedt, I 519. Hollaz, *Ex.* 414. Philippi, *K. Gl.* III 103. Vilmar, *Dogm.* I 348. Frank, *Chr. Wahrh.* I 400. Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psych.* 106 f. Cremer in *Herzog* 14, 27 etc. Creationism was in ancient times defended by Clemens Alex., *Strom.* IV 26. Lactantius, *Inst.* III 18. Hilarius, Pelagius, Cassianus, Gennadius, Theodoretus, Athanasius,

Gregorius Naz., Cyrillus Alex., Ambrosius etc. Hieronymus already spoke of it as ecclesiastical doctrine. Greek, scholastic and Roman theologians are therefore all creationist, Lombardus, Sent. II 17. 18. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 90 and 118. c. Gent. II 86-89. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. IV 2. Scheeben, Dogm. II 172 f. Kleutgen, Philos. II 583 f.; and only a few, such as e.g. Klee, Dogm. II 2 313 f. show sympathy for traducianism. The Reformed also chose, with few exceptions, such as Sohnius, Op. II 563. Martyr, Loci p. 81 and in modern times especially Shedd, Dogm. Th. II 22. 75. III 250, for creationism as party, Calvin on Hebr. 12:9. Zanchius, Op. III 609. Polanus V 31. Voetius, Disp. I 798. Moor II 1064 III 289. Marck, Hist. Parad. II 4 § 7-9 etc. Some prefer to leave the question undecided, Aug. de anima et ejus orig. de Gen. ad litt. X. Epist. 166 ad Hieron. Retract. II 45. 46, Gregorius Magnus, Leo Magnus, Isidorus, Chemniz, Buddeus, Musculus, Piscator, Maresius, or seek a mediation, Leibniz, Theod. I 91. Rothe, [566] Ethik § 136. Ebrard, Dogm. I 327 f. Indeed traducianism and creationism in strength of arguments weigh pretty well against each other. Traducianism appeals to the creation of Eve, of whose soul there is no separate mention and who therefore is called ἐξ ἀνδρός, Gen. 2:21, 1 Cor. 11:8; to the manner of speaking of Holy Scripture, that the descendants are included in the loins of the fathers and have come forth from their hip, Gen. 46:26, Hebr. 7:9, 10; to the word ידע, to know, which would at the same time indicate a spiritual act; to the completion of creation on the seventh day, Gen. 2:2; to the fact, that the animals also can bring forth their like, Gen. 1:28, 5:3, 9:4, Joh. 3:6, and especially also to the inheritance of sin and of all kinds of psychic properties. Creationism on the other hand finds support in the creation of Adam's soul, Gen. 2:7; in many texts such as Pred. 12:7, Zach. 12:1, especially Hebr. 12:9, cf. Num. 16:22, 17:16, of

which even Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 114 says: eine klassischere Beweisstelle für den Creatianismus kann es kaum geben; and then above all in the spiritual, simple, indivisible, immortal nature of the soul. And just as traducianism and creationism in arguments stand pretty well equal, so are they both equally unfit for the solution of the difficulties. Traducianism explains neither the origin of the soul nor the inheritance of sin. As regards the first, it must either come to the doctrine that the soul of the child already previously existed in the parents and forefathers, thus to a kind of praeexistentianism; or that the soul is potentially included in the seed of man or woman or of both, i.e. to materialism; or that it is produced by the parents in one way or another, i.e. to creation, now not by God but by man. And as regards the second, traducianism can contribute nothing here to explanation, because sin is not material and no substance but a moral quality, moral guilt and moral corruption. Equally powerless creationism stands over against these problems. Even if it conceives the creation of the soul as organically as possible, and even if it says with Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 17: creando infundit eas Deus et infundendo creat; yet it is at a loss with the question, when the soul is created in the embryo, cf. e.g. Polanus V 31. Bucanus VIII 26, and how the anima rationalis then nevertheless replaces the anima vegetativa and anima sensitiva that already earlier ensouled the embryo, cf. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 118 art. 2. c. Gent. II 59. 68. And original sin can by creationism only be explained in such a way, that the soul, first created pure by God, is defiled by the body, which however makes sin material, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 31; or that God, at the same moment that He creates it, also declares it guilty and makes it unclean, Voetius, Disp. I 1097. Turretinus, Th. El. IX 12. Moor III 289. No wonder, that therefore many Pelagians and Romanists precisely on the ground of

creationism denied original sin in a positive sense. Gangauf, Met. Psych. des h. August. 259. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. 155 f. 163 f. 189 f. Arguments and objections therefore do not decide the choice between traducianism and creationism; they would rather compel one, to end with a non liquet.

7. All the more remarkable is it that Greek, Roman, and Reformed theologians almost unanimously declared themselves for creationism, while traducianism found acceptance only among the Lutherans. This cannot be accidental; there must be a reason for it. And that reason lies in the different conception of the nature and the destiny of man. For, in the first place, Lutheran theology places the image of God only in certain moral properties, in the *justitia originalis*. As always, so also here it limits its view to the ethical-religious and feels no need to bring this into connection with the whole cosmic being and to conceive it as a link in the entire counsel of God. Thereby now the nature of man comes into its own neither over against the angels nor over against the animals. For if man possesses this image of God, then he is pretty well like the angels; the difference, in comparison with what they have in common, is of no significance; the angels too bear the image of God. And if man lacks this image of God, then he sinks down to the animals, becomes a stick and a block; what then still distinguishes him from the animals has, theologically and religiously, so little value that it almost no longer comes into consideration; the great distinction lay, after all, in the image of God, and that he has totally lost. The boundaries between man and angel and between man and animal are thus not sharply drawn here; the *justitia* [568] *originalis* is the one and all, everything else in man is subordinate and theologically almost of no value. But for that reason it is now also a matter of indifference for Lutheran theology how man comes into being; or rather, that which man has in

common with the angel, namely the image of God, the *justitia originalis*, that must and that can arise only by creation, that is in the absolute sense a gift; but all that man otherwise possesses is propagated in the same way as in the animals. But Roman and Reformed theologians, even if they sometimes still called the angels image of God, sought from the beginning the image of God in the whole, and wholly distinctive nature of man. It consisted very certainly also in the virtues of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, but these then even in men still bore again another character than in the angels; and it consisted not only in those virtues but further in all that is human in man. It thus consisted also in this, that the *πνεῦμα* in man from the outset was organized for the connection with a *σῶμα*, and that his *σῶμα* from the start was constituted with a view to the *πνεῦμα*. Before and after the fall, in the *status integritatis* and *corruptionis*, in the *status gratiae* and *gloriae*, always and remains man essentially distinguished from angel and animal. If he has the image of God, he does not become an angel; if he loses it, he does not become an animal; he always and eternally remains man and in so far also always and eternally God's image. And this now is maintained sufficiently only in creationism. Because man exists as an entirely peculiar kind of being, therefore he also comes into being in an entirely special way. He is related to angel and animal and yet essentially distinguished from both; in his dying he differs from both and therefore also in his origin; Adam's creation is different from that of the animals and also different from that of the angels. Creationism alone sufficiently maintains the specific peculiarity of man; it wards off both pantheism and materialism and respects the boundaries between man and animal.

In the second place, it follows from the Lutheran conception of the image of God, that the moral unity of the human race must recede behind physical

descent. Through the fall human beings in and with the whole image of God have also lost all spiritual and moral unity. Natural religion, morality, etc. is of scarcely any significance. Only physical [569] descent holds them together, and this is at the same time the cause of their moral corruption. Sin, which has robbed the human being of all religion and morality and the whole image of God, can therefore also not in an ethical way but only through physical descent become the portion of all. It is indeed no substance, although Luther et al., especially Flacius, arrived at very strong expressions, but it is nevertheless in the first place a stain, a corruption, that has affected the whole human being and precisely kills all that is religious and ethical in him. But Roman and Reformed theology said over against that, although each in its own way, that the unity of humanity was not only of a physical but also of an ethical nature. Physical descent, after all, is not enough; then the animal species too would already form a unity. Agreement in moral virtues without more is also insufficient, for then the angels among themselves and these with human beings would also form a unity. Animal species are indeed physically from one blood, but they are no *corpus morale*; and angels are indeed a unity but not related in blood. The distinctiveness of the human being thus requires that the unity of humanity be both physical and ethical. And because original sin is not physical but only ethical, therefore it can also only be built on the ethical, federal unity of humanity. Physical descent is not sufficient for its explanation and runs the danger of materializing it. The so-called realism e.g. of Shedd does not satisfy, neither for the explanation of sin from Adam, nor for the explanation of righteousness from Christ. There is yet another unity among human beings needed, in order to cause them to appear together as a *corpus morale*, organically connected and with one another also ethically solidary

in an upright manner. And that is the federal unity. On the basis of the physical an ethical unity must be erected. Adam as progenitor is not enough, he must also be covenant head of the human race, just as Christ, although in a physical sense not our progenitor, nevertheless precisely as Covenant Head can bestow righteousness and salvation upon his church. And this moral unity of the human race is now only to be maintained with creationism. It bears, after all, a character of its own, is distinguished both from that among animals and from that of the angels, and thus also comes about in a [570] peculiar way, through physical descent and through a creative act of God, both in connection with one another.

In the third place, finally, Lutheran theology, by virtue of its conception of the image of God, concerns itself little with the destiny of man. Adam had everything that he needed; he only had to remain what he was; the distinction between the *posse non* and *non posse peccare* is of little importance; the *perseverantia* is not a higher good, bestowed in Christ upon his own. And thus Adam had nothing higher to acquire for his descendants; he had only to hand down what he had; traducianism is sufficient for that; for covenant of works and creationism there is no place. But again the Roman and Reformed theology proceeded from another thought. The destiny of man lies in heavenly blessedness, eternal life, the vision of God. But this he can reach only in the way of obedience. There is no proportion between this obedience and that life. How then can that heavenly blessedness nevertheless be bestowed upon man as a reward for his works? Rome says: because in the image of God a supernatural grace is granted to him, which can make him earn eternal life *ex condigno*. The Reformed says: because God establishes a covenant with man and wills to bestow eternal life upon him, not according to the worthiness of his works but

according to his own gracious decree. Both, however, agree in this, that the destiny of man lies in eternal life, that this is attainable only in the way of moral obedience, and that God has placed the decision in this matter for the human race into the hands of Adam. And therefore both also came to creationism. For to that it was indeed necessary, both that all men were included in the covenant head Adam and that they at the same time themselves remained persons, individuals, men with independence and responsibility. Physical descent alone would have made that the sin, which we received from Adam, would be a fate, a natural process, an illness, which proceeds outside our will and thus outside our guilt. But that is not sin. And also the righteousness, which Christ, the last Adam, bestows upon us, does not bear that character. Both presuppose a federal relation of humanity to its heads. And thus now [571] creationism maintains that each man is an organic member of the great whole, and at the same time that he occupies in that great whole a place of his own, independent. It holds fast the unity of the whole human race and at the same time the independent significance of each individual. Men are not specimens, not numbers of a kind; they are also not individuals standing loosely next to one another like the angels. They are both together, parts of the whole and individuals, living stones of the building of God. Creationism preserves the organic, both physical and moral, unity of humanity and at the same time it respects the mystery of personality. Each man a member of the body of humanity and yet at the same time a thought of God of his own, with an eternal significance and an eternal destiny! Each man himself an image of God and yet that image unfolded in full only in the whole of humanity! By virtue of this unity, now indeed the whole of humanity fell in Adam, its progenitor and head; but this fall is nevertheless no fate, no natural process; on the

contrary it rests on a sovereign decree of God. And this decree, however sovereign, is nevertheless so little arbitrary, that it rather presupposes the physical connection of humanity, brings about and maintains its ethical unity, and can reveal and set in the light, in the most glorious manner, not only the strictness of God but also the riches of his grace. For when Adam falls, Christ stands ready to take his place. The covenant of grace can replace the covenant of works, because both rest on the same ordinances. If we could not be condemned in Adam, we would not be able to be acquitted in Christ. Thus, however the first man may choose, creation will not miss its destiny. The cosmogony in Genesis at once passes over into geogony and this into anthropogony. World, earth, humanity are one organic whole. They stand, they fall, they are raised up with one another. The *vestigia Dei* in creation and the *imago Dei* in man may be destroyed and mutilated by the sin of the first Adam; they come, through the last Adam and through his recreating grace, to an all the more glorious revelation. The *status integritatis*, through the fall or apart from the fall, prepares the *status gloriae*, in which God will lay his glory upon his creatures and will be all in all.

PROJECT GUTENBERG EDITOR'S REMARKS.

Every effort has been made to provide in this file a faithful reproduction of the original version. In the original, æ is rendered as ae, œ as oe; this spelling has been maintained here.

Here and there spacing or punctuation has been silently corrected. The numbers of paragraphs 27-33 have also been restored as indicated in footnote []. In chapter V, § 29 (The Creation) a paragraph 11 is missing in the original. The numbering is reproduced unchanged here.

Any possible typographical errors in the Greek have been reproduced unchanged. Clear typographical errors in the Hebrew have been corrected, and where necessary the diacritical marks have been silently improved or supplemented.

Overly obvious printing and spelling errors in the original have been corrected as follows.

Corrections.

Pag. 33: “mesnchen” replaced by “menschen” (All people cry out in spite of).

Pag. 44.: “Au” replaced by “An” (John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of religion).

Pag. 67: “schepter” replaced by “scepter” (his seat, throne, footstool, rod, scepter, weapons).

Pag. 71: “accomodeeren” replaced by “accommodeeren” (then He must descend to us, accommodate Himself).

Pag. 71: “anthopomorphisms” replace with “anthropomorphisms” (Who therefore contests the right of the anthropomorphisms).

Page 82: “sum” replaced by “zum” (Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre).

Page 85: “menseh” replaced by “mensch” (The relationship of God and man finds its image).

Pag. 93: replace “qnas” with “quas” (quia haec animarum sunt, quas illa lux perfundit).

Pag. 95: “heiligheid” replaced by “heiligheid” (In God, according to the essence, holiness and mercy may be the same).

Pag. 105: “האדון” replaced by “האדון” (alternating with האדון, which in turn is reinforced).

Pag. 107: “לְעֵלִים” replaced by “לְעֵלִים” (where one read לְעֵלִים, to conceal).

Pag. 107: “IIIIII” replaced by “IIIIII” (the four letters written as IIIII, or also according to Diodorus Siculus).

Pag. 110: “oorsponkelijk” replaced by “oorspronkelijk” (the name Ihvh originally, according to its derivation).

Pag. 110: “onstond” replaced by “ontstond” (Through shortening the form arose).

Pag. 116: “Dent.” replaced by “Deut.” (Ex. 23:17, Deut. 10:17, Jos. 3:13).

Pag. 141: replace “359” with “369” (Hoornbeek, Socin. conf. I p. 368-369).

Pag. 160: “quotve” replaced by “quot ue” (quot nascantur culices, quot ue moriantur).

Pag. 163: “condionata” replaced by “conditionata” (The knowledge of the futura conditionata therefore precedes).

Pag. 169: “Cristus” replaced by “Christus” (the foolishness of the cross, 1 Cor. 1:18, in Christ).

Pag. 177: “good” replaced by “good” (a good friend etc.).

Pag. 181: “אָרְךְ אַפִּים” replaced by “אָרְךְ אַפִּים” (long-suffering, רִוְיָהּ or אָרְךְ אַפִּים, μακροθυμία, ἀνοχῆ, χρηστότης).

Pag. 183: “אַהֲבָה” replaced by “אַהֲבָה” (The Hebr. אַהֲבָה is not rendered by ἔρω).

Pag. 185: “Relionsgesch.” replaced by “Religionsgesch.” (Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 333 f.).

Pag. 187: “there” replaced by “altar” (the tabernacle and the altar by anointing).

Pag. 204: replace “zich selbst” with “sich selbst” (die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu gebären).

Pag. 218: replace “condionata” with “conditionata” (and that in voluntas absoluta and conditionata).

Pag. 222: “הַגְּדוֹל” replaced by “הַגְּדוֹל” (Jes. 1:24, הָאֵל הַגְּדוֹל הַגִּבּוֹר, whose name is Ihvh Zebaoth).

Pag. 222: “סֵחַ” replaced by “כֹּחַ” (whose name is Ihvh Zebaoth, Jer. 32:18, אֶמְיץ כֹּחַ Job 9:4).

Pag. 235: “waar-whereby” replaced by “whereby” (the spoken word, whereby He creates all things).

Pag. 250: “schepter” replaced by “scepter” (reflection of God’s majesty, scepter of his majesty).

Pag. 261: “voooreerst” replaced by “vooreerst” (They appealed first of all to a series).

Pag. 262: “doordoor” replaced by “thereby” (He thereby of God as the unborn one).

Pag. 268: “also also” replaced by “also” (in order to represent the truth to some extent, even if imperfectly).

Pag. 271: “alleng” replaced by “allengs” (But allengs οὐσία was used in another sense).

Pag. 271: replace “Aristoleles” with “Aristoteles” (what Aristotle had called).

Pag. 275: “ontplooiing” replaced by “ontplooiing” (in humanity to its full unfolding).

Pag. 282: replace “vruchbaar” with “vruchtbaar” (the thought that God is fruitful).

Pag. 283: “de” replaced by “des” (And therefore He is not brought forth by the will of the Father).

Pag. 307: “de” replaced by “der” (for the doctrine der Trinity).

Pag. 322: “nitgegeven” replaced by “published” (and was published by the Jesuit Sirmond in 1643).

Pag. 326: replace “praedestinatia” with “praedestinatio” (that the entire praedestinatio is grace).

Pag. 341: “Salmur” replaced by “Saumur” (Synt. thesium in acad. Saumur).

Pag. 362: replace “iuftralapsarische” with “infralapsarische” (yet again proceed to the infralapsarian order).

Pag. 376: “natnur” replaced by “nature” (They fought with his nature).

Pag. 383: replace “menigmanl” with “menigmaal” (after all, Scripture also speaks “menigmaal”).

Pag. 383: “Christns” replaced by “Christus” (does the election of Christ logically precede ours).

Pag. 384: “Ezeeh” replaced by “Ezech” (Jer. 29:14, 51:45, Ezech. 11:17, Hos. 11:1).

Pag. 388: “materalistisch” replaced by “materialistic” (seeks either materialistically the origin of things).

Pag. 413: “volumtate” replaced by “voluntate” (sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit).

Pag. 415: replace “antonoom” with “autonomous” (made man autonomous and independent of God).

Pag. 418: “creatunr” replaced by “creature” (the final destination of all creature).

Pag. 423: “natunr” replaced by “nature” (for love and admiration of nature).

Pag. 429: “מלאן” replaced by “מלאך” (The Hebrew מלאך simply means messenger, envoy)

Pag. 443: “bleeds” replace with “bloods” (no community of blood).

Pag. 450: “spitsvoudige” replaced by “spitsvondige” (to all sorts of subtle questions).

Pag. 453: “שרת” replaced by “שרת” (Likewise the Hebrew שרת is rendered by both Greek words).

Pag. 458: “תהר נְבֹהוּ” replaced by תהו נְבֹהוּ (The earth is now indeed described to us as תהו נְבֹהוּ).

Pag. 458: “תְּהוֹם” replaced by “תְּהוֹם” (thereby explained, that he was a תְּהוֹם).

Pag. 460: “הִלָּחִים” replaced by “אֵלֵהִים” (this word proves that with רוּחַ אֵלֵהִים one does not mean the wind).

Pag. 479: replace “admit” with “admitted” (She has wholeheartedly admitted that the view).

Pag. 488: replace “personal men” with “personal names” (and personal names as folk names are meant).

Pag. 488: “see” replaced by “sees” (Therefore she refrains from every attempt).

Pag. 491: “Peutateuchs” replaced by “Pentateuchs” (Authentie des Pentateuchs I 306).

Pag. 494: “1S60” replaced by “1860” (Powell, Evidences of Christianity 1860).

Pag. 495: “phvsiologisch” replaced by “physiologically” (morphologically and physiologically diverge far too strongly).

Pag. 496: “onhouden” replaced by “onthouden” (to refrain from a judgment).

Pag. 504: “גֵּן” replaced by “גֵּן” (in which the court or garden, גֵּן, LXX παραδεισος, according to Spiegel).

Pag. 506: “Armonie” replaced by “Armenie” (much more northerly, namely high up in Armenie).

Pag. 508: “בְּדִמוֹת” replaced by “בְּהִמּוֹת” (that God created man בְּהִמּוֹת אֱלֹהִים, and בְּצִלְם אֱלֹהִים).

Pag. 516: replace “ze” with “zu” (ohne übernatürliche Hülfe zu leben vermochte).

Pag. 520: “natu-turalibus” replaced by “naturalibus” (man in puris naturalibus).

Pag. 522: “verkijgen” replaced by “verkrijgen” (only to be obtained in an ethical sense).

Pag. 562: “ge-created” replace with “created” (created out of one blood).

Pag. 570: “creatism” replaced by “creationism” (for covenant of works and creationism there is no place).

Expressions such as “afteleiden”, “toetelichten” etc. have been silently changed into “af te leiden”, “toe te lichten” etc.